Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term)
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BRIEFING
Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability
arrangements (9th parliamentary term)
State of play - April 2024
This document provides an overview of the public hearings of the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European
Central Bank in the ECON Committee during the 9th parliamentary term (since July 2019), and lists all research
papers requested by the ECON Committee, which are in general provided by a standing panel of banking experts.
The annex gives an overview of the respective legal bases for those hearings, which form part of the accountability
framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). For an overview of public hearings during the 8th
parliamentary term, please see here.
Overview of public hearings (since July 2019)
Transcript and/or video recording
Date EGOV Briefing
21 March 2024 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (multilingual)
7 November 2023 Briefing Video Recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
28 June 2023 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
21 March 2023 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
1 December 2022 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN /FR / DE)
30 June 2022 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
31 March 2022 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (not available)
14 October 2021 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
1 July 2021 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
23 March 2021 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
27 October 2020 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
5 May 2020 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (multilingual)
12 December 2019 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
4 September 2019 Briefing Video recording; Transcript (EN / FR / DE)
Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit (EGOV)
Author: Marcel MAGNUS, Kai SPITZER EN
Directorate-General for Internal Policies
PE 659.623 - April 2024IPOL | Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit
Overview of external expertise provided (since July 2019)
Date Subject Authors
Overly reliant on Central Bank funding? Consequences of exiting F. Heider, J. Schlegel
3/2024
TLTRO
Overly reliant on Central Bank funding? Consequences of exiting A. Resti
10/2023
TLTRO
6/2023 Digital euro’s legal framework A. Mooij
5/2023 A legal framework for the digital euro S. Grünewald
4/2023 Digital Euro: When in doubt, abstain (but be prepared) I. Angeloni
C. Hofmann
4/2023 Digital Euro: An assessment of the first two progress reports C. Monnet
A. Niepelt
Macro-prudential Policy beyond Banking. The Case of Borrower- H. Huizinga
4/2023
Based Measures
4/2023 On the need to expand macro-prudential policies to non-banks J. De Haan
Monitoring Complex Financial Instruments in Banks’ Balance J. Bischof, R. Haselmann, and T. H.
11/2022
Sheets Tröger
Evolving key risks in the banking sector and related priorities for A. Resti
11/2022
the SSM
Geopolitical risks and banking sector vulnerabilities: implications A. Lehmann
11/2022
for the SSM
Evolving key risks in the banking sector and related priorities for T. Beck, B. Bruno, and E. Carletti
11/2022
the SSM
Assessment of the current accountability framework with the A. Akbik
7/2022
SSM
6/2022 Financial institutions' exposures to fossil fuel assets W. Beyene, M. Delis, S. Ongena
The ECB’s close cooperation on supervising banks in Bulgaria and T. Beck, B. Bruno
3/2022
Croatia Z. Darvas, C. Martins
Did the pandemic lead to structural changes in the banking A. Resti
10/2021
sector? R. Christie, M. Grzegorczyk
Main differences between the practice of supervising large banks R. Haselmann, T. Tröger
7/2021 in the UK and in the euro area, and main risks of regulatory
divergence
UK banks in international markets - Implications of UK-euro area A. Lehmann
6/2021
divergence in regulation and supervisory practice
Digital transformation - why do some significant banks fall A. C. Bertay, H. Huizinga
6/2021
behind?
6/2021 Low IT spending by banks: Reason for concern? J. De Haan
Non-performing Loans - New risks and policies? NPL resolution A. C. Bertay, H. Huizinga
3/2021
after COVID-19: Main differences to previous crises J. Haynes, P. Hope, H. Talbot
K. Langenbucher, C. Leuz, J.P.
Krahnen, L.Pelizzon
B. Garcia Osma, A. Gisbert, B.
10/2020 What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?
