JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE DECISION SUMMARIES - May-June 2021
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JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE DECISION SUMMARIES
May-June 2021
In the Matter of Price, Final judgment (Alabama Court of the Judiciary June 15, 2021)
(https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/judiciary/COJ59_FinalJudgmentAndCensure.pdf)
The Alabama Court of the Judiciary suspended a judge’s salary for 3 months and publicly
censured him for, during a traffic ticket case, while on the bench and dressed in his judicial
robe, losing his temper, yelling profanity, threatening that he would take action against the
defendant if she sued his adult son, and calling the defendant several disparaging names; the
Court also ordered that the judge complete 12 hours of judicial education, issue a formal
written apology to the defendant, and pay costs of $975.55. In joint motions, the Judicial
Inquiry Commission and the judge had agreed to the censure and conditions, but the Court
found the additional sanction of a suspension was necessary. The judge has already been
suspended for 7 weeks, pursuant to the state constitution; the Court ordered that if the city has
been paying him during that suspension, he shall not be paid for his next 3 months but that if
the city has not been paying him, he will receive credit for those 7 weeks and shall not be paid
for his continued service until July 23, 2021.
Kimberley Farranto had determined that the judge’s son had been a passenger in a
vehicle that had struck her vehicle in the parking lot of a Waffle House and left the scene.
When Farranto appeared pro se before the judge in a traffic case, she asked the judge to recuse
because she was probably going to sue his son to obtain the name of the driver. The judge
became very angry and yelled, for example, “I know who you are. You’re the lady that likes to
flim-flam people,” and “If you mess with my son, I’ll bust you’re a**. Do you hear me? I’ll bust
you’re a**.” The judge eventually gave her the name of the driver and recused from the case.
Goodman, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct May 13, 2021)
(https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2020/20-274.pdf)
The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for
repeatedly failing to abide by administrative orders regarding the use of face coverings in court
facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic and for refusing to regularly review his court emails;
the Commission also ordered the judge to review a podcast about pandemic-related issues and
the duty to abide by administrative orders presented in August 2020 to the Maricopa County
Justice Courts.
The judge repeatedly failed to wear a face covering when interacting with the public and
staff in court facilities as required by administrative orders issued by the Arizona Supreme Court
and the Maricopa County Superior Court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
complaint was filed by a presiding judge. The Commission found that the judge’s failure
“caused some court personnel to refuse to enter his courtroom and led to distress among court
employees.” He persisted, “despite counseling and admonitions by two presiding judges.” The
judge also failed to require individuals in his courtroom to abide by administrative orders
regarding the use of face coverings and “appeared to publicly denigrate those orders.” Thejudge was ordered to work only in the courtroom or his office but also “violated that directive,
resulting in an order banning him from the courthouse entirely, requiring judges pro tem to
preside over matters that could not be handled remotely.” The Commission found that the
judge’s “conduct needlessly consumed judicial time and resources, including an internal
investigation, witness interviews, and repeated interventions by two presiding judges,”
rejecting his characterization of his conduct as “[s]poradic human omissions.”
The judge refused to regularly review his court emails, explaining that he opens court
emails “maybe once a month.” The Commission noted that “important court business is
conducted via email, particularly during the time period at issue here, when pandemic-related
communications and orders were commonplace” and stated that his practice was inconsistent
with the judge’s obligation to “cooperate with other judges and court officials in the
administration of court business.”
Quickle, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct June 11, 2021)
(https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2020/20-280.pdf)
The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for speaking
sharply to court staff when she was disconnected from a Zoom hearing and yelling at court staff
when lawyers and parties were allowed into the courtroom prior to the scheduled time for a
case; the Commission also ordered the judge to complete the courses “Leadership for Judges”
and “Mindfulness for Judges” offered by the National Judicial College.
On September 11, 2020, the judge was presiding over a dependency matter that was
conducted remotely via Zoom. During the hearing, the judge lost her connection to Zoom. A
court clerk, S.H., advised the attorneys and parties that the judge had been disconnected, and
the hearing was paused while the judge attempted to get reconnected. When she rejoined the
hearing, the judge stated sharply, “I am incredibly unhappy because this is going to be a pain.
So, I do not understand why I was thrown off Zoom on my laptop, my iPad, and my phone.”
The attorneys and litigants heard her comments, and the clerk felt “embarrassed and belittled.”
On October 16, the judge became upset that parties and lawyers for a scheduled matter
had been allowed into the courtroom prior to a designated time and yelled at the clerk, S.H.
After learning that it was another court employee who had allowed the parties to enter the
courtroom, the judge went to speak to the elected clerk of the court, and, as she did, her office
door slammed shut in front of other clerks and the public. The judge denied deliberately
slamming the door, but other court employees believed that she had slammed the door
intentionally. Court employees also overheard the judge yelling at the elected court clerk about
the matter.
In interviews with the Commission’s investigator, 6 court employees confirmed these
incidents and also confirmed a pattern of the judge “yelling or using an angry, rapid-fire tone
with individuals during the time she has been on the bench” that made them feel disrespected
and that created tension in the court. However, the employees also “reported a recent
improvement in the judge’s demeanor.” The judge disagreed with some of the employees’
perceptions of her conduct but stated that she had “reevaluated my interactions with staff and
other elected officials, as well as my overall demeanor with the goal of avoiding any further
misunderstandings or hurt feelings.”
2Jantzen, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct June 11, 2021)
(https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2020/20-156.pdf)
The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for failing to
issue a timely ruling in 1 case and signing a payroll certification while knowing that the ruling
was overdue.
After hearing oral argument in a civil matter on January 22, 2020, the judge took the
matter under advisement and told the parties he would issue a ruling within 30 days. However,
he did not issue a ruling until April 10, which was 79 days after he took the matter under
advisement. In March 2020, the judge signed a payroll certification knowing the ruling was
overdue at that time.
