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Runnymede Perspectives Race and Elections Edited by Omar Khan and Kjartan Sveinsson
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www. runnymedetrust.orgContents Foreword 2 Hugh Muir Introduction: Race and Elections in 2015 and Beyond 4 Omar Khan 1. Ethnic Minorities at the Ballot Box 6 Anthony Heath 2. Ethnic Minorities and Political Parties: Challenges 8 and Dilemmas Shamit Saggar 3. Britain’s Far Right and the 2015 General Election: 11 A View from History Nigel Copsey 4. Three Identity Divides that will Help Decide Election 2015 13 Rob Ford 5. The Rise of UKIP: Challenges for Anti-Racism 15 Stephen Ashe 6. Religious Political Mobilisation of British Ethnic Minorities 18 Maria Sobolewska 7. One Foot in the Door: Ethnic Minorities and the House 21 of Commons Nicole Martin 8. Registration and Race: Achieving Equal Political 24 Participation Omar Khan 9. The 2015 Election: BME Groups in Scotland 26 Nasar Meer and Tim Peace Appendix 1: Biographical Notes on the Contributors 30 Appendix 2: Black and Minority Ethnic Demographic 32 Change, 2001-2021
2 Runnymede Perspectives Foreword It is untrue to say our politicians cannot agree on anything, for they agree that the election of May 7 2015 will be the most important in a generation. In keeping with our fiercely partisan politics, each has distinct reasons for believing that to be the case. Most also agree that one of the most urgent requirements of those who scrap for votes – currently and in the future – is a better understanding of how race and culture now impacts on the British electoral process. Once they had a working knowledge. But with fast moving demographic re-alignment in towns, cities and hamlets around the country, the tectonic plates are shifting. Around them they see ties loosening, traditions eroding, certainties unravelling. With ethnic minorities projected to make up a quarter or more of Britain’s population by 2051, compared with 8% in 2001, the parties do understand that new thinking is required; not just by those that wish to represent, but by those who aspire to form governments and municipal administrations. They know that the need to grasp new realities is greater than ever. And yet - here is the oddity - none can really be said to have risen to what could become a life-or-death challenge. The loser on May 8 may rue that failure as an opportunity squandered. Talk to Labour officials and they will emphasise the importance of the party continuing to appeal to the majority of Britain’s voting minorities. These are ties going back over a half a century and replicated down generations. But they will know of grassroots disgruntlement that the relationship has been left untended. The party promises that if elected in May, it would enact a radical plan to tackle race inequality. But in the interim there are concerns that Miliband’s Labour has done too little to address the specific problems of traditionally supportive minorities for fear of losing more support among white working class communities. Concerns that the party has been reluctant to boost minority representation within parliament with the same determination that led to the increase of more female Labour MPs via all women shortlists. In April, Diane Abbott warned her party that the Conservatives are on their way to overtaking Labour when it comes to electing more black and Asian MPs. Labour faces questions connected with the pronounced shift of minorities from inner cities into the suburbs. Will those who supported Labour maintain that allegiance, or will they absorb the outlooks of neighbours who might support other parties? The Conservatives also have much thinking to do. The Tories secured just 16% of the minority vote in 2010. In a time of political plenty, such underperformance was regrettable, no more. But with the shrinking of the traditional Tory vote reservoir in white, middle England and the projected demographic shift of minorities into Tory heartlands, party bosses understand that their position is not sustainable. Are minorities conservative? Many, many are. The pollster Lord Ashcroft and others have produced research showing the relative extent to which some minority communities are more likely to connect with the Tory message than others. The key problem for the party is branding. In the years of political plenty, it didn’t matter numerically that the Tories presented as uncomfortable and hostile to diversity. It carried the millstone of Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood speech - despite Powell’s immediate dismissal by Edward Heath. There was the campaign in Smethwick in the 1964 General Election, with its unofficial slogan “If you want nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour”. There was the tacit approval of Thatcherite right wingers for backbenchers who would occasionally make the news with racist remarks. There was Thatcher herself, dog whistling with talk of Britain being “swamped” by those of alien cultures. Marketeers like brands. They communicate almost subliminally the form and shape and values of the product on offer. A positive branding endures. But so does a negative one. I once discussed this with Grant Shapps, the Conservative party chairman. He seemed puzzled that so few minorities felt able to embrace the Tory brand. I have to take my hat off to you, I told him. Given the conservative instincts of so many minorities - people who
Race and Elections 3 exhort their own self reliance, people who revere family, church and institutions - for you to pick up so few votes from them is virtually an act of genius. So the Tories have been thinking, as a sailor will think when the boat has sprung a leak. They have 18 ethnic minority candidates in held seats, compared - at the time of writing - with Labour’s 19. And they have been doing things selected minorities might like; more action regarding possible corruption on the totemic Stephen Lawrence case and a thorough review of stop and search by the police. A reduction in air passenger duty, allowing minority Britons to take cheaper flights back to south Asia and the Caribbean. Action to stop the banks moving out of the remittance market used by UK Somalians to send money home to their families. But if only it were that easy. Here’s a conundrum still baffling Tories; how to be liberal enough to negate the negative branding and build minority support, without appearing so liberal that they lose the middle class right and the white working class vote to UKIP. How to look tough on immigration without being accused of an attack on difference? Problems like this have been identified by the party but require attention and sustained determination from the top to achieve solution. Thus far, they haven’t had it. Does this represent an opportunity for the smaller parties? Perhaps, but with the Liberal Democrats in retrenchment, few believe this will be the time for it to deal with a lamentable record in terms of race and front line political representation. It too has a branding problem; not Tory hostility - just the impression of cliquism and all smothering apathy. Addressing that might one day transport the party to a healthier state. There are competing currents. Some argue that in the politics of 21st century Britain, race matters less in terms of belonging and party allegiance than class. But perhaps that is the rose tinted view. And still there are specific communities who are communally and collectively ill served by the way we do our politics. For them, the argument as to whether their disadvantage stems from race or class seems moot. For all that - survey the landscape, read the varied and hugely informative series of papers compiled within this report by the excellent Runnymede Trust - and now must strike you as a significant moment; when the votes of those who live outside the walls of white Middle England matter, and increasingly so. What altruism has failed to achieve over all these years, numbers will. Hugh Muir, Guardian
4 Runnymede Perspectives
Introduction: Race and Elections
in 2015 and Beyond
Omar Khan
In an election with the greatest uncertainty of outcome It is not just in cities such as London, Birmingham
in living memory, the different voting behaviour of or Bradford, where the large BME population
various groups in the UK is particularly salient. In this can influence who gets elected. There have been
volume Runnymede has gathered together influential notable increases in suburbia and smaller university
academics’ analysis on the role of race, ethnicity and towns. In 1981, there were 50 seats with 15% BME
religion in this and previous elections. residents. By 2011, there were 150 seats with 15%
BME residents. Inside this 150 are seats such as
For decades Black and minority ethnic (BME) voting Cambridge, Halifax, and Richmond Park (all 18%).
