Vol. LVI Allentown, PA Friday, June 10, 2016 - Bar ...
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Vol. LVI Allentown, PA Friday, June 10, 2016 No. 102
1
THE COURT
The Hon. Edward D. Reibman, President Judge
The Hon. Carol K. McGinley, Judge
The Hon. Robert L. Steinberg, Judge
The Hon. J. Brian Johnson, Judge
The Hon. Kelly L. Banach, Judge
The Hon. James T. Anthony, Judge
The Hon. Maria L. Dantos, Judge
The Hon. Michele A. Varricchio, Judge
The Hon. Douglas G. Reichley, Judge
The Hon. Alan M. Black, Senior Judge
LEHIGH LAW JOURNAL
(USPS 309560)
Owned and Published by
THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF LEHIGH COUNTY
1114 Walnut Street, Allentown, PA 18102
www.lehighbar.org
HON. WILLIAM H. PLATT, President
PATRICK J. REILLY, President-Elect
MICHELLE M. FORSELL, Vice President
James J. Kozuch, Secretary
SARAH M. JOLLY, Treasurer
SUSAN G. MAURER, Historian
THOMAS F. TRAUD, JR., Law Journal Committee
RAY BRIDGEMAN, Executive Director
SARAH MUSSEL, Case Editor
Copyright © 2016 Bar Association of Lehigh County
The Lehigh Law Journal is published every Friday. All legal notices must be
submitted in typewritten form and are published exactly as submitted by the
advertiser. Neither the Law Journal nor the printer will assume any respon-
sibility to edit, make spelling corrections, eliminate errors in grammar or make
any changes in content.
The Law Journal makes no representation as to the quality of services offered by
any advertiser in this publication.
Legal notices must be received at 1114 W. Walnut St., Allentown, PA 18102,
before 12 noon the preceding Tuesday. Telephone (610) 433-6204. Advance
issues $100.00 per year. Single copies $2.00. Payment of annual dues to the
Bar Association of Lehigh County includes year’s subscription to Lehigh Law
Journal.
Printed at 206 S. Keystone Ave., Sayre PA 18840
Periodical postage paid at Allentown, PA 18102 and
at additional mailing offices.
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to The Lehigh Law
Journal, 1114 W. Walnut St., Allentown, PA 18102.
2
Classical Elegance
A gracious facility for your social and business events....
weddings banquets parties exclusively partnered caterers
www.thebarristersclub.com
1114 W Walnut Street
Allentown | 610-433-6088 ext.12
3
Greater Lehigh Valley, PA
naisummit.com | 610.264.0200
2268 S 12TH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA
Two 11,000 SF office Four story building Divisible space from Near Routes I-78 &
suites available with ample parking approx. 5,500 SF 309, access to Rt 22
For information contact: Sarah Finney 610.871.1719 or Matt Dorman 610.871.1699
The BALC Facebook page is
updated regularly with meeting reminders and event
notices, and includes photo albums, discussion
boards, links, and much more. “Like” us at
www.facebook.com/BarAssociationLehighCounty
45
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY / ETHICS MATTERS
Representation, consultation and expert testimony in disciplinary
matters and matters involving ethical issues, bar admissions
and the Rules of Professional Conduct
James C. Schwartzman, Esq.
Chairman, Judicial Conduct Board of Pennsylvania • Former Chairman,
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of PA • Former Chairman, Continuing
Legal Education Board of the Supreme Court of PA • Former Chairman,
Supreme Court of PA Interest on Lawyers Trust Account Board • Former
Federal Prosecutor • Named by his peers as Best Lawyers in America 2015
Philadelphia Ethics and Professional Responsibility Law “Lawyer of the Year”
1818 Market Street, 29th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 751-2863
Feinberg Real Estate Advisors
Let our 30 years of experience in
investment real estate help you to sell
your investment property.
We represent qualified
investment buyers.
