Brief summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution - Facts and Trends
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Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community Brief summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution Facts and Trends
Brief summary
2020 Report on
the Protection of the
Constitution
Facts and Trends2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS AND TRENDS
Table of Contents
Politically motivated crime 7
Right-wing extremism/terrorism 10
Reichsbürger and Selbstverwalter 19
Left-wing extremism 22
Islamist extremism/terrorism 29
Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to
security (excluding Islamist extremism) 36
Intelligence activities, espionage, cyber attacks and
other activities which threaten security, carried out
on behalf of a foreign power 39
Security of classified information and counter-sabotage 46
The Scientology organisation (SO) 47
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Politically motivated crime1
In 2020, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of
44,692 politically motivated crimes (2019: 41,177). Of these, 15,275 (or
34.2%) were propaganda offences (2019: 16,182, or 39.3%) and 3,365 (7.5%)
were violent crimes (2019: 2,832, or 6.9%).
Of the total number of politically motivated crimes, 32.924 (73.7%) were
found to have an extremist background (2019: 31,472, or 76.4%). Of
these, 2,865 (2019: 2,017) offences could not be assigned to any particular
category.
Key points:
• The number of crimes with a right-wing extremist background
rose by 5.1% in the reporting period; the number of violent
crimes in this subset rose by 10.6%. Among these violent crimes,
all homicide cases (two attempted and one successful, the latter
of which was the result of a shooting spree in Hanau in the state
of Hesse) were motivated by xenophobia.
• The number of crimes with a left-wing extremist background
rose by 2.8%; the number of violent crimes in this subset rose
by 34.3% and included five attempted homicides. Most of these
violent crimes were still targeted at the police/security authorities.
Strong increases were also recorded in violent crimes against
the state, its institutions and symbols, and in violent crimes in
connection with “campaigns against restructuring”.
• The number of crimes, including violent crimes, motivated by
extremist foreign ideology fell considerably during the reporting
period. This can largely be attributed to pandemic-related
restrictions on large-scale events.
The number of offences categorised as right-wing politically motivated
crime was 23,604 (2019: 22,342). Of these, 13,659 (2019: 14,247) were
propaganda offences under sections 86 and 86a of the German Criminal
Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) and 1,092 (2019: 986) were violent crimes.
As a subset of this category, 22,357 crimes (2019: 21,290) with a right-
wing extremist background were recorded, among them 1,023 violent
1 Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office.
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crimes (2019: 925). The number of violent crimes thus rose by a good 10%
compared with the previous year, but remained below the level of 2018
(1,088). Apart from two attempted homicides, these crimes included one
homicide in Hanau resulting in nine victims – not counting the shooter
and his mother.
In 2020, the number of right-wing violent crimes motivated by
xenophobia went up by 7.3% (746 offences; 2019: 695). The number of
right-wing extremist crimes motivated by antisemitism rose by 17.8%
to 2,173 (2019: 1,844), while the number of violent crimes in this subset
dropped by 14.3% to 48 (2019: 56).
In the reporting year, 772 politically motivated offences were attributed
to “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (2019: 675), of which 599 were
categorised as extremist (2019: 589). Of these, 125 were violent crimes
(2019: 121), chiefly extortion (78) or resistance to law enforcement officers
(30). Of the crimes attributed to “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”,
37 were found to be motivated by antisemitism.
The number of offences categorised as left-wing politically motivated
crime was 10,971 (2019: 9,849), including 1,526 violent crimes (45.1%
higher than in 2019: 1,052). As a subset of this category, 6,632 crimes
(2019: 6,449) with a left-wing extremist background were recorded,
including 1,237 (2019: 921) violent crimes. The number of left-wing
extremist crimes thus rose by 2.8%, and the number of violent crimes in
this subset rose by 34.3%.
Of the violent left-wing extremist offences, 776 were categorised as violent
crimes against the police/security authorities (2019: 467), an increase
of nearly two-thirds. The number of violent offences directed at actual
or supposed right-wing extremists rose to a total of 340 (2019: 297, an
increase of 14.5%), and the number of violent crimes against the state, its
institutions and symbols rose sharply again this year to 681, an increase of
76.9% (2019: 385). The number of violent offences related to “campaigns
against restructuring”, or urban renewal, also rose significantly to 272,
up 56.3% from the year before (2019: 174). About three-quarters of these
offences were committed in Berlin.
In 2020, 409 extremist offences were recorded in the category of politically
motivated crime – religious ideology (2019: 362). Most of these offences
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(378; 2019: 314) had an Islamist background. Of the 409 offences motivated
by extremist religious ideology, 33 were violent offences (2019: 41, a drop
of 19.5%), including two attempted homicides and two homicides as
well as 24 cases of bodily injury. Another 56 offences were recorded as
preparation or support for a serious act of violence endangering state
security (sections 89a to 89c and section 91 of the Criminal Code), down
from 63 in 2019, and 34 were counted as membership in or support for
a foreign terrorist organisation (section 129b of the Criminal Code),
compared to 64 in 2019.
The number of offences categorised as politically motivated crime
– foreign ideology was 1,016 (2019: 1,897), including 113 violent
crimes (2019: 351). Of this number, 661 had an extremist background,
representing a drop by more than half (2019: 1,354). These offences were
predominantly breaches of the Act Governing Private Associations
(Vereinsgesetz, VereinsG) (25.6%) and criminal damage (23.3%), but also
included 79 violent crimes (12.0%), a drop of 68.1% compared to 2019
(248 violent crimes). Most of these were bodily injury offences (74.7%),
although one attempted homicide was also counted during the reporting
year. The major decrease in the number of extremist crimes and violent
offences is largely due to the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting
cancellation of most large-scale events, rallies and other events with large
numbers of participants.
