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H-Diplo

H-Diplo Article Review 1099- "A Self-Inflicted Wound?"
Discussion published by George Fujii on Friday, April 1, 2022

H-Diplo ARTICLE REVIEW 1099
1 April 2022

Galen Jackson and Mark Trachtenberg. “A Self-Inﬂicted Wound? Henry Kissinger and the
Ending of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 32:3 (2021): 554-578.

https://hdiplo.org/to/AR1099
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Thomas Maddux | Production Editor: George Fujii

Review by William B. Quandt, University of Virginia, Emeritus

The authors of “Self-Inflicted Wound? Henry Kissinger and the Ending of the October 1973 Arab-
Israeli War,” Galen Jackson and Marc Trachtenberg, are political scientists with strong theoretical
and research credentials. They have dug deeply into the ample available sources to substantiate an
argument that has been put forward previously in a softer form, but in this article they pull few
punches: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, by encouraging Israeli leaders in the last days of the
October 1973 war to pursue their military offensive against Egyptian forces in violation of the
ceasefire that he had just brokered in Moscow, violated the rules of détente. This provoked the Soviet
Union into threatening unilateral military intervention to stop the Israeli advances, thus triggering
the stage-three nuclear alert that convinced many Americans that the era of détente had come to an
end. It is worth noting that in the title of their article they do include a question mark, implying that
there may be more to the story than this relatively direct cause-and-effect summary suggests. Having
reviewed much of the same evidence as they have and having been in close proximity to Kissinger
during this crisis as the Middle East specialist on his National Security Council staff, I can confirm
the gist of their argument about Kissinger’s actions in the last days of the war; but I also want to add
some other points to the discussion that may provide useful context.

First, let me summarize more fully the argument. President Richard Nixon and Kissinger had sought
to develop a relationship with the Soviet Union that would ensure that competition would not escalate
into direct conflict, as it had nearly done in the October Missile Crisis in 1962. The key to this policy
of détente was both structural – the US opening to China changed the global balance of power – and
a matter of policy, namely making a serious effort to open diplomatic channels to the leaders of the
Soviet Union to try to contain or otherwise manage regional conflicts, as well as bilateral issues such
as the nuclear arms race.

The policy of détente was initially welcomed by most Americans and Nixon’s reelection in 1972 was
partly due to the perception that the ending of the Vietnam war, the opening to China, and détente
with the Soviet Union might make for a safer world. The first big test of this assumption was the
October 1973 war. According to Jackson and Trachtenberg, this crisis presented Kissinger with a

Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Article Review 1099- "A Self-Inflicted Wound?". H-Diplo. 04-01-2022.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9999158/h-diplo-article-review-1099-self-inflicted-wound
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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chance to prove the merits of détente, but his own actions undermined that opportunity and helped to
erode support for the concept across the political spectrum, thus resulting in later years in a revival
of Cold-War rivalry.

[1]
Kissinger, who has written at length about his foreign policy and the policy of détente and the
October 1973 crisis, has at various times acknowledged some responsibility for encouraging the
Israeli actions that produced the crisis at the end of the war; but he claims that he did not intend to
encourage the Israelis, and that they may have overinterpreted some of his comments. Until recently,
there was little new archival evidence that could really challenge this claim, but in the last few years
the Israelis have been declassifying some of the most sensitive documents from the period of the
October war, including the highly restricted cables sent by the Israeli ambassador in Washington,
Simcha Dinitz, to the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and her security cabinet after his many talks
with Kissinger. These are now available on-line in Hebrew, and the authors have had several of these
cables translated into English and have made them publicly available. I will review some of what
these new sources reveal later. Suffice it to say, they do show a less flattering side of Kissinger’s talks
with the Israelis than has previously been seen in the American declassified documents, to say
nothing of Kissinger’s memoir.

