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Risk Analysis for 2018
Risk Analysis for 2018
Plac Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland T +48 22 205 95 00 F +48 22 205 95 01 frontex@frontex.europa.eu www.frontex.europa.eu Warsaw, February 2018 Risk Analysis Unit Frontex reference number: 2671 / 2018 Paper version: PDF: TT-AC-18-001-EN-C TT-AC-18-001-EN-N ISBN 978-92-9471-099-4 ISBN 978-92-9471-100-7 ISSN 1977-4451 ISSN 1977-446X doi:10.2819/79485 doi:10.2819/460626 © Frontex, 2018 All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Cover photo: Swedish vessel – Triton Operation © Frontex, 2017 All rights reserved. DISCLAIMERS This is a Frontex document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its author- ities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used on the maps. The contents of open-source boxes are presented only to give context and media representation of irregu- lar-migration phenomena without engaging Frontex responsibility. Throughout the report, references to Kosovo* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Ko- sovo declaration of independence. 2 of 54 Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
Table of contents
1. Preface 6
2. Summary 8
3. Introduction 11
4. Methodology 12
5. Situational picture in 2017 15
5.1. Main trends 16
5.2. Illegal border-crossings: Overview 18
5.3. Clandestine entries 20
5.4. Refusals of entry 21
5.5. Fraudulent documents 22
5.6. Within the EU 24
5.7. Returns 25
6. Featured analyses 27
6.1. Secondary movements in the EU 28
6.2. Returns, is the system effective? 29
6.3. The role of border guards in countering terrorism 30
6.4. The impact of maritime cross-border crime to Europe 32
6.5. Debriefing interviews highlight key patterns 34
6.6. Trafficking in human beings: vulnerabilities at the external borders 36
7. Outlook 38
8. Conclusions 41
9. Statistical annex 42
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
4 of 54 Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
List of acronyms used
BCP border-crossing point
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EC European Commission
EDF European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EEZ exclusive economic zones
ETIAS European Travel Information and Authorisation System
EU European Union
EU+ 28 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
EU-Lisa European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems
in the area of freedom, security and justice
Eurodac European Dactyloscopy
Eurojust European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit
Europol European Police Office
Eurostat Statistical office of the European Union
FIRE Fighting Illicit Firearms Trafficking Routes and Actors at European Level
FRAN Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FTF foreign terrorist fighter
FTZ free-trade zones
IBM Integrated Border Management
ICJ International Court of Justice
ID identification document
INTCEN European Union’s Intelligence Analysis Centre
Interpol International Criminal Police Organization
IOM International Organisation for Migration
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
ISIS/ISIL/Daesh Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JO Joint Operation
OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office (Office européen de lutte antifraude)
PeDRA Processing Personal Data for Risk Analysis
RAU Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SAC Schengen Associated Country
THB trafficking in human beings
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
Search and rescue by Dutch vessel Amstel – Triton Operation, 2016
© Frontex
1. Preface
The year 2017, the first full year for Fron- Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians) EU Member States to cement our rela-
tex as the European Border and Coast rose significantly. tions with our partners at the national
Guard Agency, saw a significant fall in The fluid situation at the EU’s ex- level. Their duties will also include con-
the detections of illegal border-crossing ternal borders and the ever-changing tributing to future vulnerability assess-
along the EU’s external borders. This was modus operandi of the smugglers under- ments. Their presence in the Member
mainly due to a drop in detections on lines the need for a European response States will further illustrate that national
the Eastern and Central Mediterranean to the shifting migratory pressure, with authorities and the Agency together cre-
migratory routes. The Western Balkans a strengthened Frontex playing a key ate the European Border and Coast Guard.
route also experienced a large fall in il- part in channelling the necessary re- The Agency has also taken on new
legal border-crossings. sources. For the first time, the Euro- tasks to help combat cross-border crime.
The sudden plunge in the number of pean Border and Coast Guard regulation Officers deployed by Frontex have helped
irregular migrants reaching Italy in mid- clearly states that ‘the management of Member States arrest hundreds of sus-
2017 was the most noteworthy develop- the external borders is a shared respon- pected facilitators and detect fraudulent
ment at the external borders of the EU sibility of the Union and the Member documents. Combatting document fraud
since the implementation of the EU-Tur- States’. As a result, the Agency acts as the and targeting the organised crime groups
key statement in March 2016. operational arm of the EU, and a partner that are involved in producing fake and
Nevertheless, the overall pressure for the Member States. fraudulent documents are among the
on Europe’s external borders remained Frontex is a cornerstone of the EU’s Agency’s priorities. These actions have a
relatively high, and the Western Medi- area of freedom, security and justice. direct impact on the internal security of
terranean route saw the highest num- To help Europe better prepare for future the EU as detection of document fraud,
ber of irregular migrants since Frontex challenges at its external borders, Fron- along with sharing intelligence collected
began systematically collecting data in tex has begun conducting vulnerability at the external borders, is a key tool in
2009. The increase became especially assessments in Member States and al- combatting the terrorist threat.
pronounced in the second half of the ready shared its first findings with na- The new Frontex, as the European Bor-
year when the number of nationals tional authorities. In 2018, the agency der and Coast Guard Agency, is more ac-
from the Maghreb countries (notably will deploy its first liaison officers to tive at the EU external borders than ever.
