RESEARCH UPDATE Spring 2021 - FEATURES PUBLICATIONS NEWS & EVENTS PEOPLE ANNOUCEMENTS - Banco de España
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Welcome to the Banco de España Research Update The Banco de España is pleased to announce the release of the Spring 2021 issue of its Research Update. The Update aims to inform both academic and policy-oriented economists and financial specialists about publications, conferences, and other research activities at the Banco de España, during the semester from October 2020 to April 2021. As usual, this issue includes several feature articles summarizing policy-relevant findings from recent Banco de España projects in diverse areas of research. First, J. Andrés, O. Árce and P. Burriel analyse whow the dampening of the estimated co-movement between the output gap and inflation noticed in recent decades can be rationalized through a model that incorporates the increase in polarization observed in several industries. Second, D. Serrano-Puente evaluates the optimal progressivity of the Spanish personal income tax scheme through the lens of a general equilibrium model featuring rich household heterogeneity. He finds that there is room for welfare improvement by means of modifying the effective average tax rates, at the expense of efficiency losses. Third, A. Alonso and J. M. Carbó study the economic impact for financial institutions of using machine learning (ML) models for credit default predictions. They find that, although ML models outperform traditional ones, more complex algorithms do not imply better predictions. Fourth, F. Holub, L. Hospido and U. Wagner estimate the impact of air pollution on the incidence of sick leaves on a representative panel of employees affiliated to the Spanish social security system. Controlling for several possible confounding factors, their evidence points towards an impact of air pollution on the incidence of sick leaves, especially for women with pre- existing conditions. Finally, P. García-Perea, A. Lacuesta and P. Roldán-Blanco document that the increase in mark-ups in Spain during the financial crisis can be explained by the response of relatively small and unproductive firms to the drop in their sales and the increase in average costs. In addition, the Update reports on other research news such as conferences and recent publications, including the Financial Stability Review, a half-year journal published by the Banco de España. This issue also covers an interview with Enrique Moral-Benito, Head of the Sectoral Analysis Division, covering his research agenda, the policy developments at the Banco de España related to the ongoing Covid19 crisis, as well as recent efforts to develop and leverage large and granular datasets in order to tackle research and policy questions. We highlight these and other research developments at the Banco de España in hopes that they will interest the broader research community in Spain and internationally, and thereby contribute to an improved understanding of economic policy Óscar Arce Olympia Bover Ángel Estrada Eva Ortega Carlos Thomas Research Committee, Banco de España
FEATURES Market polarization unprecedented set of non-conventional monetary policy measures after the global financial crisis (GFC), inflation and and the Phillips curve inflation expectations in most advanced economies JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE AND PABLO BURRIEL remained chronically subdued even before the Covid-19 Summary of Banco de España Working Paper no. 2106 crisis. Some argue that this comes from afar and potentially well before the GFC (Blanchard, 2016). Prominent among The Phillips curve has flattened out over the last decades. the potential explanations for the weak reaction of prices to We develop a model that rationalizes this phenomenon as cyclical conditions are the decline of labor power, the rise of a result of the observed increase in polarization in many globalization and international trade, and the impact of industries, a process along which a few top firms gain an positive supply shocks caused by new technologies. increasing share of their industry market. In the model, firms compete à la Bertrand and there is exit and These factors do not exhaust the list of possible causes endogenous market entry, as well as optimal up and behind the diminishing effect of cyclical fluctuations on downgrading of technology. Firms with larger market prices. A related strand of literature is placing increasing shares find optimal to dampen the response of their price attention on some ongoing significant changes in the changes, thus cushioning the shocks to their marginal industrial structure in advanced economies. These changes costs through endogenous countercyclical markups. include, among others, the rise in market shares in many Thus, regardless of its causes (technology, competition, industries, industrial polarization along different dimensions barriers to entry, etc.), the recent increase in polarization (e.g. firm size, productivity, etc.), the rise in markups, in many industries emerges in the model as the key factor intensification of competition spurred by technology and the in explaining the muted responses of inflation to decline of the labor share. In particular, the case for market movements in the output gap witnessed recently. concentration over the last decades has been forcefully established on empirical grounds (Covarrubias, Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2019). Yet, so far little consensus can be SUMMARY FOR THE APRIL RESEARCH UPDATE found about the likely effect of these factors on the inflation rate or, more precisely, on the link between inflation and the In this paper we set up a model consistent with many of economic slack (Van Reenen, 2018). The importance of the the features highlighted by the empirical industrial new technological giants in shaping the way economies organization literature, to argue that these changes might respond to shocks, the archetypal case being the be behind the muted response of inflation to shocks to the disinflationary impact of Amazon, is in stark contrast with marginal costs that has been observed lately. The flattening the long held view in mainstream macroeconomics, of the Phillips curve that has taken place over the last according to which market concentration has been twenty years poses a challenge for monetary authorities. considered a source of inflationary pressure. On the other hand, the availability of large data sets containing firm level information on a number of relevant Our model sheds light on the connection between the rise variables has uncovered a series of facts that speak of in market polarization (increase in market shares and profound changes in the distribution of firms in many widening gap in size and productivity across firms in the industries with repercussion in the response of same industry) and the flattening of the Phillips curve. macroeconomic variables to exogenous shocks. Contrary to the previous standard view, in our model the rise in market shares is neither inflationary nor deflationary The pattern of inflation rates across most advanced per se, but it reduces the slope of the Phillips curve, which economies in recent years defies the traditional explanations is consistent with the recent empirical literature (Del Negro, based on the Phillips curve relation between inflation and Lenza, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2020). In particular, the the output gap. In spite of the implementation of an slope of the Phillips curve derived in conventional New BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 3
