Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy: The International Whaling Commission and Japanese Development Aid
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Issue Linkages
Andrew in International
R. Miller Environmental Policy
and Nives Dolšak
Issue Linkages in International
Environmental Policy: The International
Whaling Commission and Japanese
Development Aid
•
Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak*
1. Introduction
Regime scholars have identiªed issue linkages as a plausible strategy to build co-
alitions to support the establishment of regimes.1 By linking issues, actors can
distribute beneªts and costs over a larger range of actors, widen the political
support for a regime, and facilitate the emergence of cooperative solutions.2
This article examines the case of a donor that rewards developing countries
for supporting its agenda in an international regime. Speciªcally, we examine
whether Japan, the largest bilateral donor, employs aid to foster its national
agenda in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The IWC is not likely
to be identiªed as a major political or economic (or even environmental) re-
gime in the contemporary world. Nor is whaling of great economic importance
to the Japanese economy. Yet Japan has employed bilateral aid as a carrot to in-
duce developing countries to support its whaling agenda, even at the cost of in-
viting international criticism.
This article also contributes to the broader literature on donors’ motiva-
tions regarding the allocation of bilateral aid. Scholars suggest that while aid al-
location is affected by global philanthropy and the recipients’ need, in some
cases donors’ strategic interests also play an important part.3 Typically, scholars
identify this interest in two domains: economic and political. As an instrument
* Previous versions of the paper were presented at the annual meeting of the International
Studies Association and the colloquium series of the Center for the Study of Demography and
Environment, University of Washington. We thank John Frizell of Greenpeace, and Julie Creek
of the International Whaling Commission for providing IWC voting data. We thank Martha
Groom and Steve Collins for their help in identifying data sources; Barbara Connolly, Matthew
Potoski, Aseem Prakash, Stewart Tolnay, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments;
and Ken Conca for his editorial suggestions.
1. Haas 1980; and Keohane 1982.
2. Tollison and Willett 1979; and McGinnis 1986.
3. Alesina and Dollar 2000.
Global Environmental Politics 7:1, February 2007
© 2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
6970 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
to serve donors’ economic interests, aid should create a market for donors’ in-
dustries. To further their political interests, donors employ aid to strengthen
their inºuence over their former colonies, to support military alliance partners,
and to diffuse their preferred ideologies and institutions.4 Scholars have investi-
gated whether donors reward developing countries for their support in interna-
tional regimes. Voting in the UN, in particular, has attracted attention, with re-
search documenting that the inºuence of UN votes on bilateral aid allocations
varies across donors.5 These votes are least important for aid allocations by the
Scandinavian countries but important for France, the United States, and Japan.
While the importance of the UN in global politics is likely to induce donors to
employ aid to secure support for their agendas, it remains to be seen whether
donors would link their bilateral aid to developing countries’ voting in environ-
mental regimes that are of marginal economic or political value to those do-
nors. By examining the relationship between Japanese bilateral aid allocations
and developing countries’ votes in the IWC, this article contributes to the litera-
ture on issue linkages. In particular, it studies whether Japan has employed bi-
lateral aid to reward developing countries for their votes on an issue that (alleg-
edly) has cultural resonance in Japan, not political or economic salience.
The case we examine pertains to the moratorium on commercial whaling
adopted by the IWC in 1982. While some countries view the moratorium as a
way to protect whales, the largest sea-mammals, from brutal murder and possi-
bly extinction, others see the moratorium as an infringement upon their sover-
eign right to harvest a resource, a culturally embedded practice in which some
have engaged for several centuries. In addition to the cultural argument to con-
tinue whale hunting, the pro-harvest countries question whether whales are on
the verge of extinction. While moratorium equals conservation for one side, it
connotes cultural imperialism to the other.6
Whaling is an integral part of Japanese culture and traditions.7 Etymologi-
cal research suggests that Japanese culture does not view whales as mammals,
but as ªsh. Both terms used in the Japanese language for whales, kujira and
isana, indicate that this is a ªsh.8 The Japan Whaling Association notes the fol-
lowing:
“Brave Fish” pronounced “ISANA” in Japanese denotes “a whale.” The whale
to the Japanese in the ancient times was a kind of ªsh, and this ªsh was
thought to be “brave” and “great.” Because of this image of the whale, whale
meat was served at the happy and felicitous occasions such as weddings, and
other communal festivities.9
4. One could argue, however, that the latter is not merely in the interest of the donor, but also in
the interest of the global community, therefore providing global public good.
5. Alesina and Dollar 2000.
6. Danaher 2002; Caron 1995; Stoett 2005; and Hirata 2005.
7. Komatsu and Misaki 2004.
8. Hirata 2005; and Uchibayashi 2003.
9. Japan Whaling Association 2005.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 71
Therefore, Japanese view whales in a manner that is different from western cul-
tures. The Japanese Fisheries Agency notes that
Various ethnic groups and peoples have given special status to various forms
of life. Cows, which are generally considered food, are sacred animals in In-
dia. Deer are considered divine messengers on the Japanese island of
Kinkasan but are just a common menu item in French cuisine. It should be
called an act of “cultural imperialism” and should not be tolerated that cer-
tain ethnic groups or peoples press their sense of values towards animals of
their selection on other groups or peoples.10
Interestingly, while the Japanese government employs a cultural argu-
ment11 in favor of whale hunting, Japanese public opinion does not overwhelm-
ingly support whale meat consumption. The Gallup poll, using a representative,
random sample of 500 individuals, found that though the majority of respon-
dents do not oppose whaling per se, only one-third support the consumption of
whale meat.12 The 1999 MORI survey of a nationally representative sample of
1,185 adults in Japan indicated that 55 percent of respondents had no or neu-
tral opinion on commercial whaling. The survey also suggests that consumption
of whale meat in Japan is not signiªcant, with 60 percent of respondents indi-
cating that they have not eaten whale meat since childhood.13 While the two
surveys are not comparable (for reasons such as different wording of the ques-
tions), both indicate that the public is split on the issue of whale meat con-
sumption. Nevertheless, the Japanese government remains steadfast in its posi-
tion at the IWC favoring whale hunting.