Cindy McDonnell Feinberg, CCIM
cfeinberg@feinbergrea.com
610-709-6231
Gregg M. Feinberg, Esq.
gfeinberg@feinbergrea.com
610-709-6233
6is pleased to welcome
Sarah M. Jolly
BALC Board Treasurer, Ms. Jolly
joins the firm’s Allentown office,
continuing her practice in
business, real estate, and
municipal law.
ALLENTOWN | EASTON | EMMAUS | LEHIGHTON
Charles F. Smith, Jr. is pleased to announce the re-opening of
SMITH LAW OFFICES, P.C.
448 W. Walnut Street
Allentown, PA 18102
610-432-5200
csmith@smithlawoffices.com
6-10
Established Lehigh Valley family law firm is now seeking a full-time
associate. Prior family law experience required. Please forward resume
to: applicants12@yahoo.com. All correspondence will be strictly
confidential.
6-10
7TRUST YOU CAN
count on
AT UNIVEST, WE UNDERSTAND THAT TRUST IS PERSONAL.
We never lose sight that our trust services are so much more than products,
numbers, and calculations. They are about supporting the relationship you
have developed with your client and achieving the goals that are most
important to them. Our administration services include:
• Living Trusts
• Testamentary Trusts
• Special Needs Trusts
• Guardianships
• Estate Administration
• Directed Trusteeships
CHOOSE AN EXPERIENCED TRUST ADVISOR TO HELP YOUR CLIENTS
PLAN THEIR FUTURE. FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT:
Jeffrey Deloglos
Wealth Trust Advisor
Univest Bank and Trust Co.
610.554.2755
trust@univest.net
Investments offered by Univest Bank and Trust Co.’s Wealth Management and Trust
Division are not insured by the FDIC or any federal government agency, are not a deposit or
other obligation of or guaranteed by the depository institution, and are subject to risks,
including the possible loss of principal amount invested.
89
MEDIATION
ARBITRATION
MOCK TRIALS
• Hon. William E. Ford (Ret.) joins ADR
Options as a mediator and arbitrator,
available for immediate scheduling
• Judge Ford served as a Judge on the
Court of Common Pleas for 24 years,
handling every type of civil case
• He presided over hundreds of jury and
non-jury trials, settling countless matters
• Completed the Civil Mediation Program
of the National Judicial College
• Judge Ford represented both plaintiffs
and defendants through trials and
settlements during his civil litigation
Hon. William E. Ford practice from 1979 to 1991
(Ret.)
• He began his legal career as a
Judge Advocate in the United States
Marine Corps
• Working as a prosecutor in addition to
his time as Judge Advocate gave him
invaluable trial experience
• Judge Ford has disseminated his
law expertise through teaching
undergraduate and graduate law courses
at three colleges, as well as presenting
various programs for members of the bar
• His trial opinions have been regularly
covered in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly
• The Judge is an honors graduate of
2001 Market Street, Suite 1100
DeSales University and received his
Two Commerce Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7044 Juris Doctorate from The Dickinson
School of Law
Phone: 800-364-6098
215-564-1775 • Judge Ford is a partner in Ford Law Office
adroptions.com based in Allentown
10EASTERN AND MIDDLE DISTRICT ADMISSIONS
CEREMONIES ON THE SAME DAY: JUNE 15, 2016
The Federal Courts Committee is sponsoring a joint
admissions ceremony for area lawyers who wish to be
sworn in to the United States District Courts for the
Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.
This first-time event will take place at the centrally located
Allentown, Pennsylvania federal courthouse. Hon. Joseph
Leeson will preside over the Eastern District admissions,
while Hon. Malachy Mannion will preside over the Middle
District admissions. Other judicial officers from the
‘Northern tier’ will attend as their schedules permit.
Anyone interested can be sworn in to either bar, or both, at
the same time, by simply filling out the customary bar
application and paying the admission fee.
