Poland: The macroeconomic outlook for 2020-21 - Rafał Benecki, ING Bank Śląski October 2020
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Poland: The macroeconomic outlook for 2020-21 Rafał Benecki, ING Bank Śląski October 2020
Agenda
1. Diagnosis
• The economy after the pandemic
• Monetary and fiscal policy response
2. Outlook for 2H20-21
• Next outbreaks of Covid-19 and risks they bring
• EU Funds – The Recovery Plan
3. Summary – threats and opportunities, forecasts
2The Polish economy after the Covid-19 outbreak
3GDP: outperformance in 2Q20, upward revision of 2020 forecasts
Covid-19 caused a strong global recession and for the Polish economy. In GDP dynamics and contributions (in %)
2Q20 GDP in Poland contracted by 8.2% YoY (8.9% Q/Q), although the 10
data was better than expected by the NBP, government and the
consensus. Also the depth of recession was shallower than the average in
5
EU, Eurozone and the CEE region.
The reasons for this outperformance are the following:
0
• Shallower decline in exports than in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Euroland, and therefore a smaller decline in production. This is due to
the favourable GDP structure, e.g. low share of tourism, automotive and -5
rapid rebound in Euroland.
• Moderate decline in investments - shallower than the average in the EU -10
and Euroland, much better than the consensus and forecasts, mainly due 1Q16 1Q17 1Q18 1Q19 1Q20 1Q21
to public investment (high payments from the EU and contribution of
Priv. Consumption Pub. consumption Fixed Investments
local authorities)
Inventories Net exports GDP (%YoY)
• Consumption fell deeper than in CEE, but was still stronger than in
Euroland.
Poland – one of the highest fiscal stimulus’ in Europe
• Poland had largest fiscal stimulus in CEE and among highest in EU (see
35 % of GDP Expenditure and revenue measures
the chart on the right), which limited the rise in unemployment to 1ppt,
maintained the propensity to consume and prevented bankruptcies of 30
Loans and equity injections, and guarantees
enterprises. 25
• Good starting position of the Polish economy - limited imbalances (e.g. 20 29,6
low "leverage" of the economy), surplus of trade in goods and services in 15
the current account. 10 4,2
• We expect the recession to be shallower than the estimates indicated 5
6,9 4,4
immediately after the outbreak. We forecast that 3Q20 should bring a 0
dynamic GDP rebound and full year GDP should decline by 2.9% YoY vs
Poland
S. Africa
India
Mexico
S. Arabia
Russia
Turkey
Argentina
China
Indonesia
Brazil
Korea
Canada
Spain
US
Australia
France
UK
Japan
Italy
Germany
c.-4.2% YoY estimated earlier, and should rebound by 4.5% YoY in 2021.
4Investment outlook: public on the rise in 2020, private only in 2021
Structure of investments growth
• Total investment in Poland declined by as much as 10.9% YoY in 2Q20 – the
fastest pace since the beginning of quarterly data releases. However, the 30
reading was still better than expected and contributed to a better GDP 25
result in 2Q20. 20
15
• In our opinion, the decline of investment was mainly caused by private 10
5
companies lowering their outlays by -14% YoY, which would be similar to
0
1Q10 investment. -5
-10
• In the same period public outlays have grown by approx. 1%, and limited
-15
the depth of the decline in total investments. Public investment should
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continue growing in the following quarters supported by EU-funds.
• The Ministry of Finance expects public investment to rise by approx. 8.0% Public investments - contribution to the growth of total investments
in 2020. Due to the relatively lower advancement of budget expenditures, Private investments - contribution to the growth of total investments
we assume that this increase would be 2 percentage points lower. We Overall investments (yoy)
forecast public investment to grow by 4.1% in 2020 and 3.7% in 2021 (in
real terms). Private investments vs export outlook
• The faster-than-expected improvement in macroeconomic indicators in the 20 40
global economy, observed in recent months, translates itself into better 10 20
0 0
prospects for Polish exporting companies. Recent readings of harmonized -20
-10
economic sentiment survey by European Commission improvement as -20 -40
well. We estimate that the negative growth of private investment will ease -30 -60
from -14.4% YoY in 2Q20 to -11% YoY in 2H20 and will remain below zero -40 -80
in 1H21. Throughout 2020, private investment will decline in real terms by
10.1%, and in 2021 it is expected to increase by 2.2%.