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Right-wing extremism/terrorism
By the end of 2020, the number of right-wing extremist sympathisers
after subtracting multiple memberships was 33,300 (2019: 32,080). The
number of right-wing extremists classed as violence-oriented rose to
13,300 (2019: 13,000).
Right-wing extremist following¹
2019 2020
Political party membership 13,330 13,250
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
(NPD, National-Democratic Party of 3,600 3,500
Germany)
DIE RECHTE (The Right) 550 550
Der III. Weg (The Third Way) 580 600
Membership of other right-wing extremist
8,600 8,600
parties²
Membership of groups/organisations not
affiliated with or independent of political 6,600 7,800
parties³
No membership of any right-wing extremist
13,500 13,700
grouping/organisation4
Total 33,430 34,750
after subtracting multiple memberships 32,080 33,300
of which violence-oriented right-wing
13,000 13,300
extremists
1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.
2 In the reporting period, this number includes members of the Junge Alternative (JA, Young Alternative) (subject of
extended investigation (Verdachtsfall)) and the grouping Der Flügel (The Wing).
3 In the reporting period, this number includes some of the 1,000 right-wing extremist “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”
who are organised in cross-regional groups, as well as the following intelligence targets: members of Ein Prozent e.V.
(One Per Cent; subject of extended investigation), the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IDB, Identitarian Movement
Germany), Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute for State Policy; subject of extended investigation) and COMPACT-
Magazin GmbH (COMPACT Magazine; subject of extended investigation).
4 In the reporting period, this number includes some of the 1,000 right-wing extremist “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”
who do not belong to any organised group.
The total number of right-wing extremist criminal and violent offences
increased by about 5% in comparison to the previous year (2019:
21,290; 2020: 22,357). Propaganda offences make up the largest share of
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right-wing extremist crime, at 60% (13,425), while 4.6% of crimes were
violent offences. In 2020, violent right-wing extremist offences were up
10.6% (2019: 925; 2020: 1,023). Most of the violent crimes were bodily
injury offences. Bodily injury offences accounted for 82.3% of total
violent offences (842 bodily injury offences), which was about the same
percentage as in the previous year (2019: 84.4%, 781 offences). The number
of arson offences rose significantly, to 25 in 2020 from 6 in 2019, an
increase of more than 300%. Right-wing extremist bodily injury offences
with a xenophobic background rose by 10% (2019: 627; 2020: 690). The
total number of violent xenophobic offences rose as well (2019: 695; 2020:
746, an increase of 7.3%).
In 2020, two attempted homicides and one homicide were recorded,
resulting in 11 deaths (2019: five attempted homicides, two homicides).
The homicide case was the racist and xenophobic attack in Hanau,
Hesse, on 19 February 2020. The attacker shot and killed nine people
before killing his mother and himself. The choice of victims and the
texts the attacker published online point to a xenophobic motive. The
high level of willingness to use violence, in some cases extending to the
level of right-wing terrorism, therefore remains a constant of right-wing
extremism. It was once again apparent that perpetrators of the most
serious violent right-wing extremist offences not only come from within
established right-wing extremist structures and organisations, but can
also become radicalised on the fringes or even outside of the right-wing
extremist scene.
During the reporting period, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building
and Community banned a total of three right-wing extremist groups:
Combat 18 Deutschland, Nordadler and Wolfs-/Sturmbrigade 44. The
domestic intelligence agencies played a key role in identifying these
groups and gathering the information needed to ban them.
Attempts by right-wing extremists to influence public opinion were
especially apparent during the reporting period in protests against the
Federal Government’s measures to contain the coronavirus pandemic.
Right-wing extremists took part in the public debate over the pandemic,
focusing almost exclusively on government measures to protect against
infection. They protested against what they considered the Federal
Government’s infringement of basic rights. This was combined with
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fundamental criticism of the entire system. They also spread conspiracy
theories about the pandemic. Right-wing extremists tried to link their
protests against government action on the pandemic to democratic
demonstrations. Unlike those supporters of democracy who expressed
similar fears, right-wing extremists were not interested in a fact-based
debate over the handling of the pandemic, but instead in attacking the
legitimacy of government action and democratic institutions and in
steering the public debate.
The pandemic had considerable impacts on every kind of right-wing
extremist event, from demonstrations to combat sport events and above
all concerts of right-wing extremist music.
In the reporting period, the Federal Government’s measures to contain
the coronavirus pandemic and related restrictions had a major impact on
right-wing extremist demonstrations. Although the number of rallies
influenced by right-wing extremists increased by about 25% compared
to the previous year, the number of participants fell below the 2019 level
(2020: 14,640; 2019: 20,650). The number of demonstrations was the same
as in 2018 (233).
Interest in combat sports remains high among right-wing extremists.
In the past, the organisation of combat sports events was increasingly
professionalised, and the participation of foreign competitors and labels
promoted the growth of networks of right-wing extremist combat
sport enthusiasts throughout Europe. The right-wing extremist scene’s
most important combat sport competition in Europe is the Kampf der
Nibelungen (KdN, Battle of the Nibelungs). This year, however, the event
was only streamed online, due to restrictions resulting from the pandemic
and the possibility of an official ban, as was issued in 2019. Government
measures meant that the event organisers had to reduce the scale of the
competition considerably.
