CHINESE GROCERY'S AGE OF EMPIRES - TWO GIANT GROUPINGS ARE CARVING UP THE MARKET - Oliver Wyman
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
CHINESE GROCERY’S AGE OF EMPIRES TWO GIANT GROUPINGS ARE CARVING UP THE MARKET
CHINESE GROCERY’S
AGE OF EMPIRES
Chinese retail is evolving into two rival empires, each dominated by competing e-commerce
giants. One realm is centered on Alibaba, which owns two of China’s largest e-commerce
platforms, Taobao and TMall, as well as an electronic payments system, AliPay. The other is an
alliance between JD, a leading online retailer, and Tencent, an internet and digital-technology
conglomerate that owns WeChat, China’s most popular social-media app. These two empires
already own the digital lives of Chinese consumers today, where the average Chinese spends
over 60% of their mobile app usage on either ecosystem.
Now Alibaba and Tencent/JD have set their sights on physical retail, including acquiring stakes
in six of China’s top 10 hypermarkets, the country’s biggest electronics retailer, one of the largest
department stores and the largest commercial property and entertainment conglomerate.
Exhibit 1: Empire of JD/Tencent and Alibaba
Experiece Online Physical Online Offline Social
retail retail influence influence
JD/ Mobike, QQ Vip.com, Little Walmart, Tencent Video, WeChat Pay, WeChat, QQ,
Tencent University, Red Book, Yonghui, Dianping, JD logistics, LY.com, Qzone,
Tencent Cloud, YHD.com, Wanda, Sogou, QQ Meituan Pengyou.com
QQ Gaming, Zhuanzhuan Carrefour Music, WeChat
DiDi ChuXing Pay
Alibaba Ali Health, Taobao Etao, Taobao, Intime Retail, MGTV, YTO express, Sina Weibo,
Group Education, Hema, Tmall, New Huadu, Yicai.com, 36Kr, Cainiao, Alipay, Momo,
Amap.com, Suning.com Bailian, SCMP, Alipay Ali LST, Koubei Qyer.com,
Xiami, Eleme, Century Mart, AcFun, Youku
DiDi ChuXing, Sanjiang, Sun
Ali Cloud Art, Hema
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Underlying their growing dominance is Chinese consumers’ enthusiasm for online shopping:
In 2006, just 11 percent of the population enjoyed internet access; today, more than 460 million
Chinese – one-third of the population – regularly shop online.
Exhibit 2: Number of online shoppers in China from 2006 to 2016
IN MM
500 466.7
413.3
361.4
301.9
250 242.0
160.5 194.0
74.0 108.0
33.6 46.4
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Source: CNNIC, Statista 2017
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 3Unlike in Europe and North America, food shopping – the largest retail segment – is moving
online too, encouraged by densely populated cities that favor rapid, efficient home delivery.
As a result, nearly 10 percent of the Chinese population shops for groceries online, compared
to just 3 percent in the United States and 6 percent in the United Kingdom, Europe’s highest
rate. And room for expansion remains: Already, an estimated 5 percent of Chinese shoppers
buy groceries exclusively online, indicating plenty of potential growth if more people stop
shopping for food in physical stores. To gain still more customers, the e-commerce giants are
introducing new shopping formats – dubbed O2O, or online-to-offline – that blend online
shopping’s convenience and wealth of information with the social experience and physical
contact with products that people enjoy in traditional, brick-and-mortar stores.
An important foundation of the tech giants’ retail innovations is their dominance in mobile
payments, of which 97 percent are processed by either Alibaba or Tencent. Mobile payments
are already used for 35 percent of grocery purchases, and even when customers shop outside
the big e-commerce platforms, they can still be a valuable source of data. Through the
payments systems, the empires learn where, when, and what customers are buying, and
complement it with the rest of their digital ecosystem to see which websites they like to
visit, the apps they use, and whom they follow on social media.
Exhibit 3: Development of mobile payment landscape in China
MARKET SHARE BY PLAYER MARKET SIZE OF MOBILE PAYMENT IN CHINA
2017H1 IN TN RMB
2% 120
108
100
32%
80
202%
60
65%
40
35
20
16
8
0 1
AliPay WeChat Pay Others
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F
Source: Mobile payment association, Yiguan, Union Pay, Oliver Wyman analysis
China’s traditional supermarkets and convenience stores can’t compete with this onslaught,
and both their like-for-like sales and their margins are declining (see Exhibit 4).