patterns have not been a high priority for political Seats such as Beaconsfield, Gloucester, Ipswich,
parties and the wider public. The first BME MP Cheadle, and Leamington and Warwick are just
(Dadabhai Naoroji) was voted in for the constituency outside the 150 (all around 12%). For comparison
of Finsbury Central over 120 years ago and yet there of scale, the Labour Party target list for the 2015
has been comparatively little progress in this time General Election is 106 seats. The Conservative Party
for BME politicians and voters alike. Nevertheless as strategy for the 2015 General Election is to hold 40
various contributions to this volume make clear, there marginals while gaining 40 marginals.
are historically important trends around the relationship
between race, ethnicity and mainstream politics – Furthermore, there are fewer seats where BME
notably the electoral weakness of the far right and the voters have no impact at all on election outcomes.
dominance of the Labour party among BME voters – As recently as 2001, around half of all seats had a
that continue to exert significant influence over election BME population of under 3%; in 2011 the equivalent
outcomes, in 2015 and beyond. seat had a BME population of 5-6%. These might
not seem like large proportions, but in marginal
In recent years the changing demographic profile seats with majorities in the thousands or hundreds,
of Britain’s BME populations has seen a significant the BME vote will increasingly influence outcomes:
shift in their importance in electoral politics for all Operation Black Vote research shows that there are
parties. In particular the rate of growth in the ethnic now 167 seats where the BME population exceeds
minority population has been quite significant. From the current MP’s majority. Estimates also suggest
less than 5% nationally (3 million people) in 1991, that the rural BME population will double by 2050.
the BME population in 2011 rose to 13% – at
8 million, equivalent to the combined population The increasing dispersal of the BME population
of Scotland and Wales. is matched and partly driven by the increasing
diversity within the BME population. While the
Of course this population is not evenly spread, 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study showed
and so does not equally affect parliamentary that the larger ethnic minority groups continued to
constituencies across the UK. In 1991, there were disproportionately (68%) support Labour, there were
only 7 constituencies in which more than 40% of the some signs of differences among some populations
population was Black and minority ethnic. According (notably middle-class Indians). The impact of more
to the 2011 Census there are now 49 such seats. recent migrants is only beginning to be felt electorally.
In 1992 the Conservatives could only lose 7 seats
by failing to win over many ethnic minority voters, What, then, are the parties doing about this? In the
but in 2010 and beyond, the Conservatives could 2010 party manifestos, there was only one mention
lose 50 or more such seats. This is perhaps most of race and race equality – a Liberal Democrat
marked in London, where the Conservatives won commitment to name-blind CVs, lost in the coalition
a commanding majority of seats up until 1992, but bargaining. Under the coalition, race and race
have seen previously safe seats become marginal. In equality have not been directly addressed, and has
Margaret Thatcher’s old seat of Finchley and Golders even been rolled back, although we have of course
Green, the BME population is now 33%. The national witnessed the rise of immigration as arguably the
average is about 13%. most politically salient issue.Race and Elections 5
Across the Atlantic, Barack Obama’s success in communities they serve, though the document is
building a winning coalition including large majorities somewhat lacking in detail on how they will achieve
of the rising ethnic minority vote has seen the all these objectives. It remains to be seen whether
Republicans reach out again, especially to Latino these commitments will be enough to convince
voters, to neutralise what might become an inbuilt BME voters in 2015, and whether these are the key
Democratic electoral advantage. Those familiar with concerns for the next generation of BME voters.
Canada will know that right-of-centre politicians have
done much better in appealing to the children and As with all voters, BME voters are motivated by
grandchildren of immigrants. their political attitudes and values. While many such
attitudes are shared across ethnicity, two issues
While demographic change in the UK has been are distinctive for ethnic minority voters. First is that
notable for a decade now, it has taken some time unemployment is a particularly notable concern, a
for political parties to catch up to this change. A key fact that is less surprising given the higher rates and
reason for this is that BME people compose a smaller future risk of unemployment among all BME groups,
share of the electorate than they do of the overall from 16 year old NEETs to Oxbridge graduates to
population, mainly because of the relatively younger currently employed professionals. Second, all BME
age of BME residents in Britain, but also because of groups suggest they still feel racism affects their life
their lower registration rates and entitlement to vote chances, with over a third of Black Caribbean people
among some overseas citizens. reporting a personal experience of discrimination.