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
© Frontex
At any moment, the Agency has between In 2017, Frontex deployed additional provide an additional layer of control over
1 300 and 1 800 officers from Member liaison officers to non-EU countries – Ni- travellers by determining the eligibil-
States deployed in its operations, many ger and Serbia. The agency also has a li- ity of all visa-exempt non-EU nationals
times the number from just a few years aison officer in Turkey. These officers to travel to the Schengen Area. Fron-
ago. In case of an emergency at Europe’s work with the national authorities to tex will host the Central Unit of ETIAS,
external borders, Frontex has at its dis- strengthen cooperation in the fields re- which will help improve internal secu-
posal 1 500 officers, along with additional lated to border management and mon- rity, limit public health risks and iden-
vessels, aircraft, vehicles and other tech- itor the flows on key migratory routes tify persons who may pose a risk before
nical equipment. Frontex is more in- outside the EU. Frontex will continue they arrive at the EU’s external borders.
volved than ever in different stages of to develop the network of liaison offic- Amid its expanding role in the ar-
migration management in the EU. ers in countries outside the EU. eas of border control and security, Fron-
The Agency has taken large leaps in The sea, especially along the Medi- tex has reorganised to reflect its many
the area of returns to become an essen- terranean routes, will remain the most new responsibilities. Just over the last
tial actor in law enforcement on the Eu- active path for illegal crossing of the EU year, the Agency has grown by a third,
ropean level. In 2017, Frontex assisted external borders, but also one of the most to a staff of more than 530, and it will
Member States in returning more than dangerous for migrant smuggling re- more than double by 2020. Together with
14 000 people whose asylum applications quiring humanitarian assistance efforts. its many partners, the growing Euro-
were rejected and who did not receive Frontex, the European Border and Coast pean Border and Coast Guard Agency re-
subsidiary status or were no longer eligi- Guard Agency, is leading the way to en- mains committed to tackling the many
ble to remain in the EU. This was about hance the cooperation among various challenges outlined in this report, help-
a third more than the previous year and maritime security players, leading to ad- ing ensure security of Europe’s external
accounted for 9 % of the 151 398 effective ditional coordination in search and res- borders, EU Member States and Euro-
returns conducted by Member States. To cue efforts, as well as other coast guard pean citizens.
help address the challenges of returns, functions related to border control. As a
Frontex has a pool of return experts at result, border control authorities are in-
the disposal of Member States organis- creasingly involved in detection of cross-
ing return operations. border crimes, such as drug trafficking
Another key element of successful and smuggling of excise goods, but also
migration management is cooperation the detection of pollution and illegal fish-
with the countries of origin and transit ing. While these synergies create new
of migrants. From exchange of informa- opportunities, they also require scaling
tion to cooperation on returns, Frontex up of border resources.
has been increasingly active beyond the Together with EU-Lisa and Europol, Fabrice Leggeri
European Union. The Agency continues Frontex is already preparing for the im- Executive Director
to strengthen its relations with the bor- plementation of the European Travel
der authorities of third countries, espe- Information and Authorisation System
cially on topics related to security issues. (ETIAS), whose core function will be to
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
2. Summary In 2017, Member States reported a further At the EU’s external border with Tur- tries who presented themselves with drop in the detections of illegal border- key, the migratory pressure in 2017 re- fraudulent documents at BCPs on en- crossing along the EU’s external bor- mained roughly on a level with the try to the EU/ Schengen area. In con- ders, with 204 719 detections recorded months after the implementation of trast to the decreasing trend observed at that year. This represents a 60 % decrease the EU-Turkey statement. the external EU border, the number of compared with the 511 047 detections of The number of migrants detected on document fraud detections on second- 2016 (and an 89 % decrease compared with the Western Mediterranean route hit a ary movements within the EU/Schen- the 1.8 million detections at the height new record high in 2017, more than dou- gen area increased by more than 10 % of the migratory crisis in 2015). bling the previous record of last year. and reached one of the highest num- This decrease was in particular as- While during much of the first half of bers since 2013. sociated with a significant drop in de- the year the numbers were on a par with Member States reported a drop in ille- tections on the Eastern Mediterranean those reported during the last months of gal stay between 2016 and 2017, the sec- (and secondary to it the Western Balkan 2016, the flow reached a new level in June ond year in a row when a decrease in the route) and on the Central Mediterranean of the year. Domestic issues in Morocco, number of illegal stayers was recorded. route. The strong rise in detections on the main transit country for migrants This trend mirrored the fall in numbers the Western Mediterranean route, the heading to Spain, created an opening for of illegal border-crossings at the EU’s ex- displacement effects on the other routes more departures from Morocco’s western ternal borders. and the absolute number of detections, coast in particular, which starting from Despite a steady number of return which exceeds any total recorded in re- the second quarter of the year led to the decisions compared with 2016, in 2017 cent history before the year 2014, to- use of high-capacity boats able to trans- Member States continued to struggle to gether indicate that the pressure on the port large numbers of migrants. effectively return those whose asylum EU’s external border remains high. Corresponding to the changes in the application was rejected and who were The sudden reversal in the numbers of migratory routes, the relative share of not granted subsidiary protection status. irregular migrants detected on the Cen- African nationals increased compared While the effective returns of European tral Mediterranean in July 2017 is argua- with 2016, driven by fast-growing num- and American migrants stayed roughly bly the most significant development at bers of migrants from Maghreb countries on a par with last year, the number of the EU’s external borders since the im- (notably Moroccans, Algerians and Tuni- migrants returned to Africa and Asia fell plementation of the EU-Turkey state- sians) in the latter part of the year. As a further. Returns to West Africa continue ment. The numbers in the first half of result, African nationals accounted for to show the lowest ratio between effec- 2017 roughly mirrored those reported almost two-thirds of irregular migrants tive returns and return decisions. In the in 2016 at an elevated level, but in July, arriving at the shores of the EU. meantime, the Agency offers Member mostly due to internal developments in Regional differences are notable, States increased support in organising Libya, the numbers dropped suddenly to however, as the number of Eastern Af- return operations, having returned more less than half the level of June. An even rican nationals fell by a lot more than than 14 000 persons in 2017, which repre- more marked relative decrease, to al- the relative decline in numbers caused sents a 32 % increase compared with the most a third of that level, was registered by the curb imposed by developments in previous year. in August; the numbers remained at a Libya would suggest: the numbers of Er- Looking ahead, irregular migration much lower level throughout the rest of itreans, Somalis and Ethiopians for in- by sea, and more specifically along the the year. Unrelated to the decrease in de- stance fell to roughly a fourth of their Mediterranean routes, will remain the partures from Libya, more boats success- 2016 numbers. main modus operandi for illegally cross- fully left from the shores of Tunisia and In 2017, Member States reported a to- ing the EU’s, external borders, and also Algeria in the third and forth quarters. tal of 6 700 individuals from third coun- one of the most dangerous forms of mi- 8 of 54 Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018
Triton operation, 2017
© Frontex
grant smuggling requiring humanitarian types, and attempts to evade detection movements of bona fide travellers are
assistance efforts. To tackle this phe- or identification are all likely to occur facilitated smoothly.
