Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific - A Potential Change for the Army and Joint Force - National Defense ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Combat controller watches as C-17 Globemaster III,
assigned to 17th Weapons Squadron, Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada, lands on airstrip in Nevada Test and
Training Range during joint forcible entry exercise,
June 16, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kevin Tanenbaum)
he nature of troop dispositions
Countering A2/AD in T coupled with the expanse of
ocean and numerous islands
scattered in the Indo-Pacific region
the Indo-Pacific compels the redevelopment of con-
ventional forcible-entry amphibious
capability in the U.S. Army for deploy-
A Potential Change for the ment and maneuver. As Commander-
in-Chief Far East, General Douglas
Army and Joint Force MacArthur made this assessment over
half a century ago, but it deserves intel-
lectual inquiry and dialogue in the con-
temporary period based on the growing
By Hassan M. Kamara
strategic competition and potential for
conflict between the United States and
its allies and China in the Indo-Pacific.
The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, considers amphibious Furthermore, this assessment deserves
contemplation based on the Army’s
training to have unusual significance and importance in the
ongoing conceptualization of multido-
Far East Command since the nature of troop dispositions and main formations to help future joint
force commanders apply the Service’s
geography in the theater are such that a continuous requirement
capabilities across all domains, thereby
exists for the training of troops in over-water movement.
—Letter from General HQ, Far East Command to ACofS G3 Operations,
Headquarters Department of the Army, April 3, 1950 Major Hassan M. Kamara, USA, is an Officer in
the U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. He
recently served on the Army Future Studies
Group.
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kamara 97
Paratroopers of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conduct joint forcible entry operation during brigade’s Mungadai event, on Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, April 5, 2016 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull)
presenting multiple and compounding maneuver the U.S. military’s decisive and fight as landing forces in joint forc-
dilemmas for an adversary.1 ground force (the Army) through the ible entry amphibious operations.
A conflict with China in the Indo- maritime domain.3 This proposed change Landing forces are central to amphibi-
Pacific region will most likely involve is congruent with the mission of the ous operations. In fact, Joint Publication
regional access-denial efforts by China, Army as a component of the joint force. (JP) 3-02, Amphibious Operations,
resulting in a counter-antiaccess/area According to Army Doctrinal Publication defines an amphibious operation as “a
denial (A2/AD) campaign by the United 1, the Army’s mission is “to fight and win military operation launched from the sea
States and its allies. U.S. joint doctrine the Nation’s wars through prompt and by an amphibious force (AF) embarked in
anticipates the possibility of engaging in a sustained land combat, as part of the joint ships or craft with the primary purpose of
counter-A2/AD campaign and mandates force.”4 Strategic and tactical mobility introducing a landing force (LF) ashore
that “the Armed Forces of the United are inherent to the Army’s mission, and to accomplish the assigned mission.”5
States must be capable of deploying and amphibious operation—as a basic means Also, a landing force can be comprised of
fighting to gain access to geographical of deploying and maneuvering Army either Army or Marine units.6
areas controlled by forces hostile to U.S. forces—is vital to the accomplishment
interest.”2 U.S. forces conduct joint forc- of the Army’s mission and its role in the Justification for Studying
ible entry operations to gain and maintain joint force. Redevelopment
access to areas against armed opposition. It bears emphasizing that the Army Contemporary advancements in military
The redevelopment of conventional has amphibious-capable logistics forces A2/AD capabilities and regional eco-
forcible-entry Army amphibious forces that support joint operations (for ex- nomic and security trends underscore
will enhance the joint forcible entry ample, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore). the need to study this topic and foster
capability and capacity of U.S. forces in However, the Service lacks conventional dialogue. First, the sophistication of
a potential counter-A2/AD campaign (regular Army, non–special operations) the integrated air defenses of America’s
against China in the Indo-Pacific by combat arms formations that are orga- potential near-peer adversaries makes the
enabling commanders to deploy and nized, trained, and equipped to deploy contemporary construct of air superiority
98 Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020
as a condition for deploying and maneu- A2/AD. Antiaccess is described in the rubric to highlight how the redevelop-
vering ground forces unrealistic in future 2012 JOAC as “those actions and capa- ment of forcible-entry Army amphibious
counter-A2/AD operations. The U.S. bilities, usually long range, designed to forces would enhance the joint forcible
Army Training and Doctrine Command prevent an opposing force from entering entry capability and capacity of U.S.
