Enhancing scientific response in a crisis: evidence-based approaches from emergency management in New Zealand - Journal of Applied Volcanology
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Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1
DOI 10.1186/s13617-014-0020-8
RESEARCH Open Access
Enhancing scientific response in a crisis:
evidence-based approaches from emergency
management in New Zealand
Emma E H Doyle1*, Douglas Paton2 and David M Johnston1,3
Abstract
Contemporary approaches to multi-organisational response planning for the management of complex volcanic
crises assume that identifying the types of expertise needed provides the foundation for effective response. We
discuss why this is only one aspect, and present the social, psychological and organizational issues that need to be
accommodated to realize the full benefits of multi-agency collaboration. We discuss the need to consider how
organizational culture, inter-agency trust, mental models, information management and communication and
decision making competencies and processes, need to be understood and accommodated in crisis management
planning and delivery. This paper discusses how these issues can be reconciled within superordinate (overarching)
management structures designed to accommodate multi-agency response that incorporates decision-making inputs
from both the response management team and the science advisors. We review the science advisory processes
within New Zealand (NZ), and discuss lessons learnt from research into the inter-organisational response to historical
eruptions and exercises in NZ. We argue that team development training is essential and review the different types of
training and exercising techniques (including cross training, positional rotation, scenario planning, collaborative
exercises, and simulations) which can be used to develop a coordinated capability in multiagency teams. We argue that
to truly enhance the science response, science agencies must learn from the emergency management sector and
embark on exercise and simulation programs within their own organisations, rather than solely participating as external
players in emergency management exercises. We thus propose a science-led tiered exercise program, with example
exercise scenarios, which can be used to enhance both the internal science response and the interagency response to
a national or international event, and provide direction for the effective writing and conduct of these exercises.
Keywords: Exercises; Simulations; Science advisory groups; Emergency management; Mental models; Training;
Communication
1 Introduction of Mt St Helens, over 130 officials and organisations
During a volcanic crisis, whether an isolated period of responded (Saarinen and Sell 1985); during the eruptive
unrest or a full scale eruption and recovery, many agen- episodes of 1995 to 1996 in Ruapehu, NZ, over 42 organisa-
cies and organisations are involved in its response and tions were involved (Paton et al. 1998a), and in the 2012 Te
management. These range from expert and technical advi- Maari eruptions of NZ, some 30 organisations responded.
sors (e.g., geologists, geophysicists, engineers, and social The number of responding agencies increases as the
scientists), through to emergency management agencies unrest or eruptive period continues, and they need to
(civil defence, fire service, police, army, national and local collaborate and share knowledge to effectively respond
government) and lifeline organisations (lines companies, in a crisis that creates multiple, diverse consequences.
transport, water). For example, during the 1980 eruptions However, these organizations bring to the crisis manage-
ment context diverse operational roles, different organiza-
* Correspondence: e.e.hudson-doyle@massey.ac.nz tional objectives and political or economic pressures, and
1
Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University, PO Box 756, varied ways of interpreting, prioritizing and responding to
Wellington 6140, New Zealand issues that reflect organizational policies, practices and
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Doyle et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 2 of 26 cultures that range from emergency services’ command the expert source of information on hazard processes (e.g. and control practices to the more organic approach typical geology, geophysics, geochemistry, geodesy, atmospheric of scientific/research organizations. Ensuring that agency science) and the expert source of information on social representatives can integrate their knowledge and ex- and economic impacts, including communication and be- pertise for response planning and implementation, and en- haviours (as provided by the ‘Social Consequences’ sub- suring that they can continue to do so in a response advisory group of Exercise Ruaumoko; Smith 2009). environment that present complex, dynamic demands that Incorporating a wide range of expertise into an advis- need to be understood and managed over time, is a chal- ory group process is closely related to the concept of lenging task. We present here a literature review of the ‘post-normal’ science (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1991; Krauss factors influencing response effectiveness, and discuss sev- et al. 2012) which is a ‘new conception of the manage- eral approaches that have been developed to achieve an ef- ment of complex science-related issues’ (Funtowicz & fective coordinated outcome, as well as how they could be Ravetz 2003, p. 1) where ‘facts are uncertain, values are integrated into the volcanology community to enhance and in dispute, the stakes are high and decisions urgent’ inform the response of volcanologists in the unique man- (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1991, p. 137), particularly when agement environment created by volcanic crises. In the these uncertainties are of an epistemological or ethical context of this literature, we also review and evaluate exam- kind. Post-normal science considers these elements of ples of NZ volcanic science advice and response practices. uncertainty, value loading, and a plurality of legitimate First we discuss the development of science advisory perspectives to be integral to science, and that by adopt- groups in New Zealand since one of the earliest vol- ing this ‘post-normal’ approach there is a recognition canic exercises run in 1992 (Section 2). We then discuss that risks are interpreted and managed subjectively (de- psychological, social and organizational influences and pending on local values and norms as well as disciplinary practices that affect response effectiveness (Section 3) and frameworks). This approach presents a new problem- argue for the need for regular training activities to im- solving framework and acknowledges that a plurality of prove these competencies (Section 