To satisfy the vocal domestic cultural constituency, the Japanese govern-
ment is prepared to play rough in the international arena, especially with devel-
oping countries that receive bilateral aid. Greenpeace and other environmental
NGOs vociferously allege that Japan is seeking to buy the support of developing
countries in the IWC by dangling the carrot of development aid.14 Reports by
Transparency International15 and The Third Millennium Foundation16 also al-
lege that Japan is using bilateral development aid to inºuence the voting out-
comes in the IWC.
Japan denies these allegations. In an interview with BBC News Online, Joji
Morishita of the Japanese Fisheries Agency rejected allegations of vote buying.
He stated:
10. “Japan vows to battle anti-whaling ‘imperialism’,” Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 2005.
11. Japan is not alone in providing cultural justiªcations for whaling. Similar arguments for whale
hunting have been presented by the Norwegians, Native Americans in the United States, and
the First Nations in Canada.
12. Freeman 1994.
13. MORI 2000.
14. Greenpeace 2006; and “Caribbean Isles Get Money from Japan: Vote for Whaling,” The Seattle
Times, 11 December 1997.
15. Transparency International 2004.
16. The Third Millennium Foundation 2006.72 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
Japan gives development aid to more than 150 countries. The IWC has
just over 40 members. Among them are several—India and Argentina, for
example—which receive huge amounts of Japanese aid. But they never vote
with us. We’re speciªcally accused of trying to buy the votes of Caribbean
nations. Their most important industries are bananas and tourism. If they
used their votes as their economy dictates, they’d be voting with the US and
Europe, to keep the moratorium. Voting with us is certainly not something
decided by money.17
How should scholars arbitrate this debate? To study systematically
whether IWC votes have inºuenced Japan’s aid allocations, we examine data on
Japan’s bilateral aid disbursed to 26 developing countries in the IWC during
1999–2004. We employ regression analysis to examine factors impacting Ja-
pan’s bilateral aid to those countries. We ªnd strong evidence that allocation of
bilateral aid is linked to votes cast by the developing countries in the IWC, even
after controlling for alternative explanations for the disbursement of bilateral
aid.18
The article is organized into the following sections. Section two reviews
the history of the IWC and the most pressing issues it faces. Section three de-
scribes the selected issues voted on in the IWC during 1999–2003.19 Section
four outlines our analytical model. Section ªve presents our empirical model
and results. Section six identiªes issues for future research.
2. The International Whaling Regime
The IWC was established in 1946 under the aegis of the International Conven-
tion for Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). The purpose of this regime, as deªned
in the convention, was to protect whale stocks to allow for future sustainable
harvest:
Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for fu-
ture generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks;
Considering that the history of whaling has seen over-ªshing of one area af-
ter another and of one species of whale after another to such a degree that it
is essential to protect all species of whales from further over-ªshing;
Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible to natural increases if
whaling is properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale stocks
will permit increases in the number of whales which may be captured with-
out endangering these natural resources;
17. “End Whaling Ban for Whales’ Sake,” BBC News, 6 July, 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co
.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1424363.stm, accessed on April 20, 2006.
18. For an in-depth study of the linkages between the IWC votes of a small number of developing
countries and the Japanese development aid they receive, see the Third Millennium Foundation
report 2006.
19. Because we lag the IWC votes and other independent variables by one year, we examine Japan’s
bilateral aid disbursements for the 2000–2004 period.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 73
Recognizing that it is in the common interest to achieve the optimum level
of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing widespread economic
and nutritional distress;
Recognizing that in the course of achieving these objectives, whaling opera-
tions should be conªned to those species best able to sustain exploitation in
order to give an interval for recovery to certain species of whales now de-
pleted in numbers;
Desiring to establish a system of international regulation for the whale
ªsheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and development of
whale stocks on the basis of the principles embodied in the provisions of the
International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, signed in London
on 8th June, 1937, and the protocols to that Agreement signed in London
on 24th June, 1938, and 26th November, 1945; and
Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conser-
vation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of
the whaling industry.20
The objective of the regime is to preserve whale stocks, a global common-
pool resource that was being over-harvested.21 A multilateral regime was re-
quired; unilateral action via a whaling moratorium or country-level legislation
would not be effective because of the migratory nature of whales and their pres-
ence in the open ocean. To protect whale species from extinction, all countries
that harvest in the open ocean must restrain their harvesting. In this situation of
interdependence, the ªnal outcome depends on the actions of multiple actors.22
Rules regulating restrictions on the harvest were speciªed in the ICRW Schedule.
The schedule can be changed with a two-thirds majority vote. Article 5 of the
convention speciªes that countries lodging their objection to the schedule
within 90 days will not be bound by it.
In 1975, the schedule was modiªed to ensure that whale harvests could be
sustained in the long run. The catch quotas were, therefore, set below the (esti-
mated) maximum sustainable yield. While the concept of maximum sustain-
able yield has been used in ªsheries management since the early 1950s,23 it has
also been criticized for its sole focus on harvesting while not taking into account
other factors impacting stocks such as food availability and pollution.24 As a re-
sult of uncertainties in estimating the maximum sustainable yield and, as some
20. ICRW 1946, preamble.
21. A common-pool resource is deªned by two features: it is rival in consumption, that is, deplet-
able, and it is difªcult to exclude actors from using it (Ostrom 1990).