But they may survive in some form with help from the online giants themselves. Both Alibaba
and JD have developed logistics systems based on centralized, large-scale networks of
warehouses, which can replace traditional distribution. For supermarkets, the online giants
can thus provide the means to deliver fresh food quick enough to satisfy demanding Chinese
home cooks. They have also developed software that helps old-fashioned corner shops more
easily access and tap into their logistics system to directly order goods.
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 4Exhibit 4: Declining performance to traditional big box grocers
LFL REVENUE GROWTH RATE EVOLUTION BY PLAYER, 2010-2016 OPERATING MARGIN BY PLAYER
IN % 2012 VS. 2016
IN %
15 2012 2016
10
CRE1 4.42 -4.63
5
Wumart1 3.5 2.03
0
-5 Yonghui 3.0 3.0
-10
San Jiang4 4.2 2.9
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1. 2015 number for CRE and Wumart is as of H1 FY2015; CRE figures are based on retail segment result figure as reported in the annual
report “Segment Result“, mainly consisting of CR Vanguard, Chinese Arts & Crafts, CRCare, VIVO, Pacific Coffee, etc. | 2. Based on retail
segment result figure as reported in the annual report “Segment Result” representing earnings before interest income, finance costs
and taxation, to which we’ve added back the annual net gain on disposal of non-core investments and valuation surplus on investment
properties | 3. As of 2015 due to data availability | 4. 2011-2014 LFL not available; 2015-2016 comparison on same store revenue growth;
includes convenience store etc
Source: Corporate annual reports, Investor presentations, Analyst reports, Oliver Wyman analysis
Both empires are building their O2O power through three plays, each of which blends their
online capabilities with offline stores in new ways.
Exhibit 5: Future of retail in China: Major plays by the empires
1 2 3
Experiments with new Strategic partnership with Reinvention of traditional “mom and
retail formats traditional big box retailers pop” shops
Start to open own O2O retail Strategically invest in Capture the B2B opportunity to have fewer
formats to showcase what offline giants to facilitate layers, higher efficiency, and more transparency
“future” looks like their transformation and within RTM, and disrupt traditional distributors/
realize synergy wholesalers
Taobao.com,
YHD.com, JD,
Tmall.com Brands
Stay in the center of retail
ecosystem and interact with
every stakeholder
e-Commerce platform
Already became the
largest players in
Ali/
JD’s retail
empire
3
Ali LST, JD
China grocery market Xintonglu
Alibaba Group,
JD, Tencent Lianhua,
Consumers (multiple layers of)
Hema, Quik, Walmart,
7 Fresh, JD Bailian, RT-Mart, Distributors/
Convenience wholesalers
1 store, Tmall
Xiaodian
Yonghui,
Carrefour 2
Retailers
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 51 EXPERIMENTS WITH NEW
RETAIL FORMATS
The first play is the development of new formats that blend digital and physical features to
create imaginative new solutions. Many large supermarkets worldwide now offer online
services, where customers can order via a website and have food delivered. But these mainly
work as parallel services to traditional shopping in physical supermarkets.
Exhibit 6: Overview of new retail format development
Alibaba Group JD/Tencent Other players
On its own By affiliated retailers On its own By affiliated retailers
• Hema • Haiwuhui • 7 Fresh • Super Species • Fresh Ideas
(New Huadu) (JD) (Yonghui) (Bu Bu Gao)
• F2
Fast & • RT-Fresh • Zhangyu • Hyper-mart • Sp@ce
Fresh • RISO (Meituan) (Bubugao) (Tian Hong)
Fresh (Hema)
supermarket • Lianhua Jingxuan
(Lianhua & Bailian)
• Bingo Box
• Auchan Minute JD unmanned store • Bingo Box
(Auchan)
• Xingbianli
• Suning Biu
(Suning)
Unmanned
retail
Source: Analyst reports, Company annual report, Oliver Wyman analysis
At Alibaba’s Hema stores, customers don’t have to go to checkout counters; they can pay by
smartphone. Many don’t take their purchases with them; the store sends a delivery van. And
some don’t even want all their food at home; supermarket staff members cook some of it for
eating in the store.
