CHINESE FDI IN EUROPE 2020 UPDATE - Investment falls to 10-year low in an economically and politically challenging year - Rhodium Group
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MERICS REPORT CHINESE FDI IN EUROPE 2020 UPDATE Investment falls to 10-year low in an economically and politically challenging year Agatha Kratz (Rhodium Group) | Max J. Zenglein (MERICS) | Gregor Sebastian (MERICS) A report by Rhodium Group and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) June 2021
CHINESE FDI IN EUROPE 2020 UPDATE Investment falls to 10-year low in an economically and politically challenging year Agatha Kratz (Rhodium Group) | Max J. Zenglein (MERICS) | Gregor Sebastian (MERICS) A report by Rhodium Group and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)
4 | MERICS Report | June 2021
Contents
Executive summary 7
1. Introduction 8
2. C
hinese FDI in Europe: 2020 Trends 9
2.1 P
andemic pushes Chinese FDI in the EU and the UK to its lowest value
since 2010 9
2.2 Germany is top destination for Chinese capital; interest in Poland grows 10
2.3 Investment by China’s state-owned companies remains at a 10-year-low 12
2.4 C hinese investment was more evenly spread between sectors though
infrastructure and ICT remained top targets 12
3. Outlook 15
The authors 19
MERICS Report | June 2021 | 5Executive summary
hina’s global outbound investment hit a 13-year low in 2020: Concerns that
C
the Covid-19 global pandemic slump might trigger another round of Chinese
distressed asset-buying proved unfounded. Instead, China’s global outbound
M&A activity dropped to a 13-year low, as completed merger and acquisition
(M&A) transactions totaled just EUR 25 billion, down 45 percent from 2019.
hina’s FDI in Europe continued to fall, to a 10-year low: Shrinking M&A activity
C
meant the EU-27 and the United Kingdom saw a 45 percent decline in completed
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) last year, down to EUR 6.5 billion from EUR
11.7 billion in 2019, taking investment in Europe to a 10-year low. However, greenfield
Chinese investment reached its highest level since 2016 at nearly EUR 1.3 billion.
he “Big-3” reclaimed their top spot, Poland emerged as a key recipient: More
T
than half of total Chinese investment in Europe went to the “Big Three” economies
– Germany, the UK and France. However, the UK saw Chinese investment plummet
by 77 percent. Poland rose to become the second most popular destination, though
inflows of EUR 815 million were largely concentrated on one acquisition.
hina’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) took a higher share in a quiet market:
C
SOEs were responsible for 18 percent of total Chinese FDI to Europe, higher than 11
percent 2019 but still significantly below historical averages. Their investment stayed
relatively stable in absolute terms, however, concentrating in energy, infrastructure
and basic materials. Private sector investment dropped by almost 50 percent.
hinese investment was spread more evenly across sectors: Small- and mid-
C
size transactions dominated in 2020, with no major billion-dollar acquisitions as
in 2019. As a result, Chinese investment was spread more evenly across sectors.
Infrastructure, ICT and electronics were the top three sectors, attracting 51 percent
of the total.
hinese FDI faces greater scrutiny by EU member states: The Covid-19 crisis
C
prompted the EU to issue guidelines stepping up scrutiny of FDI in Europe’s
critical assets. 14 EU member states, including Italy, France, Poland and Hungary,
have updated their FDI screening mechanisms last year. Member states have also
moved to block several acquisitions by Chinese firms.
eadwinds to Chinese investment in Europe will grow in 2021: Chinese FDI
H
activity into Europe continued to fall in the first quarter of 2021 and has remained
weak elsewhere, even as global M&A activity has recovered and surged to a 10-
year high of EUR 1.08 trillion. Europe remains an attractive investment location.
However, continued disruption from Covid-19, high barriers to outward capital
flows in China and rising regulatory barriers to foreign investment in Europe
have all contributed to low levels of Chinese investments. Deteriorating EU-China
relations will create additional headwinds for Chinese investors going forward.
MERICS Report | June 2021 | 71. Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic triggered major global disruptions in business as well as societal
activity. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was no exception. As travel restrictions halted on-
going and new deal-making, global FDI volumes plunged by 38 percent in 2020 set against
the previous year, according to the OECD. It was the lowest level for global FDI activity since
2005.
