Hungary external relations briefing: Hungary' Eastern European Relations - China-CEE Institute

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Hungary external relations briefing: Hungary' Eastern European Relations - China-CEE Institute
ISSN: 2560-1601

                                                                                  Vol. 39, No. 4 (HU)

                                                                                             April 2021

                              Hungary external relations briefing:
                            Hungary’ Eastern European Relations
                                           Csaba Moldicz

                                                           1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

                                                           +36 1 5858 690
Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft.
                                                           office@china-cee.eu
Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin
Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping                      china-cee.eu

2017/01
Hungary’ Eastern European Relations

      Summary

      In recent years, Hungarian and Ukrainian relations have been severely strained. The
debate has focused on the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority; in particular, their rights to
use the Hungarian language in education, public administration, the media, and culture have
been constantly violated. The Hungarian government repeatedly called on the Ukrainian
government to correct these policy failures and to adhere to internationally accepted standards.
In addition, according to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Affairs,1 leaders of the Hungarian
minority in Ukraine and Ukrainian citizens with dual citizenship (with Hungarian passports)
have been threatened. Despite this imminent need to act for the Hungarian side, there is much
more at stake in this debate, as Hungary seems to realize the geopolitical implications of
Ukraine's membership in the NATO. And so, the entire Eastern European region is in turmoil
right now, which also affects Hungary's relations with Russia.

      Introduction

      The broader theme of this briefing is the recent political uncertainties in neighboring
Eastern European countries, but the analysis focuses explicitly on Ukraine and the debate
between Hungary and Ukraine that began just a few years ago when Ukraine changed its laws
regarding language use. The most recent element of this saga was the amendment to the law in
early 2021, which mandated the use of Ukrainian even in the service industry. In 2017,
Ukrainian lawmakers passed a law ordering middle schools that teach in minority languages to
switch to Ukrainian. The basic tension is not between Hungary and Ukraine, but between Russia
and Ukraine. This amended law seeks to cement the Ukrainian language as the main language
of the country, and thus the identity of Ukrainians, which is linguistically more complex than
in other European countries. Since Hungarians in Transcarpathia are also affected by the new
regulations, Hungarian foreign diplomacy has used all available means to change this situation

1
  Hungarian Government (2021). Szijjártó: Magyarország elvárja, hogy ukrajna tiszteletben tartsa a magyar
közösség jogait. Retrieved from: https://kormany.hu/hirek/szijjarto-magyarorszag-elvarja-hogy-ukrajna-
tiszteletben-tartsa-a-magyar-kozosseg-jogait

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created by Ukrainian identity politics. This briefing focuses on these efforts of Hungarian
foreign policy.

      Historical background – not “one inch to the east”

      As we saw in the introduction, the story is much broader than the rights of the Hungarian
minority in Ukraine, therefore it is worth looking at the international context and examining the
Hungarian strand of the story embedded into the broader context. This briefing does not intend
to delve into history, however, the historical background of the political debate on Ukraine's
membership NATO needs to be mentioned here. The debate revolves around the alleged
promise of the United States not to extend NATO to the former Warsaw Pact countries after
1990. On the Russian side, the NATO expansion is often cited as a broken promise, while the
Americans vehemently argue that this promise was never written down in a binding document,
even though the words - not "one inch to the east" - were actually said by the US Secretary
Backer during the negotiations with the Russian leader, Gorbachev.2 Which side is right in this
debate is basically irrelevant, but the geopolitical consequences of NATO enlargement are.
Hungary alone, of course, is not strong enough to prevent Ukraine's accession if the US were
to commit to NATO enlargement, but it can raise its voice to alert the other member states of
the alliance that Ukraine is not abiding by the ground rules of the alliance. Hungarian foreign
diplomacy seems to be aware of the uncertainty that Ukraine's membership in the NATO would
cause in the Central and Eastern European region. This political dilemma arises from the right
of nations to freely choose their preferred integration or alliance and from Russia's need to
create a Moscow-friendly neighborhood. This dilemma will not be resolved until relations
between Russia and the West are settled. The language debate is only one part of this larger
dispute. János Seremet, an analyst at IFAT, calls the pillar of Ukrainian politics "the holy trinity
of army, religion, and language." Using this concept of “trinity”, one can grasp that the debate
is about more than language use.

