North Macedonia external relations briefing: Macedonian External Relations Outlook for 2021 - China-CEE ...

ISSN: 2560-1601

                                                                                    Vol. 36, No. 4 (MK)

                                                                                          January 2021

                     North Macedonia external relations briefing:
                 Macedonian External Relations Outlook for 2021
                                           Gjorgjioska M.Adela

                                                             1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

                                                             +36 1 5858 690
Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft.
                                                             office@china-cee.eu
Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin
Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping                        china-cee.eu

2017/01

Macedonian External Relations Outlook for 2021

         The trajectory of Macedonian external relations in 2021 can be delineated by examining
its recent directions and destinations, as well as the underlying forces that are guiding them.
Following the elections in July 2020 and the continuation of the SDSM-DUI governing
coalition, it is to be expected that the strategy and tactics pursued by the current political
establishment will remain unchanged.1 As the (mis)management of the coronavirus pandemic
remains in the spotlight, the country’s foreign relations are likely to be assessed in direct
correlation to it.

         In 2021 the country's foreign policy will be assessed in direct correlation to its
(mis)management of the coronavirus pandemic. At the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021,
the issue of the supply and provision of Covid19 vaccinations became reflective of the foreign
policy led by Zaev’s government. Namely, in spite of guarantees given by the Health Minister
in early December that the vaccination process will commence in early January 2021, by the
end of the month it became clear that the country will face severe delays in receiving the first
supplies.2 Since the orders (for Pfizer and Astrazeneca vaccines) made through the COVAX
system and the EU could not be delivered, the state turned to the Chinese company Sinopharma
to secure a new contract for the delivery of the first batch of 200,000 necessary vaccines.3 This
meant that the Chinese vaccines will be the first to arrive in the country during the month of
February. In reaction to this development Zaev gave a statement which is indicative of the
overall foreign policy approach pursued by his Government: “I would like to confirm that we
have spoken to our strategic partners - NATO and Washington - and we have confirmed that
the supply of vaccines from China is not a geopolitical issue, but a sovereign right of each

1
 https://intellinews.com/old-partners-sdsm-and-dui-reach-deal-to-form-north-macedonia-s-new-government-
189931/?source=north-macedonia
2
    https://seenews.com/news/n-macedonia-to-get-first-batch-of-pfizers-covid-19-vaccine-in-feb-726439
3
 https://www.dw.com/mk/%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BF%D1%87%D0%B5-
%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0-%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%88%D1%82%D0%BE-
%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B5-
%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%B4%D0%B0-
%D1%98%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0-
%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5/a-56098459

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country.”4 The Prime Minister’s statement illustrates the broader servility of the Government’s
foreign relations, which against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic manifests itself as
recklessness and disregard for the health and well-being of the population. This state of affairs
is further elucidated by contrasting developments in neighbouring Serbia, the country with the
second highest vaccine roll-out in Europe in January 2021.5 On a social level, the stark
difference in the vaccination outcomes in the two former Yugoslav states, will continue to find
its expressions in renewed criticisms of Zaev’s Government.

        Against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU accession process will remain
a key foreign policy issue in 2021. Following the Bulgarian veto in November 2020, the
pathway to opening accession negotiations between N. Macedonia and the EU remains blocked.
This was confirmed in mid-December with the adoption of the conclusions of the EU’s
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). In response to this the Macedonian
Government stated that the country “will continue to build good neighborly relations and
implement European standards” although the “European values and expectations of our citizens
have been betrayed” with the decision.6 Foreign Minister Bujar Osmani stated: “The European
process should not entail the blackmail of any country of Europe or the Western Balkans”.
Moreover, he added that “support from European countries is the best way to renew enthusiasm
and trust in the process. And supporting and accelerating the integration process is the best way
to improve relations between neighbours”.7 The Government’s rhetoric suggests that it will
remain committed to the EU integration process and will thus continue adopting a constructive
approach aimed at overcoming Bulgaria’s hurdle: “We remain committed to the dialogue with
Sofia and the search for a mutually acceptable solution. We are ready to clarify certain
dilemmas if necessary, but our positions are known and publicly confirmed: We are
Macedonians who speak Macedonian language. Macedonian identity cannot be discussed and
cannot be negotiated”.8

4
 https://sdk.mk/index.php/makedonija/sad-i-nato-razbiraat-deka-morame-da-kupime-vaktsini-od-kina-reche-
zaev/
5
 https://www.euronews.com/2021/01/27/serbia-has-second-fastest-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-in-europe-
thanks-to-china
6
    https://vlada.mk/node/23577?ln=en-gb
7
 https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/north-macedonia-slams-bulgarias-blackmail-in-eu-
entry-process/
8
    https://vlada.mk/node/23577?ln=en-gb