Fears emerged in Europe (and elsewhere) that Chinese investors might engage in distressed
asset buying, taking advantage of depressed equity values worldwide as the pandemic
pushed countless countries into recession. However, there was no sign of an opportunistic
buying spree. Instead, global investment activities by Chinese firms declined in 2020.
Official Chinese statistics show stable outbound investment at USD 132.9 billion (EUR 116.5
billion), likely boosted by intra-company flows and arbitrage. However, transaction-level
data paints a different picture. According to our calculation, China’s global outbound M&A
activity slipped to a 13-year low in 2020; completed deals totaled just EUR 25 billion, down
from EUR 47 billion in 2019, a drop of 45 percent.
Exhibit 1
Official Chinese outbound FDI data, 2012 – 2020
China’s global outward FDI declined again
USD billion, GDP ratio in percent
in 2019
USD billion, percent share
State Administration of Foreign Exchange: China's global FDI assets under the balance of payments [left axis]
Ministry of Commerce: China's outbound FDI [left axis]
Value of announced global M&A transactions by Chinese companies [left axis]
China's outbound FDI (Ministry of Commerce) to GDP ratio [right axis]
300 bn 1.8%
1.6
250
1.4
200 1.2
1.0%
150 0.8%
0.8%
100 $88 bn 0.6
0.4
50 $56 bn
0.2
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
0 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
© MERICS/RHG
Sources:PRC
Sources: PRCMinistry
MinistryofofCommerce
Commerce (MOFCOM),
(MOFCOM), Bloomberg,
Bloomberg, State
State Administration
Administration of Foreign
of Foreign Exchange
Exchange (SAFE).
(SAFE).
SAFE
All full-year
2020 data is2019 data is preliminary.
preliminary.
8 | MERICS Report | June 2021China’s overseas investment activity has been declining each year since 2016, due to do-
mestic constraints on outbound capital flows and tighter scrutiny of Chinese investments
abroad. The Covid-19 pandemic accentuated the fall in China’s outbound activity by hinder-
ing normal business activity.
This report summarizes China’s investment footprint in the EU-27 and the United Kingdom
(UK) in 2020, analysing the fallout from the pandemic as well as policy developments in Eu-
rope and China. The research builds on the long-standing collaboration between Rhodium
Group and MERICS.
2. Chinese FDI in Europe: 2020 Trends
2.1 PANDEMIC PUSHES CHINESE FDI IN THE EU AND THE UK TO ITS LOWEST VALUE
SINCE 2010
As a result of the pandemic, completed Chinese FDI in the EU-27 and the UK fell to EUR
6.5 billion in 2020, from EUR 11.7 billion the previous year (Exhibit 2). Faced with a mix
of travel restrictions and changed domestic economic circumstances, some Chinese inves-
tors decided against completing large transactions. For example, the giant automaker FAW
Group discontinued talks to acquire Italian truck maker Iveco for EUR 2.6 billion, and Bank
of China walked away from its EUR 132 million purchase of Ireland-based Goodbody Stock-
Exhibit 2
Chinese FDI in the EU fell further to a 5-year low
Annual value of completed Chinese FDI transactions in the EU-28, EUR billion
Annual value of completed Chinese FDI in
transactions
the EU-27 in
andthe
the
EU-27
UK, 2000
and the
– 2020
UK, 2000 – 2020
EUR billion
M&A Greenfield
50
45 44.2
40
35
29.7
30
25
20.7
20 17.8
14.6
15
11.7
9.6
10
7.6
6.5 6.5
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
5
1.9 2.1
0.1 0.1brokers. In both cases, the Chinese side cited Covid-19 related uncertainty. However, the
pandemic was not the only force at work. Persistent outbound capital controls in China,
heightened regulatory scrutiny of Chinese investments in Europe and deteriorating public
sentiment towards China also created headwinds.
Diminished M&A activity pulled down total investment. However, Chinese greenfield in-
vestment jumped to its highest level since 2016, at nearly EUR 1.3 billion or 20 percent of
total FDI, compared to an average of 6.5 percent over the past decade. Among the most no-
table greenfield investors were technology firms such as Huawei, Lenovo, and ByteDance,
as well as consumer goods-makers Haier and Hisense. The most eye-catching of the large
multi-year greenfield projects announced last year were SVolt Energy Technology’s EUR 2.1
billion battery plant in Germany to gear up for e-vehicles; telecoms giant Huawei’s EUR 1
billion investment on an R&D center in the United Kingdom; and a EUR 438 million deal to
build data centers in Ireland for ByteDance subsidiary TikTok.
