NORTH KOREA, IAEA SPECIAL INSPECTIONS, AND THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Matthias Dembinski
NORTH KOREA, IAEA SPECIAL
INSPECTIONS, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE NONPROLIFERATION
REGIME
by Matthias Dembinski
Dr. Matthias Dembinski is a Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for International Affairs (Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik) in Ebenhausen, Germany. Prior to joining that Institute, he worked with the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Project at the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt. His most recent publications include
Amerikanische Weltpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts (edited with Peter Rudolf and Jurgen Wilzewski,
1994) and NATO and Nonproliferation: A Critical Appraisal (with Harald Muller and Alexander Kelle, 1994).
O
n October 21, 1994, the result in the dismantling of North gram is also the first test case for
United States and the Korea’s proliferation-prone fuel the reformed nonproliferation re-
Democratic People’s Re- cycle, based on graphite-moderated gime.
public of Korea (DPRK) signed the reactors. In exchange, the DPRK The crisis offers the opportunity
“Agreed Framework between the will receive modern light-water re- to evaluate two sections of the re-
United States of America and the actors, compensation for lost energy formed regime. The first issue is the
Democratic People's Republic of in the form of heavy oil, and U.S. ability of the International Atomic
Korea,” outlining a formula that diplomatic recognition. Essentially, Energy Agency (IAEA) to discover
might eventually solve one of the the agreement is based on a bargain a military nuclear program or the
gravest nuclear crisis since the end whereby the DPRK is swapping its concealed production of fissile ma-
of the East-West conflict. nuclear option for an American terial in non-nuclear weapon states.
Since 1987, the possibility of a promise to do its utmost to stabilize It is undisputed that considerable
nuclear weapon program in North one of the world’s most totalitarian loopholes in the safeguards system
Korea has troubled experts and poli- regimes. of the IAEA were discovered with
ticians. The crisis was dramatically Whether both sides are willing the unveiling of the secret nuclear
aggravated in the spring of 1993 and capable of fulfilling their part program in Iraq. In order to regain
when the North Korean leadership of this bargain remains to be seen. confidence, the IAEA undertook
refused to open its nuclear plants to A whole panoply of technical and considerable reforms in 1990 to cor-
an inspection and threatened to with- financial questions still need to be rect these deficiencies. However, the
draw from the Non-Proliferation solved under virtually unpredictable reforms rest on an uncertain legal
Treaty (NPT). In the spring of 1994, political circumstances. basis and are politically disputed.
even the dire prospect of war loomed Evaluating the agreed framework, In particular, the right of the IAEA
over the peninsula. its direct benefits, and its risks for to undertake special inspections has
In the agreed framework, both the region is difficult enough. How- to be defined over time. For the pros-
sides consented to enter a process ever, regional security is not the only pect of expanding this convention,
of carefully orchestrated steps which issue at stake. The dispute regard- the attitude of the IAEA vis-á-vis
will, if implemented successfully, ing the North Korean nuclear pro- North Korea sets a precedent.
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 31Matthias Dembinski
The second issue is the ability of ducing and separating plutonium in to the routine implementation of
the states under the regime to pun- undeclared, secret facilities (paral- their missions and gave up search-
ish a breach of contract. The tradi- lel program scenario). For many ing for indications of an infringe-
tional nonproliferation regime has states, the acquisition of unrecorded ment of the treaty, or following up
lacked effective sanctions. This source material should not be an on obvious infringements.
loophole was considered in the insurmountable difficulty. Safe-
course of the reform. On January guards under INFCIRC/153 cover Status of the Reforms
31, 1992, the Security Council con- nuclear material only at the process-
firmed its competence when it de- ing stage when the material can be The program to reform safeguards
clared that the proliferation of weap- enriched and processed into fuel aims at improving the IAEA’s abil-
ons of mass destruction could (uranium hexafluoride and uranium ity to detect undeclared nuclear ac-
present a violation of international oxide, respectively). Thus, the en- tivities. It focuses on the activation
peace and security. However, both tire process from the mining of ura- of the special inspection rights and,
the appropriateness of sanctions and nium ore to the production of ura- simultaneously the development of
the practical meaning of the Secu- nium ore concentrate (yellow-cake) additional information sources.