This explains the focus in many contributors on
This lag in the full impact of BME voting power will
discrimination and the continued effects of past
soon change. Among the 60+ population, only 5%
party political responses to it. Furthermore, there
are BME, but of those under 18 over 20% are BME.
are concerns that Islamophobia has passed what
By 2020, 10% of the 60-64 population will be BME,
Baroness Warsi called the ‘dinner table test’, and
and nearly 20% of those 40 and under.
that anti-immigration rhetoric can allow for wider
questioning about the place of Black and minority
Partly in response to change, the Conservatives ethnic people in the UK. In response to these
have dramatically increased their number of ethnic concerns, Runnymede organised an academic forum
minority MPs and candidates in winnable seats, meeting at the University of Manchester at which
meaning that they will more or less match Labour’s Stephen Ashe, Nigel Copsey and Rob Ford presented
total in 2015 from a base of none before 2005. For papers that were adapted for their contributions to
the 2015 General Election, the three major parties this volume. Given the upcoming election, we felt it
made significantly greater commitments to addressing was important to gather further contributions from
racial inequalities, or otherwise appealing to ethnic the leading UK academics to ensure that media and
minority voters, in their respective manifestos than political party discussions on race and elections was
they had done in 2010. However, the Conservatives’ informed by the evidence. This evidence indicates
proposals are relatively limited, restricted to proposing continuities with the past, as well as significant social
an increase in the numbers of Black and minority change among the increasingly diverse Black and
ethnic police officers, albeit through new recruitment minority ethnic population in Britain.
schemes which don’t appear to target minorities.
All the parties need to reconsider their strategies to
The Liberal Democrat manifesto goes considerably respond this change, and whether their previous or
further, with proposals to enact the remaining current policies will be a barrier or incentive for BME
unimplemented clauses of the 2010 Equality Act, to voters in 2015 and beyond. Whatever the parties’
promote BAME entrepreneurship, and to monitor respective strategies for winning as many seats as
and tackle the BAME pay gap – although there possible in the uncertain election of 2015, if they wait
is no mention of the BAME employment gap. It till 2020 to develop a plan for the various Black and
also proposes to tackle discrimination and ethnic minority ethnic groups living across the UK, it may be
inequalities within the criminal justice system and too late.
policing. The Labour Party on the other hand has
produced a separate BAME manifesto which makes
a wider range of commitments, including proposals
for a cross-government race equality strategy as
well as measures on the pay gap, long-term youth
unemployment and hate crimes. It also refers to the
need for the police and judiciary to represent the6 Runnymede Perspectives
1. Ethnic Minorities at
the Ballot Box
Anthony Heath
Nuffield College, Oxford and University of Manchester grounded on the historical record. All the legislation
passed by Parliament to protect minorities
It is well known that ethnic minorities tend to support against racial discrimination and to promote their
Labour in much the way that the traditional working opportunities within Britain have been passed under
class used to support Labour back in the 1950s Labour governments. This applies to the 1965,
and 1960s, providing Labour with its safest seats. 1968 and 1976 Race Relations Acts, the 2000
Nowadays many of the safest Labour seats, such as Race Relations (Amendment) Act, the 2006 Racial
Stephen Timms’ seat of East Ham, have very large and Religious hatred Act, and the 2010 Equality
ethnic minority populations. At the 2010 General Act, all enacted under Labour administrations. The
Election ethnic minorities made up around two-thirds 1998 Human Rights Act, passed under a Labour
of the East Ham electorate, and Stephen Timms won government, is also often seen as an act which has
70% of the vote for Labour. helped minorities. Many of these acts were opposed
by sections of the Conservative party, and the
However, minorities are not a monolithic Labour- Conservatives’ 2010 manifesto promised to repeal the
supporting bloc vote which can be delivered 1998 Human Rights Act (and to replace it with a UK
automatically at every general election. There are Bill of rights). In contrast, Conservative governments
considerable differences between ethnic minorities, have more often introduced legislation to restrict
with voters of Black African or Black Caribbean access to British citizenship and to make more difficult
background showing the highest levels of support for migration from the countries where Britain’s main
Labour. Voters with roots in Bangladesh or Pakistan minorities have their roots. One important exception
have been somewhat less inclined to vote Labour, should be noted, however. The Conservatives under
and at the 2010 general election around a quarter Edward Heath did grant entry to Britain for the East
of the voters of Pakistani background supported African Asians when they were expelled from Uganda
the Liberal Democrats, almost certainly reflecting by Idi Amin in 1972. It is not perhaps coincidental that
Muslims’ unease about the Labour Party’s support these East African Asians are the group nowadays
for the military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. most likely to support the Conservatives.
