Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal
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Issue 14
st
1 Issue 2017
ISSN: 2242-441X
nmiotc
Maritime Interdiction Operations
NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL
Journal
TRAINING CENTRE
1
NATO
Maritime Interdiction Operational
Training Centre
2nd Conference
on
Cyber Security
“Maritime Cyber Security and
Cyber Defense: NATO-EU cooperation
implementing the outcomeS of the
Warsaw Summit.
Recent international evolutions in
the environment.”
21st to 22nd September 2017
2
CONTENTS nmiotc
COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL
MARITIME INTERDICTION
Editorial by Georgios Tsogkas OPERATIONS
4 Commodore GRC (N)
Commadant NMIOTC
JOURNAL
MARITIME SECURITY
Director
Commodore G. Tsogkas GRC (N)
Operation Sea Guardian - The NATO Maritime Security Operation in
Commandant NMIOTC
6 the Mediiterranean Sea
by Captain Corrado Campana ITA (N)
Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Addressing. Transnational Executive Director
8 Threats in the Mediterranean
by Mr Christopher Kremidas
Captain C. Campana ITA (N)
Director of Training Support
CYBER SECURITY
Editor
Maritime Cyberpower Projection Lt Commander G. Tzevelekis GRC (N)
15 by Mr Adrian Venables Head of Transformation Section
Layout Production
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURES SECURITY CPO E. Miskou GRC (N)
Journal Assistant Editor
Holistic Protection of Critical Infrastructures. Resilience and protec-
tion of dependncies between Greek Critical Infrastructures.
29 by George Stergiopoulos, Dimitris Gritzalis, Panayotis Kotzanikolaou,
Manos Margkos and Georgia Lykou
TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES
The views expressed in this
Securing Maritime Logistics and Supply Chain : The Medusa and issue reflect the opinions of
42 MITIGATE approaches.
by Dr. Spyridon Papastergiou and Associate Professor Nineta Polemi
the authors, and do not nec-
essarily represent NMIOTC's
or NATO’s official positions.
HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS All content is subject to Greek
Copyright Legislation.
Pictures used from the web
49 VIP visitors to NMIOTC
are not subject to copyright
restrictions.
NMIOTC TRAINING You may send your comments to:
tzevelekisg@nmiotc.nato.int
52 Photos from NMIOTC Training Activities
3
NMIOTC
Commandant’s Editorial
The world continues to face a serious ance’s regional understanding and sit- It is anticipated that the Warsaw / Brus-
threat from terrorism – a global threat uational awareness, its capabilities for sels Summit outcomes would call for
that knows no border, nationality or re- expeditionary operations and its ability enhanced training opportunities along
ligion. NATO Heads of State and Gov- to project stability in its neighborhood. with our partners providing security.
ernment stated at Warsaw, “terrorism This is exactly why NMIOTC is more
has risen to an unprecedented level of Maritime environment is character- relevant than ever. In its capacity as
intensity, reaches into all Allied terri- ized by complexity and diversity. The a NETF, awarded by ACT with a Qual-
tory and now represents an immediate oceans are an increasingly accessible ity Assurance Accreditation, focused
and direct threat to our nations and the environment for transnational criminal on the maritime environment, offers
international community”. and terrorist activities. Disruption of education and training opportunities to
international maritime transportation Allies and Partners.
NATO is as essential as ever. At this and distribution networks would un-
pivotal time, the Alliance is strong dermine equally the industrial produc- With Operation Sea Guardian and EU
and continues to adapt. This was the tion and the flow of energy sources, Operation Sophia under which the de-
core of NATO’s Summit in Brussels in thus it will have a significant impact in mand for training of the Lybian authori-
late May. NATO’s Framework for the our security and at the welfare of our ties is increasing, the emphasis on
South focuses on improving the Alli- populations. partner capacity building and the es-
4
tablishment of the Hub for the South at closer co-operation with international As a conclusion, I would like to an-
JFC Naples, the request for NMIOTC stakeholders to address the secu- nounce with great pleasure, the 2nd
expertise and services to serve as the rity challenges. Adrian Venables, PhD NMIOTC Cyber Conference which will
Trainer for the Hub in the South at both Student at Lancaster University and be held at our premises (Souda Bay
JFC Naples and MARCOM disposal, Commander UK RN (reserve), on his – Crete) from 21st to 22nd September
can only grow. article “Maritime Cyberpower Projec- 2017, with theme “Maritime Cyber Se-
tion” investigates the unexplored area curity and Cyber Defense: NATO-EU
Having said that and referring to this of how cyberspace can be used to cooperation implementing the out-
journal, I wish to draw your attention influence a target population. Senior come of the NATO Warsaw Summit.
to the fact that it presents articles fo- Researcher George Stergiopoulos Recent international evolutions in the
cused on current and future challeng- and Professor Dimitris Gritzalis, deals environment”.
es to maritime security. In particular; with the “Holistic Protection of Critical
Infrastructure” a subject of high impor- Given the opportunity, please mark
In the lead article, Mr. Christopher tance for the welfare of each country. your calendars for the 9th NMIOTC
Kremidas US European Command Finally, Dr Spyridon Papastergiou and Annual Conference from 5th to 7th
Liaison to NATO and EU, on his pa- Associate Professor Nineta Polemi, at June 2018 with the main topic to de
per “Toward a Comprehensive Ap- their paper explore the risks and vul- determined and announced in due
proach to Addressing – Transnational nerabilities of the Maritime Logistics time.