FEATURES Keynesian DSGE models (regardless of whether price s where ξN = s ( s ε −1 ) s ∂ξ > 0, Ns > 0. inertia is of the Calvo or the Rotemberg type) gets 1 − s ε 1 − s − 1 s s ∂s augmented in our model by a factor that decreases with the market share of the firm, as shown in equation (1). Therefore, when a firm faces a positive shock to its 1 − s θp 1 − βθ s marginal cost it raises prices, which in turn undermines its p + mc s s s πt = βE t π t +1 s t market share and hence its desired markup; this dampens θp the inflationary effect of the shock. The strength of this Standard NKPC effect increases with the firm’s market share. Hence, in an economy featuring highly polarized industrial structures, s 1 − θp s s + s s − βθ s E s s (1) with a few large and many small competitors in each t p t t +1 1 − s s ε 1 − s s − 1 θs industry, much in line with the aforementioned recent p evidence, the response of inflation to shocks becomes heterogeneity effect more muted than it would be in a similar economy with a more balanced distribution of firms. In our simulations, s s where π t , represents inflation of firms of size s, mc t , their small variations in the drivers of market concentration s real marginal costs and st , their market share. 1 deliver significant changes in the slope of the Phillips curve. While strategic price interactions barely affect the Key to this result is the fact that markups depend positively markup of smallish firms, they do condition the desired on the firm’s market share. The endogeneity of markups markup of large firms in a material manner (Amiti, Itskhoki, hinges critically on the joint effect of two core features of the and Konings, 2019). This moderates the response of industrial structure of the economy. We assume that firms prices set by the latter to shocks, which in turn (upon have access to different TFP levels and choose among them aggregation) exerts a significant dampening effect on the optimally taking into account the costs of moving up or down volatility of aggregate inflation. In fact, in the chart below in the technology ladder. Furthermore, as in Etro and Rossi we show how a 20% increase in the productivity of larger (2015), Andrés and Burriel (2018), and, more recently, Wang firms, which increases their market share, reduces the and Werning (2020), we assume that firms compete à la response of their inflation to a negative TFP shock Bertrand taking into account the expected reaction of other significantly (by 28%), while the response of smaller firms competitors when setting their prices. Thus, substituting for to the same TFP shock remains unaltered. As a the endogenous market shares in equation (1) and solving, consequence, the response of aggregate inflation is also we get a Phillips Curve with the usual drivers of inflation, more moderate (by 26%). A similar result is obtained after expected inflation and marginal costs, pre-multiplied by a an increase in the degree of competition as measured by factor smaller than 1, which depends on the firms’ steady the elasticity of demand. Moreover, these findings are also s state market shares (s ), as shown in equation (2). found for other standard shocks, like an increase in policy rates, or negative preference or labour supply shocks. 1 + θs ξ s 1 − θs 1 − βθ s 1 p p s p N s mc s πt = βE t π t +1 + To further assess the relevance of the mechanism analyzed 1 + ξNs s s t 1 + ξN θp in the paper, we investigate the medium term response of (2) the industrial structure to increases in technological divergences, the elasticity of substitution among goods and barriers to entry, three factors that Covarrubias, 1 In the model size and productivity level are interchangeable. The s Gutiérrez and Philippon (2019) identify as the main drivers parameter 1 − θp represents the share of firms that are allowed to change their prices every period according to the Calvo price-setting of market concentration in recent decades. The model mechanism, β is the discount factor and ε the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. predictions are consistent with the main facts reported by BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 4
FEATURES Chart 1 IMPULSE RESPONSE OF INFLATION AFTER AN INCREASE IN TFP UNDER DIFFERENT PRODUCTIVITY SCENARIOS 1 AGGREGATE INFLATION 2 INFLATION OF HIGH -TFP FIRMS 3 INFLATION OF LOW -TFP FIRMS % % % 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Quarters Quarters Quarters BASELINE 20% INCREASE IN HIGH-TFP FIRMS PRODUCTIVITY a The variables are presented as percentage differences with respect to the steady state. the empirical literature: (1) Sustained increase in Andrés, J. and P. Burriel, 2018): “Inflation and optimal monetary policy in a model with firm heterogeneity and Bertrand concentration in most industries (Bajgar, Berlingieri, competition”. European Economic Review, 103, 2018, Pages Calligaris, Criscuolo, and Timmis, 2019); (2) concentration 18-38 in employment but less intense than in sales (Autor, Dorn, Autor, D., D. Dorn, L. Katz, C. Patterson, and J. Van Reenen Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen, 2019); (3) increase in (2019): “The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar polarization along other dimensions like productivity Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (forthcoming) (Berlingueri, Blanchenay and Criscuolo (2017); (4) Bajgar, M., G. Berlingieri, S.Calligaris, C. Criscuolo, and J. sustained increase of markups, mostly at the top of the Timmis (2019): “Industry Concentration in Europe and North America,” CEP Discussion Papers dp1654, Centre for markup distribution (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger Economic Performance, LSE. (2020); (5) steady decline in firm entry in most industries (Akcigit and Ates, 2019); (6) generalized fall in investment Barkai, S. 2019: “Declining labor and capital shares”, Journal of Finance (forthcoming) rates in many advanced economies (Eggertsson, Robbins, and Wold (2018); and (7) decline in the labor share Blanchard, O. (2016): “The US Phillips Curve: Back to the 60s?”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 106(5): accompanied by a fall in capital share in most industries 31--34. too (Barkai, 2019). Covarrubias, M., G. Gutiérrez and T. Philippon (2019): “From Good to Bad Concentration? U.S. Industries Over the Past 30 REFERENCES Years”, NBER, Working Paper 25983. Akcigit, U, and S T Ates (2019), “Ten Facts on Declining Business De Loecker, J., J. Eeckhout, G. Unger, 2020. “The Rise of Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory,” Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications”, NBER Working Paper 25755. Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(2), 2020, 561-644. Amiti, M., O. Itskhoki, and J. Konings, 2019: “International Del Negro, M., M. Lenza, G. E. Primiceri, and A. Tambalotti Shocks, Variable Markups, and Domestic Prices,” The Review (2020): “What’s up with the Phillips Curve?,” NBER Working of Economic Studies, 02. Papers 27003 BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 5