nomenon, cooperation among maritime in response to enhanced surveillance Given the increasing level of security
security players and the shared use of and migration control. While until re- features in modern travel documents and
assets are gaining momentum. Border cently, migrants detected at the border stricter migration policies across Mem-
control authorities are increasingly con- could swiftly continue to their final des- ber States, the misuse of genuine travel
fronted with the detection of cross-bor- tinations unhindered, the emerging pat- documents (which includes imperson-
der crimes such as drug trafficking and tern is that migrants who go undetected ation and fraudulently obtained docu-
the smuggling of excise goods, but also can arrive at their destination quickly; ments) is likely to be an entry method
the detection of pollution and fisher- it also means that they do not have to which will become more widespread.
ies issues. While synergies offer oppor- bear the consequences of being detected Finally, there is an underlying threat
tunities, they also require adaptation for illegal stay or being refused asylum. of terrorism-related travel movements
and scaling-up of border and coast guard Hence, the number of migrants under- and it is possible that foreign terrorist
resources. taking secondary movements is also ex- fighters use irregular migration routes
At the same time, border-control au- pected to rise. or facilitation networks.
thorities are expected to be increasingly Regular passenger flows across the ex-
engaged in search and rescue operations ternal border will increase significantly
covering vast areas of the Mediterranean in the coming years due to rising global
Sea, as well as being the first point of mobility. Border-control authorities will
contact for a growing number of vul- have to take on more responsibilities
nerable persons. The proportion of Af- as a consequence of visa liberalisation
rican migrants, and in particular West processes and local border traffic agree-
African migrants, detected crossing the ments. Border management will in-
border illegally is likely to grow. creasingly be risk-based, to ensure that
Swift diversification of modi operandi, interventions are focused on the move-
displacement between routes or border ments of high-risk individuals, while
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20183. Introduction
The Frontex Risk Analysis for 2018 has of risks for internal security, coopera-
been specifically designed to provide an tion with Member States, inter-agency
overview which will help make informed cooperation, cooperation with third
decisions on both common European countries, measures within the Schen-
investments and concerted actions to gen area related to border control, re-
improve the management of external turn of third-country nationals, use
borders and uphold the internal secu- of state-of-the-art technology, qual-
rity of the Union. ity control mechanisms and solidarity
Frontex operational activities aim at mechanisms.
strengthening border security through Clearly, this major change has im-
the coordination of Member States’ ac- portant implications for the analytical
tions regarding the implementation of work performed by Frontex as its risk
EU measures for the management of ex- analysis should cover all aspects of Inte-
ternal borders. The coordination of oper- grated Border Management and develop
ational activities contributes to a more a pre-warning mechanism. Therefore, as
efficient allocation of Member States’ re- much as possible, these new elements
sources and better protection of the area have been integrated into this annual
of freedom, security and justice. In this risk analysis.
context, the Risk Analysis for 2018 con- This annual report is structured as
centrates on the scope of Frontex oper- follows: (1) situational picture with em-
ational activities and, in particular, on phasis on identified migratory trends
irregular migration at the external bor- and surveillance activities utilising a
ders of the EU and Schengen Associated set of reliable indicators on irregular
Countries. migration; (2) featured analyses on key
Since the Regulation (EU) 2016 / 1624 risks affecting the security of the exter-
came into effect, the mandate of Fron- nal borders and / or internal security;
tex has been significantly enhanced to (3) presentation of outlook; and finally
ensure efficient implementation of Euro- (4) highlights on the main types of risks
pean Integrated Border Management as at the external borders.
a shared responsibility of the Union, the The Agency and in particular its Risk
Agency and of the national authorities. Analysis Unit (RAU) would like to ex-
The European Integrated Border Man- press its gratitude to all members of the
agement consists of 11 strategic compo- Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) in
nents defined in Article 4 of the Agency’s Member States for their efforts in pro-
Regulation. These are: border control, viding data and information, as well as
including measures in relation to traf- Europol, the European Asylum Support
ficking in human beings and terrorism, Office (EASO), and all colleagues involved
search and rescue operations, analysis in the preparation of this report.
Poseidon Sea Operation, 2016
© Frontex
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Frontex Situation Centre, 2017
© Frontex
4. Methodology
A coherent and comprehensive analy- documents; return decisions; effec- tics and thus may occasionally vary from
sis of the risks affecting security at the tive returns and passenger flow data those officially published by national au-
external borders requires, above all, the (when available). Data on asylum appli- thorities. Throughout 2017, some FRAN
adoption of common indicators. Consist- cations are still being collected within members performed backdated updates
ent monitoring of these indicators will the FRAN, but Frontex increasingly re- of their 2016 statistics. These updates
allow effective measures to be taken on lies on data collected by EASO, which have been accounted for in this docu-
the ground. The analysis needs to iden- has contributed to the dedicated sec- ment, hence some data presented here
tify the risks that arise at the external tion on asylum. may differ from those presented a year
borders themselves and those that arise The data were categorised by border ago in the Risk Analysis for 2017.
