"Russophobia kernel": an analysis of RT's strategic narratives of Lithuania - Milvydas Knyzelis - DIVA
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“Russophobia kernel”:
an analysis of RT’s strategic narratives
of Lithuania
Milvydas Knyzelis
Media and Communication Studies: Culture, Collaborative Media, and Creative Industries
One-year master
15 credits
2021
Supervisor: Tina AskaniusKnyzelis 2
Abstract
This research aims to explore the dissemination of strategic narratives around
Lithuania through the set of news articles of the Russian state-funded media agency RT. As
an international media platform, RT has been previously identified by scholars as an
important structural element of Russian information warfare strategy. To identify the
strategic narratives, this research follows the procedures of thematic analysis informed by the
strategic narrative framework. The findings of this study indicate that RT, through the
strategic narratives of Lithuania, seeks to criticize Western leadership and indirectly promote
a positive image of Russia as an alternative to the West. While at the national level, the goals
of RT’s strategic narratives on Lithuania include creating an image that Lithuanian
governmental institutions are broken; showing the Lithuanian government as incompetent,
and associating it with a fascist regime; presenting Lithuania not only as Russophobic but as
a failing state as well. Further research could contribute to elaborating the strategical
framework of the Russian information warfare effort in the post-Soviet countries.
Keywords: information warfare, Russia, Lithuania, RT, strategic narrative, propagandaKnyzelis 3
Table of contents
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Table of contents ....................................................................................................................... 3
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
II. Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 8
Russian Propaganda in the Post-Soviet Countries ........................................................... 8
Russian Propaganda in the Baltic states ............................................................................ 8
Russophobia ......................................................................................................................... 9
RT As an Organization...................................................................................................... 10
RT’s Audience .................................................................................................................... 11
RT Broadcasting Strategies .............................................................................................. 12
Public Diplomacy vs. Propaganda.................................................................................... 13
RT as Public Diplomacy Tool ........................................................................................... 13
III. Theoretical Framework.................................................................................................... 16
Key Concepts and Perspectives ........................................................................................ 16
IV. Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 19
Choice of Method ............................................................................................................... 19
Data Collection and Sampling .......................................................................................... 20
Coding and Data Analysis ................................................................................................. 21
Reliability and Validity ..................................................................................................... 22
Ethics ................................................................................................................................... 22
V. Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 24
Setting ................................................................................................................................. 24
Actors .................................................................................................................................. 26
Conflict ................................................................................................................................ 28
Resolution ........................................................................................................................... 30
Key themes in RTs strategic narratives of Lithuania ..................................................... 32
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 35
VII. References........................................................................................................................ 37
VII. Appendix .......................................................................................................................... 44Knyzelis 4
I. Introduction
As it was pointed out by Arquila and Ronfeldt back in 1999, contrary to the
traditional battles that are centered on whose military wins, battles in “an information age
may ultimately be about whose story wins” (as cited in Nye, 2008, p. 100). As we can see
today, governments worldwide are actively engaging in the process of shaping their images
and promoting their views through strategically selected media narratives. Iran, for example,
runs a network of 70 websites spreading the stories favoring the Iranian regime in 15
countries (Bing & Stubbs, 2018). China too is acquiring media outlets worldwide and hiring
journalists to “tell the China’s story well” (Lim & Bergin, 2018 par. 1).
Even though there are multiple players in the global information warfare arena,
Russia is a country that can be distinguished as the elite. It can also be singled out from other
countries with similar strategies for engaging in global information warfare campaigns, in
that Russia focuses much of its effort on the neighboring countries – the so-called “near-
abroad” or the former Soviet states region (Saari, 2014). Therefore, at the broader level, this
thesis aims to identify and analyze information warfare campaigns on the post-Soviet country
Lithuania, as this unfolds on the online news platform rt.com. This chapter will provide an
introduction to this research by first outlining the context and the background, followed by
research aims, research questions, the significance, and finally the limitations of this study.
Although a relatively new concept in public discourse, the term information warfare
received increasing public attention and has been more commonly used after the Russian
annexation of the Crimea region in 2014 (Szostek, 2018). Coming from the military context,
information warfare is often defined in terms of “the utilization of information technology
and communication channels to reach specific objectives” (Männistö, 2017 par. 9). Thus,
information warfare often includes the spreading of propaganda, rumors, and disinformation,
through traditional and digital media, to manipulate the nation’s citizens (Damjanovic, 2017).
One of the latest prominent Russian information warfare cases was the previously mentioned
illegal annexation of the Crimea region in Ukraine (Szostek, 2018). Through the means of
trolls, bots, fake news, and coordinated social media and traditional media campaigns, Russia
turned Ukraine into an “active propaganda battleground” (Helmus et al., 2018, p. ix). Where
media was used to promote the Russian version of the events for both the Ukrainian and
international community (Szostek, 2018).
One of the important pillars in this Russian information warfare campaign was the RT
(Russia Today) news agency. Established in 2005, RT is an international media agencyKnyzelis 5
available in hundred different countries, with headquarters in Moscow, Washington, London,
Paris. Although RT also provides content in the Russian language, the primary language is
English, and the official slogan of an agency is “Question more”. Another critical aspect, that
even though RT advertises as a non-profit organization, the funding for the network comes
from the Russian government (RT International, n.d.). The channel has already been accused
in multiple instances of spreading disinformation and fake news (Bicknell, 2005; Elswah &
Howard, 2020; LoGiurato, 2014). It has also been investigated by academic researchers as a
propaganda mechanism (Carter & Carter, 2021; Yablokov, 2015). Even though the focus of
the channel is international news, RT often reports on its near-abroad region, including the
Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
It is worth highlighting that Russia and Lithuania have an intertwined historical past.