(TRADOC) acknowledges the challenge an operational area.” The JOAC differen- forces in a possible counter-A2/AD cam-
posed by modern A2/AD capabilities tiates antiaccess from area denial. It states paign against China in the Indo-Pacific.
and argues that “integrated air defense that “area denial refers to those actions Since these precepts are inherently
networks complicate joint operations and capabilities, usually of shorter range, oriented toward meeting the challenges
because hidden, lethal, and dispersed air designed not to keep an opposing force that will be presented to U.S. joint
defenses can allow the enemy to establish out, but to limit its freedom of action forces by the A2 campaign of a potential
air superiority from the ground and take within the operational area.”10 peer adversary like China, their use as
away an essential condition for effective The JOAC expects U.S. adversaries units of analysis is appropriate. In other
joint force operations.”7 This anticipated will use A2/AD strategies to offset U.S. words, these precepts are an excellent
contest in the air domain, and the poten- strategic superiority in multiple domains, lens to highlight and appreciate the po-
tial that the United States could lose its and it presents conceptual alternatives tential utility of the Army redeveloping
forward bases early in a Chinese A2 cam- to counter them. In the Indo-Pacific, conventional forcible-entry amphibious
paign, precipitate the need to find ways the joint force should expect China to forces to enhance the joint force. The
and means of deploying and maneuver- employ an A2/AD strategy that will following are the selected precepts of
ing decisive ground forces through challenge theater access and freedom of operational access—highlighted in the
potential corridors of opportunity in the maneuver in a potential conflict. Based on 2012 JOAC—that comprise the units of
maritime domain. the ability of U.S. adversaries to challenge analysis for this study:
Contemporary economic and security the joint force’s legacy counter-A2/AD
•• Seize the initiative by deploying and
affairs in the region further underscore capabilities, TRADOC writes that “the
operating on multiple, independent
the need to study this topic and foster joint force should anticipate disrupted
lines of operations.
dialogue. Armed conflict between the deployment and sustainment operations
•• Exploit advantages in one or more
United States and its allies and China in and degraded effectiveness of the standoff
domains to disrupt enemy A2/AD
the Indo-Pacific is likely because China targeting and strikes currently required to
capabilities in others.
views the South China Sea as a long-term gain access and seize the initiative.”11
•• Maneuver directly against key
resource vital to meeting its needs and The 2012 JOAC. The 2012 JOAC
operational objectives from strategic
so seeks to control it. This is evident in describes how the U.S. military envisions
distance.14
China’s ongoing construction and force its response to emerging A2/AD capabil-
buildup on artificial islands and its armed ities of potential adversaries, who seem to
maritime confrontation with other na- view the latter as a preferred method to
The Precepts
Through the lens of the following
tions over its appropriation of islands. counter U.S. strategic superiority across
precepts of operational access, it is
Geoffrey Till concurs and writes that the domains. Through its central thesis of
conceivable that the redevelopment
South China Sea is a “stock resource” cross-domain synergy and its principles or
of conventional forcible-entry Army
that China sees “as an economic resource precepts, “the JOAC describes how the
amphibious forces will enhance the joint
vital to its future prosperity” because of future joint forces will achieve operational
forcible entry capability and capacity of
the oil, gas, and fish that will support access in the face of such strategies [anti-
U.S. forces in a potential counter-A2/
its growing energy and human needs.8 access and area denial].”12
AD campaign against China in the
Robert Kaplan writes that “at some Cross-Domain Synergy. The concept
Indo-Pacific.
