2021UPA-Chad-in- Chaos1 - The Uplifting Africa Program - Matthew Failor The Uplifting Africa Program

2021UPA-Chad-in-
             Chaos1
6/4/2021
             The Uplifting Africa Program

                     Chad’s Rebels   Photo Credit: Reuters Media

           Matthew Failor
           The Uplifting Africa Program
           www.upliftingafrica.org

Chad in Chaos:
                Background, Regional Implications,
                    and Global Consequences

Chad’s Border Frontier and President Idriss Déby         Image Credits: Wikimedia/ Britannica

       There were gunshots of celebration in N'djamena as Chad certified the results of its
presidential election. The gunshots to the north of the country, however, were of a different sort.
They were the gunshots of rebels who managed to assassinate Idriss Déby, the 68-year-old
president of Chad. Deby was an autocrat who won his six terms by suppressing opposition and
rigging elections. Yet, he was a force for stability in the region and was a key figure for the
United States and France’s regional security apparatuses.
       Déby leaves a complicated legacy and a complicated political situation behind him. First,
however, we must understand the situation by understanding the man. Idriss Déby was born in
1952 in French Equatorial Africa -- what would soon become Chad. He was a pilot, trained in
France, who participated in Chad’s civil war on the side of Hissène Habré. With Déby’s support
and military expertise, Habré won the war and became Chad’s President with Déby as the
commander in Chief of the Chadian Armed Forces. During this period, Déby received further
training at the French War College The relationship between these two men soured, as Déby was
planning a coup. Upon discovery, Déby fled to Sudan where he launched attacks on the Habré

regime which eventually led to Habré’s exile and Déby becoming president. This happened in
1990, and since then, Déby served as Chad’s president.
       Under Déby’s rule, the Chadian military became one of the strongest in the region. This
had a dual purpose. First, it helped secure Déby’s rule by oppressing the Chadian people and by
weakening the power of warlords in Northern Chad. Second, it gives his regime geopolitical
importance in the region; they were a force to be reckoned with and any power with an interest in
the region needed them as an ally and a base of power. The Chadian military is active across
Africa, supporting stabilization efforts in Mali as well as fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria.
Additionally, they have been fighting with rebels in Southern Libya, helping to end conflict in
the Central African Republic, and consistently flexing their military muscle in Darfur and Sudan.
       The composition of Chad’s army, however, stresses the important role Déby himself
played in its cohesion and strength. The army is a combination of modernized forces and former
rebel groups that have been assimilated into the army infrastructure. As such, there is a lot of
distrust and friction between commanders who represent different factions of the army or–more
broadly–different members of Chad’s ethnic groups. Déby united them with oil money and his
personal presence; many units did not respect their immediate commanders, respecting only
Déby himself. Now, after his death, it is unclear how the military will respond. Already, they
have worked to install one of their own in charge of a transitional government, which many
observers are calling a de facto coup.
       What comes next is uncertain. The transitional government, led by Déby’s son Gen.
Mahamat Idriss Déby, suspended the constitution and promised to hold new elections within 18
months. Upset with the suspension of the constitution and Chad’s apparent descent into a quasi-
monarchical state after the younger Déby’s elevation. The political opposition is becoming
increasingly organized and recently took to the streets against this move. Additionally, it is
unclear whether Mahamat Déby will be able to maintain his father’s coalition. In fact, tension
and infighting are possible even within Déby’s family. Instability seems certain and the effects of
this instability will ripple across the Sahel and Africa more broadly.
       In contrast, the Déby years (1990-2021) were marked by stability, yet also by autocracy.
Déby ruled his country like an authoritarian, allowing no dissent and relying on his powerful
military to fight off rebels and ensure the survival of his regime. This authoritarianism made
Chad one of the Sahel’s most stable countries, especially as Déby enjoyed deep international

support from the United States and France. To the West, Déby’s Chad was the cornerstone of
African anti-extremism campaigns; in a chaotic region, the West was more than willing to
sacrifice democratic principles for military and logistical support.
       This strategy worked. Déby was a key strategic partner in the fight against Boko Haram
and against Libyan rebels. He helped support the West’s desired outcomes in both CAR and
Sudan and offered his country for US military exercises as recently as 2017. Additionally, after
his death, France mourned the loss of Déby, calling him France’s “courageous friend” while the
US similarly offered condolences, while urging a peaceful transfer of power in accordance with
the constitution.
       While this strategy was effective over the last few decades, the US and France must now
reckon with a post-Déby Chad. The stability that built the alliance has been replaced by total
uncertainty. The biggest question that remains for the West is what comes next. Their support of
Déby gave him the time and tacit permission to destroy Chad’s institutions and opposition and
Chad seems poised to elevate another strongman leader outside of its constitution. On the other
hand, Chad could transition to being a weak democracy, with reasonably fair elections, but this
too is not a desirable outcome for the United States and France, as they need a stable Chad for
their grand plans of counterterrorism initiatives across Africa. No matter the outcome, the
constant threats from rebels during Déby’s presidency will not disappear, and it is unclear
whether Chad will be able to push them back without the personal appeal of Déby himself.
       The US and France are reaping what they have sown over the past thirty years. Déby
could never be immortal, and it was clear that instability would follow his death. Now, the US
and France have a choice -- they can commit to Chad, no matter what the government ends up
being or they can look elsewhere in the region. Neither are particularly feasible options as the
region offers no stable nation that would have the region-wide reach of Chad, while the situation
in Chad is likely to get worse before it gets better.
       Déby’s death brings region-wide consequences and the ripple effects of his death will be
felt for years to come as Chad reckons with a new leader for the first time in decades. The grand
strategy of the US and France will need to adapt to this new reality in the Sahel and must come
to terms with its own role and agency in the chaos that is likely coming. The US and France
should also take a moment to assess their role in Sahelian counter-terrorism efforts and analyze
whether the support of autocrats like Déby is worth marginal strategic gains in the region against

groups such as Boko Haram. This is a question without an easy answer, but it is one that the US
and France are now forced to reckon with as Chad enters into an uncertain future.

                                   Chad’s Rebels           Photo Credit: Reuters Media

References
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/world/africa/president-chad-killed.html
https://www.cfr.org/blog/chad-holds-another-sham-election
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/29/the-death-of-chadian-president-
idris-deby-itno-threatens-stability-in-the-region/
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idriss-Deby
https://www.state.gov/on-the-death-of-president-idriss-deby-itno/