4). In doing so, we perspectives should be structured into the informed deci- summarize the benefits accruing from science agencies sion making processes during uncertain high risk environ- learning from the methods that emergency management ments (see WSS Fellows on RIA 2014). agencies routinely use, and embarking on exercise and simulation programs that mirror the complexities of the 2 The development of volcanic science advisory response environment in which they will make important, groups in NZ but non-routine, contributions within their own organisa- One of the earliest exercises conducted to explore the tions. The paper argues that such in-house training (e.g., response to a volcanic eruption in New Zealand was Ex- involving cross training, positional rotation, scenario plan- ercise Nga Puia in 1992 (Martin 1992). This exercise, ning, collaborative exercises, simulations, training and based on a simulated eruption at the Okataina Volcanic shared exercise writing tasks see Sections 4 and 5) is piv- Centre (Nairn 2010), informed the response plans for otal to developing the future response capability of science the region, in particular the subsequent volcanic alert advisory groups and their ability to effectively complement level processes. A few years later, these lessons were the emergency management functions they will inevitably tested during the unrest and eruptions of Ruapehu volcano interact with. We also review national and international in 1995–1996, when over 42 organisations responded, with Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) exer- the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Science (now GNS cises (Section 5) to highlight the benefits that can arise if Science) acting as the major science provider (Johnston scientists develop their own activities rather than solely et al. 2000) (Figure 1). participating as external players in emergency manage- Analysis of the organizational response to these erup- ment exercises. Following a review of NZ’s 2008 “All of tions (Paton et al. 1998a) identified the prominent role nation” volcanic Exercise Ruaumoko (Section 5.2) to illus- the limited formalised inter-organisational networking trate how effective evaluation informs the development of played in creating a coordinated response, particularly Volcanic Science Advisory Group (VSAG) processes with- with regard to issues arising from ad-hoc interaction be- in NZ, the paper concludes with our proposing, in tween science and response agencies. Response agencies Section 6, a new exercise structure for volcanology. became inappropriately over reliant on science agencies This will facilitate the integration of volcanological expert- for management information. Paton et al. (1998a; 1999) ise into CDEM processes and how scientists and scientific found that response agencies expected the geophysicists agencies can proactively contribute to and capitalise on op- and volcanologists analysing volcanic activity to provide portunities to enhance shared understanding between di- them with direct answers to all response management is- verse responding agencies. Throughout this paper, we sues. For example, one co-author (DJ) reported how re- consider science and science advice providers to represent sponse agencies expected volcanologists to be able to
Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 3 of 26
decision making (Lipshitz et al. 2001) and can help com-
bat issues arising from conflict between scientists (Barclay
et al. 2008).
These VSAGs represent advisory bodies that are on
standby, and have plans to respond to a crisis or unrest
period. The advice provided by VSAGs is vital for effect-
ive emergency management planning, intelligence gath-
ering, and decision making and for the protection of life,
infrastructure and welfare, and depending on local pro-
cedures, the VSAG may exclusively include scientists
(volcanologists, meteorologists, etc.) or also include local
and regional emergency managers and officials. In NZ,
the earliest formalised VSAG was the Egmont Volcanic
Advisory Group formed in the early 1990s alongside the
deployment of the Taranaki Volcano Seismic Network
(for a full history see Bayley 2004), which meets once a
year to review the monitoring data and other scientific
research. By 2004, this group comprised representatives
from Massey University, University of Auckland, GNS
Science (NZ Crown Research Institute for “Earth, geoscience
and isotope research and consultancy services”, GNS
Figure 1 The information flow during the response to the 1995 Science Website 2014), Department of Conservation and
Ruapehu Eruption showing information flow between key Taranaki Regional Council; and sat at the advisory group
agencies (Paton et al. 1999). level of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management
Coordinating Executive Group.
This group advised Taranaki Regional Council in the
answer questions about the effect of volcanic ash on sheep. development of its first Volcanic Contingency Plan in
Response agencies were unprepared for the need to be able 2000, which addressed the framework of Scientific Alert
to liaise with different expert sources (e.g. volcanologists, Levels, the principal emergency management activities for
agricultural scientists, and veterinarians) to integrate input response, the expected hazards and the monitoring net-
for multiple sources to make response management deci- work. Nowadays the Egmont Volcanic Advisory Group has
sions. Similar problems emerged with regard to public evolved into the Taranaki Seismic and Volcanic Advisory
health, environmental health, and utility issues. In addition Group (TSVAG), encompassing additional representatives
to expecting certainty about volcanic hazard characteristics from Victoria University of Wellington, MCDEM, the Earth-
and future activity, response problems emanated from lack quake Commission, and local CDEM groups (TRC 2013).
of attention in the response planning context given to un- The experiences of the TSVAG have helped inform the
derstanding what sources of expertise would need to be process and formation of a number of other VSAGs
consulted and how response management would need to throughout NZ, many of which have overlapping member-
integrate and interpret information while collaborating ship in terms of volcanologists and national level CDEM
with diverse others. At the same time, the lack of network- and response organisations, most of these contain represen-
ing meant that many agencies were unable to fully utilize tatives from local CDEM, response and lifeline organisa-
scientific data as agencies found it was inconsistent with tions and scientists from across the NZ Universities, and
(unexpected) situational awareness and decision demands, Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) including GNS Science:
discussed further in Section 3.