22. Keohane and Nye 2000.
23. Gordon 1954.
24. Wilson 2002. The IWC is only beginning to engage in research on the impact of pollution and
noise on whale stocks. This may be a reason why some anti-whaling countries are not comfort-
able with the available scientiªc information regarding the sustainable yield calculations. The
disagreement between pro-whaling and anti-whaling countries pertains to whether the ICRW’s
decisions are based on “scientiªc information” as well as the quality of the information.74 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
have argued, the conscious efforts of environmental NGOs and the United
States to recruit anti-whaling countries to join the ICRW25, the IWC voted in
1982 to set the commercial catch quotas at zero (that is, to impose a morato-
rium on commercial whaling). Paragraph 10(e) states that
Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10, catch limits for the
killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986
coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This
provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientiªc advice,
and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive
assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider
modiªcation of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits.26
Not surprisingly, a number of pro-whaling countries lodged objections to
Paragraph 10(e). In the early 1980s, Japan, Norway, Peru and the Soviet Union
lodged objections. Peru withdrew its objection in 1983. The government of Ja-
pan withdrew its objections with respect to commercial pelagic whaling, com-
mercial coastal whaling for minke and Bryde’s whales, and commercial coastal
sperm whaling. During the same period, Japan asked for permission to harvest
5,000 minke whales per year. The permission was not granted even though at
that time the IWC estimate of the minke whale population in the Southern
Hemisphere was 761,000.27 Governments of Norway and the Russian Federa-
tion have not withdrawn their objections. In 2002, when Iceland signed the
IWRC, it also stated objection to the same paragraph. This triggered reactions
from a number of anti-whaling countries in the IWC, urging Iceland to recon-
sider its views. Iceland, however, has not withdrawn its objection. Paragraph
10(e) is, therefore, not binding on these objecting governments.
On the other side of the spectrum are the pro-conservation governments,
namely, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, San Marino, Spain, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom and the United States. While these countries accept
small-scale, aboriginal whaling (by the native people of Alaska and Chukotka,
Greenland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) on the basis of their long history
of whaling, they oppose any harvest by Japanese coastal communities. However,
since 2003, the position in this group is slowly changing. We address this shift
in greater detail below.
Although commercial whaling has not been allowed since the 1985–1986
25. The convention allows any country, regardless of its whaling history and proximity to an ocean,
to join the IWC (ICRW 1946). The only membership requirement for countries is the payment
of an annual fee. The open membership structure was exploited by environmental NGOs in the
late 1970s and early 1980s to bring in like-minded countries to increase support for their anti-
whaling agenda (DeSombre 2001). In fact, environmental NGOs, most notably Greenpeace,
have paid the membership fees and the annual dues for some developing countries (Friedheim
2001). On the other hand, the United States has employed economic incentives to persuade a
number of countries to join the IWC (Frizell 2004).
26. IWC 2005a.
27. Caron 1995.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 75
season, IWC members have been whaling under three general exemptions: ab-
original whaling, scientiªc permits, and whaling under objection. First, to allow
for the subsistence of aboriginal populations, whaling is permitted for Den-
mark off of Greenland (ªn and minke whales), for the Russian Federation (gray
whales), for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (humpback whales), and for the
United States (bowhead and, at times, gray whales).28 Between 1985 and 2004,
about 5,651 whales were reported caught using aboriginal permits.29 Aboriginal
whaling is an important issue of contention for Japan. While some countries
and their communities are allowed to hunt whales (for example, in 2004–2005,
the aboriginal catches by Denmark amounted to over 170 minke whales), Japan
has been unable to secure a permit for its coastal communities to take 50 minke
whales per year. While this issue has been voted on repeatedly in the IWC, Japan
has failed to secure a simple majority in support of its position. Therefore, we
should expect Japan to work towards building the required support on this issue
in the IWC.
A second type of permissible whaling occurs under the so-called “scientiªc
whaling permit.” To take whales for scientiªc research, countries issue scientiªc
whaling permits and inform the IWC that they have done so (in other words,
prior permission from the IWC is not required). Since 1985, the ªrst year of the
moratorium on commercial whaling, 9,150 whales have been caught for
scientiªc research. Japan itself reported a catch of 8,368 whales, a practice criti-
cized by Greenpeace as commercial whaling in disguise.30 A collective catch of
782 whales is reported by Iceland, the Republic of Korea, and Norway. While
certain types of research on whales can be done without killing them, other
forms of research, such as studying the impact of toxins on whales or food in-
take, require that the whales be killed. Some IWC members and even the
Scientiªc Committee of the IWC question the scientiªc value of such research.
While scientiªc whaling has not been outlawed, the IWC passed resolutions in
2000, 2001, and 2005 urging Japan to withdraw its proposal for scientiªc whal-
ing.31
The third type of permissible whaling is undertaken “under objection” to
the schedule. Because IWC members that have lodged objections to the sched-
ule are not bound by it, they may engage in whaling without being found in vi-
olation of the ICRW. Between 1985, the year in which the moratorium on com-
mercial whaling entered into force, and 2005, whaling “under objection”
amounted to 17,879 whales.32 In the early years of the moratorium, the Soviet
Union, Japan, and Norway harvested whales under objection. However, since
1993, only Norway is reported to be catching whales under objection, with a to-
tal catch of 5,552. Norway’s strategy differs from that of Japan. By refusing to
28. IWC 2006.
29. IWC 2004b.
30. Greenpeace 2005.
31. IWC 2006b; Frizell 2004; and Creek 2006.
32. IWC 2005b.76 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
withdraw its objection to the schedule, Norway may continue to participate in
the IWC without being found in violation of the ICRW. Japan, on the other
hand, withdrew its objection under the pressure from the United States and is,
therefore, bound by the schedule.
While the United States took forceful actions favoring the conservationist
views in the early 1980s, these actions have lost their intensity over time. In
1980s, the United States used the threat of denying access to Japanese vessels to
ªsh in the US Exclusive Economic zone (EEZ). As a result of this action, Japan
withdrew its opposition to the commercial whaling moratorium in the IWC.
However, the United States subsequently closed its EEZ to all foreign ªshing. In
early 1990s, only about 1 percent of ªshing vessels in the US EEZ were of for-
eign origin.33 In 2000, when the United States was reconsidering its policy to al-
low foreign vessels to ªsh in US waters, the link between ªshing access and
whaling resurfaced. President Clinton directed that Japan not be granted access
to the EEZ in response to its plans to expand the whaling program. In the same
year, the US Department of Commerce certiªed Japan under the Pelly Amend-
ment for the third time.34 This amendment authorizes the President to apply
trade sanctions to countries that do not support species conservation efforts. Al-
though President Clinton considered using trade sanctions,35 he ultimately re-
frained from doing so.36
Though the US Congress also expressed dissatisfaction with the Japanese
whaling program, it did not seek the imposition of economic or political sanc-
tions. In 2000, a resolution was introduced in the House (Con. Res. H. 431) urg-
ing President Clinton not to support Japan’s bid for permanent membership to
the UN Security Council until Japan addressed US concerns about its scientiªc
whaling program. In 2001, another House concurrent resolution (Con. Res. H.