Exhibit 7: Key features of new “O2O” stores – Hema example
ASSORTMENT
AND STORE IN-STORE CHECK
PRODUCT SET-UP EXPERIENCE -OUT
DISPLAY
1. WELL PACKED HIGH 2. BASKETS ON THE 3. IN-STORE DINING 4. HEMA APP TO CHECK
QUALITY FRESH FLYING RAIL OUT AND ALIPAY TO PAY
PRODUCTS
• Get assured that products • Items picked from the • Buy high quality sea food • Get all purchase histories
are kept fresh and good store and put on a flying with low price through App
quality even with rail to get it delivered to • Enjoy in-store dining • Facilitate next purchase
packaging your home within 30 mins
together with grocery online if customers want
• Gradually get used to it • Feel comfortable and shopping to buy same products
once customers build convinced that the future
trust with Hema online order enjoy the
same product quality as
in offline stores
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 6Hema stores aim to give shoppers the best of both worlds: the chance to see food before
purchase combined with online shopping’s detailed product information, quick payment,
and home delivery: To ensure customers get their food fresh, it arrives at their homes within
30 minutes. JD is experimenting with unmanned stores, uses mirrors, cameras, and smart
shopping carts to see which products customers are looking at and taking from shelves.
Then the store can provide them with information – and check what they’re walking out with.
More generally, this kind of model will often feature in-house apps, digital price tags, self-
service checkouts, and automated shopping carts. In the background will be a double-duty
logistics hub that serves both the physical store and deliveries from O2O orders, whether
placed online in in-store.
Early signs indicate that O2O retail will go beyond an interesting experiment and significantly
change the retail landscape. Hema stores are already attracting young, wealthy, tech-savvy
shoppers, a coveted group. They increasingly trust the Hema brand and are more willing to buy
fresh food online.
Exhibit 8: Profile of Hema shoppers
Hema shoppers are younger Hema shoppers have higher Hema Shoppers show more
than other consumers income level than other interest in online shopping for
consumers FMCG products
AGE MIX INCOME MIX ONLINE SHOPPING (FMCG ONLY)
WHICH AGE GROUP DO YOU WHAT IS YOUR MONTHLY HOUSE- DO YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE
BELONG TO? HOLD INCOME? SHOPPING ONLINE FOR FMCG
IN RMB AFTER-TAX IN RMB PRODUCTS?
IN RMB
100%
4% 5%
8% 19%
13%
80% 31%
41% 38%
34%
60%
45%
50%
40% 34%
69%
62%
20% 54% 11%
37% 19%
19%
0% 6%
Hema Other Hema Other Hema Other
shoppers1 shoppers2 shoppers shoppers2 shoppers shoppers2
30 and below 31-40 5,000 and below 5,000 - 9,999 Yes No
41-50 51 and above 10,000 - 19,999 20,000 - and above
1. Incl. all shoppers w/different shopping frequency in Hema | 2. Refer to those consumers who are aware of these new concept stores in
the catchment, but never visited it
Source: Consumer survey (N=656,Oct 26-Nov 1, 2017), Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 7We estimate that O2O – that is, sales via the app for home delivery, rather than products
checked out in the traditional way – contributes as much as 60 percent of Hema revenues.
Though stores with O2O features have been expensive to set up and their initial running
costs are high, the O2O contribution has boosted productivity, thus keeping losses marginal.
With further maturity and greater scale, they should soon be able to break even. We believe
there is potential for at least 1,000 stores in prime locations in major cities with total revenues
of 200 billion yuan.
Exhibit 9: P&L estimate of a Hema store
A MATURE STANDARD HEMA STORE AT 4,000 SQM
AS % OF STORE REVENUE
25
23-24 5
20
3-5
15 c.4
10 c.3
5-7
5
c.-3%
0 3-4 (on avg.)
-5
Gross Markdown Store In-store Home Logistics Other Operating
margin rental overhead delivery profit
overhead
Source: Store visits, Primary research, Research reports, Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 82 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH
TRADITIONAL BIG BOX RETAILERS
The second major strategic play consists of partnerships between online stores and large,
traditional supermarkets. Big-box retailers have tried their own O2O and online shopping
services in the past. Hypermarket chain RT-mart launched B2C online platform Feiniu.com
in 2014, while Carrefour China tried a similar system a year later in Shanghai. But these and
other initiatives have failed.