Private investments (yoy)
Expectations for exports in the following months (will
increase/will decrease net, rhs, PL, Q+1)
5Labour market: unemployment growth will be less pronounced than we expected and
delayed to autumn 2020
Unemployment is not falling, despite seasonal factor Registered unemployment rate Stopa bezrobocia (%)
4 14%
ING forecast
3 12%
70
2
10%
1
20
0 8%
-1
-30 6%
-2
-3 4%
-4 -80
2%
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
0%
Registered unemployment rate - %YoY, left axis 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Number of collective redundancies
• Labour market performs much better than we expected. This is largely due to anti-crisis measures which require their beneficiaries to maintain the
employment level for 6-12 months. Moreover, labour market is supported by deferred demand and widespread staycations by Poles.
• These factors , however, are not sustainable. The pent-up demand will fade, domestic tourism should also drop in the Autumn (business travels won’t
compensate). We expect redundancies to emerge in hotels, catering and travel services.
• At the peak of Covid-19 pandemics the number of people not working (despite being formally employed) reached 1.2m according to LFS.
• The unemployment rate will start to rise again from October reaching 7.7% at the end of 2020.
• The labour market recovery will be adversly affected by the 7% rise in the minimum wage from January 2021 – which is twice as much as the expected
growth of average wages.
• In 2021 we expect the unemployment rate to fall again below 7%, due to the robust economic recovery.
6Impact of anti-crisis programs – the Polish shield softened the GDP fall by about 2-
3ppt
• The supply and demand shock in sectors most affected by the Support paid out of the Shields in PLN bn, as of 4 Sep
pandemic-related restrictions, widespread to the whole economy and
led to a collapse in international trade.
wage co-financing, microloans 25,1
• Using an input-output model of 54 sectors, we estimated the economic
effects for the whole economy. Lower consumption, investments, and
exports due to Covid translate into a drop in demand for products from social security breaks, stand-by payments 22,3
a given sector (eg, restaurants), and indirectly – through inter-sectoral
connections – also lead to lower domestic and demand and lower
imports of goods and services from other sectors.
PFR Financial Shield 60,5
• A comparison of the Covid shock scenario with a Shield scenario,
indicates that anti-crisis measures softened the GDP loss by about 2- -9 1 11 21 31 41 51 61
3ppt.
• In the Shield scenario, assuming a transfer of about PLN132bn (app.
6%of GDP) to households and assuming that three-quarters of this
income support is consumed, the GDP loss is softened by 3ppt.
Assuming that only a half of these means is consumed, the Shield
reduced the recession in Poland in 2020 by about 2ppt.
• The anti-crisis Shield reduced the liquidity risk in enterprises and
probably prevented some businesses from bankruptcy and production
potential loss. Also, it prevented an increase in the unemployment rate.
7Monetary policy: long period of low interest rates, the largest QE in CEE EM
Nominal and real interest rates in Poland
• In 2020 NBP: (1) reduced reference interest rate to 0.1%, (2) initiated its
asset purchase program, which remains open ended in terms of size and 8
in %
duration.
6
• So far, the central bank purchased securities of PLN103bn (4.6% of GDP,
including PLN52bn of T-bonds, PLN19bn of state-guaranteed PFR bonds 4
and PLN32bn of BGK bonds). In our view, the NBP can increase its balance
sheet by additional 2% of GDP. 2
• Monetary Policy Council keeps monetary policy parameters unchanged 0
noting that GDP risks are tilted to the upside. Economic activity is supported
-2
by fiscal programs and a loosening of monetary policy. Lower commodity NBP reference rate Real NBP reference rate
prices in combination with a decline of economic activity will support lower -4
inflation in the next year.