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, once the largest state in entire Europe fell under the control
of the Russian empire in the late 18th century. Following the Bolshevik revolution in Russia,
after more than a hundred years of occupation, Lithuania declared its independence in 1918.
However, the existence of a new country did not last long. In the midst of World War II, in
June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania as well as other Baltic states. Although there
was a short three-year gap, when Lithuania was under the military occupation of Nazi
Germany, Lithuania remained part of the Soviet Union from 1940 until 1991. During the time
of occupation Lithuanians consistently resisted the repressions of the communist regime.
Throughout the years of 1944-1953, the movement of Lithuanian freedom fighters was
actively participating in a guerilla war against the Soviet Union. The guerilla war was
suppressed by executing or deporting tens of thousands of people that were suspected of
collaborating with the Lithuanian freedom fighters to Siberia. As a way of actively resisting
the repressions, in the late 1980s following the Glasnost period in the Soviet Union,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia organized the Singing Revolution. The massive protests
against the Soviet Union occupation reached their peak in 1989 when The Baltic way – a
human chain connecting capitals of all three Baltic states was organized. Following these
events in 1990, Lithuania announced the reestablishment of the independent state, being the
first state to break out from the Soviet Union. Later the same year Latvia and Estonia
declared their independence as well, which eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Even though other post-Soviet states have kept close ties with Russia, the Baltic states
decided to shift their focus to the West by becoming members of the European Union and
NATO in 2004.Knyzelis 6
Although all three Baltic countries turned towards Western democracy, Russian
influence continues to be an issue in the Baltic region. There have been multiple cases
already when the Russian propaganda apparatus has been responsible for interference in the
internal affairs of the Baltic countries (Andriukaitis, 2020; Meidutė, 2019). In varying forms
and shapes Russian propaganda is being disseminated through many different channels,
including Russian television channels such as RT or Russia-24, media outlets, the most
prominent being Sputnik News, or social media campaigns (Andriukaitis, 2020;
Maliukevičius, 2015). Accordingly, the popularity of the Russian language in the region,
positive imagery of Soviet symbolism, and the nostalgia for the Soviet past ensure the
sufficient public receptivity of Russian propaganda campaigns (Denisenko, 2017;
Maliukevičius, 2015).
As a result, Russian information warfare campaigns is a well-researched topic by both
Lithuanian and international scholars. Numerous studies have analyzed strategies,
approaches, channels, and effectiveness of the Russian propaganda machine. At the same
time, RT, as an important pillar of the structure was investigated through the angles of its
broadcasting philosophy (Miazhevich, 2018); organizational behavior (Elswah & Howard,
2020); distribution of conspiracy theories (Yablokov, 2015); YouTube channel viewership
(Orttung & Nelson, 2019); Twitter followers (Crilley et al., 2020); influence to the Western
audience (Carter & Carter, 2021; Feklyunina, 2008); or ties to the Russian government
(Pomerantsev, 2015). Thus, traditionally these studies considered RT as a tool for Russia to
project its positive image in the West. However, this body of research often overlooked the
fact that RT can be used to shape the image of other countries as well. As a result, the
existing research on the representation of post-Soviet countries through rt.com is inadequate,
as it assumes Russian-Western relation as the main and in many cases the only focus.
Given the lack of research regarding the representation of post-Soviet countries
through RT online news platform, this study will identify and analyze the strategic narratives
that are used to represent a post-Soviet country – Lithuania on rt.com. Thus, my research
questions are as follows:
1) What strategic narratives are used in RT’s framing of Lithuania?
2) How can we understand these narratives as part of a broader information warfare
campaign and public diplomacy effort on the part of Russia?
This research will contribute to the body of empirical knowledge on Russia’s ongoing
information warfare efforts by investigating RT’s strategic narratives in the context of a post-
Soviet country. This will help to address the shortage of research in this area and provideKnyzelis 7
valuable insights to the institutions tackling the threat of Russian information warfare
campaigns. However, this research has certain limitations. It is worth mentioning, that data
for this research was only accessible from January 2017 and onwards. In this way, it was not
possible to analyze strategic narratives disseminated over an extended period of time. Also,
being a single case study, this thesis can only perceive the limited scope of tactics involved in
the broader Russian information warfare strategy.
The thesis is structured as follows. In this first chapter, the background of this
research has been introduced along with a presentation of the research questions and the
value of this study. In chapter two, the existing body of research will be reviewed
highlighting the Russian propaganda efforts in the post-Soviet countries and the significance
of RT as an important element of Russian information warfare strategy. In chapter three the
theoretical framework of this study will be presented, covering the key concepts and
perspectives. In chapter four, the choice of qualitative approach will be justified and the
methodological framework will be discussed, including the reliability, validity, and ethics of
this study. In chapter five, the primary components of strategic narratives will be discussed
and the key themes will be identified. In the final chapter, the overall study will be
summarized. Also, the implications of the findings together with suggestions for future work
will be presented and the limitations of the study will be discussed.Knyzelis 8
II. Literature Review
Up until now, a substantial amount of research has been done on the Russian
propaganda and information warfare campaigns as well as on the media agency RT. Even
though the scholarly literature covers a wide variety of contexts for Russian propaganda, this
literature review will focus on a specific set of topics closely related to the research problem
and the empirical focus of the thesis. Therefore, this chapter will further investigate the topics
of Russian propaganda in the post-soviet countries and the Baltic states; the concepts of
Russophobia and public diplomacy; RT’s organizational behavior, its audience, broadcasting
strategies, and its role in the Russian information warfare campaigns.