One reason for such failures is that traditional retailers lack distribution capabilities of their
own: Fresh food typically requires 30-minute delivery, which is only possible with a logistics
operation that is complex, sophisticated, and large-scale. Another is that they do not naturally
generate O2O traffic. This is something that internet and e-commerce companies do through
their contact at multiple touch points in customers’ daily lives, such as payment services, social
media, and e-commerce purchases. So, traditional retailers have little option but to join one
of the tech empires.
A number of alliances have been announced in the past few years. The most recent came in
January 2018, when Tencent and YongHui Superstores agreed to take a stake in Carrefour
China, as part of a plan to work on smart retail, mobile payments, and data analysis.
Exhibit 10: Key M&A/partnership deals in China grocery retail
August May November
JD acquired 10% stake in Ali acquired 18% public shares Ali invested 2.9 billion USD in
Yonghui and formed strategic of Lianhua supermarket and Sun Art Retail Group and
partnership became 2nd largest shareholder formed strategic partnership
JD, Yonghui Alibaba, LianHua Alibaba, Sun Art
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Today
March June – December January
Tencent invested 214 million Walmart bought c.10% of Tencent and Yonghui agreed to
USD to become 3rd largest JD public shares and became take a stake in Carrefour China
shareholder of JD at that time 3rd largest shareholder of business
JD at that time
JD, Tencent Tencent, YongHui, Carrefour
Walmart, JD
November
Ali acquired 32% shares of
Sanjiang Group – the largest
grocery chain in Zhejiang
Alibaba, SanJiang
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 9These partnerships show early signs of success thanks to complementary strengths, as
technology from the online retailers helps the brick-and-mortar stores generate incremental
revenue. For example, Alibaba installed shelves from its Tmall Supermarket online grocery
service in RT-mart branches and started to offer one-hour home delivery for products on
these shelves. Next, Alibaba is likely to help RT-mart optimize its in-store O2O infrastructure
through an improved app, greater integration with backend, traffic help from Taobao and
TMall, and support for delivery. In turn, RT-mart could strengthen Alibaba’s grocery supplier
management and store operation capabilities. It could also provide valuable data to Alibaba
on customers’ buying habits.
Exhibit 11: O2O business contribution in major grocery retailers
% OF ORDERS/PURCHASES PER DAY1
Level of change
W/o eCommerce W/ eCommerce partner W/ eCommerce partner
partner but no store upgrade and store upgrade
100 c. 1
95 90-95 85-90 c.85
20 O2O
0 In-store
Carrefour Walmart Sanjiang1 Super RT-mart3
(before recent Species2
acquisition)
O2O order # c.50 c.100 150-200 c.300 c.800
per day
Format Hyper Hyper Super Super Hyper
Ecommerce None JD Alibaba JD Alibaba
Partner
O2O Carrefour/ JD Daojia Meituan Yonghui/ RT-mart/
platforms Meituan mainly mainly JD Daojia Meituan
1. Not all stores operate O2O | 2. The online order # only accounts for c.5% in Yonghui Bravo Luban Rd. Store in Shanghai | 3. A new
format store located in Yangpu, Shanghai
Source: Primary research, Store visits, Desktop research, Oliver Wyman analysis
Walmart has a strategic partnership with JD which is using its O2O unit JD Daojia as the service
platform for more than 150 Walmart stores in order to attract online traffic. Walmart is currently
planning to upgrade its stores in China to support O2O services, for example by adding picking
areas in store warehouses.
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 103 REINVENTION OF TRADITIONAL
“MOM AND POP” SHOPS
The third strategic play is to reinvent small, family stores. Traditional stores still account for
half the sales of fast-moving consumer goods in China, much of them going through the
more than 7 million family-run stores that dominate retail outside big cities. Since early
2017, JD and Alibaba have been converting these into franchises. These stores are rebranded
under the Tmall/JD umbrella and offer new services, such as bill-paying. In addition, each
store is unique in its product offerings, as store owners receive data-based curation advice
so that they stock the optimal product selection based on its neighborhood: infant milk in
a neighborhood with lots of babies and pet supplies if many residents keep dogs or cats.
