WZB Report 2014 WZB Berlin Social Science Center
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WZB www.wzb.eu Report 2014 WZB Berlin Essays on: Migration, integra- tion, education, Social Science Center global governance, democracy, market behavior and science policy
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Contents WZB Report 2014 Cover photo: 5 Editorial 48 Can You Trade Love for Wealth? Getty Images / Grant Faint Jutta Allmendinger and Heinrich Baßler The TV Series Breaking Bad Can Teach Us Some Lessons about Economics 7 The WZB in 2013/2014 Steffen Huck 50 With Shared Responsibility Migration and Integration How Committee Decisions Depend on Procedures and Size 11 Taking the Scripture Literally Justin Valasek Religious Fundamentalism among Muslim Immigrants and Christian Natives in Western Europe Democracy Ruud Koopmans 52 After the Arab Uprising 16 A Measure for Social Integration A Conflict-ridden Region in the Grip Mixed Marriages between Muslims and of Autocrats Non-Muslims Are Accepted but Rare Wolfgang Merkel Sarah Carol 55 The Pragmatic Turn of Democracy 19 Religion Matters Combining Representation and Faith and its Practice Influence Coex- Participation istence More Than Generally Assumed Thamy Pogrebinschi Sarah Carol, Marc Helbling and Ines Michalowski 59 Elites in the Mirror Self-Image, Collective Image, and Issues of Responsibility among Germany’s Education and Labor Leaders Elisabeth Bunselmeyer and 22 A Call for Action Marc Holland-Cunz The Right to Education Challenges Germany’s Social and Educational System Global Governance Michael Wrase 62 Governing the World without World 26 Wishes and Reality Government Managers and Part-Time Work: States, Societies and Institutions A European Comparison Interact in Many Ways Lena Hipp and Stefan Stuth Michael Zürn 29 Diverging Paths 66 The Rise of New World Players How the UN Disability Convention In Global Governance, a Balance of Affects School Reforms in Germany Power Is Re-emerging Jonna M. Blanck, Benjamin Edelstein, Matthew Stephen and Justin J.W. Powell 69 And It Does Listen - Sometimes 33 Growing in a Niche Public Debates Can Influence the Dual Study Programs Contribute to Politics of the EU Commission Change in Germany’s Higher Education Christian Rauh Lukas Graf 72 Publications Science and Globalization 76 In Focus 37 Globalization à la carte The Political Economy of Research Co- 84 Bodies, Boards, Committees operation with China Is Bound to Change Benjamin Becker and Ulrich Schreiterer All Things Considered 41 Preventing Global Disaster International Governance of Dual-use 86 EU Support for Social Science and Sciences Humanities Alexandros Tokhi More Money for Identities and Cultures Jutta Allmendinger and Julia Stamm Markets and Decisions 45 Goods without a Price Tag Smart Market Design Can Make the Distribution of Important Goods More Fair and Efficient Dorothea Kübler WZB Report 2014 3
Imprint About the WZB WZB Report 2014 The WZB Berlin Social Science Center conducts basic r esearch ISSN 2195-5182 with a focus on problems of modern societies in a globalized Publisher world. The research is theory-based, problem-oriented, often The President of the WZB Berlin Social Science long-term and mostly based on international c omparisons. Center (WZB) Professor Jutta Allmendinger Ph.D. Key research topics include: Reichpietschufer 50 – democracy and civil society 10785 Berlin – migration and integration and intercultural conflicts Germany – markets, competition, and behavior Phone: +49 - 30 - 25 491 0 – education, training, and the labor market Fax: +49 - 30 - 25 491 684 – inequality and social policy – gender and family www.wzb.eu – international relations Editorial staff – transnationalization and the rule of law Dr. Paul Stoop (editor-in-chief) – innovation and science policy Gabriele Kammerer Claudia Roth Kerstin Schneider 160 German and international researchers work at the WZB, including sociologists, political scientists, economists, legal Documentation scholars, and historians. Martina Sander-Blanck Translations Research results are published for the scientific community David Antal as well as for experts in politics, business, the media, and civic Rhodes Barrett organizations. Carsten Bösel Nancy du Plessis Teresa Go As a non-university research institute, the WZB is member of the Leibniz-Association. The WZB closely cooperates with Photo Page 5: David Ausserhofer Berlin universities. Its directors also hold chairs at universi- ties in Berlin and beyond. Layout Kognito Gestaltung, Berlin The WZB was founded in 1969 by members of the German Printing arliament from all parties. The WZB is funded by the Federal p Bonifatius GmbH, Druck · Buch · Verlag, government and the state of Berlin. Paderborn 4 WZB Report 2014
Beyond Seven Looking back on the WZB’s development in 2013, we can say with great satisfaction that we did not experience a seven- year itch in this seventh year of our tenure as the institu- tion’s management. We take pride in what has been accom- plished and are grateful for the dedication of the many people who contributed to the WZB’s academic and societal impact. We also thank our shareholders—the German federal govern- ment and the Berlin state government—which have entrusted us with the careful, wise, and creative use of the funding they provide. They are realistic about what is possible for us and do not call for us to attract ever more outside funding or to pub- lish a constantly increasing number of peer-reviewed journal articles at any price. Our shareholders encourage our efforts to focus on certain topics in the European research agenda, to pursue particular academic career paths, and to emphasize networked research throughout Berlin. This constructive ex- change with the federal and Land governments is a key asset. This report gives many insights into what we do, stressing the WZB’s service to social science and to public discussion of basic social issues. Readers may imagine what lies behind that input: the research itself, the institutional support for it, and the intense work in internal committees as well as col- lective celebrations and original events like the science slams. All these activities ultimately enrich academic life and scientific research. Jutta Allmendinger and Heinrich Baßler WZB Report 2014 5
