Barcelona 1-3 Real Madrid: Real comfortable defensively and ruthless on the break

Barcelona 1-3 Real Madrid: Real
comfortable defensively and ruthless on the
break
27th February 2013

The starting line-ups

Barcelona suffered their second major defeat within the space of a week, and Real are
through to the Copa del Rey final.

Jordi Roura brought in Jose Pinto for Victor Valdes in goal – as always in this competition.
The rest of the side was the same as against Milan with both Cesc Fabregas and Andres
Iniesta in the side, despite David Villa’s impact against Sevilla at the weekend.

Jose Mourinho chose Raphael Varane and Sergio Ramos at centre-back, with Pepe on the
bench. Gonzalo Higuain, as expected, started upfront.

Real outplayed Barcelona. Their defensive shape was good, their breaks were typically direct
and efficient. 3-1 didn’t flatter them.

Real positive without the ball

In previous Clasicos Real have pressed heavily from the start of the game and dominated the
opening ten minutes by forcing Barcelona to concede possession cheaply. Real’s approach
was a little less aggressive here, and they followed Milan’s lead of pressing in midfield rather
than sitting deep and inviting continual pressure – at least at the start of the game.

The danger with this approach, however, is that a reasonably high defensive line was
necessary. Real were torn apart in the 5-0 Clasico because Barcelona ripped their high line to
shreds – Lionel Messi coming deep and threading the ball through the defence for the wide
forwards. In this match, there was surprisingly little threat in behind the defence from
Barcelona, primarily because of the Andres Iniesta-Cesc Fabregas problem on the left, which
continues to frustrate.

On the opposite flank, Pedro Rodriguez offers speed and clever runs, but he stayed in a very
wide position and therefore wasn’t a direct goal threat – he only got in behind the defence
once, in the second minute when creating a chance for Messi, and even this was after he’d
checked back and beaten Fabio Coentrao.

Real midfield play

The midfield strategy was similar to Milan’s in theory, if not in actual positioning. Milan
played a 4-3-3, Real are 4-2-3-1, which meant the format of the midfield was different, but
considering that Milan (like Chelsea and Celtic) often brought their deepest midfielder
forward in advance of the other two, maybe it didn’t make that much difference.

There was another familiar theme – Real’s happiness to leave space between their defence
and midfield lines, seemingly confident no Barcelona player would move into that zone
unattended. Sami Khedira was given the freedom to press the player in his zone – generally
Fabregas, who played deeper than against Milan, while Xabi Alonso got tight to Xavi
Hernandez, forcing him into backwards passes.

Messi tried to drop into that zone a couple of times, particularly towards the right, but Ramos
moved up and stuck tight to him, with Varane becoming the spare man. Messi had a couple
of opportunities to turn and run at the Real defence, but overall they limited his influence.

Alonso positioning

Alonso deserves a huge slice of credit for Real’s performance. He’s struggled in many
Clasicos, unable to live with Barcelona’s rondos because he’s not a natural tackler, and
unable to assert his influence on the game in an attacking sense because of Barca’s pressing.
For such an elegant midfield creator, he often becomes a scrapper in these fixtures.

But this was an absolutely superb display. Alonso managed to help nullify two Barcelona
players simultaneously – he positioned himself cleverly in front of the defence to prevent
forward passes being played into Messi’s feet, yet also stayed alert to the danger of Xavi,
always in a position to charge up the pitch and pressure him. Then when Xavi had distributed
the ball, Alonso would drop back and get in front of Messi. That freedom to move vertically
stemmed from Real’s willingness to leave space in front of the defence.

Again, when Real lost 5-0 at the Camp Nou, Alonso was told to stay deep and Ozil was given
the responsibility of tracking Xavi – Xavi moved higher up, Alonso had to react late, Messi
became free. Tonight’s tactic – albeit after several subsequent experiences of facing Barca –
worked much better.

Equally vital was Alonso’s communication. It’s worth re-watching the first 15 or 20 minutes
of the game and solely concentrating on Alonso – not just for his positioning, but for his
constant pointing and shouting at his centre-backs. That was crucial considering the
partnership at the back – Varane, a youngster who has been primarily used in home matches,
and hadn’t played at the Camp Nou before, and Ramos, a terrific defender but one who can
be dragged out of position too easily by Messi and Barcelona.

Alonso dispossessed Xavi on the edge of the Real box for the first goal, which summed up
his dominance of that contest.

Wide positions

In wider areas, Angel Di Maria sat deep while Cristiano Ronaldo stayed higher up – in fact,
he was Real’s most advanced player over the course of the game. This has always been the
case for Real, but Barcelona’s shift in full-back play has actually played into Real’s hands –
Jordi Alba is now more permanently involved in attacks than Daniel Alves, and Di Maria is
the better player to take care of Barcelona’s attacking threat. Previously, Mourinho had
sometimes felt obliged to switch Ronaldo and Di Maria, allowing the Argentine to deal with
Alves, but forcing Ronaldo away from his preferred position. That is no longer necessary.

Ronaldo’s battle against Alves is always key in these matches. Early on the Brazilian broke
past Ronaldo to provide an overlap and cross, but even when this happened Real weren’t
hugely concerned – they had a spare defender, after all, and Alves’ advanced positioning
meant Pedro had moved central to be looked after by the centre-backs.