rity Council’s new role need to be is not subject to surveillance. In February 1991, when Direc-
tested. Again, North Korea can be This serious loophole in the tor General Hans Blix put the issue
viewed as a first test case. IAEA safeguards system can only of special inspections on the agenda
The outcome of this test will have be explained by examining the ori- during the meeting of the Board of
a lasting effect on the future devel- gin of INFCIRC/153. The NPT was Governors of the IAEA, his request
opment of the nonproliferation re- primarily aimed at the industrial was resisted by a group of Third
gime. Accordingly, an assessment of nations in Europe and East Asia. World States.6 It took another year
the agreed framework needs to take On the one hand, those countries, before a resolution passed confirm-
these long-term effects into account. notably Germany, rejected an overly ing the right to conduct special in-
restrictive system. On the other spections. Nevertheless, the circum-
NORTH KOREA: A FIRST hand, no one assumed that these stances under which the resolution
TEST-CASE FOR THE states would secretly produce was adopted must be interpreted as
REFORMED IAEA nuclear weapons.3 In this contro- a sure indication that also in 1992
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM versy, the United States managed to no more than a compromise was
add Paragraphs 73 and 77, which reached.7 While the Director Gen-
give the IAEA the right to under- eral believes he has the right to com-
Shortcomings of the Traditional prehensive special inspections at his
take special inspections. Neverthe-
Safeguards System disposal, the Board of Governors has
less, special inspections were never
actually used.4 not explicitly confirmed this right.8
IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear Thus, a convention in the use of
weapon states party to the NPT The resistance of the West Euro-
pean states to an overly vigilant and special inspections will have to de-
(INFCIRC/153 safeguards) rely velop over time. Here the attitude
heavily on material accountancy. strong control agency produced a
series of further restrictions on the toward North Korea sets a precedent.
Traditionally, they have been re- This ambivalence also overshad-
stricted to declared nuclear facili- reach of the Vienna controllers.
These limitations are partly tied to ows the problem of developing and
ties. 1 This system has been quite using additional information.9 The
successful in preventing the diver- the safeguards agreement and have
resulted from supplementary prac- IAEA has created the organizational
sion of fissile material from the de- requirements necessary to receive
clared stock.2 However, it is bound tices.5 Probably the most meaning-
ful consequence of these restrictive intelligence information. However,
to fail if a state manages to obtain standard procedures still need to be
some undeclared source material, provisions is that over time a prac-
tice of cursory inspections of the developed in this area. Also, no
and succeeds either in secretly pro- settlement has yet been reached on
cessing this material in declared fa- operators of nuclear plants in mem-
ber states evolved at the IAEA. The the comprehensive mandatory noti-
cilities (evasion scenario) or in en- fication regarding the trade of
riching uranium or respectively pro- inspectors often limited themselves
nuclear material and goods. More
32 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995Matthias Dembinski
transparency in this area might al- spections to follow up on indications contrast, American governmental
low the recognition of a procurement of a breach of the safeguards agree- authorities presume that the reactor
pattern. Currently, the European ment. was shut down in 1989 and that the
Union (EU) and several individual North Korea’s nuclear program entire core was possibly exchanged.
countries inform the IAEA about dates back to the 1950s. It was prob- North Korea could have gained 15
nuclear transfers on a voluntary ba- ably influenced by the experience kilograms of plutonium, enough to
sis.10 of the atomic threat from the United build two bombs.16
Additional reform steps are al- States during the Korean War. Al- North Korea acceded to the NPT
ready being prepared by the Direc- though outside observers agree that in 1985 under pressure from the
tor General. Lasting improvements the nuclear threat has been fading Soviet Union, but delayed the con-
to the traditional safeguards system since then, the nuclear fear has been clusion of a safeguards agreement
can be expected from a project called kept alive through the permanent at that time.17 The DPRK govern-
“Programme 93 + 2” which is ex- exaggerated presentation of alleged ment eventually signed the agree-
pected to be presented to the Board American nuclear capabilities and ment in December 1991, after the
of Governors for approval in spring aggressive, imperialistic designs. United States had declared that the
1995.11 One element of “Programme With initial assistance from Rus- last 150 nuclear weapons would be
93+2” is the development of meth- sia and China in basic nuclear tech- removed soon from the south of the
ods for the detection of radioactive nology, the DPRK succeeded in lay- peninsula and after Japan had con-
substances in the environment [en- ing the foundations for an indepen- ditioned economic assistance upon
vironmental monitoring techniques], dent nuclear program.14 Between the signing of a safeguards agree-
which could provide information 1980 and 1987, a graphite-moder- ment.
about undeclared nuclear activities. ated research reactor running on Relations between North and
The IAEA and several member natural uranium with a capacity of South Korea improved as well, cul-
states expect a substantial strength- 30 megawatts thermal (MWt) was minating in December 1992 with the
ening of the verification regime from built, using indigenous resources signing of an agreement between the
these methods. Analysis from a tech- only. two Korean states to ban nuclear
nical consultant group and the first Uranium processing plants, a fuel weapons on the peninsula. Enrich-
field trials demonstrated that such fabrication plant, and a rather large ment and reprocessing plants would
an instrument is suitable to indicate reprocessing facility complete the have been forbidden. North Korea
hidden nuclear activities over a short fuel cycle. The construction of two ratified the agreement with the
range. As far as the detection of se- power reactors, the first with 150 to IAEA, but the conclusion of bilat-
cret nuclear activities over a long 200 MWt in Yongbyon and the sec- eral talks failed because the North
distance, for example in an entire ond with a capacity of 600 MWt constantly added new demands.18`
state, is concerned, the reliability of near Taechon is under way. The Nevertheless, South Korea and the
this technique must still be investi- smaller reactor, to be completed in United States cancelled their “Team
gated.12 The first field trials raised 1995, will produce approximately Spirit” military training maneuvers
the expectation that these techniques 50 kilograms of plutonium per in 1992.