WZB Research Education, Work, and Life Chances Dynamics of Political Systems Research Unit Skill Formation and Labor Markets Research Unit Democracy and Democratization Director: Professor Heike Solga Director: Professor Wolfgang Merkel Research Unit Inequality and Social Policy Research Professorship Structural Problems of Liberal Director: Professor David Brady Ph.D. Political Systems Professor Kurt Biedenkopf Project Group Demography and Inequality Head: Professor Anette Eva Fasang Research Professorship Theory, History and Future of Democracy Project Group National Educational Panel Study: Professor John Keane Vocational Training and Lifelong Learning Head: Professor Reinhard Pollak Project Group Civic Engagement Head: Dr. sc. Eckhard Priller Junior Research Group Work and Care Head: Lena Hipp Ph.D. Migration and Diversity Markets and Choice Research Unit Migration, Integration, Transnationalization Director: Professor Ruud Koopmans Research Unit Market Behavior Director: Professor Dorothea Kübler Emmy Noether Junior Research Group Immigration Policies in Comparison Research Unit Economics of Change Head: Dr. Marc Helbling Director: Professor Steffen Huck Junior Research Group Risk and Development Head: Ferdinand Vieider Ph.D. Trans-sectoral Research WZB Rule of Law Center Society and Economic Dynamics Managing Head: Professor Mattias Kumm Bridging Project – Cultural Framing Effects in Research Unit Cultural Sources of Newness Experimental Game Theory Director: Professor Michael Hutter Heads: Professor Michael Hutter, Professor Dorothea Kübler Research Group Science Policy Studies Bridging Project – Recruitment Behavior of Companies in Head: Dr. Dagmar Simon Vocational Training and Labor Markets Heads: Professor Dorothea Kübler, Professor Heike Solga Project Group Globalization, Work and Production Head: Dr. Martin Krzywdzinski Bridging Project – The Political Sociology of Project Group Modes of Economic Governance Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism Head: Sigurt Vitols Ph.D. Heads: Professor Ruud Koopmans, Professor Wolfgang Merkel, Professor Michael Zürn International Politics and Law Research Unit Global Governance Director: Professor Michael Zürn Research Professorship Rule of Law in the Age of Globalization Professor Mattias Kumm Project Group The Internet Policy Field Head: Professor Jeanette Hofmann Structure as of January, 2014 6 WZB Report 2014
The WZB in 2013/14 After years of change wrought by constant re- skill formation, aspirations, and attainment, es- cruitment and the emergence of a new struc- pecially during the transition from school to ture having six research areas, the WZB had work. time in 2013 to consolidate its achievements and build on them. Research does well with a The Institute for Protest and Social Movement phase of calm, as shown by this year’s list of Studies, in which researchers of the former WZB works, many of which appeared with in- WZB Research Group on Civil Society, Citizen- ternational publishers and journals. Numerous ship, and Political Mobilization in Europe would WZBriefe and scholarly reports sparked discus- like to continue their work, is gaining a firm sion, leaving their mark on specialists and the institutional footing. The WZB supports the broad public alike. WZB events now have new, founding of this organization. Its public pre- interdisciplinary formats inviting links with sentation in June 2013 gave a chance to reflect other social sectors. on this field of inquiry and to consider avenues of cooperation with other institutions. Institutional Developments We are privileged to be an active part of the Leibniz Association, which links 89 indepen- The research units changed little during the dent nonuniversity research institutions rep- year under review. The final phase of work in resenting a broad range of disciplines. We prof- the Research Unit on Inequality and Social In- it from the joint research opportunities this tegration was completed in March. The Schum- organization affords. Forming thematic clus- peter Junior Research Group on Position For- ters, the new Leibniz research networks con- mation in the EU Commission ended in stitute an outstanding resource on which we September. Miriam Hartlapp, the head of the all draw. We welcome three new Leibniz cen- group, accepted a professorship at the Center ters. The WZB will have an exceptionally close for Social Policy at the University of Bremen. relationship with the Leibniz-Institut für Bil- dungsverläufe (LIfBi). The LIfBi has now become When the WZB founded the Alexander von part of the system of federal and Land research Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society funding, a milestone in empirical research on (HIIG) in 2012, critical questions ensued, and education, to which the WZB is committed. the institute’s future seemed uncertain. But the research has withstood scrutiny. Google is initially supporting the institute through 2016, The WZB in Berlin’s Academic and further sponsors have been found. The Setting WZB has responded by creating the Project Group on The Internet Policy Field, which is The WZB traditionally seeks close ties to Berlin currently planned for three years. The group is universities, at which researchers at the WZB expected to ensure a solid link between the can complete their doctorates and teach. With- HIIG and the WZB and is headed by Jeanette out this opportunity, their academic careers Hofmann, who is also a director at the HIIG. would not be possible. The WZB can do much for the universities, too. We work with them, Together with the Free University of Berlin training doctoral students, teaming up to apply (FU), the WZB has also set up the Junior Re- for research funding, pooling resources for ap- search Group on Neuroeconomic Decision The- pointments, and jointly financing junior re- ory. It is seated at the FU and will begin its search groups. work in 2014, exploring issues of research on experimental and behavioral economics. The degree of coordination between the Berlin institutions varies from discipline to disci- The WZB has decided to establish a Research pline. Joint announcements of postdoctoral va- Professorship on Risk and Adaptation in the cancies have already become a reality through Transition to Adulthood. It will be offered to In- the network of Berlin’s behavioral economists, grid Schoon, a professor of human develop- for instance. In 2013 the WZB, Humboldt Uni- ment and social policy at the Institute of Edu- versity of Berlin, and the German Institute for cation at the University of London. Her research Economic Research (DIW) together filled five will focus on matters of social inequality in positions, for which more than 300 economists WZB Report 2014 7