The authors are intent on showing that Kissinger regularly gave accounts of his actions in public that
were not consistent with what the documentary evidence later showed. They examine four incidents
where Kissinger’s public claims are shown by subsequent documentation to be false or misleading.
One case involves Vietnam; a second the question of whether the US warned Israel not to launch
preemptive strikes prior to the October 1973 war; the third is Kissinger’s misleading account of a
Soviet initiative in 1971 to advance ideas for a US-Soviet effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict;
and the fourth is Kissinger’s version of his talks with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s envoy in early
1973, which he portrays in rather disparaging terms in his memoirs, but which seem, from the
lengthy transcripts now available, to have held considerable promise.

The article is largely on the mark in calling attention to these discrepancies, and I think it is fairly
obvious to those who have followed Kissinger’s career that he has worked hard to burnish his
reputation as a diplomatic wizard, even suggesting that wizardry might sometimes involve saying
different things to different parties. A recent book by Martin Indyk, Master of the Game, notes
instances of Kissinger’s duplicity and manipulativeness but seems to see these as essential parts of
[2]
his success as a diplomat. My own take on this is a bit different.

Several points need to be made to understand Kissinger in 1973 as he faced a looming major Arab-
Israeli crisis. First, when Nixon named him as his National Security Adviser in 1969 he specifically
excluded the Middle East from Kissinger’s domain of influence. William Rogers, the Secretary of
State, was to lead the policy process on Arab-Israeli affairs. Quite simply, Nixon was not sure that he
could count on Kissinger to be fair-minded because of his Jewish background. Kissinger greatly
resented this, and went to considerable lengths to sabotage Rogers’s efforts, one of which was right
out of the détente playbook, namely the initiative of 1969, which was meant to be a joint US-Soviet
plan to provide principles for an Egyptian-Israeli and a Jordanian-Israeli peace settlement.

Kissinger made his way into dealing with Middle East issues during the Jordan crisis of 1970. His

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approach was to see this very much in Cold-War terms. A Soviet client had threatened an American
client and the US had to find a way to ensure that King Hussein survived, which he did. Nixon was
pleased with the outcome of this crisis and began to pay more attention to Kissinger’s complaints
about the State Department. Eventually, Sadat concluded that he was wasting his time dealing with
Rogers. He understood that for Kissinger it was Egypt’s relationship with the Soviet Union that
prevented a significant improvement of relations, so in mid-1972 Sadat took the remarkable decision
to expel most Soviet advisers from Egypt and to simultaneously open a back-channel to Nixon and
Kissinger in which he signaled that he was ready to work with them on achieving peace with Israel.

At this point Kissinger had never met Sadat and seemed to read his initiative as a sign of weakness.
In any event, it arrived in an election year, and Kissinger knew that Nixon was not prepared to move
on Middle East issues until the election was over. In addition, both he and Nixon had met with Meir
in December 1971 and had reached some kind of understanding that there would be no US initiatives
[3]
for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement until after US elections in 1972 and Israeli elections in 1973.
The quid pro quo requested from the Israelis was that they agree not to launch any preemptive
strikes against the Egyptians during this period of ‘standstill’ diplomacy. Kissinger was playing for
time and was still trying to figure out what to make of Sadat. In addition, he largely shared the view
that Israel had such a military advantage over the Arabs, thanks in considerable part to generous US
aid, that Arab threats of war could be dismissed as mere bluster. As a realist, Kissinger did not think
any leader would launch a war that he was certain to lose. On one occasion when he pressed Meir to
consider diplomacy because the alternative might be an Arab decision for war, her reply was in
essence that a war would be a problem for the Arab states, not for her. Israel would defeat them even
[4]
more decisively than in 1967.

Shortly after Nixon’s reelection, Sadat reached out to the president with the suggestion of a meeting
between Kissinger and Sadat’s security adviser, Hafiz Ismail. The meeting took place just outside
New York in February 1973, and, as Jackson and Trachtenberg note, the content of the meeting was
quite substantive and somewhat encouraging. Kissinger was still not convinced that there was any
need to rush on the diplomacy, but he did say to both the Israelis and Egyptians that he would be
prepared to get involved by the end of the year, i.e., after the Israeli elections. A second meeting
[5]
between Kissinger and Ismail took place in May but produced no real breakthrough. Kissinger had
also deflected Ismail’s suggestion that he come to Cairo to talk directly to Sadat.