2.2 G
ERMANY IS TOP DESTINATION FOR CHINESE CAPITAL; INTEREST IN POLAND
GROWS
The “Big Three” European economies were back as the main destination for Chinese invest-
ment in 2020, receiving more than half of the total, or 53 percent (see Exhibit 3), which was
Exhibit 3
Chinese FDI was concentrated in Northern Europe in 2019
Completed Chinese FDI in the EU-27 and UK by country group, 2011 – 2020
Chineseshare
Percent FDI in the EU-28 by country group 2009-2019, percentage
France Germany UK “Big 3“ Benelux Eastern Europe Southern Europe Northern Europe
100% 1
4 France 10
90 Germany
80 29 UK
“Big 3“ 30
70
4
60 3
6
12
50
Benelux 3
40 Eastern Europe
Southern Europe 24
30 53
20
9
10
Northern Europe 11
0
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
'11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20
© MERICS/RHG
Source:Rhodium
Source: RhodiumGroup.
Group. The “Bigincludes
“Benelux” 3” includes France,
Belgium, Germany,and
Netherlands, andLuxembourg.
the UK. “Benelux”
“Easternincludes
Europe”Belgium, Netherlands,
includes Austria, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. “Southern Europe” includes Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy,and
and Luxembourg. “Eastern Europe” includes Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
Malta,
“Southern
Portugal, Europe”and
Slovenia, includes Croatia, Cyprus,
Spain. “Northern Europe”Greece,
includesItaly, Malta,
Estonia, Portugal,
Denmark, Slovenia,
Finland, andLatvia,
Ireland, Spain.Lithuania,
“Northern Europe”
and Sweden.
includes Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden.
10 | MERICS Report | June 2021a return to normal patterns after high levels of deal-making in the Northern Europe region
(the Baltic states, Scandinavia and Ireland) the previous year. Germany was by far the larg-
est recipient of Chinese investment, most of which consisted of relatively small transac-
tions. The UK, which ranked third overall, recorded a drop of 77 percent in inbound Chinese
investment – the lowest level in nearly ten years.
Poland rose up the rankings to second overall as it attracted a record EUR 815 million in
Chinese investment, much of it due to Poland’s share of GLP’s acquisition of the Goodman
Exhibit 4
Cumulative Value of completed Chinese FDI in the EU-27 and the UK by country, 2000 – 2020
EUR billion
0 – 0.5
0.5 – 2
2 – 10
10 – 20
> 20
Sweden
7.9
Finland
13.3
Estonia
Denmark 0.1
1.2 Latvia
Ireland NetherlandsGroup’s Eastern Europe logistics portfolio. The deal pushed the Eastern Europe region up
to become the second preferred destination for Chinese investors in 2020, attracting a total
of EUR 1.5 billion.
Investment in the rest of Europe was more evenly split, due to the small average size of
transactions. Northern Europe’s share of China’s investment slumped from 53 percent in
2019 to 11 percent in 2020 (at EUR 703 million). Some major transactions occurred in the
region including Evergrande’s acquisition of the remaining shares in Swedish electric vehi-
cle-maker NEVS AB for EUR 333 million. Southern Europe and the Benelux countries both
saw slight gains in their share of China’s FDI, as Southern Europe got 9.4 percent (EUR 598
million) and Benelux region attracted 3.3 percent (EUR 213 million).
2.3 I NVESTMENT BY CHINA’S STATE-OWNED COMPANIES REMAINS
AT A 10-YEAR-LOW
Historically, China’s state-owned enterprises (SOE) constituted the bulk of Chinese invest-
ment in Europe, averaging more than 70 percent of total investment between 2010 and 2015.
The private sector’s share started to rise from 2014, helped by the liberalization of China’s
outward FDI (OFDI) regime. Administrative controls were loosened and incentives for firms
to invest overseas increased. By 2019, European investments by SOEs had fallen to 11 per-
cent of total Chinese investment.