had applied. The selected researchers have an search (BMFB) and the Jacobs Foundation. If office at either the WZB or the DIW and at Hum- this international pilot program runs success- boldt University. fully, the WZB will strive to extend it into other areas of research. Heike Solga is also steward- Networking is less advanced in the social and ing the WZB’s involvement in the Berlin Inter- political sciences. Graduate schools in these disciplinary Education Network (BIEN), for two fields operate separately. Creation of a which BMBF funding has been pledged from common roof for them lies far in the future. the end of 2013 through 2016. The WZB is now striving to interlink and even- tually stabilize the considerable number of doctoral programs. Discussions opened in 2013 International Engagement for moving toward an integrated structure in 2014: the Berlin Center for Doctoral Programs The WZB seeks to help strengthen research in in the Social Sciences. the social sciences and the humanities in Eu- rope. To this effect we initiated an open letter to EU Research Commissioner Máire Geoghe- Strengthening Interdisciplinary gan-Quinn and members of the European Par- Approaches liament in May. It called for an appropriate sum to be guaranteed for the social sciences and Projects spanning two or more areas within humanities in the negotiations on the new EU the WZB continued expanding in many fields of research framework program, Horizon 2020. activity: bridging projects and other joint re- The letter was cosigned by the Max Planck In- search, joint events such as the Distinguished stitute for the Study of Societies, the Free Uni- Lectures in Social Sciences, and jointly con- versity of Berlin, and the Bremen International ducted advanced interdisciplinary academic Graduate School of Social Sciences. training offered by the doctoral and postdoc- toral scholars. The WZB’s series of Distin- Aside from working on research policy at the guished Lectures was launched in 2013, with European level, the WZB expanded its scientific Neil Fligstein (University of California, Berke- cooperation with European partners. The inno- ley), Torsten Persson (Stockholm University), vative “Research in Pairs” program of the WZB and Robert Keohane (Princeton University) and the Institute for Advanced Studies (IAST) of each giving an address. the Toulouse School of Economics opened in the spring of 2013. It affords scholars of both Interdisciplinarity also figured prominently in organizations new possibilities for cooperating the interaction of the organizations within the on a research project or academic work by al- Leibniz Association. More and more Leibniz re- ternating relatively long exchanges at the search alliances are forming. The WZB takes partner institutes. In the first round of these part in four of them: educational potential, exit arrangements, Dorothea Kübler (WZB) and Yin- from nuclear and fossil-fuel energy, crises in a gua He (IAST) are pursuing a joint survey on globalized world, sustainable food production admission procedures at universities, and Fer- and healthy nutrition. In the network dealing dinand Vieider (WZB) and Christoph Rhein- with energy issues, the WZB has the role of co- berger (IAST) are developing an experimental ordinator. design for “Texting Ambiguity Aversion in the Wild: Experiment on Uncertain Health Risks.” Institutionally, the WZB is emphasizing inter- disciplinary research especially for postdoc- The WZB’s visibility in 2013 increased beyond toral scholars in order to establish them in Europe’s borders as well. For instance, the their own disciplines and to help them keep proven collaboration with the University of the big picture in mind. An example is the pio- Sydney entered a new phase in November, neering postdoctoral program that Heike Solga when a three-day workshop entitled “Re-Imag- has initiated and elaborated in empirical re- ing the Future of Democracy” explored new op- search on education. Of the 60 applicants cho- tions for cooperation with the Research Units sen, 30 fellows from 22 scientific centers in on Democracy, Global Governance, and Migra- Europe were admitted from the fields of so- tion (Michael Zürn, Ruud Koopmans, and Wolf- ciology, psychology, pedagogy, and economics gang Merkel). Both the Rule of Law Center (un- and are now working across subject-area der Mattias Kumm) and the Research Unit on boundaries to grapple with important topics of Inequality and Social Policy (David Brady) were educational research. They are focusing pri- involved, too. marily on educational disparities, academic successes against the odds, skill development The WZB found additional academic partners in as an educational and social process, and mon- Singapore, concluding a cooperation agree- etary and nonmonetary returns on education. ment with the College of Humanities, Arts, and This research training group is funded by the Social Sciences of Nanyang Technological Uni- German Federal Ministry of Education and Re- versity (NTU). Substantively, cooperation with 8 WZB Report 2014
the NTU and with the National University of Interlinking Areas of Society Singapore as yet another partner began with a workshop entitled “Immigration Policies, Im- If the challenges to globalized societies are to migrant Rights, and Social Inclusion – Western be mastered, various areas of society must im- Experiences and Asian Challenges.” Leading prove what they know about each other and migration researchers from the participating how they interact. To reinforce this dialogue, institutions developed specific ways to con- the WZB has introduced “Science in Practice.” tribute to this topic. This program gives young scholars the chance to work in business, administration, the poli- Another milestone in 2013 was the signing of cy-making community, or associations, where the memorandum of understanding with the they offer their theoretical and methodologi- International Social Science Council (ISSC) in cal knowledge as scientists in residence. Paris. Cooperation will center on a joint fellow- ship program announced in the summer for For three to twelve months, these academics the first time. The WZB–ISSC Global Fellowship work with the selected partner on a specific Program will bestow a six-month stipend to a project they have developed together. The researcher from a developing country. The partner institutions profit from the expertise widely advertised call for applications and the of the scholars, and the scholars gain insight competitive selection procedure was conceived into the culture, logic, and approach of other by the WZB and the ISSC together. The first sectors. These individuals acquire versatile WZB–ISSC fellow has been invited for 2014. skills and can develop ideas for new projects that may have practical relevance. The first The ties to the Minda de Gunzburg Center for WZB researcher in this capacity worked in an European Studies (CES) at Harvard University, international recruitment consultancy in 2013. which have been institutionalized for some years, consolidated further under the organi- The intention at the WZB is to promote this zation’s new director, Grzegorz Ekiert. Two mutual understanding by doing more than WZB–Harvard Merit Fellowships were awarded preparing corresponding publications and in 2013: one to Céline Teney, a senior research- opening events to a broad audience. We regu- er in the Research Unit on Migration, Integra- larly host “Lunch Talks” and the “Berliner Run- tion, Transnationalization; the other to Sebas- den” – the latter sponsored by Soroptimist In- tian Botzem, a research fellow of the Project ternational Deutschland – in which discussants Group on Modes of Economic Governance. Both from a wide range of areas take part. scholars will work at CES for three months. The WZB’s cooperation with the University of Syd- A new series of events along these lines was ney was fostered, too. In 2013 Matthew D. Ste- added. It began with a public discussion with phen, a research fellow of the Research Unit on Vince Gilligan, the creator and producer of the Global