Russian Propaganda in the Post-Soviet Countries
Russian propaganda in the post-Soviet countries has been intensively researched by
academics from post-Soviet countries and international scholars as well. The post-Soviet area
or the so-called “near-abroad” region is a term often appearing in Russian foreign policy
(Maliukevičius, 2015). Even though Russia engages in the global information warfare
campaigns, the Kremlin’s engagement in the former Soviet states is stronger than in other
foreign countries (Pomerantsev, 2015; Saari, 2014). As a result, Russia has been criticized by
the West for having neo-imperial ambitions in the near-abroad region (Feklyunina, 2008).
Despite the criticism, cases in Belarus, Georgia or Ukraine, indicate the tendency of Russian
interference in the domestic affairs of post-Soviet countries (Helmus et al., 2018;
Pomerantsev, 2015; Szostek, 2015, 2018). Scholars have identified a range of objectives of
the Russian propaganda mechanism in the post-Soviet area as well as in the global arena
including sowing fear and confusion within society (Helmus et al., 2018); portraying the
West as an enemy (Maliukevičius, 2015); inducing a positive image of Russia (Feklyunina,
2008); decreasing trust in democratic institutions (Orttung & Nelson, 2019). Although
highlighting different aspects, scholars seem to agree that the scale of Russian information
warfare in the post-Soviet region is alarming.
Russian Propaganda in the Baltic states
Since the interest of this thesis is the news coverage of Lithuania in Russian media, it
is essential to analyze Russian propaganda in the regional context more deeply. Interestingly,
in Russian foreign policy, the Baltic states are usually treated as one entity. Thus, the Russian
propaganda trends identified in one of the three Baltic states typically apply to all of themKnyzelis 9
(Helmus et al., 2018; Maliukevičius, 2015). In this way, Denisenko (2017) presents five
narratives commonly used in Russian media when representing the Baltic states: 1) Baltic
states are unfriendly because they seek to move away from Russia. 2) Baltic states are
Russophobic and seek to restrict the rights of Russian-speaking citizens living within the
Baltic countries. 3) Governments of Baltic states are malfunctioning and leaning towards
authoritarianism. 4) The existence of fascism and Nazism is widespread throughout the Baltic
countries. 5) Baltic countries are failing states (pp. 109-111). From such narratives, it is
evident that the primary goal of Russian propaganda within the Baltic region is political
destabilization, which aligns with the overall goals of Russian propaganda identified by
previous scholars (Feklyunina, 2008; Helmus et al., 2018; Maliukevičius, 2015; Orttung &
Nelson, 2019).
Russophobia
The previous discussion about Russian propaganda ties together with another topic of
relevance to this thesis project – Russophobia. Dapkus (2021) argues that the accusation of
Russophobia is a convenient weapon in Kremlin’s information warfare. As defined by
Merriam-Webster dictionary, Russophobia is “fear or dislike of Russia or Russian policy”.
Although introduced to the political discourse back in the middle of the nineteenth century,
the term Russophobia became widely used during Stalin’s regime in the middle of the
twentieth century and echoes in the contemporary discourse as well (Darczewska &
Żochowski, 2015). The Russian government often employs Russophobia as a strategic
narrative to discredit Kremlin’s opponents (Dapkus, 2021; Darczewska & Żochowski, 2015;
Hellman & Wagnsson, 2017). Throughout history, the accusations of being Russophobic
were used to justify disciplinary actions against rebellious people within the Russian state and
to condemn the enlargement of international actors, like NATO or EU (Darczewska &
Żochowski, 2015). Feklyunina's (2012) discourse analysis of official statements of Russian
leaders throughout the years suggests that usage of Russophobia as a way of critiquing the
West has varied dramatically based on global events and the political climate. After the 9/11
terrorist attacks, Russian officials seemed to be “softer” in their statements. However, it
slowly got worse with the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Belarusian protests in 2020, and it now
appears to be reaching a peak with the EU and Russia threatening each other to completely
cut the ties with each other (Feklyunina, 2012; Ivanova & Balmforth, 2021). More
importantly for this research, Russian media often employs “the Russophobia card” when
commenting on post-Soviet countries (Denisenko, 2017). At the same time, Russian officialsKnyzelis 10
keep claiming that the Baltic States is a “Russophobia kernel” and portraying Lithuania as the
most Russophobic country within the Baltics (Kelly, 2016; Lithuania Tribune, 2016; The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2021).
After establishing the necessary regional and political context in which this thesis
operates, it is also essential to pay attention to the empirical focus of the research – the media
agency RT. Therefore, the second part of the literature review focuses on what previous
research tells us about RT as an organization, its audience, broadcasting strategies, and its
functions as a public diplomacy tool.
RT As an Organization
The launch of the RT channel in 2005 was closely related to the strategic objectives of
the Russian government. It was argued that back in the 1990s, the Russian economy lacked
foreign investments because of the negative image that Russia had in the West (Feklyunina,
2008). Therefore, Putin’s administration suggested a strategy for building a positive Russian
image internationally. The establishment of RT was just one of the tools that the Kremlin
used to project positive images of Russia in the West (Feklyunina, 2008). This view is
supported by Yablokov (2015), who writes that the initial goal of RT was a promotion of
Russian culture. Only later, starting with the Russian and Georgian diplomatic crisis in 2008,
the RT channel was used as a weapon in information warfare (Miazhevich, 2018). As later
research suggests, RT became a tool to spread alternative narratives that match the objectives
of the Russian government (Helmus et al., 2018; Pomerantsev, 2015). Elswah & Howard
(2020) also suggest that the decision in 2009 to change the name of the channel from Russia
Today to RT was highly influenced by the ideological shift in purpose: from merely
promoting Russian culture to actively spreading a disguised Russian narrative in the
international context. A similar view is presented by other researchers as well (Miazhevich,
2018; Orttung & Nelson, 2019; Yablokov, 2015), suggesting that the purpose of rebranding
Russia Today to RT was to make ties to the Russian government less explicit. Either way, as
argued by Elswah and Howard (2020), being a richly state-funded news agency, RT can be
considered as one of the elite players in the world of global disinformation.