In 2020, SOE investment remained steady in absolute terms at EUR 1.2 billion (see Exhibit
5). However, private sector investment plummeted 49 percent to EUR 5.3 billion, so SOEs
ended up with a bigger share – 18 percent – of the total. Increased scrutiny of Chinese
state-owned investments in Europe has not impeded Chinese SOEs from making major ac-
quisitions in the European transport, energy and infrastructure sectors. China Three Gorges
bought an additional stake in Portuguese energy provider EDP for EUR 229 million. China
Railway Construction Corp (CRRC) purchased Spanish construction company Aldesa for
EUR 242 million. And CRRC Zhuzhou acquired German rail firm Vossloh Locomotive for
EUR 44 million.
2.4 CHINESE INVESTMENT WAS MORE EVENLY SPREAD BETWEEN SECTORS THOUGH
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ICT REMAINED TOP TARGETS
Chinese Chinese investment in Europe was more diverse in 2020 than the previous year, when more
investment in than 70 percent of it went into consumer products and services and ICT. The more even dis-
Europe was tribution profile was due mainly to the smaller average size of Chinese investments.
more diverse in
2020 than in In 2020, the top target was the transportation, construction, and infrastructure sector, with
previous years 25 percent of the total (see Exhibit 6). The largest transaction was GLP’s acquisition of the
Goodman Group’s warehouse portfolio in Central and Eastern Europe; it included transac-
tions in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic totaling roughly 1 billion EUR.
Other high-value investments included CRCC’s EUR 243 million acquisition of construction
firm Aldesa and China Three Gorges’ EUR 229 million purchase of an additional stake in
energy provider EDP.
12 | MERICS Report | June 2021Exhibit 5
Completed Chinese FDI in the EU-27 and the UK by investor type, 2011-2020
State-owned investors’ share of OFDI plummeted in 2019
State-owned
EUR investors’
billion, percent share share of OFDI plummeted in 2019
Chinese OFDI in the EU-28 by investor type. EUR billion, percent share
Chinese OFDI in the EU-28 by investor type. EUR billion, percent share
State-owned investment* [left axis] Private investment [left axis]
State-owned investment* [left axis] Private investment [left axis]
State-owned investment’s share of the total [right axis]
State-owned investment’s share of the total [right axis]
€50 bn 100%
€50 bn 100%
45 87 90
45 87 90
31.2
31.2
40 83% 80
40 83% 73 80
73
35 67 70
35 67 70
63
63
'19
30 60
30 60
59 8.0
59 8.0
25 50
25 50
40
20 21.8 40 40
20 6.7 21.8 40
6.7
29 10.6
15 29 10.6 30
15 30
5.4 14.0
0.0
1.3 5.4 14.0 12.9 18
10 0.0
1.3 12.9 10.5 18 20
10 €1.3 bn 10.5 20
€1.3 bn 9.2 11
8.4 9.2 11
5 6.3 8.4 2.7 7.2 5.3 10
5 6.3 2.7 7.2 5.3 10
3.9
0
3.9 1.2 1.2 0
0
1.2 1.2 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
© MERICS/RHG
© MERICS/RHG
*State-owned companies refer to those that are at least 20% owned and controlled by the government or
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
*State-owned companies
a central state-owned refer to those
enterprise (SOE).that are at least 20% owned and controlled by the government or
a central state-owned enterprise (SOE).
*State-owned
Source: Rhodiumcompanies
Group. refers to firms that are at least 20 percent owned and controlled by the government
Source: Rhodium
or a central Group. enterprise (SOE).
State-owned
Source: Rhodium Group
Nonetheless, the ICT sector remained popular, attracting 18 percent of the total. The strik-
ing feature of in 2020 was how much ICT investment was channeled into greenfield pur-
chases; major examples include the already mentioned Huawei R&D centers in the UK and
Hungary, and ByteDance’s TikTok data center in Ireland.
Electronics was the third largest sector by investment value. Transactions included: Uni-
versal Scientific Industrial’s acquisition of French Asteelflash Group (EUR 395 million), and
Jiangsu Riying Electronics’ acquisition of Elektromechanische Schaltsensoren EMS GmbH
in Germany (EUR 171 million).