It is worth shifting attention for a moment to Nixon. Compared to Kissinger, he seemed to have a
view of the policy of détente as leading to coordinated US-Soviet policies to resolve regional conflicts.
He saw the Middle East as a dangerously volatile region, often comparing it to the pre-World War I
Balkans. He was also much more willing to consider putting pressure on Israel than was Kissinger.
Because of the Watergate scandal, Nixon’s political capital was being drained away month by month
in 1973, culminating in major upheavals in his immediate staff during the October war. This placed
Kissinger in an increasingly powerful position as the year unfolded, culminating in September with
his becoming Secretary of State, while still retaining his position as National Security Adviser. He
still had to clear major issues with Nixon, but it is fair to say that during most of 1973, and especially
during the October crisis, Kissinger was making policy without much concern that Nixon would
override his recommendations.

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[6]
When war broke out on October 6, 1973, Kissinger was caught by surprise. Some have speculated
that he had concluded that war might facilitate his ability to produce an American-led diplomatic
initiative in its aftermath, and Kissinger has gone so far as to suggest that the war may have been
necessary to bring about the significant changes that eventually led to productive negotiated
[7]
agreements. But at the time that the war began, he was angry that Sadat had not given him more
time and he expected the Egyptians and Syrians to be decisively defeated by Israel within a matter of
days.

Kissinger’s first calls when the war seemed imminent were to the Soviet Ambassador and the senior
Israeli diplomat, Mordechai Shalev, in Washington. The call to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
was consistent with détente principles. Both major powers should urge restraint; they should try for
an early ceasefire; and they should work to ensure that this local conflict did not lead to superpower
confrontation. Détente was at stake. Almost immediately, Kissinger publicly called for a ceasefire
with a return to the status quo ante. He knew that the Arabs, who had made territorial gains, would
object, but he expected that within a few days they would change their minds as they were pushed
back.

Kissinger’s initial view was that Sadat had made a disastrous choice in going to war. But almost
immediately he received a backchannel message from Sadat setting out his rationale. He explained
the frustration that had led him to conclude that he had no choice but to upset the status quo by
going to war. Sadat said he had no illusions that he could defeat Israel. His goal was to create new
conditions for a US-led peace initiative after he had shown Egypt’s ability to break the stalemate and
the Israelis had learned that the status quo ante was no longer a guarantee of their security.
Throughout the war, a dialogue of sorts went on between Kissinger and Sadat, and this was the
beginning of Kissinger’s rethinking of his previous pejorative view of the Egyptian leader. But it was
only when he finally met Sadat about two weeks after the end of the October war that he came to the
full realization that he had misread Sadat’s intentions – and had underestimated Egypt’s military
capabilities.

After the first two days of the war, Kissinger’s views gradually adapted to an unfolding reality that
kept catching him by surprise. First, the Israelis came to him and admitted that their casualties were
much higher than expected and that they needed an urgent resupply of arms. Secondly, as the
Israelis began to turn the tide on the Syrian front, the Soviets began to mount a substantial airlift on
October 10 to both Egypt and Syria. In addition, they placed seven airborne divisions on a high state
of alert. This seems to have convinced Kissinger that he needed to make an effort to keep the conflict
from escalating into a US-Soviet confrontation, so on October 11-12 he tried to get Soviet and Israeli
agreement to the idea of a ceasefire-in-place. Surprisingly, he managed to get the Israelis to agree,
and the Soviets said that they had assurances from Sadat that he would also, but that the proposal
should be put forward in the UN Security Council by someone other than the USSR or the United
States. Somehow this was supposed to make it easier for Sadat to accept. But the British, who were
tasked by Kissinger with carrying out the ceasefire initiative, mishandled the job and by October 14
Sadat had decided to advance his armored forces further into Sinai, ending the immediate chance for
a détente-style end to the conflict, and opening the way for a different and less positive calculus of
Soviet motives and abilities on Kissinger’s part.