The ceremony will commence at 3:30pm on June 15 at the
courthouse. After the ceremony, you are invited to join the
bench and bar at the Lehigh Valley Iron Pigs game at Coca-
Cola Park in Allentown.
For those from the Montgomery County/greater
Philadelphia area, bus service from will be available from
Plymouth Meeting to the courthouse, then to the ballpark,
then back home to Plymouth Meeting. The bus will leave
Plymouth Meeting, from the mall, at 1 pm, returning at
approximately 10:45p after the ballgame.
DETAILS SUMMARIZED:
Date: June 15, 2016
Time: 3:30 (1 PM departure from the Plymouth Meeting
mall)
Cost: Bar admission is $201 for each bar ($402 total, if
you are joining both bars). Round trip bus transportation
and admission to the ballpark will be $45.
For further information, click here, or call committee
co-chairs Cary Flitter at 610-822-0782
cflitter@consumerslaw.com or Greg Voshell at 215-977-1081
gsv@elliottgreenleaf.com. If you need bar admissions forms or
have questions about the process, please contact Greg.
5-20, 27; 6-3, 10
11LEHIGH COUNTY PARALEGAL ASSOCIATION LUNCH & LEARN
New Directions in Workers’ Comp
Presented by:
Richard D. Director, Esq.
Thursday, June 16, 2016 at 12:00 p.m.
Bar Association of Lehigh County
1114 West Walnut Street
Allentown, PA 18102
The Workers’ Compensation Law has been in existence for over 100 years. There
have been many changes in the way the Statute has been applied and how the
Courts have interpreted the Statute. There is also a relatively new online process for
filing claims, other petitions and actions in the workers’ compensation setting.
Understanding these changes is critical to maintaining a workers’ compensation
practice.
No Fee for LCPA members
$20.00 for attorney BALC members
$25.00 for guests
$10.00 for students
Please RSVP by June 13, 2016
to the Lehigh County Bar Association
610-433-6204 x12
or KMesch@lehighbar.org
6-3; 10
12ZATOR LAW is looking for a highly qualified ATTORNEY for our
team. General civil practice with emphasis on real estate and
commercial transactional work, land use and development,
business, contracts, finance, municipal, and civil litigation.
Candidates must be highly motivated with excellent credentials
and minimum two to five years of experience. Our office has an
exceptional and friendly environment where we deal with
challenging matters on a daily basis and offer the opportunity for
professional growth. Please forward cover letter, salary
requirements/history, references, and resume to: J.
Schanbacher, Zator Law, American Heritage Building, 4400
Walbert Ave., Allentown, PA 18104 or
jschanbacher@zatorlaw.com. All correspondence will be
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Greater Lehigh Valley Chamber of
Commerce Excellence in Business Award winner and Best of the
Valley Business Attorneys 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.
6-10, 17
13NOTICE TO THE BAR
Judge Michele A. Varricchio’s weekly walk-in civil motions
court for Monday, June 20, 2016 is cancelled.
5-27; 6-3, 10, 17
——————
KingSpry, a progressive, expanding regional law firm seeks
a top notch legal administrative assistant for our litigation
group. Requirements: proficient in Microsoft Word, Outlook,
PowerPoint, Excel; possess transcription skills; excellent in-
terpersonal, organizational, communication and phone skills,
self-starter and able to juggle multiple projects and deadlines;
able to work independently and as part of the team in a fast-
paced environment. Position provides administrative support
to two attorneys, client contact, scheduling appointments/
maintaining calendars, creating and maintaining files. Quali-
fied applicants should submit resume and cover letter with
salary requirements to dkeller@kingspry.com. Full benefit
package provided.
6-10, 17
14ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 931
ALLENTOWN NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT ZONE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner vs.