FEATURES Eggertsson, G., J. Robbins, and E. Wold, 2018: “Kaldor and Piketty’s Facts: The Rise of Monopoly Power in the United States”, NBER Working Paper No. 24287 Etro, F. and L. Rossi, 2015. “New-Keynesian Phillips curve with Bertrand competition and endogenous entry”, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, vol. 51(3), pp. 318--340. Van Reenen, J., 2018. “Increasing Differences Between Firms: Market Power and the Macro-Economy,” CEP Discussion Papers DP1576, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. Wang, O. and I. Werning, 2020. “Dynamic Oligopoly and Price Stickiness,” NBER Working Papers 27536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 6
FEATURES Optimal Progressivity of Personal economies. For that reason, the optimal design of a redistributive tax system is subject to many constraints, as Income Tax: A General Equilibrium argued by Bakis et al. (2015). This is why having a Evaluation for Spain quantitative theory that accounts accurately for the observed income and wealth inequality is crucial when assessing the DARÍO SERRANO-PUENTE aggregate, distributional, and welfare implications of certain Summary of Banco de España Working Paper no. 2101 policies. For that purpose, a heterogeneous households Published in SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pp. 407-455, November 2020 general equilibrium model is here calibrated to replicate some characteristics of the Spanish economy and used to Is the Spanish economy positioned at its optimal compare the steady-state consequences of setting an progressivity level in personal income tax? This article optimal progressivity level in the Spanish personal income quantifies the aggregate, distributional, and welfare tax. This frames the setup here presented in literature of consequences of moving toward such an optimal level. A general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents to heterogeneous households general equilibrium model explore the relationship between fiscal policy variables and featuring both life cycle and dynastic elements is calibrated the endogenous cross-sectional distribution of income to replicate some characteristics of the Spanish economy and wealth in Spain. Examples of this body of literature are and used to evaluate potential reforms of the tax system. Pijoan-Mas and González-Torrabadella (2006), Díaz- The findings suggest that increasing progressivity would Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2019), and Guner et al. (2020), be optimal, even though it would involve an efficiency loss. among others. The optimal reform of the tax schedule would reduce wealth and income inequality at the cost of negative effects The theoretical framework of this paper is built for Spain on capital, labor, and output. Finally, these theoretical following Castañeda et al. (2003). The model is devoted to results are evaluated using tax microdata and describe a (i) account for income and wealth inequality and (ii) study current scenario where the income-top households decisions of households that face labor income processes typically face suboptimal effective average tax rates. that are random, household-specific, and uninsurable. In these model-based economies, households accumulate wealth in part to smooth their consumption. Heterogeneity Many modern governments implement a redistributive fiscal is introduced in this setup via distinct labor market policy, where personal income is taxed at an increasingly opportunities using an uninsurable process on the higher rate, while transfers tend to target the poorest endowment of efficiency labor units that features non-linear households. The taxation of personal income is not a minor dynamics. Given the labor market opportunity, the issue, since most of the OECD economies obtain a large households choose their work effort. In other words, proportion of their tax collection through it. Raising taxes on 1 the labor choice is set here to be endogenous. Life cycle higher incomes may be potentially justified by the increase in characteristics are modeled using aging and retirement and income and wealth inequality in recent years in Spain, dynastic links are modeled in a way that households are especially after the 2007 crisis, as documented by Angel et altruistic toward their descendants (hybrid model with al. (2018). Beforehand, one is likely to consider that raising retirement and bequests). Household face a progressive tax taxes on the income-rich households could reverse the schedule modeled through the Heathcote et al. (2017) growing concentration at the top. However, this type of policy specification, a function that allows for assessing average could be very costly in terms of efficiency in advanced market level of taxes and progressivity separately. The model is properly calibrated to match some empirical statistics of the Spanish economy and replicates the distributions of income The OECD average of the share of personal income tax 1 and wealth in very much detail (also at the very top tails of revenues over total tax revenues (excluding social security contributions) has been around 30-35% in recent years. those distributions). BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 7
FEATURES Once the theoretical framework is defined, a bunch of potential decomposed by household type, where it is observed that the progressivity reforms are assessed through the calculation of poorest working and non-working households are the ones many different general equilibria (one equilibrium for each who benefit the most from the reform. Contrarily, the most degree of progressivity evaluated). Then a Benthamite social efficient working households and the wealthiest ones (either planner, who takes into account all households in the economy working or non-working) are those who experience the largest by putting the same weight on each of them, discerns the trade-off between (i) positive welfare effects derived from higher optimal progressivity reform that leaves the aggregate tax income (due to an increased interest rate that pushes up burden and transfers-to-output levels unchanged. The findings capital returns) and (ii) adverse effects emerging from higher suggest that aggregate social welfare is maximized when the tax payments (due to the increase in progressivity of the level of progressivity of the Spanish personal income tax is income tax that discourages labor and savings). The losses increased to some extent. More precisely, in the optimally from this trade-off are particularly high