Governance, and Rustamdjan Hakimov, a critically acclaimed TV series Breaking Bad. The research fellow of the Research Unit on Market exchange revealed the great interest in bound- Behavior, spent a few months in Sydney, and ary-crossing dialogue between research and Janine Bredehöft and Elisabeth Humphrys the arts. Gilligan, opera general manager and came to the WZB from Sydney. series expert Sir Peter Jonas, and WZB director Steffen Huck examined the theme of markets The WZB’s presence throughout the world was and morals that lies at the heart of the series. apparent also from the foreign guests interest- ed in research of this organization. The inter- national delegations that visited the WZB in Career Advancement 2013 included junior academics from Uganda; scholars from the Khobara Center, a new think Young academics face a host of uncertainties, tank in Yemen; and a group from the social sci- such as short-term contracts, part-time em- ence academy in China. ployment, ambiguity about what is expected of them during the doctoral and postdoctoral The A.SK Academic Award and the A.SK Public phase of their work, excessively lax supervi- Policy Fellowships serve as an international sion, unpredictable career prospects, and lack beacon. They were conferred in 2013 for the of information about the job requirements in fourth time. The economist and Africa expert other social sectors. Paul Collier received the main award, with Klaus Töpfer delivering a eulogy. The fellowships went These years of life are rife with other issues as to Daniel Tischer (Centre for Research on So- well: How do I combine academia and family? Is cio-Cultural Change, University of Manchester), science more than a calling and a vocation? Rami Zeedan (University of Haifa), Olga Ulybina Does it dominate my entire life and leave little (Cambridge Central Asian Forum), Theresa Rein- room for a partner, friends, parents, and chil- hold (WZB), and Josef Hien (Max Planck Institute dren? Do I have to choose between these for Study of Societies (Cologne and Turin). worlds? WZB Report 2014 9
For these reasons career advancement at the Finances and Human Resources WZB centers on a code of conduct. As a written statement of the rights and responsibilities of As in previous years, the financial perspective doctoral and postdoctoral scholars being was shaped in 2013 by the Joint Initiative for trained at the WZB, it serves as a common ori- Research and Innovation, in which the WZB entation and foundation for people to work to- shares as a member institution of the Leibniz gether. Questions of guidance and feedback, Association. The revenues received, and thus constant dialogue, length of contract, start-up the total funds spent, at the WZB in the year and wrap-up funding, and the possibilities of under review came to €19.3 million (as op- pursuing a number of topics and gaining posed to €18.8 in 2012). Institutional funding teaching experience are all addressed system- from the German federal government and the atically and transparently. Land (state) government of Berlin totaled €15.2 million in 2013 (compared to €15.3 million in 2012). The revenues spent from external fund- Alumni Network and “Friends of ing for research and development amounted to the WZB” €4.2 million (€3.6 million in 2012). The exter- nally funded projects that were in progress on In May 2013 representatives of different December 31, 2012, accounted for 21.8% of the spheres convened at the invitation of Kai-Uwe WZB’s total expenditures (19.8% in 2012). Peter (Association of Savings Banks, Berlin) to consult with and actively support the WZB An additional sum of €3.5 million for 27 new through an association called The Friends of externally funded projects was raised in 2013 the WZB. The goal of this group is to facilitate (€5.6 million in 2012) from organizations pro- networking between the WZB’s multiple con- moting research and from federal ministries, tacts in Berlin, Germany, and the international the European Commission, public and private community and to familiarize interested par- foundations, and industry. Over time there has ties outside science and academia with this been a notable shift in the relative proportions organization’s research results. The main goal accounted for by the donors. Since 2006, when is take the critical examination of urgent con- the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) temporary issues and extend it beyond the sci- contributed 10% of the WZB’s external funding, entific disciplines and to strengthen its moor- that share has risen to far more than 50% today. ing in the policy-making community, business and associations, culture, the media, and soci- The average number of people employed by the ety. WZB by the end of 2013 was 368. 83.2% of the institution’s total number of employed research Just under 2,000 people have worked at the ers were on temporary contracts. Doctoral can- WZB and left again since it was founded in didates made up 32.3% of the scientific staff, and 1969. For the WZB they are potential advisors, 22 doctorates were completed in 2013. 5 ap- mentors, project partners, multipliers, employ- prentices had finished their training at the WZB. ers, political allies, volunteers, and supporters. Since then, nearly 500 WZB alumni have agreed The WZB’s efforts to provide working conditions to join the new alumni network. Its formation that enable to reconcile work and family have was celebrated at the inaugural meeting in Oc- carried the auditberufundfamilie® seal since tober by more than 100 former and new mem- 2010. The WZB’s good practice and the measures bers of the WZB. They gathered in the building, agreed upon to keep developing it were recog- witnessed young academics present their work nized again when reinspected in 2013. In 2013, at the science slam, and exchanged their views. the European Commission rewarded the WZB The WZB is clearly a place with which its alum- with the "HR Excellence in Research" logo. The ni identify and feel connected as they look WZB is the first German institution to receive back on their time there. This line of tradition the logo thanks to the joint efforts of WZB mem- became possible to highlight for the first time bers working in the fields of science, adminis- – an auspicious beginning. tration, and research management. 10 WZB Report 2014