And Britain’s largest ethnic minority – the Indians (and
particularly those from East Africa) – are the minority However, minority support for Labour cannot be
most likely to be supportive of the Conservatives. But taken for granted. This was shown very clearly by
even voters of Indian background gave only a quarter the Respect Party. In 2005 George Galloway, who
of their votes at the 2010 general election to the had been expelled from the Labour party for his
Conservatives compared with 61% voting Labour, strident opposition to the Iraq war, won the Bethnal
a lead for Labour of 37 points – far larger than Green and Bow constituency, and subsequently and
Labour’s lead in the working class. sensationally overturned a safe Labour majority at the
Bradford West by-election in 2012. More generally
This support for Labour, rather like that of the there is something of a tension between minorities’
traditional working class in the 1950s and 1960s, support for Labour at the ballot box and their policy
does not appear to be rooted in preferences for preferences on specific issues (such as the wars
specific Labour policies (or opposition to specific in Iraq and Afghanistan), a tension which gives the
Conservative ones). Rather it appears to be based possibility of a realignment of voting patterns.
on the general, and largely accurate, perception that
Labour has in the past been the party most likely to This tension is not limited to divergences with
protect minority interests, whereas the Conservatives Labour’s former policies on Iraq and Afghanistan.
in contrast are not seen as a party which is especially In fact, the policy agendas of minorities are not as
interested in helping minorities. distinctively left-wing as might be expected. On
the classic issue of cutting taxes versus increasing
This shared perception that Labour is the party spending on health and social services, for example,
most likely to look after ethnic minority interests is all the main ethnic minority groups are actually moreRace and Elections 7
in favour of cutting taxes than is the electorate as a probably tells us more about the kind of white people
whole, with the South Asian groups being particularly who are exercised about Europe than it does about
distant from Labour’s policies. Furthermore, on other minorities: European integration tends to be an issue
topics like immigration there are large differences which worries older generations, brought up at a time
between the different minorities, with Indians being when Britain still had an empire and thought of itself
notable for their lack of support for high rates of as a world power. So the anti-European messages
immigration. emanating from UKIP and the Euro-sceptic wing of
the Conservative party are not likely to have much
More generally, many members of ethnic minorities positive appeal to minority voters.
resemble the ‘aspirational’ voters whom the
Conservative party has often successfully appealed Second, and perhaps most important, all ethnic
to, and whom New Labour set out to woo with their minority groups share a concern to be offered equal
move towards the centre of the political spectrum. opportunities in British society. There is little evidence
So although minorities might look like traditional that minorities want special treatment to make up
working-class Labour supporters if we look only at for a history of discrimination in the way that some
their voting patterns, more detailed examination of African Americans do. There is absolutely no appetite
their policy preferences suggest that they have much among British ethnic minorities for quotas or for
more in common with the aspiring, upwardly mobile ‘positive discrimination’. Rather, minorities in Britain
voters whom New Labour set out to win. want to achieve educational and economic success
for themselves and their children on their own merits.
Migrants themselves are rarely representative of It is a desire for a level playing field, an archetypal
the population in their country of origin. Indeed, the British concern. Any party which shows an appetite
more difficult it is to migrate, the more distinctive for trying to make a reality of the British dream of
the migrant tends to be in terms of resourcefulness, equality of opportunity is likely to find a receptive
drive and ambition from those who stayed behind audience among ethnic minorities.
in the country of origin. In the jargon of economics,
migrants tend to be ‘positively selected’, and there
is considerable evidence now that migrants from
Further reading
China, India, and parts of Africa are very highly Many of the topics briefly covered here are dealt with
selected (whereas migrants from Europe, for whom in greater depth in:
it is much easier to come to Britain, are more likely
to be typical of their country of origin). Since many Heath, Anthony F, Stephen Fisher, Gemma
migrants found their opportunities to progress in Rosenblatt, David Sanders and Maria
Britain were blocked by lack of language skills or by Sobolewska (2013) The Political Integration of
racial discrimination, their aspirations have often been Ethnic Minorities in Britain. Oxford: Oxford
transferred to their children – and we indeed find that University Press.
the children of migrants tend to have higher levels of
educational aspiration and are more likely to progress Heath, Anthony F and Yael Brinbaum (eds)
to university than are their white British peers from (2014) Unequal Attainments: Ethnic Educational
similar social class origins. Inequalities in Ten Western Countries. Proceedings
of the British Academy 196. Oxford: OUP for the
It is probably fair to say then that minorities – both British Academy.
the migrants and their children – in many respects
are aspirational voters eager for social mobility, if
not for themselves then for their children. Many will
also be employed in the private sector or be self-
employed, and relatively few are members of Trades
Unions – although once again this will vary between
as well as within minorities.
Some commentators have even suggested that
ethnic minorities have a ‘natural affinity’ with the
Conservative party, but offsetting these affinities are
two divergences with other policy areas. First of all,
minorities tend to be much less interested in the
European question than are the white British. This8 Runnymede Perspectives
2. Ethnic Minorities and Political
Parties: Challenges and Dilemmas
Shamit Saggar
University of Essex
The bulk of South Asian, African and Caribbean impacts on national cohesion. The left has mostly
origin Britons trace their British roots to a time in the enjoyed the electoral backing of New Commonwealth
mid to late twentieth century. This is when either they, immigrants and their offspring, leading, in some
or their parents, or their grandparents, made the trek places, to a heavy reliance on these voters and even
to Britain as permanent settlers. Britain was a rather voting blocs. Labour’s core challenge has been to
different country then: it was awash with strong anti- embed itself as the natural party of ethnic minorities
immigrant public sentiment, early prospects for the much in the same way that it was once thought of as
newcomers were challenging at best, their potential the natural party for, and of, the working class.