CITY OF ALLENTOWN, ALLENTOWN SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LEHIGH COUNTY and LEHIGH COUNTY
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, Respondents
Assessment Appeals—Tax Immunity—Tax Exemption—
Property Taxes—Economic Development Financing Law—
Property Owned by Public Authorities—“Authorized Purpose”
Test—Commercial Tenants—Economic Development As
Authorized Purpose—Allentown Neighborhood Improvement
Zone Development Authority (ANIZDA).
Allentown Neighborhood Improvement Zone Development Authority (ANIZDA)
appealed from the determination of the Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals that
certain properties located in the statutorily-created Neighborhood Improvement Zone
(NIZ) were subject to taxation and responsible for payment of property taxes. The Court
held that the subject parcels are immune from taxation because they are located in the NIZ,
and ANIZDA owned and operated those parcels in a manner consistent with its legislatively-
established purpose.
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Pennsyl-
vania—Civil Division. Nos. 2015-C-1488, 2015-C-1489, 2015-C-
1490, 2015-C-1491. Allentown Neighborhood Improvement Zone
Development Authority, Petitioner vs. City of Allentown, Allen-
town School District, Lehigh County and Lehigh County Board
of Assessment Appeals, Respondents.
Zachary J. Cohen, Esquire, on behalf of Petitioner.
Scott C. Holbert, Esquire, on behalf of Respondent City
of Allentown.
Raymond P. Wendolowski, Jr., Esquire, on behalf of Re-
spondent Allentown School District.
Lucas J. Repka, Esquire, on behalf of Respondents Lehigh
County and Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Reichley, J., May 20, 2016. This matter comes before the
Court as an appeal by the Allentown Neighborhood Improvement
Zone Development Authority from a determination by the Lehigh
County Board of Assessment Appeals on May 1, 2015 that four
15
Lehigh 7-17 op932 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
properties are subject to the imposition of property taxes imposed
by the Allentown School District, the City of Allentown, and Lehigh
County. The properties are located at 701, 701-4, 701-5, and 701-
7 West Hamilton Street, Allentown, Pennsylvania. Respectively,
these properties constitute an arena, two separate parcels that
constitute two parking decks, and a separate condominium parcel
that is leased to two privately-operated restaurants adjacent to the
arena property.
Factual and Procedural History
These four properties are located within the geographical
contours of what is designated as the Allentown Neighborhood
Improvement Zone by legislation enacted in 2011. The arena
constitutes the centerpiece of an urban redevelopment initiative
in Allentown, and has been promoted as a catalyst for other eco-
nomic redevelopment in the downtown Allentown area. The park-
ing decks are adjacent to and contiguous with the arena and the
restaurant parcels. The parking decks are open not only to patrons
of the arena and the restaurants, but for the convenience of anyone
patronizing the downtown Allentown area.
The Allentown Neighborhood Improvement Zone Authority
(ANIZDA) oversees the Neighborhood Improvement Zone (NIZ).
This body was created under the language of the Economic De-
velopment Financing Law, 73 P.S. §371 et seq., otherwise referred
to as the Financing Law. The ANIZDA was crafted as the succes-
sor to the Allentown Commercial and Industrial Development
Authority (ACIDA). The ANIZDA was authorized by statute to
finance and monitor economic development within a district of
128 non-contiguous acres located in the downtown area and along
the riverfront in Allentown. See 72 P.S. §1901-B et seq. (NIZ law).
Under the Financing Law, the ANIZDA was created for the
purpose of “acquiring, holding, constructing, improving, maintain-
ing, owning, financing, and leasing, either in the capacity of lessor
or lessee, [development] projects.” 73 P.S. §376(a). The Financing
Law further directs the ANIZDA shall “[p]romote the use of urban
and commercial centers by, among other things, providing parking,
convention, tourism, recreational and sports facilities.” 73 P.S.
§372.1(10).