Migration and Integration. How societies cope with immigration and the in- creased cultural and religious diversity is explored mainly in the Research Area on Migration and Diversity. The objects of study include the integration of immi- grants along its various dimensions, the reactions of native populations to immi- gration, as well as the impacts of immigration and diversity on social trust, coop- eration and solidarity in society at large. Policies and institutions of core relevance are immigration policies, citizenship, assimilation requirements, church-state relations, and the welfare state. Taking the Scripture Literally Religious Fundamentalism among Muslim Immigrants and Christian Natives Ruud Koopmans In the context of heated controversies over immigration and Islam in the early Summary: A lmost half of European 21st century, Muslims have become widely associated in media debates and Muslims agree that there is only one popular imagery with religious fundamentalism. To counter this, others have interpretation of the Koran, that Mus- argued that religiously fundamentalist ideas are only found among a small mi- lims should return to the roots of Is- nority of Muslims living in the West, and that religious fundamentalism can lam, and that religious rules are more equally be found among adherents of other religions, including Christianity. important than secular laws. Based on However, claims on both sides of this debate lack a sound empirical base, be- these items, a WZB study shows that cause very little is known about the extent of religious fundamentalism among religious fundamentalism is much Muslim immigrants, and virtually no evidence is available that allows a compar- more common among Muslims than ison with native Christians. among Christians. This is alarming in the light of the strong link between Religious fundamentalism is certainly not unique to Islam. The term has its ori- religious fundamentalism and out- gin in an early 20th century Protestant revival movement in the United States, group hostility. which propagated a return to the “fundaments” of the Christian faith by way of a strict adherence to, and literal interpretation of the rules of the Bible. A large number of studies on Protestant Christian religious fundamentalism in the US have shown that it is strongly and consistently associated with prejudice and hostility against racial and religious out-groups, as well as “deviant” groups such as homosexuals. By contrast, our knowledge of the extent to which Muslim mi- norities in Western countries adhere to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam is strikingly limited. Several studies have shown that in comparison to the ma- jority population, Muslim immigrants define themselves more often as religious, identify more strongly with their religion, and engage more often in religious practices (such as praying, visiting the mosque or following religious prescrip- tions such as only eating halal food or wearing a headscarf). But religiosity as such says little about the extent to which these religious beliefs and practices can be deemed “fundamentalist” and are associated with out-group hostility. A WZB-funded survey study among immigrants and natives in six European WZB Report 2014 11
countries – Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Sweden – provides a solid empirical basis for these debates for the first time. The survey with a total sample size of 9,000 respondents was conducted in 2008 among persons with a Turkish or Moroccan immigration background, as well as a native comparison group. Following Altermeyer and Hunsberger’s widely accepted definition of fundamentalism, the fundamentalist belief system is defined by three key elements: - that believers should return to the eternal and unchangeable rules laid down in the past; - that these rules allow only one interpretation and are binding for all be lievers; - that religious rules have priority over secular laws. Ruud Koopmans i s director of the WZB research unit Migration, Integration, Transnationalization and pro- Native respondents who indicated that they were Christians (70%), and respon- fessor of sociology and migration research at Hum- boldt University Berlin. He holds a guest professor- dents of Turkish and Moroccan origin who indicated they were Muslims (96%) ship at the University of Amsterdam.[Photo: private] were asked about aspects of fundamentalism that were measured by the follow- ruud.koopmans@wzb.eu ing survey items: “Christians [Muslims] should return to the roots of Christianity [Islam]” “There is only one interpretation of the Bible [the Koran] and every Christian [Muslim] must stick to that” “The rules of the Bible [the Koran] are more important to me than the laws of [survey country]” Figure 1 shows that religious fundamentalism is not a marginal phenomenon within West European Muslim communities. Almost 60 percent of the Muslims surveyed agree that Muslims should return to the roots of Islam, 75 percent think there is only one interpretation of the Koran possible to which every Mus- lim should stick and 65 percent say that religious rules are more important to them than the laws of the country in which they live. Consistent fundamentalist beliefs, with agreement to all three statements, are found among 44 percent of the interviewed Muslims. Fundamentalist attitudes are slightly less prevalent among Sunni Muslims with a Turkish (45% agreement to all three statements) compared to a Moroccan (50%) background. Alevites, a Turkish minority current within Islam, display far lower levels of fundamentalism (15%). Contrary to the idea that fundamentalism is a reaction to exclusion by the host society, we find the lowest levels of fundamentalism in Germany, where Muslims enjoy fewer Christians Muslims 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Return to Only one binding Religious rules Agree with all the roots interpretation more important three statements than secular laws Figure 1 Religious fundamentalism among native Christians and Muslim immigrants in Western Europe 12 WZB Report 2014
religious rights than in any of the other five countries. But even among German Muslims, fundamentalist attitudes are widespread, with 30 percent agreeing to all three statements. Comparisons with other German studies reveal remark- ably similar patterns. For instance, in the 2007 Muslime in Deutschland study 47 percent of German Muslims agreed with the statement that following the rules of one’s religion is more important than democracy, almost identical to the 47 percent in our survey that finds the rules of the Koran more important than German laws. The second striking finding in Figure 1 is that religious fundamentalism is much more widespread among Muslims than among Christian natives. Among Christians, agreement with the single statements ranges between 13 and 21 percent and less than 4 percent can be characterized as consistent fundamen- talists who agree with all three items. In line with what is known about Christian fundamentalism, levels of agreement are slightly higher (4% agreeing with all statements) among mainstream Protestants than among Catholics (3%), and most pronounced (12%) among adherents of smaller Protestant groups such as Seventh Day Adventists, Jehova’s Witnesses and Pentecostal believers. However, even among these groups support for fundamentalist attitudes remains much below levels found among Sunni Muslims. Turkish Alevites’ view on the role of religion is, however, more similar to that of native Christians than of Sunni Muslims. Because the demographic and socio-economic profiles of Muslim immigrants and native Christians differ strongly, and since it is known from the literature that marginalized, lower-class