War in Europe: Responding to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
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Statement Published 24 February 2022
By International Crisis Group
War in Europe: Responding to
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s assault on Ukraine threatens to become the largest European
conflict in decades. A vigorous but judicious Western and global response
is critical to limit the damage.
I
n a chilling act of aggression, Russian Presi- sometimes honoured in the breach – has
dent Vladimir Putin launched a military underpinned global affairs since World War II.
assault on Ukraine in the early hours of 24 The rest of the world, and not just the Western
February. That Western leaders had warned of powers who thus far have been most vocal, now
this possibility for weeks did little to cushion needs to do what it can to limit the damage.
the shock. President Putin announced what he While the available steps may seem small given
characterised as a “special military operation” the scale of what President Putin is doing, and
to demilitarise and “denazify” Ukraine, and cannot turn back the clock or by themselves
made a barely coded threat of nuclear strikes reverse Russia’s aggression, a demonstration of
upon any outside power that might come to its unity and imposition of costs by outside powers
aid. Residents of Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, and represent the best hope of bringing the region,
cities throughout the country woke to explo- and the world, back toward a more stable order:
sions as Russian bombs and missiles fell on
military facilities and infrastructure. The bom- • The first task for Western powers and their
bardment follows a months-long build-up of as partners – one that is well under way – is
many as 200,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s to take the steps they had warned Moscow’s
borders, to the north, west and south. Ground military escalation would provoke. That
forces that then entered Ukraine indicate that means rolling out the full sanctions pack-
Russia has embarked upon not only an air cam- ages they have promised, including against
paign aimed at toppling Ukraine’s government financial institutions, Russian officials, and
but a full-scale invasion. The human toll could business leaders, while avoiding steps that
be catastrophic. unnecessarily harm average Russian citizens,
Russia’s belligerence deals a staggering blow such as visa bans. NATO and its members
to the norm against conquest, which – though should also continue to build up forces on
the alliance’s eastern flank. They should also
“ Russia’s belligerence deals a keep supporting Ukraine with weapons and
other assistance. At the same time, though
staggering blow to the norm against
diplomacy holds little promise in the days
conquest, which … has underpinned ahead, they should keep the door open no
global affairs since World War II.” matter how bad things get.INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 2
• Non-Western powers should make their opprobrium. The UN General Assembly or
voices heard, following the example of Human Rights Council should establish a
Kenya’s permanent representative to the UN, fact-finding mechanism to collect evidence of
whose powerful intervention before the Secu- violations of international humanitarian law
rity Council on 21 February called Russia out and human rights abuses in the present fight-
for its violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. ing and any occupation that may follow.
They should make clear the reputational
costs of Moscow’s war of aggression. Rus- In reality, though, how horrific things get
sia’s friends, especially China – which for the mostly depends on decisions taken in the
moment appears, regrettably, to have cast its Kremlin. Moscow faces not only the sanctions
lot with Putin’s plan – should take stock of and NATO troop build-ups that Western pow-
what this disruptive act will cost them politi- ers will now undertake, but also prospectively
cally and economically. To the extent they fierce Ukrainian resistance that it seems to
can pressure Russia to reverse course, they have discounted, potentially immense costs to
should do so. its global repute and the need to convince its
public that this war on a neighbouring country
• The UN and others should take urgent in which many Russian citizens have relatives
steps to help Ukraine prepare for the war’s and friends is truly crucial to national secu-
probable humanitarian fallout. Large-scale rity. Seemingly isolated, angry and set on his
displacement and emergency medical needs dangerous path, President Putin may be beyond
are likely. Russia itself will surely be required reaching. Pivoting to the pursuit of a negotiated
to host large numbers of refugees, for which settlement could still lead to real reductions of
it does not seem to have prepared. Humani- forces in Europe and would do much more for
tarian agencies should, with donor support, Russian security than war in Ukraine. For now,
prepare for the worst. More for reputational though, that appears a distant hope. Those who
purposes than because their outcry is likely oppose Moscow’s aggression need to raise the
to be effective, other international bodies costs to Russia and prepare for what could be a
should do what they can to demonstrate their long and difficult struggle.
