NATO Crisis Response Planning - Anders Møller Lt Col (GS) DNK-Army a/Chief G5 plans
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COPG
NATO
Crisis Response Planning
Anders Møller
Lt Col (GS) DNK-Army
a/Chief G5 plans
Purpose and Agenda
COPG
Purpose Agenda
• To describe the NATO Crisis • NATO Crisis Response Planning
Response Planning process (CRP)
– Mission Analysis • CRP
– Commanders Intent – Phase 1 Situation Awareness
– Phase 2 Appreciation and
Assessment of Options
– Phase 3 Orientation
– Phase 4a CONOPS
Development, Phase 4b
OPLAN Development
– Phase 5 Execution
• Questions
Comprehensive Operations Planning Process
Purpose
COPG
COPG NATO Levels in CRP
NATO Crisis Response Planning
Levels
COPG
North Atlantic Council (NAC)
Political level
Military Committee (MC)
Political Strategic level
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Military Strategic level
Joint Force Command (JFC)
Operational level
Component Command (CC)
Tactical level
NATO Crisis Response Planning
Options in JTF / ILCC context
COPG
SHAPE SHAPE
or or
AIRCOM
JFC JFC JFACC
JTF HQ
LCC as JTFHQ
LCC
JFACC
MCC Direct to
SOCC Formations/Units
NATO Crisis Response Planning
1 (GE/NL) Corps Different Roles
COPG
ILCC below SHAPE or JFC
CRP Phase 1 -6 lead for phase 3-6
Land Component Command (LCC) below a JFC
CRP Phase 2-6
Corps below a LCC
CRP Phase 3-6
COPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning (CRP)
–
an overview
NATO Crisis Response Planning II
COPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning II
COPGNATO Crisis Response Planning III
COPGNATO Crisis Response Planning
COPD – Operational Planning Group Bible
COPG
• Planning options in the COPD:
– Comprehensive
Operations Planning
Process (Chapter 2-4) –
Crisis Response Planning.
Involves SOPG and JOPG.
– Operational Estimate
(Appendix 3 to Annex F)
Time sensitive planning.
Can be used by any
military level.COPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning –
Phase 1Comprehensive Operations Planning Process
COPG
Phase 1
Situation Awareness
Phase 2
Appreciation of the
strategic environment
Phase 3
Operational Estimate
Phase 4a
CONOPS
Development
Phase 4b
OPLAN
Development
Phase 5
Execution
Phase 6
TransitionPlanning Process, phase 1
Situation Awareness
COPG
Situation Awareness, supported by Knowledge Development (KD)
Information and knowledge about the current and developing situation
Phase 1
Situation Awareness
Phase 2
Appreciation of the
strategic environment
Phase 3
Operational estimate
Phase 4a
CONOPS
Development
Phase 4b
OPLAN
Development
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Phase 6
TransitionPlanning Process, phase 1
Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment
COPG
Theatre
TheatreGeometry
Geometry Geographical
Geographical
Characteristic
Characteristic
Meteorological
Meteorological Health
Healthand
andMedical
Medical
Characteristics
Characteristics Comprehensive Situation
Situation
Preparation of the
Operational
Population
Population Environment Infrastructure
Infrastructure
Demographics
Demographics Situation
Situation
Political
Political Information
Informationand
and
Situation
Situation Media
MediaSituation
Situation
Military
Militaryand
andSecurity
Security Economic
Economic Socio-cultural
Socio-cultural
Situation
Situation Situation
Situation Situation
Situation
No major change from LCC level Additional requirements as JTF)COPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning –
Phase 2Planning Process, phase 2
Appreciation of the Strategic Environment
COPG
Understand the situation, the nature of the problem and NATO’s
desired End State, and Objectives
NATO will in possible Military Response Options (MRO) develop
what:
• Must be done?
• Should be done?
Phase 1 • Could be done?
Situation Awareness
Phase 2
• What will other actors do?