Stores’ procurement processes also improve dramatically. Small stores have traditionally
been served by a network of multi-layered distributors and wholesalers, which often come
with troublesome requirements such as minimum purchase quantities. The two e-commerce
giants have developed ordering systems that store owners can operate on their martphones:
Alibaba’s Ling Shou Tong (LST) system and JD’s Xin Tong Lu (XTL). Goods arrive from centralized
warehouses in less than three days and often on the day the order is placed – in contrast to
delays of weeks with traditional wholesalers. The scale of the alliances gives them leverage over
the product brands, resulting in better margins both for the stores and for JD and Alibaba.
Exhibit 12: Disruption of traditional distribution model with B2B ordering tools
Brands
Tier 1
distributors
B2B ordering
tools (mainly
Less in # Ali and JD
and layer ecosystem)
JD Xintonglu,
Wholesalers/ Ali LST
low tier
distributors
(gradually
phase out)
Chained retailers Independent retailers
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 11Exhibit 13: JD Xin Tong Lu vs. Alibaba Ling Shou Tong
DIGITAL SELF-OPERATED RESELLER: JD XIN TONG LU DIGITAL PLATFORM: ALIBABA LING SHOU TONG
Regardless where
inventory is,
brands own the
inventory
3a Deliver
product via
brands own
Brands’
warehouse
warehouse
Very small proportion
of the business for now
3 0 3b
Deliver Sell products Deliver
products and send product via
Small JD’s products to Brands Small Internet B2B Alibaba’s Brands/
retailers warehouse warehouse retailers players’ warehouse distributors
warehouse
1 Place order 2 Arrange
delivery
1 Place order
2 Inform
brands of the
order details
JD Alibaba
Information flow Product flow
MAJOR DIFFERENCE OF TWO MODELS
Stock ownership JD Brands
(working capital management)
Level of transaction visibility Mid-depending on JD’ willingness High
to brands to share information
Decision power of assortment JD to decide Brands to decide
and pricing
Source: Primary Research, Oliver Wyman analysis
Tmall was planning on 10,000 such franchises in 2017, while JD has said it is aiming for one
million by 2021. In addition to the customer data and insights they can capture from these
expansions, Alibaba and JD are likely to dominate the growing market for ordering systems,
which could be worth around 400 billion yuan over the next five years.
Exhibit 14: Number of registered shops
JD XIN TONG LU ALIBABA LING SHOU TONG
IN MM
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.1
0
2016 2017 2016 2017
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 12CONCLUDING REMARKS
As O2O becomes the new normal in retail, the two alliances will act as both players in and
facilitators of these new models. Traditional retailers may start to test dark stores in selected
regions, and even the smallest stores are using the giants’ ordering systems.
To facilitate these combinations of e-commerce and traditional retail, a wave of acquisitions and
partnerships has taken place over the past four years. Alibaba has made strategic investments
totaling $21 billion in retail alone in just the past two years. The two empires already account
for around a tenth of grocery retail, and these plays will attract more consumers through
different activities and channels. Their share of grocery shopping could increase to around
30 percent over the next five years, when it could be worth around 4,000 billion yuan in gross
merchandise value.