A Slow, then Rapid Escalation
Russia’s bombardment marks a dramatic The Minsk deals laid out a roadmap for peace
escalation in a war it has waged against and reintegration of the separatist-controlled
Ukraine since 2014. Back then, protests sup- regions under an undefined “special status”.
porting closer links to the European Union Moscow saw the deals as a way to force Kyiv to
led to the ouster of a pro-Moscow president. absorb its proxies into a confederation, in which
Russia, which saw a Western hand in both the separatist-controlled entities would exercise a
unrest and Kyiv’s new government, annexed veto over any major decision. Kyiv had no incli-
the Crimean peninsula and sent weapons nation to move in this direction, and faulted
and personnel to support separatists in the Moscow for failing to withdraw weapons and
eastern Donbas region. Two ceasefire deals forces, as the Minsk deals also stipulated.
signed in 2014 and 2015 – the Minsk accords Moscow’s preparations for this latest phase
– brought an end to the worst of the fighting of the war stretch back to at least the spring of
and left separatists in control of about a third of 2021. Increasingly frustrated with Ukrainian
Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who came to
they proclaimed the breakaway Donetsk and power in 2019 having campaigned on prom-
Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR). ises of peace but refused to implement theINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 3
Minsk agreements on Russia’s terms, Moscow escalated in mid-February. The line of contact
deployed near Ukraine’s border what looked between separatist- and government-held ter-
like the beginnings of an invasion force. It ritory in Donbas, which had been mostly quiet
subsequently pulled back many troops though throughout the build-up, saw a sharp increase
it left infrastructure in place. A second build- in shelling. Russian and separatist-controlled
up began in the autumn of 2021, this time with media, which heretofore had focused on
greater numbers of soldiers and with deploy- denouncing Western hysteria and played down
ments on new fronts, including Belarus in the the risks of war, portrayed the fighting as the
north and Crimea in the south. start of a Ukrainian campaign to reconquer the
The deployments prompted a frenzy of separatist-held territories, amid an attempted
diplomacy aimed at averting war. Western genocide of the Russian-speaking population.
states embarked on a two-pronged diplo- Ukraine, for its part, insisted that it did not start
matic campaign – making clear, first, that the shooting, and the Ukrainian army accused
any new aggression in Ukraine would be met separatist combatants of shelling their own
with harsh economic sanctions and a build- territory for propaganda purposes. Russia’s
up of NATO forces near Russia’s borders and, genocide claims relied on doctored and out-of-
secondly, that if Russian forces pulled back, context images that were easily debunked. On
Western governments were ready to negotiate 17 February, the heads of the DNR and LNR
new limits on activities, exercises and deploy- announced the evacuation of their civilian
ments in Europe. Moscow responded with its populations to Rostov, in Russia, seemingly to
own demands, while claiming that Westerners the surprise of Rostov’s governor, who indicated
were “hysterically” exaggerating its build-up. he had no preparations in place. By 22 February,
It wanted NATO and the U.S. to sign binding some 90,000 refugees had arrived, according to
treaties pledging not to expand the alliance Moscow, despite continuing gaps in availability
further, especially not to any more former of housing and food. The refugees are over-
Soviet countries; remove all military forces to whelmingly women, children and the elderly.
countries that were already NATO members The separatists announced the mobilisation of
when the Soviet Union collapsed; and eschew the entire male population aged eighteen to 55
intermediate-range missile and U.S. nuclear and prohibited the men from leaving.
weapon deployments in Europe. While NATO At the same time, Russian sabre-rattling
refused to close its door to new members, grew louder. Exercises in the Black Sea sharply
Western leaders communicated to Moscow that curtailed freedom of movement and navigation.