Some scholars argue that the current organizational model of RT is closely related to
the model of media organizations during the Soviet era (Oates, 2007; Yablokov, 2015). First
of all, it must be acknowledged that there is very little research that can be found on RT’s
organizational behavior. One of the reasons for this is the nondisclosure agreements that
prevent RT’s journalists from speaking up (Elswah & Howard, 2020). In addition toKnyzelis 11
restricting journalists from speaking with media or researchers, RT’s organizational
philosophy also imposes self-censorship for journalists (Elswah & Howard, 2020). Self-
censorship is one of the main defining elements of the Soviet media model. However,
contrary to the Soviet times, at RT it is not imposed by a fear of being punished, but rather by
a fear of losing perks that the channel provides (Oates, 2007). Another point that connects
RT’s organizational model to the Soviet media model is government interference. During the
Soviet era, the appointment of media editors was based on loyalty to the Communist party. At
the same time, the stories published by the media were supposed to reflect the position of a
party. Similarly to the Soviet model, as revealed from interviews with former journalists, the
Russian government controls RT operations by appointing high-rank managers, imposing
narratives, and enforcing the removal of stories that do not match the position of the
government (Elswah & Howard, 2020). To summarize, although the RT media model to
some extent matches with the Soviet model, it is not as forced and not as autocratic.
Therefore, according to Oates (2007), the current organizational model of RT can be
considered as neo-Soviet.
RT’s Audience
Information about RT’s audience seems to be controversial. RT itself advertises
having over 100 million weekly viewers in 47 countries (RT International, n.d.). In terms of
website traffic, they state that according to SimilarWeb, RT is “the top non-Anglo-Saxon TV
news network in terms of traffic” (RT International, n.d. par. 9). However, a quick fact check
shows that in the category of “News and Media”, RT is only in 126th place worldwide,
besides non-Anglo-Saxon news portals like wp.pl (Poland), uol.com.br (Brazil), sohu.com
(China) seem to be overperforming RT in this ranking (SimilarWeb, 2021). Such ambiguity
should not be surprising since researchers previously discovered that RT’s claims of
popularity lack verifiable information (Miazhevich, 2018; Zavadski, 2015). Nevertheless,
with over 4 million YouTube subscribers, almost 3 million followers on Twitter, and close to
7 million followers on Facebook currently, RT’s online reach is still widespread.
Data on audience engagement and their political stance seem to vary as well. Orttung
& Nelson's (2019) analysis of RT’s YouTube channel viewership suggests that the audience
of RT is actively engaging in liking, sharing, and commenting on their YouTube videos. The
findings of Crilley et al. (2020) study on RT’s Twitter followers suggest that most followers
only rarely actively engage with RT’s Twitter channel content. Also, the RT Twitter audience
is more likely to be bots compared to an average Twitter audience (Crilley et al., 2020).Knyzelis 12
Turning now to the political worldview of the audience, journalistic discourse persistently
claim that RT has a “disillusioned western audience” (Turner, 2016 par. 2), that “wants to
believe that human rights are a sham and democracy a fix” (Cohen, 2014 par. 9). Some
scholars seem to agree with these claims that RT’s audience tends to believe that their
domestic media consistently reports news inaccurately (Orttung & Nelson, 2019;
Pomerantsev, 2015; Yablokov, 2015). At the same time, Feklyunina (2008) is less radical and
suggests that RT’s audience believes that western media use double standards when reporting
on Russia. On the other hand, Crilley et al. (2020) advocate that extreme attitudes belong to
the “very small but vocal minority” and it does not represent the RT audience as a whole
(p. 19). Such deviating findings could indicate that members of the RT audience are
diversified not only in their political views but also in their engagement levels.
RT Broadcasting Strategies
As previously mentioned, RT’s internal organizational behavior remains hidden from
researchers. The research by Elswah & Howard (2020) is probably the only study involving
interviews with former journalists of RT media organization. Therefore, interviews with RT’s
former journalists revealed that the main strategical objectives of RT are the following: (1) to
drive the idea, that life in the Western countries is as bad (or even worse) as in Russia; (2) to
discredit and compromise Western media by pushing conspiracy theories (3) to spread
controversy and encourage people to criticize the channel, as this would make the channel
look important (Elswah & Howard, 2020, p. 650). Similarly to Elswah & Howard’s findings,
other scholars identify analogous strategies: promoting a positive image of Russia compared
to the West (Feklyunina, 2008); Undermining Western democracies (Orttung & Nelson,
2019); covering controversial stories (Yablokov, 2015); sowing confusion and reducing trust
in media (Helmus et al., 2018); spreading false narratives (Pomerantsev, 2015). It is also
worth mentioning that RT’s slogan “Question more” is clearly supporting the strategic
choices of the channel. This slogan not only encourages audience members to seek
alternative truth but also builds on the belief that “Anglo-Saxon media never tell the truth”
(Yablokov, 2015, p. 305). In the same way opposition with the West and framing West as a
villain is a theme that appears not only in the RT’s broadcasting strategies but in the Russian
government’s position as well (Miazhevich, 2018). Therefore, building on this idea, the
subsequent section of the literature review focuses on how the RT channel is employed by the
Russian government as a tool of public diplomacy.Knyzelis 13
Public Diplomacy vs. Propaganda
Before investigating how the Russian government is using RT as a public diplomacy
tool, it is necessary to establish the context of the term public diplomacy. Debates in the
academic discourse indicate that public diplomacy measures are growing in importance in
this global world. The term public diplomacy is defined in the following manner:
Public diplomacy…deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and
execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations
beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in
other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with
another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication
between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents;
and the process of intercultural communications. (Edmund Gullion 1965 cited in Cull,
2006, par. 2).
