Defending Taiwan in an Expanded Competitive Space
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Ships and aircraft from U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force, and Royal Australian Navy, led by USS Carl Vinson, HMS Queen Elizabeth,
and JS Kaga, transit in formation during Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021,
October 17, 2021, in Bay of Bengal (U.S. Navy/Haydn N. Smith)
Defending Taiwan in an
Expanded Competitive Space
By Joel Wuthnow
aiwan’s defense has always been proposals, China’s People’s Liberation of the People’s Republic of China in
T precarious, and the dangers are
only likely to grow as China’s
power increases.1 Chinese economic
Army (PLA) has amassed significant
forces across the Taiwan Strait, includ-
ing more than 600 short-range ballistic
2049—and a local military balance that
pits a regional heavyweight against a small
island with few diplomatic allies and lim-
inducement since the 1990s has done missiles opposite the island.2 Taiwan’s ited resources. Taiwan’s proximity to the
little to persuade Taiwan’s citizens will to resist Chinese pressure depends, mainland and the “tyranny of distance”
to embrace China’s vision of a “one in part, on the speed and efficacy of facing an attempt to surge U.S. forces
country, two system” model for cross- U.S. intervention in a conflict. China’s across the Western Pacific are liabilities
strait relations, prospects that are even military has thus built an arsenal of for the defense.
lower with China’s recent steps to erode long-range missiles and supporting Much can still be done to address
political freedoms in Hong Kong. To capabilities to try to keep the United the threat head-on, but a prudent U.S.
deter Taiwan independence and to pres- States out of the fight. approach should also consider ways of
sure Taiwan’s leaders to accept Beijing’s China’s basic advantages in any shifting the competition to areas where
Taiwan scenario include a high level of China is at a disadvantage. Multiple
political will—reunification is a “core in- pressures on the PLA, driven by China’s
Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow terest” for the Chinese Communist Party unfavorable geostrategic environment,
in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military
Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at
(CCP), which aspires to resolve the prob- provide the basis for a competitive
the National Defense University. lem on its own terms by the centennial strategy. In peacetime, the United States
JFQ 104, 1st Quarter 2022 Wuthnow 89
Security Forces Airmen assigned to 28th Security Forces Squadron from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, patrol near Air Force B-1B Lancer taxiway
at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, in support of Bomber Task Force mission, December 26, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Tristan Day)
should create headaches for the PLA in rely, wherever possible, on nonkinetic all the services have rolled out revised
other areas bordering China by increasing means. Ensuring Taiwan’s defense is no operational concepts designed to allow
military assistance and training to China’s easy feat but will be easier with operations U.S. forces to operate within China’s
other rivals. This approach would lever- that defray China’s local advantages and antiaccess/area-denial envelope, such
age the demand that many states have keep the PLA off balance. as using stealthier ships more, reducing
for better capabilities to resist Chinese reliance on large bases, operating more
coercion and play to preexisting Chinese A New Lens for an Old Problem from austere airstrips, and exploiting
concerns about threats suddenly appear- Most discussions on improving Tai- long-duration unmanned technology.
ing in secondary theaters. A PLA that is wan’s defenses focus on two issues. Both approaches are helpful in in-
simultaneously having to counter many First is modernizing Taiwan’s military stilling doubt in the Chinese leadership
different challenges will be less able to and equipping it with the means of about the PLA’s prospects in an amphibi-
focus on Taiwan. resisting Chinese aggression. This is ous invasion. Nevertheless, a problem
Looking at Taiwan’s defense through the subject of Taiwan’s “overall defense for the defense is that China has built
a competitive strategy lens also suggests concept,” which focuses on asymmetric large advantages in most categories of
different options for confronting the PLA weapons such as sea mines and coastal conventional power across the Taiwan
in wartime. China’s military structure is defense cruise missiles needed to blunt Strait—in submarines, for instance, the
built on the notion that the PLA must an invasion.3 Taiwan’s limited ability to ratio is 34 Chinese submarines assigned
be prepared to fight in many theaters at weather a Chinese offensive even with to the relevant theaters versus 2 for
once. By necessity, it contains a central- advanced equipment has led to a second Taiwan—forcing Taipei to rely on U.S.