in top parts of the reformed scenario (setting the optimal level of progressivity), income and wealth distributions and clearly offset the potential welfare gains are equivalent to an average increase of 3.08% welfare gains of the households populating such areas. of consumption. Therefore, knowing that these agents would be the losers of the reform, despite positive aggregate welfare effects, By decomposing the aggregate welfare change, it is shown the consequences on aggregate capital, labor, and that most of the welfare gains are obtained from a majority of output would be negative, which means that the economy households facing a lower tax rate, i.e. the poorest households would experience an efficiency loss. Moreover, looking at facing lower effective income tax rates and richest households the distributional implications, this reform would reduce affronting higher effective income tax rates. On the contrary, income and wealth inequality. the general equilibrium effects of the optimal reformed economy (higher interest rate and lower wage) and the effects Finally, the theoretical results are evaluated with Spanish tax resulting from changes in the equilibrium distribution of micro data. From the point of view of a Benthamite social households across income levels (larger mass of households planner, households between the 20th and the 80th at lower income levels) show a welfare loss, but these losses percentiles would experience a decrease in their average tax are so small that together cannot overpass the welfare gains rates under the optimal progressivity reform. For example, directly coming from the reformed tax system, jointly resulting the effective average tax rate encountered by a household in positive aggregate welfare changes. These welfare gains are situated within the 40th and the 60th percentiles of the Figure 1 AGGREGATE WELFARE CHANGE % change in consumption 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 A ct u a l Optimal -10 -12 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 Progressivity level AGGREGATE WELFARE CHANGE BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 8
FEATURES Figure 2 AVERAGE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND SHARE OF TAX REVENUES 1 AVERAGE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES Average effective tax rates (%) 40 33.00 28.40 30 25.20 22.40 18.00 18.80 18.20 18.80 20 11.70 11.00 10 6.70 5.60 2.00 1.40 0.10 0.01 0 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 90-95 95-99 99-100 Percentiles of household gross income 2 SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME TAX REVENUE Share of total income tax revenues (%) 100 90 78.13 80 74.88 70 60 50 40 26.47 30 20.89 22.48 23.73 17.25 15.7 20 13.78 13.71 6.48 5.29 10 1.34 0.88 0.06 0.0001 0 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 90-95 95-99 99-100 Percentiles of household gross income ACTUAL OPTIMAL income distribution would drop from 0.067 to 0.056, which addition, the reform would reduce income and wealth involves a change of 1.1 p.p.. On the other hand, households inequality. However, this would lead to an efficiency loss above the 80th percentile would experience a drastic increment of the economy, since it discourages work and savings in their effective average tax rate. For instance, the top 1% mainly by penalizing the top-working and wealthiest households of the gross income distribution would go from households. confronting an average tax rate of 0.284 in the actual scenario to dealing with an average tax rate of 0.330 in the optimal one. REFERENCES Anghel, B., H. Basso, O. Bover, J. M. Casado, L. Hospido, M. In conclusion, as policy implications arising from this Izquierdo, I. A. Kataryniuk, A. Lacuesta, J. M. Montero, and E. study, what the model (jointly with the data) indicates is Vozmediano (2018): “Income, Consumption and Wealth Inequality in Spain,” SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic that, in terms of aggregate welfare, it would be optimal to Association - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 9, increase the progressivity of the personal income tax. In 351–378. BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 9
FEATURES Bakis, O., B. Kaymak, and M. Poschke (2015): “Transitional dynamics and the optimal progressivity of income redistribution,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 18, 679–693. Castaneda, A., J. Díaz-Giménez, and J. V. Ríos-Rull (2003): “Accounting for the U.S. Earnings and Wealth Inequality,” Journal of Political Economy, 111, 818–857. Díaz-Giménez, J. and J. Pijoan-Mas (2019): “Investment expensing and progressivity in flat-tax reforms,” SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 10, 365–399. Guner, N., J. Lopez-Segovia, and R. Ramos (2020): “Reforming the Individual Income Tax in Spain,” SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 11, 369-406. Heathcote J, Storesletten K, Violante G (2017) “Optimal tax progressivity: an analytical framework,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132, 1693–1754. Pijoan-Mas, J. and M. González-Torrabadella (2006): “Flat Tax Reforms: A General Equilibrium Evaluation for Spain,” Investigaciones Económicas, 30, 317–351. BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 10
FEATURES Understanding the performance institutions could realize by using different ML algorithms. While there exists an extensive and growing literature on of machine learning models to the predictive gains of ML in credit default prediction, predict credit default: a novel usually the findings are based on different sample sizes and different types of underlying assets, making any approach for supervisory conclusion not robust enough. Furthermore, the economic evaluation impact of the use of ML in credit default prediction remains understudied. ANDRÉS ALONSO AND JOSÉ MANUEL CARBÓ Summary of Banco de España Working Paper no. 2105 To tackle this research gap we use a unique and We study the economic impact for financial institutions anonymized database provided by one of the most of using machine learning (ML) models in credit default important Spanish banks. We first measure the relative prediction. We do so by using a unique and anonymized performance of the following ML models, comparing it database from a major Spanish bank. We first measure with a logistic regression (Logit): Lasso penalized logistic the statistical performance in terms of predictive power, regression, Classification And Regression Tree (CART), both in classification and calibration, comparing models Random Forest, XGBoost and Deep Neural Networks. To like Logit and Lasso, with more advanced ones like this purpose we calculate the benefits in terms of statistical Trees (CART), Random Forest, XGBoost and Deep performance assessing the predictive performance under Learning. We find that ML models outperforms traditional different circumstances such as different sample sizes and ones, although more complex ML algorithms do not different amount of explanatory variables. This allows us to necessarily predict better. We then