MERICS Report | June 2021 | 13Exhibit 6
Completed Chinese FDI in the EU-27 and the UK by industry, 2000 – 2020
EUR billion
Consumer products Basic materials Financial and Industrial machinery
and services business services and equipment
Electronics
Agriculture and food Health and Real estate
Energy and power generation biotechnology and hospitality
Automotive
Entertainment ICT Transport, utilities
Aviation and infrastructure
45
40 7
6
35
5
4 0.8
30
3 0.8
25 2
1 1.6
20
0
2020
15
10 Electronics
ICT
5 0.1
Transport, utilities
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
2.3 0.7 and infrastructure
0
'11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20
Source: Rhodium Group
14 | MERICS Report | June 20213. Outlook
Global M&A activity (pending and completed) climbed back to EUR 1.08 trillion (USD 1.3
trillion) in the first quarter of 2021, a ten-year record. The jump was fueled by the broaden-
ing global economic recovery and low cost of capital due to stimulus measures deployed by
governments worldwide.
However, China’s outward investment remained depressed. China’s global outbound M&A
activity was hovering at 2020 levels in the first quarter of this year; monthly transaction
counts remained low, at approximately 20 single deals. Within the EU-27 and UK, the value
of completed Chinese FDI transactions continued to drop in the first quarter, dipping to one
of the lowest quarterly amounts in at least a decade (EUR 707 million) (see Exhibit 7).
In March, there was a bounce in announced Chinese FDI into the EU (as opposed to pend-
ing or completed) to EUR 4.6 billion, compared to EUR 155 million in January and EUR 708
million in February. Most of it was accounted for by one single deal: Hillhouse Capital’s
EUR 3.7 billion upcoming acquisition of Philips’ domestic appliances business.
Exhibit 7
Value of completed Chinese FDI in the EU-27 and the UK
EUR billion
M&A Greenfield 3-quarter moving average
30
28.0
25
22.4
20
15
11.0
10 9.0
8.4 8.1
6.7 7.0 6.8
4.5 4.7
5 3.8 4.0
2.8
2.0 2.3
1.2 1.6 1.7 1.2
0.7
0
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Source: Rhodium Group
MERICS Report | June 2021 | 15Exhibit 8
Notable screened acquisitions in the EU-27 and the UK in 2020 and early 2021
Investor Target Country Sector Description
Shenzhen LPE Italy Semiconductors Italy’s government vetoed the takeover
Investment on national security grounds, after
Holdings discussions with the EU commission,
Sweden and the Netherlands.
FAW Group Iveco SpA Italy Automotive The Italian and French economy ministers
coordinated to oppose the sale of a unit
of Iveco SpA. Eventually, Iveco SpA’s
owners pulled out of the talks.
CASIC ISMT Germany Satellite Germany blocked the deal citing national
communications, security concerns as ISMT is an important
radar provider of satellite communications,
radar and radio technology. The Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Energy said
the deal would endanger Germany’s
technological sovereignty.
Zhejiang Schmiedetech- Germany Automotive The transaction was dropped by Zhejiang
Shuanghuan nik Plettenberg, Shuanghuan after failing to reach an
Transmission Werkzeugtechnik agreement with the German Ministry of
Machinery Plettenberg, Economic Affairs and Energy on some
VVP Vermögens- pro- visions of the agreement required
verwaltung by the foreign investment screening
Plettenberg review.
Vital PPM Pure Metals Germany Metallurgy The German government initially blocked
Materials the deal as PPM Pure Metals supplies
Co the German military. How ever, in
© MERICS/Rhodium Group
December the acquisition was finalized.
Sources: MERICS and Rhodium Group
ow investment levels in early 2021 reflected several factors, all of them likely to persist
L
through the year:
Beijing’s strict capital controls continue to constrain Chinese FDI, despite the swift
economic recovery. China’s government has retained its strong hold on capital outflows,
unmoved by such positives as China’s rapid and broadly healthy economic recovery from
the pandemic slump which brought strong inbound capital inflows to China in late 2020
and Q1 2021. This scenario could have given Beijing confidence to lift some of the current
barriers to outward FDI. However, it has limited itself to lifting restrictions only carefully
and in minor ways. For example, quotas for outward portfolio investments through the
QDII (Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors) were marginally increased; the scope of
the Southbound Hong Kong Connect Mechanisms which allow foreign investors to trade
16 | MERICS Report | June 2021eligible mainland-listed stocks through Hong Kong was expanded. But few steps were tak-
en that could bolster outward FDI. And most regulatory changes aimed to facilitate inflows
rather than outflows. Many outward investors are also constrained in their access to capi-
tal, as Beijing has shifted its policy priorities away from stimulus to deleveraging and finan-
cial risk management.