The Commission noted that the judge had previously been publicly censured for a
delayed ruling but found that only a public reprimand was warranted based on the length of
the delay and mitigating information supplied by the judge, which included new techniques for
affirmatively addressing complex cases and litigants and new calendaring and tracking
methods.
The Commission also granted a request by Disciplinary Counsel for a protective order for
the judge’s supplemental response.
Re Sims (Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission May 21, 2021)
(https://www.jddc.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/JDDC-Agreed-Sanction-19-202-
19-264.pdf)
Based on an agreement, the Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission
publicly censured a judge for inappropriate comments and demeanor toward public defenders
in 2 cases.
During an omnibus hearing about a no-knock search warrant in April 2019, the judge left
the bench while the public defender was asking a witness a question and refused to let her
make her record when she attempted to respond to an objection. His tone of voice was curt,
and his facial expressions, demeanor, and actions “alarmed other attorneys and members of
the gallery.” The Commission found that the judge’s actions and demeanor created an
injudicious atmosphere in his courtroom. The Commission noted that there was no evidence
that the judge’s decision was unfair.
During a criminal jury trial in May 2019, the judge called the attorneys to the bench
during voir dire and made statements about the way in which a public defender was conducting
voir dire, asked if her client had a defense, and stated that he would still accept a guilty plea.
The defendant was acquitted. The Commission noted that the judge’s comments and
demeanor “gave the appearance, whether intentional or not, of an attempt to coerce a
settlement.”
Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission v. Sims (Arkansas Supreme Court June 3, 2021)
(https://opinions.arcourts.gov/ark/supremecourt/en/498133/1/document.do)
3Accepting the findings and recommendation of the Judicial Discipline & Disability
Commission based on the judge’s agreement, the Arkansas Supreme Court suspended a judge
for 90 days without pay for asking a public defender if she was going to file another complaint
against him if he did not accept a plea negotiation; 60 days of the suspension was held in
abeyance for 1 year conditioned on the judge attending a class on mindfulness, patience, or
civility and hiring a counselor or life coach to consult with about how to treat the professionals
appearing in his court and on the Commission receiving no complaints that result in public
charges or agreed discipline.
During a hearing in October 2019, the judge asked a public defender, on the record in
front of her client, whether she was going to file another complaint against him if he did not
accept a plea agreement. His voice, tone, and demeanor “were intimidating and improper.”
The Commission noted that that public defender had not filed a complaint against the judge.
The Commission stated to the judge: “The inquiry of someone you suspected had assisted or
cooperated with the investigation could have caused others to believe that you were going to
retaliate, directly or indirectly, against actual and potential complainants. A judge investigated
by a disciplinary agency has a duty to cooperate in the investigation process, not to hinder it by
confronting witnesses and complainants regardless of the judge’s intent.”
The Commission noted that the judge had been publicly admonished in 2010 for
abandoning his judicial role to issue “a writ . . . to facilitate the testimony of a witness, whose
criminal case had been closed, to support the prosecution in a separate pending criminal case.”
In the Matter of Gunkel (Colorado Supreme Court May 13, 2021)
(https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Opinions/2020
/20SA409.pdf)
Approving a stipulated disposition, the Colorado Supreme Court accepted the
retirement of a judge and publicly censured her for 2 convictions for driving under the
influence.
On January 14, 2018, the judge was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.
On her arrest, her preliminary blood alcohol content was 0.137. According to the arrest report,
she told the 2 arresting officers that she was a judge and asked if they could just take her home.
On November 9, 2018, she entered a plea of guilty to DUI and careless driving. She was fined
$100 for careless driving. On the DUI charge, she received a deferred sentence of 2 years with
probation, community service, and abstention from alcohol. Her driver’s license was revoked
followed by a requirement that, for 2 years, she could only operate vehicles equipped with an
ignition interlock device that would monitor her blood alcohol content.
On August 17, 2019, the judge was arrested in Kansas and charged with DUI. Noting the
restriction on her driver’s license, the arresting officer also charged her with failure to have an
interlock device operating in her vehicle. Her preliminary BAC registered 0.164. According to
the sheriff’s narrative supporting the arrest, the judge stated that she was a judge and asked if
her husband could come get her.
In light of concerns about whether litigants might question her impartiality and fairness
in cases involving DUI charges and probation revocation complaints, the Chief Judge in her
district ordered that no DUI or probation revocation cases would be assigned to her.
4On May 7, 2020, the judge admitted that her DUI incident in Kansas violated the terms
of her deferred sentence, her deferred sentence was revoked, and a conviction for DUI was
entered. The judge was sentenced to 48 hours of public service, an alcohol evaluation,
probation, and payment of fines and fees of $1,924.50.
On June 8, the judge pled guilty to and was convicted of DUI–second offense under
Kansas law. She was sentenced to 12 months of supervised probation; 90 days in jail, which
were suspended upon completion of 48 consecutive hours of confinement and 120 hours of
house arrest; and ordered to pay fines and fees of $1,903.
Inquiry Concerning Cupp (Florida Supreme Court May 13, 2021) (https://efactssc-
public.flcourts.org/casedocuments/2021/391/2021-391_disposition_152642_d39g.pdf)
Approving a stipulation, the Florida Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for (1)
contacting individuals to inform them that he was supporting the incumbent judge’s opponent
in a judicial election and, in some instances, requesting that the community member support
his favored candidate and (2) failing to officially designate a campaign account and treasurer
with the Division of Elections before receiving campaign contributions or issuing any funds.
(1) In the lead up to the 2020 election for Hendry County Court judge, the judge began
contacting individuals he knew in the county to inform them that he was supporting the
incumbent judge’s opponent because he had heard concerns about the incumbent. The judge’s
preference for the incumbent’s opponent eventually became widely known in the community.