Appreciation of the
strategic environment
Phase 3
Orientation The process will review:
Phase 4a • Key factors contributing to the problem
CONOPS
Development • Nature and scope of the problem
Phase 4b • Main actors and their role in the crisis
OPLAN
Development • Risks and threats
JTF to provide Operational Phase 5 • Relations with other actors
Advice. Time constrained Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
process Phase 6
OLPG stakeholder analysis TransitionPlanning Process, phase 2
Stakeholder Analysis
COPG
+
DANIDA CARE
G6
G3 G2 G9
WHO
G7
Level of Interest
G1
MSF
- Level of Influence +Planning Process, phase 2
Operational Advice on Military Response Options
COPG
Preconditions
Preconditionsfor
for (Assess
(AssessJOA)
JOA)
Success
Success
Mission
MissionEssential
Essential Additional
AdditionalCRM
CRM
Force
ForceCapabilities
Capabilities Operational Advice
Critical
CriticalIn-theatre
In-theatre Relevant
RelevantInteraction
Interaction
Support
Supportandand with
withnational
nationaland
and
Infrastructure
Infrastructure international
internationalactors
actors
Essential
EssentialC2
C2and
and Information
InformationStrategy
Strategy
CIS
CISenablers
enablers
Pre-deployment
Pre-deploymentand
and Deterrence
Deterrence ROE
ROE
Enabling
EnablingForces
Forces Operations
Operations Considerations
ConsiderationsCOPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning –
Phase 3Planning Process, phase 3
Operational Estimate I COPG
The Operational estimate phase will determine the:
• Problem to be solved WHAT?
• Conditions to create
• Key factors influencing the conditions to be created
• Limitations in freedom in designing the operation
Phase 1
Situation Awareness
Phase 2
Appreciation and
Assessment of Options
Phase 3
Orientation
Phase 4a
CONOPS
Development
Phase 4b
OPLAN
Development
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Phase 6
TransitionPlanning Process, phase 3 WHAT?
Orientation II Frame the problem
COPG
Knowledge
Initiate
Development-
Mission Analysis
Systems approach
Initial framing of the
Strategic/JFC Input operational level Problem Comprehensive
Strategic Assessment Preparation of the
Strategic Planning Directive Understand the Operational Environment
Other Strategic doc. Operational Environment (CPOE)
and Main Actors
Commander’s Estimate
Operational Factors Assumptions Operational
(T/S/F/A) Likely Actor behavior Requirements
Staff Functional Estimates
Mission Analysis
Required Civilian Interaction Limits on Advice from
Operational
Complementary action, Freedom supporting CC and
Risks
mutual support, of subordinates units
T/S/F and mitigation
de-confliction Action Advice from cooperating
IO/GO/NGOs
Centre of Gravity
Operational
Design
Force Capability Mission Analysis Course of Action Course of Action
Briefing Development briefing and decisionPlanning Process, phase 3
Key Factor Analysis and PMESII
COPG
Time
Space
Forces
Information
Political
Military
Economic
Social
Infrastructure
InformationPlanning Process, phase 3
Key Factors
COPG
EXAMPL
E
Fact 5 Deduction Conclusion
IDPs in LCC AOO •IDP movement could hamper •Gain Situational Awareness
MILITARY
(100.000 in BIYE operations (use of rail system) regarding IDP camps dynamics
KOBE W&E, 20.000 •Increase of Aid Agency activity to avoid unexpected actions
unsupported) will strain APOD/SPOD and (IT)
LLOC capacities •Create effective monitoring of
•Camps are overcrowded: violations and alert mechanisms
deteriorating living conditions / (IT)
SOCIAL
risks for health, further •As soon as security situation in
displacement and increased of DD area allows for the safe
sexual violence, risk of human return of IDPs, IDPs should be
right abuse and human encouraged to return (CR)
trafficking •Harmonization and
INFRASTRUCTURE
•Authorities and/or IO/NGO may synchronization with
request support for local HN/UN/IO/NGO/GO required
citizens, internally displaced (IT)
persons •Recce of alternative routes (IT)
Water shortage in IDP
camps •Camps require level of •Provide water drilling and
sustainment that is desperately purification to ease the water
needed elsewhere shortage if required (IT)Planning Process phase 3,
Actor System Analysis
COPG
EXAMPL
EPlanning Process, phase 3
Unacceptable and Acceptable Conditions
EXAMPL COPG
E
Acceptable short term Acceptable mid and long term
Unacceptable
12 months
Security Security Security
• KAM threat towards • KAM forces withdrawn from • Ethnic cleansing stopped in KAM
TYT territorial TYT border • Flow of refugees from KAM diminished
integrity • Ethnic cleansing stopped in Stability
• PET TRIBES TP • TYT able to sustain itself without
influence/incursion • FIKA does not use TP as foreign support
into NE TYT safe haven • GoT is taking ownership on
• Kloridisation & • PET Tribe raids interrupted governance and development
ethnic cleansing • FoM for HA ensured • Economic development initiated
• ELKAIM & FIKA Stability • Shadow economy marginalized
fighting in TP • TYT development strategy • Corruption reduced to an acceptable
Stability supported level
• Infrastructure improved to • Support to CUPD/BLA radicalization
• GOT unable to
ensure HA marginalized
provide essential
services /
exercising an
acceptable level of
governance in the
whole countryPlanning Process, phase 3
Centre of Gravity
COPG
EXAMPL
Aim: E
A secure environment in TYT, contributing to the stability of the region and setting the
conditions for the handover of NIMFOR security responsibilities to UN forces.