they had no plans to allow Ukraine or Georgia Moscow also held nuclear and conventional
to join; could mutually limit intermediate-range strategic deterrence forces drills, including
missile deployments, exercises and activities; launches of ballistic and cruise missiles on
and were ready to embark upon a long-deferred 19 February. While likely scheduled long in
broader discussion about the European security advance, these contributed to a sense that Rus-
architecture. They declassified and shared intel- sia was preparing for war. Elsewhere near the
ligence regarding the build-up and Moscow’s Ukrainian border, Russian forces moved ever
plans, which appeared to include a large-scale closer, in sharp contrast to promises by Russian
invasion and occupation of much of Ukraine. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to start with-
Weeks of negotiations and Russian troop drawing troops at the end of exercises. Indeed,
movements continued side by side, until things joint Russia-Belarus military exercises, which
“ [Putin’s] speech portrayed NATO as a hostile
enemy bent on weakening and constraining Russia.”INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 4
were the pretext for tens of thousands of Rus- blame on Vladimir Lenin for having recognised
sian troops to gather in Belarus on Ukraine’s Ukraine as a Soviet republic during the post-
northern flank – some 200km from Kyiv – were revolutionary period. The recognition of the
extended beyond their scheduled end date of DNR and LNR rendered the Minsk agreements
20 February, with the Belarusian Ministry of moot. It created a pretext for Moscow to send in
Defence citing rising tensions in Donbas. There troops, ostensibly as peacekeepers to defend the
and elsewhere, Russian troop and weapon for- LNR and DNR, which in Moscow’s view were
mations grew smaller, more widely dispersed now empowered to consent to their presence. It
and better hidden. Satellite images showed a also underscored Putin’s dismissal of Ukraine’s
new pontoon bridge in southern Belarus across legitimacy as a nation-state.
the Pripyat, a major river that runs parallel to As more Russian troops entered separatist-
the Belarus-Ukraine border, positioned to cut held areas, Ukraine, on 23 February, declared
the route from staging positions to the Ukrain- a state of emergency, called up reservists and
ian capital by 70km. passed a law allowing citizens to carry firearms
A flicker of hope on 20 February was soon and use them in self-defence. That evening,
dashed. Putin and French President Macron President Zelenskyy reported that his efforts to
spoke twice by telephone, and pledged to reach Putin had been in vain. Speaking Russian
continue talks, including to facilitate a summit on his Telegram channel, he addressed the Rus-
with U.S. President Joe Biden, who agreed to sian people in a heartfelt plea to prevent war.
meet, subject to the condition that there be no Referring to Moscow’s propaganda, Zelenskyy
further escalation by Russia. The next day, on went on to ask how he, the grandson of a man
21 February, Moscow televised a visibly staged who served out World War II in the Soviet
Putin-led meeting of the Russian National infantry and died in independent Ukraine,
Security Council, convened to discuss the possi- could be a Nazi (Zelenskyy is also Jewish).
ble recognition of the two breakaway republics, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded
and then broadcast Putin’s speech announc- by saying Kremlin officials were not sure what
ing that recognition. The speech portrayed the two presidents might discuss, though they
NATO as a hostile enemy bent on weakening were not opposed to talks if those could “cut the
and constraining Russia. It was marked by Gordian knot” of eastern Ukraine. As Russia’s
anti-Ukraine vitriol and rejection of Ukrainian bombardment started, Kyiv officially broke
nationhood, reaching back into history to cast diplomatic ties with Moscow.
The First Day of Full-scale War
While much remains unclear, Russia appears Ukrainians and demonstrate Russia’s massive
to have begun its assault with long-range strikes military superiority. Already reports suggest
targeting military and other infrastructure the bombing has killed and wounded dozens of
throughout Ukraine, including near Kyiv and civilians.
other major cities across the country such as Russian ground forces, including columns of
the Black Sea port of Odessa, as well as eastern heavy armour and artillery, then advanced from
industrial hubs Kharkiv, Dnipro and Mari- Crimea in the south and Belarus in the north,
upol. Western Ukraine was not spared, with even as helicopters delivered more personnel
bombs landing in the Lviv region and near to locations elsewhere. Numerous reports of
Lutsk. The initial bombing may have aimed to fighting, particularly in the south, were followed
destroy Ukraine’s air defence capability, such by news that Russian forces had taken parts of
as it was. It may also have intended to menace Ukraine, including Kherson in the south, SumyINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 5
“ If Russia’s goal is a demilitarised,
compliant Ukraine … it is hard to see how this happens
without some element of military occupation.”