16
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 933
On February 8, 2012, Mayor Edward Pawlowski endorsed
the Articles of Incorporation establishing ANIZDA. These Articles
of Incorporation were filed with the Pennsylvania Department of
State on March 23, 2012, and the Certificate of Incorporation was
granted on the same date. Within the Articles of Incorporation
(attached as Exhibit 1 to the Stipulated Facts filed by the parties
on March 4, 2016), it states under paragraph (c):
The Authority shall have all the powers and authority
granted to an industrial and commercial development author-
ity pursuant to the Financing Law, which shall include but
shall not be limited to acquiring, holding, constructing, im-
proving, maintaining, owning, financing, and leasing, either
in the capacity of lessor or lessee, industrial, specialized or
commercial development projects and serving as successor
to the Allentown Commercial and Industrial Development
Authority (ACIDA) for purposed [sic] of administering, pro-
viding financing for and undertaking all other activities re-
lated to the Allentown Neighborhood Improvement Zone
(NIZ) established pursuant to the law governing Neighbor-
hood Improvement Zones ... In its role as successor to
ACIDA for purposes of administering the NIZ, the Author-
ity’s powers shall be limited to development activities within
the NIZ.
(Stipulated Facts, filed March 4, 2016, Exhibit 1 (emphasis added).)
On October 2, 2012, ANIZDA obtained all the properties
owned by the ACIDA located within the boundaries of the NIZ.
These properties included those four parcels which are the subject
of the current litigation. Within the Asset Purchase Agreement
between ACIDA and ANIZDA (attached as Exhibit 2 to the
Stipulated Facts), the language of the Articles of Incorporation for
ANIZDA is in large part replicated. Specifically, in the fourth
paragraph of the first page of the Agreement, it states, “In its role
as successor to Transferor [ACIDA] for purposes of administering
the NIZ activities, the Transferee’s [ANIZDA’s] powers shall be
limited to development activities within the NIZ.” (Id. Exhibit 2
(emphasis added).)
On February 11, 2013, ANIZDA designated the properties
located within the 700 block of West Hamilton Street as a condo-
17
Lehigh 7-17 op934 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
minium and converted the parcel into nine separate development
units. The ANIZDA maintained legal ownership of the develop-
ment units, including the four properties which were eventually
developed as the arena located at 701 West Hamilton Street; Unit
Four, the North Parking Deck, located at 701-4 West Hamilton
Street; Unit Five, the South Parking Deck, located at 701-5 West
Hamilton Street; and Unit Seven, the Retail Unit, located at 701-
7 West Hamilton Street.
Pursuant to an agreement entered on December 9, 2011,
ANIZDA entered into a fifty-year lease of the arena facility and
retail unit to BDH Development LLC, with an effective date of
August 14, 2014. The primary use of the arena is for a franchise of
the American Hockey League to play games there. The arena is
also used for musical concerts, trade shows, and other types of
entertainment options. The lessee is also encouraged to “promote
tourism, and encourage economic growth and development of the
Lehigh Valley metropolitan region.” (Joint Exhibit 4 at 27.) The
retail unit is leased for operation of dining establishments along
Hamilton Street directly adjacent to the arena. Both the arena and
the restaurants are open to the public.
ANIZDA contracts with the Allentown Parking Authority to
operate and maintain the two parking decks in question for use by
the general public without regard or limitation on whether the
patrons of the parking decks are going to the arena or the dining
establishments, or if those using the parking decks are patronizing
establishments outside the physical confines of the NIZ.
The Lehigh County Board of Assessment determined the
arena, the retail unit condominium, and the two parking decks are
subject to the imposition of real estate property taxes by the Allen-
town School District, the City of Allentown, and the County of
Lehigh. ANIZDA appealed the Board’s determination that the
property was taxable and requested that it be deemed immune from
taxation. The Board conducted a hearing on April 29, 2015 to con-
sider ANIZDA’s application for tax immunity. On May 1, 2015, the
Board issued a “Board Decision Notice” denying ANIZDA’s request
for tax immunity.