As a result, science advisory processes were redeveloped The Auckland Volcanic Scientific Advisory Group
through the formation of a number of VSAGs (Smith 2009; (AVSAG) was established by the Auckland Civil
Jolly and Smith 2012). During many natural hazard events, Defence and Emergency Management Group in
such science advisory bodies have been called upon to pro- 2007 as part of its Volcanic Contingency Plan and in
vide information and advice. The ability to source science preparation for the MCDEM led volcanic Exercise
advice through “one trusted source”, such as the VSAG, Ruaumoko, to provide advice to officials about the
has proved beneficial (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emer- volcanic field residing under Auckland City
gency Management, MCDEM 2008) (Figure 2a). This ap- (MCDEM 2008; McDowell 2008; Smith 2009). This
proach also facilitates an integration of a wide range of built on the pre-existing VSAG mechanisms
expert opinions required to manage uncertainty during established in the 2002 Contingency Plan (BecaDoyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 4 of 26
Figure 2 Information flow processes during a NZ Volcanic crisis. (a) The information flow during Exercise Ruaumoko in 2008, outlining the
operating structure of the Auckland Volcanic Scientific Advisory Group and its relationship to GeoNet and CDEM (Smith 2009). (b) The proposed
model for a national hazard science advisory group, to enable integration of nationwide science capability, as proposed by Smith (2009) after Exercise
Ruaumoko. Smith (2009) states that “this advisory group would be made up of appropriate subject experts from across universities, crown research
institutes and other science organisations including consultancies, [and] … could play both an operational role (during events) and a strategic role for
planning science activities” (p. 76). The current advisory structure of the CPVAG, TVSAG, and CAG reflect a similar advisory process (Jolly and Smith 2012).
Carter Hollings & Ferner 2002) which included activities for volcanic hazards in the Central Plateau”
volcanologists (from GNS Science, Auckland which includes the volcanoes Mt. Ruapehu, Mt.
Regional Council, and University of Auckland), Ngauruhoe, and Mt. Tongariro (CPVAG 2009, p. 5).
meteorologists, and specialist medical advisors. In This group formed directly in response to the dam
2007, AVSAG was the first NZ VSAG to establish break lahar that occurred from the Ruapehu Crater
formal terms of reference that were signed by Lake in 2007, and the recognition by key
member organisations (Cronin 2008), and this stakeholders that a combined expanded advisory
updated VSAG incorporated a wider range of group was needed for effective planning,
representatives from Auckland, Waikato and Massey preparedness, relationship building, and inter-agency
Universities, GNS Science, MetService, the Kestrel coordination (ibid). CPVAG encompasses a Science
Group, as well as local and national CDEM Focus Group, a Planning Focus Group and a
representatives (Smith 2009). Communications Focus Group, all guided by a
The Central Plateau Volcanic Advisory Group framework strategy and Contingency Plan, and who
(CPVAG) was established in 2008 to “provide a meet every six months to report back on work
forum for the collective planning and readiness programmes, outcomes, and future plans. TheDoyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 5 of 26
processes set up by CPVAG were recently tested in first test of AVSAG. For this, AVSAG was co-ordinated
2012 during the Te Maari eruption and unrest through a tri-partite sub-group system (Volcanology,
period, and the evaluation of that response is Volcano Monitoring, Social Consequences), which re-
currently ongoing as the eruption represents a critical ported upwards to a smaller core VSAG that liaised dir-
opportunity to review effectiveness, and identify areas ectly with MCDEM and Auckland CDEM via on-site
for improvement and capacity building. liaison officers in the Emergency Operation Centres
The fourth VSAG in NZ is the Caldera Advisory (EOCs) at each location (see reviews in: Smith 2009; Doyle
Group (CAG, Waikato Regional Council 2014; & Johnston 2011).
Potter et al. 2012), which was formed in late 2010, Reviews of this exercise (MCDEM 2008; McDowell
with a focus on the eight caldera volcanoes in the 2008; Cronin 2008) identified that the AVSAG process
Taupo Volcanic Zone. This group formed in facilitated the provision of valuable advice in a clear,
response to the recognition of a gap in the advice timely manner. As advocated for by the International
provision available for the particular effects of Association for Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s
caldera volcanoes, and an acknowledgment that Interior (1999), the AVSAG provided a facility for the sci-
these effects could last for significant time periods entists (from all contributing disciplines) to “use a single
(years to decades) with a “profound impact on the voice”, share information to reduce confusion, and to en-
social and economic environments” (Waikato courage efficient teamwork amongst scientists and public
Regional Council 2014). officials, while also encouraging integration of diverse sci-
entific expertise and minimising communication delays.
Similar science advisory group processes also exist for However, during the most active periods of the response
other hazards in NZ including the Tsunami Expert towards the end of the exercise, the existence of two dis-
Panel, which activates in response to a local, regional, or tinctly separate scientific sub-groups composed of the pre-
distant source earthquake and tsunami warning. This dominately university-based ‘volcanology’ group and the
advises officials of coastal regions at risk, expected tsu- ‘monitoring’ group of GNS Science based scientists be-
nami arrival times and durations, and the expected max- came unrealistic, and as stated by McDowell (2008), p. 22,
imum wave amplitudes at the coast, providing advice the priority instead should be to have “the rapid assess-
directly to the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency ment and decision-making in relation to technical data”
Management response team (MCDEM 2010). rather than maintaining and communicating between
More recently, during the 2010–2012 earthquake and these two separate groups. While the main advantage of
aftershock sequence in the Canterbury region, the Natural this AVSAG approach was the wide range of scientific ex-
Hazards Research Platform assumed the role of national perts and competency, during the most active period the
coordinator of science advice when the government de- due process needed to maintain this inclusivity actually
clared a State of National Emergency after the fatal M6.3 slowed down advice provision (MCDEM 2008).
event in February 2011 (Canterbury Earthquakes Royal A clear advantage during the exercise was the presence
Commission – Te Komihana Rūwhenua o Waitaha 2012). of a science advisor in both the National Crisis Management
This government funded multi-party research manage- Centre (NCMC) and the Auckland CDEM Group EOC,
ment platform was established in 2009 to provide secure, providing a vital link between the VSAG assessment and
long-term funding for natural hazard research, to encour- the emergency management decision-making. However,
age stakeholder involvement in research, and to promote during the rapid escalation of unrest and the critical mo-
collaborative research (Natural Hazards Research Platform ments of the crisis, there was a potential for disconnect to
2009). In future natural hazards events, and based upon occur between this local and national advice provision to
the Canterbury experiences, the various scientific advisory the AGEOC and the NCMC respectively, and this resulted
group sections of the wider volcanic advisory groups de- in a divergence of the science advice (which was informing
scribed above would likely fall under the coordination of evacuation planning) at Local and National levels (Cronin
the Natural Hazards Platform, or a future equivalent, as 2008, discussed further in Section 5.2).