will be able to indicate the opera- year,15 enough for eight to 10 im- On May 4, 1992, North Korea
tion of a concealed reactor or a re- plosion-type bombs. provided an allegedly complete list
processing plant over the long The various perceptions on the of its nuclear inventory, including
range.13 status of North Korea’s nuclear the plants in which the material
weapon program are based on dif- should have been contained. There-
THE TEST: IAEA ferent estimates of the research upon, ad hoc inspections began. The
INSPECTIONS IN NORTH reactor’s operational life. According IAEA initially was to investigate the
KOREA to North Korea’s declarations, the accuracy and completeness of the
reactor has been run with many North Korean information. 19 Six
North Korea is the first test case shorter interruptions since the be- inspections took place prior to Feb-
for the ability of the IAEA to gather ginning of 1987, and the first core ruary 1993. They confirmed the
information on undeclared nuclear was only discharged in 1994. By existence of the declared North Ko-
activities and to conduct special in-
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 33Matthias Dembinski
rean plants but also created suspi- NORTH KOREA TESTS THE is changing. Meanwhile, more and
cion that the existing nuclear mate- ENFORCEABILITY OF THE more members of the international
rial was not completely registered. NONPROLIFERATION NORM community appear to be willing to
Specifically, the analysis from the deal with restrictions on national
plutonium samples indicated that in sovereignty rights in this regard.
1989, 1990, and 1991 plutonium Sanctions and the Traditional This shift was expressed in the dec-
had been gained. This contradicted Regime laration of the Security Council on
North Korea’s statement that in 1990 January 31, 1992. The Council de-
This was the first time in its his-
it had only removed a defective fuel clared that the proliferation of all
tory that the IAEA had made such a
rod from the reactor and separated weapons of mass destruction con-
declaration and had appealed to the
90 grams of plutonium on a trial stitutes a threat to international peace
Security Council. As became appar-
basis.20 and security.25 It can be concluded
ent in the coming month, the Coun-
In order to clear up this inconsis- that in the case of a withdrawal from
cil was ill-prepared to handle the
tency, the IAEA tried to obtain ac- the NPT, the Council would also
situation and to play its role as the
cess to two undeclared storage ar- examine the extent to which this step
enforcer of the nonproliferation re-
eas, both located in the Yongbyon presents a danger to international
gime.
nuclear complex where waste from peace and security. What actions the
This is hardly surprising. To what
reprocessing was kept. The North Security Council adopts would be
degree and with what means the
Koreans had concealed the two determined by the extent it is con-
Security Council would react to such
plants from the inspectors, but the vinced of the credibility of the rea-
a contingency was never clearly
United States had informed the sons for withdrawal, and whether it
spelled out until 1992 for two rea-
IAEA of their existence.21 An analy- recognizes a threat to peace result-
sons. First, the East-West confron-
sis of the residues could have pro- ing from the withdrawal.26
tation blocked the Council. Second,
vided information about how much With this declaration the Security
whether the regime should have
plutonium North Korea has at its Council entered uncharted legal
forceful sanction instruments at its
disposal. grounds and a controversial new
disposal was disputed. 22
After an informal request for in- political arena. On the one hand,
Two questions deserve attention:
spection of the storage sites had been this declaration represents progress
What actions would infringe upon
denied by the DPRK, Director Gen- along the path to a consensual sanc-
the safeguards agreement, and, sec-
eral Hans Blix formally requested a tions mechanism. On the other hand,
ond, can a state leave the NPT at
special inspection in accordance the declaration raises delicate issues
any time, as provided in Article X?23
with Article 73 (b) (INFCIRC/153) regarding political order. These will
Since the NPT allows the accumu-
on February 9, 1993. On February not be discussed at length here; yet,
lation of plutonium or highly-en-
25, the IAEA’s Board of Governors they should be noted. For example,
riched uranium and most of the
latched onto this request. In re- the authority of the Council to limit
groundwork for a bomb program,
sponse, North Korea declared its the right of individual self defense
the question remains whether a
withdrawal from the NPT on March is questionable, as long as the five
member state could obtain all the
12. On April 1, the Board of Gov- permanent members of the Security
necessary material and equipment
ernors declared that North Korea Council (P-5) are still in the pos-
for a nuclear force, exercise its right
was not adhering to the safeguards session of several thousand atomic
of withdrawal, and establish itself
agreement; it also stated that the warheads. Therefore, sanctions can
quickly as a nuclear weapon state.24
IAEA could no longer guarantee that legitimately be applied only after all
In the early 1970s, a withdrawal
fissionable material was not being attempts to bring about compliance
without specific grounds by one of
diverted. The IAEA then turned the by negotiations and inducements
the member states would have been
case over to the U.N. Security Coun- have failed.27
accepted without opposition. How-
cil as provided for in Article XII C A second question concerns po-
ever, the general interpretation re-
of the IAEA statute. litical practice. The existence of a
garding the right to denounce the
legal framework for action does not
NPT and to obtain nuclear weapons
by itself create the political will to
34 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995Matthias Dembinski
act. Therefore, it becomes impor- reach a solution in their talks.28 In late fall 1993, the State De-
tant to analyze the political inter- The U.S.-North Korean talks pro- partment gained the upper hand and
ests and motivations of the P-5. Can gressed equally tediously at the be- the Clinton administration decided
it be assumed that the P-5 act as ginning; however, the possibility of to take a more flexible approach.31
guardians of the regime and as dis- a compromise emerged early on. The administration developed a
interested, neutral enforcers of the North Korea demanded diplomatic strategy of offering limited rewards
nonproliferation norm? Or are they recognition from the United States, in exchange for limited concessions
primarily pursuing their national in- as well as economic assistance and on the verification question. Further
terests? Even if the second hypoth- technological support in the civil- concessions, including diplomatic
esis is correct, the Security Coun- ian use of nuclear energy, as a pre- recognition, the delivery of light-
cil might be capable of enforcing condition for its willingness to al- water reactors, and economic assis-
nonproliferation in individual cases. low inspections of its nuclear plants. tance were placed on the horizon.