Right-wing extremist music continues to play an important role in
disseminating right-wing extremist ideas. It also offers a low threshold
for entry into the right-wing extremist scene. In 2020, there were no larger
concerts of right-wing extremist music, with hundreds or even thousands
in attendance, which could have served as high-profile publicity events,
like the concert and rally “Rock against excessive foreign influence” held
in Themar, Thuringia, in 2017, which attracted an audience of roughly
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6,000. Already in 2019, the authorities issued stricter rules for maintaining
public security and order, which made right-wing extremist festivals
less attractive within the scene. Further, starting in March 2020 almost
all concerts were cancelled as a result of the pandemic. The “Shield and
Sword” series of concerts and rallies in Ostritz, Saxony, was also affected:
both the original date and the planned fall-back date for the 2020 event
had to be cancelled.
The number of concerts in 2020 dropped dramatically, to 141 from 311
in 2019. This development was due to the unusual situation caused by
the pandemic and is not a reliable indicator for the future of right-wing
extremist concerts.
Despite the pandemic and the related travel restrictions, German right-
wing extremists continued to collaborate with right-wing extremists
abroad. Internet networks played a special role in this regard in 2020
due to the pandemic. Two major right-wing extremist events were held
early in the year – and thus before the pandemic-related restrictions: the
memorial “Day of Honour” at the Városmajor Park in Budapest, Hungary,
on 8 February 2020, with up to 900 people in attendance; and the “Lukov
March” in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 22 February 2020, which attracted only 150
participants, in contrast to previous years, when several thousand people
marched. In 2020, the Bulgarian authorities prohibited participants from
marching through the streets of Sofia, so only a memorial event was
held. Events like these regularly offer the right-wing extremist scene an
opportunity to make new contacts and reinforce existing international
networks.
Antisemitism is an important element of right-wing extremist ideology
across most of the spectrum. Because political leaders, the media and the
majority of the population all agree that antisemitism is unacceptable,
right-wing extremists – sometimes for tactical reasons, to make their
utterances more palatable – often avoid making their antisemitic patterns
of argument the focus of their agitation, instead slipping them into asides
or marginal comments. Antisemitism is deeply entrenched in right-
wing extremist parties. Their anti-Jewish attitudes and argumentation
are evident in differing forms and degrees of intensity. Antisemitism
continues to be an important element of ideology among violence-
oriented right-wing extremists. Those internet groups which explicitly
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declare their devotion to National Socialism in a particularly provocative,
sometimes anarchic way that glorifies violence, such as the Goyim Partei
Deutschland (Goyim Party of Germany), especially stand out with their
pronounced antisemitic ideology and propaganda.
Even though right-wing extremist parties received less public attention
in the reporting year, they continue to have a certain significance for the
internal structure of the right-wing extremist scene despite shrinking
membership numbers and poor election results. Even co-operation
on elections, like that between the Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) and the party
DIE RECHTE (The Right) in local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia on
13 September 2020, failed to improve electoral results, demonstrating the
continuing weakness of all right-wing extremist parties in elections.
NPD membership fell to about 3,500 (2019: 3,600). The open conflict
over the orientation and course of the NPD does not seem to have
been resolved yet. The plans for a strategic reorientation presented by
party chair Frank Franz in 2019 have only partly been carried out. For
example, the party publication Deutsche Stimme (DS, German voice)
was redesigned as a magazine available for purchase, and a media studio
was opened in Berlin. These changes are intended to enable the party
to reach a wider audience and better position itself in the pre-political
sphere. For example, the new media studio was used to record interviews
for the YouTube channel “Nationaldemokraten” (national democrats)
concerning current political issues, such as the coronavirus pandemic,
affordable housing and legislation to ensure that men and women are
equally represented in parliaments.
With limited ability to mobilise its followers, ongoing election losses,
shrinking membership and shrinking budgets, the NPD was already
facing serious problems. Pressure on the party increased further when
three constitutional bodies (the Federal Government, Bundesrat and the
German Bundestag) submitted a petition on 19 July 2019 to the Federal
Constitutional Court to exclude the NPD from public funding for political
parties. Even apart from these proceedings currently under way and the
possible loss of all public funding, the party is in financial trouble, but it
still played an important role for the internal structure of the right-wing
extremist scene in 2020.
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The coronavirus pandemic and the measures to prevent infection further
limited the party’s ability to act and conduct campaigns. The NPD
responded to the measures by disparaging democracy. The NPD also
attempted to position itself in the pre-political sphere and gain acceptance
within mainstream society by criticising the Federal Government’s
measures to contain the pandemic. The NPD also responded to bans and
attempted bans on displaying the flag or war flag of imperial Germany at
demonstrations in some federal states by organising rallies focused on
the bans.
The small right-wing extremist party DIE RECHTE is made up of eight
federal state associations (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt and a south-
western association made up of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland) with
16 local associations and a small number of “bases”. Some associations at
local or state level are currently being established, have existed only for a
few months, are inactive or are being re-established without having been
formally dissolved. Other associations only exist in name and have never
been active. North Rhine-Westphalia remains the party’s heartland. The
membership of DIE RECHTE remained unchanged in the reporting year
at 550 (2019: 550).
Since 5 January 2019, Sascha Krolzig and Sven Skoda have led the party as
national chairmen. In February 2018, the local court in Bielefeld, North
Rhine-Westphalia, sentenced Krolzig to six months in prison for the
offence of incitement to hatred and violence coinciding with the offence
of insult. In 2016, he called the president of a Jewish congregation an
“insolent Jew functionary”, among other things. After the Higher Regional
Court of Hamm, North Rhine-Westphalia, confirmed the verdict in January
2020, Krolzig submitted a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court
which was thrown out in July 2020. The justices explained their decision
by stating that the term “insolent Jew” was part of the typical vocabulary
of National Socialism and incited hatred of Jews. Krolzig began serving
his sentence at the Castrop-Rauxel correctional facility in North Rhine-
Westphalia on 15 July 2020.