There seems to be an agreement between scholars that through the means of public
diplomacy country gains diplomatic, economic, and symbolic advantages (Feklyunina, 2008;
Miazhevich, 2018; Yablokov, 2015). However, the latest scholarship surrounding the
phenomenon of public diplomacy of Russia varies in the ways of defining it. While Saari
(2014) explicitly talks about public diplomacy, Miazhevich (2018) more often employs the
term nation branding, Pomerantsev (2015), on the other hand, refers to the same actions as
propaganda. As argued by Feklyunina (2008) and Yablokov (2015), the common narrative
seems to be to use the terms public diplomacy, branding, and propaganda interchangeably.
Even though, for many, the term propaganda associates with monochrome Bolshevik and
Nazi imagery, as argued by O’Shaughnessy (2004), “propaganda is not synonymous with
mere overt polemicism, but informs many cultural products, including such apparently
politically neutral areas as entertainment and documentaries” (pp. 1–2). This thesis comes
from the same perspective as Feklyunina (2008) and Yablokov (2015) and therefore when
referring to the government’s strategic international communication through the state-
sponsored media the terms public diplomacy and propaganda are employed interchangeably.
RT as Public Diplomacy Tool
As indicated by previous research, the Russian propaganda machine operates in a few
distinct realms (Miazhevich, 2018; Orttung & Nelson, 2019; Saari, 2014; Szostek, 2018). On
the one side of the line, we have domestic and international propaganda (Pomerantsev, 2015).Knyzelis 14
One of the trends in domestic propaganda strategy, as argued by Samadashvili (2015), is
focused on indoctrinating Russian society by manipulating information and portraying the
West as an enemy. Since the focus of this thesis is international propaganda measures, the
more detailed analysis of domestic Russian propaganda is willingly left for other researchers.
Nevertheless, in the international diplomatic arena, Russia’s propaganda efforts are split
between a broader general context and the realm of post-Soviet states (Saari, 2014). The
overall focus of the international domain is to promote a positive image of Russia
(Miazhevich, 2018). Besides, the trend of portraying the West as a global villain to
undermine Western democracy is not only used in domestic propaganda but is visible in the
international context as well (Orttung & Nelson, 2019). In addition to the domestic and
international propaganda efforts, Saari (2014) identifies the realms of general and post-Soviet
propaganda. An important fact for this research, that Russian public diplomacy engagement
in post-Soviet countries is much stronger than in other foreign countries (Saari, 2014).
Therefore, as previously established, the Russian influence in the post-Soviet region and its
neo-imperial ambitions have been criticized in the West (Feklyunina, 2008).
It is then interesting to look at the role of RT as a tool of propaganda in this
intertwined context. The explicit connection between the RT channel and the Russian
government position has been well documented in previous research (Elswah & Howard,
2020; Miazhevich, 2018; Orttung & Nelson, 2019; Yablokov, 2015). Since English is the
primary language of RT, the channel operates mainly in the international context rather than
the domestic one (Carter & Carter, 2021; Feklyunina, 2008). Besides, with the headquarters
in Moscow, Washington, London, and Paris, the RT arguably focuses more on the Western
world and also where an anti-Western message may have an impact rather than focusing on
Russia’s “near-abroad” – the post-Soviet states (Orttung & Nelson, 2019; Saari, 2014). Even
though its focus is different, RT still provides comprehensive coverage on the affairs of post-
Soviet states (Szostek, 2018). However, the representation of post-Soviet states on the RT
news platform has been overlooked by previous studies.
The purpose of this literature review was to discuss and synthesize the general
patterns of findings in the scholarly literature on Russian information warfare and RT media
agency. It is clear from the research reviewed that the overall goals of Russian information
warfare campaigns focus on sowing fear and confusion within society, diminishing trust in
media and democratic institutions, while at the same time criticizing West leadership and
inducing the positive image of Russia (Feklyunina, 2012; Helmus et al., 2018; Maliukevičius,Knyzelis 15 2015; Orttung & Nelson, 2019). Also, researchers highlight that the Russian information warfare efforts are increased in the post-Soviet states, compared to the international level (Pomerantsev, 2015; Saari, 2014). Also, studies show that the receptivity of Russian propaganda efforts in its near-abroad region is considerable because of the popularity of the Russian language, positive imagery towards Soviet symbolic, and the nostalgic longing for the Soviet past (Denisenko, 2017; Maliukevičius, 2015). Along with this, it is also clear that the RT media agency is an important pillar of the Russian information warfare mechanism (Pomerantsev, 2015; Yablokov, 2015). Although RT has been previously analyzed in various contexts, there is a visible lack of research focusing on how RT frames the post-Soviet countries in its news articles. Therefore, this thesis seeks to fill the research gap investigating RT’s strategic narratives in the coverage of Lithuania.
Knyzelis 16
III. Theoretical Framework
The previous chapter was dedicated to introducing the body of literature around the
research phenomenon. In the theoretical framework chapter, key concepts such as
information warfare and soft power are presented. Further, the relevance of the strategic
narrative framework for this research is discussed.
Key Concepts and Perspectives
Information Warfare. Disinformation campaigns, propaganda, and information
warfare are terms often linked to Russia and its current government in both critical scholarly
and journalistic discourse (Andriukaitis, 2020; Darczewska & Żochowski, 2015; Gerber &
Zavisca, 2016; Hellman & Wagnsson, 2017; Helmus et al., 2018; Thompson, 2019;
Thornton, 2015). Information warfare is defined as, “the utilization of information
technology and communication channels to reach specific objectives” (Männistö, 2017, par.