they fulfil their science advisory role; pending reviews of A potential disconnect could also occur not only be-
recent volcanic eruptions and earthquake events of the last tween the science advice at the local and national CDEM
4 years, and changes currently under consideration for level, but also between the local and national science
new national funding procedures. research response, capability, and processes in future
AVSAG was the first VSAG to be comprehensively events. Smith (2009) suggests that to address these limi-
tested in a simulation. This was done through Exercise tations and coordinate the scientific advice beyond the
Ruaumoko, which was a MCDEM led exercise to test an limited knowledge pool and resources in a locally im-
all of nation response to a volcanic eruption in the pacted area, a nationwide Volcanic Science Advisory
Auckland volcanic field (MCDEM 2008) and was the Panel (NZVAP) should have (see Figure 2b):Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 6 of 26
“at its core national hazard monitoring capability individuals swap hierarchal/seniority position as they
and processes (e.g. GeoNet), with involvement of move from their day-to-day role to their response role.
additional capability from universities and other To manage these issues, it is essential to build future
science organisations based on thresholds of response capability via the development of good team
response. The intent is that GeoNet (both the and inter team mental models. This facilitates situational
technology and the science expertise of GNS Science) awareness and enhanced decision making capability for
be the hub of any science response for earthquake, personnel within the VSAG and key responding agen-
volcano, tsunami or landslide events” (p. 77). cies. This should be supported by training (Sections 4
and 5) and resource planning (e.g., accommodating the
GeoNet is a collaboration between the Earthquake need to coordinate multiple shifts throughout a re-
Commission (EQC - NZ’s insurance provider for natural sponse, manage fatigue, allow individuals to attend to
disasters; EQC Website 2014) and GNS Science and is personal and family demands) that ensures that staff can
the “official source of geological hazard information for return to their role with a fresh perspective. Limiting
New Zealand”. Established in 2001 it monitors geoha- time on shift has pragmatic benefits in reducing re-
zards (in particular earthquakes, tsunami, volcanoes and sponse risks from personnel adapting to small incre-
landslides) via an extensive monitoring system and arch- mental change and losing situational awareness (e.g.
ival data centre, and provides public and official infor- Tickell 1990). In contrast, a fresh responder/scientist
mation including earthquake reports and Volcanic Alert would recognise a significant change demanding an ac-
Bulletins (GeoNet website 2014). The NZVAP approach tion. This tendency, colloquially referred to as the ‘boiling
outlined by Smith (2009), encompassing GeoNet at its frog syndrome’a, was particularly noticed in the volcanolo-
core, still supports the existence of regions having exist- gist’s experience when managing the 1991 eruption at
ing scientific or planning advisory groups with a volcanic Mt. Pinatubo (Whittlesey and Buckner 1993), and high-
and/or earthquake focus, but it also addresses the need lights the need for regular shift rotation of scientists and
for mobilisation of NZ-wide science capability, while other responders in crisis response.
remaining responsive to local CDEM needs (see also It is also important to consider rotating the role of the
Section 5.2; Jolly and Smith 2012). lead science individual (or agency) within a VSAG dur-
Developing VSAGs prior to an event can prospectively ing a response, particularly for long duration crises. In a
enhance the crisis response capability of scientists and the NZ context for example, many of the responding scien-
full multi-agency response alike, through the development tists will be balancing their ‘response role’ (to provide
of terms and protocols for response, information sharing advice to responding agencies and understand the phe-
and inter-agency management, and situational awareness. nomena occurring) with their ‘day-to-day role’ (including
A prospective approach facilitates future collaboration funded research, consultancy contracts and lecturing).
(e.g., enhanced mental models, shared situational awareness, The ‘day-to-day role’ may need to take priority at times,
enhanced multi-team performance) and more effective com- and thus by rotating the role of ‘lead’ individual (or
munications between scientists and responding agencies. agency), this will allow time and space to respond to these
other competing demands, while also managing issues
around fatigue and tunnel vision as the various agencies
3 Factors that influence response effectiveness and individuals ‘share the load’. Further, by rotating these
Even with a pre-existing VSAG, the development of effect- roles, individuals can develop a greater understanding of
ive multi-agency response needs to accommodate issues each other’s responsibilities, roles, pressures, and demands,
arising from, for example, differences in organisational helping to build a better shared mental model of the team
culture, jurisdictional expectations, and differences in the response (see Sections 3.3 and 4.1). For any role swap or
economic and political pressures on participating agencies. shift change to work effectively an effective change-over pro-
These represent demands on the goal of prioritising cedure (e.g., role shadowing for a specific time period) is
tasks and information needs over and above those em- needed to transfer situational awareness and overall re-
anating from the complex, evolving volcanic hazard. sponse performance. This is essential to maintain deci-
The corresponding threats to trust, leadership or team sion making effectiveness in evolving crises.