contribution to society was scarcely noticed, and
the country’s major political parties reacted with Electorally speaking, the task of successive Tories in
indifference or arrogance. appealing to migrants has been an uphill task from
the outset. The party’s motives, character and history
Contesting the past are quickly dragged up, with a suggestion that the
The period between the 1964 Smethwick episode Conservatives have not done enough to repudiate
and the 1968 Kenyan Asian crisis and the outspoken their Powellite past. Writing in the run-up to the 2015
warnings of Enoch Powell, set the tone. Mainstream General Election, Rob Ford, a widely respected
parties saw black and brown immigrants as a way follower on the parties’ fortunes in appealing to
to gather votes cheaply – ensuring that immigrants migrant voters, concluded that:
were viewed and discussed as the sources of social
problems. First impressions counted in the minds The first wave of migrants who arrived in Britain
of the immigrants and have contributed to a bitter in the 1950s and 1960s have never forgotten the
legacy as a result. hostility stoked in particular by Enoch Powell and
his allies in the Conservative Party, nor the passage
British domestic party politics has undoubtedly by the Labour Party of the first wave of anti-
been shaped by the legacy of Powell in the half discrimination legislation. The fierce arguments of the
century since. On the right, Conservative nationalists period forged an image of the parties in these voters’
and social authoritarians have been influential and minds, with Labour then seen as the party which
have clung onto a ‘myth of invitation’ argument. protects migrant and minority interests in contrast
Since much of the immigration from the New to the Conservatives. This image has survived to the
present, and even been passed to second and third
Commonwealth had not been the product of explicit
generation ethnic minority voters with no memory of
government policy, let alone endorsed by parliament,
the period when it was formed. (Ford, 2015)
Powellites asserted that the migrants were and would
remain an illegitimate presence. Older generations of
voters on the right have thus tended to be prepared
to tolerate – guardedly and at a distance – the ethnic
Binary political choices
diversity brought by mass immigration whilst not The party system itself poorly reflects and even
accepting its basis. distorts the nature of political choice facing ethnic
minorities. This is because, as subsequent generations
This has left open the opportunity to contest the of ethnic minorities have become established, the
past, itself a deeply divisive signal. Conservative factual picture describing their circumstances and
liberal modernisers have thus had to address fears outlooks has become ever-more heterogeneous.
about the pace of cultural change as well as lingering Meanwhile, parties mostly view minorities through
grievances about its validity. homogenising spectacles, loosely equating ethnicity
with disadvantage or exclusion of some kind.
Meanwhile, for the Labour Party and the left, mass
immigration has given rise to a substantial set of Black and brown minorities occupy a broad
arguments about the limits of cultural pluralism and spectrum of social, economic and cultural positions.Race and Elections 9
A compelling evidence base points to Indians and Britain elected its first cohort of ethnic minority MPs
Chinese groups in general pulling ahead of most in modern times in the mid 1980s. This all-Labour
other minorities in educational and employment group was spawned from a then-strong alignment
terms. However, the increasing educational success between the party’s hard left factions committed to
of all minority groups, through compulsory school tackling structural inequalities and the ambitions of
attainment and higher education participation rates a rising second generation of minority politicians.
in particular, which now stand comfortably above Thereafter Labour’s tightened it grip on minority
the national average. Within all groups – though representation at Westminster for more than fifteen
more notably among Indian and Chinese Britons years, giving rise to an impression of a natural affinity
– there are groups with rising levels of material with Labour accompanied by a stand-off-ish posture
prosperity, widening of occupational and social by their Tory rivals. The breakthrough for the Tories
circles, increasing levels of residential dispersal, and came a full decade later, and even then only a small
an increase in marriage across ethnic lines. Yet all trickle of black and Asians got as far as Westminster.
groups struggle to convert their educational success
into commensurate employment outcomes, and all A particular pattern stood out early on whereby
still have higher rates of unemployment, particularly minority elected representation was overwhelmingly
for Black Caribbean, Black African, Pakistani and channelled into areas of relatively high ethnic minority
Bangladeshi people. While all groups affirm a British residential and voter concentration. An obvious
identity, on some attitudinal measures or in terms colour-coding of constituencies was at play: minority
of marriage across ethnic lines some groups have hopefuls focused on their chances in these seats;
lower rates of integration as well as reduced entry such seats tended to be Labour strongholds thus
into recognised routes of progression, although there carrying big prizes for those selected; and the
is some evidence of recent accelerated gains for ethnically and racially-oriented concerns of minority
Bangladeshis in Britain. electors in such places were given prominence over
the full array of political issues. Only one Labour
Political parties have generally not been alive to minority MP (the late Ashok Kumar) managed to defy
this layered and nuanced picture. Their reticence this unwritten code in Middlesbrough South and East
or discomfort is doubly frustrating because Cleveland. And the code was further reinforced as
the signature lesson of party leadership and a result of concerns about the continuing electoral
management in Britain in the past twenty years has liability of ethnic minority candidates in ‘snow-
been the enormous degree to which parties have white’ constituencies. Several rows in Battersea,
managed, and accepted the need, to reach beyond Cheltenham and elsewhere highlighted this anxiety,
their traditional base. Labour and the Tories have fully coupled with another regarding how selectors might
grasped the idea that voters in general are arranged favour particular groups in seats where many different
along a series of overlapping continuums that reflect minority groups had settled and might be competing
inter alia socio-economic realities, personal aspiration for a single vacant nomination, e.g. Southall and
and social attitudes. In other words, there is every Bethnal Green and Bow.
reason not to appeal to voters as members of two
discrete, static camps. And yet this out-dated, In the period from 2005 onwards the bias towards
binary logic remains cast in concrete in respect to Labour in minority representation in parliament has
campaigns to attract minority voters – due, in the been diluted significantly. In the 2010 general election
main, to a sense that race remains an electoral in particular, the Conservatives surged both in terms
trump card. of minorities and women who succeeded in gaining
nominations in either safe or reasonably attractive
seats. The Tories going into the 2015 contest are
Westminster: the cockpit likely to improve in their current tally of 11, and some
estimates suggest that, if the party were to win an
of democracy outright parliamentary majority, this total could rise
If ethnic minority voters have been only partially to 19. Given that Labour currently has 16 such MPs,
integrated into British mass electoral democracy, the symbolic importance of overtaking the standard
what can be said about the function of political bearer cannot be downplayed.