180) opposed scientiªc whaling undertaken by Japan. Both resolutions were re-
ferred to the House Committee on International Relations. In subsequent years,
however, the Congress has not introduced resolutions related to Japanese whal-
ing. For example, the most recent document prepared by the Congressional Re-
search Service addressing Japan-US relations does not even mention whaling.37
It seems that the US position on whaling has substantially changed from pro-
conservation to one that allows for sustainable harvest of non-endangered spe-
cies. William T. Hoggart, the new president of the IWC and who is from the
United States, gave a statement after the 2006 IWC meeting indicating that the
United States will try to ªnd a compromise between protecting endangered
whales and harvesting species that are no longer endangered.38
33. NRC 1994.
34. The US Department of Commerce previously certiªed Japan under the Pelly Amendment in
1988 and 1995 (Garrett 2000).
35. The White House 2002.
36. Danaher 2002.
37. Chanlett-Avery 2006.
38. “Whaling Observers Split Over US Intentions,” Los Angeles Times, 22 June 2006.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 77
While the actions of environmental NGOs and the US government re-
sulted in the moratorium on commercial whaling and allowed whale stocks
around the world to regenerate, they also created ill will among the pro-whaling
countries.39 The whaling countries believe that the IWC voting process has been
rigged: no matter how much scientiªc data they present showing that some
whales can be sustainably harvested, they will not be able to overturn the mora-
torium because of the anti-whaling states previously recruited into the regime.
Hideki Moronuki, a Japanese delegate to the IWC, said, “The whale population
has grown so large that it is even damaging the supply of ªsh. But the IWC re-
fuses to listen to anything Japan says.”40
To address the apparent dissatisfaction of the pro-whaling countries with
the inability of the IWC to revise the schedule, the IWC adopted a new policy in
the mid-1990s. The so-called Revised Management Procedure (RMP) provides
scientiªc information on the stocks of various whales and speciªc algorithms to
be used to determine the proper limits on their catch. Though such information
is now easily available, the political acceptability of this new policy is still low.
The contentious issues in RMP implementation are commercial whaling, its re-
lationship to whale sanctuaries, and the monitoring and enforcement of catch
limits. While the RMP would allow for a phased-in resumption of commercial
whaling, as recommended by an advisory group to the IWC Chair in 2003,41 the
majority of IWC members have not yet accepted this decision. It seems that it is
not the lack of available information but the absence of political consensus that
is slowing down the resumption of commercial whaling. Consequently, during
the 2006 IWC meeting, the Revised Management Scheme (RMS), a policy based
on RMP, did not get majority support. Therefore, whaling states may now feel
that their only remaining options are to recruit members or to ‘persuade’ some
exiting members to switch votes.
3. Voting in the IWC, 1999–2003
Voting in the IWC is rather polarized. The pro-conservation countries identiªed
above have consistently voted with the avowed objective of protecting whale
populations. While these countries accept small-scale, aboriginal whaling based
on their long history and tradition of whaling, they are very concerned about
commercial whaling. The implicit argument is that whaling by indigenous peo-
ple using traditional weapons is not likely to threaten the whale population, but
that commercial whaling that employs modern, sophisticated devices will do
so. It is important to note, however, that with the increased availability of infor-
mation on the stocks of some whale species, countries including the United
States are considering a revision of the zero-catch quotas.
39. DeSombre 2001.
40. “Japan Admits Using Aid to Build Pro-Whaling Vote,” The Guardian, 11 November 1999.
41. IWC 2005c.78 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
On the other side of the spectrum are the pro-whaling countries: Antigua
& Barbuda, Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Ga-
bon, Grenada, Guinea, Iceland, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Mali, Marshall Island,
Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Russia,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Is-
lands, Suriname, and Tuvalu. While the pro-whaling countries have signed and
adhere to the provisions of the IWRC, some of them have also lodged reserva-
tions to the 1982 ban on commercial whaling, or, in the language of the IWRC,
to paragraph 10(e). These countries argue that stocks of some species of whales
are large enough to allow commercial whaling. In support of their position,
they cite the report of the Scientiªc Committee and the 2003 report of the advi-
sory group to the IWC Chair. Therefore, whether to permit commercial whaling
remains a highly contested issue.
3.1 Annual Voting
During the studied period (1999–2004), from eight to twenty issues were voted
on at each annual IWC meeting. Some votes pertained to issues that surface
every year, such as creating whale sanctuaries, permitting Japanese coastal com-
munities to take 50 minke whales, changing the voting procedure to allow se-
cret balloting, allowing scientiªc research using lethal methods, and changing
IWC whale quotas. Further, in many years, countries have voted on procedural
issues about the agenda of the meeting, funding issues, and issues relating to
other international environmental regimes, such as the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species. To change the whaling catch quotas, or the
schedule in the parlance of the ICRW, a two-third majority is required. For any
other issue, a simple majority sufªces.
Table 1 includes selected issues from annual meetings during this period
and the voting outcomes. In 1999, the key issues for Japan included the intro-
duction of the secret ballot, the status of the Greenpeace at the annual meetings,
permits for coastal whaling in Japan, and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. All ini-
tiatives by Japan on these issues failed. Table 1 presents the number of countries
that voted with and against Japan. In 1999, Japanese proposals were supported
by only a small number of countries: Antigua & Barbuda, China, Norway,
Oman, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Sol-
omon Islands. While the pro-Japan bloc did not constitute a simple majority, it
was able to deny the anti-whaling countries the two-thirds majority required for
changing the schedule.