translate this into test whether the better statistical behavior of ML models economic impact by estimating the savings in regulatory comes from an information advantage (associated to the capital that an institution could achieve when using a access to big amounts of data) or model advantage ML model instead of a simpler one to compute the risk- (associated to ML as high-end technology). We find that weighted assets following the Internal Ratings Based ML models outperform Logit both in classification and in (IRB) approach. Our benchmark results show that calibration, particularly XGBoost, existing a model implementing XGBoost instead of Lasso could yield advantage that can be statistically isolated from an savings from 12.4% to 17% in capital requirements, information advantage. Nevertheless, most complex depending on the type of underlying assets. models like Deep Learning (Neural Networks), do not necessarily predict better. Recent surveys show that financial institutions are increasingly adopting Machine Learning (ML) tools in Second, we propose a novel approach to translate this several areas of credit risk management, like regulatory statistical performance into actual economic impact of capital calculation, optimizing provisions, credit-scoring or using ML models in credit default prediction. Taking as a monitoring outstanding loans (BoE, 2019; Fernández, basis the Basel formulas for risk-weighted assets (RWA) 2019). While ML models usually yield better predictive and the regulatory capital requirements in the Internal performance, from a supervisory standpoint they also Ratings-Based (IRB) approach, we compute the savings in bring new challenges, like interpretability of the results, terms of minimum capital requirements which could be stability of the predictions and governance of the models achieved by using more advanced algorithms, in particular (EBA, 2020; BdF, 2020). Given the novelty and complexity XGBoost, compared to traditional techniques like Lasso. of some ML models, defining an adequate supervisory We perform a step-by-step computation of the capital model evaluation approach is not an easy task. Therefore, requirements for both methods. Out of nearly 75,000 loans before conducting any model risk analysis, it is essential to in our dataset, we use around 60,000 to train the models understand the real economic gains that financial and make predictions of the probability of default (PD) over BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 11
FEATURES Figure 1 RANKING PDS PER MODEL 1 LASSO 2 XGBoss 0.30 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 OBSERVED DEFAULT RATE PD ESTIMATED the remaining 15,000 loans.1 We organise the predictions 17 % lower for XGBoost than for Lasso. These capital proportionally into 50 buckets (about 300 loans in each savings come from two sources. First, the difference in the bucket), from lower to higher values of PD. The results are distribution of loans in buckets between models. Lasso’s displayed in Figure 1. The discrepancy between the PD distribution is particularly flat in areas with low PD observed default rate (blue line) and the average PD (red (Figure 1), accumulating a disproportionately large amount line) is greater for Lasso than for XGBoost, as Lasso of loans at around 1.5% of PD. According to the Basel tends to both overestimate and underestimate the formulas, the K function of a group of loans is mainly fraction of default. concave and increases with the PD of the loans, particularly for low PDs. Second, the difference in the number of In order to get the approval from a supervisor, the buckets found within each model. Since XGBoost’s PD classification into buckets must comply with two criteria: (i) distribution (Figure 1 right) fits the observed default better risk heterogeneity between buckets, and (ii) risk than Lasso’s, XGBoost ends up with more buckets in the homogeneity within buckets. To meet both criteria, we final rank (eight instead of six). This implies, due to the sequentially reduce the number of buckets. Out of the 50 concavity of the RWA Basel function over the parameter starting buckets, we end up with six for Lasso and eight PD, a difference in capital requirements in its favour. for XGBoost. Lasso finds fewer buckets because we are constrained by its underlying PD distribution, which Our results indicate that ML models, due to their better presents important flat areas, undifferentiated, that do not statistical performance, could generate significant savings allow further disaggregation (Figure 1 left). for financial institutions in terms of regulatory capital requirements compared to traditional statistical models. Once we have our final bucket classification for Lasso and The magnitude of our results suggests that supervisors XGBoost, we calculate the capital requirements (K) for need to thoroughly investigate the risks associated with each bucket, and find that the average K can be up to the use of these models, both from a micro and macro- prudential perspective, in order to ease the adoption of 1 Different train-test partitions do not affect the results of this section. this innovation in the market. BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 12
FEATURES REFERENCES BdF (2020). “Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Finance,” Fintech Innovation Hub ACPR. Banque de France. June 2020. BoE (2019). “Machine learning in UK financial services.” Bank of England Fernández, Ana (2019). ”Inteligencia artificial en los servicios financieros.” Boletín Económico 2/2019. Artículos Analíticos. Banco de España EBA (2020). ”Report on Big Data and Advanced Analytics.” European Banking Authority. BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 13
FEATURES Urban air pollution and sick observed in post-industrial economies. Our empirical analysis is based on a novel administrative dataset from the period leaves: Evidence from social 2005-2014 that links rich information on personal and security data occupational characteristics of Spanish workers to the frequency, length, and diagnosis, of sick leaves taken. We FELIX HOLUB, LAURA HOSPIDO AND ULRICH J. WAGNER estimate the impact of air pollution on workers’ propensity to Summary of Banco de España Working Paper no. 2041 call in sick, based on weekly variation in ambient concentrations of particulate matter (PM10) across 99 cities in Air pollution poses a major threat to public health by Spain. Our baseline model is a linear regression of the share shortening lives (Deryugina et al., 2019) and increasing acute of sick-leave days on the share of high-pollution days and morbidity (Schlenker and Walker, 2016). Air pollution causes weather variables. To control for non-random assignment of additional damage by reducing productivity on the job (Graff pollution across workers, we include city-by-year, year-by- Zivin and Neidell, 2012) and by hindering human capital quarter, and worker fixed-effects. Possible remaining accumulation (Currie et al., 2009; Ebenstein et al., 2016). endogeneity is addressed in an instrumental-variables (IV) Recent