in third countries. type (land, air or sea) and those on land Member States were not requested to
The backbone of the Risk Analysis for borders were additionally grouped by answer specific questions in support of
2018 is the monthly statistics exchanged border section with neighbouring third this analysis. Rather, bimonthly analyt-
among Member States within the frame- countries. The data exchanged within ical reports and incident reports of Mem-
work of the FRAN. For the Risk Analy- the FRAN are compiled and analysed on ber States routinely collected within the
sis for 2018, the key indicators collected a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the FRAN, as well as other Member States’
through the FRAN were: detections of il- use of the data for management purposes contributions submitted in 2017 were
legal border-crossing through the green and to their fast sharing among Member important sources of information, es-
border or at BCPs; refusals of entry; de- State border-control authorities. pecially as regards the analysis of routes
tections of illegal stay; detections of Member States’ data processed by and modi operandi. Additionally, the out-
facilitators; detections of fraudulent Frontex are not treated as official statis- comes of debriefing activities carried
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018out in the framework of Joint Opera- gen Associated Countries and Schengen Consistent with other law-enforce-
tions constituted essential analytical Member States are considered as internal ment indicators, variation in admin-
material. borders. For the indicators on detections istrative data related to border control
Open-source information was also ef- of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, depends on several factors. In this case,
fectively exploited, especially in identi- statistics are also reported for detections the number of detections of illegal bor-
fying the main push and pull factors for at the land borders between Schengen der-crossing and refusals of entry are
irregular migration to the EU. Among Member States and those Member States both functions of the amount of effort
others, these sources included reports that have either not joined the Schen- spent, respectively, on detecting mi-
issued by government agencies, inter- gen area yet (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, grants and the actual flow of irregular
national and non-governmental organ- Romania) or have opted to stay out of it migrants to the EU. For example, in-
isations, as well as mainstream news (the United Kingdom, Ireland). Thus, a creased detections of illegal border-cross-
agencies and official EU reports. total for Member States and Schengen ing might be due to a real increase in the
External borders, a term often used Associated Countries as a whole can be flow of irregular migrants, or may in fact
in this report, refer to the borders be- presented. It was not possible to make be an outcome of more resources made
tween Member States and third coun- the aforementioned distinction for air available to detect them. In exceptional
tries. The borders between the Schengen and sea borders because Member States cases, increased resources may produce
Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland, do not habitually differentiate between a rise in reported detections while effec-
and Switzerland) and third countries are extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea con- tively masking the actual decrease in the
also considered as external borders. By nections but tend to aggregate data for irregular migratory flow, resulting from
contrast, the borders between the Schen- all arrivals per airport. a strong deterrent effect.
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 20185. Situational picture in 2017
Operation Triton, 2017
© FrontexLatest situation 2017
Reported cases
(2016)
2017 (2 219) Detections
of illegal
1 618
border-crossing
at BCPs
(7 042) Detections
6 725 of fraudulent
5.1. Main trends document users
(12 621) Detections
In 2017, illegal border-crossings dropped of applications that were lodged in the
10 213 of facilitators
to the lowest aggregate number since EU+ during the previous year. Of the ap-
2013, in particular due to a significant plicants in 2017, 8 % had previously sub-
decrease in detections on the Eastern mitted an application in the same EU+
Mediterranean and secondary to it on the reporting country (repeated applicants). (175 377) Returns
Western Balkan route. While the compar- In 2017, the reported detections of il-
ison on the annual basis shows that these legal border-crossing remained consist-
151 398 (effective)
two routes had the the most significant ently lower than the level of applications,
decline in absolute numbers, arguably, suggesting that some of the applicants
after the implementation of the EU-Tur- for international protection had entered
key statement and regaining control of Europe earlier, crossed the border unde-
the Western Balkan transit corridor, the tected, or under a visa-free scheme. Some (215 403) Refusals
most significant development took place evidence suggests that the second and of entry
on the Central Mediterranean route. On third reasons led to increases, although it 183 548
this route, a sudden reversal took place in is difficult to quantify these phenomena.
July 2017 which led to a marked drop in In 2017, there were over 111 823 with-
the number of detections of illegal bor- drawn applications, a 36 % decrease com-
der-crossing. Against these notable de- pared with 2016.2 The two main countries
creases in numbers, however, the rise in receiving applications – Germany and Detections
detections on the Western Mediterranean Italy – together accounted for half of all (511 047) of illegal
border-crossing
stands out. In particular the development withdrawals. 204 719 between BCPs
on the Western Mediterranean and the In 2017, border-control authorities for
noticeable diversion effects in the Cen- the Schengen area continued to devote
tral and Eastern Mediterranean would the majority of their efforts to entry and
suggest that while the actual pressure exit checks. This obligation increased
on the external borders remained high, significantly in 2017 when a regulation
effective action taken by Member States was adopted obliging Member States to
and the EU prevented this pressure from carry out systematic checks against rele- (305 463) Returns
(decisions)
materialising. vant databases on all persons, including
According to EASO, in 2017, as many
as 701 997 applications for international
those enjoying the right of free move-
ment under EU law when they cross the
279 215
protection were lodged in the 28 EU Mem- external borders. The amendment to
ber States plus Norway and Switzerland the Schengen Borders Code came into
(EU+).1 This represents half the number
2 In line with Art. 27 and 28 of the recast
Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/
1 At the time of writing, data for EU), an application can be withdrawn
(491 918)
Detections
December 2017 were available for 25 either explicitly (where the applicant
of the 30 EU+ countries. Missing data informs officially the determining
of persons
staying illegally
435 786
for December for Bulgaria, Greece, body of their wish to discontinue their
Malta, Portugal and Romania where application) or implicitly (where an
supplemented with weekly estimates. applicant can no longer be located
Similarly, weekly estimates were used and is judged to have abandoned the
for the missing monthly data of Cyprus procedure). At the time of writing, data
(January and March), Malta (June and for December 2017 were available for 26 of
November) and Portugal (November). the 30 EU+ countries.
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Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018effect on 7 April 2017. While this has sig- an inward passenger traffic far beyond In 2017, facilitators, who continue to
nificantly impacted the work of border that of other Member States, remaining pose a serious threat to the EU, managed
guards, so did ever-increasing passen- roughly at 35 million in 2017. to successfully operate mostly out of third
ger flows, which continue to be driven by In 2016, 13.9 million short-term uni- countries and thus, mostly out of the
visa liberalisation and local border traf- form Schengen visas were issued, a de- reach of Member States’ law enforcement
fic agreements as well as ever-increas- crease of almost 3 % compared with 2015. agencies. Overall, the number of reported
ing passenger numbers. These are most This further fall in issued short-term uni- facilitators fell by 19 %, a decline partly
visible at the air borders as a result of in- form Schengen visa was due to a variety explained by the modi operandi newly
creased mobility and the rapid expansion of factors: for instance, a visa waiver adopted by smuggling networks and the
of the supply of more affordable flight agreement for Colombians, which came general increase in their level of sophisti-
options. into effect in December 2015, led to a de- cation. Europol noted that more sophis-
As regards to visa liberalisation, the crease in the number of visas issued to ticated and dangerous methods are used
most significant development was the them by over 120 000 between 2015 and by criminals to smuggle migrants across
decision to transfer Ukraine to the list of 2016. Likewise, a short-stay visa waiver borders. For instance, cases of migrants
third countries whose nationals (using agreement with Peru entered into effect being detected in purpose-built, airtight
a biometric passport) are exempt from in March 2016, which resulted in a drop compartments in vans, lorries, cars and
visa requirements, which came into ef- in the aggregate number of visas by an- cargo trains are increasingly reported.