Threats in the Mediterranean” draws and Supply Chain presenting two Eu-
upon building a comprehensive ap- ropean research projects.
proach culture within NATO, enabling
Georgios Tsogkas
Commodore GRC (N)
Commadant NMIOTC
5
MARITIME SECURITY
Operation Sea Guardian
The NATO Maritime Security
Operation in the Mediterranean
Sea
by Corrado Campana
Captain ITA (N)
T he NATO Operation Sea Guardian Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) con- trolling and boarding merchant vessels
started in November 2016 as a result of stitutes the first actual activation of in the Mediterranean for more than a
the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, during one of the tasks assigned to NATO’s decade, has provided the Alliance with
which the Alliance decided to launch maritime forces by the Alliance Mari- a strong expertise in the deterrence
a new maritime security mission in time Strategy (AMS) of March 2011, and prevention of maritime terrorist
the Mediterranean Sea. As reported the Maritime Security Operations, and and criminal activities, and this profi-
in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué: directly derives from its predecessor ciency is exploited by OSG as it con-
“We have transitioned Operation Ac- Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), tinues with the efforts of OAE, but with
tive Endeavour, our Article 5 maritime which was launched after the events a significantly broader scope.
operation in the Mediterranean, which of September 11 with the purpose to As mentioned in the “Operation Sea
has contributed to fight against terror- deter and disrupt terrorist activity in the Guardian Factsheet” of the Allied
ism, to a non-Article 5 Maritime Secu- Mediterranean Sea. Maritime Command: “Operation Sea
rity Operation, Operation Sea Guard- The broad and long-lasting experience Guardian is a standing Maritime Se-
ian, able to perform the full range of gained by OAE, with NATO Standing curity Operation (MSO) aimed at work-
Maritime Security Operation tasks, as Naval Forces ensuring presence, col- ing with Mediterranean stakeholders
needed”. lecting information, monitoring, con- to deter and counter terrorism amd
6
MARITIME SECURITY
mitigate the risk of other threats to se- to the implementation of the arms em- allocated to OSG are separated by the
curity”. In this context, the three main bargo in the high seas off the coast of assets (ships, submarines and mari-
missions of OSG are to provide mari- Libya in accordance with the UNSCR time patrol aircrafts) that compose, on
time situational awareness, to counter 2292 (2016). a rotational basis, the NATO Stand-
terrorism and human trafficking, and The NATO involvement in tackling the ing Naval Forces. This characteristic
to contribute to the regional capacity worst migration crisis since the Sec- allows OSG to keep the focus on its
building, while additional tasks – such ond World War and, more in general, main tasks without being committed to
as countering the proliferations of in securing the Mediterranean Sea, the responsibilities of the NATO Re-
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), can be considered as a remarkable sponse Force (NRF).
ensuring the freedom of navigation accomplishment for the Alliance, as The launch of OSG represents the first
and protection of maritime critical in- it demonstrates its willingness and real implementation of the NATO-EU
frastructure – can be performed as readiness to take action to cope with Joint Declaration and, while accom-
necessary. a challenge affecting the Allies, and plishing the task of crisis management
Further to a Joint Declaration signed also because it proves the capability to in the Mediterranean Sea, it promotes
by the NATO Secretary General, the make the Allied Maritime Strategy op- the dialogue in the region and im-
President of European Council and the erational. Indeed, with the Operation proves the cooperative maritime se-
President of European Commission in Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean curity ensuring presence and surveil-
July 2016, OSG also cooperates with Sea NATO is not only implementing lance.
the European Union Naval Force (EU- the AMS, but also – for the first time The efforts to address the migrants
NAVFOR) MED Operation Sophia. In since its approval in 2011 – executing and arms smuggling, to fight the mari-
the Joint Declaration, it was recog- the full spectrum of Maritime Security time terrorism and, in broader terms,
nized that “a stronger NATO and a operations. to contribute to maritime security and
stronger EU are mutually reinforcing”, Within the framework of the AMS, Op- stability in the Mediterranean Sea, are
and with this in mind NATO contributes eration Sea Guardian is an updated performed by NATO in the full aware-
to the activities of Operation Sophia in version of the precedent Operation ness that the security in Europe can
the Mediterranean Sea with the provi- Active Endeavour, with a broader only be granted by ensuring stability in
sion of information, surveillance and scope and mission, though a relevant this strategic Sea and in the region of
logistic support, while also contributing change from OAE is that the resources Middle East and North Africa.
Captain Corrado Campana
Attended the Italian Naval Academy from 1987 until 1991, when he was commissioned as
Ensign. He has achieved the qualification in Naval Artillery and Missile Systems and the
specialization in Naval Weapons Direction. He served onboard several Italian Navy ships
such as the frigates Libeccio and Maestrale and the destroyers Ardito and Luigi Durand de
la Penne, and was appointed as Commanding Officer of the auxiliary ship Ponza and of the
frigate Granatiere. He served in international staffs such as the Force HQ of the Multinational
Force and Observers (M.F.O.) in El-Gorah (Sinai, Egypt) as Naval Advisor, and the EU Naval
Force OHQ in Northwood (UK) as ACOS CJ3 Operations within the anti-piracy Operation
ATALANTA. He served in national staffs such as the Command in Chief of the Italian Fleet as
Head of the Artillery and Missile Systems Section, the Command of Italian Maritime Forces in Taranto as ACOS N3 Operations
and at the Italian Joint Operations HQ in Rome, as Head of Maritime Operations Section (J3). He attended the Italian Joint War
College and the Course in International Humanitarian Law at the Centre for Defence High Studies in Rome and also served as
Tutor for the attendees. Captain Campana has achieved the Degree in Maritime and Naval Science at the University of Pisa,
the Degree in Political Science at the University of Trieste, and the Master in International and Military-strategic Studies at the
L.U.I.S.S. University “Guido Carli” in Rome. Since the 1st August 2013 he is appointed at the NATO Maritime Interdiction
Operational Training Centre in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece as Director of the Training Support and Transformation Directorate.