in the north east, and the Chernobyl exclu- before accepting any surrender, which would
sion zone. Hostomel airport near Kyiv changed mean continued bombardments. As Russian
hands at least twice. Fighting also raged in troops move in, both the expected resistance
Donbas. A variety of sources presented visual to them and their response to it will inevitably
evidence of casualties on both sides and prison- put civilians in jeopardy. So, of course, do the
ers of war taken by Ukraine. How long Ukrain- bombardments.
ian forces will be able to resist is simply unclear. Moreover, rumours and U.S. intelligence
If Russia’s goal is a demilitarised, compliant assessments of Russian plans for incarceration
Ukraine, as Putin’s statements and speeches and even murder of serving Ukrainian officials
indicate, it is hard to see how it can achieve this and others raise concerns about potential viola-
end without some element of military occupa- tions of international humanitarian and human
tion. The deployments of Russian National rights law in a Ukraine under Russian control.
Guard troops alongside offensive units to People with ties to Western organisations will
Ukraine’s borders since the start of 2022 sug- likely face increased danger. So, too, will those
gest that Moscow has been preparing to occupy affiliated with groups, movements and identi-
at least parts of Ukraine. Over time, occupation ties demonised by Moscow, such as LGBTQ+
will almost surely face resistance and be enor- individuals.
mously expensive, which may lead Moscow to Beyond that, if Russia does occupy most
try to install a surrogate government. But creat- or all of Ukraine, Ukrainians can look to some
ing a governing authority capable of control- degree to what happened in the DNR and LNR
ling a hostile population will also be costly and for a glimpse of their future. It is likely that a
difficult, although Moscow may either expect Russian-occupied Ukraine would face sanc-
– likely mistakenly – that most Ukrainians will tions, meaning that its economy would deterio-
go along or believe that the brutal methods it is rate. Russia’s goal is a subdued, not prosperous,
prepared to deploy will cow them. It is also not Ukraine and support from Russia – whose own
clear how seriously Moscow meant its demand, economy will be groaning under new sanc-
late on February 24, that Ukraine surrender, tions – is likely to be meagre. Mass migration
and commit to both neutrality and demilita- to parts of Ukraine not controlled by Russia,
risation. But Kyiv, which thus far is defiant, is and perhaps to neighbouring states, is likely
highly unlikely to comply. if it remains feasible. So is migration to Rus-
If Russia may not count on rapid Ukrain- sia itself. Unlike in the LNR and DNR, active
ian capitulation, Putin’s refusal to talk to opposition, and perhaps even armed resistance,
Zelenskyy on the evening of 23 February may is certainly on the cards, though its shape and
indicate a Russian desire to punish Ukraine scope is hard to predict.
Moscow’s Logic
As Crisis Group has previously noted, President Iraq and Afghanistan, toppling a government
Putin has chosen a path marked by risk and and creating something viable in its place are
uncertainty for Russia. The question is not who two very different things. Installing a surrogate
will win the war. Ukraine is overmatched by regime capable of controlling a hostile popula-
the Russian military. But as the U.S. learned in tion absent Russian military backing will beINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 6
difficult, even if that government extends the in of its more successful tools in recent years. In
terrorem tactics that Moscow appears ready to Syria, Russia’s intervention turned the course
deploy to stamp out opposition to its designs. of the war, propping up the Bashar al-Assad
Outright occupation would be enormously regime and placing Russia squarely in a criti-
expensive. The extent to which the Russian cal role. Moscow may see its 2008 interven-
economy will be able to bear the crippling sanc- tion in Georgia as having helped prevent that
tions the West envisages is unknown. Mean- country from aligning more closely with NATO
time, Putin’s aggressive campaign has breathed and the EU. It may believe that only the use
new life into NATO and provoked precisely of force will convince Ukraine and Ukrainians
the kind of troop build-up on its borders that that they have no choice but alignment with
he has been trying to discourage. While many Russia — particularly as Western states will not
non-Western countries until now have avoided ride to their rescue. As stated earlier, it may
strong condemnation of Russia’s belligerence, either underestimate the hostility Moscow’s
invading a sovereign country on such a flimsy policies since 2014 inspire in Ukraine outside
pretext may do lasting damage to Putin’s inter- separatist-held areas or be confident in its abil-
national standing beyond the West. ity to overcome resistance with blood-curdling
Why, then, such a dangerous move? The brutality.