COG CC
NIMFOR Combined Arms force harmonised with Ability to:
non military actors • Contribute to deterrence
• Conduct local security control
• Project power and support across TYT
• Enable TYT armed forces and support SSR
• Coordinate activities with all non military factors
and HN
CV CR
• Extended LLOC • Combined Arms Groupings (Combat Bdes)
• Limited number of forces in space and weak • Liaison with GoT, and non military actors
infrastructure • Credibility of NIMFOR and cause
• Not tailored to support disaster relive • FoM
• Forces prepared and trained for operations in
extreme dry hot and extreme hot wet conditions
Conclusions / likely DP/DC:
• TYT armed forces enabled
• SASE in selected crisis areas
• NIMFOR mission understood by GoT and TYT populationPlanning Process, phase 3
Operational Estimate and Design, Comprehensive Approach
COPG
EXAMPL
EPlanning Process, phase 3
Operational Design
COPG
Phase 1a: Preparation Phase 1b: Initial Entry Phase 2: Execution
EXAMP LE3: Re-deployment
Phase
NIMFOR mission NIMFOR
understood in NE mission
TYT accepted in NE
TYT
Early InfoOps started NIMFOR presence
accepted
Provision of HA
LLOCs capable to Convoy ops
LLOCs secured Ops deconflicted with HA deliveries
LOO 1 UNMEC spt HA flow conducted on MSR's unimpeded
Provision of Provision of HA
HA ensured
ISR along LLOCs Status of No protection
Convoys are
established LLOCs required for HA
protected
assessed
HA arrives at
Key infra on Major damage to destination
LLOCs secured LLOCs repaired
Arms embargo
implemented
TYT police
ISR along PET
assisted to GoT assisted to GoT assisted to
border
disrupt disrupt TO marginalise OC
established
smuggling
Security in NE TYT
Liaison with
LCC present in
GoT/UN
DD OC/TO influence
established Arms embargo monitored
LOO 2 suppressed
Effective liaison Security in JURA tribe raids Majority of DD IDPs
LCC IOC denied resettled
Liaison with
established NE TYT Security in NE TYT
Root cause JURA incursions improved
IO/NGO
of DD IDP
established Basic services problems
solved
KLE C2/ICE TYT AF assisted Lack of basic services
ISR on JURA
established established to deny PET
tribe in NE TYT
incursion
Water drilling &
LCC logistics NFO JURA raids in NE purification
established established TYT interdicted provided
TYT AF Capabilities
TYT AF requirements TYT AF requirements Partnering with TYT AF TYT AF mentored by TYT AF capable of
LOO 3 TYT assessed established established NIMFOR independent ops
Capabilities of TYT
AF AF in NE TYT
Capabilities improved
TYT AF
TYT AF materiel TYT AF
capabilities Training programme
requirements sufficiently
assessed established
assessed equipped
TYT troops Partnered ops
Training facilities redeployed from KAM conducted with
Training facilities
established border TYT AF
inventory completedPlanning Process, phase 3
Translation of Objectives
COPG
Objectives Objectives
Assigned by SHAPE
• Derived from the
End state
Centre of Gravity.