It can be assumed that the P-5 in The Clinton administration hinted A temporary rapprochement suc-
general share the interest of prevent- at the possibility of economic assis- ceeded on this basis, enabling a re-
ing the further spread of nuclear tance and diplomatic recognition but sumption of the talks between North
weapons. However, nonproliferation demanded that North Korea freeze Korea and the IAEA. Nevertheless,
is just one goal amidst others on its nuclear program as a prerequi- an American ultimatum, as well as
their national security agendas. The site for continuing the talks.29 clear military signals, was needed
Council would be able to act effec- The further enunciation of a U.S. to force the resumption of safe-
tively in cases where all its perma- position regarding North Korea’s guards.32 A six member IAEA team
nent members place nonproliferation nuclear ambitions was disputed eventually arrived on March 1,
above their foreign policy interests. within the Clinton administration.30 1994, in North Korea, after several
In other cases, the Security Coun- The debate revolved around North complications and visa problems had
cil would likely remain ineffective. Korea’s nuclear capabilities and, been solved. However, during the
more generally, the appropriate strat- course of the inspections, the IAEA
egy for the transformation of the was denied the previously negoti-
NORTH KOREA AND communist regime. The U.S. State ated access rights. Moreover, the
SANCTIONS? Department argued that it was im- Vienna inspectors determined that
probable that North Korea had a a seal, securing a section of the re-
After the IAEA had submitted the bomb at its disposal. It was in processing plant, had been broken.
case to the Security Council in April America’s interest to facilitate the in- Thereupon, the Board of Governors
1993, the Council invited Director evitable change of the regime. If the determined once again on March 21,
General Blix to report on the crisis. nuclear program could be frozen, 1994, that the IAEA was no longer
Its members, however, could not time and a regime change would fa- in a position to assure that no fis-
reach a clear decision about North vor the United States. The U.S. De- sionable material was being diverted
Korea because of Chinese pressure partment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs and turned the matter over to the
not to mention the imposition of of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Security Council.33
sanctions. Instead, two rounds of ne- Agency (CIA) argued that North The North Korean government
gotiations between North Korea and Korea already had plutonium for ap- was not impressed by this step. It
the United States, as well as North proximately two bombs at its dis- even escalated the crisis by discharg-
Korea and the IAEA, were initiated, posal. The regime could not survive ing the reactor before IAEA inspec-
and North Korea, according to its a political liberalization, and was not tors had arrived. With this step, the
legal interpretation, suspended its at all interested in a détente. DPRK not only made the recon-
withdrawal from the NPT. Pyongyang would only become more struction of the history of its nuclear
The dialogue with the IAEA pro- incalculable and more dangerous program more difficult, it also
gressed very slowly with many con- with the increase of its nuclear po- gained material containing pluto-
frontations. The North Korean ne- tential. Consequently, time was nium for three to five bombs. By
gotiators dragged their feet when- working against the United States this time, the State Department had
ever they could thereby increasing and its allies. accepted the fact that the foundation
the pressure on the United States to
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 35Matthias Dembinski for a policy of moderation had ference to solve the crisis.36 offer security assurances, and reduce eroded. The Clinton administration North Korea reacted to the impo- barriers to trade. was thrown back to the alternative sition of symbolic sanctions by the In a second phase, scheduled to of either forcing North Korea to al- IAEA Board of Governors by fur- begin approximately five years af- ter its behavior, thereby risking a ther escalating the crisis. It declared ter the signing of the agreement, military escalation of the crisis, or its immediate withdrawal from the North Korea will allow inspections tolerating its nuclear ambitions. IAEA on June 13, 1994, and threat- of the two waste sites and will ship However, the imposition of sanc- ened to expel all inspectors. The the 8,000 fuel rods abroad. Subse- tions remained controversial. China climax of the crisis had been quent to the IAEA’s reconstruction was sending contradictory signals. reached. of North Korea’s nuclear history, key On the one hand, Chinese President, It is unknown whether a resolu- nuclear components for the light- Jiang Zemin assured the North Ko- tion in the Security Council would water reactors will be delivered. rean General Chief of Staff of the have succeeded. Instead, former After the light-water reactors are further support of his country and U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s mis- completed, the DPRK will in a third clearly rejected