18
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 935
ANIZDA filed an appeal from that decision with respect to
the four properties in question on May 8, 2015, claiming that be-
cause the four properties are owned by ANIZDA, a public instru-
mentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the properties
are immune from any form of local taxation, including school
district property taxes. Conversely, the School District argues the
enabling legislation which created ANIZDA did not specifically
exclude the properties owned by ANIZDA from property taxes.
Furthermore, the School District alleges the leasing of the four
properties goes beyond the legislatively authorized purpose for
ANIZDA to engage in economic development, and that the appeal
by ANIZDA should be denied.
For the following reasons, the decision of the Lehigh Coun-
ty Board of Assessment Appeals is REVERSED. The Court finds
the arena, retail condominium units, and two parking decks
within the NIZ are immune from taxation by local governing bod-
ies.
Discussion
The elementary premise underlying taxation is that the
power to tax is exclusively vested within the legislature. Common-
wealth v. Dauphin County, 335 Pa. 177, 179, 6 A.2d 870, 871 (1939).
It cannot be presumed that general statutory provisions giving
local subdivisions the power to tax local real estate were meant to
include property owned by the Commonwealth, since to allow such
taxation would upset the orderly processes of government. Id. at
180, 6 A.2d at 872. In order to tax property owned by the Com-
monwealth, a local subdivision must establish that it has the author-
ity to tax such property. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA) v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 574 Pa. 707, 713,
833 A.2d 710, 713 (2003).
As an initial determination, it must first be established if
ANIZDA is a public authority or entity which would not ordinar-
ily be subject to imposition of property taxes. Tax immunity is
distinct from tax exemption. Delaware County Solid Waste Author-
ity v. Berks County Board of Assessment Appeals, 534 Pa. 81, 85,
626 A.2d 528, 530 (1993). Tax immunity refers to a circumstance
19
Lehigh 7-17 op936 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
where the taxing body lacks the authority to levy a tax. Id. On the
other hand, tax exemption carves out specified property from
taxation by a taxing body which otherwise has the authority to tax.
Id. As a result, the primary distinction between “immunity” and
“exemption” is simply that “[t]he ordinary presumption against
exemption does not apply where the property involved is owned
by the Commonwealth, since such property has for reasons of
public policy been consistently recognized as free from taxation.”
Dauphin County, supra at 182, 6 A.2d at 872-73.
The parties have agreed the case before the Court is one of
tax immunity as opposed to tax exemption. (See Appellant’s Brief,
p. 7; Appellee’s Brief, p. 13.) Furthermore, the parties have agreed
ANIZDA is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania. The Economic Development Financing Law, which was
enacted on August 23, 1967, declared that “every industrial and
commercial development authority incorporated under this act
shall be a public instrumentality of the Commonwealth.” 73 P.S.
§376(a).
On March 23, 2012, the City of Allentown formed ANIZDA
as a development authority by filing Articles of Incorporation with
the Pennsylvania Department of State. As stated within the Articles
of Incorporation:
[ANIZDA] shall have all the powers and authority
granted to an industrial and commercial development author-
ity pursuant to the Financing Law, which shall include but
shall not be limited to acquiring, holding, constructing, im-
proving, maintaining, owning, financing, and leasing, either
in the capacity of lessor or lessee, industrial, specialized, or
commercial development projects and serving as the succes-
sor contracting authority to the Allentown Commercial and
Industrial Development Authority (ACIDA) for purposes of
administering, providing financing for and undertaking all
other activities related to the Allentown Neighborhood Im-
provement Zone (NIZ) ... .
(Stipulated Facts, filed March 4, 2016, Exhibit 1 (emphasis added).)
In 2012, ANIZDA acquired properties formerly owned by
ACIDA for purposes of the development and construction of the
20
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 937
arena. ACIDA was also a duly recognized public authority. The
Appellee School District does not dispute that ACIDA was a pub-
lic instrumentality of the Commonwealth. As such, the School
District could not impose property taxes upon any property to
which ACIDA had legal title. The parties have agreed the transfer
of properties from ACIDA to ANIZDA did not alter the fact the
properties are owned by public authorities.