9). It is essential to mention that information warfare does not in all cases connect directly
with the spreading of propaganda, but it certainly is a crucial aspect for demoralizing and
manipulating “the opponent and the public” (Damjanovic, 2017, p. 1045).
In this thesis, information warfare serves as an important term placing the research
phenomenon in an appropriate academic context. Of course, naturally, the term “warfare”
comes with certain presuppositions and guides the research process in a certain direction.
However, the recent events in Ukraine indicate the tendency that was already stated in the
literature review, that Russian engagement and neo-imperialistic ambitions in the near-abroad
region are high (Feklyunina, 2012; Saari, 2014). Because of that, scholars studying relations
of Russia and the post-Soviet countries often reiterate the weaponization of information
analogy and employ the term information warfare (Szostek, 2018). Therefore, following the
background of this thesis, the information warfare approach was taken as a conceptual
framework in the analytical process.
Soft Power. Soft power is a widely used concept when it comes to understanding the
role of power and communication in international affairs (Roselle et al., 2014). Consistent
with Miazhevich's (2018) research, this thesis also considers the role of soft power in the
international diplomatic arena. As defined by Nye (2008), “soft power is the ability to affect
others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment”
(p. 94). Certainly, influencing another person towards specific action is more easily done
through the mean of hard power than soft power; however, Roselle et al. (2014) suggest thatKnyzelis 17
soft power results are more lasting. In the case of Lithuania, the soft power rivalry is sensed
between the West, including the EU and NATO, and Russia. As indicated in the literature
review, Russia poses high engagement and neo-imperial ambitions in the post-Soviet states,
Lithuania being one of them. Vaišnys et al. (2017) argued that one of the ways for Russia to
maintain Lithuania in its area of influence is through media. Since, the popularity of the
Russian language in the region, positive imagery of Soviet symbolism, and the nostalgia for
the Soviet past ensure the sufficient public receptivity of Russian propaganda campaigns
(Denisenko, 2017; Maliukevičius, 2015). Building on Nye’s (2008) ideas, in the information
age, it is not focused on whose soldiers win, but rather whose story wins. In this way, the soft
power concept provides valuable insights for understanding and analyzing the importance of
media in spreading narratives. Consequently, Nye's (2008) understanding of current
international affairs leads to another critically important concept for this thesis – the strategic
narratives.
Strategic Narratives. Building on the soft power concept, strategic narratives help us
understand the underlying complexities of modern-day international politics (Roselle et al.,
2014). Salmon, (2017) argues that the art of storytelling has existed since the emergence of
humanity and essentially shaped the human perception of the surrounding world. In this
thesis, the concept of strategic narrative is a common denominator uniting previously
discussed concepts of information warfare, public diplomacy, propaganda, and soft power. In
the context of this thesis, the narrative is a substantial part of the communication process
through which the soft power resources (culture, values, and policies) can be distributed
compellingly to “strategically sway target audiences” (Roselle et al., 2014, p. 74). It is then
necessary to highlight that the influence of strategic narratives is not invoking the
hypodermic needle approach. As explained by Roselle et al. (2014), the interpretation of
strategic narratives does not necessarily correspond to the objectives of its initial formation.
More importantly, the measurement of the influence projected narratives generate in public is
beyond the strategic narrative analysis.
Coming from the field of international affairs, strategic narratives suit the need of
understanding the role of new digitalized media in the competition for global influence.
Hardwired into the human brain, narratives shape and help to explain the world around us
(Roselle et al., 2014). Therefore, in this study, the framework of the strategic narrative serves
as a supporting foundation for the analytical process. The framework developed by Roselle et
al. (2014) provides tools for analyzing narratives by identifying and investigating different
components, such as setting, actors, conflict, and resolution. While at the same time, much ofKnyzelis 18 the researcher’s work is still interpretive, the strategic narrative framework provides the structure and necessary constraints for the critical and systematic research process. Thus, the more detailed steps of the analytical process are further explained in the methodology chapter.
Knyzelis 19
IV. Methodology
In the previous chapter, the key concepts and perspectives relevant to this study were
discussed. In the following chapter, the choice of a qualitative research method is presented.
Data collection, sampling and coding procedures are introduced and the data analysis process
is described. In the closing part of the chapter, the reliability, validity, and ethical
considerations of the research are discussed.
Research paradigm
I conducted this research following the Interpretivism research paradigm. This
approach is grounded in the assumption that “social reality is socially constructed” (Blaikie &
Priest, 2017, p. 101). Thus the social reality is shaped by shared interpretations that every
social actor refers to individually (Blaikie & Priest, 2019). Looking from the perspective of
the Interpretivism paradigm, the meaning of a media text depends on the interpretation of a
person who interacts with the media text at hand. Similarly, the Interpretivism research
paradigm acknowledges that there is no permanent process to determine that the obtained
knowledge can be considered as true (Blaikie & Priest, 2019). Therefore, in line with the
Interpretivism approach, in this research, I also recognize that there is no correct or false
representation in media, simply the socially constructed interpretations of it.
Choice of Method
According to Blaikie & Priest (2018), in social research, documents as a source of
data can be treated both qualitatively and quantitively; however, the final outcome and
findings of each research method would differ significantly. Since this research aims to
examine the strategic narratives through which Lithuania is represented on RT’s online news
platform, the priority was given to the qualitative thematic analysis method. The qualitative
thematic analysis method allows me to identify and draw connections between the documents
in the sample (N. W. H. Blaikie & Priest, 2019). To better understand the narratives of RT,
this research followed the steps of Braun & Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis in combination
with Roselle et al. (2014) strategic narrative framework. A more detailed analysis process is
described in the coding and data analysis section below.