7
MARITIME SECURITY
Toward a Comprehensive
Approach to Addressing
Transnational Threats in the
Mediterranean
by Mr. Christopher Kremidas
US European Command Liaison to NATO and the EU
Abstract by the current security environment violence and humanitarian disasters
include instability in fragile and fail- has led NATO to adopt the Compre-
In recent years the challenges posed ing states and the resulting cycles of hensive Approach to improve coor-
8
MARITIME SECURITY
dination among international actors. a number of tasks required to bring ers endorsed an Action Plan for the
At the same time, some of the most stability to a failed state while simul- development and implementation of
prevalent challenges facing the Euro- taneously addressing the impact of NATO’s contribution to a Comprehen-
Atlantic community today are transna- transnational threats, some of which sive Approach.
tional threats such as organized crime, seek to take advantage of a vacuum At the Lisbon Summit in November
terrorism, illicit trafficking in humans, in governance. 2010 and in its new Strategic Concept,
drugs, and weapons and weapons, the Alliance “…decided to enhance
cyber crime, and the possibly destabi- 2. The Comprehensive NATO’s contribution to a comprehen-
lizing challenge of irregular migration. Approach sive approach to crisis management as
Within this context, the Euro-Atlantic part of the international community’s
community should take a more proac- The Comprehensive Approach (CA) effort and to improve NATO’s ability
tive approach to employing the Com- is a way to achieve a common un- to deliver stabilization and reconstruc-
prehensive Approach, starting with derstanding and approach among all tion effects”. To support this decision,
addressing transnational threats in actors of the International Community NATO agreed to form a modest civilian
the Mediterranean before they reach through the coordination and de‐con- capability to interface more effectively
the crisis stage. At the same time, fliction of political, development and with other actors and conduct appro-
building a Comprehensive Approach security efforts in solving an interna- priate planning in crisis management.
culture within NATO and in conjunc- tional crisis. The effective implementation of a
tion with other international actors will The requirement to work with partners comprehensive approach requires all
help to transform its relationships with and the nature of these new chal- actors to work together with a shared
the and enable closer cooperation and lenges have made operations increas- sense of responsibility and openness,
collaboration in addressing common ingly complex, requiring a closer level taking into account and respecting
security challenges. of coordination and collaboration. On each other’s strengths, mandates and
the ground, partners generally find a roles, not to mention their decision-
1. Introduction way to work together successfully but making autonomy. In other words, the
at the operational and strategic levels, Comprehensive Approach is not hier-
In recent years the challenges posed coordination has been characterized archical but rather it is a collaborative
by the current security environment by a lack of understanding and insuf- effort among equals.
include instability in fragile and fail- ficient awareness and coordination of NATO’s experience from operations,
ing states and the resulting cycles of each other’s planning. A strategic and including Afghanistan and in address-
violence and humanitarian disasters. operational level process was needed ing piracy, has demonstrated that
More recently, we have also seen the to build coherency and the answer has managing complex conflicts and cri-
impact of spillover from these fragile been the Comprehensive Approach, ses requires a wide range of internal
and failing states. In some cases, which focuses on building a shared and external actors, including govern-
these effects have been serious understanding of the problem, devel- ments, civil society, the private sector
enough to impact and endanger previ- oping a shared overarching vision of and international agencies, to work to-
ously stable states. At the same time, the solution and facilitating coordina- gether in a coherent and coordinated
some of the most prevalent challenges tion of effort while respecting the in- effort. In a Comprehensive Approach,
facing the Euro-Atlantic community to- dividual mandates of multiple entities. the military can provide a secure space
day are transnational threats such as NATO heads of state and government to enable other actors to address im-
organized crime, terrorism, illicit traf- recognized the need for a Compre- mediate humanitarian needs and the
ficking in humans, drugs, and weap- hensive Approach when it tasked the root causes of the problems.
ons and weapons, cyber crime, and North Atlantic Council to develop prag- Given the requirement to include civil
the possibly destabilizing challenge of matic proposals for it during the Riga society, nongovernmental organiza-
irregular migration. Summit in November 2006. In 2008, tions (NGO), and private enterprise
In some cases, we can be dealing with at the Bucharest Summit, Allied lead- - no single organization or nation can
9
MARITIME SECURITY
conduct an effective Comprehensive 3.1 Since 2014, Russia’s use of and continuity of governance in the
Approach by itself. This large number broad-spectrum tactics to splinter Eu- face of hybrid threats. At the same
of actors and the complexity involved rope’s ability for collective action has time, both documents call for greater
in coordinating actions are particularly been given a name; hybrid warfare. NATO-EU cooperation in addressing
challenging from the perspective of the The concept of hybrid warfare is the hybrid threats and the staffs of both
Comprehensive Approach (CA). Ac- mix of conventional and unconven- organizations have worked together to
tors can vary from local governmental tional, military and non-military, overt agree upon a number of areas where
officials and parties in the conflict to and covert actions employed in a co- they can focus their cooperative ef-
private sector entities and local NGOs. ordinated manner to achieve specific forts.
The variety of international actors in- objectives while remaining below the 3.5 As we can see, both NATO and
cludes other international organiza- threshold of a formally declared war- the EU are proactively applying some
tions and NGOs, humanitarian actors, fare. (but not all) of the principles of the
donor governments and representa- 3.2 Hybrid Warfare targets critical Comprehensive Approach as they ad-
tives of the private sector. vulnerabilities and seeks to create dress the challenges of hybrid warfare.
The risk of not working together ambiguity in order to hinder swift and But even this method is not sufficient
through a Comprehensive Approach is effective decision-making. There are in dealing with the broader challenge
to have our efforts result in fragment- a wide range of measures applied as of transnational threats on NATO’s
ed and inconsistent programs and part of a hybrid campaign; from cyber southern flank nor does it address root
policies, which can duplicate efforts attacks on critical information sys- causes. Thus, the work that remains
leading to inefficient spending and a tems, through the disruption of critical to be done is for the Comprehensive
reduced capacity for delivering results. services, such as energy supplies or Approach to be applied to the chal-
At the same time, a failure to work to- financial services, to undermining pub- lenge of Transnational Threats in the
gether to address the often linked con- lic trust in government institutions or south, especially in the Mediterranean
ditions of underlying causes can force exploiting social vulnerabilities. While Region.