point, China is likely to, in effect, be able of cross-domain synergy outlined in the
Seize the Initiative by Deploying and
to deny the U.S. Navy unimpeded access 2012 JOAC advocates the “comple-
Operating on Multiple, Independent
to parts of the South China Sea.”9 This mentary” versus the merely “additive”
Lines of Operations. The redevelopment
will precipitate conflict with the United employment of joint force capabilities to
of conventional forcible-entry Army
States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. optimize exploitation of the asymmetric
amphibious forces will enhance the
advantages inherent in each Service’s
joint force’s capability and capacity to
Concepts and Framework capabilities.13
mount multiple lines of operations across
of Analysis The Analytical Framework. The
domains. The latter can compound the
Articulating the concepts and the concept of cross-domain synergy as pre-
number of avenues of approach an enemy
framework used for the ensuing analysis sented in the 2012 JOAC rests on certain
has to defend in its A2 campaign. The
is necessary to foster understanding. precepts intended to help guide think-
JOAC concurs and posits that “operating
The concepts discussed include A2/AD, ing and planning for future counter-A2
on multiple lines in multiple domains
the Joint Operational Access Concept campaigns. The following analysis uses
simultaneously can help joint forces to
(JOAC), and cross-domain synergy. a selection of these precepts as a lens or
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kamara 99seize the initiative by overloading the surface-to-air missile unit, and several a unique role as America’s elite light ex-
enemy’s ability to cope.”15 units of the Shorts Blowpipe and SA-7 peditionary ground combat force, a role
During his 1944 World War II Pacific Grail man-portable air-defense systems.17 for which the Army, with its greater mass
campaign, General MacArthur success- British military planners were for sustained ground combat operations,
fully seized Saidor, New Guinea, from the compelled to exploit the Royal Navy’s is ill suited. The transformation proposed
Japanese by deploying Army, joint, and al- capabilities in the maritime domain in this article is not targeted at having
lied forces on multiple lines of operations for deployment and decisive ground the Army usurp the role of the Marine
across domains. His combat report fol- maneuver because the Argentine air Corps but rather at giving future U.S.
lowing the seizure of Saidor proves this: defense threat precluded airborne joint force commanders and planners the
forcible-entry operations. Additionally, ability to deploy and maneuver the Army
We have seized Saidor on the north coast there was no host nation bordering the through temporary maritime corridors
of New Guinea. Lit a combined operation Falkland Islands that could be used for of opportunity provided by the Navy to
of ground, sea and air forces, elements of forward staging and maneuver. Michael apply its unrivaled capacity for sustained
the Sixth Army landed at three beaches Clapp, the commander of the British ground combat in the Indo-Pacific.
under cover of heavy air and naval Amphibious Task Group at the time, The counterargument that the am-
bombardment. The enemy was surprised writes that quite early in their prepara- phibious capability of the Marine Corps is
both strategically and tactically and the tion, British military planners appreciated prodigious enough to preclude the need
landings were accomplished without loss. the disconcerting fact that “there would for complementary amphibious capability
The harbor and airfields are in our firm be no ‘host-nation’ and we would there- in the Army also fails to take into account
grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast fore have to offload (possibly during the the potential for China, like Argentina
between the Sixth Army and the advancing opposed landing always considered so in the Falklands War, to field forces with
Australians are trapped with no source unlikely by the Government), protect capabilities and such mass that it becomes
of supply and face disintegration and ourselves and deploy forward using our necessary to employ the Army for its
destruction.16 own assets and fuel.”18 mass and endurance in ground combat.
Given the mass or troop strength of This counterargument also neglects the
Exploit Advantages in One or Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands, possibility that an adversary may widely
More Domains to Disrupt Enemy A2/ retaking them required the decisive distribute its forces among the many dis-
AD Capabilities in Others. Growing ground forces of the British army in addi- connected land masses in the Indo-Pacific
conventional forcible-entry amphibi- tion to Royal Marine commando forces. (consider Japan in the World War II Pacific
ous capability in the Army will enable This understanding required deploying campaign) to necessitate employing the
joint force commanders to deploy and both Royal Marine commando forces Army’s decisive ground forces as part of a
maneuver the Service’s decisive ground and the non-amphibious, decisive ground joint and allied effort to dislodge them.