ized command and control and logistics focus: preserving a credible U.S. inter- intervention to ensure its ability to resist
system designed to manage and reallocate vention capability so that the United a blockade and successive waves of am-
forces in a war. Targeting those critical States would be able to meet its obliga- phibious and airborne assaults. Yet this
links would complicate Chinese decision- tions under the Taiwan Relations Act to is a gamble, if one credits reports that
making, reduce the PLA’s capacity to “maintain the capacity” to resist China’s wargames consistently show U.S. forces
mass forces, and support U.S. and Taiwan use of force (acknowledging that any losing to China, due in part to China’s
operations in the main theater. To limit military intervention would ultimately impressive counter-intervention capa-
escalation risks, those operations should be a political decision).4 In recent years, bilities and in part to the vast distances
90 Features / Defending Taiwan in an Expanded Competitive Space JFQ 104, 1st Quarter 2022
that U.S. forces need to traverse. Some carriers in the 1995–1996 Taiwan landings, widely disperse its resources
concepts of intervention also envision Strait Crisis, sparked an emphasis on across the country (including allocating
extensive strikes on the mainland, which developing long-range antiship missiles advanced fighters and other modern
would carry a high risk of retributive and other capabilities to forestall U.S. capabilities to other regions), balance the
Chinese strikes on U.S. targets, such as intervention in a conflict. three naval fleets, and develop plans and
military bases in Japan or Guam.5 The PLA could not, however, fully train for a variety of contingencies.13 The
Given those limitations, more commit to preparations for a war with theater command system itself, as noted
thought is needed on how to move Taiwan and the United States. The crux below, is optimized for smaller border
the competition to different playing of the problem is a highly unfavorable clashes and not a single major conflict
fields where China has fewer advantages geostrategic environment. Within China of the sort that would be prosecuted on
(reflecting the logic of the “competi- itself, the western third of the country is Taiwan. Compounding the problem is
tive strategies” approach pioneered by occupied by ethnic Uighurs and Tibetans the PLA’s personnel system in which offi-
Andrew Marshall in the early 1970s).6 who have their own dreams of indepen- cers spend most of their careers in a single
Adopting this philosophy, the 2018 dence. Regionally, China shares land theater and are thus less fungible across
National Defense Strategy encourages borders with 14 countries and maritime different contingencies than, for instance,
U.S. policies that “expand the com- borders with an additional 7, including their American peers who frequently ro-
petitive space, seizing the initiative to states that are either unstable, such as tate to new assignments.
challenge our competitors where we pos- North Korea and Afghanistan, or that The June 2020 escalation with Indian
sess advantages and they lack strength.”7 have territorial disputes with China, troops along the disputed Himalayan
U.S. doctrine has emphasized a related including Japan, India, the Philippines, border illustrates the countervailing pres-
point: that adversary decisionmaking and Vietnam.10 Defending China’s long sures on PLA resources and attention.14
should be complicated by presenting it borders and dissuading other countries The area is what the PLA refers to as a
with “multiple dilemmas,” overwhelm- from asserting their sovereignty claims “secondary strategic direction,” where the
ing its capacity to reach timely decisions put competing demands on China’s finite threats facing China are less intense than
on the use of force.8 Both tenets encour- military resources. U.S. military presence in the main strategic direction, but still
age U.S. strategists to think creatively and the specter of U.S. involvement in require significant forces to deter or defeat
about our adversary’s constraints while conflicts ranging from Korea to the South a rival. To counter India and perform
taking a more holistic view of our own China Sea also mean that the PLA must other missions such as defending China’s
comparative strengths. prepare for high-end conflicts outside the Central Asian borders and deterring
Taiwan Strait. uprisings in ethnic majority regions, the
The PLA’s Fundamental Dilemma An additional problem, from the PLA has allocated roughly a quarter of
The basis of a competitive strategy PLA’s perspective, is the fear that China’s its ground forces to the Western Theater
is the tension in Chinese military rivals—both within the region and Command and the Tibet and Xinjiang
strategy between preparing for a war domestic forces opposed to Chinese military districts, complemented by eight
with Taiwan and fulfilling the dizzy- Communist Party rule—could take ad- fighter/ground attack brigades and four
ing array of other requirements with vantage of a war with Taiwan to challenge missile brigades.15 These forces train for
finite resources.9 A war with Taiwan has the regime or seize Chinese territory. missions such as counterterrorism and
been the PLA’s top planning scenario Chinese strategists write of the possibility high-altitude warfare and against the ca-
since the early 1990s. The rise of a new of a “chain reaction” of wars cascading pabilities of particular adversaries that have
generation of Kuomintang leaders who across China’s frontiers. Such concerns little bearing on the operations China
had less interest in a political union are not new. Mao himself reputedly would conduct in a war with Taiwan.