sanctions on June sion in mid-June brought about an phase dismantle its graphite-moder- 7, 1994.34 On the other hand, there easing of tensions. Despite the death ated reactors, its reprocessing plant were signals indicating stronger Chi- of Kim Il-Sung and the allegedly and associated facilities. nese pressure on the DPRK to come unresolved power struggle in to terms with the United States. The Pyongyang, the subsequent high- LESSONS OF THE CRISIS Chinese delegation did not vote level dialogue with the United States against a decision of the IAEA resulted in the October 21 agreed If viewed in isolation, the agreed Board of Governors to exempt North framework. framework might be justifiable. Korea from the technical support The agreement contains three However, the agreement contains program of the Vienna organization. phases. During the first phase, many peculiar facets and at least one While the exclusion was only sym- North Korea will remain a party to harmful aspect: The agreement puts bolic in nature, for the first time an the NPT, restart the dialogue with the United States and the other mem- international group had voted for the South, and freeze its nuclear bers of the consortium in the politi- sanctions against North Korea with program. Specifically, Pyongyang cally disputable position of helping a large majority. Twenty-eight states agrees not to refuel the research re- to stabilize a repressive and unac- voted for the resolution, only Libya actor and not to reprocess the ap- ceptable regime. voted against it, and four states proximately 8,000 fuel rods it has The many peculiarities of the (China, India, Lebanon, and Syria) removed from the reactor. The re- agreement include the following: were undecided.35 processing plant will be sealed, and • The United States is leading the Parallel to the Security Council’s construction work at the two power consortium and is setting the agenda, efforts, the United States began reactors stopped. IAEA inspectors but others (especially Japan and forming a coalition of states that are to monitor the freeze. In return, South Korea) are carrying most of would impose sanctions without for- the United States will form a con- the financial burden. mal authorization from the Coun- sortium under its leadership, which • President Clinton has promised cil. The South Korean and Japanese will finance and supply two large to step in if the consortium fails to governments, however, insisted on light-water reactors worth $4 billion. deliver the promised goods, pend- gradual actions due to the fragility To compensate for energy that al- ing congressional approval. Spend- of domestic support. A blockade of legedly would have been produced ing American taxpayers’ money on money transfers from the North by the North Korean reactors prior rewarding North Korea, however, Korean community in Japan, there- to the completion of the light-water will be politically difficult for Con- fore, was to follow only in a later reactors, the consortium will pro- gress.37 phase. Russia joined this “coalition vide the DPRK with up to 500,000 • The DPRK is so politically un- of the willing” after the United States tons of heavy oil annually. In addi- stable that planning the construction had agreed in principle to the Rus- tion, the United States has agreed of nuclear reactors from scratch is sian request for an international con- to establish diplomatic relations, likely to prove very difficult. 36 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995
Matthias Dembinski
• The North Korean power grid suspicion. Much to North Korea’s facilities were military installations
is not suited for the transportation dismay, the inspectors’ behavior dif- was weakened.
of the amounts of electricity pro- fered from that of earlier routines. The process of proposing special
duced by the light-water reactors.38 The North Korean Atomic Ministry inspections proved to be suitable and
Transmission lines need to be up- complained about this in a protest flexible. First, Director General
graded, probably at the expense of note in February 1993: “The Blix, informally and in an
South Korea. inspectors...searched every nook nonconfrontational manner, had
• The agreement will make North and corner of the rooms [in the re- raised the possibility of additional
Korea’s nuclear energy program de- processing plant] with instruments, inspections. He placed a formal pe-
pendent on the delivery of spare like a policeman searching the house tition that the Board of Governors
parts and enriched fuel from abroad, of a suspected criminal, not as guests immediately supported when North
probably from its main adversary, who came at the invitation of the Korea rejected the informal one.
the Republic of Korea. Therefore, host.” 39 The inspectors actively There were only four days between
the agreement directly contradicts sought and found indications that the refusal of the informal proposal
the idea of self-sufficiency, the para- hinted at undeclared fissionable for an inspection from the Director
mount dogma of North Korea’s po- materials. General and the confirmation of the
litical philosophy. 2. Instruments that resemble the formal proposal by the Board of
These unsolved questions and envisaged environmental monitoring Governors.