DIE RECHTE entered candidates for some polling districts in local
elections in North Rhine-Westphalia on 13 September 2020 and won
2,369 votes in the council elections in Dortmund (1.12% of the vote). That
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was 268 votes more than the party gained in the 2014 local elections,
which allowed it to keep its seat on the Dortmund city council.
The small right-wing extremist party Der III. Weg (The Third Way) was
able to consolidate its organisation in 2020 despite restrictions resulting
from the coronavirus pandemic. It still has more than 20 regional “bases”
linked to its three associations in the federal states of Bavaria, Saxony,
Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate (the last three
combined in the association named West). The party continues to serve as
a catch-all for members of the neo-Nazi scene, some of whom belonged
to organisations that have been banned. Its membership has increased
slightly as a result of its structural consolidation and expansion, and it
now has more than 600 full and sponsoring members, up from 580 in
2019.
As part of its efforts to create additional regional organisations, Der III.
Weg opened an office in Siegen, North Rhine-Westphalia, on 6 July 2020,
modelled on its office in Plauen, Saxony, as a point of contact for the
public and “national forces” within the territory of its West association.
With its “national patrols” and neighbourhood watch programmes, Der
III. Weg attempts to style itself the “troubleshooter party” and emphasise
its supposed connection to mainstream society. In the reporting year it
again organised campaigns such as its “German Winter Aid” campaign
in which it collected clothing for those in need, but only if they were
ethnically German, which is another issue the party focuses on.
To “put future election campaigns on a legally secure footing”, at a
national party conference in 2019 Der III. Weg adopted changes to its
statutes intended to reorganise its existing regional associations as state
associations. In line with this decision, the state associations in Saxony
and Bavaria were founded, as was the West association. This gradual
restructuring underscored the party’s intention to campaign in state and
federal parliamentary elections, thereby meeting one of the conditions
necessary to preserve the party.
A group within the party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative
for Germany) known as Der Flügel (The Wing) was classified as a subject
of extended investigation (Verdachtsfall) by the domestic intelligence
agencies in 2019. On 12 March 2020, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
(BfV) declared it proven that Der Flügel was engaged in right-wing
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extremist activities. The AfD’s national leadership then passed a resolution
calling for Der Flügel to disband, but although it did so formally, effective
30 April 2020, it was apparent that it remained active during the reporting
year. The leader of Der Flügel, Björn Höcke, stated that people associated
with it remained active in the AfD and had not given up their political
convictions. Despite its formal disbanding, functionaries and followers
of Der Flügel seek influence within the AfD to advance their political
agenda. Der Flügel claims that at least 20% to 30% of AfD members have
supported it since 2019.
Since spring 2020, the dominant political themes have been the
coronavirus pandemic and the measures taken by the governments and
parliaments at federal and state level to contain it. These themes also
dominated the rallies and speeches initiated by Der Flügel supporters
in the second half of the year. They consistently condemned all action
by the government as illegal and unconstitutional, calling it a “corona
dictatorship” and comparing it to the Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz)
that gave Hitler the power to enact laws without the involvement of the
parliament and to override the constitution.
Some members of Der Flügel, which had been formally dissolved by that
time, responded vehemently to the Islamist extremist attacks in France
in the autumn of 2020. They not only accused all Muslims of having a
greater propensity to violence and terrorism simply by virtue of their
ethnicity, religion and culture; they also defamed Muslims by saying they
were entirely incompatible with other faith communities and sketched
out a plan for the step-by-step expulsion of Muslims from Europe. This
fundamental rejection of the practice of Islam in Germany is incompatible
with the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law.
The Junge Alternative für Deutschland (JA, Young Alternative for
Germany) was founded in 2013 and is the official youth organisation
of the AfD according to the party’s statutes. In January 2019, the JA was
classified as a subject of extended investigation. It has 15 state associations
which are divided in turn into district and local associations. Again in the
reporting period, there are facts of sufficient weight indicating that the
JA’s main political ideas are maintaining the ethnic purity of the German
people and excluding people of other ethnicities.
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The Neue Rechte (the New Right) appears in this edition of the report for
the first time. The name covers an informal network of groups, individuals
and organisations, from right-wing conservative to right-wing extremist,
which work together to promote their sometimes anti-liberal and anti-
democratic positions in society and the political sphere. The Neue Rechte
includes among others the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IDB,
Identitarian Movement Germany), Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute
for State Policy; subject of extended investigation), COMPACT-Magazin
GmbH (COMPACT Magazine; subject of extended investigation) and Ein
Prozent e.V. (One Per Cent; subject of extended investigation).
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Reichsbürger and Selbstverwalter
The category of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (literally, “citizens
of the Reich” and “self-administrators”) spans a broad range of individuals
and organisations with very different ideologies. This category includes
individuals not affiliated with any organisation, small to very small
groupings, groups active across state borders, and virtual networks.
What they all have in common is their fundamental rejection of the
legitimacy and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany and
its legal order. Many of them dispute the validity of the Basic Law. This
rejection stems from different ideological positions: for some of these
people, aspects of territorial and historical revisionism are central, and they
invoke the past German Reich under its various forms of government and
within its different borders. Taken all together, the various facets combine
to form a highly ideological view of the world as driven by conspiracies.
For those who share it, this view can grow from total rejection to absolute
hate of the state.