The judge admits that his “unsolicited contact with many influential members of the
community, during which he expressed his preference for a certain candidate in a judicial race,
and in some instances requested that the community member support his favored candidate”
was inappropriate, violated the code of judicial conduct, and “damaged the integrity of the
judiciary, by creating the appearance that he was interceding in a judicial election.
(2) The judge also admits that he violated the code and a state statute during his 2020
re-election campaign by failing to officially designate a campaign account and treasurer with
the Division of Elections before receiving any contributions or issuing any funds.
Inquiry Concerning Howard (Florida Supreme Court May 20, 2021) (https://efactssc-
public.flcourts.org/casedocuments/2020/1251/2020-1251_disposition_152703_d39g.pdf)
Approving a stipulation, the Florida Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for
attempting to dissuade a judicial candidate from running against an incumbent judge (the first
incumbent) and to either run against a different incumbent judge (the second incumbent) or
not to run at all.
In early April 2019, the husband of a judicial candidate running against the first
incumbent was told that he should contact the judge and the judge would explain why the
candidate should run against a different judge in the same county. The judge’s personal phone
number was provided to the candidate’s husband, and he called the judge. The judge
suggested that the candidate and her husband meet with him at an event for the local Boy
Scouts. The candidate was unable to attend, but her husband did. At the event, the judge
explained that the first incumbent enjoyed strong support and recommended that the
5candidate change races to target a second incumbent in Citrus County. The judge said that he
would like to meet and speak with the candidate herself, and her husband advised the judge
that he would pass along the judge’s contact information.
On April 17, the judge met with the candidate and her campaign treasurer/law partner
at their law office for 20 to 50 minutes. The judge asked the candidate why she was running for
judge and, after she responded, told her that her reasons were not good enough. The judge
attempted to persuade the candidate not to run against the first incumbent, who in his
estimation, was doing a good job and enjoyed the support of the community. The judge
repeatedly suggested that the candidate switch her candidacy to run against the second
incumbent in the same county, who was also up for election in 2020, because the judge
perceived the second incumbent as a weaker and more vulnerable candidate. Alternatively, the
judge suggested that the candidate drop her candidacy against the first incumbent and instead
seek appointment to some future seat through the Judicial Nominating Commission process.
When the candidate asked if the judge would be willing to provide a recommendation if the
nominating commission contacted him about her, the judge stated that he does not do that.
The candidate did not relinquish her campaign against the first incumbent.
In mitigation, the Commission noted that the judge accepted full responsibility,
cooperated throughout the investigation, and acknowledged that his actions were
inappropriate and should not have occurred. The Commission further noted that the judge had
no prior discipline as a judge since his appointment in 2000 and no disciplinary history with The
Florida Bar.
Although it approved the stipulation, the Court did not agree with the Commission’s
conclusion that the judge’s conduct constituted a public endorsement or opposition to judicial
candidates. The Commission had also found that the judge’s conduct “failed to uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary, “created the appearance of impropriety,” “failed to
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary,” and “constituted an improper
use of the prestige of his position in favor of the private interest of the first incumbent.
In re Brown, Report of disposition (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission May 3, 2021)
Based on a consent agreement and the judge’s resignation, the Georgia Judicial
Qualifications Commission disposed of a complaint against a judge. The Commission had been
investigating allegations that the judge had engaged in nepotism and favoritism in conduct,
actions, and/or appointments to the juvenile court, had improperly attempted to influence
appointments in the magistrate court, and had improperly inserted himself into the plea
negotiation process. During its investigation, the Commission was notified that the judge
would be resigning effective June 30th for medical reasons. The judge, who was serving as chief
judge of the circuit, agreed to immediately relinquish any administrative and/or supervisory
duties and involvement” with the juvenile and magistrate courts. The agreement allows him to
seek appointment as a senior judge after his retirement, but he may not seek, request, or
accept any other elected or appointed judicial office in the future.
6In re Hughes (Louisiana Supreme Court June 30, 2021)
(https://www.lasc.org/opinions/2021/21-0771.O.action.pdf)
Accepting a motion for consent discipline based on a joint stipulation and
memorandum, the Louisiana Supreme Court publicly censured a supreme court justice for a
meeting with a campaign worker for a candidate for a different seat on the Court that
constituted interference with and/or had the potential to interfere with the working
relationship between the candidate and the campaign worker during a highly contested
campaign. The Court also ordered the justice to pay $2,068.72 in costs the Commission
incurred investigating the matter. 1 justice dissented and would have rejected the petition to
allow the matter to proceed to a public hearing on the merits
(https://www.lasc.org/opinions/2021/21-0771.O.jlw.dis.pdf).
In the fall of 2019, there was a run-off election between then-Judge William Crain and
Judge Hans Liljeberg for Louisiana Supreme Court District 1. Leading up to the election, after
telephone calls regarding the amounts being paid to campaign workers on the Crain campaign,
Justice Hughes reviewed campaign finance reports filed on behalf of Crain’s campaign. He
recognized some of the names on the reports and knew Johnny Blount, a former city
councilman, better than the others.
Although he had not seen Blount for several years, on October 30, the justice went to
Blount’s home to discuss the race and specifically the amounts of money being paid to
campaign workers for the Crain campaign. During their conversation, the judge communicated
to Blount that he believed that Blount could receive more money for his services from the
Liljeberg campaign. The justice left his card with Blount. This discussion left Blount with the
impression that the justice was attempting to change Blount’s support from Judge Crain to
Judge Liljeberg.
In an affidavit after this meeting, Blount attested that the justice offered him $5,000 to
support the Liljeberg campaign. In early November, several news articles were published about
the meeting, including a photograph of Blount’s affidavit regarding this “offer,” in The Times-
Picayune | The New Orleans Advocate. “The news articles reported negatively on respondent’s
conversation with Mr. Blount and portrayed the judiciary in a negative light.”