In 2000, some of the same issues reappeared on the agenda. Japan’s pro-
posal to allow the harvesting of 50 minke whales for its coastal communities
failed again. Similarly, Japan’s proposal to review the criteria for the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary failed. On the other hand, the anti-whaling bloc successfully
passed two resolutions opposing Japanese scientiªc whaling in the Antarctic
and the North Paciªc. Given that scientiªc whaling does not require an IWC ap-Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 79
Table 1
IWC Members’ Voting Related to Japanese Preferences, Selected Issues, 1999–2003
Issue Vote 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Secret ballot With Japan 10 — 13 18 18
Against Japan 22 — 21 24 26
Abstained 1 — 2 2 1
Did not vote 0 — 0 0 1
Coastal whaling (50 With Japan 11 11 14 19 —
minkes) Against Japan 15 18 20 21 —
Abstained 7 2 2 3 —
Did not vote 0 2 0 1 —
Abolishing/changing With Japan 8 11 12 16 16
schedule for the Southern Against Japan 22 20 23 25 26
Ocean Sanctuary Abstained 1 0 1 2 2
Did not vote 0 2 0 1 2
Resolution opposing Japa- With Japan — 9 13 — —
nese scientific whaling in Against Japan — 20 21 — —
the Antarctic Abstained — 3 1 — —
Did not vote — 1 0 — —
Resolution opposing Japa- With Japan — 11 13 — —
nese scientific whaling in Against Japan — 19 20 — —
the North Pacific Abstained — 2 2 — —
Did not vote — 1 0 — —
Establishing a new South With Japan — — 12 17 18
Atlantic Whaling Sanctuary Against Japan — — 20 23 24
Abstained — — 4 4 3
Did not vote — — 0 0 1
Establishing a new South With Japan — — 13 15 16
Pacific Whaling Sanctuary Against Japan — — 20 24 24
Abstained — — 3 5 4
Did not vote — — 0 0 2
Revised management With Japan — — — 15 —
scheme to allow commer- Against Japan — — — 25 —
cial whaling Abstained — — — 3 —
Did not vote — — — 1 —
Japanese proposal to With Japan — — — — 18
change the schedule to al- Against Japan — — — — 26
low a take of 150 minke Abstained — — — — 1
whales Did not vote — — — — 1
Notes: Number of countries voting does not include Japan.
— indicates that the issue was not voted on this year.
Source: Compiled from John Frizell, Greenpeace International and Julie Creek, IWC 2006.80 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
proval, these resolutions cannot ban Japanese scientiªc whaling. They are, how-
ever, a clear indication of these countries’ disapproval of Japanese scientiªc
whaling requiring lethal methods.
In 2001, all but two voting outcomes were against Japanese interests. The
pro-whaling bloc was able to prevent the establishment of two new whaling
sanctuaries, the South Atlantic Sanctuary and the South Paciªc Sanctuary. On
the other hand, the anti-whaling group passed two resolutions opposing Japa-
nese scientiªc whaling. Japan’s proposal for adopting the secret ballot for voting
failed. Similarly, the Japanese proposal to abolish the Southern Ocean Sanctu-
ary failed. The Japanese request for a take of 50 minke whales for its coastal
communities also failed. While the pro-whaling group did not muster a simple
majority, there was increased support for Japanese initiatives. For example, in
1991, nine developing countries and Norway voted with Japan in favor of the
secret ballot; the number increased to twelve plus Norway in 2001.
In 2002, most of Japan’s initiatives again failed to garner majority support,
but the pro-whaling bloc grew in size. However, the pro-whaling group again
successfully blocked the proposed South Atlantic and South Paciªc sanctuaries.
While the Japanese proposal to change the schedule for the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary failed again, the number of countries voting with Japan on this issue
doubled from 1999. Similarly, while Japan’s proposal for the secret ballot again
failed, the number of countries supporting the proposal increased from 10 in
1999 to 18 in 2002. Japan’s request to allow coastal hunting of 50 minke whales
also failed, but again the margin of its defeat diminished. Similarly, Japan’s pro-
posal to amend the Revised Management Scheme, the change that would bring
the IWC closer to setting commercial whaling quotas, also failed.
In 2003, the pro-whaling group was again successful in blocking the estab-
lishment of the two new sanctuaries. On the other hand, the anti-whaling group
passed a number of resolutions requiring a simple majority that went against
the wishes of Japan. These included the Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the
Conservation Agenda of the Commission, as well as voting down Japan’s pro-
posals to change the schedule to allow it to take 150 Bryde’s whales from the
Western Stock of the North Paciªc and 150 minke whales from the Okhotsk
Sea-West Paciªc Stock of the North Paciªc.
This review of voting outcomes during 1999–2003 reveals an important
trend. While in 1999 the vote tallies indicate that the anti-whaling group com-
manded a two-thirds majority, the more recent votes indicate that the balance of
power is shifting. Though Japan still fails to garner majority support, it has nar-
rowed its voting disadvantage and can deny the two-thirds majority to the anti-
whaling countries. This trend continues beyond our studied period.42 For exam-
ple, Japan’s 2005 proposal to institute secret balloting was supported by 26
other countries and opposed by 30 countries. In the 2006 meeting, the same
42. Votes in 2004–2006 are not part of the study because data on per capita aid for 2005 and be-
yond are not yet available.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 81
proposal received 29 votes (in addition to Japan) in favor and 33 opposed (one
country abstaining). Similarly, while Japan’s request for a quota for catching
minke whales from the Okhotsk Sea-West Paciªc Stock again failed, 29 other
countries supported the Japanese position while 31 countries opposed it (with
four countries abstaining). It is clear that over time the pro-whaling position is
getting increased support. While some have alleged that this is because Japan is
trading votes for aid, to the best of our knowledge, no research has systemati-
cally examined this allegation for all developing countries in the IWC while
controlling for alternative explanations for aid disbursements. The following
section outlines the analytical model employed in this paper to accomplish this
analytical task.