forces through the maritime domain, forces of the British army into a maritime- The British experience in the
not just the air domain, which creates centric theater where the enemy was Falklands campaign shows that in a
a dilemma for an adversary’s A2/AD contesting access by air and sea. Michael counter-A2/AD campaign, particularly
campaign planning. This transformation Clapp writes that “it was clear . . . that in a maritime-centric region like the
will provide an asymmetrical advantage merchant ships would be required and Indo-Pacific, the complementary versus
critical for maneuvering against enemy that the 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal the merely additive employment of joint
positions on the many disconnected land Marines, would be enhanced by further force capabilities is critical to optimal
masses that will constitute objectives in Army forces.”19 exploitation of the asymmetric advantages
a potential counter-A2/AD campaign Clapp’s statement compels conten- inherent in each Service’s capabilities. The
against China. The British experience in tion with a major counterargument to British complemented the amphibious
the 1982 Falkland Islands campaign is redeveloping forcible-entry amphibious commando forces of the Royal Marines
instructive in this regard. capability in the U.S. Army for employ- with shipborne army paratroopers to fully
Following its full occupation of the ment in the Indo-Pacific, which is that exploit the Royal Navy’s sea control for
Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982, the the amphibious capability of the U.S. deployment and decisive ground maneu-
Argentinian military developed an inte- Marine Corps is prodigious enough to ver against Argentine forces.
grated air defense system in and around preclude the need for complementary Maneuver Directly Against Key
Port Stanley with the aid of an AN/TPS- amphibious capability in the Army. This Operational Objectives from Strategic
43 Search radar and a command, control, counterargument indirectly suggests that Distance. Redeveloping forcible-entry
and communications center (Centro redeveloping forcible-entry amphibious amphibious capability in the Army will
de Información y Control). According capability in the Army can make it dupli- afford joint force commanders the flex-
to Rodney Burden and his co-authors, cative and therefore capable of replacing ibility of deploying America’s decisive
Argentinian forces deployed several the Marine Corps. This suggestion is ground forces directly into combat from
batteries of antiaircraft guns, a Roland groundless because the Marine Corps has the U.S. mainland and other overseas
100 Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020Marines take new Amphibious Combat Vehicle out for open-ocean low-light testing at Del Mar Beach on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California,
December 17, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Andrew Cortez)
bases—thereby complicating enemy airpower against critical U.S. forward corridors facilitated by the Royal Navy’s
defensive preparations by wielding an bases like Kadena Air Force Base, Japan, control of the sea. Subsequently, the
Army that is not tied to fixed forward and Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The British military hastily requisitioned sev-
bases or restricted solely to deployment study’s “analysis shows that China’s con- eral merchant ships taken up from trade
and maneuver through the air domain ventional missile forces have expanded (STUFTs) to transport ground forces
(for example, airborne forced entry). their capabilities over the past 15 years to the Falkland Islands. Many STUFTs
According to the 2012 JOAC, “some to the point that the PLA [People’s were hurriedly retrofitted for transporting
elements of the joint force will oper- Liberation Army] can now contest U.S. Army and Marine commando troops.
ate directly against key objectives from air base operations within roughly 1,500 Among the STUFTs was the North Sea
points of origin or other points outside km of Chinese territory. This capability ferry MV Norland, which transported
the theater without the need for forward will indirectly impinge on a much larger 840 paratroopers from the British army’s
staging.”20 The JOAC cautions that the range of U.S. capabilities, complicating Second Battalion, Parachute Regiment.23
assured regional access afforded by U.S. the air superiority battle.”22 Another STUFT used to move troops
forward bases can be degraded by attacks The British army’s experience in the in the counter-A2 campaign was the SS
on those bases and consequently “calls 1982 Falklands War offers insight on the Canberra, a cruise ship.
for some elements of a joint force to ma- subject of maneuvering directly against
neuver against key operational objectives key operational objectives from a strategic The Way Ahead:
directly from ports of embarkation.”21 distance. Given that the airspace over Recommendation
According to a 2015 RAND study the South Atlantic was contested by the There are many considerations inherent
of U.S.-China military capabilities and Argentine air force, and the objective was in redeveloping conventional forcible-
capacity in simulated Taiwan and Spratly an island without a land-bordering “host- entry amphibious capability in the
Islands campaign scenarios, the Chinese nation,” the British army had to deploy Army. Two broad yet critical consider-
military will be able to contest U.S. air and maneuver directly against operational ations are examined herein. First, as part
superiority through the use of conven- objectives in the Falkland Islands from of any effort to redevelop conventional
tional precision standoff weapons and the United Kingdom using maritime forcible-entry amphibious capability
JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020 Kamara 101in the Army, this Service and the joint force’s ability to deploy and maneuver .
force as a whole should develop an America’s decisive ground force against an 5
JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations (Wash-
intellectual foundation in the form of an adversary like China in a contested mari- ington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 10, 2009),
operational concept that will facilitate time-centric region like the Indo-Pacific xi, available at .
overall force management decisions. air domains. Redeveloping forcible-entry
6
Ibid., II-7.