research has provided credible evidence that air regression that exploits exogenous variation in PM10 driven by pollution damages the economy also via reductions in labor dust storms in Northern Africa. Under certain meteorological supply in the context of emerging economies (Hanna and conditions, storms in the Sahara Desert stir up dust into high Oliva, 2015; Aragón et al., 2017), but little is known so far altitudes. These dust clouds can travel very long distances about this relationship in post-industrial societies where and reach European territory several times a year. The arrival pollution levels are low and productivity is high. of Sahara dust occurs throughout all of Spain, and it is most frequently observed on the Canary Islands, due to their Our paper provides the first causal estimates of how many geographical proximity to the Sahara, where the work days are lost due to air pollution concentrations typically phenomenon is popularly known as “Calima”. Because Figure 1 TRENDS IN POLLUTION, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 2005-2014 1 SHARE OF HIGH-POLLUTION DAYS (a) 2 EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCER WAGES (b) 100 7.5 .4 .3 95 7 Million workers Euros of 2018 .2 90 6.5 .1 85 0 6 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Year Year PM10 > 50 ?g/m³ Affiliated workers (cities in the sample) PM10 > 37.5 ?g/m³ Real daily producer wage NOTES: Figure 1.1 displays the share of worker days with PM10 concentration exceeding EU 24-hour limit of 50 mg/m3 (solid line) and the share of worker days with concentration in excess of 75% of the limit value (dashed line). The figure is based on our sample of 99 Spanish cities with at least 40,000 inhabitants. PM10 concentrations are weighted by the number of social security affiliates in each city and year. Figure 1.2 displays the number of workers affiliated with the General Social Security Regime on our sample of 99 Spanish cities with at least 40,000 inhabitants (solid line) and the daily producer wage, expressed in constant 2018 Euros (dashed line). BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 14
FEATURES Calima events substantially increase non-anthropogenic response of vulnerable workers (defined as those belonging PM10 concentrations, the cities affected by this to the top-five percentile of the distribution of sick leaves phenomenon are allowed to discount the measured taken during the pre-estimation period) is more than three 24-hour-mean concentration for this effect. Official PM10 times stronger than the response of healthy workers. discounts constitute a valid instrument for pollution Furthermore, our analysis reveals that job security matters, in because they shift local PM10 concentrations in ways that that workers with a high predicted risk of losing their job are plausibly orthogonal to local conditions that drive sick respond less strongly to a pollution shock than others. This leaves, after conditioning on weather. finding suggests that exacerbated presenteeism could adversely affect future health outcomes and lower productivity Our IV estimates imply that a 10%-reduction in high-pollution in this tier of the labor market. These interactions of behavior events reduces the weekly absence rate by 0.0213 and labor market institutions have a large impact on estimates percentage points, i.e. by 0.8% of the mean absence rate of the external costs of air pollution that arise from changes in (2.79%). The estimation results allow us to compute a lower labor supply. If we adjust the above-mentioned benefits of air bound on the benefits of improving urban air quality in Spain. quality improvements to account for presenteeism, the We proceed in two steps. First, we calculate the reduction in impact estimates imply a corresponding increase in sick days caused by a specific improvement in air quality. To production worth €706 million. Irrespective of which number translate this into a monetary benefit, we then multiply this one prefers, this exercise shows that the productivity-related number by the average daily producer wage. Under the benefits of air quality improvements that occurred in Spain assumption that workers are paid their marginal product, this between 2005 and 2014 were both economically and approximates the value of incremental production enabled by statistically significant. the reduction in sick days. While improving air quality yields sizable additional benefits by reducing mortality, human REFERENCES suffering, and medical treatment costs, we focus on foregone Aragón, F., Miranda, J. J., and Oliva, P. (2017). Particulate matter production because this component of the social costs of air and labor supply: The role of caregiving and non-linearities. pollution is directly linked to our outcome variable and has not Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 86, 295–309. yet been quantified in previous research. Currie, J., Hanushek, E. A., Kahn, E. M., Neidell, M., and Rivkin, S. G. (2009). Does pollution increase school absences? In particular, we evaluate the cumulative benefits of the Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (4), 682–694. actual air quality improvements that have taken place in urban Spain over the period. The left-hand side graph of Deryugina,T., Heutel, G., Miller, N. H., Molitor, D., and Reif, J. (2019). The mortality and medical costs of air pollution: Figure 1 shows that worker exposure to PM10 concentrations Evidence from changes in wind direction. American Economic exceeding the EU 24-hour limit of 50 µg/m³ decreased from Review, 109 (12), 4178–4219. 18.8% in 2005 to just under 2% in 2014. This improvement Ebenstein, A., Lavy, V., and Roth, S. (2016). The long-run in ambient air quality saved at least €503 million in foregone economic consequences of high-stakes examinations: Evidence from transitory variation in pollution. American production by reducing worker absence by more than 5.55 Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8 (4), 36–65. million days. It is important to note that this calculation is affected by major economic fluctuations that occurred Graff Zivin, J. and Neidell, M. (2012). The impact of pollution on worker productivity. American Economic Review, 102 (7), during the sample period, depicted in the right-hand side 3652–3673. graph of Figure 1. We account for this by using annual Hanna, R. and Oliva, P. (2015). The effect of pollution on labor values of employment and wages. supply: Evidence from a natural experiment in Mexico City. Journal of Public Economics, 122, 68–79. We uncover two important sources of treatment heterogeneity. Schlenker, W. and Walker, W. R. (2016). Airports, air pollution, One relates to preexisting medical conditions that we infer and contemporaneous health. Review of Economic Studies, from a worker’s sick leave record. We estimate that the health 83 (2), 768–809. BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 15