curious aspects constitute some techniques proved to be effective. 4. The instrument of the special
major question marks regarding the They allowed the IAEA to confirm inspections was politically con-
chances for successful implementa- serious inconsistencies in the North firmed. The Council demonstrated
tion of the agreed framework. How- Korean material balance and to de- its willingness to apply this instru-
ever, even if the agreement falls apart termine a breach of the safeguards ment. The demand for special in-
at a later stage, it will nevertheless agreement. spections was supported by an im-
have served an important function 3. For the first time, the instru- pressive majority. Only China and
by buying time. ments for special inspections were a small minority of states, who view
But, the verdict becomes bleaker tested under real conditions, and, the NPT with skepticism anyway,
if one takes into account the long- from a technical point of view, they did not consent to applying the new
term repercussions for the nonpro- proved to be effective. Initially, the instrument.
liferation regime. First, the agree- success of the IAEA special inspec- But much of this valuable prece-
ment rewards blatant misconduct. tions depends on the availability of dent has been contradicted by the
North Korea has proven that a information on undeclared material agreed framework. It is true that the
would-be proliferator can use its and facilities. After the IAEA ex- insistence on special inspections was
nuclear weapon option to blackmail aminations had yielded grounds for not renounced altogether and that
the world community. Second, and an initial suspicion, the United major components of the light-wa-
more importantly, the crisis over States transmitted additional intelli- ter reactors will only be delivered
North Korea’s nuclear program must gence information to the IAEA. This after special inspections have been
be seen as at best a mixed outcome information enabled the IAEA au- conducted. However, North Korea
from the first test case for the re- thorities to name specific locations was allowed to renegotiate its treaty
formed nonproliferation regime. they wanted to visit in order to clear obligations, permitting it a consid-
The capability of the IAEA to up inconsistencies between the erable degree of freedom in choos-
uncover evidence for undeclared North Korean declaration and their ing which provisions of the safe-
activities and to follow up on it has own findings. Significantly, the guards agreement it will accept. In
been vastly improved. From North United States made this information other words, what Director General
Korea’s perspective, it was the “first available to the Board of Governors, Blix has called “à la carte-ism” and
victim” of the reformed IAEA. a group with representatives from what he has tried to prevent for over
1. The inspectors from the IAEA countries such as Libya and Syria. two years has finally been granted
viewed the declarations from the The information was so detailed that to the DPRK.40
controlled state with the necessary North Korea’s objection that these The failure to enforce the IAEA’s
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 37Matthias Dembinski
demand for special inspections re- tinuing the sanctions course. Given Press, 1994), pp. 89-112.
3
See Wolfgang Fischer and Gotthard Stein,
sults from the inability of the Secu- these circumstances, the agreed “Stand und Perspektiven der Bemühungen um
rity Council and its permanent mem- framework was probably the best die Verschärfung der IAEA-Safeguards,” in
bers to agree about the North Ko- possible deal. Taking all factors into Joachim Krause, ed., Kernwaffenverbreitung und
internationaler Systemwandel. Neue Risiken und
rean challenge. But, the lessons in account, it is also a justifiable deal. Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten (Baden-Baden: Nomos
regard to the enforceability of the First, the risk of war was great, and 1994), p. 288f.
4
Since special inspections are confrontational in
nonproliferation norm are not com- the consequences of a war for the nature, the IAEA has developed the idea of invi-
pletely bleak. The right of the Se- neighboring states might have been tations from states to the agency to visit facilities
curity Council to order the imposi- dramatic. It would have been inap- anywhere and anytime. This instrument may be
used by a state to prove to its neighbors that it is
tion of sanctions in such cases was propriate for the Security Council not engaging in clandestine nuclear activities.
implicitly confirmed. That alone and the permanent members not to Such invitations have been offered by several
marks progress. However, the per- consider, to the extent possible, this states, among them Iran and South Africa.
5
Lawrence Scheinman, Assuring the Nuclear
manent five members of the Coun- risk and the interests of the neigh- Non-Proliferation Safeguards System (Washing-
cil turned out not to be the disinter- boring countries. Second, the time ton: Atlantic Council Occasional Papers 1992).
6
Resistance came from Algeria, Cuba, India,
ested neutral enforcers of the non- factor was critical for the evaluation Iran, Mexico, North Korea, and Pakistan. Ap-
proliferation norm, as envisaged in of this issue. The agreed framework prehensions about an undue limitation on national
the ideas of collective security. In will freeze North Korea’s nuclear sovereignty rights were uttered from others as
well.
this case, not all of the P-5 placed activities while North Korea’s po- 7
See Johannes Preisinger, Deutschland und die
nonproliferation above their other litical, economic, and military situ- nukleare Nichtverbreitung (Bonn: Arbeitspapiere
foreign policy interests, and the ations deteriorate. Third, North der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige
Politik, No. 76), pp. 54ff.
Council remained ineffectual. Korea is a special case that makes 8
See Eric Chauvistré, “The Future of Nuclear
China’s refusal to let a sanctions special treatment necessary. North Inspections,” Arms Control (August 1993).