parties in political recruitment to Westminster and
in shaping access to executive office? The picture The Tory catch-up, if it can be dubbed as such,
here is rather better in that party membership and is attributable to two main factors. First, it reflects
candidacy increasingly reflect a broader distribution the considerable effort that has been invested by
of political attitudes and preferences. the national party bureaucracy in professionalising10 Runnymede Perspectives
the selection processes and practices of local support tailored services and revised priorities in a
constituency associations. This has often been viewed way that commands greater legitimacy. Ethnicity, in
locally as unwanted interference, and alien, in what is other words, is respected for the twist that it brings
after all a federally organised national political party. in describing political outlooks and supporting
Secondly, the recruitment of a fresher, more feminine political choices.
and black and brown cast list to fight in winnable seats
has been an integral element of the modernisation
tone set by the Cameron-Osborne-Hague-Maude
Reference
quad at the helm of the party. Modernisation may have Ford, R. (2015) Migrant Voters in the 2015 General
stalled on many occasions but it is likely to deliver an Election. Migrant Rights Network/CoDE, University
irreversible shift in the sociological composition of the of Manchester. Available under: http://www.
party’s parliamentary wing. migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/Migrant_
Voters_2015_paper.pdf
Both of these factors have not been without risks.
Local party backlashes have occurred regularly
signifying the disruption intended and felt. Equally,
the direction of travel has been keenly fought over,
in a party that is struggling with its long post-
Thatcher legacy.
Diversity and difference
With the convergence between the major parties’
ethnic composition at elite level, an old debate is
now expected to come to the fore. This centres on:
a) what difference will a less-white parliament result
in? and b) how should minority MPs behave and be
thought of politically?
The answers to these two questions will depend on
how the major parties address two mostly unrelated
matters. First, issues of party discipline are likely to be
more important in the next parliament than the current
one. This is because winning majorities are simply
less attainable today. Therefore, in some cases the
ethnicity of an MP – and indeed any individual-level
characteristic – may be cast as especially relevant in
securing their support, particularly if standard party
loyalties come under heavy pressure. Second, MPs’
division lobby behaviour on certain issues is likely to
pose as many questions as it answers. Traditional
bread and butter political issues such as deficit
reduction or NHS funding can be interpreted to more
easily address the needs of discrete population sub-
groups. So squeezes on public spending are rapidly
viewed through the lens of ethnicity to highlight which
groups use or are reliant on which services. Health
service priorities also contain many potential ethnically-
related prisms.
The next parliament can, however, point in a different
direction. Its greater ethnic diversity can be a
powerful force to interrogate political difference by
focusing on the overlaps and shared understandings
that exist across ethnic lines. This principle then
enables minority and majority ethnic group MPs toRace and Elections 11
3. Britain’s Far Right and the 2015
General Election: A View from
History
Nigel Copsey
Teesside University
Introduction on more violent tactics against Muslim targets? And
yet the horrific murder of Lee Rigby did not usher in
Fractured more today than for many years - possibly
a spiral of radicalisation (see Macklin and Busher,
more fractured than ever before - Britain’s far
2015; Feldman and Littler, 2014).
right is in absolute disarray. If in 2010 the British
National Party (BNP) had returned its best ever
set of general election results, five years later, the The same old story?
BNP has foundered on the very same rock as its As I write, the outcome of the 2015 general election
predecessors. Britain’s far right may have succeeded remains impossible to predict. Yet when it comes to
in winning representation to the European Parliament the far right, one thing is absolutely certain: its impact
in 2009, but like the National Front before it, the at the ballot box will be negligible. So what more
BNP failed to navigate the more tortuous passage to needs to be said? The story is an all too familiar one:
Westminster. Left rudderless by unremitting internal Britain’s far right remains, or so it seems, historically
strife (in 2014 Nick Griffin was finally ousted as leader irrelevant. Highly marginal, unimportant in terms of
and expelled), and buffeted both by the rise of UKIP popular support and political significance, its history
and the headline-grabbing activities of the English reads like a classic case of abject political failure.
Defence League (EDL), the BNP has now well and Britain’s largest far right organisation, the British
truly run aground. Union of Fascists, did not even contest the 1935
general election. That the BNP polled over 563,743
A miscellany of fragments has emerged from the votes in the 2010 general election, an increase of
wreckage. While history never quite repeats itself, 192,746 on their performance in 2005, should not
parallels have inevitably been drawn with the blind us to the fact that no fewer than 267 of their
fragmentation of the far right following the National candidates lost their deposits and their share of the
Front’s abysmal showing in the 1979 general national vote was a paltry 1.9 per cent.
election. Recent developments have been watched
with a combination of delight (particularly at Nick
Griffin’s fall from grace) and concern. Some in the The stock line is that British society, with its liberal
media have viewed the proliferation of far-right traditions of tolerance and civility enjoys immunity to
groups (over two dozen at my last count) as an the right-extremist virus that is rarely found elsewhere.
indicator of far-right strength. If truth be told, this is Something about ‘our history’ so the argument runs,
more a marker of organisational weakness. Having makes Britons reluctant to embrace the fascist or far
said that, when electoral prospects are so bleak right. There is, as one anti-BNP campaign group had
the proclivity of the far right towards combative once put it, ‘Nothing British about the BNP’.2 But are
and violent forms of direct action is probably more ‘British values’ so inherently benign?