Justice Crain won the election. Justice Crain and Justice Hughes recused themselves
from the discipline case.
The Commission and the justice stipulated that the meeting and discussion “constituted
interference with and/or had the potential to interfere with the working relationship between a
judicial candidate and one of his campaign workers during a highly contested campaign for a
seat on the same Court on which respondent serves.” However, the parties’ joint submission
states that Blount’s allegation that the justice offered him $5,000 was “unsubstantiated.”
Although the parties stipulated that the justice had intended his conversation with
Blount to be private, the Court concluded that, “given the unusual nature of the conversation,”
the justice’s status as a member of the Court that was the subject of the election, and “the
contentious nature of the campaign, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to respondent
that Mr. Blount might publicize the conversation. Once the conversation was in fact made
public, it resulted in negative media articles and harmed the public’s confidence in and respect
for the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary.”
7In aggravation, the Court emphasized the justice’s position as a member of the Court
and his lengthy judicial experience. In mitigation, it noted that the justice was not acting in his
official capacity, believed his conversation was private, expressed remorse, cooperated during
the disciplinary proceedings, and accepted responsibility. The Court emphasized that it
recognized “the unique nature of this case,” noting that the justice “is the second most senior
justice on this Court, which is constitutionally charged with regulating the judiciary.”
In re Konschuh, 959 N.W.2d 708 (Michigan 2021)
Adopting in part the recommendations, findings, and conclusions of the Judicial Tenure
Commission, the Michigan Supreme Court imposed a 6-year suspension without pay on a
former judge if he is elected or appointed to judicial office during the next 6 years for (1) while
he was a prosecutor, taking several types of funds that belonged to the county and depositing
them in his and his family’s personal bank accounts and failing to keep any records related to
those funds; (2) his no contest plea to a crime and subsequent false statements about the plea;
(3) failing to disclose his relationships with 3 attorneys when he presided over cases in which
those attorneys appeared or to disqualify himself from those cases; and (4) testifying falsely
before the Commission. The Court did not adopt the Commission’s conclusion that the judge’s
actions regarding county funds constituted embezzlement and rejected as moot the
Commission’s recommendation that the judge be removed because the judge left office on
January 1, 2021. The Court held that “the cumulative effect and pervasiveness of respondent’s
misconduct convinces this Court that respondent should not hold judicial office.” On the basis
of the judge’s intentional misrepresentations and misleading statements, it found him liable for
the costs, fees, and expenses the Commission incurred in prosecuting the complaint.
(1) In 2008, while serving as county prosecutor, the judge entered into a verbal
agreement with a company named Hartland, under which Hartland would try to collect on “bad
check” cases designated by the prosecutor’s office for a fee of $35 per check. The judge did not
disclose his agreement with Hartland to the county board for approval as required by a county
policy. The judge stopped using Hartland by the end of 2008.
In early February 2009, under the Hartland program but after it had ended, the judge’s
office received a money order for $60.28, representing the face amount of a dishonored check
plus Hartland’s $35 fee. The judge admitted that he cashed the money order and deposited the
entire $60.28 into his and his wife’s personal bank account. The next day, the judge provided
only $45.28, i.e., $15 less than the full amount of the money order, to a clerical employee in the
prosecutor’s office.
Effective January 1, 2009, the judge entered into a written contract with Bounce Back,
another collection company. Under the contract, the county prosecutor’s office was to receive
a $5 fee from each $40 Bounce Back collected. The judge did not disclose his agreement with
Bounce Back to the county board for approval as required by a county policy.
Between September 2009 and April 2013, the judge deposited $1,022 into his personal
bank accounts from 42 checks sent to the prosecutor’s office by Bounce Back.
The judge participated with other assistant prosecuting attorneys in 18 Law
Enforcement Officers Regional Training Commission training sessions. Preparation for the
trainings took place at the prosecutor’s office, using office equipment and supplies. Each
8training was conducted during business hours, and the participating assistant prosecuting
attorneys did not take any vacation, sick, or compensatory time from their county positions to
prepare for or to participate in the training. Following each session, the judge submitted a cost
documentation sheet designating himself as the sole recipient of any compensation, received
18 checks from LEORTC for a total of $5,450, and deposited the checks into his personal bank
accounts.
In 2011 and 2012, assistant prosecuting attorney Cailin Wilson provided legal instruction
at a LEORTC sponsored corrections academy. The judge directed Wilson to submit her mileage
expenses for the training to the county. Pursuant to Wilson’s request on the cost
documentation forms, LEORTC issued 2 checks, for $300 in 2011 and for $480 in 2012, made
payable to the Lapeer County Prosecutor’s Office. Even though county resources were used to
generate this money, the judge deposited these checks into his personal bank accounts.
Between 2001 and 2008, the judge and other assistant prosecuting attorneys made
court appearances on behalf of the City of Lapeer, and the Lapeer City Attorney paid the judge
for every case covered. The judge received $100 to $300 each year for his and his staff’s
appearances on behalf of the City of Lapeer. The judge deposited the City of Lapeer funds in his
personal bank accounts.
(2) After becoming a judge, the judge was charged with 5 counts of embezzlement by a
public official for his actions while county prosecutor. After mediation, he entered a no contest
plea with a deferred sentence, no restitution, and dismissal after a short probation. In a
subsequent motion, lawsuit, and statements to the Commission, the judge stated that the plea
had been to violating a non-criminal accounting statute, not a misdemeanor.
(3) The judge had been represented in the criminal case by Michael Sharkey. During
2016, the judge openly supported Sharkey’s campaign for county prosecutor against incumbent
Timothy Turkelson, who was a witness in the criminal case against the judge. The judge was
also involved in the judicial campaign of his longtime friend and law school classmate, David
Richardson. The judge failed to disqualify himself from more than 100 civil and criminal cases in
which Sharkey, Turkelson, or Richardson appeared and did not sufficiently disclose the
relationships on the record or obtain waivers.