us to start over again and again, much the concept of hybrid warfare is not
like Sisyphus endlessly trying to push new, its application by Russia, and to a 4. Transnational Threats: A
the rock up the hill. lesser extent by Daesh, against NATO Challenge to Governance
member states’ interests has present-
3. Toward a Proactive Appli- ed a new challenge to the Alliance. Transnational threats are commonly
cation of The Comprehensive 3.3 In response, NATO finds itself at defined as threats such as organized
Approach a transformative juncture once again. crime; terrorism, illicit trafficking in
Post-2014 NATO has adopted the humans, drugs, and weapons, cyber
Since its inception, the Comprehen- Readiness Action Plan (RAP) as a crime, and the destabilizing challenge
sive Approach has been applied in means of responding rapidly to new of irregular migration. In the Mediter-
the aftermath of emergency situations threats as they present themselves ranean, this broad group of threats can
where international actors found them- along the eastern and southern flanks. also take the form of proliferation of
selves thrust together by necessity – in 3.4 More recently, NATO adopted a weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
other words, we’ve used it only when Hybrid Warfare Strategy in December cyber attacks targeting the commercial
reacting to security challenges. Given 2015 and the European Union adopt- shipping and port security sector, nat-
the two main challenges facing the ed its Joint Framework for Addressing ural and manmade disasters, illegal,
alliance today: hybrid warfare threats Hybrid Threats in April 2016. Both irregular and unreported (IUU) fish-
from the east and transnational threats documents speak to taking a proac- ing and environmental pollution. The
from the south, a more proactive ap- tive “whole-of-government” approach three aspects most discussed current-
plication of the Comprehensive Ap- in conjunction with a variety of actors ly are transnational organized crime,
proach is urgently needed. in order to improve resiliency, security, terrorism, and irregular migration.
10MARITIME SECURITY
4.1 Transnational organized crime re- nate their activities. In addition and been to erect stronger immigration
fers to self-sustaining groups that oper- unlike organized crime groups, ter- barriers that affect both regular and ir-
ate transnationally to obtain power, in- rorists also require sophisticated stra- regular migrants as well as refugees.
fluence, and commercial gains, wholly tegic communications capacities in These policies have a number of un-
or in part by illegal means. They also order to gain the maximum impact for intended consequences such as in-
protect their activities through corrup- their actions. creasing illicit entries, causing them to
tion and/or violence, while exploiting Terrorists also present a challenge attempt riskier methods to gain entry,
and creating gaps and seams in the to governance in that they stress the and fostering the growth of sophisti-
framework of transnational commerce, system to respond which can lead to cated criminal trafficking networks.
communications, and financial mecha- harsh measures, disrupted economic At the same time, irregular migration is
nisms. activity and reduced freedom of move- seen as more than just a humanitarian
Increasingly, their illicit activities ment for citizens – all of which can concern. One danger is the potential
across borders and communities not drive a wedge between the people and of terrorists exploiting illicit crossings
only adversely impact security and their government. to facilitate their operational aims.
economic health but also contribute to 4.3 Irregular migration is a complex Two possible forms come to mind:
an illicit underworld operated by pow-
erful criminal networks that can pres-
ent a challenge to governance.
These illicit criminal organizations
pose an immediate threat to public
trust and weaken governance since
unlike legitimate business, they re-
quire a system of impunity that gives
them the freedom of action to con-
duct their illicit activities. In building,
maintaining, and growing this system
of impunity they corrupt government
officials, computer systems, financial
institutions, and deny governments the
ability to maintain their sovereign bor-
ders and exclusive economic zones.
This in turn weakens their ability to
collect taxes and customs fees to fund
their government’s activities. problem because it presents a wide using migrants as a cover to secretly
It is important to note the challenge to variety of human security, law enforce- enter Europe and taxing smugglers to
governance is not just a threat to trou- ment, development, and governance access departure points under militant
bled states but to our own as well. As challenges in dealing not just with the control as a means of raising money.
criminal networks’ influence spreads symptoms but also the root causes.
outward, it brings corruption with it – This issue can also be a sensitive 5. Applying the Comprehen-
even into currently well-governed na- problem internally when absorbing sive Approach to addressing
tions. large irregular migrant flows. Transnational Threats in the
4.2 Terrorists require and use the In many cases, these arrivals are Mediterranean
same financial and transportation viewed as unwelcome and a potential
pathways and system of impunity to threat to national identity, unity, and So, what would a Comprehensive Ap-
move people, weapons, and coordi- stability. The typical response has proach in the Mediterranean look like?