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Kissinger’s revised plan was to keep talking with the Arabs, but also to accelerate arms shipments to
Israel and to signal to the Israelis that they should move rapidly on both fronts to turn the military
[8]
tide in their favor. In my view, this was the decision that risked putting a détente-like outcome to
the conflict in jeopardy. But Kissinger thought it would put him in the position at some point to press
the Israelis to stop their advance, thereby demonstrating to the Arabs that the United States held the
keys to the next phase of diplomacy. So, when the Soviets, seeing a change of fortunes on the
battlefield, offered to send Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Washington, Kissinger countered by
saying he would go to Moscow to deal directly with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. This was all
taking place just as Nixon was losing his Vice President and other of his top aides. Kissinger thought
he could buy some time by going to Moscow and would have freedom of maneuver if he was away
from the White House. What he found was a Soviet leader anxious to bring the war to an end. Without
much delay, Kissinger got the Soviets to agree to a UN resolution on a ceasefire and on direct
negotiations under US-Soviet auspices. To ensure Israeli compliance, he returned home via Tel Aviv.
He encountered a very angry Meir, who felt that the United States had deprived Israel of an
overwhelming victory, since Israeli troops were within artillery range of Damascus and had crossed
the Suez Canal and were nearly in a position to surround the entire Third Egyptian army in Sinai.
This is the context in which Kissinger said that Israel could take a few more hours since he would be
flying home, and nothing could happen until his return. Not surprisingly, the Israelis took this as a
[9]
green light.

From the documents translated from the Israeli archives, there are two that shine light on the issue
[10]
of Israel’s violation of the October 22 ceasefire. On October 23 at 1:15 p.m., the Israeli
Ambassador to Washington, Simcha Dinitz, reported to Meir that Nixon specifically asked Israel to
cease fire immediately. He added that it was obvious that the Americans were in constant touch with
the Russians, i.e., Dobrynin. About two hours later, Dinitz met with Kissinger and reported that
Kissinger had said that the US would not press for Israel to withdraw to the October 22 lines, since
no one really knew where they were in any case. “They will give us all the covert support for our
move and even in public,” he wrote. According to Dinitz, Kissinger reportedly said that he supported
“extending Israel’s progress in the field” and had even advised Meir to do so before he arrived in
Washington. He continued by saying that he wanted the improvement of Israel’s position in the field
as much as possible, but he did not want to cause significant damage to relations with the Soviets and
the Arab world. Kissinger went on to say that he would cooperate closely with Israel in devising a
post-war strategy. “Kissinger added that if anyone knew about the degree of intimacy between us he
would be fired immediately.” (Emphasis added. To me Kissinger seems to be saying to Dinitz that if
the President knew the extent of his sharing of information with the Israelis Nixon would fire him).
[11]
Kissinger also told Dinitz in confidence that he would “throw the Russians out of the picture.” In
short, Nixon and Kissinger were giving the Israelis different signals. It is clear that they took
Kissinger’s more seriously.

In a conversation with President Gerald Ford just after Nixon’s resignation, Kissinger explained in a
fairly balanced way the evolution of his own thinking about the Middle East. He started by stating
that after 1967 he operated on the basis of the illusion that the Arabs were militarily impotent. He
noted his misconception that Egypt and Syria were essentially Soviet satellites:

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“Our strategy during this period was… we always try to have a simple strategy but
complicated tactics. We like complicated tactics, not for their own sake because we want the
other parties committed first so we can sell our support to keep things fluid. We try to create
a need for an American role before we give it…. That we changed last spring. This was good
strategy except with the Soviet Union, where we have to be simple, direct, and clear. In the
Mideast before the October War, we tried to create such frustrations that the Arabs would
leave the Soviet Union and come to us.… We didn’t expect the October war…The basic
strategy has been this: Israel can’t stand and we can’t handle dealing with all these issues at
once. That is what the Soviet Union wants. That would guarantee a stalemate and a war. We
[12]
must move step by step, which will make further steps possible.”