4. Factors Driving Japanese Bilateral Development Aid
To examine the claim of a voting-aid linkage, we develop an analytical model
examining factors driving Japan’s bilateral aid allocations. Bilateral aid alloca-
tions typically do not respond to the needs of the recipient countries43 but,
rather, to the strategic interests of donors. Maizels and Nissanke44 deªne strate-
gic interests as those that reºect donors’ political, security, or commercial inter-
ests. They contrast those interests with recipients’ needs as alternative drivers of
aid allocation. They ªnd that bilateral donors allocate development aid in re-
sponse to their strategic interests and do not necessarily disburse aid to coun-
tries with the highest need. A number of other empirical studies45 conªrm these
ªndings. On the other hand, multilateral donors disburse their aid to countries
with low per capita incomes, a ªnding also conªrmed by Trumbull and Wall,
and one that suggests the possibility of a less strategic rationale for aid alloca-
tion.46
Development aid is also tied to geography, usually reºecting historical or
political relations between donors and recipients47 or proximity.48 However,
while Japanese aid was concentrated in Asia in the 1970s, it has become more
widely dispersed in the 1980s and the 1990s. The 1973 oil crisis was a major
factor in this regard. The crisis made Japan aware of its vulnerability to interna-
tional political developments. Consequently, Japan began using foreign aid as a
tool for diplomacy and more aid began to ºow to the Middle East. The Japanese
government also began reducing or withholding aid to countries such as Af-
ghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia, and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, which were ruled by hostile or rogue regimes.49
43. This ªnding holds across countries, except for Scandinavian countries (Maizels and Nissanke
1984; Pratt 1989; and Lumsdaine 1993).
44. Maizels and Nissanke 1984.
45. Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003; and Akram 2003.
46. Trumbull and Wall 1994.
47. Wagner 2003.
48. Poirine 1999.
49. Takagi 1995.82 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
Japan is selective in its aid allocations. When giving aid, Japan applies the
“self-help” principle; that is, Japan helps only those countries that are willing to
help themselves. The recipient countries must request development aid and de-
sign their projects.50 Japan believes that the “self-help” principle encourages the
recipients to more effectively use the development assistance. In applying the
“self-help” principle, Japan has tended to stress the economic rather than the
social needs of the recipient, which explains why a large proportion of Japanese
aid has gone to the construction of economic infrastructure in higher-income
countries51–in some ways, for projects that encourage economic linkages with
Japan. Many developing countries lack the human resources required under the
“self-help” principle to design their own projects and programs. Thus, Japanese
development assistance does not necessarily go to the neediest countries, but to
countries that have the ability to absorb it.52
Alesina and Dollar53 report that Japan also began to reward countries that
towed its line at the United Nations. The aid-for-inºuence logic is a compelling
way to understand Japanese aid allocations in areas where Japan has economic
and political stakes. Our analysis, on the other hand, examines whether Japan
employed the same logic for a case of arguably low politics, the IWC.
To provide a sense of the overall picture, Table 2 provides data on the aver-
age annual per capita aid from Japan during the study period to countries voting
with Japan in the IWC and, in contrast, aid levels for countries voting differently
from Japan. Countries are listed in descending order of per capita aid.
Important policy decisions such as the provision of foreign aid are un-
likely to have mono-causal explanations. While we are most interested in exam-
ining how IWC votes affect Japanese bilateral aid allocations, drawing on the ex-
isting aid literature, we control for other drivers of bilateral aid as well. Our
dependent variable is Japan’s Ofªcial Development Assistance for the years
2000–2004. We normalize the development assistance by the size of population
of the recipient country, as the same amount of aid offered to India or to a small
country like Dominica brings very different level of beneªts to the recipient
country. We operationalize vote correspondence as the proportion of all votes in
a given year on which a country voted with Japan.54
Voting is not done by a secret ballot and therefore it is possible for Japan
and the environmental NGOs to monitor how various developing countries
have voted. Our key thesis is as follows:
50. Third Millennium Foundation 2006.
51. Takagi 1995.
52. Dollar and Levin 2004.
53. Alesina and Dollar 2000.
54. As a speciªcation check, we operationalized the correspondence of a developing country’ voting
with Japanese votes in two other ways. First, we examined only issues that recurred every year.
This included secret ballots, whale sanctuaries, scientiªc whaling, and a whaling quota for Japa-
nese coastal communities. All votes on these recurring issues were equally weighted. Second, we
weighted recurring issues by how often they appeared on the agenda. Whale sanctuaries were
weighted 6, secret ballots 5, coastal whaling 5, scientiªc whaling 2 and all other issues 1. Results
of the empirical analyses were consistent across these operationalizations.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 83
Table 2.
Average Annual Per Capita Foreign Aid from Japan to Developing-Country IWC mem-
bers, 2000–2004 (US Dollars, constant 2003 prices)
Countries Voting with Japan Countries Voting Differently from Japan
Dominica: 190 Peru: 4.9
Grenada: 41 Senegal: 3.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis: 39 Chile: 1.0
Palau: 37 Argentina: 0.4
Saint Lucia: 28 South Africa: 0.31
Mongolia: 26 Brazil: 0.6
Saint Vincent and the Grenadas: 18 India: 0.4
Nicaragua: 5.2
Guinea: 2.4
Panama: 2.2
China: 0.61
Source: OECD, Destination of Ofªcial Development Assistance and Ofªcial Aid—Disbursements
(Table 2a). Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/16/5037775.htm, accessed 20 December
2005; Frizell 2004; and Creek 2006.
Hypothesis: The higher the correspondence between the recipient country’s votes
and Japan’s votes in the IWC in any given year, the higher the bilateral aid the re-
cipient will receive in the following year.
Japan’s aid disbursements may be driven by factors other than the recipi-
ents’ IWC votes. To account for these alternative explanations, our model in-
cludes the following control variables:
1. Recipients’ need, operationalized as GDP per capita. If Japan provides aid
for humanitarian reasons, then poorer countries with lower levels of per
capita GDP should receive higher levels of Japanese bilateral aid.