It is often very difficult to distinguish between “Reichsbürger” and
“Selbstverwalter”. The former refer to the continued existence of some
kind of “German Reich” and reject the Federal Republic of Germany.
By contrast, “Selbstverwalter” feel that they do not belong to the state.
They claim they can secede from the state by making a declaration to
that effect and are therefore not bound by its laws. They often invoke a
UN resolution which they believe allows them to administer their affairs
independently of the state. They may mark the borders of their residential
property with (boundary) lines, signs, coats of arms or the like to indicate
the extent of their supposedly sovereign area of administration. In some
cases, they may defend this area using force, especially when claiming a
right of self-defence.
Only a small percentage of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” are also
right-wing extremists. Areas of overlap exist in particular with regard
to territorial and historical revisionism, nationalist and to some extent
National Socialist thought, and antisemitism. However, the large majority
of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” display few elements of right-
wing extremist ideology, if any.
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The broad ideological spectrum of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”
means they have large numbers of sympathisers. Despite its diversity of
views, the entire scene should be considered hostile to the state. In 2020,
the scene was thought to comprise about 20,000 persons nationwide
(2019: 19,000). About 1,000 of them can be considered right-wing
extremists (2019: 950).
About 2,000 of them are thought to be violence-oriented. This number
includes violent members of the scene as well as persons who have
come to the attention of the authorities by making threats or statements
approving violence and having the relevant ideological content.
The number of sympathisers rose slightly compared to the previous year.
This increase mainly had to do with the protests against government
measures to contain the coronavirus pandemic. Many “Reichsbürger”
and “Selbstverwalter” actively opposed these measures, for example by
becoming very involved in the various demonstrations against federal
and state measures to fight the pandemic. Their ideology is usually
receptive to all kinds of conspiracy theories.
For some “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”, it is no longer enough
to express their opposition at “hygiene demonstrations”; they also use
simple physical force, for example against police officers assigned to the
demonstrations. But even apart from their behaviour at demonstrations,
some of their actions are criminal.
The most common of these continues to be sending large numbers of long
letters to government agencies and offices. These usually contain obscure
or muddled arguments or claims and questionable interpretations of the
law. Statements range from simple opposition to official activity all the
way to extortion, insult and coercion, sometimes accompanied by threats
of violence.
Activities which earn some “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”
considerable revenue from others in the scene remain especially
important: seminars and sales of worthless fake documents represent a
significant source of income.
Because of the potential threat they pose to the free and democratic
basic order, “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” are increasingly the
focus of government action. On 19 March 2020, the Federal Minister of
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the Interior, Building and Community banned the “Reichsbürger” and
“Selbstverwalter” organisation Geeinte deutsche Völker und Stämme
(GdVuSt, united German peoples and tribes) in accordance with Article
9 (2) of the Basic Law in conjunction with section 3 of the Associations
Act. This was the first organisation associated with “Reichsbürger” and
“Selbstverwalter” to be banned. The organisation was heavily influenced
by racist and antisemitic ideology.
The “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” scene has considerable
potential for violence. Members of the scene have repeatedly come into
conflict with public service staff. “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”
continue to pose a potential threat due to their affinity for weapons. By
the end of 2020, at least 880 weapons permits held by “Reichsbürger” and
“Selbstverwalter” had been revoked.
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Left-wing extremism
The number of left-wing extremist sympathisers (after subtracting
multiple memberships) rose by 2.4% to a total of 34,300 in 2020. More than
one in four of all left-wing extremists can be classed as violence-oriented.
Left-wing extremist following¹
2019 2020
Violence-oriented left-wing extremists 9,200 9,600
including:
Autonomists² 7,400 7,500
Anarchists³ 900 1,200
Strictly ideological left-wing extremists 900 900
Non-violent strictly ideological left-wing
25,300 25,800
extremists and other left-wing extremists
Total 34,500 35,400
after subtracting multiple memberships 33,500 34,300
1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.
2 This group includes post-autonomists as well as anarchists and anti-imperialists not affiliated with any organisation.
3 This group includes anarchosyndicalists and other anarchists affiliated with an organisation.
Left-wing extremists seek to do away with the existing state and social
order, and therefore the free and democratic basic order. In its place,
they want to establish a communist system or an anarchist society
“without rulers”, possibly with a socialist transitional phase, depending
on their ideological orientation. With this in mind, issues such as “anti-
fascism”, “anti-repression” or “anti-gentrification” are, depending on the
circumstances, relevant but ultimately interchangeable areas of action
which only serve to advance left-wing extremists’ ideological notions.
Left-wing extremists are in principle also willing to use violence to
achieve their ends.
The number of criminal offences motivated by left-wing extremism
set a new record again in 2020. In the reporting period, 6,632 offences
were recorded, representing an increase of 2.8% (2019: 6,449). A troubling
development in 2020 was the increase of 34.3% in the number of violent
left-wing extremist offences, to 1,237 offences from 921 in 2019. Five
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attempted homicides (2019: 2, an increase of 150%) and 423 cases of
bodily injury (2019: 355, up 19.2%) clearly show that left-wing extremists
are very willing to use violence. After a big jump in the number of arson
attacks in the previous year, the increase in 2020 was rather moderate
(2019: 164; 2020: 173, an increase of 5.5%). But the numerous riots by
left-wing extremists in 2020 resulted among other things in 321 cases of
breach of public peace (2019: 72, an increase of 345.8%). The already large
number of property damage offences in 2019 (3,520) grew again by 6.1%
in 2020 to 3,734.