Where I somewhat differ with Jackson and Trachtenberg is in placing the major responsibility for the
failure of the détente policy on the events surrounding the Israeli violation of the ceasefire and the
subsequent US-Soviet confrontation and the stage-three alert. Once the ceasefire had finally taken
hold, Kissinger expressed his view that détente had worked relatively well in avoiding a worse
[13]
conflict and that now the US was in “the catbird seat.” Israel was still strong, but less arrogant
and now quite dependent on continuing American support. Sadat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad
realized that they would need American help if they were to recover the territories that Israel
occupied in Sinai and the Golan. The Soviets seemed satisfied with symbolic gestures such as co-
sponsoring UN resolutions but were unlikely to find a way into the next phase of diplomacy since
neither the Egyptians nor the Syrians wanted them to do so. The Arab states’ oil embargo and
production cuts were a bigger problem than Kissinger had anticipated, but they insured that the
American public would understand the need for an energetic diplomatic engagement in the Middle
East to prevent another round of war and to create conditions for ending the embargo. In short, the
outcome of the war was promising from the American standpoint. The Israelis were up, but not too
much; the Arabs were down, but not humiliated; the Soviets were willing to settle for a symbolic role
as co-sponsor of the formal peace process. But it would be Kissinger, who was now fully in charge of
US policy, who would move forward with his step-by step policy.

My own criticisms of Kissinger’s policy include the encouragement he gave to the Israelis to violate
the October 22 ceasefire, but even worse was his serious initial misjudgment of Sadat and his
unwillingness to take steps in mid-1973 that probably could have prevented the 1973 war entirely.
That would have been good for US-Soviet relations, for the world economy, and, yes, for détente. But
after making these serious errors of judgment, Kissinger proved to be a quick study, and he soon saw
that he could negotiate effectively with Arab leaders – in fact he had surprisingly good relations with
many of them. And he turned out to be a shrewd and tenacious negotiator, achieving three partial
agreements in the space of two years. By the end of the Ford Administration, however, he had run out
of steam. He had been unable to get beyond modest disengagement agreements, and even on the
Israel-Jordan front he had given up. He did manage to get the oil embargo lifted and restored good
relations with Saudi Arabia, but never really understood the relationship of the global energy market
to Middle East politics. And he was deeply skeptical about the possibility of achieving a real peace
between Arabs and Israelis. Finally, the way in which he managed the US-Israeli relationship put the
Israelis in a very strong position. Later presidents kept discovering commitments that Kissinger had
given to the Israelis in return for minor concessions. These, such as the promise not to talk to the

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Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), often tied their hands, just as Kissinger had intended.

A final point is worth making. It is true that public opinion in the United States turned against
détente, but that was not the end of efforts to work with the Soviet Union on a range of issues,
including Middle East peace. In the Carter Administration, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance tried to
cooperate with the Soviets to launch a peace initiative in late 1977. At that point, it was Sadat who
was impatient and saw Soviet involvement as making his own room for maneuver more constrained.
Hence his decision to go to Jerusalem in November 1977, thereby derailing plans for a Geneva
conference under US-Soviet sponsorship. The Reagan administration never tried to do much with the
Soviets on the Middle East, but President Ronald Reagan went to great lengths to reach out to
successive Russian leaders and when he finally met with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in
Reykjavik in October 1986 the two came close to agreeing on far-reaching nuclear disarmament.
George H. W. Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, certainly revived a policy of détente
which allowed for Germany’s peaceful reintegration, a joint position in the UN opposing Iraq’s
annexation of Kuwait in 1990, and a US-Soviet sponsored Middle East peace conference in Madrid in
October 1991, just before the breakup of the Soviet Union. So, although the high hopes for détente
that may have existed, especially in Nixon’s mind, were never fully realized, the realistic notion that
major world issues would need to be addressed through sustained superpower dialogue did not
entirely disappear because of the events of October 1973.