with the mainland, combined with warned the PLA not to overlook prob- Concerns about flare-ups in other
a Taiwan electorate largely opposed lems outside the main theater. Indeed, regions and a broad distribution of
to unification, meant that the PLA Chinese historians note that none of the capabilities have not prevented the
needed to prepare to seize and occupy wars that China fought during the Cold military balance across the strait from
the island. This led to investments in War was in an area then designated as the shifting gradually in China’s favor. PLA
short-range ballistic missiles, subma- “main strategic direction.”11 In the PLA’s capabilities have regularly been used
rines, and amphibious capabilities, as jargon, the military should not overem- to intimidate Taiwan’s leaders—for
well as training in what used to be phasize the main strategic direction (the instance, by a steady rhythm of H-6
called the Nanjing Military Region, southeast coast; and the Taiwan Strait, bomber flights around the island—and
recently rebranded as the Eastern in particular); it also needs to prepare for are sufficient for a range of cross-strait
Theater Command, focused on captur- combat in other theaters.12 operations, including missile bombard-
ing offshore islands. The possibility Combined, these competing concerns ments and a blockade.16 Moreover, there
of U.S. intervention, underscored by mean that the PLA has needed to gener- are some circumstances in which Beijing
the involvement of two U.S. aircraft ate capabilities less relevant to island might accept a high degree of risk to its
JFQ 104, 1st Quarter 2022 Wuthnow 91other interests to launch a war against requiring them to be actively involved in Critical Targets
Taiwan. For instance, a Taiwanese dec- cross-strait affairs. U.S. strategy could also try to move the
laration of independence could generate From this perspective, expanded competition in new directions during
a high degree of domestic pressure on security cooperation with states far a conflict. Such moves are typically
the CCP to act. However, Taiwanese from China’s southeast coast is particu- discussed under the label of “horizontal
leaders have been careful to avoid such larly useful. India is a prime example. escalation,” involving attacks on an
provocations, meaning that the likeliest Upgrading defense ties with New Delhi adversary’s interests in a secondary the-
scenario for China would be a calculated has been a goal of the last few U.S. ater.20 In a Taiwan scenario, it is tempt-
war of choice.17 Yet competing consider- administrations, pursued most recently ing to imagine U.S. forces leveraging
ations reduce China’s ability to mass its through renewed efforts to expand their maneuverability to pose problems
forces in wartime and make the task of defense industry cooperation; approval that tie up PLA resources elsewhere.
Taiwan’s defense more manageable for of $3 billion in arms sales, including However, opening a second front
Taipei and Washington. high-end items like air defense radars, would be difficult because of the near
MK 54 torpedoes, and Harpoon missiles; certainty that India or other countries
A Chain of Porcupines an agreement on the sharing of military in the region would stay out of the
China’s force planning dilemma pro- intelligence; and combat-focused exer- conflict and the likelihood that U.S.
vides options for thinking differently cises in the Indian Ocean featuring India leaders, attuned to the costs of a wider
about Taiwan’s defense prior to and and Japan. Further arms sales and other regional conflagration, would also try
during a conflict initiated by Beijing. assistance would not only serve India’s to avoid a larger war. As the congressio-
Applying a competitive strategies interest in countering Chinese coercion, nally mandated National Defense Strat-
approach, U.S. defense strategy in which has been piqued because of the egy Commission argued, “It is unlikely
peacetime should aim to reduce China’s 2020 border crisis, but also draw PLA that the United States could force its
ability to focus on Taiwan by maximiz- resources away from the Taiwan Strait. adversary to back down by applying
ing the range and complexity of chal- As Andrew Marshall explained re- pressure—military or otherwise—in
lenges facing the PLA in other theaters. garding the Soviet Union, competitive secondary areas.”21
This requires, in part, that the United strategies should also leverage bureau- In an indirect way, however, China’s
States maintain a strong presence at cratic fissures in the target country. geostrategic circumstances give the
many points along China’s periphery, Relevant here are China’s tendency United States additional warfighting op-
voice support for the defense of allies, to carve up the budgetary pie with as tions that do not rely on kinetic strikes or
and conduct high-end exercises with many “winners” as possible, contesta- futile diversions. The starting point is that
China’s other rivals. Such activities, tion between different parts of the PLA the PLA has adopted an organizational
which are central to the current Indo- for scarce resources, and the lack of a structure attuned to many small conflicts,
Pacific strategy, play into Chinese strong central mechanism to adjudi- and not to a single large contingency.