likely to increase than decrease (see Goodwin and
Evans, 2012). Moreover, as groups vie for hegemony There is a clear problem with overemphasising
on the far right, some might be tempted to further tolerance: we turn a blind eye to the racism that runs
radicalise as a way to carve out a distinctive identity. alongside it. So, we have been told by Nigel Farage,
Reciprocal radicalisation between the far right and the hard-working Britons that once voted for the
violent Islamism also remains a lingering possibility BNP, and now UKIP, are not ‘real’ right-wing racists
(even if the dynamics of this ‘cumulative extremism’ but just decent folk concerned about ‘changes’
remain poorly understood).1 Fortunately one can only in their community, concerned about the scale of
speculate but what might have happened had the ‘uncontrolled’ immigration. When these folk voted
six jihadists succeeded in exploding their homemade for the BNP they did so ‘holding their nose’ because
bomb at an EDL demonstration in Dewsbury in they did not agree with the BNP’s racism.3 Yet aside
2012? What if a far-right group decides to gamble from begging the question as to what a ‘real’ racist12 Runnymede Perspectives
is (?), and not wanting to blanket all UKIP voters as History does matter and it tells us that the far
‘racist’, we will undoubtedly find racism amongst the right has, at various moments, impacted on
votes that UKIP have stolen from the far right. British politics and society. Beyond its effects on
legislation, let us reflect on the everyday impact
The obvious point to make is that racist expression in upon local communities: the Jewish community in
British society has not disappeared with the collapse London’s East End in the 1930s; its impact upon
of the BNP (or for that matter, the EDL). In March East London’s Bengali community in the 1970s; or
2014, in one of his self-congratulatory moments, more recent interventions in Oldham, Bradford and
Nigel Farage remarked that ‘I would think we have Burnley. What is the relationship between the far-right
probably taken a third of the BNP vote directly from presence in such localities and the extent of racial
them, I don’t think anyone has done more, apart violence? Also consider the impact of the far right
from Nick Griffin on Question Time, to damage the in terms of the popular opposition that its activities
BNP than UKIP and I am quite proud of that.’4 But have given rise to, from Cable Street in 1936
has Farage really challenged the racism that courses through to Lewisham in 1977 and beyond. The 2015
through the veins of some of his supporters? general election will no doubt bring further electoral
reverses to Britain’s far right but there is much more
to be said about Britain’s far right ‘fringe’ than its
The bigger picture… interminable inability to make a serious challenge for
For sure, the far right is part of Britain’s national story. representation in Westminster.
It will continue to be part of that national story even
when voters abandon it, as they have recently done
in their droves – almost 764,000 voters in the 2014
Notes
European elections when compared to 2009. Of 1. For the most sophisticated conceptual treatment
course election results count, but there is a much of ‘cumulative extremism’ to date, see Macklin
bigger picture, and yet it is one which we struggle and Busher (2014).
to see (and no doubt the 2015 general election 2. ‘Nothing British about the BNP’ was an online,
results will reinforce this myopia). So let us, for a centre-right campaign group.
moment, look beyond the ballot-box, and think about
3. See Nigel Farage’s comments when speaking in
historicising the impact of Britain’s far right in its
March 2014 at a debate at Chatham House.
broader social and political context.
4. Ibid.
For a start, there is its impact on immigration control. 5. See Cabinet Memorandum by Home Secretary,
Thatcher’s intervention in this area is one well-known 17 February 1965, available online at http://
example from the 1970s. There are others of course: filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-
the role of the British Brothers’ League in the 1905 129-120-c-23.pdf.
Aliens Act; or the role played by domestic fascists
in the 1930s in deterring the British government
from opening the door to ‘too many’ Jewish References
refugees; or the part played by local Immigrant Feldman, Matthew and Mark Littler (2014)
Control Associations in encouraging the introduction Tell MAMA Reporting 2013/14: Anti-Muslim
of immigration controls in 1962. But it is not just Overview, Analysis and ‘Cumulative Extremism’.
in relation to immigration control where we see Middlesbrough: Teesside University.
impact. We also encounter it in relation to legislation
restricting fascist activity, such as public order Goodwin, Matthew and Jocelyn Evans (2012)
legislation: the 1936 Public Order Act, for example, From Voting to Violence? Far Right Extremism
and subsequent amendments (in 1963 Section 5 in Britain. London: HOPE not hate/Searchlight
of the Public Order Act was strengthened following Educational Trust.
disturbances between fascists and anti-fascists). No Macklin, Graham and Joel Busher (2014)
fewer than 430,000 signatures had been collected by ‘Interpreting “cumulative extremism”: Six proposals
the anti-fascist Yellow Star Movement in 1962 calling for enhancing conceptual clarity’, Terrorism and
for legislation against racial incitement. And after Political Violence 0: 1-22.
Labour came to office, a new offence of incitement
to racial hatred was enacted under section 6 of the Macklin, Graham and Joel Busher (2014) ‘The
1965 Race Relations Act. Providing machinery by missing spirals of violence: four waves of movement–
which appropriate legal steps could be taken against countermovement contest in post-war Britain’,
propaganda of the ‘Hitler was Right’ type formed part Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political
of the Home Secretary’s rationale.5 Aggression 7(1): 53-68.Race and Elections 13
4. Three Identity Divides that will
Help Decide Election 2015
Rob Ford
University of Manchester
Election 2015 looks set to be the closest, hardest weaker among younger, second and third generation
fought and most unpredictable for a generation. ethnic minority communities.