11MARITIME SECURITY In order to know for certain, it would sive Approach in action. obligations and security constraints. require the actors to come together In this case, it is necessary to move Despite this seemingly large number to work through the stages of con- from a culture of “need to know” to one of obstacles to closer cooperation, ap- ducting a common assessment of the of the “duty to share “ information. This plying the Comprehensive Approach challenges, developing common ap- is the most effective way to build trust, to addressing transnational threats proaches to address them, and plan- enable coordinated action, ensure true can show us the areas where we can ning for coordinated actions among interagency cooperation, and facilitate work together to achieve our common nations and organizations. Until then, the production of common threat as- goal of security and stability in the there are some indications of what sessments. Mediterranean. their results may look like. While information sharing is gener- “Don’t Let What You Cannot Do Inter- In the last few years of facilitating in- ally viewed as essential in dealing with fere With What You Can Do” ~ John ternational discussions among law maritime threats, instituting a robust Wooden enforcement, diplomatic, military, intel- information fusion capability encom- ligence, and humanitarian actors on passing military, law enforcement, 6. Potential Areas For Fur- how to collectively address transna- and commercial sources can be a real ther Exploration tional threats in the Mediterranean, a challenge, few common themes emerge. This is due to the number of laws and 6.1 Situational awareness: Seeking 5.1 First, is the need for complemen- agencies involved and the reality that shared awareness and developing tarity, coordination and collaboration. many agencies are reluctant to re- a common understanding of evolv- Unilateral and/or partial responses lease real-time actionable information. ing threats through a continuous ex- are recognized not only as limited Often this stems from the inherent cul- change of information among actors in and short sighted but also as leading tural tension between entities involved the Mediterranean region. The Infor- to secondary effects which expose in interdiction (with a bias for immedi- mation Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singa- neighboring governments to a new ate action) and those responsible for pore is a good model for a non-hierar- array of challenges to their national investigations (whose concern is to chical multinational maritime security security. collect and protect evidence on an information fusion capability. Through 5.2 Secondly, it is general recognized entire network for successful criminal the timely sharing of information, it fa- that most all of the transnational threats prosecutions). cilitates timely and effective responses in the Mediterranean are of a law en- 5.4 Finally, reducing the tension be- from partners through linkages to 65 forcement nature and thought must be tween security concerns and human agencies in 35 countries, and with 16 given to how military capabilities can rights in this context is an area where International Liaison Officers (ILOs) support and amplify law enforcement the Comprehensive Approach can from 15 countries. The IFC also con- efforts while not crossing any legal help us to find common ground. In ducts capacity-building activities such boundaries which may prohibit military this case, a Comprehensive Approach as international information-sharing forces from directly conducting law could include contributions from ex- exercises and workshops, for exam- enforcement activities. Finding ways perts in Law of the Sea, maritime se- ple, the biennial Maritime Information to achieve this is necessary because curity, migration and refugee studies, Sharing Exercise (MARISX). no government can afford to purchase and human rights, to address the po- 6.2 Planning and Conduct of Op- these same capabilities twice. sition of migrants and refugees from erations: Enhance integrated civilian- 5.3 Thirdly, because of the large num- an integrated perspective. Through military-law enforcement planning ber of security-related agencies from the inclusion of these perspectives, throughout the planning process and more than a dozen countries operating we can develop an approach on how in operations in adjacent waters. in the Mediterranean, rapid and com- to respond to differing needs and legal FRONTEX’s European Patrols Net- prehensive information dissemination entitlements of migrants and refugees work (EPN) is an excellent example is necessary to enable a Comprehen- and how to reconcile them with State of how to accomplish this among sev- 12
MARITIME SECURITY
eral nations, ministries, and agencies. ber incident prevention, prediction, ing Group of regional actors must be
The EPN is a permanent regional bor- detection, and response. The NATO convened at once to apply the process
der security concept that enables the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of to the problem of both Transnational
synchronization of national measures Excellence in Estonia can serve an im- Threats and threats from state actors
of EU Member States and their inte- portant role in bridging the civ-mil gap in the Mediterranean Region. This
gration to joint European activities. It in cyber security. group can provide a holistic assess-
is based on Member States´ existing ment of the issues and make recom-
activities and on strengthening of co- 7. Summary and Recommen- mendations for a common approach
operation and coordination at national dations and enable the Alliance to develop
and EU levels. its own strategy in concert with other
6.3 Lessons Learned, Training, and The Comprehensive Approach is now regional and international actors. A
Exercises: Commonly collect and a recognized method to achieve a similar effort for the Black Sea region
share lessons learned and best prac- common understanding and approach should also be considered.
tices from putting the Comprehensive among various actors of the interna- 7.2 A More Proactive Use of the Com-
Approach into action in the maritime tional community through the coordi- prehensive Approach. When major
environment and incorporate them into nation and de‐confliction of political, international challenges arise, rather
training and exercises. At the same development and security efforts in than waiting until the crisis stage is
time, invite other actors to participate solving an international crisis. reached, a Comprehensive
in exercises and training to strengthen Currently, both NATO and the EU Approach Working Group should be
cooperation and mutual trust. With its are applying some principles of the convened at the problem recognition
experience and connections to a wide Comprehensive Approach in their stage to provide a holistic assessment
variety of maritime experts and actors, strategies to address the challenges of the issues and make recommenda-
especially from years of addressing of hybrid warfare. But even this ap- tions for a common approach among
counter-piracy and its more recent proach is not sufficient in dealing with regional and international actors. This
emphasis on transnational threats, the broader challenge of transnational would also allow for the NATO Secre-
the NATO Maritime Interdiction Op- threats on NATO’s southern flank tary General to provide a more com-
erations Training Center (NMIOTC) since it does not address root causes prehensive strategic assessment to
is uniquely suited to serve as a focal nor include the collaboration of a num- better frame the issues for SACEUR
point for the Comprehensive Approach ber of entities to include private enter- when asking for military options and
in the maritime environment. prise, NGOs, and civil society. advice to be provided to the North At-
6.4 Strategic Communications: Where Taking into account the increasing lantic Council.
possible, share information strategies recognition of the Comprehensive 7.3 Build a Comprehensive Ap-
and campaigns regularly to ensure Approach as an essential process to proach Culture. Sponsor and host
complementarity and mutual reinforce- improving coordination among various Comprehensive Approach Awareness
ment with other involved international actors in solving major security chal- Seminars at headquarters throughout
organizations and local actors. lenges, the following recommenda- the NATO Command Structure and
6.5 Cyber Defense: Seek to build tions are offered. Centers of Excellence to engage and
shared threat awareness and mutu- 7.1 A Comprehensive Approach for build habitual relationships with re-
ally supportive improvements to resist the Mediterranean. On NATO’s south- gional actors to enable the Alliance to
cyber attack. Enhance cyber informa- ern flank and in particular the Medi- enhance its readiness to put the Com-
tion sharing of best practices at the terranean region, the Hybrid Warfare prehensive Approach into action at
technical level – including on technical Strategy is insufficient to address the the strategic, operational, and tactical
innovations, incident handling meth- variety of transnational threats since levels. This will enable a Comprehen-
odologies, and secure configuration they are much broader in scope. Thus, sive Approach culture to take root at
of networks in order to improve cy- a Comprehensive Approach Work- all levels within the Alliance and help
13MARITIME SECURITY
to transform its relationships with other no longer seen just as a Civilian-Mili- resent the author’s personal opinion
international actors. tary (CIMIC) or J9 function but rather and findings and not the official views
7.4 Move the Comprehensive Ap- one that is equally owned and sup- or policy of the United States govern-
proach into the Mainstream. Finally, ported by operators, strategists, and ment.