individuals are more strongly attracted to funda- mentalist movements, it would of course be possible that these differences are due to class rather than religion. However, results of regression analyses con- trolling for education, labor market status, age, gender and marital status reveal that while some of these variables explain variation in fundamentalism within both religious groups, they do not explain at all or even diminish the difference between Muslims and Christians. A cause for concern is that whereas religious fundamentalism is much less widespread among younger Christians, funda- mentalist attitudes are as widespread among young as among older Muslims. Research on Christian fundamentalism in the United States has demonstrated a strong association with hostility towards out-groups, which are seen as threat- ening the religious in-group. To what extent do we find this linkage in the Euro- pean context as well? To answer this question, we use three statements that measure rejection of homosexuals and Jews, as well as the degree to which one’s own group is seen as threatened by outside enemies: “I don’t want to have homosexuals as friends.” “Jews cannot be trusted.” “Muslims aim to destroy Western culture.” [for natives] “Western countries are out to destroy Islam.” [for persons with a Turkish or Moroccan migration background] Figure 2 [see p. 14] shows that out-group hostility is far from negligible among native Christians. As much as 9 percent are overtly anti-Semitic and agree that Jews cannot be trusted. In Germany that percentage is even somewhat higher (11%). Similar percentages reject homosexuals as friends (13 % across all coun- tries, 10% in Germany). Not surprisingly, Muslims are the out-group that draws the highest level of hostility, with 23 percent of native Christians (17% in Ger- many) believing that Muslims aim to destroy Western culture. Only few native Christians display hostility against all three groups (1.6%). If we consider all natives instead of just the Christians, levels of out-group hostility are slightly lower (8% against Jews, 10% against homosexuals, 21% against Muslims, and 1.4% against all three). Even though these figures for natives are worrisome enough, they are dwarfed by the levels of out-group hostility among European Muslims. Almost 60 percent reject homosexuals as friends and 45 percent think that Jews cannot be trusted. WZB Report 2014 13
Whereas about one in five natives can be considered as Islamophobic, the level of phobia against the West among Muslims – for which oddly enough there is no word; one might call it “Occidentophobia” – is much higher still, with 54 percent believing that the West is out to destroy Islam. These findings concord with the fact that, as a 2006 Pew research institute study showed, about half of the Mus- lims living in France, Germany and the United Kingdom believe in the conspira- cy theory that the 9/11 attacks were not carried out by Muslims, but were or- chestrated by the West and/or Jews. Christians Muslims 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Don't want Jews cannot The west/Muslims Agree with all homosexual be trusted aim to destroy three statements friends Figure 2 Out-group hostility among native Christians and Muslim immigrants in Western Europe Slightly more than one quarter of Muslims display hostility towards all three out-groups. Contrary to the results for religious fundamentalism, out-group hostility is more widespread among Muslims of Turkish (30% agreeing with all three statements) than among those of Moroccan origin (17%). Although the dif- ference is smaller than in the case of religious fundamentalism, Alevites (13% agreeing to all three statements) display considerably lower levels of out-group hostility than Sunni Muslims of Turkish origin (31%). A worrying aspect is again that while out-group hostility is significantly lower among younger generations of natives, this is not the case among Muslims. Here too, we must of course make sure that differences between Muslims and natives are not due to the different demographic and socio-economic composi- tions of these groups, since xenophobia is known to be higher among socio-eco- nomically deprived groups. Multivariate regression analyses indeed show this to be the case, but controlling for socio-economic variables hardly reduces group differences. Group differences are moreover much more important than so- cio-economic ones. For instance, the difference in out-group hostility between those with low and university levels of education is about half as large as the difference between Muslims and natives. This picture radically changes when we take religious fundamentalism into ac- count, which turns out to be by far the most important predictor of out-group hostility and explains most of the differences in levels of out-group hostility between Muslims and Christians. Furthermore, the greater out-group hostility among Turkish-origin Sunnis compared to Alevites is almost entirely explained by the higher level of religious fundamentalism among the Sunnis. A further indication that religious fundamentalism is a major factor behind out-group hostility is that it is also the most important predictor in separate analyses for Christians and Muslims. In other words, religious fundamentalism not only ex- plains why Muslim immigrants are generally more hostile towards out-groups 14 WZB Report 2014
than native Christians, but also why some Christians and some Muslims are more xenophobic than others. These findings clearly contradict the often-heard claim that Islamic religious fundamentalism is a marginal phenomenon in Western Europe or that it does not differ from the extent of fundamentalism among the Christian majority. Both claims are blatantly false, as almost half of European Muslims agree that Muslims should return to the roots of Islam, that there is only one interpreta- tion of the Koran, and that the rules laid down in it are more important than secular laws. Among native Christians, less than one in 25 can be characterized as fundamentalists in this sense. Religious fundamentalism among both Chris- tians and Muslims is, moreover, not an innocent form of strict religiosity as demonstrated by its strong relationship to hostility towards out-groups. Both the extent of Islamic religious fundamentalism and its correlates – ho- mophobia, anti-Semitism and “Occidentophobia” – should be serious causes of concern for policy makers as well as Muslim community leaders. Of course, re- ligious fundamentalism should not be equated with the willingness to support, or even to engage in religiously motivated violence. But given its strong rela- tionship to out-group hostility, religious fundamentalism is very likely to pro- vide a nourishing environment for radicalization. Having said that, one should not forget that in Western Europe, Muslims make up a relatively small minority of the population. Although relatively speaking, levels of fundamentalism and out-group hostility are much higher among Muslims, in absolute numbers there are at least as many Christian as there are Muslim fundamentalists in Western Europe, and the large majority of homophobes and anti-Semites are still natives. As a religious leader respected by both Muslims and Christians once said: “Let those who are without sin, cast the first stone.” Reference Koopmans, Ruud: Religious Fundamentalism and Out-Group Hostility among Mus- lims and Christians in Western Europe. WZB Discussion Paper SP VI 2014-101. Ber- lin: WZB 2014. WZB Report 2014 15