ability, conflicts over responsibility or priorities, reputation
management, and need to function under high psycho- 3.1 Decision making
logical and environmental stressors (fatigue, tunnel vision, Pivotal to effective volcanic crisis management are the
family commitments and over work) conspire to impair decision making, situational awareness, mental models
performance of the individual and team (Boin and’t Hart (which is an individual’s representation or visualisation of
2001; Handmer 2008; Quarantelli 1997; Sinclair et al. a real system, including concepts, relationships, and their
2012b; Paton 1996). In addition, conflict may arise as role within that system) and trust processes that underpinDoyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 7 of 26 effective response. We commence discussion with an period preceding the volcanic ‘crisis’ the science advice overview of the individual and group decision making pro- could be carefully evaluated and compared, and relatively cesses occurring in volcanic management and response. lower time pressures afforded scientists and decision Analytical decision-making is defined by working makers the opportunity to adopt an analytical decision through a process: identifying a problem; generating op- making approach. However, as the situation moved from tions to solve the problem; evaluating these; and imple- this early warning phase into the crisis of impending menting the preferred option (Flin 1996; Saaty 2008). eruption, or for a situation where scientists are responding This form of decision making requires time to allow this rapidly after an eruption (e.g. the “Blue Sky” eruption of process to occur. It is the default approach adopted by Ruapehu in September 2007), the more intuitive naturalis- scientists (and managers) due to their training. However, tic style would again be adopted. As stated by Paton et al. in emergency response a range of other decision making 1999, “attention must [thus] be directed to understanding styles: analytical; naturalistic; procedural based; creative; [this] naturalistic decision-making of experts, and how it and distributive (e.g. Crichton & Flin 2002); are required can be modelled in simulations to develop this contingent and need to be matched to the situation and conditions management capability” (p. 44). encountered by decision-makers. The slower, more considerate, analytical decision mak- 3.2 Situational awareness ing processes lie at one end of a continuum of decisions Pivotal to effective decision-making process is a capacity styles. At the “faster” end of the decision making con- to: 1) evaluate and define a problem and task character- tinuum lies naturalistic decision making (NDM; Martin istic via situation assessment (Endsley 1997; Martin et al. et al. 1997). This relies on experience garnered through 1997); and 2) select a decision-making strategy from the real world crises as well as simulations and exercises four options described above (Crichton and Flin 2002). (Crichton and Flin 2002; Klein 2008). It is commonly The former process is intrinsically dependent upon the adopted in high risk and low time contexts and natural- situational awareness (SA) of the individual and the team istic settings which involve: ill-structured problems; un- (Cannon-Bowers and Bell 1997; Crichton and Flin 2002). certain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-defined, or Situational Awareness comprises three levels (Endsley competing goals; action/feedback loops; time stress; high 1997, p. 270–271): 1) Perception – understanding the stakes; multiple players; and the effects or pressures of importance of information and cues in the environment; organizational goals and norms (Orasanu & Connolly 2) Comprehension – combine, interpret, store, and retain 1993, as cited in Zsambok 1997, p. 5). For critical incident information and be able to use it; and 3) Projection – management, research has identified four key NDM pro- prediction of future situations from existing and previous cesses (Crego and Spinks 1997; Crichton and Flin 2002; situations. Initial and ongoing SA is critical to decision Pascual and Henderson 1997): 1) recognition-primed and making (Sarna 2002). Thus a decision-maker may make intuition led action; 2) a course of action based upon writ- the correct decision based upon their perception of the ten or memorised procedures; 3) analytical comparison of situation, but if their situation assessment is incorrect then different options for courses of action; and 4) creative de- this may negatively influence their decision (Crichton and signing of a novel course of action; ordered by increasing Flin 2002). When responding to a volcanic eruption, de- resource commitment. veloping and maintaining this SA is important for both In a crisis, uncertainty, environmental change, risk and volcanologists (in their assessment of available data and time pressures are amplified, making decision making future projections, information from other agencies, de- (whether by scientists or responders) in this dynamic con- mands upon their advice) and emergency managers and text one that is dependent on ‘task conditions’ (Martin et al. decision makers (in their assessment and understanding 1997), and thus throughout one incident different processes of information - including science advice, resources, de- may be adopted. For example, during Exercise Ruaumoko mands and future requirements and needs). (Sections 2.1 and 5.2), the on-site GeoNet duty officers in- In reviews of the inter-organisational response of the side both the Auckland Group EOC and the NCMC were 1995–1996 Ruapehu eruptions in NZ (Paton et al. often asked to provide answers to questions from key de- 1998a, 1998b, 1999), several issues affected the SA of cision makers who required an immediate response due to both scientists and emergency managers. In particular, response management demands. This “task condition” “inter-organisational networking” was weak, with none (short time) would have favoured the more naturalistic of the responding agencies (e.g. fire, police, civil defence, decision making, where the scientists would have relied social services, media, etc.) having an established or for- upon their experience to assess the situation (both the malised inter-organisation network in place with GNS question and the available science) to make an intuitive or Science before the event, even though GNS Science recognition-primed decision (Paton et al. 1999, Klein acted as an information provider for 63% of the respond- 1998). However, earlier in the exercise, during the warning ing agencies. This resulted in organisations interacting
Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 8 of 26 on an “ad hoc” basis (Paton et al. 1998a, p. 7) contribut- 3.3 Shared mental models ing to co-ordination and communication problems and The scale and complexity of volcanic crisis response re- preventing their using crucial information to build and sults in decision-making involving people who differ in maintain SA, and thus impacting both emergency man- their profession, expertise, functions, roles and geo- agement and volcanological decision-making processes graphical location. This more integrative decision style is and outcomes. This was compounded by issues such as called distributed decision making (Rogalski & Samurcay the “lack of clear responsibility for co-ordination” across 1993, as cited in Paton & Jackson 2002). As discussed in responding agencies (reported by 45% of participating Section 3.1, an individual’s mental model impacts indi- agencies), “inadequate communication with other agen- vidual decision making, as it is their representation of cies” (37%), and “inadequate co-ordination of response” the wider system and processes, including inter-agency (32%). These are all indicators of “team breakdown”, in- relationships, needs and demands, and an individual’s adequately defined and co-ordinated roles, and poor role within a crisis. Thus, for effective distributed deci- communication (Paton et al. 1998a, 1999). The develop- sion making, individuals require a good shared mental ment of effective inter-organisational crisis communica- model of the response environment in time and space, tion requires (Paton et al. 1998a) “information needs which incorporates how their expertise contributes to [that] are anticipated and defined, that networks with in- different parts of the same plan, and their understanding formation providers and recipients are organised, and of each other’s knowledge, skills, roles, anticipated be- [that] crisis communication systems capable of provid- haviour or needs (Flin 1996; Marks et al. 2002; Paton ing, accessing, collating, interpreting and disseminating and Jackson 2002; Schaafstal et al. 2001). By building a information are established. … [and] shared terminology shared mental model, team members can develop an ac- and systems” (p. 8). curate expectation of the performance of their team The development of VSAGs and the associated Terms members and themselves, leading to effective coordin- of Reference within NZ over the last two decades will ation without overt strategizing (Blickensderfer et al. have helped to build shared mental models of the re- 1998; Cannon-Bowers et al. 1998; Lipshitz et al. 2001; sponse environment across organisations. VSAG devel- Salas et al. 1994). opment has included the identification of protocols for The collection of GNS Science information by re- communication and networking with emergency man- sponse agencies in an ad-hoc basis (Paton et al. 1998a & agement and key response organisations, and specifying Paton et al. 1999) during the 1995–1996 Ruapehu erup- relationship building activities to be undertaken within tions describes a process where information was being these groups. These activities have improved communica- provided by explicit requests only. In such cases, the in- tion and information flow during a volcanic crisis and thus formation provided often also needed to be adapted and the shared situational awareness in that crisis. Comparison translated to meet decision needs. However, research in of Figures 1 and 2 illustrates the change and improvement the decision making community has identified that ef- in information flow processes between Ruapehu in 95–96 fective teams move from the sharing of information by (Figure 1) and Ruaumoko in 2008 (Figure 2). explicit request towards an approach that adopts implicit The rarity of large scale eruptions makes it important supply, where members provide not only good informa- to capitalize on the learning opportunities events, exer- tion, but unprompted information that is tailored in cises, and reviews provide for developing situational terms of content and format due to their understanding awareness and for facilitating the ability of scientific ad- of the needs of the recipient (Lipshitz et al. 2001; visors to develop shared mental models of their and Kowalski-Trakofler et al. 2003; Paton and Flin 1999). others role in response management. This feeds into Implicit communication also facilitates the mainten- training needs analysis and the development of the situ- ance of situational awareness during periods of dynamic ational awareness competencies and decision support information, as it allows decision makers to focus on task systems required to sustain effective situational aware- management. For this kind of team functioning to be suc- ness in complex, rapidly evolving and dynamic volcanic cessful in complex, time pressured situations, (Wilson crises. It can also inform the development of the shared et al. 2007, as cited in Owen et al. 2013, p. 5) identified situational awareness required if all team members make that it required the following characteristics: their respective contributions to a shared task or goal. That is, to develop shared mental models of presenting Effective communication consisting of accurate and problems and response options, particularly when deci- timely information exchange, correct phraseology sion inputs come from different professions and/or from and closed-loop communication techniques; participants who are spread over a large geographical Coordinated behaviour based on shared knowledge, area. Facilitating the latter introduces a need for distrib- performance monitoring, back-up and adaptability; uted decision making, discussed next. and
Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 9 of 26
A co-operative team orientation, efficacy, trust and prioritise issues, and to identify where is safe for people
cohesion. to be evacuated to, etc. This example illustrates how, for
example, public health specialists and volcanologists
However, as highlighted by Owen et al. (2013), p. 6 for the need to bring their professional team mental model to
multi-team, multi-organisational, coordination characteristic bear on identifying their specific contribution, but also
of large-scale complex emergency management events, develop a superordinate (overarching) mental model that
the challenge is not just to build an effective team, but “to integrates all areas of expertise. A significant challenge
understand how a team coordinates within teams” and arises because scientists, and indeed all stakeholders,
how understanding may be “shared between teams”. When need to switch between a) being autonomous actors, and
we consider a multi-agency VSAG, the responding scien- b) being multi-disciplinary team members, depending on
tists can be considered as but one team within the com- the task being undertaken (Janssen et al. 2010).