Despite some differences of emphasis in my views compared to those of Jackson and Trachtenberg, I
do believe that they have contributed to our understanding by probing into the previously murky
accounts of what happened in the few days after the US-Soviet agreement on a ceasefire resolution at
the end of the October 1973 war. There is probably not much additional documentary evidence from
the American side to add to the discussion, but their use of the recently declassified Israeli archival
material is welcome, and there may be more there for other historians to explore as we near the
fiftieth anniversary of the October war.

From 1994 to 2013, William B. Quandt held the Edward R. Stettinius chair in the Department of
Politics at the University of Virginia, where he taught courses on the Middle East and American
Foreign Policy. Before going to Brookings in 1979, Dr. Quandt served as a staff member on the
National Security Council (1972-1974, 1977-1979). He was actively involved in the negotiations that
led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. His books include: Peace
Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (Brookings, 2005, third
edition): Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, (Brookings, 1986).

Notes

[1]
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), esp. 545-613; also
Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) and Crises: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).

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2
Martin Indyk, Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy (New York:
Knopf, 2021).

3
Yigal Kipnis, 1973: The Road to War (Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2013) 78-91.

[4]
Kipnis, 258, notes that the Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, also shared this view, but
expressed himself a bit differently: “…as a rule, Israel was not interested in deterring the Egyptians from
attacking because if they did [attack], ‘we will take care of them.’”

5
Indyk, Master of the Game, 106-111, asserts that Kissinger told Ismail at this meeting during an
informal conversation that he only dealt with crises. Ismail concluded from this that Egypt would have to go to
war in order to get Kissinger’s attention. The written record of the meeting shows no such comment, but a
former CIA officer who was well informed made such a claim in a book he wrote. See Jack O’Connell, King’s
Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 117,
quoting another CIA officer, Eugene Trone, who spoke to Ismail just after the informal remarks that Kissinger
allegedly made.

6
In particular, see Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Ballantine, 1976). Heikal was
close to Sadat at the time of the 1973 war and maintains that Kissinger wanted the war so that he could put
himself in the central position to manage the crisis and the subsequent diplomacy.

7
Indyk, Master of the Game, 111 says Kissinger felt that if war did break out, the US would not pay a
heavy price. In his first briefing of President Ford in August 1974, Kissinger said “We did not expect the October
War.” Ford replied, “But wasn’t it helpful?” Kissinger replied: “We couldn’t have done better if we had set the
scenario.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976
[hereafter FRUS], Doc. 95, 402.

8
Jackson and Trachtenberg, p. 566, claim that Kissinger wanted “the most massive Arab defeat
possible.” Kissinger did make such a statement in June 1975 when speaking to a group of American Jewish
leaders who had been critical of him at the time for Ford’s so-called “reassessment” policy toward Israel. See
FRUS, Doc. 189, 712. I would interpret this comment as an attempt to show the Jewish leaders that he was a
strong supporter of Israel. During the war itself, he wanted an outcome in which Israel prevailed on the
battlefield but stopped short of a 1967-style crushing victory.

9
See Indyk, Master of the Game, 175-176 for more details of Kissinger’s talks to Meir, Dayan and other
Israelis which, taken together, do suggest he was urging the Israelis to continue their military operations beyond
the ceasefire deadline.

[10]
For these translated documents, see the longer version of the paper by Jackson and Trachtenberg

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at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/selfinflicted.pdf.

         [11]
                            Jackson                   and                    Trachtenberg,
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/selfinflicted.pdf.

         [12]
                FRUS, Doc. 95, 402-404.

         [13]
                FRUS, Doc. 93, 714.

Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Article Review 1099- "A Self-Inflicted Wound?". H-Diplo. 04-01-2022.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/9999158/h-diplo-article-review-1099-self-inflicted-wound
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

                                                               9

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