story told in President Putin’s speech reflects a The tendency toward coercion may have
worldview in which the eastward expansion of been strengthened during the last two years as
Western institutions is a zero-sum game that an already narrow advisory circle around Putin
intentionally limits, weakens and aims to coerce shrunk further due to COVID-19 precautions.
“ The story told in President Putin’s speech
reflects a worldview in which the eastward expansion
of Western institutions is a zero-sum game.”
Russia politically, militarily and economically. As one observer argues, this circle likely has
As Putin said, even if Ukraine is not on track come to exclude those who are more moder-
to join NATO, Moscow sees its growing ties to ate and focused on economic development in
the alliance as a danger, likely to lead to the favour of those who take a harder line and are
deployment of NATO forces and infrastructure prone to the zero-sum views described above.
in Ukraine, all with the aim of menacing Russia. Those people, and it seems Putin himself, see
Moscow does not trust NATO verbal promises a West that is simultaneously losing ground
that Ukraine will not join and that no infra- geopolitically and acting aggressively toward
structure will be deployed in the country. It sees Russia, creating both opportunity and impera-
NATO expansion to date, for which it mostly tive for Moscow to press its advantage. By this
blames the U.S., as a substantial breach of calculus, Ukraine, with such close historical
faith. Historians debate the degree of assurance ties to Russia, would be a logical place for the
offered to the Soviet Union that the alliance Kremlin to draw a line. This group, moreover,
would not grow, but it is clear that no formal is unlikely to be deterred by sanctions, taking
guarantees were granted to Moscow. This the view that the West is determined to deploy
historical experience helps explain the Russian these in an effort to strangle Russia’s economy
demand for “legally binding” agreements this whatever it does, and that they are irrelevant
time around. to themselves personally, as many are already
Still, other factors are likely at play in Presi- designated.
dent Putin’s decision to opt for war. One might The war is almost certainly long in the plan-
be that Moscow judges military force as one ning. The build-up near Ukraine, beginningINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 7
with the smaller version in the spring of 2021, the permanent stationing of substantial NATO
gave Moscow the options it has now acted upon. forces on the territories of new members, many
Moscow’s moves of recent weeks show signs of those new members see the presence on their
of having been carefully orchestrated. The 21 soil of smaller, rotational forces as critical for
February National Security Council meeting not security, not least because they believe them
only looked wooden, despite Putin’s assurances crucial to dispel any thought Moscow might
that it was not, but appeared to have been taped have of aggressive action – hardly an academic
well in advance, based on the watches visible on consideration given the course of events in
participants’ wrists. Open-source intelligence Ukraine. Secondly, although they made clear
journalists questioned whether the evacuation that they are not looking to admit Ukraine any
from the breakaway republics was performa- time soon, NATO members are not as a mat-
tive after spotting in the video’s metadata that ter of principle prepared to rescind the open-
both separatist leaders in Luhansk and Donetsk ended promise that they made in 2008. Thirdly,
recorded the calls for evacuation on the morn- Western governments were quite reasonably
ing of 16 February, two days before they were worried about the precedent they might set by
aired. Long-planned does not necessarily mean appearing to cave in to Russian gunboat diplo-
inevitable. But Moscow’s unwillingness to macy and the possibility that domestic political
budge from its initial maximalist negotiating opponents might try to tar them as weak.