      Hungary’s dispute with Ukraine

      The last time Hungary warned about the violation of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine
was on April 19, 2021, when EU foreign ministers held an informal online meeting. The

2
  Jim Goldgeier (2019). Promises made, promises broken? What Yeltsin was told about NATO in 1993 and why
it matters. Retrieved from: https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsi

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Ukrainian foreign minister took part in the online meeting, where he was urged by Hungary to
respect the rights of ethnic Hungarians living in Transcarpathia. At the same time, it was also
underlined by the Hungarian Foreign Minister that the Hungarian minority does not threaten
the territorial integrity of Ukraine and it misrepresents the situation if the current situation is
presented this way by Ukraine.

        The Hungarian side stressed several Hungarian steps showing Hungary's good intentions
and called for the protection of minority rights in Ukraine:

    -    Medical treatment for Ukrainian soldiers,
    -    gas supplies for Ukraine,
    -    $10 million in economic aid to the Ukrainian hospital in the fight against the Covid-19
         virus.

        In late 2020, tensions between Hungary and Ukraine increased significantly when a series
of raids were carried out by Ukrainian authorities on the premises of ethnic Hungarian
institutions. The Hungarian Foreign Minister said in December “Ukraine, a country not a
member of NATO, has launched an attack against a minority group originating from a NATO
member country.”3

        Balancing

        As we have already indicated, Hungary pursued a consistent foreign policy based on
pragmatism and the pursuit of its own interests. For this reason, Hungary maintained relatively
good relations with Russia even after the annexation of Crimean Peninsula and the imposition
of economic sanctions by the EU against Russia. Because of this balanced position, Hungary
has often been criticized by the West and accused of having special relations with Russia and
dividing the EU in this way. Just think of the last incident when Hungary announced its
intention to join Eurasian Development Bank when the country was accused of acting to protect
Russia's interests. The Hungarian foreign minister justified the move as follows: "This (
joininng the EDB) aims to open up new financing sources for Hungarian firms to help them be
even more successful in Eurasian markets." It's a move that can be explained more by economic
factors than anything else. But Hungary's willingness to buy Russia's Covid-19 vaccine was

3
  Hungary Today (2021). Gov’t Protests Ukrainian Authorities’ Raid of Ethnic Hungarian Institutions. Retrieved
from: https://hungarytoday.hu/ukraine-hungarians-raid-intimidation-transcarpathia-hungary-relations/

                                                       3
also under fire for several months until the vaccine's efficiency became clear, and most
importantly, other Western European countries (Austria, Germany) have recently shown
interest in buying Sputnik V.

      That Hungary is not Trojan Horse in the EU is shown by many moves of Hungarian
diplomacy. To name just a few from the last few weeks:

      Hungarian diplomacy expressed solidarity with Poland when the leaders of Polish
National Community were arrested in Belarus.

      Hungarian diplomacy expressed solidarity with Czech Republic in its dispute with Russia
when the two countries expelled each other's diplomats.

      The Hungarian Foreign Minister added: "Hungary knows exactly how it feels when the
rights of a national community are violated, because Hungarians in Transcarpathia face the
same approach." 4 By this statement he was referring to the arrest of Polish minority leaders in
Belarus.

      Similarly, we can also see that Hungary is not only ready to cooperate within the
framework of European integration, but also to take the initiative. The Hungarian Prime
Minister had a meeting last Friday with Ursula von der Leyden, the European Commission
President. They discussed several issues, such as Hungarian plans regarding European Union's
recovery and Resilience Facility or the rule of law procedure. During these talks, the Hungarian
Prime Minister suggested that the EU should have a strategy regarding Russia (also China). But
he added that this strategy must also take into account the aspects of economic cooperation with
Russia. In other words, Hungary is committed to sensible EU cooperation with Russia, and
Hungary is not going its own way for its own sake, but because of its close economic interests.

      Summary

      Hungary "dances" between European Union and Russia, constantly shifting between the
two depending on power shifts and Hungary's narrow economic interests. Relations with
Ukraine are shaped more by Hungary's political than economic interests, as the country fights
vehemently for the rights of ethnic Hungarians living in Transcarpathia. Already two years ago,
Hungary's foreign minister clearly stated that Hungary would block Ukraine's membership in

4
 Krisztina Than (2021). Hungary plans to join Eurasian Development Bank in eastward diplomatic push.
Retrieved from: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hungary-plans-to-join-eurasian-development-bank-in-
eastward-diplomatic-push-2021-04-06

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NATO until rights for the Hungarian minority were restored. Since then, the Hungarian position
on this issue has not changed, only the situation in Transcarpathia has worsened. At the same
time, we must add that the pressure to make Ukraine a member of NATO has increased in recent
months. Although there is no commitment from the American side for Ukraine's membership,
the attitude may change soon. In that case, the pressure on Hungary to change its position
towards Ukraine would increase.

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