Neither of the main two parties has a decisive
advantage, while surging support for UKIP in England Over the past decade or so, the long term rise in
and the SNP in Scotland has changed the nature of ethnic diversity triggered by the “first wave” of mass
the political competition. Much of the analysis of this migration to Britain from the Commonwealth in the
close race focuses on the short term cut and thrust 1950s and 1960s has been overlaid by a further
of politics – dissecting policy and messaging, and shift driven by a “second wave” of mass migration.
the strengths and weaknesses of leaders. While such The growth in British migrant communities over
things doubtless matter, there are other, longer term the past two decades is the largest in the nation’s
forces at work: changes in the composition, values history, and the most diverse in its origins. Britain
and loyalties of the electorate which will impact on now has large and rapidly growing communities
the competition in May, and well beyond. Some of from Poland, Nigeria, Lithuania, China, and Somalia,
the most important are the identity divides in the joining the more established communities from
British electorate, which are playing an ever more the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent. The
significant role in driving voters’ political loyalties: political impact of these communities in 2015
the steady growth in Britain’s ethnic minority depends heavily on where they come from. Migrants
communities, the emergence of new immigrant from Commonwealth countries have voting rights
minorities arriving as part of the largest wave of from arrival in Britain, and their rapid growth
migration in British history, and the growing identity provides an important new electoral constituency,
divide within the white majority population between with distinctly liberal views on immigration, race
those who embrace these changes and those who relations and other issues. Migrants from many
find them threatening. poorer non-Commonwealth countries such
as Somalia or Iran also tend to acquire British
Race matters for party politics because white and citizenship at high rates, and so rapidly enter into
non-white British voters behave very differently. All the electorate.
of Britain’s large ethnic minority communities have
a much higher propensity to vote Labour than white Migrants from the new EU member countries of
voters do, and all tend to shun the Conservatives. As Eastern Europe, however, do not. As a result, this
a result, the steady increase in the ethnic diversity of group – who have formed the focus of intense and
the electorate has important political consequences. polarised political debate – have little political voice
Recent analysis by the think tank British Future has of their own. Less than 5% of Britain’s new Polish
suggested that the Conservatives would have won a community will be eligible to vote in the 2015 election
majority in 2010 if the electorate had the same ethnic (though all are eligible to vote in local and European
mix as in 1992. The sharp rise in the ethnic diversity elections). This is likely to change over time, however.
of London, Manchester, Birmingham and other large Migrants of all origins tend to acquire citizenship in
cities is an important driver of the long term decline growing numbers as they settle and form families
in Conservative prospects in these areas. The big – there is already evidence of an acceleration of
question for the Conservatives in 2015 is whether citizenship grants to Polish migrants in recent Home
they can increase their appeal to ethnic minorities to Office statistics. The politics of the next Parliament
neutralise the electoral cost of rising diversity. The big may accelerate this – the growing demands for a
question for Labour is whether they can retain the referendum on Britain’s EU membership will increase
loyalty of ethnic minority communities. Such loyalties anxieties among East European migrants that their
were frayed by the last Labour government’s actions rights to live and work in Britain may be under threat.
in Iraq and “the war on terror”, and research by the This could encourage more to take British citizenship
Ethnic Minority British Election Study team suggests in order to protect the lives they have built here,
that partisan attachments to Labour are much bringing a new electorate with very distinct views14 Runnymede Perspectives
and experiences on the immigration issue into party Placing too much focus on migration and
politics for future elections. the anxieties of anti-immigration voters also
risks alienating the growing young “confident
The unprecedented wave of migration to Britain cosmopolitan” electorate – socially liberal university
since the mid-1990s has also helped to politicise graduates unconcerned by migration, who may
a deepening value divide within the native born perceive parties who place too much emphasis on
white majority, between “traditional nationalist” the issue as intolerant and out of touch with their
voters who oppose migration as a threat to British concerns. The recent surge in support for the Green
identity and a source of economic problems, and party has come primarily from this group, who form
“confident cosmopolitan” voters who accept mass the opposite end of the identity divide to UKIP.
migration as a normal part of an outward looking
society and a globally integrated economy. This Identity divides new and old will force tough choices
divide is one of generation, education, class and on all the mainstream parties in May 2015. The high
values, splitting younger, middle class, socially liberal electoral salience of immigration, and the rise of UKIP,
university graduates from older, working class, creates a strong short term pressure to assuage
socially conservative voters who left school with few the anxieties of older white “traditional nationalist”
qualifications. A deep division in outlook between voters. Yet any party that adopts an overly restrictive
these groups has been visible in public opinion for and nationalistic stance on these issues could lose
many years, but the sharp rise in immigration, and credibility with established ethnic minority voters,
the emergence of UKIP as the political voice of new migrant voters and the cosmopolitan young.
opposition to it, has greatly increased its relevance to Although right now all parties worry about appearing
political competition. too soft on immigration, in the long run the greater
risk may come from seeming too tough.
This divide will be a key feature in the 2015 election.
It cuts across the traditional issues of economics
and public services that split Labour and Tory voters,
and poses dilemmas for both. In an election as close
as this, neither party can afford to lose “traditional
nationalist” voters angry over immigration to UKIP.
Yet short term appeals to such voters, through
promises of swingeing cuts to immigration or
action to restrict the social or political rights of
migrants, carry their own risks. Parties who define
themselves as hostile to immigrants and immigration
will struggle to appeal in future to migrant and
ethnic minority voters, who will distrust them. The
Conservatives already paid this price with “first wave”
migrants whose descendents still shun them today.
Exclusionary rhetoric and restrictive policy risks
alienating second wave migrants in the same fashion.You can also read