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Moreover, the Macedonian government informed that it had proposed a first draft of an
Action Plan to their Bulgarian counterparts, which includes projects between the two countries
that can enhance cooperation in various fields (economy, infrastructure, culture, education,
etc.)9 In mid-January Sofia responded with its own Action Plan, which has not yet been
disclosed publicly. According to diplomatic sources it includes projects related to railways,
highways, and investments of Bulgarian companies in N. Macedonia and the opening of branch
campuses of Bulgarian universities in N. Macedonia. Moreover, it allegedly includes specific
requests with regards to history textbooks.10 It is yet to be seen whether the Action plan will be
approved by both countries and how its contents will be received by the Macedonian (and
Bulgarian) public. The untangling of the current deadlock will also depend on the status of the
ongoing discussions within the Joint History Commission between N. Macedonia and
Bulgaria.11 The outcome of this process however is also highly uncertain and contentious as
Bulgaria continues to use its asymmetrical position in order to push through its own nationalist
interpretation of history, at the expense of Macedonian history and identity. Some have ascribed
Bulgaria’s intransigent nationalist position to the current Bulgarian government’s need to
distract the attention of the domestic population away from its corruption allegations, street
demonstrations and economic downturn.12 In view of this, the outcome of the April 2021
Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria may have a bearing also on its position towards the
Macedonian EU accessions trajectory.

         In parallel to the ongoing negotiations with Bulgaria, it is to be expected that the
Macedonian foreign policy will continue to align with the foreign policy of the EU. The
decision to join the EU’s sanctions regime against Nicaragua in early 2021 is illustrative of
this.13 Officially titled “Decision to introduce restrictive measures with regards to the situation
in Nicaragua”, the decision includes a copy of the original decision on the sanctions reached on
May 4th 2020 by the Council of the European Union”.14 This suggests that as an aspirant

9
    https://vlada.mk/node/23577?ln=en-gb
10
     https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/bulgaria-is-trying-to-change-tactics-with-skopje/
11
     https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/16/bulgaria-north-macedonia-fail-to-move-history-dispute-forward/
12
 https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/08/bulgaria-s-block-on-north-macedonia-s-bid-to-join-eu-massively-
endangers-europe-s-security
13
     https://www.europeansanctions.com/region/nicaragua-2/
14
  https://dejure.mk/zakon/odluka-za-voveduvanje-na-restriktivni-merki-soglasno-odlukata-znbp-2020-607-na-
sovetot-od-4-maj-2020-godina-za-izmenuvanje-na-odlukata-znbp-2019-1720

                                                        3

member of the EU, N. Macedonia is taking active steps to align its foreign policy more closely
with the Common Foreign Security Policy of the European Union. Additionally, in 2021 the
Government is likely to continue following the foreign policy decisions of the USA. Statements
given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in front of the Parliamentary Committee of Foreign
Affairs in late 2020 are indicative of this tendency: “In the broader international context, the
strategic partnership with the USA remains one of the key pillars of our diplomacy, as an
inseparable part of the overall state strategy”.15 It remains to be seen what foreign policy path
steps the Macedonian diplomacy prioritize in 2021 if and/when divergencies appear between
the foreign policy acts of the EU and the USA.

      The coronavirus pandemic is likely to continue exposing the by-products of the foreign
policy pursued by the SDSM-DUI Government. In the first months of 2021 this will find its
expression in the Government’s handling of the vaccination process. As the year unfolds it will
also expose the capacity of the state and its diplomatic service to use foreign policy as an
instrument for domestic governance, and especially ameliorating the various consequences of
the pandemic. Against the backdrop of the health crisis, the country’s foreign policy is likely to
remain on the same path focused on EU and NATO membership. Thus, the foreign policy
decisions taken by the SDSM-DUI Government are likely to be in close alignment with the
foreign policy decisions taken by the EU, NATO and the USA. The opening of EU accession
talks will remain conditional on developments with neighbouring Bulgaria. At the same time
however any resolution of the dispute, which is done at the expense of Macedonian history,
language and identity is likely to cause a public backlash domestically. In the short to medium
term this may affect the legitimacy and the stability of the Governing coalition. In the long term
it could have with far-reaching consequences for the country and society as a whole.

15
 https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/osmani-pred-pratenicite-eu-zgreshi-shto-go-odlozhi-pochetokot-
na-pregovorite

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