Counter-attacks

Besides, it left Ronaldo free to break. Barcelona gave him too many opportunities to run one-
against-one on counter-attacks throughout the game – sometimes against Alves, but often
against one of Real’s centre-backs instead, in more central areas. Considering Ronaldo is
unquestionably Real’s main attacking weapon, it was somewhat surprising Barcelona found
themselves so exposed to his runs, but there was some subtle, good movement and passing
from Higuain and Ozil.

Higuain didn’t have a superb game, but he either stayed towards the right side of the pitch,
forcing Barca’s centre-backs towards that side, or started left and made runs across them,
moving them away from Ronaldo. That’s something Real do very cleverly.

Ozil, meanwhile, played an understated role but made typically clever movements
throughout. Those two players’ contribution for the move that resulted in the penalty for
Barca’s first (Ozil’s lob over Sergio Busquets’ head, Higuain’s through-ball past Puyol for
Ronaldo to chase) may be simple technically, but showed a great understanding of what Real
needed to do when they won possession – get the ball past their opponent as quickly as
possible, taking players out of the game.

Average position diagram, courtesy of WhoScored.com, for Barcelona (left) and Real Madrid
(right). Three interesting features include Iniesta (8) and Fabregas (4) so close together,
Ronaldo (7) being Real's highest player, and Ramos (4) slightly higher than Varane (2) as he
moved towards Messi

Iniesta – Fabregas problems

At the risk of repeating what was said following the Milan game, Roura’s continued use of
Fabregas and Iniesta in these roles was hugely surprising. Iniesta stayed nearer the touchline
while Fabregas floated around in a more central position, but they often got in each other’s
way, and Iniesta seems unable to influence the game significantly while Fabregas is taking up
his space.

There was one perfect example of the problem, after 10 minutes. Pinto claimed the ball and
immediately chucked it long to Iniesta, for Barcelona to break three-against-three. Fabregas
started slightly inside of Iniesta, but then made a lazy, casual run into the same ‘vertical’
piece of space as him. He needed to either burst through the middle to provide the potential
for a forward pass in behind the defence, or charge to the outside (as Ozil would certainly
have done) to stretch the play and allow Iniesta to come inside. In the end, he offered nothing,
and Iniesta had to check back, winning a foul from Khedira.

That problem – two players on top of each other – would never have happened under Pep
Guardiola. He was insistent on training drills involving ‘boxes’ which forced Barcelona to
always cover space effectively – when one man came into your zone, you moved out into
another zone. It provides the man in possession with a number of options on the ball, it
stretches the play and therefore the opposition defence, and it distributes players across the
pitch evenly so Barcelona can press effectively immediately (something also lacking this
season). It’s far from unique, and in many ways very basic, but clever spatial distribution was
a key part of Guardiola’s strategy, yet so absent here.

Amazingly, using Fabregas and Iniesta so close seems to constrain Barcelona in three
separate ways – it doesn’t provide a permanent third central midfielder to help dominate the
middle of the pitch, it doesn’t stretch the opposition enough laterally, and it doesn’t offer
penetration in behind the defence. Alvaro Arbeloa stuck tight to Iniesta – getting booked
towards the end of the first half, which made that approach less possible after the break, but
generally coped with him well.

Villa was desperately needed on the left. It was interesting that Messi had commented on
Villa’s impact against Sevilla at the weekend, saying, “With Villa up front in the second half,
Sevilla’s centre backs couldn’t move forward, which gave me more space.” He hasn’t always
worked well with Villa, but would surely have been disappointed to see him on the bench
here.

Pattern continues after the break

It was odd that Roura left Barcelona unchanged for the start of the second half, but entirely
predictable that the pattern would continue. Barcelona didn’t make the angles for incisive
passing, while Real continued to counter-attack. Ronaldo’s second, on 57 minutes, came after
another break and before Barcelona had made a change. Barca now needed to score three
goals.

At last, Villa replaced Fabregas – but Barcelona quickly conceded another goal, this time a
Varane header from a set-piece. Tello replaced Pedro on the right, and now Barcelona had
two direct, fresh wide forwards trying to run in behind. Real sat deeper as a result.

But Barcelona now needed four goals, and the tie was effectively over – Mourinho made
three logical substitutions, each time introducing a more defensive player in place of the man
he was withdrawing. Alba scored an 89th minute consolation, significant only because he
was offering forwards runs in behind the defence from the left, something Barcelona should
have offered from the outset, through Villa.

Conclusion

It’s worth remembering why Barcelona find themselves in this situation – their manager is
recovering from cancer, and Roura haw found himself in a job he doesn’t want, forced to
cope with pressure and responsibility without warning. It would be extremely harsh to
criticise him strongly considering the circumstances – it’s more polite, perhaps, to simply say
that Barcelona are missing Tito Vilanova and his tactical ability, particularly his ability to
change matches in-play, which was apparent even in Guardiloa’s reign.

That shouldn’t take anything away from Real’s performance: they defended with a brave high
line and the midfielders pressed energetically, with Alonso helping to stop both Messi and
Xavi with superb positioning. They, like Milan, scored their goals in the expected fashion
against Barcelona – two from counter-attacks, one from a set-piece.

And how important is experience of playing Barcelona? Barca’s two key defeats this week
have come against sides now accustomed to facing them – Milan played them four times last
season, Real Madrid six times. After ‘aggregate’ defeats in 2011/12, maybe Allegri and
Mourinho have learnt lessons for 2012/13.