When it comes to the logic of inquiry, the analytical process is informed by previous
scholarship on Russian strategic narratives. However, following the principles of thematicKnyzelis 20
analysis, previously established narratives are considered as a starting point and not as an
ultimate framework. Therefore, this research embraces both inductive and deductive logic.
This research is also constrained by epistemological assumptions, as thematic analysis
can be performed following either realist or constructionist approaches (Braun & Clarke,
2006). Because of the interpretive nature of this study, it draws more on the constructionist
approach. Hall (1997) identified three different approaches to representation: reflexive,
intentional, and constructionist. In the reflexive approach, meaning is linked with an object;
while in the intentional approach, the author imposes a meaning to others. The constructionist
approach contrary to the previous two acknowledges that there is no fixed meaning, but
rather the one that is constructed. As Hall (1997) puts it, “things don’t mean: we construct
meaning, using representational systems – concepts and signs” (p. 11). In the same way, the
strategic narrative framework also acknowledges that the reception of the narrative is not
guaranteed to match the initial author’s objectives.
Data Collection and Sampling
Data for this research was collected from the English language version of the rt.com
website. Articles on the rt.com website are tagged with keywords, which involves a tag
“Lithuania news”. Therefore, the data collection was done based on the pieces that were
marked using this tag. Of course, since the RT website has a search function, it was possible
to look for articles using different search keywords surrounding Lithuania; however, the tag
method was chosen for several reasons. First of all, the tag method enabled me to perform
data collection quickly and efficiently. On top of that, the tag method involves articles that
were purposefully marked by RT personnel, suggesting that these articles were intentionally
written to represent Lithuania in one way or another. It is also necessary to stress out that for
the purpose of this research, only the textual content of an article was considered. In this way,
visuals appearing at the top of an article or incorporated throughout the text were not taken
into consideration. This was due to the fact that visual analysis as a separate field of research
requires different methods of analysis. Similarly, often treated as a separate entity in media
and communication research, the comments section was also not considered for the scope of
this study.
One of the limiting factors for data collection was data accessibility. Interestingly it is
not possible to track any articles of rt.com earlier than January 2017. It is possible that
previous articles were eliminated because of the Crimean conflict, which received a lot of
media and public attention and in which RT played a role as a propaganda channel (Szostek,Knyzelis 21
2018). It is also possible that previous articles were removed from the website to save server
space as 5-year-old reports are assumed to become irrelevant to the public. Either way, taking
into account the available data, the sample consists of the news articles that were posted
between January 2017 to February 2021. The end of the data collection period marked the
date when the sample was formed. Because of the feasible amount of data, the total
population sampling method was chosen, and none of the articles were excluded. In the end,
the sample size comprises 40 articles published in this roughly 50 months period. Even
though some articles were thematically incompatible within the broader context of the
sample, the total population sample was chosen to avoid selection bias.
Coding and Data Analysis
As argued by Braun & Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is a commonly used
framework within social research. The thematic analysis fits well within this research since it
allows a researcher to identify, analyze and report on patterns or themes from the data (Braun
& Clarke, 2006). Braun & Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis framework consists of six
different phases. In the first and initial phase researcher becomes familiar with the data and
takes notes on the interesting patterns or unique ideas. In the second phase, the initial coding
scheme is generated based on the notes from the first phase. To ease the manual work, for the
process of this thesis, data was coded using MS Excel software, and each article was given a
number, so it could be then referred to in the analysis chapter. The third phase involves
sorting and transforming initial codes into potential themes. During the fourth phase, possible
themes are reviewed to match with the data sample. In the fifth phase, themes are refined the
last time, and clear names for the themes are generated. The sixth phase involves producing
the final report of the thematic analysis. It is clear from the steps involved in a thematic
analysis that it is not linear but rather a cyclical process. In the same way, the analytical
process of this research also followed the recursive manner. Meaning that I as a researcher
was going back and forth between the data and coding scheme until the final themes were
identified.
As mentioned earlier, the analytical process is informed by the strategic narrative
framework of Roselle et al. (2014). Therefore, besides following the steps of thematic
analysis, I also probed the data for components of the strategic narrative framework. In this
way, each article was coded for (1) Setting/environment/space; (2) Character or actors; (3)
Conflict or action; (4) Resolution or suggested resolution. In terms of the setting, it is
considered where the action is happening and how the surrounding world is understood. InKnyzelis 22
this thesis, the setting of the articles was considered based on the significant domestic or
foreign events surrounding either Lithuania or Russia or both. For Roselle et al. (2014),
characters or actors “are those who have agency and are depicted as important to the
narrative” (p. 75). In this study, the domestic and international; individual and organizational
actors were considered. Talking about the conflict part, Roselle et al. (2014) ask, “who does
what to who or what, and what reactions and interactions follow from that?” (p. 75). And
finally, the resolution is looking at what action is offered to resolve a conflict. As a result, the
coding and data analysis processes were following the structured framework of strategic
narrative by Roselle et al. (2014) in combination with the procedures of Braun & Clarke's
(2006) thematic analysis.
Reliability and Validity
The reliability and validity in the qualitative analysis of media texts have been a
widely discussed topic among scholars (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). Since the qualitative
methods usually depend much on the interpretation of data, it is extremely difficult to
eliminate the impact of a researcher (Alhojailan, 2012). Because of the interpretive nature of
the thematic analysis performed in this research, I acknowledge that the researcher’s bias
exists to some extent, however, there were certain measurements taken to keep it to a
tolerable level. As it was mentioned in the sampling section above, because of the feasible
amount of data, the total population sampling method was chosen, which allowed the
elimination of the sample selection bias. Further, following the systematic process of Braun
& Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis, data was analyzed five times, until the final
classification was identified. Besides, the analytical process was informed by a strategic
narrative framework of Roselle et al. (2014). Following these meticulous procedures, it was
possible to minimize the systematic errors. On top of that, during the process of data analysis,
it was relied on the themes of classification that were identified in preceding scholarly
literature. This allowed to perform extensive verification of data categories and to match it
with the initial research objectives.