(4) During the Commission proceedings, the judge testified falsely that he had not been
aware of the county’s policy about public contracts and that he gave the entire payment for a
Hartland money order to an employee of the county prosecutor’s office.
In the Matter of Knutsen, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct
June 10, 2021)
(http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/K/Knutsen.Kenneth.C.2021.06.10.DEC.pdf)
Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his office
and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future
(http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/K/Knutsen.Kenneth.C.2021.05.26.STIP.pdf), the New
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a non-lawyer judge.
In April 2021, the Commission had informed the judge that it was investigating a complaint
alleging that he conveyed the impression of bias against LGBTQ individuals and publicly posted
anti-LGBTQ content on his personal Facebook page. A review of the Facebook page revealed
9numerous other posts with partisan political content; expressions of bias in favor of law
enforcement and against criminal defendants; expressions of anti-Muslim bias; and prohibited
commentary on pending cases including the murder trial or former Minneapolis Police Officer
Derek Chauvin.
In the Matter of Fishkin, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct
June 10, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/F/Fishkin.Ellen.D.2021.06.10.DEC.pdf)
Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that she has vacated her office
and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future
(http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/F/Fishkin.Ellen.D.2021.05.13.STIP.pdf), the New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a former judge. In April,
the Commission informed the judge that it was investigating complaints alleging that she (1)
shoved or pushed a county assistant district attorney outside her courtroom when court was in
session and the courtroom was full of lawyers, litigants, and others on the evening of March 21,
2019; (2) accused a different county assistant district attorney of being "anti-Semitic" when
they would not offer a lenient plea to an associate of the judge's husband in a Vehicle and
Traffic Law matter; (3) turned court audio recording equipment on and off in the middle of
court proceedings; (4) presided over and took pleas in vehicle and traffic law matters without
an county assistant district attorney present; (5) locked the court while she traveled to prevent
the associate village court justice from presiding over matters in her absence; and (6) exhibited
inappropriate demeanor on the bench and in interactions with county assistant district
attorneys and other attorneys and litigants. After the judge’s testimony before the Commission
was adjourned due to a scheduling conflict, the Commission told the judge that it had been
informed of a new matter concerning an audit of the court's finances by the Office of the State
Comptroller.
In the Matter of Novak, Decision and order (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct
June 11, 2021) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/N/Novak.Jason.2021-06-11.DEC.pdf)
Accepting a stipulation based on the judge’s affirmation that he has vacated his office
and will not seek or accept judicial office in the future
(http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/N/Novak.Jason.2021.06.09.STIP.pdf), the New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded a proceeding against a former non-lawyer
judge. In May, in a formal complaint, the Commission had alleged that the judge, who took
office in January 2020, (1) had failed to attend the Office of Court Administration training
program for town and village court judges, had not passed the required examination, and had
not been certified as required by court rules yet continued to work as town justice, and (2) had
failed to cooperate in the Commission investigation.
In re Pool (North Carolina Supreme Court June 11, 2021)
(https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&pdf=40426)
10Adopting the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, which was based
on stipulations, the North Carolina Supreme Court publicly censured a former judge for a
pattern of inappropriate and sexual communications on Facebook with numerous women,
many of whom were involved in matters pending in his district; engaging in these
communications while on the bench in the courtroom; taking frequent breaks, frequently
continuing cases, and frequently recusing himself to have conversations or physical encounters
with the women he contacted on Facebook; making misrepresentations and misusing the
prestige of office to solicit assistance from law enforcement during an investigation of an
attempt to extort him by one of the women; and making material misrepresentations to the
Commission.
On his Facebook page, the judge identified himself as the Chief District Court Judge
located in Marion, North Carolina. His Facebook page was public, and anyone could see his
posts and comments. He had thousands of “friends” on Facebook and frequently posted his
own photos or comments or commented on posts of other Facebook users. He is married and
was chief judge.
From November 2018 to May 2019, the judge engaged in conversations that ranged
from inappropriate and flirtatious to sexually explicit with at least 35 women, many of whom
were litigants or witnesses in matters pending in his district and some of whom appeared or
worked in his court in their professional capacities. The judge often sought photographs of the
women or shared photographs of himself. The judge had ex parte discussions through
Facebook with some of the women regarding pending proceedings in his district. The judge and
some of the women also had telephone conversations, exchanged texts, and met, including for
sexual encounters with some women. The judge used the prestige of his office to assist some
of the women, including using his position as Chief Judge to direct a local attorney to assist a
litigant with whom the judge was having a sexual relationship.
After the judge exchanged inappropriate electronic communications and nude
photographs with a woman the opinion referred to as Ms. T., she attempted to extort him. The
judge misused the prestige of his judicial office to solicit assistance from local law enforcement
relating to the investigation of the attempted extortion. During the investigation, the judge
made material misrepresentations to the State Bureau of Investigation.
A comparison of his Facebook records and official reports of his time on the bench
shows that the judge engaged in extensive Facebook activity, including posts, comments, and
private messages, while he was reported as being in court. The judge routinely sought to
arrange personal meetings with women he contacted on Facebook during breaks and recesses
from court, before court convened, or immediately after court adjourned and took frequent
breaks and continuances to have conversations or physical encounters with them. Court
personnel assigned to the judge’s courtroom observed that the judge was frequently on his cell
phone while on the bench and would often “disappear” during recesses and lunch breaks, and
that the judge would often recuse in cases for “very tenuous” reasons and continue so many
cases that their jobs were more difficult. Some of the recusals were based on his sexual
misconduct. Although the judge did not engage in any Facebook or other conversations on his
cell phone while he was actively presiding in a case, he did use his cell phone extensively during
times on the bench that did not require his direct attention.