7
Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Com-
As part of this effort, the Army should amphibious capability in the Army will
bined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025–2040,
review and update its legacy doctrine for afford future joint force commanders the version 1.0 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC,
amphibious operations in coordination flexibility of deploying and maneuvering December 2017), available at .
8
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Field Manual 31-12, Army Forces in temporary corridors of sea control af-
Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge,
Amphibious Operations (The Army forded by the Navy. This will increase 2013), 319.
Landing Force), provided Army com- the overall cross-domain synergy of U.S. 9
Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The
manders and planners “the fundamental forces in a potential counter-A2/AD cam- South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific
principles, doctrine, and procedures paign against China in the Indo-Pacific. In (New York: Random House, 2015), 15.
10
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),
relative to the U.S. Army component of his work on A2/AD, Sam Tangredi high-
version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department
an amphibious task force.”24 Obsolete lights the value of cross-domain synergy of Defense, January 17, 2012), available at
doctrinal documents like this are worth and writes that “militaries that can obtain .
foundation of Army amphibious opera- more capable [ones].”26 JFQ
11
Multi-Domain Battle.
12
JOAC.
tions as part of the joint force. 13
Ibid.
Working in concert with the Navy and 14
Ibid., 17.
Marine Corps, the Army should consider Notes 15
Ibid., 20.
identifying, training, and qualifying two 16
Reports of General MacArthur, The
brigade combat teams (BCTs) to operate
1
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, vol. 1
mand (TRADOC), Pamphlet 525-3-1, The (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Mili-
as landing forces in an amphibious task U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 tary History, 1994), 132, available at . The Army’s evolving con- Air War (London: British Aviation Group,
cept of multidomain operations is congruent 1986), 17–18.
landing force. For operational flexibility, with the joint force’s efforts to integrate U.S. 18
Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Taily-
one of the BCTs should be capable of capabilities to fight in “all domains.” Speak- our, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle
conducting ship-to-shore movement by ing on changes in the character of war and the of San Carlos Water (Annapolis, MD: Naval
helicopter (air assault) and the other by global strategic landscape, General Joseph F. Institute Press, 1996), 35.
surface (landing craft). Dunford, Jr., emphasized that the “future force 19
Ibid., 25.
must remain competitive in ‘all domains,’ deny 20
JOAC, 23.
Additionally, selecting a BCT to adversaries’ ability to counter our strengths 21
Ibid., 19.
serve as a landing force in joint forcible asymmetrically, and retain the ability to project 22
Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China
entry amphibious operations will ensure power at a time and place of our choosing.” Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the
the Army provides the joint task force See “Gen. Dunford: The Character of War & Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa
commander the doctrinally prescribed Strategic Landscape Have Changed,” DOD Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 45, available at
Live, April 30, 2018, available at .
Operations, mandates that “the Army 2
Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, Joint 23
Ibid., 64–65.
maneuver battalion, brigade, division, Forcible Entry Operations (Washington, 24
Field Manual 31-12, Army Forces in Am-
or corps . . . be task-organized with ap- DC: The Joint Staff, 2018), vii, avail- phibious Operations (The Army Landing Force)
able at . 25
JP 3-02, II-7.
3
Decisive ground force refers to the Army’s 26
Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare:
The redevelopment of conventional unrivaled capacity (the combination of its supe- Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD:
forcible-entry Army amphibious forces in rior mass, lethality, and sustainment infrastruc- Naval Institute Press, 2013), 157.
ture) for sustained (long-term) ground combat
the contemporary period could benefit operations.
the Army and the joint force in a potential 4
Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army
counter-A2/AD campaign against China (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department
in the Indo-Pacific. Currently, the joint of the Army, September 2012), 1–8, available at
102 Features / Countering A2/AD in the Indo-Pacific JFQ 97, 2nd Quarter 2020You can also read