2. Recipients’ level of democratization, operationalized in terms of the Heri-
tage Foundation’s Index of Political Rights. We inverted the values from
the original source so that higher value of the index corresponds to higher
level of political rights. If Japan wants to reward developing countries that
are democratic, then its bilateral aid allocations should be positively asso-
ciated with this variable.
3. Japan’s economic interest, operationalized in terms of trade between Ja-
pan and the recipient country. Japan would be interested in providing aid
to countries that provide markets for its exports or sources for its critical
imports.
4. Geography, operationalized as the distance of the recipient’s capital from
Tokyo. The logic is that donors tend to provide aid to countries that are in
physical proximity.84 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
For detailed description of the independent variables, see Appendix 1. All
independent variables are lagged by one year to avoid reverse causality.
5. Empirical Model and Results
5.1 Model
We analyze the relationship between developing countries’ IWC voting in years
1999–2003 and Japanese bilateral per capita disbursements in years 2000–2004
for 26 developing countries that are members of the IWC. Countries included in
the analysis are listed in Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for the variables are
reported in Appendix 3.
Our statistical analysis employs regression models that are typically rec-
ommended for time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis. The key advantage of
using data where countries’ attributes are observed over a number of years
(in our case, IWC votes cast by developing countries, along with the non-
geographic control variables) is that we can examine the relationship between
the independent variables and the dependent variable across both space and
time. This analytical advantage comes at a price because the widely understood
Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) must be modiªed to address potential
problems in TSCS datasets, namely panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous
correlation, and serial correlation.55 Therefore, our analysis employs three dif-
ferent speciªcations of regression models.
Serial correlation or auto correlation is rampant in panel data because the
same units (countries or country-pairs) are observed repeatedly over time. In
many cases, this leads to violation of the assumption that observations are inde-
pendent. Because errors may be correlated over time, the estimates are biased.
To give a concrete example, aid budgets are typically ‘sticky’ over time. The level
of aid Japan provides to country A in year t is likely to inºuence Japanese aid to
the same country in year t 1 as well. Clearly, there is often a path dependency
in aid budgets, such that aid allocations over time are not independent. Thus,
for both theoretical reasons and econometric reasons, we include in the base
model (Table 3) a lagged development variable to correct for serial correlation.
Further, the base model adjusts the estimation of the error terms to correct
for heteroscedasticity—that is, the case when errors terms are not constant and
are correlated with the independent variables. To correct for heteroscedasticity,
this model employs the widely popular Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE)
as proposed in the seminal work by Beck and Katz.56 For easier comparison of
this main model with models employing other statistical speciªcations, we also
report these results in Table 4, Column 1. Other Columns in Table 4 report re-
55. Beck and Katz, 1995; 1996.
56. Beck and Katz 1995.Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 85
Table 3
Regression of Aid per Capita, 1999–2003
Variable Coefficient Z
lagVote (0.000021*** ⫺2.76
(7.79e⫺06)
Control Variables
LagAidCap (0.2178866 ⫺0.55
(0.39352)
lagGdpcap ⫺1.62e⫺10 ⫺0.56
(2.89e⫺10)
distance (1.09e⫺09** ⫺2.12
(5.13e⫺10)
lagPolRight (2.90e⫺06*** ⫺3.86
(7.52e⫺07)
lagTrade ⫺1.74e⫺14* ⫺1.54
(1.13e⫺14)
Notes: Number in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.
N=110; * p=0.10, ** p=0.05, *** p=0.01 one-tail test.
R2=0.2615; Wald chi2(12) =31.66, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.
sults with two different speciªcations that take into account methodological is-
sues associated with using TSCS data.
In Table 4, Column 2, we include year dummies to control for year-spe-
ciªc effects not captured by the independent variables that might inºuence Jap-
anese bilateral aid disbursement in any given year. For example, while Japanese
aid to speciªc countries might increase in a given year because of natural disas-
ters in the recipient countries, it may revert to the usual levels thereafter. Inclu-
sion of year dummies or year-ªxed effects controls for such exogenous events
that may have inºuenced Japanese aid in a given year. Importantly, even when
we incorporate year-ªxed effects, our results hold.
In Table 4, Column 3, we report results of the model controlling for auto-
correlation of errors across time using AR1 correction,57 rather than by includ-
ing lagged dependent variable (Columns 1 and 258). Achen59 has critiqued the
use of a lagged dependent variable in TSCS data because it sucks away variance
from other covariates. Consequently, some scholars favor alternative ways to
control for serial correlation and the AR1 correction has been widely used in
57. Woodridge 2003.
58. Following Beck and Katz 1995; 1996.
59. Achen 2000.86 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
Table 4
Specification Checks for Regression of Aid per Capita, 1999–2004
PCSE, OLS
PCSE, OLS Lag. Dep. Variable, Year PCSE OLS
Variable Lag. Dep. Variable Fixed Effects1 AR1 Correction
lagVote 0.000021*** 0.000021*** 0.000022**
(7.79e⫺06) (8.36e⫺06) (0.0000102)
Controls
LagAidCap 0.2178866 0.26370
(0.39352) (0.40116)
lagGdpcap ⫺1.62e⫺10 ⫺1.70e⫺10 ⫺3.37e⫺10
2.89e⫺10) (3.11e⫺10) (1.12e⫺10)
distance 1.09e⫺09** 1.02e⫺09** 1.15e⫺09**
(5.13e⫺10) (5.14e⫺10) (4.54e⫺10)
lagPolRight 2.90e⫺06*** 2.65e-06*** 3.66e⫺06**
(7.52e⫺07) (8.57e⫺07) (1.52e⫺06)
lagTrade ⫺1.74e⫺14* ⫺2.31e⫺14** ⫺1.55e⫺14
(1.13e⫺14) (1.08e⫺14) (2.95e⫺14)
R2 0.2615 0.2965 0.0924
Wald ÷2 31.66 170.07 5.82
Prob > ÷2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes:
1Regression coefficients for year dummies are not reported.
Number in parentheses are Panel Corrected Standard Errors.