A Measure for Social Integration M ixed Marriages between Muslims and Non-Muslims Are Accepted but Rare Sarah Carol Researchers view mixed marriages and friendships as important indicators of Summary: S tudying intermarriages the social integration of minorities. Besides the actual marriages and friend- and attitudes toward intermarriage in ships between Muslims and non-Muslims, attitudes toward them also play an Western Europe provides insights into important role. In my PhD project at the WZB I examined attitudes toward inter- aspects of social distance between marriage and the actual marriage behavior of Muslims in six European coun- ethnic minorities and the majority tries. What are the marriage patterns of the second generation? Is there a gen- population. Overall, the second gener- der difference regarding the partner search? What roles do parents, the family ation accepts intermarriages to a and religion play? How do immigration and integration policies affect the search greater extent than the first genera- for a partner? tion. However, if we look at actual marriages, we observe the per- To find out how policy affects the partner search, various international compar- sistence of marriage patterns across ative data sets were analyzed, especially the WZB’s EURISLAM data set. This in- generations with the majority of mar- cludes information on about 7,000 people in Belgium, Germany, France, United riages conducted within the family’s Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland without immigration background, as own ethnic and religious group. Mar- well as Muslims with Yugoslav, Moroccan, Turkish and Pakistani backgrounds. riage decisions are related to parental Respondents in the ‘Muslim’ group had at least one Muslim parent. The countries preferences, family values and levels studied have developed various religious rights and strategies regarding Mus- of religiosity. lims, so the question was whether Muslims are better integrated in countries with more liberal religious rights or if the liberal granting of religious rights reinforces the segregation of religious groups. The analysis shows that neither granting Muslims religious rights, as in the United Kingdom, nor having a re- strictive policy, as in Switzerland, forces a return to the individual’s religious group (‘reactive ethnicity’). Integration policy neither promotes nor hinders so- cial integration. Family reunification policies do have an indirect effect on social integration and the choice of a partner. The Six Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey (SCIICS) shows that children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden increasingly seek partners in the country of immigration, and that making the family reuni- fication policy stricter leads to fewer transnational marriages (to people from the parents’ country of origin) and more marriages within the ethnic communi- ty living in the same country of residence. Among the main factors that influence the partner search are the prospects and the size of the local marriage market. Pakistani immigrants in particular, who constitute just a small share of Muslims in Western Europe (except in the United Kingdom), fall back on help from family networks. Still, only a fraction of mar- riages are arranged. In the second generation, hybrid forms can be observed, in which children search for suitable partners with their parents. When many im- migrants from the same country live in proximity, partners tend to be chosen from their own group. Especially for the second generation, this pool offers more possibilities of finding a partner who was similarly socialized, and who generally is less religious. Transnational marriages offer highly qualified women the chance of finding a partner. Scientifically, this is interpreted as a strategy for emancipation because the geographic distance of transnational marriages allows women to live apart from the groom’s family, which traditionally incorporates a bride into the household. Analysis shows that women with and without im- 16 WZB Report 2014
migrant backgrounds tend to be more protected by their families than men, which results in lower rates of interethnic marriages. Religious groups sometimes interpret a woman’s marriage as a partial loss, because they as- sume that the husband’s religion will prevail and be transmitted to the next generation. Marriage Patterns Remain Stable Closer examination of interethnic and interreligious relationships shows that, contrary to theory, interethnic marriages are not generally more frequent in the second generation when educational differences are taken into consider- ation, although Muslim members of the second generation clearly have more Sarah Carol i s researcher in the WZB research unit positive attitudes than their parents toward marriages between Muslims and Migration, Integration, Transnationalization. Her main non-Muslims. research fields are social integration of immigrants and interethnic friendships and marriages (see also her article p. 19-21). [Photo: David Ausserhofer] Why do marriage patterns remain stable? Parental preferences for a specific sarah.carol@wzb.eu marriage partner play a role in social integration, regardless of the children’s age. The influence of ethnic communities and parental socialization goals are closely linked. For immigrant children, education does facilitate their emancipa- tion from predefined structures and their parents’ views of marriage, but social- ization in school does not automatically lead to social integration, and the sense of being discriminated against makes integration more difficult. Equally important is the role of parents without immigrant backgrounds who influence their children’s interaction with ‘immigrant’ children. Middle-class parents tend to control their children’s free time and social contacts more than parents from higher or lower walks of life. Since the social status of children with immigrant backgrounds is often below that of the receiving society, par- ents without immigrant backgrounds may associate interethnic contact with social decline and be more concerned about their children than better-off par- ents who send their children to exclusive schools, where there is almost no contact with immigrant children. The lack of opportunity for children and young people with and without immigrant backgrounds to develop close friendships subsequently affects their partner choice. Beyond the major role that parents play in relation to children’s social integra- tion, various