• Are friendly goals
Criteria for Success. • Specify what must
Conditions that must exist for Decisive Points/Conditions. be accomplished
an objective to be achieved Critical Conditions to • Have one single
including any conditions that accomplish the objective
result
cannot exist. • Are prescriptive,
specific and
Effects. Determine the likely changes –effects – required in specific unambiguous
systems/system elements. (Effects: A change in the state of a system (or • Is not a written task
system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes)
– does not infer
ways and means
Measure of Effectiveness. MOE are Actions. (Only relevant for Corps and
used during the conduct of operations above)
to help determine “are we doing the
Formulated as a mission
right things.” They describe how the
system capabilities and behaviour
should change if our actions are
Tasks. (For divisions and below).
effective. Describes …in order to… .
Develop a main task matrix 31Planning Process, phase 3
Assessment on required branches and sequels
COPG
EXAMPL
E
• Possible Branches:
– Security in TP not achieved by CUSFOR, UNMEC fails to manage
HA activities
• Branch 2a: Support CUSFOR
• Branch 2b: Support UNMEC
– GoT collapses (Coup d’Etat and/or anarchy), regional stability
deteriorates, TYT and CUSFOR fail to provide security in TP
• Branch 3: Support to extract UNMEC
– TYT AF incapable of taking over responsibility for internal
security
• Branch 4: Extend NIMFOR mandate
• Possible CONPLAN:
– Disaster Relief Support
– JURA / YUNNI Tribe Raid
– CUSFOR SupportOperational Risk Assessment
COPG
EXAMPL
E
Probability
Conclusion
Severity
Risk identification Consequence Risk Management
Limited FOM on LLOC by Jura • HA delivery interrupted • Screen border and interdicts raids
tribe and TOs • Sustainment NIMFOR/CUSFOR • Prepare for Counter IED Campaign
impacted • Train TYT SF in counter IED operations
•NIMFOR and civilian casualties • Stock levels
erode mission support
No effective local authorities • Lack of legitimacy (TYT Face) • SA of local culture and power brokers
/ security mechanism in place • NIMFOR activities will destabilize • Establish Local/Regional coordination/C2
in NE-TYT. local economy and are vulnerable for mechanism for security enhancement and
unintentionally contribute to involvement TYT authorities
corruption • Urge NIMFOR HQ / UNMEC to provide
•LCC accused of partiality because instruments iot improve capabilities TYT
of LCC project focus in NE TYT and police
LCC religious background. •Balanced approach on Development via
• Unintended unbalanced approach UNMEC project outside LCC AOO
towards local powerbrokers/tribes • Redeployment of Elms DD Corps from NW
TYT back to barracks
Attacks against High Profile • Loss of credibility (discredit • Identify and secure iccw local authorities
targets (Incl IDP camps, DD NIMFOR and local authorities) key infrastructure
power station) by TOs • Instability civil unrest • Enable return of IDPs or relocate camps
• Decrease in basic services (power)
Natural disaster • Inability to react leads to • Improve consequence management
resentment towards NIMFOR capabilities
• Loss of popular support by • Develop CONPLAN based on D&G NIMFOR
NIMFOR and local authorities / GoT. HQ
Severity Extremely High High Moderate Low
Probability High Moderate Low
Conclusion Unacceptable Conditionally Acceptable Acceptable
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable SFJT12Planning Process, phase 3
Command and Control
COPG
EXAMPL
EPlanning Process, phase 3
Course of Action Development 1
COPG
EXAMPL
E
• MCC is leading Operation
PROMETHEUS the Anti-Piracy
operations.
• JFAC's main effort is to maintain Air
Superiority and contribute to
deterrence of KAM, with a supporting
effort to provide air support in
Northeast TYT.
• SOCC will conduct Special Operations
Missions and in parallel support the
MCC with Maritime Special
Operations.
• POTF continues to ensure that the
mission is understood and accepted
nation wide.
• JLSG provides logistic support, RSOM
and ensures sustainment.Planning Process, phase 3
Course of Action Development 2
COPG
EXAMPL
E
• 2 SCR (USA) continues to provide
LLOC security from DIRE DAWA into
the GRV; support the provision of
HA inside the GRV; contribute to the
provision of a SASE while
intensifying training and partnering
with TAF.
• 11 AMB (NLD) dedicated NIMFOR
RES from UNAKOS.