FEATURES Raising Markups to Survive: costs are a theoretical construct, so one needs a proxy for them. Second, output price data at the firm level is scarce, Small Spanish Firms during if not inexistent. For this reason, we rely on recent the Great Recession methodological advances in production function estimation (e.g. De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012), PILAR GARCÍA-PEREA, AITOR LACUESTA AND PAU ROLDAN-BLANCO measuring firm-level markups as the ratio of a variable Summary of Banco de España Working Paper no. 2033 input’s elasticity to output on that input’s share of total sales. The Banco de España data proves to be an excellent Over the past few decades, profit rates and various other resource because not only is it highly representative of the measures of market concentration have been on the rise in Spanish economy (containing a large amount of firms and the United States (De Loecker et al, 2020). These patterns a very high percentage of aggregate value added), but it of the data have attracted much attention recently in both also contains very disaggregated information on the academic as well as policy circles for their impact on structure of costs, allowing us to disentangle variable productivity dynamics, the composition of industries and inputs (e.g. materials and labor expenses from workers ultimately consumer welfare. The evidence points to with fixed-term contracts) from fixed inputs (e.g. other rapidly growing and highly productive firms as the drivers operating expenses and labor expenses from open- of this phenomenon, with these firms leading the increase ended contracts with large firing costs). It is this latter in markups and the decline in the labor share (Autor et al. aspect which allows us to make the main point of the 2017 and 2020). However, these trends seem to be less paper: the evolution of firm-level markups in Spain can be pronounced in Europe, and be driven by factors seemingly explained by firms’ efforts to rebalance their cost structure unrelated to the dynamics of superstar companies. between variable and fixed inputs, a behavioral response to the cycle, rather than by reasons of a more structural In this article, we exploit rich balance-sheet data from the nature. Therefore, in the case of Spain, the evolution of Banco de España to document the behavior of markups markups may not reflect aggregate changes in the at the aggregate level in Spain, and perform various competitive structure of markets, but rather an idiosyncratic decompositions to help us identify the main drivers response of firms to economic conditions. behind their evolution over the period 2004-2017. Our main finding is that, contrary to the United States, markup The figure above shows the evolution of the sales- dynamics were primarily led by small and unproductive weighted average markup (measured relative to materials) firms. Particularly in response to the Great Recession of over the period 2004-2017. The average markup has been 2008, these firms were unable to increase their productive efficiency when their average costs rose due to a sharp Figure 1 increase in the fixed part of their production costs, and SALES-WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARKUP (2004 = 1) this translated into higher price markups. This behavioral 1.14 response, related to the composition of the structure of 1.12 costs, seems to indicate that these firms, when faced 1.10 with economic hardship, may have preferred to increase Normalized Markup 1.08 their markups in an attempt to survive in their sector even 1.06 if this may have come at the expense of losing some 1.04 market share in the process. 1.02 1.00 Measuring price markups (defined as the ratio of a firm’s 0.98 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 final output price to the marginal cost of producing it) is Year challenging because of at least two reasons. First, marginal BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 16
FEATURES normalized to one in 2004. We observe that markups are in some specific sectors after 2009, most notably in countercyclical, rising by about 13ppt between 2004 and Construction, Supplies and Real Estate. 2009, and declining slightly thereafter. The behavior in the first part of the sample is roughly common across Most importantly, we find that the behavior of average most sectors of activity, albeit markups continued to rise markups is driven by small and unproductive firms. First, Figure 2 SALES-WEIGHTED AND UNWEIGHTED AVERAGE INPUT COSTS SHARES, RELATIVE TO FIRM SALES, BY TYPE OF INPUT 1 MATERIALS/SALES 2 GENERAL COSTS/SALES 0.65 0.28 0.26 0.60 0.24 0.55 0.22 0.20 0.50 0.18 0.16 0.45 0.14 0.40 0.12 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 3 LABOUR COSTS/SALES 4 TEMP LABOUR COSTS/SALES 0.40 0.09 0.08 0.35 0.07 0.30 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.15 0.02 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 5 PERM LABOUR COSTS/SALES 6 FINANCIAL EXPENSES/SALES 0.35 0.030 0.30 0.025 0.25 0,020 0.20 0.015 0.15 0.010 0.10 0.005 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 SALES-WEIGHTED UNWEIGHTED BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 17
FEATURES most of the increase during the Great Recession is due to However, we find that most of the evolution of the sales- the firms at the very top of the markup distribution, who weighted markup is explained by changes in the composition happen to be firms with relatively low levels of productivity of industries among surviving firms, as well as by changes in and low market shares. Second, the firms that increase their the markups of these firms themselves, rather than by the markup the most (in relative terms) during this period were extensive margin of entry and exit of firms. precisely this group of small and unproductive companies. All in all, our study demonstrates that understanding the To understand what is behind this phenomenon, we next structure of firm’s balance sheets is key to understand turn to the behavior of different variable and fixed costs over the behavior of markups in Spain. Rather than reflecting this period. In the figure, the black line is the sales-weighted change in market power per se, the rise in markups during share of each input relative to firm turnover (sales), while the the Great Recession seems to have been driven by a red line is an unweighted average. By construction, when reshuffling of cost expenditures away from variable and into the sales-weighted average is above the unweighted fixed inputs. This was particularly the case among small and average, smaller firms (in terms of sales) have a lower input unproductive firms, who may have behaved in this manner share of sales. As seen in the figure, there exist sizable in order to soften the blow of the shock onto their profits, differences in the terms of the cost structure of firms by firm and thereby increase their chances of survival. size, especially regarding the contribution of materials and labor expenses. First, larger firms devote a larger share of REFERENCES their sales to paying for material inputs (the variable input Autor, D., D. Dorn, L. F. Katz, C. Patterson and J. V. Reenen relative to which our markup estimates are