This increase in left-wing extremist offences and violent offences, which
in some cases was dramatic, is part of a trend that has lasted with some
fluctuation for nearly 20 years. There are no signs that left-wing extremists
will end their use of violence. On the contrary, certain violence-oriented
groups are committing more and more serious crimes and violent
offences.
Some violence-oriented left-wing extremists display obvious indications
of radicalisation. The high level of radicalisation among some members
of the scene is also apparent from the way crimes are committed and
from the groups committing them. The intensity of the violent offences
has again increased further. At the same time, a few small groups
set themselves apart from the rest of the violence-oriented scene by
increasingly crossing apparent “red lines” based on the left-wing extremist
principle that violence should only be used to achieve a purpose.
These trends are especially apparent in Leipzig, Berlin and Hamburg. But
in Bavaria, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia (Hambacher forest), Saxony-
Anhalt and Thuringia too, there are signs of growing radicalisation
among certain elements of the violence-oriented scene, in particular
with regard to the fight for “autonomous free spaces”, opposition to urban
restructuring, and the “anti-fascist fight” against (supposed) right-wing
extremists.
Left-wing extremist attacks are increasingly violent, professional and
personal. Left-wing extremists long viewed escalating demonstrations as
an expression of their desire for revolution. But in recent years, there has
been an obvious shift away from the “mass militancy” of demonstrations
and towards violent acts by small groups acting covertly. Their violence
has shifted to the sidelines of gatherings or is entirely independent of
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these events. Their violent acts are planned and carried out very carefully
by a small group in isolation from the rest of the scene. The choice of
targets has also changed: attacks are shifting from the institutional to
the personal level. Victims are carefully selected and attacked in a highly
aggressive manner. The perpetrators are increasingly willing to risk
inflicting serious bodily injury, even to the point of death, on their victims.
Left-wing extremists are mainly interested in intimidation and in creating
a climate of fear for their political opponents and others who disagree
with them, with the aim of keeping those who are directly or indirectly
affected from taking a specific action or freely expressing their opinions.
These actions may include participating in events, acting on behalf of a
political party or group, or disseminating political views. In other cases,
serious crimes are intended to “raise the stakes” for political or economic
decisions, thereby influencing decision-makers.
As the crimes have become more serious, the groups committing them
have changed as well. There are indications in several federal states that
small groups operating clandestinely are forming within the violence-
oriented left-wing extremist scene. These groups carry out their own
series of crimes and isolate themselves from the rest of the scene due to
their greater willingness to use violence. They also ignore the consensus
that has applied within the scene until now that violence is only acceptable
to achieve a certain purpose and only if it is directed against property,
and that it should not harm those who are not involved. The increasingly
violent actions have met with little protest from the rest of the left-
wing extremist scene, which instead justifies violence as a supposedly
legitimate means of “defence”. In general, the language used has become
more extreme. Broad statements extending to threats of violence or even,
in a few cases, subtle death threats, are tacitly tolerated.
If it is not stopped, isolation from the rest of the scene and the increasingly
professional, clandestine, planned and targeted action by individual
groups can lead to a spiral of radicalisation and ultimately to terrorist
structures.
The coronavirus pandemic and the government measures to contain
it also had an impact on the activities of the left-wing extremist scene,
although the scene did not develop any new strategies or patterns
of action in response. In the early months of the pandemic, almost all
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left-wing extremist events were cancelled. A large number of ideological
texts related to the pandemic were published on the relevant internet
platforms, accusing the “capitalist system” of spreading the virus and
discussing whether the government would take advantage of the
public’s acceptance of “measures restricting freedom” and whether
lasting “repression” would result. The discussion followed the familiar
patterns with the addition of the pandemic simply as a new point of
reference. The traditional left-wing extremist areas of action, “anti-
repression” and “anti-fascism”, continued to be especially relevant. On
the fringes of demonstrations against coronavirus-related restrictions,
violence-oriented left-wing extremists targeted and physically attacked
demonstrators whom they identified as right-wing extremists. They also
attacked persons providing logistical support for the demonstrations.
Violence-oriented left-wing extremists regularly commit crimes and
violent offences in the name of “anti-fascism” which are directed against
individuals or institutions which they define as “fascist”. Along with those
they identify as right-wing extremists, these left-wing extremists also
target the state and its free and democratic basic order. The Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) remains in the focus
of violence-oriented left-wing extremists, who describe the party as a
“first-class opponent”. Left-wing extremists regularly commit crimes and
violent offences in attacking AfD members and property.
“Capturing” and defending “autonomous free spaces” is extremely
important for autonomous left-wing extremists in particular.
Autonomists do not accept the public order, so they ignore existing
ownership of property and establish sites where they hope to follow their
own rules for living in a community. These sites may be squats, collective
“housing projects” or independently run cultural centres which they view
as symbols of resistance free from government supervision, influence or
“the logic of capitalist exploitation”. Every kind of state intervention is
seen as an attack on their self-determination. At the same time, these
“free spaces” serve violence-oriented left-wing extremists as a base for
their criminal activity and “militant campaigns” and as a safe haven.
As user contracts or rental agreements expire, property is sold to
new owners or neighbourhoods undergo restructuring, the scene is
increasingly forced to abandon its “free spaces”. In 2020, this was the case
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particularly in Berlin when the squat Liebig34 was cleared of its left-wing
extremist occupants and the bar Syndikat was closed; further pressure
came from searches of the squat Rigaer94 and the anarchist bookshop
Kalabal!k.