within NATO it is time to mainstream logisticians.
the Comprehensive Approach so it is The views presented in this paper rep-
References
European Commission (2016), Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats. http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/docu-
ments/16201
“Effective Cooperation: The Bedrock of Any Security Architecture” ADM (ret) P. Xinofotis, NMIOTC Journal, July 2013.
http://www.nmiotc.nato.int/files/NMIOTCjournal7.pdf
European Commission (2014). “Maritime Security Strategy”, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security/
index_en.htm
Guptill, Murray “Sandy,” Course Designer, NATO Comprehensive Approach Awareness Seminar, Interviews Sept
2015-April 2016
NATO (2011), “Alliance Maritime Strategy”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm
NATO (2010), “NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010”, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publica-
tions/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf
NATO Defense College (2011), NATO Comprehensive Approach Awareness Seminar, Course Guide
Christopher Kremidas
Chris Kremidas currently serves as Liaison to NATO and the EU for US
European Command (EUCOM). His previous positions include service
as Political Advisor to the Commander, NATO Training Mission – Iraq
and Assistant Political Advisor to Commander, Joint Forces Command
Naples.
He has also served as Chief Strategist for US Joint Task Force North,
Policy Planner at the US Delegation to NATO, and as Deputy Defense
Policy Advisor for the US Mission to the European Union (EU). Previ-
ously he served as Regional Cooperation Manager for the Mediterra-
nean region at the EUCOM Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Cen-
ter (JICTC).
He earned a master’s degree with honors in Strategic Studies from the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) and a Bachelor of
Arts in Political Science from Ball State University. He is also a distin-
guished honor graduate of the NATO Defense College and a veteran of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Mr. Kremidas is a recognized expert on the NATO Comprehensive Approach and has published sev-
eral articles on it as well as serving as facilitator and course designer for NATO Comprehensive Ap-
proach seminars throughout Europe. Chris Kremidas is also a sought-after expert on multinational
maritime border security cooperation and has facilitated numerous dialogues on information sharing,
coordinated responses, and addressing irregular migration.
14CYBER SECURITY
Maritime Cyberpower Projection
by Adrian Venables,
PhD Student at Lancaster University, UK and
Commander UK Royal Naval Reserve
a.venables2@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract ighting arms as demonstrated by the ronments in the projection of seapow-
use of amphibious troops, maritime er. This paper examines the as yet un-
UK military doctrine recognises five op- aviation and the use of satellite de- explored area of how cyberspace can
erating environments, Maritime, Land, rived communications and intelligence be used as a mechanism by which the
Air, Space and Cyberspace. These are illustrating how naval forces can utilise maritime environment can generate
not regarded as totally separate warf- the distinctive attributes of other envi- cyberpower to influence a target popu-
15CYBER SECURITY
lation afloat or ashore. The maritime present additional unique challenges air forces to embark on expeditionary
and cyber environments have many of operating at sea or in coastal re- operations as part of a coordinated
similar characteristics such as their de- gions. The link between the maritime strategy to achieve their government’s
pendence on manufactured resources and cyber environments is a subject strategic objectives. The maritime op-
to exploit their potential and that their that is poorly researched, yet the erating environment is described in UK
size prevents them from being under two have many similarities and have Ministry of Defence (MoD) doctrine as
the total control of a single power, but mutual dependencies in their use for providing critical access for joint as-
that temporary regional control is vital trade, communication and the projec- sets allowing influence in support of
for trade, communication or to achieve tion of national power. Current doc- political objectives, the conduct of a
an effect on an adversary’s behaviour. trinal definitions are explained and wide range of maritime security and
By examining the components of cy- the two environments are compared international engagement and when
berspace that are dependent upon leading to the introduction of the new necessary, the means to assemble
the maritime environment, methods terms of Maritime Cyberpower and and apply decisive combat power at
to identify the components that can Cyber Seapower. This is followed by a time and place of political choice.2
project the new concepts of maritime an examination of the composition of The Doctrine highlights that maritime
cyberpower and cyber seapower are maritime cyberspace and its charac- power is not an end in itself, but op-
explored with particular emphasis on teristics to show how they contribute erates within a wider national security
addressing the potential cyber vulner- to security and the influence of others framework and that the environment
abilities of ship systems. through power projection. The paper comprises six dimensions; Physical,
concludes with methods to identify the Economic, Political, Diplomatic, Legal,
Introduction components of maritime cyberspace in and Military. These are noted as being
order to project maritime cyberpower interrelated and of equal importance
The maritime operating environment and cyber seapower with particular although the physical element pro-
is one of five recognised by UK Min- emphasis on the need to address the vides the overarching context for all
istry of Defence (MoD) doctrine, the potential cyber vulnerabilities of ship and highlights its uniqueness.3
others being Land, Air, Space and systems.
Cyberspace. This paper describes the Cyberpower and the maritime
relationship between the maritime and Defining the maritime envi- environment
cyber environments and introduces ronment \
the concept of maritime cyberspace The UK Ministry of Defence defines
in terms of cyberpower projection. At the heart of any definition of the maritime power as the ability to proj-
The nature of maritime power is an maritime environment is an accep- ect power at sea and from the sea to
important one for states that are either tance of its critical importance to global influence the behaviour of people or
dependent on the seas for trade or trade, security and as a source of fuel the course of events. 4 As such, it is
security or wish to have an influence and food. With the growth of globalisa- coherent with other more general de-
in the areas surrounding their coasts. tion, climate change and over popula- scriptions of the concept of power and
Drawing on UK maritime doctrine, the tion resulting in unsustainable regional to achieve this maritime forces have a
concept of power at sea and from the pressure on natural resources, this role number of unique attributes that they
sea in terms of control and denial is is not going to diminish in the foresee- can exploit such as Access, Mobility,
explained in which free access to ar- able future. Indeed, it is predicted that Lift Capacity, Sustained Reach, Versa-
eas of the oceans are required to be a high proportion of future conflicts will tility, Poise, Resilience and Leverage.5
maintained by nation states. Allied to occur in or adjacent to a zone of mari- Although cyberspace is viewed as a
sea power is the issue of maritime time influence.1 From a military per- unique nvironment alongside land,
security and its related tasks, which spective, the sea also provides access air, sea and space, these are not re-
may include a cyber element that will for amphibious, land and embarked garded in isolation as operating areas.