N=108; * p=0.10, ** p=0.05, *** p=0.01 one-tail test
this regard. Thus, instead of the lagged dependent variable, we use the AR1 cor-
rection. Our results hold with the AR1 correction as well.
5.2 Results
Our analysis suggests that Japanese per capita bilateral aid to developing coun-
tries in the IWC is positively associated with votes cast by these countries in the
IWC in the previous year, even after controlling for a variety of alternative expla-
nations for aid disbursement. Moreover, these results are robust across statistical
speciªcations (such as year-ªxed effects and AR1) and have substantive implica-
tions. A ten percent increase in the overlap between a developing country’s vot-
ing and Japanese voting in any given year is associated with a $2.1 increase in
per capita aid in the following year, holding other variables constant (Table 3,
column 1). To put this ªgure in perspective, $2.1 equals the average annual per
capita aid that Panama receives from Japan or about ªve times the average an-Andrew R. Miller and Nives Dolšak • 87
nual per capita aid that Argentina receives from Japan. Our results, therefore,
provide evidence supporting the allegation made by environmental NGOs and
addressed in the IWC Resolution 2001–1 regarding vote buying by Japan in the
IWC.
Important policy decisions such as the provision of foreign aid are un-
likely to have monocausal explanations. Multivariate regressions, through
which one can study the impact of several independent variables together on
the dependent variable are, therefore, analytically useful to isolate the inde-
pendent impact of the covariates of interest. While we are most interested in in-
vestigating the inºuence of a developing country’s IWC voting on Japanese aid
disbursements, we recognize that there are other drivers of foreign aid disburse-
ment. Hence, to isolate the independent impact of voting overlap on Japanese
aid, our model controls for the impact of alternative aid drivers. Our results sug-
gest that in addition to responding to voting overlaps, Japan disburses develop-
ment aid based on the recipient’s domestic institutions, distance, and trade. An
increase of political freedom in the recipient country by one unit on a scale
from 1 to 7 is associated with a $2.9 increase in annual per capita aid in the sub-
sequent year, holding other variables constant (Table 4, Column 1). For per-
spective, a one-unit increase in political freedom equals a difference between
domestic institutions of Mongolia (6) or Korea (6) and South Africa (7) or St.
Lucia (7). Our model also suggests a weak negative relationship between Japa-
nese per capita aid disbursements to a developing country and trade with this
country. For example, an increase in trade between Japan and the aid recipient
by $1 million is associated with a decrease of per capita aid by $0.0000174. (To
put this number in perspective, trade between Japan and Grenada amounted to
about $10 million in 2002). Finally, and surprisingly, our results indicate that
distance has a positive relationship with aid allocated by Japan to the 26 devel-
oping-country members of the IWC.
Our results are robust across different statistical models and our key inde-
pendent variable, the correspondence of the recipient country’s votes with Ja-
pan’s votes on IWC, retains statistical and substantive signiªcance across spe-
ciªcations. Results hold when we included year dummies60 to control for any
exogenous shocks that could impact aid allocations across all countries in a par-
ticular year (Table 4, Column 2). Similarly, our results hold even when we re-
place lagged dependent variable by AR1 correction (Table 4, Column 3).
6. Conclusions
This article demonstrates that politicians may respond to cultural issues that
may not possess compelling economic or political foundations. Hence, to un-
derstand why policy-makers adopt speciªc positions in international regimes,
scholars must look beyond a narrowly constructed understanding of material
60. Wooldridge 2003.88 • Issue Linkages in International Environmental Policy
interests. Whaling does not have economic importance for Japan. Currently,
only a limited number of ªrms are involved in coastal whaling and only one
has been permitted to hunt whales for scientiªc research. The industry does not
employ a large number of people. The revenue it generates is barely as much as
Japanese fees to the IWC.61 Yet Japanese politicians, irrespective of party afªlia-
tions, are willing to take a stand that hurts their country’s reputation interna-
tionally and provides fodder to Japan’s critics. This article provides empirical ev-
idence of the impact of domestic cultural issues on foreign policy, speciªcally
foreign environmental policy. It highlights the needs to carefully understand
how non-material factors might shape domestic politics and create incentives
for politicians to favor internationally unpopular policies.
Future research could examine the complexities encountered when multi-
ple, powerful actors with divergent interests seek to link issues and sway the pol-
icy positions of weaker actors. The IWC provides an excellent case in this regard.
While our analysis focused only on the use of development assistance by Japan
to sway votes, similar logic could be extended to the use of economic threats by
the United States and to the use of development aid by other countries (such as
Norway) that are interested in the resumption of commercial whaling. A pro-
ductive direction for future research would be to examine how donors identify
countries to target, and with what consequences. Donors might seek to inºu-
ence countries in their geographic proximity and/or those that are vulnerable to
trade sanctions. Work by Steinberg62 and Davis63 offer promising hypotheses
about the spatial sphere in which donors may exert inºuence. Caribbean coun-
tries that receive aid from both the United States and Japan could constitute an
interesting case for the study of diverging donor preferences regarding this
global environmental regime.
This paper also raised important concerns regarding democratic decision-
making in international regimes. As the paper illustrates, the debate is between
the relative merits of ensuring transparency in voting, on the one hand, and the
freedom of countries to vote without any pressure, on the other. Members of the
IWC as well as a number of NGOs allege that Japan is tying foreign aid to IWC
votes to make the IWC more Japan-friendly, allegations that Japan denies. Since
1999 Japan has unsuccessfully sought to introduce the secret ballot. The debate
on the pros and cons of secret balloting has resonated in other international re-
gimes such as the WTO and CITES.64 The question, then, is how a secret ballot
might impact voting. While secret balloting is typically employed when citizens
choose their representatives, open balloting is often employed in the voting
procedures of elected bodies such as legislatures. Arguably, with a secret ballot,
Japan would not be able to use voting information to allocate its aid, assuming
it currently does so. The secret ballot would, however, also disadvantage the
61. Stoett 2005.
62. Steinberg 1997.
63. Davis 2004.
64. Duffy 2002.You can also read