computed). In 2017). Concentrating on the fall of the labor share. American response to the Great Recession, all firms decreased the Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 107 (5), 180 – 185. share of their sales that pays for material expenses, but this — (2020). The fall of the labor share and the rise of superstar ratio decreased disproportionally more for smaller firms, firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135, 645 – 709. explaining the stronger response in markups for these De Loecker, J., J. Eeckhout and G. Unger (2020). The rise of firms. This phenomenon is reversed for inputs with higher market power and the macroeconomic implications. Quarterly adjustment costs, such as general costs and labor Journal of Economics, 135 (2), 561 – 644. expenses related to permanent workers on open-ended — and F. Warzynski (2012). Markups and firm-level export contracts with high firing costs. In both cases, the share of status. American Economic Review, 102 (6), 2437 – 2471. sales paying for these fixed inputs increased, indicating that in response to the adverse economic shock, continuing firms shifted their resources away from variable costs into fixed ones, perhaps in an attempt to soften the adverse effects of the shock on their economic profits and their chances at survival. To complement this analysis, we conclude on the evolution of firm demographics and measures of market concentration during this period. We show that, in spite of the aforementioned behavioral responses at the firm level, we do observe a decline in firm entry (from about 11% to about 7% only in the period 2007-2009) and a rise in firm exit (from about 4% to 8% in the same period), as well as a mild increase in the share of industry sales captured by the ten largest firms (on average, from 47% in 2008 to 56% in 2017). BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 18
PUBLICATIONS Recent working papers WHO TRULY BEARS (BANK) TAXES? EVIDENCE FROM ONLY SHIFTING Link to Working Papers page STATUTORY INCIDENCE GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, DAVID MARTÍNEZ-MIERA AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN INTERNATIONAL JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ BUSINESS CYCLES Working paper no. 2040 MÁXIMO CAMACHO, MATÍAS PACCE AND GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS Working Paper no. 2034 URBAN AIR POLLUTION AND SICK LEAVES: EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL SECURITY DATA FELIX HOLUB, LAURA HOSPIDO AND ULRICH J APPLICATION OF TEXT MINING TO THE WAGNER ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE-RELATED Working paper no. 2041 DISCLOSURES ÁNGEL IVÁN MORENO AND TERESA CAMINERO Working paper no. 2035 THE NARRATIVE ABOUT THE ECONOMY AS A SHADOW FORECAST: AN ANALYSIS USING BANCO DE ESPAÑA QUARTERLY REPORT WAGE DETERMINATION AND THE BITE OF NÉLIDA DÍAZ SOBRINO, CORINNA GHIRELLI, SAMUEL COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS IN ITALY AND HURTADO, JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND ALBERTO URTASUN SPAIN: EVIDENCE FROM THE METAL Working paper no. 2042 WORKING INDUSTRY EFFROSYNI ADAMOPOULOU AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA REFORMING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX Working paper no. 2036 IN SPAIN NEZIH GUNER, JAVIER LÓPEZ-SEGOVIA AND ROBERTO RAMOS SCREENING AND LOAN ORIGINATION TIME: Working paper no. 2043 LENDING STANDARDS, LOAN DEFAULTS AND BANK FAILURES MIKEL BEDAYO, GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, JOSÉ-LUIS OPTIMAL PROGRESSIVITY OF PERSONAL PEYDRÓ AND RAQUEL VEGAS INCOME TAX: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM Working paper no. 2037 EVALUATION FOR SPAIN DARÍO SERRANO-PUENTE Working paper no. 2101 WHY COGNITIVE TEST SCORES OF SPANISH ADULTS ARE SO LOW? THE ROLE OF SCHOOLING AND SOCIOECONOMIC ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY AND DIVISIVE BACKGROUND POLITICS: EVIDENCE FROM THE BRINDUSA ANGHEL, PILAR CUADRADO AND DOS ESPAÑAS FEDERICO TAGLIATI SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE, HANNES MUELLER Working paper no. 2038 AND CARLOS SANZ Working paper no. 2102 THE SHORT- AND LONG-RUN EMPLOYMENT IMPACT OF COVID-19 THROUGH THE EMU DEEPENING AND SOVEREIGN DEBT EFFECTS OF REAL AND FINANCIAL SPREADS: USING POLITICAL SPACE TO SHOCKS ON NEW FIRMS ACHIEVE POLICY SPACE CHRISTOPH ALBERT, ANDREA CAGGESE AND IVÁN KATARYNIUK, VÍCTOR MORA-BAJÉN AND BEATRIZ GONZÁLEZ JAVIER J. PÉREZ Working paper no. 2039 Working paper no. 2103 BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 19
PUBLICATIONS ARE WE MOVING TOWARDS AN ENERGY- TIME VARIATION IN LIFECYCLE CONSUMPTION EFFICIENT LOW-CARBON ECONOMY? AND INCOME AN INPUT-OUTPUT LMDI DECOMPOSITION YUNUS AKSOY, HENRIQUE S. BASSO AND CAROLYN OF CO2 EMISSIONS FOR SPAIN AND THE EU28 ST AUBYN DARÍO SERRANO-PUENTE Working paper no. 2111 Working paper no. 2104 PRICE SETTING IN CHILE: MICRO EVIDENCE UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE OF FROM CONSUMER ON-LINE PRICES DURING MACHINE LEARNING MODELS TO PREDICT THE SOCIAL OUTBREAK AND COVID-19 CREDIT DEFAULT: A NOVEL APPROACH FOR JENNIFER PEÑA AND ELVIRA PRADES SUPERVISORY EVALUATION Working paper no. 2112 ANDRÉS ALONSO AND JOSÉ MANUEL CARBÓ Working paper no. 2105 DOES THE ADDED WORKER EFFECT MATTER? NEZIH GUNER, YULIYA A. KULIKOVA AND ARNAU MARKET POLARIZATION AND THE PHILLIPS VALLADARES-ESTEBAN CURVE Working paper no. 2113 JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE AND PABLO BURRIEL Working paper no. 2106 UNEQUAL TRADE, UNEQUAL GAINS: THE HETEROGENEOUS IMPACT OF MERCOSUR RODOLFO G. CAMPOS AND JACOPO TIMINI NEW DIMENSIONS OF REGULATORY Working paper no. 2114 COMPLEXITY AND THEIR ECONOMIC COST. AN ANALYSIS USING TEXT MINING JUAN DE LUCIO AND JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI Working paper no. 2107 Recent occasional papers Link to Occasional Papers page ENDOGENOUS TIME VARIATION IN VECTOR TENDENCIAS RECIENTES DE LA POBLACIÓN EN AUTOREGRESSIONS LAS ÁERAS RURALES Y URBANAS DE ESPAÑA DANILO LEIVA-LEON AND LUIS UZEDA EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO Working paper no. 2108 AND ROBERTO RAMOS Occasional Paper no. 2027 WEATHER, MOBILITY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE CORINNA GHIRELLI, ANDREA GONZÁLEZ, JOSÉ LUIS COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT ON EURO HERRERA AND SAMUEL HURTADO AREA WAGE GROWTH: PANEL DATA ANALYSIS Working paper no. 2109 ÁNGEL LUIS GÓMEZ Occasional Paper no. 2028 FED COMMUNICATION ON FINANCIAL STABILITY CONCERNS AND MONETARY ANALYSIS OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS POLICY DECISIONS: REVELATIONS IN SPAIN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE FROM SPEECHES COVID-19 CRISIS: INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, KLODIANA ISTREFI, FLORENS ODENDAHL PRE-INSOLVENCY ARRANGEMENTS AND AND GIULIA SESTIERI THE INSOLVENCY MORATORIUM Working paper no. 2110 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ Occasional Paper no. 2029 BANCO DE ESPAÑA | RESEARCH UPDATE, SPRING 2021 | 20
You can also read