16CYBER SECURITY
This is demonstrated in the UK by the in its own right.6 However, the use by cyberattacks experienced at sea must
coordinated use of the Royal Marines both state and non-state actors of cy- not be investigated in isolation, but
amphibious troops, the Royal Navy’s berspace as an asymmetric means to that evidence, precedence and devel-
Fleet Air Arm and the deployment of seek an advantage over an otherwise opments in other environments should
satellite supported communications militarily superior force is also recog- be considered as part of a holistic ap-
and intelligence capabilities illustrating nised. This is significant as it implies proach in their resolution.8
how naval forces can utilise the dis- that the maritime community afloat
tinctive attributes of the other environ- is no longer platform centric and de- Maritime Power at sea
ments in the projection of seapower. tached from cyberspace, but an inte-
However, although the dependencies gral part of it if connected via satellite, In order to project maritime power, it
between these physical elements is mobile telephony or via radio trans- is necessary to be able to deliver an
well recognised, each one’s unique mission of digitised navigation or other effect at sea and from the sea. Initially
link to cyberspace is not and the con- maritime related information. Although the term Command of the Sea was
cept of how the projection of cyber- this bring advantages, it also exposes used to be able to exploit the environ-
power could be conducted from the the maritime community to the same ment to an advantage. However, as
sea has not attracted much, if any, dis- risks and vulnerability to attack as their this implied total control of the entire
cussion and requires further investiga- land based counterparts. This is exac- ocean all of the time, which was im-
tion. This may be due to a lack of un- erbated by the issue of software aging practical, other terms are now used
derstanding of the unique conditions of in which a ship’s lifespan may exceed that refer to a more realistic aspiration
the coastal and oceanic regions or that that of the software that is required to of temporary control limited in time
they are not considered suitably differ- operate it. This will require regular, but and space to that required to conduct
ent from the other environments to potentially expensive and time con- a given task or operation. Sea Control
warrant particular investigation. What suming ‘software refits’ to mitigate for is defined as the freedom to use an
effort has been devoted to the subject any vulnerabilities in their systems, but area of the sea for one’s own purpose
has been concentrated on the related which may in reality offer no additional for a period of time and if necessary
security aspects of shipping, which in functionality and may even reduce per- to deny its use to an opponent if it is
2016 is now gaining increased inter- formance if the hardware upon which it contested and requires dominance of
est from both the mercantile industry is running is not upgraded at the same the surface and sub surface environ-
and suppliers of cyber security prod- time.7 This may well also be combined ments including the seabed and the
ucts. The maritime environment and with increased automation and the in- air above.9 This may range from being
its relationship with cyberspace in the tegration of different functions into a able to exercise the right of innocent
projection of power introduces the single system to reduce the manpower passage in a state’s territorial water
concept of maritime cyberpower as a required afloat, which further limits its or Exclusive Economic Zone to using
facilitator of maritime power. The role ability to operate without the aid of the force to eliminate another naval force
of cyberspace in contributing to mari- computer systems. Ocean going ves- from challenging control over an area
time power is acknowledged as going sels are also increasingly reliant upon of sea. As Sea Control is a temporary
beyond just information systems and a robust logistics organisation to pro- condition, it would usually be an ob-
reaching into command and control, vide global support – a system that it- jective in order to conduct a particu-
intelligence, surveillance and recon- self is dependent upon Internet based lar mission or as a precursor to other
naissance activities as well as the communications and disruption of operations. Depending on the threat,
physical control of systems. Thus the such networks may have a significant obtaining it may involve actual military
importance of the cyber environment effect on the seaworthiness or ability action against an opponent at sea or
is recognised as a facilitator in the ef- of a ship to embark on transcontinental their containment by blockade to pre-
fective operation of other systems, but passages. This emphasises the inte- vent them from accessing the disputed
not as a means to exert power at sea grated nature of cyberspace and that area. The concept of Sea Denial dif-
17CYBER SECURITY
fers from Sea Control in that it occurs the operation of offshore oil platforms navigation, maritime attack against
when one party prevents another from from the adverse influence of others. the national infrastructure, arms pro-
controlling an area, but without con- The UK National Strategy for Maritime liferation, drugs and people smuggling
trolling the region itself. Historically Security defines it as: are all listed.13
minefields or the threat of submarines …the advancement and pro-
were used to deny access to an area tection of the UK’s national in- Defining the cyber environ-
or threaten opposition surface forces. terests, at home and abroad, ment
More recently and especially in littoral through the active manage-
areas, surface to surface missile or ment of risks and opportuni- Although there is no formally accepted
gun batteries have been used to pres- ties in and from the maritime definition for the cyber environment,
ent an increased level of risk that may domain, in order to strengthen the UK Ministry of Defence’s Cyber
deter maritime forces from operating in and extend the UK’s prosperity, Primer describes it as the interdepen-
coastal regions. Sea Control and Sea security and resilience and to dent network of information technology
Denial may also be used in conjunc- help shape a stable world.11 infrastructures, (including the Internet,
tion as denial in one region may facili- Within the military context, British telecommunications networks, com-
tate control in another. Defence Doctrine notes that the role puter systems, as well as embedded
of national security encompasses processors and controllers), and the
Maritime security the safety of the State and its protec- data therein within the information en-
tion from both external and internal vironment.14 At the heart of cyberspace
There is a direct correlation between threats, but is also integrated within, is information and the information en-
power and security, which is applica- and dependent upon, the security of vironment is defined by the UK Minis-
ble in all environments including mari- neighbouring states and partners. The try of Defence as a logical construct
time and cyberspace. As power seeks former of these counter the threat of whereby assured information can pass