Ethics
Because this research is not dealing with human participants and the sample data was
publicly available it was not required to obtain ethical clearance from a research committee.
However, because of the research topic and choice of a method, there were other ethical
considerations. Because of the interpretive nature of this study, the research development wasKnyzelis 23 highly influenced by the author’s ontological and epistemological assumptions, personal beliefs, values, geographical location, worldview, and political ideology. In this way, having in mind the history of relations between Russia and Lithuania, I as a Lithuanian come to this research with certain presuppositions. However, this close proximity to the research object provides me with certain advantages that wouldn’t be accessible for another researcher not knowing the language and culture of the region. Therefore, for the purpose of ensuring the transparency of this thesis, I applied the self-reflexive approach for being aware of my “actions, feelings and perceptions” towards my research object (Darawsheh, 2014).
Knyzelis 24
V. Analysis
In the previous chapter, the data collection, coding, and analysis approaches were
introduced, together with the reliability, validity, and ethics of the research. The following
analysis chapter is structured around the four key components of strategic narratives as
proposed by Roselle et al. (2014); (1) setting, (2) actors, (3) conflict, and (4) resolution. In the
second part of the analysis chapter, two key themes in RT’s strategic narratives of Lithuania
are further investigated; anti-western sentiments and Russophobia.
Setting
The setting is an important piece of a narrative. Even though the setting in RT articles
is rarely stated directly, however, knowing the contextual information surrounding the
article’s publication date it is not difficult to connect the dots. Three distinct angles were
identified as being the most influential for the Lithuania-Russia relations during the period of
the study. The main background events surrounding the publications of the data sample are
(1) Annexation of Crimea in 2014; (2) Spread of questionable information surrounding the
holocaust around 2016-2018; (3) the anti-government protests in Belarus in 2020-2021.
The annexation of Crimea. Even though the Ukraine conflict started in 2014, the
references to the Ukraine events in RT articles remain visible years after that. As it was
previously mentioned in the literature review, the annexation of the Crimean region is an
illustrative example of how Russia still possesses an interest in the post-Soviet states.
However, as RT puts it, “Russia has repeatedly and consistently denied any allegations of its
perceived threats” (item 2). Although it is internationally acknowledged (EEAS, 2021; Pifer,
2020; Stern, 2014) that the annexation of Crimea was illegal, RT maintains the position that
“Crimea voted to split from Ukraine and rejoin Russia in a referendum” (item 3). Further, the
case of Ukraine highlights the relevance of information warfare terminology, since as Helmus
et al. (2018) puts it, Ukraine was turned into an “active propaganda battleground” (p. ix). As
it is relevant for the setting, following the events in Ukraine, NATO sent troops to the Baltic
States, including Lithuania, “as a deterrence against potential Russian aggression” (item 1).
Interestingly throughout the articles “Russian aggression” is always placed in scare quotes,
thus suggesting that it is only alleged. The framing of NATO involvement is further
investigated in the upcoming sections.
Controversies surrounding the holocaust. The theme of holocaust history in
Lithuania sporadically reappeared throughout several RT news articles, mostly following theKnyzelis 25
publication of two books that provided controversial information on Lithuanian freedom
fighters. Both books, “Our people” (Vanagaite & Zuroff, 2016) and “The Nazi's
Granddaughter” (Foti, 2021) focused on the stories of famous Lithuanian freedom fighters
and how they allegedly collaborated with Nazis during the holocaust. For the clarification
regarding the timeline, it is necessary to mention, that even though Foti’s book was originally
published in 2021, the excerpts of the book were released back in 2018, which sparked
conflicting public discussions. Even though the credibility of information provided in the
books is debatable, the focus of this thesis is not to argue the truthfulness of arguments
introduced in both books. Rather the interest of this study is to observe what articles RT
released following the context of these controversial publications.
Therefore, the angle perceived throughout the articles of this setting is related to
Nazism. RT’s position regarding this can be illustrated with a quote where RT talks about
Lithuanian freedom fighter Noreika, who allegedly collaborated with Nazis, as “one of many
historic figures in Lithuania, whose crimes are being whitewashed or understated and who
are being lauded as heroes, despite their crimes” (item 17). This indicates the tendency for
RT not only to make links between Lithuanian historical figures and the fascist regime but to
frame the current government as leaning towards fascism as well. These findings tie with
Denisenko's (2017) conclusions, that Russian media tends to escalate the occurrences of
Nazism and fascism in the Baltic states. More detailed analysis surrounding the Lithuanian
historic figures is present in the conflict section further below.
Protests in Belarus. Another set of articles was closely related to the events in
Belarus, following the 2020 presidential election. Item 27, clearly indicates RT's position
regarding the issues in Belarus. RT quotes “President Alexander Lukashenko” by saying that
“unrest in his country may well have been fanned by geopolitics and financed from abroad”.
Therefore, it is visible that RT recognizes Lukashenko as a legitimate president, even though
the European Parliament, along with other Western democratic leaders, did not recognize
Belarus 2020 presidential election as legitimate (European Parliament, 2020). Additionally,
RT imposes that the foreign states were intentionally fueling protests in Belarus. This frame
of foreign interference is evident in item 28: “anti-government protests are being directed
from abroad” and item 29: “neighboring states are stroking protests in the country”. Russia,
amid these events, is framed as a peace-maker securing Belarus from any foreign interference
and adding that “Belarus has been coping with the situation just fine on its own” (item 28).
While Lithuania in this context is perceived as an obstacle for peace-making in Belarus byYou can also read