positions and its continued escalation, all the Against this backdrop, the U.S. and its
while meeting Western leaders and in some NATO partners took the best course available to
instances even promising to withdraw troops, them, making clear that they would support but
suggest that there was not much hope that it not militarily defend Ukraine; coming together
would accept a negotiated settlement short of behind a significant set of costs to impose in the
total capitulation. event of further aggression; exposing Russian
Critics of Western policy look at fateful plans and intentions so as to rob it of legitimis-
decisions with respect to NATO’s post-Cold ing arguments before an international audi-
War enlargement and suggest that this crisis ence; and creating a serious diplomatic option
is partly of the alliance’s own making. But to discuss the issues of greatest concern to
whatever that argument’s merits, the complete Moscow. This approach was never guaranteed
reversion to the pre-1997 status quo that Rus- to succeed. But the alternatives – either putting
sia demanded was never realistic over the past military confrontation among nuclear powers
few months, and it is out of the question now. on the table or doing nothing, thus encouraging
So too was its insistence that NATO formally the impression of cost-free aggression – would
pledge to cease expansion. First, while the have been worse.
1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act prohibits
Responding to Russia’s Aggression
After months of crisis diplomacy have failed to security architecture. But with the Kremlin
avert what could well be Europe’s biggest war seemingly bent on a more destructive path, oth-
in a generation, attention now needs to turn to ers must do what they can to maximise the costs
doing whatever possible to limit the damage. for Russia, to both deter future aggression and,
All meaningful responsibility lies with Moscow, though this appears to be a tall order for now,
which ideally would return to talks with both motivate some rectification of the situation in
Kyiv and Western powers and indeed could still Ukraine.
benefit from negotiations over the EuropeanINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 8
The toughest decisions in the coming period already imposed limited sanctions in response
likely rest with President Zelenskyy. Severely to Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s two sepa-
outgunned, he will need to decide how to wage ratist regions. The measures hit Russian banks
the war, and what cost his government and the and individuals and took steps toward cutting
Ukrainian people more broadly are prepared to Russia out of world financial markets. German
sustain in defending their homeland. Polling, at Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision to put on
least, showed nearly 60 per cent of Ukrainians ice approval for Russia’s Nord Stream pipe-
willing to resist as of mid-February; but with line to pump gas to Germany was particularly
bombs falling and families threatened it is diffi- stark because of Berlin’s longtime support
cult to know whether that sentiment will harden for the project and may have helped catalyse
or fade. Kyiv will need to make its calculations the European response. In response to the 24
without any illusion that NATO member states February attacks, President Biden announced
will come to their aid beyond providing some further measures, including sanctions on four of
arms. Even before Putin appeared to threaten Russia’s major state banks and the imposition
to use nuclear weapons in his 24 February of export controls to deprive Russia of techno-
speech, Western powers had, understandably, logical goods that would, in his words, cut off
made clear that their military intervention is over half of Russia’s high-tech imports. The EU
not on the cards. is expected to follow suit. South Korea has also
For Western powers, the challenges will now said it would join in the sanctions regime.
be of a different nature. Most have already As Western powers take these steps, they
reacted with outrage to what they described should be clear about what Moscow can do –
as an unjustifiable attack on Europe’s stabil- namely, reverse its aggression in Ukraine – to
ity and the international order. U.S. President get sanctions lifted. This is unlikely to have
Biden warned of a “catastrophic loss of life” and much impact on a Kremlin leadership that is
the EU’s chief executive Ursula von der Leyen expecting a heavy economic blow. But it would
dubbed Russia’s advance “barbaric”. While signal to the Russian people that their political
reiterating that NATO troops would not enter leaders have the power to mitigate the shocks
the fight, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg they are about to suffer. Popular sentiment
harshly condemned the Russian action: “Peace in Moscow suggests a less enthusiastic mood
on our continent has been shattered,” he said. about this military adventure than that which
“This is a deliberate, cold-blooded and long- greeted (for example) Putin’s 2014 move against
planned invasion. Russia is using force to try Crimea. Though it is a difficult line to walk, the
to rewrite history”. Western states also report- U.S. and other Western powers should do what
edly prepared a UN Security Council resolution they can to stay on the right side of the Russian
condemning Russia’s action, although Moscow public by avoiding gratuitously punitive meas-
is expected to veto when it comes to a vote. ures, such as a blanket visa ban, that would work
The question is what they can do beyond using at cross-purposes with longer-term goals.