fect on 11 June 2017. For the three months other 50 000. Other significant changes Despite reporting a steady number of
post-visa liberalisation (July-September), in absolute numbers were a decline of return decisions compared with 2016,
the size of the passenger flow of Ukrain- over 220 000 visas for Chinese citizens, Member States continued to struggle to
ians heading to the Schengen area in- a further drop in Russian visas by over effectively return those whose asylum
creased by 15 % compared with the same 310 000 and an increase in visas issued application was rejected and who were
period one year before. Georgian citizens to Ukrainians by over 170 000. not granted subsidiary protection sta-
holding a biometric passport are also ex- In 2017, a total of 183 548 refusals of tus. While the effective returns of Eu-
empt from the visa requirement since 28 entry were reported at the external bor- ropean and American migrants stayed
March 2017. ders of the EU, a fall of 15 % compared roughly on a par with last year, the num-
Concerning the passenger flow at the with 2016. ber of migrants returned to Africa and
air border, Eurostat data – the latest avail- In 2017, Member States reported Asia fell further. Particularly, returns to
able data being that for 2016 – suggests a around 6 700 persons fraudulently us- West Africa continue to show the lowest
continuation of the gradual year-to-year ing documents at the external borders, ratio between effective returns and re-
increase in passenger transport by air, al- the lowest number since 2012. By con- turn decisions.
beit not as fast as in the previous couple trast, the number of document fraud
of years. The EU-28 data (excluding Greece detections within the EU/Schengen area
and the United Kingdom for incomplete increased by almost 9 % and reached its
datasets for 2016) showed a 1.5 % increase second highest number since 2013.
compared with a 4.4 % increase from 2014 The number of detections of illegal stay
to 2015 (for EU-28). – 435 786 reported by Member States – fell
At the land border, for the 13 Mem- by 11 % for the second year in a row after
ber States reporting data to Frontex, the the year of the height when the migra-
number of passengers increased from 110 tion crisis reached its peak (2015). In 2017,
337 008 (in 2016) to 112 468 517 (in 2017). too, illegal stayers were largely detected
The Croatian external land border – in on secondary movements; they were mi-
particular the border section with Bosnia grants who entered the EU/Schengen area
and Herzegovina – continued to receive on the Central Mediterranean route.
17 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Eastern borders route
(1 349)
Detections of illegal border-
crossing at the EU’s external
776
borders, 2017
204 718
(511 046 in 2016)
Western Balkan route Black Sea route
Route Pakistan 4 355
(130 261) (1)
Top three nationalities Afghanistan 3 388
(in 2016)
Syria 19 447 12 178 Iraq 960 537
in 2017 Nigeria 18 309
Côte d’Ivoire 14 300
Circular route from
Albania to Greece
(5 121) Eastern Mediterranean route
6 396 (182 277) Syria 16 395
Iraq 7 193
42 305 Afghanistan 3 985
Western Mediterranean route
(9 990) Morocco 4 809
Algeria 4 219
23 143 Côte d’Ivoire 3 345
Western
African route
Central Mediterranean route
(671)
(181 376) Nigeria 18 163
421 118 962
Guinea 9 714
Côte d'Ivoire 9 509
5.2. Illegal border-crossings: Overview
For the second year in a row after the re- with 2016 due to even higher migratory decline in the pool of migrants looking
cord year of 2015, Member States reported pressure from Libya than in the year be- to use the route. Hence, with 118 962 mi-
a significant decrease in the numbers fore. A trend similar to that observed in grants detected in 2017, a fall of 34 % com-
of detections of illegal border-crossing 2016 continued until June 2017 (23 461 in pared with 2016 was reported, meaning
along the EU’s external borders. The June 2017 versus 22 344 in June 2016). In that the Central Mediterranean still re-
204 719 detections reported by Member July 2017, the numbers dropped suddenly corded by far the largest number of ir-
States in 2017 represent a 60 % decrease and markedly to less than half the level regular migrants. In the second part of
compared with the 511 047 detections of of June and July (11 460), followed by an the year, migrants were increasingly pre-
2016. However, this should not distract even larger fall to almost a third of that vented from departing from Libya. At the
from the fact that the aggregate exceeds level in August (3 914). A variety of fac- same time, but unrelated to the decrease
any total reported in FRAN history be- tors, notably internal developments in in the flow from Libya, more Tunisians
fore the year 2014, an indicator that the Libya, are deemed to be the cause, not a and Algerians embarked boats in their
migratory pressure on the EU’s exter-
nal borders remained very high in 2017. Figure 1. Detections of illegal border-crossing, by main nationalities
This decrease mostly resulted from the (scale in absolute numbers, with labels showing percentages of total) in 2017
lower number of detections recorded on 41%
200 000
the Eastern Mediterranean, the West-
ern Balkan and the Central Mediterra-
nean routes.