9
The objections of the Third World representa-
resolution pass was probably moti- Korea might have been rewarded tives to use of information from intelligence
vated by its general skepticism about lavishly. However, those rewards are sources were based among other things on the
any infringement of the principle of offered in return for obligations that fear that industrial nations exclusively would be
in the position to provide this type of informa-
national sovereignty. In addition, the exceed those stipulated by the NPT. tion. Thus, in their view, a manipulation of this
desire to undermine American in- North Korea is giving up an entire data could not be excluded. It was therefore sug-
fluence in the region may have reactor line and renouncing repro- gested that the IAEA should furnish itself with
commercial satellites and independently gather
played a role. If the Council was cessing. The agreed framework the information. Wolfgang Fischer et al., “The
unable to react in this case, despite contains problematic aspects, espe- Role of Satellites and Remote Data Transmission
in a Future Safeguards Regime,” in International
a clear breach, and North Korea's cially the deferment of the special Nuclear Safeguards 1994, proceedings of a sym-
extreme political isolation, it can inspections. However, this outcome posium (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
be surmised that in other cases the is clearly preferable to alternative Agency 1994).
10
The mandatory notification of nuclear trade
planned regime mechanism for the strategies that contain the risk of war should help the IAEA to recognize procurement
introduction of sanctions may fail on the Korean peninsula. patterns.
11
again due to the political consider- Cf. Bruno Pellaud, “IAEA Safeguards: Status,
Challenges and Opportunities,” in International
ations of individual members. Nuclear Safeguards, loc. cit. See also Bruno
The possible alternative of impos- Pallaud, Safeguards in Transition: Status, Chal-
1
Ben Sanders, “IAEA Safeguards: A Short His- lenges, and Opportunities, (Vienna: IAEA Bul-
ing sanctions outside the U.N. torical Background,” in David Fischer, Ben Sand- letin, September 1994).
framework through a “coalition of ers, Lawrence Scheinman, and George Bunn, A 12
Cf. Marvin Peterson, “A New Safeguards Syn-
the willing,” which had been pon- Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear thesis," in International Nuclear Safeguards,” loc.
Weapons, International Verification and the In- cit. The long term surveillance system, which is
dered by the United States at one ternational Atomic Energy Agency (Southampton: being installed in Iraq, will use these methods.
time, proved equally difficult to Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Prolif- 13
Cf. G. Andrew, “Prospects for Environmental
implement. Not only were South eration, Study No. 3, 1992), p. 4. Monitoring" in International Nuclear Safe-
2
David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding guards,” loc. cit.
Korea’s and Japan’s positions toward the Atom (London: Taylor & Francis 1985); Tho- 14
Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boul-
substantive sanctions ambivalent, mas W. Graham, “The International Atomic En- der: Westview 1990), p. 121.
15
ergy Agency: Can it Effectively Halt the Prolif- Bruce Cumings, “Spring Thaw for Korea’s Cold
but the United States itself was ulti- eration of Nuclear Weapons,” in Roger A. Coate, War?,” in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April
mately unwilling to bear the risks ed., U.S. Policy and the Future of the United 1992) and Mark Hibbs, “North Korea Obtained
(and the possibly high costs) of con- Nations (New York: Twenties Century Fund Reprocessing Technology Aired by Eurochemic,”
38 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995Matthias Dembinski
22
Nuclear Fuel (February 28, 1994), p. 6f. According to a commonly shared interpreta- International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1994,
16
In 1989, satellites observed a cooling down of tion, the regime should single-handedly allow pp. 1, 5.
33
the reactor, from which it was concluded that it its members to mutually demonstrate their peace- Twenty-six countries voted for the resolution.
remained inactive approximately 75 to 100 days. ful intentions but not enforce the observance of Libya voted against it and Brazil, China, India,
This amount of time would have been enough to the norms. In case of a breach of the treaty, it Indonesia, Lebanon, and France were undecided.
exchange the core. Other reports indicate would be the responsibility of the nation states to France did not vote, because it did not consider
weaponization activities. Allegedly, North Ko- react appropriately. The regime would see to it the wording of the resolution to be sufficient.
rea has converted plutonium nitrate to metal and that enough time is available in order to take pre- Arms Control Today (April 1994).
34
has tested conventional explosive technology for cautions against the emerging threat. Preisinger, International Herald Tribune, June 8, 1994,
igniting a plutonium bomb. According to a Chi- op. cit., p. 69; Fischer and Szasz, op. cit., p. p. 1.
35
nese source, North Korea searched further in 149. International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin,
23
Peking for assistance in developing of krytrons. Article X, 1 provides for the right to withdrawal (Fall 1994), p. 58ff
36
PPNN Newsbrief, No. 25 (January 1994), p. 1. after a three-month notice period if the highest International Herald Tribune., June 11, 1994,
17
North Korea twice allowed an 18-month pe- political security interests of the state are endan- p. 1.