forms of religiosity and family values are linked to fewer inter- marriages and more negative attitudes toward intermarriage. Religious practice that includes observing dietary rules and holidays, as well as wearing religious symbols, plays a larger role than simply self-identifying with a religion. This connection is more pronounced for some groups than others. In particular, im- migrants from secular former-Yugoslavia are confronted with less acceptance of intergroup relationships on the part of the receiving society, while immi- grants from more religious countries like Morocco and Pakistan indicate less willingness to marry someone from the receiving society. This can be explained by their greater religiosity. Besides religiosity, ethnic differences are mainly explained by family solidarity. Muslim immigrants cultivate especially close parent-child relationships in which adult children assume responsibility for their parents, demonstrate their respect, accept their authority and consider it more important to protect the family’s reputation than do children without immigrant backgrounds. Not only are the actual differences in cultural and religious values significant, but per- ceptions can also affect social distance: The more differences individuals per- ceive with regard to religiosity, parent-child relationships and pre-marital sex, the less likely they are to accept marriage with a Muslim (or a non-Muslim). Thus the dividing line between groups runs along family values and religiosity. This divide might explain why the divorce rate of interethnic couples is higher than those of ethnically homogeneous couples. But describing that precisely, as well as the consequences of intergroup relationships, must be left for future research. Earlier studies have indicated that interethnic marriages positively affect the integration of people with immigrant backgrounds into the job market. WZB Report 2014 17
The integration of people with immigrant backgrounds is a bilateral process that is influenced by many factors. Both on the part of the receiving society and among immigrants, resentment of intergroup relationships remains. My work has shown how different family values, gender concepts and religiosity help explain this situation. As a driving force of integration, education creates the conditions for people with immigrant backgrounds to establish contacts. But the openness of the family of origin and the ethnic community are also important, as is acceptance by the receiving society. References Carol, Sarah: Is Blood Thicker Than Water? The Role of Family and Gender Values for the Social Distance between Muslim Migrants and Natives in Western Europe. Doc- toral Dissertation. Berlin: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2013. Carol, Sarah: “Intermarriage Attitudes among Minority and Majority Groups in Western Europe: The Role of Attachment to the Religious In-Group.” In: International Migration, 2013, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 67-83. Carol, Sarah/Ersanilli, Evelyn/Wagner, Mareike: “Spousal Choice among the Children of Turkish and Moroccan Immigrants in Six European Countries: Transnational Spouse or Co-ethnic Migrant?” In: International Migration Review, 2014. DOI: 10.1111/imre.12068. 18 WZB Report 2014
Religion Matters Faith and its Practice Influence Coexistence More Than Gener- ally Assumed Sarah Carol, Marc Helbling and Ines Michalowski These days, when someone in Western Europe speaks about ‘migrants’ they usu- Summary: T wo WZB surveys ques- ally mean immigrants from Muslim countries who make up most of the immi- tioned Muslims and non-Muslims grant population in most West European countries. In the past two decades, the about their attitudes toward the other most heated debates regarding immigrants and their integration have been group and religious symbols. It was about Muslim religious practices, such as wearing a headscarf, or about houses shown that most people make clear of worship like mosques, and especially minarets. Now secular societies of West- distinctions between Muslims as a ern Europe are finding themselves confronted by completely new challenges: group and religious practices such as Which religious practices can be tolerated and how can liberal values be main- wearing a headscarf. These distinc- tained? tions can partly be explained by the respondents’ values, religiosity, gen- Given the urgency of this matter, it is surprising how little is known about West- der and attitudes towards gender dif- ern European attitudes with regard to these challenges, and which religious ferences. The state-church relation- rights Muslims themselves consider important. Most studies have focused on ship also plays a major role. political discussions about Islam and Muslim integration. Despite the numerous surveys about migration, attitudes towards Muslim migrants and their religious practices have hardly been explored. To close this research gap, the WZB’s Migration and Diversity research area re- cently conducted two surveys on native and Muslim immigrant attitudes about immigration and integration in Western Europe: The EURISLAM Telephone Survey questioned some 7,000 people with and with- out immigrant background in six countries – Belgium, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The respondents with immi- grant background had Muslim roots in ex-Yugoslavia, Morocco, Turkey and Paki- stan. International comparisons were made about the attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims regarding religious symbols such as a Christian nun’s habit and Muslim headscarves, as well as religious education. The “Six Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey (SCIICS)” compared the attitudes of 500 natives of Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Aus- tria and Sweden (3,000 altogether) toward Muslims in general, and toward head- scarves in school in particular. The study sought to discover to what extent a difference is made between the group as such and its religious practices. Most attitudes to Muslims were fairly tolerant. However, most respondents re- jected schoolgirls wearing headscarves. The second stage of the study investi- gated this difference and revealed that attitudes regarding Muslims and the headscarf have to do with the respondents’ liberal values and religiosity. People with liberal values were found to be more positive toward Muslims than people with conservative values, which corroborates numerous studies showing that liberal values make for greater openness towards immigrants. However, whether people with liberal values are actually tolerant of alien cultures or only of those things that do not conflict with their liberal values is hotly debated. Some people view religion itself as conflicting with a liberal state; even more view the Muslim headscarf as a sign of a woman’s oppression. The study also revealed that people with liberal values tend to be skeptical of the headscarf. WZB Report 2014 19
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