150 000
Central Mediterranean route
4%
4%
The number of irregular migrants detected 5%
on the Central Mediterranean route at the 100 000 5%
5%
beginning of 2017 roughly mirrored that 6%
seen at the beginning of 2016, with fluc- 6%
6%
tuations very much dependent on weather
50 000
conditions in the winter months. After 9%
Bangladesh
Morocco
January, however, the registered num-
Pakistan
Gambia
9% Côte
Guinea
Others
bers were at an elevated level compared
Mali
Iraq
Syria Nigeria d’Ivoire
0
18 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018respective countries and headed to Sic- to Western Europe, as well as the smug- June 2017. In the latter part of the year,
ily and Sardinia. Finally, the Turkey- It- gling activity via the Ionian Sea (1 465), the observed increased usage of rubber
aly maritime corridor remained open to increased. dinghies east of the Strait of Gibraltar
smugglers, who nevertheless transported – used by sub-Saharan migrants – sug-
fewer migrants in 2017. Black Sea route gests increased activity of people smug-
gling networks, as the dinghies and the
Eastern Mediterranean route The Black Sea route was temporarily used required engines are unlikely to have
in 2017, with 537 migrants detected on been procured by the (mostly sub-Saha-
At the EU’s external border with Turkey, the Black Sea between August and No- ran) migrants themselves.
the migratory pressure in 2017 remained vember, accounting for the highest
roughly on a level with the months af- number of migrants ever detected on Western African route
ter the implementation of the EU-Turkey this route since 2009.
statement (ranging from 1 601 to 7 136 de- On the Western African route, the 421
tected illegal border-crossings per month Western Balkan route detected irregular migrants represent
in 2017). Therefore, the statement has the lowest number since 2015. The low
continued to prevent a large share of de- The flow of migrants across the Western number on the route connecting Sene-
partures. Regarding the sea border, the Balkans continued to somewhat reflect gal, Mauritania and Morocco with the
comparison between preventions of de- the influx on the Eastern Mediterranean Spanish Canary Islands is a success to
partures and apprehensions seems to indi- route, yet at a lower level compared with be attributed to the Memorandum of
cate that the overall number of attempts to previous years given the continuing ef- Understanding between Spain, Sene-
cross the Eastern Aegean reached a higher forts made on the route to curb the flow. gal and Mauritania, which continued
level, particularly in September. On the The detected illegal border-crossings at to deliver joint surveillance activities
Greek land border with Turkey, 5 540 re- the EU’s external border mostly took and effective returns of people detected
ported illegal border-crossings represented place at the Serbian borders, with many crossing the border illegally.
the highest number of detections since migrants stranded in Serbia known to
2012. This is, alongside the temporary make several attempts to cross, often at Eastern land border route
re-emergence of detections in the Black different border sections.
Sea, the outcome of diversion effects as In 2017, the Eastern land border reported
the route via the Eastern Aegean islands Western Mediterranean route the lowest number of illegal border-
is becoming less attractive, while at the crossings since the inception of FRAN
same time a large pool of potential mi- The numbers of migrants detected on data collection. In particular, at the
grants remain stranded in Turkey. Fur- the Western Mediterranean route hit a land borders with Russia the numbers
thermore, strengthened controls on the new record high in 2017, more than dou- dropped, indicating that the Russian au-
Western Balkan route and both the num- bling the previous record of last year. thorities are continuing good coopera-
ber of people stuck on the Hotspot islands While during much of the first half of tion with the respective Member States’
and the Greek mainland and/or their wait- the year the numbers were on a par with local authorities. More than one-third
ing time means that the amount of docu- those reported during the last months of detected migrants were Vietnamese
ment fraud detections at Greek air borders of 2016, the flow reached new levels in citizens.
19 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
by border section (people hiding in vehicles), 2017
1 618 (2 219)
Number in parenthesis is for 2016
200
5.3. Clandestine entries
In 2017, the number of detections of clan- number of Afghan nationals increased checking all vehicles would introduce
destine entry (people hiding in vehicles considerably (from 233 in 2016 to 489 in undue waiting time for many bona fide
to avoid border control) at BCPs remained 2017) whereas the number of Syrians de- travellers, the advancement of opera-
much lower than the number of detec- creased significantly (from 667 to 113). tional risk analysis techniques for bet-
tions of illegal border-crossing between The fall in detections of clandestine ter results of targeted checks must be
BCPs. There was a significant decrease entries at the EU’s land border with Tur- considered anew. The role of pooled in-
(-27 %) in detections of clandestine entry key raises questions about the effective- telligence at EU-level, as well as techni-
compared with 2016, from 2 219 to 1 618. ness of checks. In light of this and taking cal and other support to Member States,
However, it is unlikely that the attempts into account the fact that thoroughly is in this regard paramount.
to enter the EU’s external borders actu-
ally decreased given the measures taken
to control irregular migration between
BCPs (which should increase the incen-
tive to attempt clandestine entry), and
so this number may well be an indica-
tion that more attempts of clandestine
entry were successful.
The fall in the numbers of detected
clandestine entries is due to two oppos-
ing phenomena: at the Bulgarian land
border with Turkey, detections fell to al-
most an eighth of the number of 2016,
whereas at the Croatian land border with
© European Commission
Serbia the detections rose significantly.
The latter is likely connected to a signif-
icant fall at the Hungarian land border
with Serbia, which likely created the
diversion effect at the Croatian border.
In terms of the nationalities of mi- Figure 2. A Hungarian police officer sets a sensor of a heart beat detector and
grants detected trying to enter clandes- a flexible camera to search for irregular migrants during control of a lorry at
tinely, two saw significant changes. The the border between Hungary and Serbia near Röszke
20 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Refusals of entry
per border type, 2017
(only values higher than 1 000 are stipulated)
126 502 (162 302) 49 378 (46 663) 6 438 (7 668)
Number in parenthesis is for 2016 Number in parenthesis is for 2016 Number in parenthesis is for 2016
Land Air Sea
Estonia United
Lithuania Kingdom
Netherlands
Poland Germany
Hungary Belgium
Slovakia
Romania France Switzerland
Croatia
Bulgaria Italy
Italy
Spain Spain
Greece
Portugal
Cyprus
Trend of the total
Land Air Sea
2016 162 302 46 663 6 438
2017 126 502 49 378 7 668
5.4. Refusals of entry
In 2017, a total of 183 548 refusals of en- the aforementioned ports, the top na- At the air border, the number of re-
try were reported along the external bor- tionalities refused entry at sea borders fusals of entry issued to citizens of Al-
ders of the EU, a 15 % drop compared with were Albanians (from 3 744 to 4 521 refus- bania increased from 5 141 in 2016 to
2016 and thus, an even smaller share of als) followed by Moroccans (from 985 to 6 577 in 2017.
the increasing passenger flow. While Po- 1 830 refusals). Since 2009, refusals at the sea and
land issued the most refusals of entry, At the land border, the significant de- air borders remained relatively stable,
their number dropped most in relative crease in refusals of entry almost entirely despite incresing passenger flow at the
and absolute terms due to drops in refus- resulted from the decreases reported at air border. At the land border, where
als of Russians, Tajiks and Armenians. the Polish-Belarusian land border. Com- most refusals take place, a sharp de-
Nonetheless, the number of refusals of pared with 2016, the number of refus- creased was reported between 2016 and
entry issued by Greece more than dou- als decreased in particular with regard 207, mostly due to the decreasing num-
bled, a development entirely resulting to Russians (by 44 973), as well as Ta- ber of Russians refused entry.
from the increased refusals issued to jiks (4 632).