• 13 MechBde (NLD) increases
security and control activities in TP;
supports GoT and UNMEC in order to
secure the area; disrupt militias
activities stopping ethnic cleansing
and prevent TP to be used as safe
haven; enable delivery of HA and
provision of essential services by
GoT and the IC. Intensify training
and partnering with TAF.COPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning –
Phase 4Planning Process, phase 4 a+b
Concept and Plan Development I
COPG
• Actions are synchronised in time and space and harmonised with
relevant actors HOW?
• Sequence of operations along clearly defined lines of operations
• Capabilities required for the conduct and sustain actions are identified
• Aspects of time, space, forces, actors and information are balanced
within acceptable risks
Phase 1
Situation Awareness
Phase 2
Appreciation and
Assessment of Options
Initial Wargame
Phase 3
Orientation
Phase 4a
CONOPS
Development
Phase 4b
OPLAN
Development
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Phase 6
TransitionPlanning Process, phase 4 a+b
Concept and Plan Development II
COPG
1. Situation HOW?
2. Mission
3. Execution
Intent
Concept Of Operations
4. Logistics
5. Command and Signal
Phase 1
Situation Awareness
Phase 2
Appreciation and
Assessment of Options
Phase 3
Orientation
Phase 4a
CONOPS
Development
Phase 4b
OPLAN
Development
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Phase 6
TransitionPlanning Process, phase 4 a+b
Supporting Concepts - Movement Concept
COPG
EXAMPL
E
SPOD
MLC 30 15-20 Km/h Assab
MLC 60 20-25 Km/h
s
MSR DOG
hr
MLC 100 30-40 Km/h S
ift tratS
11
Rail (755Km) 40-50 Km/h rL eaL
t Ai ift
S tra
s
0 hr SPOD
1:4 APOD
12
Mile CSC MSR FROG
hr
AS Osman
s
IT MSR CAT
hr
14h r s
MSR LEMON t
irLif
40
ra t A
St
0:
s
13hr
t
StratAirLif MSR TULIP
AirF MSR Distance
MSR BIRD 7hr s TULIP 530km
1 Dire Dawa
rs ROSE 230km
MSR Unakos 8h hr CSC
DOG 200km
BEAR 1: 00 LEMON
BIRD
440km
310km
10hrs CAT 250km
Awash
APOD FROG 10km
Bole rs CSC FOX 180km
7h BEAR 620km
MSR
MSR FOX
ROSE 10hrsPlanning Process, phase 4 a+b
LCC Force Flow
COPG
EXAMPL
EPlanning Process, phase 4 a+b
Supporting Concepts Medical Concept
COPG
EXAMPL
ECOPG
NATO Crisis Response Planning –
Phase 5Operational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products I
COPG
G+130 G+145 G+205 G+235 G+300Operational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products II
COPG
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Operational Assessment (G10)
•We are not creating the right
effects
OE02 JURA Tribe
raids in NE TYT
tempted and/or
preventedOperational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products III
COPG
MOE 2.1 THRESHOLDS SUPPORTED REPORTIN
DECISIVE G
CONDITION
# GREEN: 0-3 per month DC02 – Jura G2
decrease tribe raids FGB
in the YELLOW: 4-15 per month stopped 43X
JURA
tribe RED: Daily attacks
raids/att
acks OE2 – JURA tribe raids in NE TYT
against tempted and /or prevented
HA
convoys
p/monthOperational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products IV
COPG
MOE 2.1 THRESHOLDS SUPPORTED REPORTIN
DECISIVE G
CONDITION
# GREEN: 0-3 per month DC02 – Jura G2
decreas tribe raids FGB
e in the YELLOW: 4-15 per month stopped 43X
JURA
tribe RED: Daily attacks
raids/at
OE2 – JURA tribe raids in
tacks
NE TYT tempted and /or
against
prevented
HA
convoys
p/mont
hOperational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products V
COPG
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Operational Assessment (G10)
•We are not creating the right
effects
OE02 JURA Tribe
raids in NE TYT
tempted and/or
preventedOperational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products VI
COPGOperational Planning, Phase 5
Execution – use of products VII
COPG
Phase 5
Execution/Assessment
OPLAN Review
Operational Assessment (G10)
•We are not creating the right
effects
OE02 JURA Tribe Adjusting our actions ‐ tasks
raids in NE TYT •Planned by G3 or G5
tempted and/or
prevented •Executed in JCO or FRAGO
NIMFOR
JCO 01COPG Questions ?
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