plex multi-team response. Owen et al. (2013) identify four Fundamentally, in a volcanic crisis response setting,
distinct stages for effective and adaptive team functio- the science advisors’ and VSAGs’ role is to provide infor-
ning for an inter-team inter-organisational response, mation to facilitate the response agencies understanding
including: 1) situation assessment, 2) plan formulation, of the hazard issues, priorities, the wider context, im-
3) plan execution, and 4) team learning. These, and the pacts, and potential future outcomes, and thus build
indicators typically used to identify whether these acti- their situational awareness to aid their decision-making
vities are occurring, are depicted in Table 1. process. However, as stated by Doyle & Johnston (2011),
A significant challenge here derives from a need to co- it is not just a case of providing the emergency managers
ordinate the inputs of different agencies and experts to with all available science information, but about under-
assist the holistic management of complex hazard conse- standing their needs to meet their information require-
quences. For example, public health specialists possess ments. Simply providing as much advice as possible may
expertise concerning the specific effects of ash and gas actually hinder the decision process, due to cognitive
on health. However, to mount an effective response, overload and an overuse of these available resources
their input, as members of an ‘emergent’ team, must be (Crichton and Flin 2002; Omodei et al. 2005; Quarantelli
integrated with input from, for example, volcanologists, 1997). To contribute in this way, scientific advisors need
emergency managers, social welfare, and transport agen- to develop a shared mental model with their emergency
cies, to facilitate understanding of the ‘whole’ problem, manager counterparts both prior to an event (to develop
Table 1 Framework for inter-team inter-organisational coordination (Owen et al. 2013)
Phase Within teams Between teams Anchor points
Situation assessment Information gathering, individuals Boundary spanning Within teams: incident briefings; handovers
scan the environment to identify cues
Individual and Team Situation Awareness Distributed Situation Between teams: Emergency Management
Awareness Social networks Team (EMT) briefings; situation reports;
emergency services liaison officers
Sense-making Organisational culture Information flows through texting, emails,
data retrieval
Plan formulation Meaning making Shared beliefs Regional and state level team membership
Setting goals, clarifying roles, Centralised-decentralised Decision-structures analysis
prioritising tasks decision making authority
Psychological safety Distributed cognition Command and Control (C2) teleconferences;
EMT meetings
Team trust and cohesion Social networks Regional and state level team membership
Plan execution Communication Relational coordination Observations of teamwork
Explicit and implicit coordination Cultural-historical activity theory Temporal and cultural-structural boundary points
Cross-checking/monitoring/backup
behaviour
Leadership Boundary spanning C2 teleconferences; EMT meetings
Team learning Psychological safety Analysis of organisational Within teams: immediate debriefs
tensions and contradictions
Opportunities for reflection Organisational learning Between teams: multi-agency after action
and perspective-taking (post response) reviews; development of knowledge networks.Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 10 of 26
effective plans) and during the crisis itself. This shared key tasks that relate to the features of the setting (i.e., the
mental model encompasses the overlapping elements of need to integrate diverse organizational and professional
each team member’s SA and represents the inter-team perspectives to tackle specific response issues as a mem-
co-ordination (Endsley 1994), allowing an effective co- ber of a superordinate team). If all members of the super-
ordination amongst team members without the need for ordinate EOC organization, incorporating the VSAG,
extensive overt strategizing (Salas et al. 1994; see review adopt these roles they are more likely to be able to develop
in Doyle & Johnston 2011). trusting relationships that facilitate effective information ex-
For science response it is thus vital that scientists de- change and utilization in high risk, evolving crisis events.
velop this shared mental model within the VSAG, and in Evidence of swift trust first emerged from Goodman
the wider multi-agency response, to facilitate their ability and Goodman’s (1976) observation that some temporary
to implicitly provide the science information required by groups did not have a history of trust, but developed
the main decision makers at critical periods (see also “swift trust” through task related interaction. Evidence
Doyle & Johnston 2011). However, when dealing with for the effective role that swift trust can play in multi-
the uncertainty implicit in volcanic crises the effectiveness agency and distributed management systems comes from
of this information sharing relationship is influenced by research into global virtual teams that exemplify tempor-
the degree of trust that exists, or that needs to be devel- ary organizations; and the requirement for collaborative
oped in situ, between key players. This is particularly im- team management further supports its utility (Coppola
portant given the rarity of opportunities for functional et al. 2004; Crisp & Jarvenpaa 2013; Robert et al. 2009;
organizational interaction before a crisis occurs. White et al. 2008). The concept of swift trust has only re-
cently been tested in multi-agency natural hazard crisis re-
3.4 Trust sponse contexts (Curnin et al. 2015). This, as well as
Trust plays a pivotal role in developing sustainable, evidence for its effectiveness in military contexts which in-
functional relationships when members of diverse orga- volve the collaborative response to emergent, low-time/
nizations need to collaborate to access, share and use in- high-risk demands over time (Ben-Shalom et al. 2005;
formation for decision making in response environments Hyllengren et al. 2011; Lester & Vogelgesang 2012) sug-
characterized by uncertainty (Siegrist and Cvetkovich gests it should be included in future volcanic crisis re-
2000). Without trust, teams focus on task demands, not sponse protocols. Swift trust research in military contexts
teamwork, reducing their effectiveness in tackling emer- also highlighted the importance of selecting team mem-
gent crisis response needs (Pollock et al. 2003). bers with sufficient status to be ‘heard’ in a multi-agency
Inter-agency trust develops through collaboration. Since team context (Curnin et al. 2015).
volcanologists and emergency managers rarely work together
under normal circumstances, trust among agencies may
be lacking (Dirks and Ferrin 2001). Since representatives 4 Activities to improve future response capability
of scientific and EM agencies typically meet and interact In the above discussion, we outlined that effective indi-
for the first time during a crisis, agency representatives are vidual and team response to a crisis, such as a volcanic
denied the luxury of building trusting relationships over eruption or unrest period, is characterised by good situ-
time. Trust must be developed via other mechanisms. ational awareness, strong inter-organisational networks,
One approach capitalizes on the concept of swift trust effective shared mental models, and high trust between
(e.g. Meyerson et al. 1996). responding organisations and individuals. To achieve
Swift trust can be developed in temporary (EOC) orga- this, and develop a common understanding of each other’s
nizations if certain conditions are met. Meyerson et al. roles, dependencies, and information needs, and the
(1996) argue that, firstly, swift trust is less about the inter- over-all response environment, it is important to under-
personal relationship factors that underpin traditional take multi-organisational and multi-disciplinary planning
forms of trust (built up over a prolonged period of time), activities, and collaborative exercises and simulations
and more about encouraging a focus on goal achievement with all team members and advisors, to help in the devel-
by facilitating the ability of participants to understand opment of similar mental models of the task (see review
their respective contributions to a superordinate (over- in Paton & Jackson 2002; Doyle & Johnston 2011). Such
arching) team managing complex evolving eruption con- a comprehensive suite of training and relationship build-
sequences. Secondly, swift trust is more likely to arise ing activities prior to an event, and detailed analysis of
when drawing upon a small pool of representatives who event and exercise response, can facilitate future re-
have an increased chance of future interaction, with this sponse capability and identify areas for improvement.