ANIZDA contends the four properties in question are im-
mune from imposition of property taxes because of the specific
language of the Financing Law. ANIZDA points to the wording of
the statute which provides that public authorities such as ANIZDA,
“shall not be required to pay any taxes or assessments upon any
property acquired or used by them ... and shall be free from taxa-
tion within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” 73 P.S. §385
(emphasis added). The difficulty with this assertion is that ANIZDA
has failed to include the entire statutory provision. The particular
portion to which ANIZDA refers actually reads,
The effectuation of the authorized purpose of authorities
created under section 4 of this act ... shall and will be in all
respects for the benefit of the people of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, for the increase of their commerce and
prosperity, and for the improvement of their health and living
conditions; and, since they will as public instrumentalities of
the Commonwealth be performing essential governmental
functions in effectuating such purposes, authorities and the
financing authority shall not be required to pay any taxes or
assessments upon any property acquired or used by them for
such purposes, and the bonds issued by any authority or by
the financing authority, their transfer and the income there-
from ... shall at all times be free from taxation within the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
73 P.S. §385 (emphasis added).
The plain effect of this statutory language is that properties
owned or acquired by ANIZDA are free from taxation only if they
are acquired for the purposes designated within the enabling lan-
guage of the Financing Law. ANIZDA mischaracterizes the lan-
guage which it asserts precludes taxation. It is the bonds that are
21
Lehigh 7-17 op938 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
issued by ANIZDA, and any income derived from said bonds, which
are free from taxation based on the wording of the statute, not the
properties themselves. See id.
The School District argues the properties owned by ANIZDA
therefore are not in fact immune from taxation, and have not been
granted any specific legislative exemption from the imposition of
property taxes. This is not an accurate characterization of the en-
abling legislation either. Based on the section of the Financing Law
stated above, the properties owned by ANIZDA may be immune
from taxation if they are “acquired or used” by ANIZDA for the
purposes identified within the statute, namely the increase of com-
merce and prosperity, and the improvement of the health and
living conditions, of the people of the Commonwealth. 73 P.S.
§385.
The School District contends the leasing of the properties
contravenes the purpose for which ANIZDA was created. Both
ANIZDA and the School District referred the Court to several
cases which have addressed the degree to which properties owned
by public authorities are subject to property taxes. ANIZDA asserts
that property owned by a public authority is presumed to be im-
mune to taxation. “In short, Commonwealth property is presumed
immune, and the local taxing body bears the burden to demonstrate
taxability.” Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority v. Lehigh
County Board of Assessment Appeals, 585 Pa. 657, 670, 889 A.2d
1168, 1176 (2005). Furthermore, ANIZDA argues all doubts
whether a property owned by a Commonwealth entity is immune
from taxation must be resolved in favor of the public agency. Id.
In Delaware County Solid Waste Authority v. Berks County
Board of Assessment Appeals, 534 Pa. 81, 626 A.2d 528 (1993),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that property owned by a
Commonwealth agency is not given “blanket immunity” from
property taxation. “It is well settled that property owned by the
Commonwealth and its agencies is beyond the taxing power of a
political subdivision. Thus, absent an explicit statutory grant of
authority, property owned by the Commonwealth is immune from
taxation.” Id. at 85, 626 A.2d at 530-31. However, the Supreme
Court added, “If an agency acts outside its authorized governmen-
22
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 939
tal purposes, then its immunity is not automatic.” Id. at 87, 626
A.2d at 531.