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• We see at least three reasons for the MPC to keep its loose monetary
policy stance in the coming months:
• (1) threats identified by the MPC: uncertainty regarding pandemic NBP’s QE program: distribution in time and structure
developments, risks of lower income dynamics and weaker market
35 PLNbn
sentiment than in the recent years;
30
• (2) NBP readiness to continue its QE program remains critical to assure a
25
smooth debt financing in the context of still high borrowing needs; T-bonds PFR BGK
20
• (3) Zloty exchange rate: in our view, MPC’s dissatisfaction with the current
Zloty exchange rate (a lack of depreciation undermines the economic 15
recovery) means that as long as QE is continued by the ECB, there will be 10
no correction in interest rates in Poland. 5
• We assume that the first possible interest rate hike might occur no earlier 0
19.Mar 23.Mar 26.Mar 16.Apr 29.Apr 13.May 27.May 10.Jun 24.Jun 8.Jul 22.Jul 19.Aug
than 2022.
8Fiscal policy: ready for a large-scale economic stimulus
• In the years 2020-21 the borrowing needs of the public finance sector
State budget borrowing needs & BGK and PFR bond issuances
(state budget, Covid-19 Response Fund in BGK and PFR Financial Shield) PLN bn
will amount to PLN430bn (19.1% of GDP) and PLN284bn (12.6% of GDP) 450 Financial Shield of the Polish
respectively ( chart). 400
Development Fund
85
350
• Estimation assumes: (1) execution of the planned deficit for 2020-21 (both COVID-19 Response Fund in
300 112 BGK
too high), (2) bond issuances by BGK for the Covid-19 Response Fund at
250
PLN112bn in 2000. (MinFin); (3) bond issuances by PFR for the Financial 114 Net borrowing needs
200
Shield in the amount of PLN85bn in 2000. 101
150 57
54 1
• The borrowing needs may be PLN10-20 billion lower due to: (1) a too 100 26
89 108
140 Domestic debt redemptions
84 89 97
pessimistic central budget deficit for 2020-21; and (2) lower utilization of 50 74
22 23 17 24 34 24 30
the Financial Shield for large companies. 0
Foreign debt redemptions
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020PW 2021P
• By the end of August borrowing needs have been financed: 97% in case of
the amended budget, 69% in case of BGK, 78% in case of PFR (adj. for the
lower utilization of Shields). BGK issued bonds of PLN77bn, PFR of Debt as a percentage of GDP - national and EU definition
PLN62bn. In 2020 there is potentially PLN7bn State, PLN35bn BGK and
PLN23bn PFR bonds to be issued. 70
Public debt (national
methodology)
• MinFin amended the budget with too high deficit planned for 2020-21 64,7
(public finance sector: 12.1% of GDP in 2020 and 6% of GDP in 2021). General government debt
(ESA'2010)
After July execution of the central deficit was only 15% of the plan for 60
2020 (the anti-crisis measures were covered by BGK and PFR). This means
Debt (article 38a of the PF
that part of the 2020 budget financing will be used to pre-finance the 52,9 Act)
borrowing needs of the 2021 budget, some of the financing will be 50
transferred to the so-called investment fund (outside the stabilizing 51,6 I threshold (article 38a of
expenditure rule!). the PF Act)
• In our opinion, public finances are preparing to co-finance EU funds from 40 Constitutional limit, II
the Recovery Fund. In the coming years the national and the EU financial threshold (Public Finance
Act)
stimulus for the economy will be enormous. 9Macroeconomic outlook for 2H20-21
10How dangerous are the next Covid-19 infection waves?