condition creating a social setting that can foster quicker This is particularly important given the rarity of volcanic
trust building between parties. Finally, swift trust avoids and other hazard events, and thus a lack of opportunity
personal disclosure in favour of a reliance and focus on for real world experience.Doyle et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology (2015) 4:1 Page 11 of 26 According to Kozlowski (1998), p. 120–122, team 4.1 Cross training training should be considered as a sequence or series of Cross training enhances the awareness and knowledge developmental experiences that are carried out across a that each team member has of their fellow team mem- series of different environments, to build “knowledge bers’ tasks, duties and responsibilities and facilitates the and skills in an appropriate sequence across skill levels, holistic (shared mental model) understanding of team content and target levels”. Ideally this training and exer- functioning and the respective, interdependent role of a cising needs to develop both individual and team situ- given agency within the team (Marks et al. 2002; Schaafstal ational awareness (SA) and explore how and when each et al. 2001; Volpe et al. 1996). This is termed their interpo- is appropriate for response, within evolving, dynamic re- sitional knowledge (IPK). Volpe et al. (1996) reason that sponse environments. Team SA can be developed in IPK allows team members to “anticipate the task needs post-event and post-exercise reviews that include identi- of fellow team members”, leading to more effective team fying inter-agency relationship issues as opportunities performance and enhanced coordination with a minimal for development (and not as problems). Through the communication requirement, important when task loads analysis of past events, lessons for successful communica- are high and individuals are too busy attending to these to tion, advice provisions and distributed decision-making be able to make explicit information requests. In the ab- can also be learnt. However, these training activities need sence of IPK, there exists interpositional uncertainty which not necessarily develop shared mental models and the can hamper team performance (Blickensderfer et al. 1998). capacity for true levels of collaborative management etc. Cross training is “an important determinant of effective Agencies can also use them to update, write, and prepare teamwork process, communication, and performance” plans, identify potential or existing issues with the re- (Volpe et al. 1996, p. 12). Teammates who develop inter- sponse, logistical, and communication plans; while also positional knowledge through cross-training: 1) interacted testing such processes, systems, and communications. more effectively with each other, 2) used more efficient Adopting a suite of training activities increases opportun- communication strategies, and 3) volunteered information ities for developing an understanding of the technical is- more often (Blickensderfer et al. 1998). It facilitated these sues involved and the multi-agency context in which they outcomes by “encouraging members to understand the occur (Borodzicz & van Haperen 2002). activities of those around them” (Blickensderfer et al. Several training methods have been identified that can 1998), to better anticipate their needs and assist those in enhance naturalistic decision-making (e.g. Cannon-Bowers need of help (see Table 2 and Schaafstal et al. 2001; & Bell 1997), enhance decision skills (e.g. Pliske et al. Marks et al. 2002). Furthermore, cross-training can foster 2001), train effective teams (e.g., Salas et al. 1997b), and a sense of a shared “common bond” (Greenbaum 1979, develop effective critical incident and team based simula- as cited in Blickensderfer et al. 1998) amongst team tions (e.g. Crego & Spinks 1997; see review in Flin 1996, members and support the establishment of morale, cohe- chap. 6), all of which are relevant for volcanologists and sion and confidence. VSAGs. These include cross training, positional rotation, Cross-training encompasses three methods that be- scenario planning, collaborative exercises and simulations, come progressively more detailed and involved, and thus shared exercise writing tasks, and ‘train the trainer’ type more effective for improving shared mental models, un- tasks; in addition to workshops, seminars, and specific derstanding of complementary roles, and enhancing col- knowledge sharing activities. laboration (Blickensderfer et al. 1998; Marks et al. 2002). We briefly discuss below two methods in particular: These are: 1) positional clarification, a form of awareness cross-training and scenario planning, as we feel that they training (e.g., by discussion, lecture, demonstration or dis- are particularly suitable for volcanic response environ- semination of information) where specific information is ments. Exercises, and the application of them to science provided about other roles and responsibilities in the team response, are discussed in detail in Section 5, including an (e.g., working together in an EOC, or in a science response evaluation of the lessons learnt from Exercise Ruaumoko team, for example); 2) positional modelling, a training pro- in the context of the key competencies discussed in cedure in which the duties of each team member are dis- Section 3. It is important to highlight that for all cussed and observed via behaviour observation (e.g., these, it is not just knowledge and skill development that offering potential EOC participants some actual practice is addressed through these activities; they also address in the other positions: a volcanologist could be given the “how the disaster context influences performance and opportunity to play the role of, for example an intelligence well-being” (Paton et al. 2000, p. 176). In addition, each of or logistics officer in an EOC context); and 3) positional the training activities can be carried out at the many levels rotation, which involves training within the exercise con- of a response, for teams within an agency, for the entire text where all team members spend significant periods of organisation, across multiple organisations, and for the full time performing other team members’ jobs and roles, pro- multi-organisation response. viding a working knowledge of each member’s specific
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