strong rhetoric that is at once meaningful and NATO members will also have to recalibrate
mindful of the need to avoid a potentially cata- their force posture in Europe, to reassure allies
clysmic escalation. near Russia first and foremost. They will almost
The main focus will be on putting in place certainly raise the tempo of military exercises.
and rigorously enforcing sanctions that Western The NATO-Russia Founding Act and its com-
leaders have been threatening for weeks, which mitments will surely join the wealth of other
will be critical if the bloc’s threats are to be seen agreements lately sent to the dustbin. Putin’s
as a credible deterrent in the future. As of 23 threat of extreme consequences notwithstand-
February, the U.S., EU and others including ing, Western powers should continue to support
the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia had the Ukrainian state with weapons and suppliesINTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP · 24 FEBRUARY 2022 9
while that remains feasible. At the same time, organisations, many of which will be uprooted
as tempers run high on both sides of the East- by the invasion, should be given a chance
West line, and more NATO forces arrive close to participate early on in the humanitarian
to Russia’s frontiers, it will be more important response. Russia itself will have to cope with
than ever that command centres on both sides refugee flows, and be prepared to take on most
keep lines open for deconfliction and de-escala- if not all humanitarian responsibilities in areas
tion of tensions that could build around higher- it controls. International bodies that monitor
than-normal levels of activity. the commission of wartime atrocities should
The West should not be the only bloc that also signal that they will be watching the situ-
is sending messages to Moscow. The more that ation as it evolves. For example, the UN Gen-
non-aligned countries can communicate to eral Assembly or Human Rights Council could
Moscow the reputational costs its aggression mandate a fact-finding mission or similar body
will incur, the better. They could echo themes to collect any evidence of breaches of interna-
in Kenya’s intervention at the 21 February UN tional law or human rights abuses committed
Security Council meeting: spelling out, in other as the hostilities unfold or in any subsequent
words, the carnage that would follow if the rest occupation.
of the world decides to abrogate borders in the For now, diplomacy and the counter-meas-
ostensible service of uniting like peoples. China, ures that the West has prepared are unlikely
if it chose to, could play a useful role. Though at to change the mood in Moscow, and things
first muted in backing Russia’s moves, Beijing could well get worse before they get better.
made statements on 24 February that were War in Ukraine and a military build-up in
more supportive of Moscow and avoided calling Eastern Europe all but guarantee new crises,
Russia’s attack on Ukraine an invasion. What- each potentially that much more volatile. While
ever China’s geostrategic calculations to date, Ukraine clearly holds special significance in
it should weigh seriously the risks of throwing Moscow, and to Putin himself, it cannot entirely
its lot in with Putin. Russia’s war is a frontal be assumed that Russia will stop there. As
assault on the principle of sovereignty, which Western states run out of economic punish-
China has tended to treat as inviolable. The ments to dole out, the pressure to respond
risks, uncertainty and economic shock waves militarily will increase. The growing risk means
the crisis will unleash create headaches for eve- that continued talks about European security
ryone, including Beijing. and arms control, nuclear and conventional, are
Preparing to tackle the humanitarian fallout necessary, even if, for now, they sadly appear
must be another priority. If war continues – far from reach. Unless and until things indeed
particularly if followed by occupation – tens or escalate to unprecedented levels, the U.S. and
hundreds of thousands of people, potentially the EU will have to resume dialogue with Rus-
even more, could be displaced, seeking safety sia sooner or later, both to ensure that everyone
and security. Access to necessary medical care understands fully the consequences of the path
for civilians will be at a premium. Ukraine, they are on and to identify ways to avoid further
which thus far appears not to have prepared disaster.
sufficiently for such eventualities, will need to As tanks roll over European borders, it is
do what it can, as fast as it can, in cooperation tempting to look somewhere for hope. Today,
with international organisations and NGOs. sadly, that is in short supply. Right now, it is up
Neighbouring countries, which have begun to to those countries that want to avoid a future
take steps to get ready, will need to do more. made safe for aggressors to demonstrate unity
All planning should build on the experience and gird themselves to meet the challenges that
humanitarian organisations have gained lie ahead with prudence and resolve.
in Donbas over the past eight years. LocalYou can also read