Spain: new cases above, new deaths below 1H20 level
• So far, public policies aimed at keeping the virus reproduction rate below 1,
so an increase in daily cases does not grow rapidly and the health care
system is not overburdened, in order to avoid increased occurrence of 12 000 900
deaths. 800
new cases (lhs)
• However, the second wave of the pandemic in Western Europe is milder 700
than the first one – a large increase in new daily cases is accompanied by a 8 000 new deaths (rhs) 600
marginal increase in mortality (see charts). In addition, lower mortality
500
results from: :
400
• (1) Lower contagions among elderly people, whose mortality rate is high.
Older people are more aware of the existing risks, and became more 4 000 300
cautious. 200
• (2) Wide-spread testing, also during the early phase of virus incubation. 100
0 0
• (3) More efficient health care, both from the medical and technical side. Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jun Jul Aug Sep
• As a result, governments can tolerate an increase of the reproduction rate
above 1, therefore an introduction of drastic precautionary measures (total
lockdown) is not needed. The lockdowns can be local only, focused on
elderly people, obligatory face masks or hygienic measures.
• All this does not mean that the Covid-19 threat to the economy is over. Still,
an uncontrolled increase in contagions among elderly people cannot be
excluded, and the risk of total lockdown has not disappeared. The recent
Israel case is a telling example.
11New EU Financial Perspective 2021-27 in EU Recovery Fund will support economic
recovery from 2021
• In response to the economic crisis due to the pandemic Covid-19, EU EU grants for Poland in 2021-27 vs 2014-20
members agreed on a joint economic program – European Recovery
Plan. It includes €390bn in grants and €360bn in preferential loans. 2018 € prices
124.9
116.8
• From the EU Recovery Plan and the next 7-year budget 2021-27, 120
Poland will get around €125bn in grants compared to about €117bn in
2014-20 (all 2018 euro prices). This means a 7% increase. In addition,
Poland may get approx. €30.6bn in loans. Without the EU Recovery 90
plan, Poland would suffer a significant decline in its EU funds envelope
in the next programing period.
• The grants from the Recovery Fund need to be utilised in 2021-23, 60
and about 50-70% of them already in 2021-22. Thanks to these funds,
Poland will obtain an important instrument to support economic
recovery, replacing various measures from the anti-crisis shield, which 30
have either expired or are to expire late this year.
• We estimate that the utilization of €29.5bn (6% of GDP) in grants will 0
occur in the following years: 0.5-1.2% of GDP in 2021, 2.0% of GDP in Financial Perspective 2014-20 Financial Perspective 2021-27
2022, 1.8% of GDP in 2023, and 1.6% of GDP in 2024. But the overall
impact on GDP dynamics might be lower (3-4% total in 2021-24),
Just Transition Fund
given that investments in photovoltaic or offshore wind are usually
import-intensive. ReactEU
Recovery Fund
Cohesion Funds and Common Agricultural Policy
12Comparison of the current and next EU budget, including the Recovery Fund
MFF 2014-2020 MFF 2021-2027, including the Recovery Fund, €155bn (2018 constant
€117bn (2018 constant prices) prices)
Environment and energy
Road transportation
Rail transportation
Other transportation
Health
30,6 Loans
Economic and social development, tourism, culture
CAP - rural areas development 3,0 REACT EU
120 3,5 Just Transition Mechanism
5,2
CAP - direct payments Recovery and Resilience 8,0
19,0
100 Facility: €23bn 1,5 3,2
5,0
3,6 Other cohesion funds
17,8 8,4 Cohesion Fund
80 Cohesion policy:
8,0 13,2
€85,3bn European Social Fund+
6,8
2,3 Cohesion policy: €67bn
60
41,6 European Regional
31,3
40 Development Fund
10,8
20 9,4
CAP: €31,5bn
20,6 CAP: €29bn 19,2
0
• There is no distribution of cohesion funds in the next EU’s budget yet, but the EC’s proposal assumes the following allocation:
• EFRD: min. 35% to support innovative and smart economic transformation; min. 30% more environment friendly, low-carbon economy and 6% sustainable development of
urban areas.