Albanians. This increasing trend of re-
fusals of entry issued to Albanians was
observed at EU level at all border types Figure 3. Trend in refusals of entry at the EU’s external borders,
starting in 2014 (Figure 3). by border type, 2011–2017
The overall fall in the refusals of en-
160 000
try was the effect of differing, opposing
trends observed at the different border
types – while refusals at both air (+6 %) Land border
120 000
and sea borders (+19 %) increased signif- 126 690
icantly, the drop at land border (-22 %)
outweighed both, as the number of re- 80 000
fusals reported at this type of border is Air border
twice as large as the number recorded at 49 415
both air and sea borders. 40 000
At sea borders, the increases were par- Sea border
ticularly marked at the Italian ports of 7 668
Bari and Brindsi, and the Spanish port 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
of Tarifa. Given the connections from
21 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Type Nationality of users
Type of fraudulent document Claimed nationality of persons detected
detected, by main countries with fraudulent documents on entry Number 200 100
of issuance, 2017 from third countries, 2017
(only highest values are stipulated)
Number
300
50 Change from 2016 to 2017:
rm ce
s
or t
its
ds
p es i d e n
s
mp increase (over 25%)
car
ssp
as
Sta
Vis
Re
Pa
ID
stable (between 25% and −25%)
529 Ukraine
France Not specified decrease (less than −25%)
Italy Kosovo*
Spain
Poland Albania
Morocco
Germany
Greece
Lithuania
Syria
Belgium
Romania
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
Morocco
Netherlands
Portugal
Senegal
Hungary
Syria
Bulgaria
Guinea
5.5. Fraudulent documents
In 2017, Member States reported a total A remarkable development was recorded Istanbul Atatürk Airport
of about 6 7001 persons from third-coun- with regard to the detected Ukrainians, remains the top departure
tries presenting themselves with fraud- whose numbers dropped significantly airport for detections of
ulent documents at BCPs on entry to the compared with the previous year. As a fraudulent documents from
EU/Schengen area, the lowest number result, Moroccan nationals became the third countries
of detections since 2013, despite the in- most reported nationality using fraud-
creasing regular passenger flows. In con- ulent documents. Apart from these two As in the previous year, most detections
trast to the decreasing trend observed at nationalities, the number of Iranians de- were reported on air routes. At 477 detec-
the EU’s external border, the number of tected with fraudulent documents cross- tions, the number of document fraud
document fraud detections on second- ing the EU’s external borders started cases from Istanbul Atatürk decreased
ary movements within the EU/Schengen increasing. To a certain extent, this is by 23 % compared with 2016. Despite re-
area increased by almost 9 % and reached caused by the visa-free regime granted porting the lowest number of document
its second-highest number since 2013. to Iranian nationals by the Serbian au- fraud cases since 2013, Istanbul Atatürk
This development mainly resulted from thorities. In general, there were no sig- airport, remains the most reported last
the significant increases in departures nificant changes to the top five most departure airport outside the EU/Schen-
from Greece involving Syrian, Afghan, reported nationalities detected with gen area.
Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian nationals. fraudulent documents on entry to the The second-most reported last de-
At EU level, of the 138 nationalities EU/Schengen area from third countries, parture airport remained Dakar Inter-
detected using fraudulent documents apart from the fact that Russians re- national Airport in Senegal with 222
to illegally enter the EU or the Schengen placed Iraqis in comparison to the pre- detected persons using fraudulent doc-
area from a third country, the most com- vious year. Also, the number of Russian uments to cross the EU’s external border;
monly detected were Moroccans (803), nationals detected in 2017 almost dou- Senegalese nationals were most often de-
Ukrainians (801), Iranians (438), Albani- bled that registered in 2016. tected on the above mentioned routes.
ans (346), Russians (278) and Turks (275). Compared to 2016, in 2017 more de-
tections were reported at EU level on ar-
1 As of 19 January 2018, December 2017 rival from Tirana’s airport.
data missing for Bulgaria
22 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018At land and sea borders, most parison to previous years. The sea border ceal overstaying. At the air borders, the
detections of document fraud between Spain and Morocco remains types of forgeries are more diverse, and
were from Ukraine, Serbia and most affected, with Ceuta as the most so are the risks associated with these
Morocco reported BCP and Moroccan nationals detections.
as the main nationality.
In 2017, most of the document fraud
cases at land borders were reported be- On exit to third countries
tween Ukraine and Poland (519), mainly Ukraine remains the most-
involving Ukrainian nationals holding reported destination, followed
fraudulently-obtained Polish visas. How- by Canada
ever, the visa liberalisation regime for
Ukrainian nationals, which entered into Typically, land borders with Ukraine are
force in June 2017, had also contributed to affected and as regards the air routes,
the decrease in the number of Ukrainians mostly Canada is targeted as the in-
misusing fraudulently obtained visas. tended final destination. At the land
With regard to the external sea bor- border with Ukraine, most detections
ders, no change was observed in com- concerned counterfeited stamps to con-
© Frontex
Figure 4. Automated Border Control systems provide a fast and secure solution for airports and border control authorities
23 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Illegal stayers
Number of detected cases
of illegal stay, 2017
435 786 (491 918) Germany
Number in parenthesis is for 2016
Austria
France Switzerland
50 000
(only highest values are displayed) Italy
815
713
5.6.218Within the EU
263
Illegal stayers Facilitators the statement1, while slower progress was
noted in terms of returns to Turkey when
In 2017, Member States reported a drop Member States reported 10 213 facilita- the total number of returnees reached
in illegal stay compared with 2016, the tors in 2017, a 19 % decrease compared 2 082 persons by the end of 20172, with
second year in a row with a decrease with 2016. Both Italy and Spain reported many cases being subsequently appealed.