concerns about encirclement and add cate bureaucratic disputes. Increasing This preference for smaller contingencies
to the pressure to divide up resources threats from smaller rivals in the South is reflected in the PLA’s theater com-
among many theaters.18 China Sea would not only take up time mand system (which replaced the former
Expanding security cooperation with and capacity for the Southern Theater military regions as part of the broad
other states would enhance those effects. Command but also provide an argument restructuring of the military that began
Using Michael Beckley’s twist of a phrase for that theater to demand resources, in late 2015).22 The Eastern Theater
coined by William S. Murray, an explicit which might otherwise go to the Eastern Command lacks all the capabilities that
goal of U.S. strategy should be to ring Theater Command. Deepening defense would be necessary to execute a war:
China with “prickly porcupines” by sup- cooperation with India, for instance, amphibious and airborne units are based
plying other states with the military tools would serve as a powerful rationale for in adjacent theaters and space and cyber
necessary to resist coercion.19 Providing the Western Theater Command to argue assets are under the Strategic Support
additional training and advanced for more resources. Force. Countering U.S. intervention
weapons and equipment, like antiship Selling more advanced arms to would require long-range missiles that
missiles, to states such as Vietnam, the China’s other neighbors in a bid to take are likely under the direct control of the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, pressure off Taiwan would probably not Central Military Commission. In addition
would serve their interests in maintaining dissuade China from using force—any to mobilizing reinforcements, frontline
sovereignty while also ramping up the decision to use force assumes a high risk commanders may have to request am-
challenges the PLA Navy, Marines, and and cost tolerance and would be under- munition and equipment based in other
Air Force would have to counter outside taken only in exigent circumstances. But theaters if major losses are sustained at
the Taiwan Strait. By pursuing their own it does encourage the PLA to spread out the war’s outset.
ends, these countries could indirectly its limited resources, which ultimately The limitations of China’s theater
contribute to Taiwan’s defense without works in favor of Taiwan’s defense. command structure mean the war would
92 Features / Defending Taiwan in an Expanded Competitive Space JFQ 104, 1st Quarter 2022be centrally managed, most likely by the approach exploits a PLA organizational for U.S. forces to seize the initiative and Joint Staff Department in Beijing. Logistics culture that emphasizes centralization, in sustain a higher decision tempo than PLA operations would rely on a distributed contrast to the U.S. “mission command” leadership can operate within. network of depots controlled by the Joint philosophy of empowering command- Logistic Support Force in Wuhan.23 Then, ers to implement approved policy aims Conclusion rather than focusing mainly on the Taiwan without precise direction and intensive Taiwan benefits from regional distur- Strait, U.S. operations should try to sever management oversight. bances, such as the recent clash with the command and control and logistics Generating those effects would also India, in direct and indirect ways. The networks critical to Beijing’s ability to benefit from information operations that possibility of a conflict with other rivals manage the war (while preserving critical try to exploit cleavages in Chinese civil-mil- forces China’s constrained resources U.S. networks that would be targeted by itary relations. During a conflict, the PLA to be broadly dispersed and its troops the PLA). Such operations would leverage would likely argue that it is fully capable trained and equipped for diverse scenar- what one RAND study deems potential of managing the conflict while adequately ios. Such contingencies have also pro- Chinese weaknesses in cyber defense,24 and defending China’s security in secondary duced a theater structure not well suited may benefit from recent investments, such theaters. However, civilian leaders, prone to a war. These are systemic weaknesses as the U.S. Army’s creation of informa- to years of PLA dissembling and obfusca- for the PLA that could be leveraged to tion operations detachments within its tion, would approach those assurances with shift the competition to areas beyond multidomain task force concept, which at least some skepticism.26 Information the Taiwan Strait, rendering the task of include both cyber and electronic warfare operations that raise questions about the countering Chinese operations in the capabilities.25 Even if the PLA is able to PLA’s competence—such as misinforma- main theater more manageable. Playing reconstitute those systems, the disruption tion suggesting that key systems may not to existing concerns among Chinese could frustrate China’s decisionmaking be completely reliable—would exacerbate strategists, U.S. alliances could be deep- process and buy valuable time for U.S. those doubts and potentially lead to ad- ened to overextend PLA assets, while forces to intervene, without the need for ditional delays as problems are investigated. critical links in the PLA’s command kinetic strikes. An added virtue is that this This would create new opportunities structure could be targeted in a conflict Sailor stands spy radar system control watch aboard USS Barry during routine transit of Taiwan Strait, September 17, 2021 (U.S. Navy/Justin Stack) JFQ 104, 1st Quarter 2022 Wuthnow 93
to reduce its capacity to mass force.