The judge made material misrepresentations to the Commission during its investigation.
11The judge had had a long and distinguished career with a good reputation as a judge,
made contributions to improvements to the administration of justice in his district, and had
been engaged in his community.
In early October 2020, the judge was diagnosed with early-stage Frontotemporal
Dementia, a disease that can manifest itself in a lack of control of sexual impulses. The judge
agreed that, based on the nature of his misconduct and that diagnosis, he will not seek a
commission as an emergency judge or a retired recall judge or attend future judicial
conferences or continuing judicial education programs.
The Court agreed with the Commission that censure was appropriate because the judge
is no longer a sitting judge, has agreed not to serve, has 18 years of distinguished service as a
judge, and has expressed remorse.
In re Younge, Opinion and order (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline June 2, 2021)
(https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210603/135802-
opinionandorder(june2,2021).pdf)
Based on its findings of misconduct
(https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210603/133816-file-10800.pdf), the
Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline suspended a judge for 6 months without pay for, in
dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings, (1) failing to file opinions in 24
appeals within the fast track time limits established by court rule; (2) incarcerating parents for
contempt without a legal basis in 3 cases; detaining parents in holding cells with the threat of
longer incarceration without a legal basis in 2 cases; threatening to incarcerate parents in the
absence of any evidence of contempt in 1 case; and improperly holding an attorney in civil
contempt; (3) in numerous cases, exhibiting an angry, arrogant, demeaning, rude, dismissive,
condescending, callous, and impatient demeanor; (4) repeatedly failing to accord the right to be
heard to parents and guardians, to the lawyers representing parents and guardians, and to DHS,
deciding issues without hearing testimony or holding hearings, refusing to admit medical
reports, repeatedly interrupting testimony, and rushing a non-placement review hearing; and
(5) during several dependency hearings, applying the standard for permanency hearings. The
Court also (1) ordered that the judge be on probation until the end of her current term in
January 2026; (2) prohibited the judge from serving in the family court division during her
probation; (3) ordered that the judge consult with a mentor; and (4) ordered the judge to write
and deliver an individual letter of apology to each person she wronged as described in its
findings.
The Court emphasized that the judge’s “repeated, clearly improper conduct was blatant
and inexcusable. No jurist should ever behave in such a manner.” The Court noted that the
judge explained during the sanction hearing that she had been “suffering from a serious
medical condition and undergoing great personal difficulties which contributed to her poor
attitude and actions.” The Court also noted that “character witnesses testified on her behalf in
a sincere and forthright manner.”
However, it also noted that witnesses “credibly testified to the havoc Judge Younge had
wreaked in their lives with her imperious actions in cases involving their children and
themselves.” The Court concluded that the case was “the most egregious one involving rude
12demeanor, failure to timely proceed and imperious action it has seen.” In mitigation, the Court
noted that the judge had “unequivocally acknowledged her improper conduct” and voiced
contrition and that no new incidents had been charged while the case was pending. The Court
stated that it was “important to note” that cases in which judges were removed “generally
involved a criminal conviction, or at least clearly criminal conduct on the part of the offending
jurist” or multiple violations and judges who had essentially stopped working. The Court
explained that the 6-month suspension was the most severe sanction it had ever imposed short
of removal.
1 lawyer-member of the Court wrote a dissenting opinion in which a second lawyer-
member joined, arguing that the judge should have been removed.
(1) By rule in Pennsylvania, if a party files a notice of appeal and statement of errors
from a family division judge’s decision regarding dependency or termination of parental rights,
the judge has 30 days to file “at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the
rulings or other errors complained of, which may, but need not refer to the transcript of the
proceedings.”
The Court found that the judge failed or neglected to perform that duty in 24 cases,
which prevented the superior court from timely resolving the appeals. The judge delegated the
task of drafting and filing the opinions to her law clerks and did not read the notices of appeal
or discuss the issues with her clerks. 6 months after assuming the bench in January 2016, the
judge had already fallen behind. Even as the backlog grew, the judge did not discuss the need
for an effective tracking system with her law clerks or monitor and supervise their compliance
with the deadlines. The superior court “was compelled to closely monitor the judge’s
increasing backlog of opinions and to repeatedly contact” the judge directly or through her law
clerk. On May 10, 2018, the family court administrative judge and supervisory judge assigned
the judge to “chambers weeks” because of the pattern of inordinate delay in filing her opinions,
but she still had a “voluminous backlog” on May 21. In July, the president judge re-assigned the
judge to the civil trial division.
The Court emphasized that the judge’s failure adversely impacted the lives of 24
children, noting that every day in a child’s disrupted family life can make a difference. The
Court noted that the judge failed to adopt the procedural strategies and practical advice for
expeditious resolution of cases described in the dependency bench book, such as placing a clear
statement of the reasons for her orders on the record, which would have allowed her to cite
the transcript to the superior court.
(2) The judge incarcerated parents for contempt without a legal basis in 3 dependency
cases; detained parents in holding cells with the threat of longer incarceration without a legal
basis in 2 dependency cases; threatened to incarcerate parents in a termination of parental
rights case in the absence of any evidence of contempt; and improperly held an attorney in civil
contempt.
For example, at a dependency hearing, the judge had ordered that 2 children remain in
foster care but did not restrict the parents’ phone contact. At a subsequent hearing, the judge
heard testimony that the father called the children as often as 10 times a day and met with
them following court proceedings. The father denied the allegations. The judge found that the
father had unauthorized contact with the children in violation of her order and incarcerated
13him for 7 days even though the father’s alleged conduct occurred outside of the courtroom and
was not specifically prohibited in the order.
In another example, without cause or a basis in law, the judge detained a mother and
father until their children were delivered to DHS. DHS had filed a petition to adjudicate a
newborn child, Y.C., dependent but did not allege any present danger. At the hearing, DHS
presented testimony about the mother and Y.C., both of whom tested positive for opiates at
the hospital, which notified DHS because the mother declined to permit the hospital to hold
Y.C. for 5 days of monitoring. The mother testified about the circumstances and her
compliance with the directives for follow-up care for Y.C.