to influence the behaviour of people invasion, attack or blockade and the unhindered from point of origin to point
or the course of events, this may be latter includes the dangers from ter- of need, with assured meaning that the
perceived as a threat, particularly if it rorism, subversion, civil disorder, information can be proven as authen-
is detrimental to a government or so- criminality, insurgency, sabotage and tic and that the originator can be iden-
ciety’s policy, social norms or strategic espionage.12 The role of cyberspace tified.15 The Cyber Primer also moves
ambitions. Among multiple definitions is referred to within the context of an beyond just describing cyberspace to
of security, the Oxford English Diction- attack on the country’s critical national what comprises military operations in
ary includes Freedom from threat or infrastructure. This document also the environment, defining them as the
danger, and safeguarding the inter- obliquely refers to the maritime com- employment of capabilities where the
ests of a state.10 Effective security can ponent by highlighting that the govern- primary purpose is to achieve effects
thus be used as a means to counter ment’s primary duty is to maintain the in, or through, cyberspace. This has
the effects of a campaign of power freedom and integrity of the UK and significant coherence with the defini-
projection or influence – it is a coun- that its stability, prosperity and well-be- tions of maritime power projection and
ter power strategy. At sea, maritime ing depend on international trade and security in being able to influence the
security can be utilised as a means to investment. This it notes requires raw behaviour of people or the course of
counter some of the measures used to materials being imported and goods events. In an attempt to explain cy-
exert control over people or systems exported by sea and are facilitated berspace as part of the Information
by a threat actor, be they state spon- through access to global information environment, the Primer describes it
sored or criminally motivated. These flows. In highlighting the threat posed in terms of three domains; the Physi-
may range from efforts to exercise to the UK by criminals operating in cal (hardware, location and network-
power through Sea Control or Denial the maritime environment; terrorism, ing components), Virtual (software,
to protecting fisheries or maintaining disruption to trade or the freedom of networking protocols and information),
18CYBER SECURITY
and Cognitive (people, their roles and when seeking to achieve an effect in berspace.’ 17
groupings). Noting that cyberspace is cyberspace. For example, the total- In addition to using the features of the
a complex and dynamic environment, ity of the two environments are both maritime environment as a means of
the Cyber Primer emphasises its im- ungovernable by a single authority, influencing others in the wider medium
portance to military operations and indicating that sea control and denial of cyberspace, it is also conceivable
the reliance it places on defence com- may have equivalents in cyberspace to use the properties of cyberspace to
munications. However, it also notes for power projection. Both also require develop the concept of power at sea in
the need to use Commercial Off The manufactured devices to effectively the conventional sense. This presents
Shelf (COTS) hardware, software and use them, be they ships or computing a new theory of cyber seapower, which
civilian owned and operated infrastruc- devices as unlike land warfare, a hu- can be termed:
ture for its essential operations.16 This man cannot enter and engage with the ‘The ability to use cyberpower
requires protective measures to be environment unaided. Furthermore, to project power at sea and from
implemented to enable mission criti- the maritime and cyber environments the sea to influence the behav-
cal systems and the information they are international in nature with ships ior of people or the course of
carry to function with the requisite re- at sea originating from many coun- events in the maritime environ-
silience in order to maintain the same tries and cyberspace comprised of ment’
confidentially, integrity and availability components manufactured worldwide, There is a distinct difference in these
of data as military systems. A key facet with no single country having total new concepts of maritime cyberpower
of this is its relationship and interde- dominance in either. However, influ- and cyber seapower as whereas the
pendency with the electromagnetic ence can be exerted as seen by some former seeks to achieve an effect from
spectrum, which is an integral part of states having large merchant fleets or the sea that influences events any-
the cyber environment, particularly for being dominant in the computer or net- where in cyberspace, the latter seeks
mobile platforms that do not have ac- working markets. Similarly, in order to to use cyberspace to achieve an effect
cess to a fixed infrastructure for com- function, there are global agreements solely in the maritime environment,
munication. However, data exchange that govern both environments – The including the littoral. An example of
via radio frequency transmissions United Nations Convention on the Law maritime cyberpower would therefore
have the significant disadvantage in of the Sea (UNCLOS) in regulating the be to use a maritime platform to dis-
that they can be intercepted and un- use of the oceans and the use of in- rupt or influence a cyber infrastructure
less encrypted can be subject to col- ternationally accepted addressing and at sea or ashore to prevent access or
lection for analysis, manipulation or routing protocols that control how data to alter the content of systems in order
interference by persons other than is exchanged in the networks of cyber- to affect the behaviour of a popula-
the intended recipient thereby making space. By adapting the UK’s definition tion ashore. Cyber seapower how-
them a valuable target for espionage, of Maritime Power of The ability to ever would be to utilise the medium
sabotage or subversion. project power at sea and from the sea to directly affect the ability to facilitate
to influence the behaviour of people Sea Control or Sea Denial. This would
Comparing maritime and cy- or the course of events and by using include adversely affecting the ability
ber environments the concept of seapower as the basis of ships, ports or offshore installations
for projecting cyberpower, the notion to operate normally. The concepts of
Although the maritime and cyber envi- of Maritime Cyberpower can be intro- Maritime Cyberpower and Cyber Sea
ronments may appear very dissimilar duced as: Power within the contexts of Cyber-
at first inspection, there are a signifi- The ability to project cyberpow- power and Sea Power are shown in
cant number of parallels that can be er at sea and from the sea to in- Figure 1 below, which emphasise their
drawn between them and many of fluence the behaviour of people contributory nature to the wider power
the factors that need to be considered or the course of events through component and their role in circum-
when operating at sea can also apply and within the medium of cy- venting the security of the defender:
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