The threatened loss of their “free spaces” typically provokes an extremely
aggressive response from violence-oriented left-wing extremists. For
example, the measures referred to above were followed by arson attacks
across Germany and damage to vehicles and machines of estate agents and
construction companies as well as to “luxury real estate”. Such attacks are
intended to “raise the price” of political or business decisions and influence
those making such decisions. Those thought to be responsible are also
personally threatened and police officers are attacked at demonstrations
or when patrolling near property claimed by left-wing extremists. The
mere presence of police, emergency personnel or journalists in the
vicinity of “free spaces” repeatedly provokes violent attacks.
Through their ostensible support for the climate protest movement,
left-wing extremists from various parts of the scene attempt to shift
democratic discourse in order to add their own ideological positions,
radicalise social protest and question the legitimacy of the state and its
institutions. Left-wing extremists also use alliances, amongst other things,
to attempt to influence protests. The alliance Ende Gelände, which is
influenced by the Interventionistische Linke (IL, Interventionalist Left),
plays a key role in this regard. The clearing of the Dannenröder forest in
Hesse in autumn 2020 also provided an opening for left-wing extremist
attempts to influence and radicalise the protests against the clearance. As
the logging began on 1 October 2020, there was an increase in criminal
offences and “militant actions” in the area.
Organisations of strictly ideological left-wing extremists too participated
in the climate protests and aggressively exploited them as a political
platform. Along with attempts to influence the ideology of the protests,
another focus is making personal contact with the protesters and
recruiting new members.
The left-wing extremist scene is characterised by its heterogeneity,
which is apparent in the differing ideologies, degrees of organisation,
preferred forms of action and relationship to violence of the different
currents within the scene. The left-wing extremist scene can be divided
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into two camps – the violence-oriented and the non-violent – based on
their attitudes towards the question whether violence is a legitimate
means to achieve political objectives at the present time or only in a
future “revolutionary situation”.
Autonomists are by far the largest group among violence-oriented
left-wing extremists, numbering some 7,500. Despite their ideological,
strategic and organisational differences, they all share a fundamental
belief that political action should focus on individuals and their self-
realisation. They reject all forms of external control and view every
type of government as authoritarian, to be replaced by an order free of
domination. For this reason, they differ from Marxists in that they do not
strive to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in a transitional phase.
Anarchists reject the subjugation of human beings by other human
beings. This includes all forms of state rule, including those within
liberal democracies. There are various currents within anarchism which
differ in terms of their ideology or degree of organisation. Violence-
oriented anarchists who tend to oppose organisation want to attack and
violently overthrow the existing democratic constitutional state now. In
this respect, they are similar to some elements within the autonomist
spectrum.
By contrast, anarchosyndicalism is highly organised, based on the idea
of taking over the means of production through trade and labour unions
in various economic sectors. Syndicalist anarchists are not interested
in assuming political responsibility and seeking to change society from
within the existing system. Instead, they want a revolution to overthrow
every form of rule, including the democratic constitutional state and its
institutions.
Strictly ideological left-wing extremists base their ideology and politics
principally on the theories of early communist thinkers such as Karl Marx,
Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. A common element is their
central goal of establishing a socialist system which would then serve as
the foundation for a “classless” communist society. A small segment of
this group numbering about 900 violence-oriented, strictly ideological
left-wing extremists explicitly accepts the use of violence.
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The vast majority of strictly ideological left-wing extremists cannot be
considered violence-oriented. These include the orthodox communist
Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, Communist Party of Germany),
the strictly Maoist-Stalinist Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei
Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany) and the
Trotzkyist Sozialistische Gleichheitspartei (SGP, Socialist Equality Party).
The DKP, MLPD and their youth organisations in particular regularly
conduct major outreach efforts to contact and recruit young people.
With some 11,000 members and about 50 local groups throughout
Germany, Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid) is one of the largest and most
important groupings of left-wing extremists in Germany. Its member
numbers have increased greatly in the last four years (2019: 10,500;
2018: 9,200; 2017: 8,300). It describes itself as an “independent left-wing
organisation providing protection and solidarity to various movements”.
Its main activity is supporting left-wing extremist offenders both during
criminal proceedings and when in prison. The organisation provides
political and social backing and gives legal and financial support.
Rote Hilfe’s actions are intended to minimise the deterrent effects of
criminal proceedings and to question the legitimacy of the democratic
constitutional state. Through its financial support for potential criminals
and violent offenders as well as its solidarity and public relations efforts,
it also contributes to cohesion across the entire left-wing extremist
spectrum.
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Islamist extremism/terrorism
Overall, the numbers for 2020 show a year-on-year increase in the Islamist
extremist following of around 2.5% to a total of 28,715 individuals (2019:
28,020).
Following in the field of Islamist extremism/terrorism¹
Organisations 2019 2020
Salafist Groups 12,150 12,150
Islamic State (IS)
Al-Qaeda Core
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQM)
Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) no no
hard hard
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) numbers numbers
Al-Shabab
Hai’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Tanzim Hurras al-Din (THD)
Hezbollah 1,050 1,250
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS) 380 450
Turkish Hezbollah (TH) 400 400
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) 430 600
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) /
Deutsche Muslimische Gemeinschaft e.V. 1,350 1,450
(DMG, German Muslim Community)
Tablighi Jama’at (TJ) 650 650
no no
Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V.
hard hard
(IZH, Islamic Centre Hamburg)
numbers numbers
Millî Görüş movement and affiliated
10,000 10,000
associations (IGMG)
Furkan Gemeinschaft (Furkan Community) 350 400
Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HIA) 100 160
Others² 1,160 1,205
1 Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded off.
2 Other organisations whose membership figures and figures of followers are to be taken into account as regards the
Islamist extremist following.