At the hearing, the attorneys presented reports and arguments about Y.C.’s 4 siblings,
but DHS did not file any petition for orders for protective custody or adjudication for them.
However, the judge adjudicated all 5 children dependent and immediately removed them from
the family home. The judge asked the mother and her fiancé where the children were, and
they disclosed that 3 children were in school and 2 were with a babysitter. The judge ordered
the deputy sheriffs to handcuff the mother and her fiancé and to confine them until DHS
located the children and placed them in protective custody.
The Court found that the judge’s orders were the equivalent of a contempt ruling but
that she had not conducted a contempt hearing; the mother had had no notice that the judge
would remove all 5 children, no opportunity to prepare them for foster care, and no notice that
she would be detained. The Court found that the mother and her fiancé had been “forthright”
and “displayed an appropriate temperament and respectful demeanor during the hearing.”
In another example, the judge found Brian McLaughlin, an attorney, in contempt
without affording him due process and in the absence of an essential element for civil
contempt. McLaughlin, as counsel for a mother, had timely signed in for a 1:00 p.m.
termination of parental rights hearing. While waiting for the judge to call the case, McLaughlin
was summoned by another judge to a nearby courtroom for a delinquency case, which took
longer than expected. As a result, McLaughlin was not present in the judge’s courtroom when
she called the case, and the judge announced that she was holding McLaughlin in contempt.
The superior court vacated the order, ruling that the judge had not found that McLaughlin had
intentionally disobeyed her order and there was no evidence to support that essential element.
(3) The Court found that the judge “failed to display the vital qualities of patience and
courtesy when she repeatedly spoke harshly, and loudly to attorneys, social workers, and
others who appeared before her” in numerous cases; exhibited an angry, arrogant, demeaning,
rude, dismissive, condescending, callous, and impatient demeanor; and interrupted attorneys
and social workers.
For example, during a hearing, the judge reacted angrily to testimony that J.C. was beat
up for the second time by girls at the group home where she resided and became irate that
DHS Social Worker Ishmael Jiminez had not followed through with her prior order to relocate
J.C. DHS Attorney James Wise stated that Jiminez, who was not present at the hearing,
understood that the bullying had stopped. The judge harshly criticized and sarcastically
demeaned Jiminez in front of those present in the courtroom and exclaimed: “Let me tell you
something. Ishmael – and this is court order. Ishmael Jiminez can never darken the threshold
of [Courtroom] 5[A]. I would not believe his tongue if it were notarized. And honest to
goodness, I mean that.”
14When the current social worker stated that J.C. may have instigated some of the fights,
the judge angrily interrupted and stated:
Okay. So how about this, I’m not receiving that from DHS and you can save it for the
contempt hearing because it’s easy to kind of make her the victim when we knew you
did not exercise good social work practice in this case. So I’ll be damned if you’re going
to let that young lady and paint her out to be a victim as if she had not already been
abused enough by coming into a system that doesn’t protect her. We’re not doing that
at this hearing. I’m not that judge.
You know what, come back in ten days and I’m going to read you all the Riot Act and I
don’t care who feels some kind of way about it and everything like that but it’s not going
to happen in my courtroom ever, ever, ever, that a child should be at risk like that and
DHS is on the clock because you know what, that’s how you end up in the Daily News
and this Judge is not going to be on the front page for some nonsense like that. I’m not
doing it. I’m not doing it for the second time we’re having the same discussion. You’re
not going to make a court record and make this girl, oh she’s the one who instigated.
I’m not hearing that.
In another example, after learning that G.N. had spent nights at the foster home of his
girlfriend, J.Y., an 18-year-old female in extended foster care, the judge reacted angrily and
loudly and made intemperate statements “in a derisive and undignified manner.” She stated:
“Oh, we’re done here. Let me tell you something. Crazy, crazy, crazy. Call me crazy. I’m not
paying caregivers to allow hookup here.” When the foster father attempted to respond, the
judge continued to yell and abruptly discharged J.Y. from extended foster care, stating, “I don’t
care if she’s eighteen. Not on my watch. This is over. Over, over, over, over, over. That’s it.
Not doing it. I mean like really? I’m done. Done, done, done. This is over. Discharged.
Discharged.”
During a non-placement review hearing in another case, the judge interrupted and
rushed testimony about the dependency of 3 siblings after the hearing began at 5:37 p.m., over
6 hours after the scheduled time of 11:30 a.m. For example, she repeatedly interrupted the
child advocate’s testimony, rapidly firing questions: “Did she actively engage in drug and
alcohol as she’s been court ordered to do? Is she doing dual diagnosis as she’s been court
ordered to do? Are these children truant as she’s been court ordered to do? We’ve been
sitting here for two years doing the same thing with the same results. So what are you going to
do different because supervision isn’t working out on this case?” The Court stated that the
judge’s frustration did not excuse the “overt display of displeasure,” “intolerant attitude,”
“disdainful and sarcastic facial expressions,” and “rolling her eyes.”
(4) The Court found that the judge repeatedly failed to accord the right to be heard to
parents and guardians, to the lawyers representing parents and guardians, and to DHS, deciding
issues without hearing testimony or holding hearings, refusing to admit medical reports,
repeatedly interrupting testimony, and rushing a non-placement review hearing.
For example, while presiding over a hearing, the judge excused the mother from the
courtroom when she became ill but refused to grant the mother’s counsel’s repeated requests
15to check on the mother and to permit her to re-enter the courtroom. Contrary to the
Pennsylvania Adoption Act, the judge did not warn the mother that the hearing would proceed
despite her absence from the courtroom. The judge impatiently directed the mother’s counsel
to present his case in 7 minutes, refused to let him call the mother to testify about her mental
health, and denied his request to present argument. The superior court vacated the judge’s
termination of the mother’s parental rights and remanded the case for a new hearing, finding
that the judge denied the mother her due process rights.