The EU has tightened investment screening of Chinese investors. The EU FDI screening
framework became fully operational in 2020. Investment screening regimes have been re-
viewed by 14 EU countries, including France and Italy, since the onset of the Covid-19 pan-
demic. Others, including Germany, are still finetuning theirs. In January, the German gov- The EU has
ernment announced plans to broaden investment screening rules to cover high-tech sectors tightened
including AI, semiconductors, autonomous driving and aerospace. In the short-term, new investment
investment screening rules and their implementation may create some uncertainty for for- screening
eign investors, until a track record of implementation emerges. Transactions in sensitive of Chinese
sectors are more likely to be reviewed and potentially blocked (see Exhibit 8). However, investors
transparent and consistent screening rules can help reduce uncertainty in the long run and
limit the politicization surrounding certain transactions. The approval of CRRC Zhuzhou’s
acquisition of Vossloh, despite strong public debate, is a case in point.
In addition to FDI screening, Brussels is upgrading defensive measures against per-
ceived distortions from China that affect the EU single market. Some of these measures
could raise barriers for Chinese investments in the next 12 to 18 months. The EU Commis-
sion published a proposal on May 5, 2021, for an instrument on foreign subsidies that would
give it powers to review and block foreign investments that benefit from foreign subsidies.
The EU has also resumed work on the International Procurement Instrument (IPI), which
could limit the participation of Chinese firms in the EU’s public procurement markets if
European firms face restrictions to participate in Chinese public tenders.
As EU-China relations enter a new phase, the greatest risk to China’s FDI into Europe
is the souring political relationship. In March, following EU sanctions against Chinese
officials and public entities for alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Beijing retaliated
with its own sanctions against EU individuals (including MEPs of all major political fac-
tions and individual researchers) and research organizations (including MERICS). China’s
tit-for-tat sanctions led MEPs to pass a motion on May 20, 2021, to freeze parliamentary rat-
ification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) unless sanctions
were lifted. The CAI’s adoption by 2022 is now highly unlikely. Whatever the CAI’s short-
comings, the failure to conclude it could lead to slower progress on true reciprocity and
erode public tolerance towards Chinese FDI. Current political tensions could also be exac-
erbated by greater EU attention to issues surrounding the South China Sea and Taiwan, as
well as China’s human rights record. Experience has shown that it was the souring of polit-
ical relations, rather than FDI screening, that triggered drastic falls in Chinese investment
into the US. Shifting relations could similarly become a key risk for Chinese investment in
Europe going forward.
MERICS Report | June 2021 | 1718 | MERICS Report | June 2021
The authors
Agatha Kratz is an Associate Director at Rhodium Group. She coordinates Rhodium Group’s
European activities and leads research on European Union-China relations and China’s
commercial diplomacy. She contributes to Rhodium work on China’s global investment,
industrial policy and technology aspirations. Agatha is also a non-resident Adjunct Fellow
of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies under
the Simon Chair in Political Economy.
Max J. Zenglein is Chief Economist at MERICS. He leads the economic research team at
MERICS. His research focuses on China’s macroeconomic development, international trade
and industrial policies. Zenglein has over ten years of professional experience working on
China-related economic issues.
Gregor Sebastian is a Junior Analyst at MERICS. His research focuses on China’s industrial
policy and Chinese foreign direct investment and partnership activities in Europe. He holds
an MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE) and studied Mandarin Chinese in Chengdu. Prior to joining MERICS, he interned at
Deutsche Bahn’s China Tech Team and at Sinolytics – a China-focused consultancy.
MERICS Report | June 2021 | 19IMPRINT MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies Klosterstraße 64, 10179 Berlin, Germany Tel.: +49 30 3440 999 0 Mail: info@merics.de www.merics.de EDITED BY Claudia Wessling, Director Publications, MERICS Mary Hennock, freelance editor DESIGN/LAYOUT STOCKMAR+WALTER Kommunikationsdesign Copyright © 2021 MERCATOR INSTITUTE FOR CHINA STUDIES Printed in Berlin, Germany ISSN (Print): 2509-4319 ISSN (Online): 2509-5862
ISSN (Print): 2509-4319 www.merics.org ISSN (Online): 2509-5862
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