Navallas
G. Barba Navaretti, G. Calzolari, A.
F. Pozzolo
Has the relaxation of capital and liquidity buffers worked in A. Matyunina & S. Ongena
10/2020
practice? J. Abad & R. Repullo
A. Bertray & H. Huizinga
What are the main factors for the subdued profitability of A. Resti
12/2019 significant banks in the Banking Union and is the ECB’s B. Bruno & E. Carletti
supervisory response conclusive and exhaustive? T. Farina, J.P. Krahnen, L.Pelizzon
& M. Wahrenburg
2 PE 659.623Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability arrangements (9th legislative term)
ANNEX: Accountability arrangements regarding the SSM
Accountability provisions
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the system of banking supervision for Europe, which aims to
ensure the safety and soundness of the European banking system, increase financial integration and stability,
and ensure consistent supervision.
In that context, the ECB was given a central role for the supervision of euro area banks, on the one hand
directly supervising the most important banking groups, on the other hand, as regards the supervision of less
significant banks, of coordinating and cooperating with national supervisors and ensuring consistent
supervision.
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 sets out the specific supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB and the
accountability arrangements between the ECB and the European Parliament (EP) (see below for relevant
excerpts). The ECB is also accountable to the Council (having concluded a memorandum of understanding)
and to national parliaments. The practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and
oversight over the ECB’s performance are set out in more detail in an Interinstitutional Agreement between
the EP and the ECB (see below for relevant excerpts).
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, Article 20 on Accountability and reporting:
1. The ECB shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for the implementation of
this Regulation, in accordance with this Chapter.
2. The ECB shall submit on an annual basis to the European Parliament, to the Council, to the Commission
and to the euro Group a report on the execution of the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, including
information on the envisaged evolution of the structure and amount of the supervisory fees mentioned
in Article 30.
3. The Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall present that report in public to the European
Parliament, and to the euro Group in the presence of representatives from any participating Member
State whose currency is not the euro. [...]
5. At the request of the European Parliament, the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall participate
in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the competent committees of the European
Parliament.
6. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament, or by the euro
Group in accordance with the its own procedures and in the presence of representatives from any
participating Member States whose currency is not the euro. [...]
8. Upon request the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall hold confidential oral discussions
behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European
Parliament concerning its supervisory tasks where such discussions are required for the exercise of the
European Parliament’s powers under the TFEU. An agreement shall be concluded between the European
Parliament and the ECB on the detailed arrangements for organising such discussions, with a view to
ensuring full confidentiality in accordance with the confidentiality obligations imposed on the ECB as a
competent authority under relevant Union law.
9. The ECB shall cooperate sincerely with any investigations by the European Parliament, subject to the
TFEU. The ECB and the European Parliament shall conclude appropriate arrangements on the practical
modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks
conferred on the ECB by this Regulation. Those arrangements shall cover, inter alia, access to information,
cooperation in investigations and information on the selection procedure of the Chair of the Supervisory
Board.
PE 659.623 3IPOL | Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit
Interinstitutional Agreement between the EP and the ECB
Part I.1: Reports
The ECB shall submit every year a report to Parliament (‘Annual Report’) on the execution of the tasks
conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. The Chair of the Supervisory Board shall present the
Annual Report to Parliament at a public hearing. [...] The Annual Report shall cover, inter alia:
i. execution of supervisory tasks,
ii. sharing of tasks with the national supervisory authorities,
iii. cooperation with other national or Union relevant authorities,
iv. separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks,
v. evolution of supervisory structure and staffing, including the number and the national composition of
Seconded National Experts,
vi. implementation of the Code of Conduct,
vii. method of calculation and amount of supervisory fees,
viii. budget for supervisory tasks, ix. experience with reporting on the basis of Article 23 of Regulation
(EU) No 1024/2013 (Reporting of violations) [...].
Part I.2: Hearings and confidential oral discussions
The Chair of the Supervisory Board shall participate in ordinary public hearings on the execution of the
supervisory tasks on request of Parliament’s competent committee. Parliament’s competent committee and
the ECB shall agree on a calendar for two such hearings to be held in the course of the following year. [...]
In addition, the Chair of the Supervisory Board may be invited to additional ad hoc exchanges of views on
supervisory issues with Parliament’s competent committee.