(5) During several dependency hearings, the judge applied the standard for permanency
hearings. During a dependency hearing, a judge is supposed to determine whether the
conditions in a child’s home are contrary to the child’s health, safety, and welfare and whether
DHS made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from the
home. At a subsequent permanency hearing, a judge determines whether the placement
outside the home continues to be necessary and whether DHS made reasonable efforts to
finalize a placement plan.
In re Wilson (Texas Special Court of Review May 4, 2021)
(http://www.scjc.texas.gov/media/46832/wilsonscr-20-0004opinion.pdf)
Following a trial de novo, a Texas Special Court of Review affirmed the admonition of a
judge for approaching a legal assistant in his courtroom, touching her on the arm or shoulder,
and admonishing her for sitting in a section of the courtroom reserved for attorneys. The State
Commission on Judicial Conduct had also ordered the judge to complete 2 hours of instruction
about sexual harassment with a mentor; the Court modified that requirement to 2 hours of
instruction about decorum. The complaint had been filed by the presiding judge of the judge’s
court.
On January 29, 2019, Sarai Garza, then a legal assistant for Joseph Gagliardi, was seated
on the first bench in the judge’s courtroom. Garza testified that she had been a legal assistant
for 11 years and that she had always sat in the well of the courtroom with attorneys,
interpreters, and other legal assistants.
On that day, as the judge called the docket, he said, “Lady interpreter, are you ready?”
Garza did not realize that the judge had mistaken her for the interpreter until she noticed that
he was looking at her. Garza then introduced herself as Gagliardi’s legal assistant and said that
she was not the interpreter but that she would be “more than glad to help.” Garza said that
“everyone in the courtroom started laughing,” but the judge continued to call the docket.
Blasa Lopez, a contract interpreter for the county, then entered the courtroom.
According to Garza, the judge left the bench, walked toward Lopez, and grabbed Lopez’s arm.
Garza testified that she walked to the judge and Lopez to settle the confusion about who was
the interpreter and that the judge grabbed and “jiggl[ed]” her own right arm and told her in an
“angry” and “very upset” voice that she could not sit in the well. Garza said that the touching
was painful, that she never expected the judge to grab her arm in such a manner, and that she
was speechless. Garza left the courtroom crying.
Lopez also testified that the judge grabbed her arm as she stepped into the courtroom
and asked if she was an attorney. Lopez responded that she was the interpreter. Garza walked
up to them and said, “Lopez, you know the judge thought I was you.” Lopez testified that she
16saw the judge “grab” and “yank” on Garza’s arm while saying, “Didn’t I tell you that’s for
attorneys only?” According to Lopez, the judge’s tone of voice and the way he grabbed Garza’s
arm demonstrated that he was upset and angry. Lopez said that she was shocked at his tone of
voice and that Garza was also surprised and shocked.
After Garza then left the courtroom, another interpreter asked her if she was okay, and
she told him about the incident. Lopez joined them and witnessed that Garza was crying and
upset and that her arm was red. Lopez texted her supervisor to report the incident and was
later called into the presiding judge’s office to discuss it. Court deputies also asked Garza if she
was okay, telling her to calm down because she was crying. Garza testified that, after the
incident, she feared the judge, had never received an apology from him, and had nothing to
gain by testifying in the discipline matter.
According to Garza, the judge grabbed her arm so hard that it was bruised.
Approximately 2 days later, Garza went to a clinic for a medical examination. The records from
that visit state that she presented with “[r]ight biceps and triceps, mild swelling with
tenderness.”
Lopez testified that, during an unrelated incident in which she made a mistake in
translation, the judge had reprimanded her “in a very upsetting tone” that reminded Lopez of
“when [she] used to get abused and yelled at” and made her cry. She reported the incident to
her supervisor and did not want to return to the judge’s courtroom because he “was very
rude.” The next day, in private, the judge apologized to Lopez with her supervisor present, and
Lopez accepted the apology. The judge later got everyone’s attention in open court and again
apologized to Lopez, who said that she “did not appreciate the attention because it
embarrassed her and ‘opened a Pandora’s box for people to ask [her] . . . what happened.’”
Alan Perez testified that he was speaking to his client in the judge’s courtroom on
January 29 and found it odd when the judge walked off the bench. Perez saw the judge grab
Garza by the shoulder or arm. Perez did not see Garza’s reaction but saw her and the judge
exchange words that he did not hear. Perez saw Garza outside of the courtroom and asked her
what happened because “[s]he was very upset.” According to Perez, Garza said that the judge
“had come down and grabbed her.”
Sam Cammack, an attorney called by the judge as a witness, testified that the judge
“came off the bench” in a packed courtroom of “probably 300 people,” “touched [Garza] on the
elbow like [he was] trying to get somebody’s attention,” and told her that she could not be on
that side of the courtroom. Cammack testified that he walked with his client, Garza, and Lopez
to the elevator after the incident and that they all engaged in small talk and laughter. However,
Garza said that she was with Gagliardi’s client and denied laughing and joking with Cammack.
The judge called several witnesses to testify that he was patient, dignified, and
courteous, but none of these witnesses had been in the courtroom on January 29 and admitted
that they had no personal knowledge of the allegations.
During the hearing, the judge denied the allegations by Garza and Lopez under oath.
According to the judge, “[t]he story really beg[an]” when Garza visited him in chambers 7 to 10
days before the incident to introduce herself to him. At that meeting, the judge learned that
Garza was a legal assistant for an attorney who did not speak Spanish. The judge said that he
and Garza had a “very pleasant exchange” and became connected when Garza and the judge
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