• EFS+: social programs - min. 25% to support social inclusion, min. 2% fighting poverty, 10% support employability of the youth.
• Within the RRF (Recovery Fund, €23bn) 35% is to be allocated for road transport, 23% environment and energy, 22% economic and social development, tourism, culture;
14% rail transport, 7% health (ING estimates based on draft inputs to the National Recovery Plan).
• The draft of Polish energy policy through 2040 assumes access to EU funding of app. €30bn (2018 constant prices), including €18bn from cohesion policy, €1bn from
ReactEU, €3.5bn from the Just Transition Fund and €7bn from the RRF.
13The expected structure of public outlays from EU Recovery Plan
MFF 2021-2027, including the Recovery Fund, €155bn (2018 constant
prices) • The National Development Plan (KPO), which will be subject to allocation
of funds from the European Recovery Plan, is not yet available. The EU
members states should submit their plans to the EC till end of 2020. So we
can infer about the structure of the public investment indirectly from
30,6 other documents available.
Loans
3,0 REACT EU • Based on the local government Development Plan already submited to
3,5 Just Transition Mechanism Polish national government we estimated the structure of future public
5,2
Recovery and Resilience 8,0
outlays, which should be funded from EU Recovery Plan in Poland (see
Facility: €23bn 3,2 previous slide, right graph and this slide).
1,5
5,0
3,6 Other cohesion funds
8,4 Cohesion Fund
• Also, we know that the Ministry of Regional Development has established
7 working groups, which present the areas where money will be invested,
European Social Fund+
13,2 they are: energy and environment, transport, infrastructure (including
health), innovation, society, digitization and territorial cohesion.
Cohesion policy: €67bn European Regional
Development Fund
• The digital transformation and transition to a green economy are
41,6
priorities. These funds will contribute to the transformation of key sectors
to a low-emission model and circular economy, using development
opportunities in the area of green technologies. It will also serve the
9,4 effective adaptation of the most vulnerable areas and sectors to climate
CAP: €29bn
change, including sustainable transport.
19,2
14Summary
15Forecasts for 2H20 and 2021 – opportunities and threats
Opportunities:
• Milder pandemic in 2H20 – lower mortality, limited new lockdowns, so
economic recovery in main trading partners and in Poland should Prognozy makroekonomiczne
continue.
• The fiscal impulse from Polish budget (new investment fund to be
created) and EU funds, also Poland’s main trading partners are adding to 2018 2019P 2020P 2021P
the existing stimulus.
• CEE region and Poland among the biggest beneficiaries of the new EU GDP growth (%) 5.1 4.1 -2.9 4.5
Recovery Fund.
Consumption growth 4.1 3.9 -2.7 4.7
• Low share of Covid-sensitive sectors (tourism, automotive) and higher
resilience than in Czechia and Hungary to a decline in international trade. Investment growth 8.9 7.2 -6.8 3.2
Threats: General government deficit acc. to EU
0.2 0.7 9.5 5.0
• Increased propensity to save of households. methodology (%GDP)
• Low private investments. CPI, year avg (%) 1.7 2.3 3.3 2.8
• Transition period between 2H20 and 1H21, after expiration of the anti- Unemployment rate (%) 5.8 5.2 7.0 6.8
crisis shields, but before the launch of projects funded from the
Recovery Fund. USD/PLN rate (year end) 3.76 3.80 3.63 3.49
• New pandemic outbreaks in Poland and its main trading partners cause EUR/PLN rate (year end)
4.30 4.26 4.36 4.36
local full lockdowns.
• Lack of PLN depreciation, which lowers the fiscal multiplier and hence WIBOR 3M (year end) 1.7 1.7 0.3 0.3
reduces the effectiveness of fiscal programs.