6
Andrew W. Marshall, Long-Term Independence,” The National Interest, February
Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for 19, 2019, available at .
investments, including greater resources see Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., Competitive 18
Joel Wuthnow, Just Another Paper Tiger?
for U.S. Cyber Command to pursue Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Indo-Pacific
electronic warfare capabilities.27 and Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Strategy, INSS Strategic Forum No. 305
Press, 2012). (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2020).
This approach, however, comes with a 7
Summary of the 2018 National Defense 19
Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military
key caveat: U.S. assistance to Taiwan itself Strategy of the United States of America: Balance in East Asia,” International Security
should remain focused on vital areas, Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017), 117; William S. Murray,
such as capabilities necessary to thwart Edge (Washington, DC: Department of “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval
an invasion.28 Flashy upgrades in U.S.- Defense, 2018), 4. War College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008),
8
Terrence J. O’Shaugnessy, Matthew 2–27.
Taiwan defense cooperation envisioned in D. Strohmeyer, and Christopher D. Forrest, 20
Michael Fitzsimmons, “Horizontal
recent U.S. legislation, such as high-level “Strategic Shaping: Expanding the Competitive Escalation: An Asymmetric Approach to Russian
visits or port calls, would spark the ire of Space,” Joint Force Quarterly 90 (3rd Quarter Aggression?” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no.
the Chinese public and shine a spotlight 2018), 10–15. 1 (Spring 2019), 95–133.
on problems in the Taiwan Strait, reduc-
9
For instance, the growth of China’s official 21
Providing for the Common Defense:
defense spending has slowed in recent years. The Assessment and Recommendations of
ing attention to the Himalayas, the East
The 2020 budget was approximately $178 the National Defense Strategy Commission
China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula. billion, though experts believe the true number (Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Such activities, though intended to deter is somewhat higher. U.S. defense spending in Peace, 2018), available at .
See Yew Lun Tian, “China Defence Spending 22
See Phillip C. Saunders et al., eds.,
Rise at Three-Decade Low, Still to Grow Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing
6.6%,” Reuters, May 21, 2020, available at Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, DC:
Notes . city of Wuhan in early 2020. See Joel Wuthnow,
China’s Military Be Distracted in a War Over 10
For a broad overview, see Andrew J. “Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan:
Taiwan? China Strategic Perspectives No. 15 Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Insights into Chinese Military Logistics,” China
(Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2020), Security (New York: Columbia University Press, Brief 20, no. 7 (April 13, 2020), available at
available at . during the 1979 border war, it was in the north. 24
Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China
2
Annual Report to Congress: Military and 12
Wuthnow, System Overload, 8–11. Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the
Security Developments Involving the People’s 13
See Andrew Scobell et al., eds., The Evolving Balance of Power 1996–2017 (Santa
Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 266–268.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 166. Planning in China (Washington, DC: NDU 25
Sean Kimmons, “Army to Build Three
3
For a summary, see Drew Thompson, Press, 2015). Multi-Domain Task Forces Using Lessons
“Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New 14
M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Sovereignty from Pilot,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
Defense Concept,” War on the Rocks, October Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, June 26, 2020, October 15, 2019, available at .
4
Specifically, the Taiwan Relations Act states 15
Frank O’Donnell and Alexander K. 26
On problems in civil-military relations, see
that U.S. policy is to “maintain the capacity of Bollfrass, The Strategic Postures of China and Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Large
the United States to resist any resort to force or India: A Visual Guide (Cambridge, MA: Belfer and in Charge: Civil-Military Relations Under
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize Center for Science and International Affairs, Xi Jinping,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA,
the security, or the social or economic system, March 2020), available at . Need More Electronic Warfare Tools?” Fifth
U.S.C. 3301 et seq., 96th Cong., 1st sess., 16
Derek Grossman et al., China’s Domain, May 21, 2019, available at . 17
Most recently, Tsai Ing-wen has 28
Such a strategy complements Taiwan’s
5
Kathy Gilsinan, “How the U.S. Could lowered the barriers to an independence “overall defense concept,” which focuses
Lose a War with China,” The Atlantic, July 25, referendum but “strategically left out plebiscites primarily on ways to counter a prospective
2019, available at . Is Not the Time for a Referendum of Taiwanese
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