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The threat posed by Islamist terrorism in Germany remained at a high
level in 2020. During the second half of the year in particular, this threat
became more concrete in the form of a dynamic threat situation after
several attacks were committed in Germany and Europe. A major factor
in this were incidents involving criticism of Islam such as the publication
of cartoons showing the Islamic prophet Muhammad.
While no complex or multiple attacks directed by terrorist groups from
abroad have been committed in Germany so far, such attacks may happen
at any time. Most of the attacks carried out over the last few years were
lone-perpetrator attacks, which are equally significant for the objectives
of terrorist groups because they can also have a strong impact. Inspired by
violence-oriented propaganda or by contacts with a terrorist organisation
such as Islamic State (IS), lone perpetrators mainly choose “soft” targets
that are easy to attack and use weapons that are easy to obtain and handle.
In 2020, Germany saw several attacks presumably committed by lone
perpetrators:
• In Waldkraiburg (Bavaria) in April and May 2020, several business
premises owned by people of Turkish origin were damaged and
an arson attack was carried out on a grocery store. A suspect
arrested at a later point said that he had acted out of hatred of
Turkey and out of sympathy for IS.
• In August 2020, an individual driving on the A100 urban
motorway in Berlin caused at least six collisions, which left six
people injured. It can be assumed that the attack was motivated
by Islamist extremism, apparently facilitated by the suspect’s
mental health issues.
• In Dresden (Saxony) in early October 2020, a knife attack was
committed against two tourists, one of whom later died. The
perpetrator initially managed to flee the scene unrecognised, but
a suspect was arrested in late October. The attack was probably
motivated by Islamist extremism.
Furthermore, the attacks carried out in the neighbouring countries
France and Austria also affected the situation in Germany in autumn
2020: in late September 2020, two people were attacked in front of the
former Charlie Hebdo editorial office in Paris. The perpetrator of that
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knife attack said he had assumed that the satirical magazine was still
based in the building. In a Paris suburb in mid-October 2020, the history
teacher Samuel Paty was beheaded in the street after he had shown and
discussed Muhammad cartoons in class. In late October 2020, a knife
attack presumably motivated by Islamist extremism was committed on
people in Nice Cathedral, leaving three of them dead.
These attacks took place in the context of the renewed debate surrounding
the (re-)publication of Muhammad cartoons: On the occasion of the
beginning of the trial, in early September 2020, against suspected helpers
of the attackers who had stormed the editorial office in January 2015
and killed twelve people, Charlie Hebdo had once again published the
cartoons. After the attacks, the French government clearly defended
freedom of speech and the display of Muhammad cartoons, sparking
anti-French protests in many Islamic countries. Anti-French feeling was
also expressed in the Islamist extremist scene in Germany.
In the Salafist/jihadist scene, high-profile incidents involving criticism
of Islam – especially if they are linked with the prophet Muhammad or
with the Koran – trigger highly emotional reactions that can range from
general threats to concrete calls for violence.
Even Islamist extremists who are not first and foremost violence-oriented
consider these incidents a provocation and react to them by interpreting
them in the context of their ideological convictions and by using them to
mobilise their followers.
The incidents were followed by a public discussion in France and elsewhere
that also centred on legalist Islamist extremism, which was raised as an
issue in a number of reactions from within state and society including
government officials at the highest level. This sparked strong reactions
especially from among non-violent and legalist Islamist extremists.
Through numerous statements in the media, Islamist extremist
associations and groups condemned the display of Muhammad cartoons.
While some also condemned the murder of Paty, others qualified the
crime. Some of the reactions considered the incidents to be proof of
an alleged generally Islamophobic attitude in Western societies and in
part included explanations with antisemitic connotations. The term
“Islamophobia”, which is frequently used in that context, is used to
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present a victim narrative according to which the majority society
supposedly rejects Islam as a religion in its entirety. Anti-colonialist
and anti-racist arguments are often used in that connection as well.
On that basis, Islamist extremists claim that living the Islamic faith in
conformity with the rules is only possible through a return to a purely
Islamic identity – a hypothetic idea – and through isolation from all
external influence.
The fact that this topic has a relevant potential for mobilisation, which
sometimes even stretches beyond the extremist spectrum, is proved by
the demonstrations held in connection with the incidents in France.
In late October 2020, for example, Islamist extremist groups held high-
profile protests in front of the Brandenburg Gate not far from the
French embassy in Berlin. Participants carried out activities similar to
flash mobs, among other things.
In the city centre of Vienna in early November 2020, an attacker shot
four people dead and injured more than 20, some of them seriously.
Enforcement measures were also taken in Germany against individuals
suspected of having ties to the perpetrator.
The attacks committed in France and Austria in autumn 2020 underline
the persisting threat in Europe posed by attacks motivated by Islamist
extremism. It cannot be ruled out that there might be copycat attacks
in Germany, especially by lone perpetrators inspired by such attacks.
Responsibility for the attack in Vienna was later claimed by IS, which
shows that European countries participating in or regarded as belonging
to the “anti-IS coalition” can still become targets of attacks motivated
by Islamist extremism. With the propaganda spread after the attack, IS
has revealed its continued interest in convincing its sympathisers of its
capabilities and in thereby recruiting new followers.
Over the last few years, the terrorist organisation has less often claimed
responsibility for attacks carried out in Germany and Europe, and the
perpetrators seldom expressed their loyalty for any specific jihadist
group explicitly. At the same time, both IS and al-Qaeda including their
regional branches continue to claim a leading position in the global
jihad they are striving for. The Federal Republic of Germany as well as
its interests and institutions worldwide thus continue to be among the
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