• Rising labour costs (in 2021 2.5x higher increase in minimum wages than
average wages).
16Disclaimer
ANALYST CERTIFICATION
The analyst(s) who prepared this presentation hereby certifies that the views expressed in this presentation accurately reflect his/her personal views about the subject securities or issuers and no part of his/her compensation was, is, or
will be directly or indirectly related to the inclusion of specific recommendations or views in this presentation.
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All data comes from Macrobond, GUS, NBP, Moody’s, Fitch, S&P, ING forecasts.
17Informacje i zastrzeżenia
• Analityk(cy), który przygotował ten raport zaświadcza, że poglądy wyrażone w niniejszym raporcie odzwierciedlają jego/ ich osobiste poglądy na temat instrumentów finansowych i żadna część jego / ich wynagrodzenia nie jest i nie będzie bezpośrednio lub pośrednio powiązana
zamieszczeniem poszczególnych rekomendacji (o ile występują) lub opinii w niniejszym raporcie.
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dokładne i kompletne.
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• Przedstawione w raporcie prognozy oraz elementy ocen, jak również zalecenia i sugestie zachowań inwestycyjnych, oparte są wyłącznie o analizę przeprowadzoną przez Analityka, bez uzgodnień z innymi podmiotami i opierają się na szeregu założeń, które w przyszłości mogą okazać się
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• Rekomendacja wydawana przez ING Bank Śląski S.A. obowiązuje do momentu zrealizowania kursu docelowego, chyba, że zostanie wcześniej zaktualizowana. Aktualizacja jest uzależniona od sytuacji rynkowej oraz subiektywnej oceny Analityka.
• Wszelkie prognozy dotyczące poziomu kursów walutowych nie odnoszą się do instrumentów finansowych opartych o te kursy walutowe.
• Nadzór nad ING Bankiem Śląskim S.A. sprawuje Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego.
• Inwestowanie w instrumenty finansowe, w tym w papiery wartościowe, wiąże się z szeregiem ryzyk związanych m.in. z sytuacją makroekonomiczną kraju i na rynkach giełdowych, zmianami przepisów prawa i innych regulacji dotyczących działalności podmiotów gospodarczych. Inwestorzy
korzystający z rekomendacji nie mogą zrezygnować z przeprowadzenia niezależnej oceny i uwzględnienia innych okoliczności niż wskazywane przez Analityka czy przez ING Bank Śląski S.A.
UJAWNIENIA
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Śląskiego.
• Ceny instrumentów finansowych: Ceny są ustalane z poprzedniego dnia zamknięcia na rynku krajowym, chyba że zaznaczono inaczej.
• Zawieranie transakcji: ING Bank Śląski S.A. i każdy z jego pracowników, w tym Analitycy zakresie dozwolonym przez obowiązujące przepisy, mogą zawierać transakcje na instrumentach finansowych, o których mowa w niniejszym raporcie.
• ING Bank Śląski S.A. jest aktywnym uczestnikiem rynku walutowego oraz instrumentów finansowych, w tym instrumentów pochodnych i skarbowych papierów wartościowych, które mogą być przedmiotem rekomendacji.
• ING Bank Śląski S.A. oświadcza, że jest animatorem rynku lub dostawcą płynności w odniesieniu do skarbowych papierów wartościowych wyemitowanych przez Ministerstwo Finansów (pełni funkcję Dealera Skarbowych Papierów Wartościowych).
• Jednocześnie wprowadzone wewnętrzne rozwiązania organizacyjne (np. odseparowanie fizyczne osób sporządzających rekomendacje od jednostek zawierających transakcje) oraz obowiązujące bariery informacyjne mają na celu zapobieganie konfliktom interesów.
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monitorowane przez jednostkę Compliance.
Źródła danych: Macrobond, GUS, NBP, ING, Worldmeter, Bloomberg.You can also read