Exhibit 15: GMV projection in the long-term (FMCG)
IN BN RMB
Alibaba Group JD/Tencent
e-Commerce platforms2 c.1,800 in GMV c.500 in GMV
(FMCG) Taobao.com, Tmall.com JD
c.1,000 in GMV c.300 in GMV
+ “New concept”
O2O retailers3 Hema, Sun Art, New Huadu, Bailian,
Sanjiang
Yonghui Superstores, 7 Fresh,
Walmart, Carrefour
+ B2B initiatives c.200 in GMV
Ali LST
c.200 in GMV
JD Xintonglu
= Total GMV c.3,000 c.1,000
1. 5 years’ projection; for the GMV of Hema, Ali LST, JD XTL, “theoretical” full potential is used for this calculation | 2. Ali current FMCG GMV
is c.410 bn, JD current FMCG GMV is c.100 bn; assume c.30% CAGR for both players in FMCG categories in the next five years; for JD, YHD
GMV is excluded as it remains a very small proportion (So, retailers need to plan for how to function in a world dominated by the two empires. The first step is to build a clear plan for strategic alliances that leverage the empires’ tools and strengths. These include online traffic resources, technology capabilities that make better use of physical retailers’ customer transaction data to inform buying and merchandising decisions, and the integration of online and offline aspects of their business. In the case of sub-scale smaller stores and chains that are rapidly losing their ability to compete, the online platforms may prove to be of help in areas where physical hypermarkets traditionally had an advantage, such as product assortment, procurement, and supply chain management. However, if a store is not be viable even after these potential improvements, its owners should consider switching to another business model, reducing size, or simply shutting down. Brands, too, need to figure out the best ways to engage the new tech empires. Just as anchor tenants in malls get preferential treatment thanks to their role in attracting shoppers, brands should establish themselves as part of store networks’ core propositions, so that they benefit from prominent display and favorable financial terms. They should work with the tech giants to make distribution more efficient, while also maintaining relationships with other distributors – if these survive – to avoid being completely dependent on the e-commerce giants. It is inevitable that the shape and future of the supermarket and hypermarket industry will be strongly influenced by the tech empires. To survive and thrive, incumbent retailers need to find ways to partner or co-exist. Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman All rights reserved. This report may not be reproduced or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the written permission of Oliver Wyman and Oliver Wyman accepts no liability whatsoever for the actions of third parties in this respect. The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Oliver Wyman. This report is not investment advice and should not be relied on for such advice or as a substitute for consultation with professional accountants, tax, legal or financial advisors. Oliver Wyman has made every effort to use reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive information and analysis, but all information is provided without warranty of any kind, express or implied. Oliver Wyman disclaims any responsibility to update the information or conclusions in this report. Oliver Wyman accepts no liability for any loss arising from any action taken or refrained from as a result of information contained in this report or any reports or sources of information referred to herein, or for any consequential, special or similar damages even if advised of the possibility of such damages. The report is not an offer to buy or sell securities or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities. This report may not be sold without the written consent of Oliver Wyman. 14
ABOUT OLIVER WYMAN
Oliver Wyman is a global leader in management consulting that combines deep industry knowledge with specialized expertise in strategy,
operations, risk management, and organization transformation. Oliver Wyman’s global Operations Practice specializes in end-to-end
operations transformation capabilities to address costs, risks, efficiency and effectiveness. Our global team offers a comprehensive and
expert set of functional capabilities and high-impact solutions to address the key issues faced by Chief Operating Officers and Chief
Procurement Officers across industries. In the Distribution and Wholesale practice, we draw on unrivaled customer and strategic insight
and state-of-the-art analytical techniques to deliver better results for our clients. We understand what it takes to win in distribution and
wholesale: an obsession with attracting, serving, and growing customers, constant dedication to operational excellence, and a relentless
drive to improve capabilities. We have a track record of helping clients win in this environment, creating real competitive advantage and
driving significant growth. We believe our hands-on approach to making change happen is truly unique – and over the last 25 years, we’ve
built our business by helping distributors and wholesalers build theirs. Oliver Wyman is a strategic advisor to the NAW and sponsors a
number of NAW roundtable events for companies with revenues $1 BN+.
www.oliverwyman.com
ABOUT JANCHOR
Established in 2009, Janchor Partners takes a long-term industrialist mindset in investing in companies that have superior business
models, favorable growth prospects and the potential to take advantage of long-term positive structural dynamics of Asia
countries and economies. Janchor Partners’ ability to invest for the long-term is strengthened by its investment
partners, comprising high quality global institutional investors including family offices, university
endowments, foundations and pension funds, who commit their capital to Janchor Partners
for multi-year periods. This in turn enables Janchor Partners to build strong and
meaningful relationships with its investee companies.
www.janchorpartners.com
AUTHORS
WAI-CHAN CHAN JOHN HO
Global Consumer Goods Practice Leader Janchor
Oliver Wyman john.ho@janchorpartners.com
wai-chan.chan@oliverwyman.com +852 3665 8823
+852 2201 1702
SHEN LI
RICHARD MCKENZIE Janchor
Partner, Oliver Wyman shen.li@janchorpartners.com
Retail & Consumer Goods +852 3665 8823
richard.mckenzie@oliverwyman.com
+852 2201 1703 YUBO GONG
Janchor
JAMES YANG yubo.gong@janchorpartners.com
Principal, Oliver Wyman +852 3665 8823
Retail & Consumer Goods
james.yang@oliverwyman.com
+852 2201 1715
Copyright © 2018 Oliver WymanYou can also read