37
riod for signing the safeguards agreement to lapse, gered. However, it requires the withdrawing state Republicans have already expressed resistance
the first time because of a formal mistake by the to inform the other members and the Security to the agreement. (The New York Times, Novem-
IAEA. In 1989, the DPRK suddenly introduced Council of its reasons for withdrawal. According ber 27, 1994). So far, the Clinton administration
additional reservations. Pyongyang demanded to general legal interpretation, the Security Coun- has used $5 million in discretionary Defense
that the United States withdraw its nuclear weap- cil is not in a position to comment on the reasons Department funds to finance the delivery of
ons from the southern part of the peninsula be- provided by the state or to forbid withdrawal. 50,000 tons of oil, thereby avoiding a clash with
24
fore the safeguards agreement could be signed. In contrast, a new analysis argues that the NPT Congress over the financing of the deal.
18 38
See Harald Müller, Matthias Dembinski, and also forbids substantial “weaponization” process Gerald Segal, "The World Still Doesn't Have
Annette Schaper, “Nordkorea betreibt die techni- activities. George Bunn and Roland M. an Effective Nonproliferation System," Interna-
schen Vorarbeiten für die Atombombe,” (Frank- Timerbaev, Nuclear Verification under the NPT: tional Herald Tribune, October 25, 1994, p. 4.
39
furter Rundschau Dokumentation, March 26, What should it cover? How far may it go? North Korea’s published statement from Feb-
1993). (Southampton: PPNN Study No. 5, 1994). How- ruary 22, 1993, quoted from The Washington
19
The drawing up of the opening balance in a ever, even this study agrees that those techni- Post, April 27, 1993, pp. A1, A11.
40
newly acceded state, which prior to joining op- cally necessary steps for building the bomb that The Washington Post, October 20, 1994, p.
erated a nuclear program, is exceedingly prob- could also have a civilian purpose are not pro- A32.
lematic. It is likely that little hard evidence that hibited.
25
would enable the IAEA to examine the state’s The declaration is published in PPNN
information. See Leonard S. Spector, “Repen- Newsbrief, (Spring 1992), p. 15.
26
tant Nuclear Proliferants,” Foreign Policy (Fall Harald Müller, Nukleare Nichtverbreitung. Ein
1992), pp. 21-37. umfassender Strategieentwurf (Frankfurt: HSFK
20
During the first inspections, the inspectors had Report, 1993), p. 36f.
27
compared the plutonium samples provided by This hierarchy is clearly established in the U.N.
North Korea with reprocessing waste. As it was Charter. Article 33 demands that "parties to any
exposed that the isotopic composition of the plu- dispute...shall first of all seek a solution by
tonium did not correspond to the waste, the in- negotiations...or other peaceful means of their
spectors searched for tiny radioactive particles choice." Only after the negotiations and media-
in the reprocessing plant with the help of gamma tions described in Chapter VI have failed can the
ray detectors. Despite the previous cleaning of U.N. Security Council resort to the forceful mea-
the plant, particles had settled in. An analysis of sures described in Chapter VII.
28
PU241 particles and americium yielded that four International Herald Tribune, December 3,
reprocessing campaigns had taken place. See R. 1993, p. 2.
29
Jeffrey Smith, “North Korea and the Bomb: High- The American negotiator Robert Gallucci speci-
Tech Hide-and-Seek,” The Washington Post, April fied this condition as follows: North Korea will
27, 1993, pp. A1, A11; Mark Hibbs, “Isotopics not process spent fuel; hence, it will not produce
Show Three North Korean Reprocessing Cam- plutonium-rich material. The continuity of the
paigns since 1975,” Nuclear Fuel, (January safeguards will be guaranteed, and the country
1993), p. 8f. will remain a member of the NPT. Furthermore,
21
First, at issue is the basement of a building the United States implicitly demanded that the
whose upper story had military purposes. North reactor not be discharged without the presence
Korea tried to conceal the existence of the base- of IAEA inspectors. North Korea appeared open
ment. The second building, a one story storage to the matter. Nucleonics Week, February 24,
area, was also covered with dirt and camouflaged 1994, p. 3.
30
with plants. In order to distract the inspectors, a International Herald Tribune, November 16,
third storage area with non-violating waste was 1993, pp. 1, 5 and December 6, 1993, pp. 1, 7.
31
set up. See the Report by the Director General of Wall Street Journal Europe, November 22,
the IAEA on Behalf of the Board of Governors to 1993, p. 2.
32
the Security Council and to the General Assem- The American and South Korean militaries had
bly of the United Nations on the Non-Compli- openly speculated on the possibility of war, their
ance of the Democratic People’s Republic of strategies in the case of war, and the reality of a
Korea with the Agreement between the IAEA and total North Korean defeat. The stationing of Pa-
the DPRK for the Application of Safeguards, U.N. triot missiles was prepared, and additional Ameri-
General Assembly document A/48/133; Secu- can troops and weapons were deployed. The
rity Council document S/25556, April 12, 1993. readiness of the troops was increased as well.
The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 39You can also read