Where necessary for the exercise of Parliament’s powers under the TFEU and Union law, the Chair of its
competent committee may request special confidential meetings with the Chair of the Supervisory Board in
writing, giving reasons. . [...]
All participants in the special confidential meetings shall be subject to confidentiality requirements equivalent
to those applying to the members of the Supervisory Board and to the ECB’s supervisory staff. [...]
The principle of openness of Union institutions in accordance with the TFEU shall apply to the SSM. The
discussion in special confidential meetings shall follow the principle of openness and elaboration around the
relevant circumstances. [...]
The ordinary hearings, ad hoc exchanges of views and the confidential meetings can cover all aspects of the
activity and functioning of the SSM covered by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
No minutes or any other recording of the confidential meetings shall be taken. No statement shall be made
for the press or any other media. [...]
Part I.3: Responding to questions
The ECB shall reply in writing to written questions put to it by Parliament. [...] Questions shall be replied as
promptly as possible, and in any event within five weeks of their transmission to the ECB.
Both the ECB and Parliament shall dedicate a specific section of the websites for the questions and answers
referred to above.
Part I.4 4.: Access to information
The ECB shall provide Parliament’s competent committee at least with a comprehensive and meaningful
record of the proceedings of the Supervisory Board that enables an understanding of the discussions,
including an annotated list of decisions. [...]
In the event of the winding-up of a credit institution, non-confidential information relating to that credit
institution shall be disclosed ex post, once any restrictions on the provision of relevant information resulting
from confidentiality requirements have ceased to apply. [...]
The ECB shall publish on its website a guide to its supervisory practices.
4 PE 659.623Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability arrangements (9th legislative term)
Appointment procedures
The EP’s strong governance role in the overall organisational design of the SSM is furthermore underlined by
the fact that the candidate proposed by the ECB for the position of Chair of the Supervisory Board has to be
approved by the EP according to Art. 26 (3) of the Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (see excerpts below). In that
context, the Interinstitutional Agreement between the EP and the ECB sets out more details of the
appointment procedure.
In the past, the EP has inter alia taken the following actions in that respect:
20/09/2023: EP vote on the appointment of Ms Buch as Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board
29/11/2018: EP vote on the appointment of Mr Enria as Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board
11/12/2013: EP plenary vote on the approval of Ms Nouy as Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board
Interinstitutional Agreement between the EP and the ECB Part 2: Selection Procedures
[...] Parliament’s competent committee shall be informed two weeks before the ECB’s Governing Council
publishes the vacancy notice of the details [for the Chair], including the selection criteria and the specific job
profile, of the ‘open selection procedure’ that it intends to apply for the selection of the Chair.
Parliament’s competent committee shall be informed by the ECB’s Governing Council of the composition of
the pool of applicants for the position of Chair (number of applications, mix of professional skills, gender and
nationality balance, etc.) as well as of the method through which the pool of applicants is screened in order
to draw up a shortlist of at least two candidates and eventually to determine the proposal by the ECB.
The ECB shall provide Parliament’s competent committee with the shortlist of candidates for the position of
the Chair of the Supervisory Board. The ECB shall provide that shortlist at least three weeks before submitting
its proposal for the appointment of the Chair.
Parliament’s competent committee may submit questions to the ECB relating to the selection criteria and the
shortlist of candidates within a week from receiving it. The ECB shall respond to such questions in writing
within two weeks.
The approval process shall comprise the following steps:
- The ECB shall convey its proposals for the Chair and the Vice-Chair to Parliament together with written
explanations of the underlying reasons.
- A public hearing of the proposed Chair and Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board shall be held in
Parliament’s competent committee.
- Parliament shall decide on the approval of the candidate proposed by the ECB for Chair and Vice Chair
through a vote in the competent committee and in plenary. Parliament will normally, taking into
account its calendar, aim at taking that decision within six weeks of the proposal [...].
Disclaimer and copyright. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised,
provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. © European Union, 2024.
Contact: egov@ep.europa.eu
This document is available on the internet at: www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses
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