in illegal stay numbers. This is mostly fewer facilitators (and thus were mostly Several policy-related developments
connected with the lower numbers of responsible for the decline in aggregate took place at EU level in the course of 2017
detected illegal border-crossings at the numbers). as the implementation of the European
EU’s external borders, as the illegal stay Agenda on Migration continued, includ-
detections are primarily a reflection of Asylum applications ing activities related to the strengthen-
them. Despite the significant decrease ing of the common asylum policy. At the
since 2015, the high absolute number In 2017, according to EASO, 701 997 appli- end of 2017, negotiations were ongoing
indicates the persistence of the prob- cations for international protection were in the European Parliament and in the
lem. The majority of detections con- lodged in the 28 EU Member States plus Council on the Commission’s proposals
tinue to be associated with the spillover Norway and Switzerland (EU+). The three tabled in May and July 2016 for the reform
effect of secondary movements of mi- main countries of origin of applicants in of the Dublin Regulation, the Qualifica-
grants who entered the EU/Schengen the EU+ were Syria (97 619 applications), tions and Asylum Procedures Regulations
area on the Central Mediterranean Iraq (48 771), and Afghanistan (46 533). and the Reception Conditions Directive,
route. On the other hand, the number Syrians continuously represented be- as well as on the proposal concerning the
of persons detected on exit at BCPs at the tween 13 % and 16 % of all applicants. transformation of the European Asylum
EU’s external borders without a valid Citizens from Iraq applied in higher Support Office into the European Union
permission to stay remained roughly numbers in the second half of the year. Agency for Asylum.
on a par with 2016. The relocation scheme ended in Sep-
Inland detections of illegal stay de- tember 2017, but relocations of persons
creased particularly in Germany, Aus- already registered for the process con-
tria, Switzerland, as well as Bulgaria. tinued. According to EASO in 2017, 23 238
The share of illegal stayers increased in persons were relocated, half of whom
1 European Commission, Annex to the
France, which therefore replaced Ger- were Syrian nationals, a third Eritreans,
report from the Commission to the
many as the country with the highest and one tenth Iraqi. Altogether, there European Parliament, the European
number of illegal stay cases. were 33 168 persons relocated from both Council and the Council. Progress report
Italy and Greece since the launch of the on the European Agenda on Migration.
Resettlement, 15 November 2017.
mechanism.
2 European Commission, State of play
The implementation of the EU-Turkey
EU-Turkey Statement. Returns from
statement continued with 11 354 people Greece to Turkey since 21 March 2016,
resettled from Turkey to the EU+ under 19 January 2018.
24 of 54
Frontex · Risk Analysis for 2018Ukraine 29 267
24 356 Others
99 012
52 771
21 613 14 235
Morocco 5 969 Pakistan 6 685
19 100 17 905
Iraq 5 570 Albania 25 811
18 445 8 112 6 019
Afghanistan 3 832 Tunisia 3 731 Nigeria 2 641 Return decisions in 2017: 279 215
Effective returns in 2017: 151 398
6 923
India 4 801 Return decisions
Effective returns
5 838
Algeria 9 494
3 941 Syria
8 829
660 Russian Fed. 4 586 Iran 4 221
1 196
5 749 Turkey 4 453
Brazil 2 900 1 948
Please note that the number of effective returns may sometimes be larger than return decisions, as a return decision issued in a given month may be effectively enforced at a later date. Also, return decisions may be issued
without prejudice to the person’s right to apply for asylum. Readmissions between Member States are not included (for example between France and Italy). Effective returns do not necessarily mean returns to the country of
origin and, for example in the case of Syrians, they include returns of persons to third countries considered to be safe (for example from Hungary to Serbia).
5.7.Returns
In 2017, Member States reported 279 215 effectively implement a return decision. before a possible negative asylum deci-
return decisions issued to third-country Other Member States report figures on sion is issued.
nationals, which represented an 8.6 % effective returns that exceed the number The Commission noted in its commu-
decrease compared with 2016. The abso- of return decisions. This is primarily be- nication on return policy that data on
lute total number of migrants subject to cause some authorities are not fully re- basic parameters (such as the average
return decisions is still underestimated porting these decisions. length of detention, grounds for deten-
by this indicator, as data on decisions Finally, return decisions may also tion, number of failed returns, and use
were unavailable from Austria, France concern voluntary returns that are not of entry bans) proved to be only availa-
and the Netherlands. As in previous registered. In fact, for voluntary return, ble from a limited number of Member
years, the number of return decisions only a few Member States apply a policy States. Moreover, common definitions
was much larger than the total num- of controlled departure. Under these cir- and approaches concerning data collec-
ber of effective returns to third countries cumstances, it is difficult to ascertain tion are frequently absent, impacting
(151 398). The main reasons for non-re- that a return decision has effectively on the comparability of such data across
turn are related to practical problems in been implemented. the EU.
the identification of returnees and in ob- Within the number of effective re- In 2017, the Agency assisted Member
taining necessary documentation from turns to third countries, 50 % were re- States in returning more than 14 000
third-country authorities. In addition, ported to be on a voluntary basis and 50 % people whose asylum applications were
many decisions to return voluntarily do were forced returns. In terms of nation- rejected and who did not receive subsid-
not materialise as the persons decide to alities, there is a striking difference be- iary protection status or were no longer
stay illegally. tween the nationalities detected crossing eligible to remain in the EU. This was
Some Member States reported that, the border illegally or staying illegally in about a third more than the previous
over time, several return decisions have the EU, and those effectively returned. year and accounted for 9 % of the 151 398
been issued to the same individuals. Al- Indeed, many detections of illegal bor- effective returns conducted by Member
though it is not possible to quantify the der-crossing or even detections of illegal States. In addition, the Agency increased
phenomenon, as data at EU level are an- stay concern migrants who will apply the number of Member States to which
onymised, it illustrates the difficulty to for asylum and thus are not returned return specialists were deployed.
25 of 54
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