Within the Delaware County decision, the court referenced
an earlier decision in Appeal of Municipal Authority of Borough
of West View, 381 Pa. 416, 113 A.2d 307 (1955), which involved a
municipal authority leasing out a portion of a building owned by
the authority to three commercial tenants. The court in West View
Borough found the portion of the building which was rented out
to commercial concerns was not exempt from taxation. In referring
to West View Borough, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiter-
ated, “we read West View as consistent with the proposition that
property which is not acquired or used for authorized governmen-
tal purposes will not enjoy governmental immunity.” Delaware
County, supra at 87-88, 626 A.2d at 532.
Echoing concerns which were raised by the Allentown School
District in the current matter, the Delaware County decision
noted the concern of the Board of Assessment Appeals when it
stated, “The concern of the Board is that a Commonwealth agen-
cy should not be able to take land that is not being used for the
benefit of the public off the tax rolls.” Id. at 88, 626 A.2d at 532.
“If a municipal authority can lease one residential property for
revenue, and thus keep it off the tax rolls there is no reason why it
might not acquire an entire residential section of a township against
future use, and in the meantime, make it the course of similar
income without liability for property taxes.” Id. (quoting Appeal of
Municipal Authority of West View Tax Case, 175 Pa. Superior Ct.
641, 107 A.2d 130 (1954), aff ’d, 381 Pa. 416, 113 A.2d 307 (1955)).
The Court shrugged off the assertion that tax immunity should
have been limited in the Delaware County case to only those por-
tions of the acreage specifically used for purposes of trash dis-
posal. “We do not find that the immunity is limited to the absolute
minimum of property necessary to operate the Landfill. Rather,
the immunity covers property that was acquired or used for an
authorized purpose.” Id. at 88-89, 626 A.2d at 532.
The School District also directs the Court to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s opinion in SEPTA v. Board of Revision of Taxes,
City of Philadelphia, 574 Pa. 707, 833 A.2d 710 (2003). In that case,
23
Lehigh 7-17 op940 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
SEPTA purchased a twenty-story office building in downtown
Philadelphia. The agency used most of the building as its head-
quarters but leased out a portion to commercial tenants. When the
Board of Revision of Taxes of the City of Philadelphia determined
the property had a fair market value of over $225 million dollars,
SEPTA applied for a real estate tax exemption on the basis the
property was immune and exempt from taxation. The Board
granted a partial exemption and exempted eighty-five percent of
the building’s assessed value from taxation, corresponding to the
portions which were used by SEPTA and other government or
non-profit entities. This reduced the tax value of the property to
$1.2 million.
SEPTA appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. Interest-
ingly, the parties in SEPTA agreed the parts of the building oc-
cupied by SEPTA and the other public entities, as well as the
parking areas, were not subject to taxation. The only issue then
before the court was whether the portions leased out to commer-
cial tenants was taxable. The Court of Common Pleas held the
leasing of parts of the building to commercial tenants rendered
those same parts exempt from taxation on the grounds the trans-
portation agency used the revenue from the leased properties as
a means of raising revenue and reducing expenses, thus fulfilling
a public purpose. The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial
court on appeal by the Board of Revision. The Commonwealth
Court held the agency is immune from taxation so long as it acts
in accordance with the powers granted to it. The purpose of
SEPTA was to operate a transportation system. The leasing of the
real estate solely to raise revenue was not an activity connected to
that purpose. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court concluded,
the excess property leased to the commercial tenants was not im-
mune from taxation.
On appeal by the agency, the Supreme Court found SEPTA
had acted outside its authorized statutory purpose when it leased
out portions of the office building which SEPTA purchased. The
court articulated that in a tax immunity, as opposed to a tax exemp-
tion, case, the “authorized purpose” test as explained in Delaware
County was the appropriate lens through which to analyze SEPTA’s
assertion for tax immunity for the entirety of the office building it
24
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 941
owned. The court found that SEPTA was a statutorily created
municipal authority, and as such, exercised powers as a Common-
wealth agency and instrumentality. Because SEPTA was an
agency of the Commonwealth, the property owned by SEPTA was
presumed immune from taxation.
Additionally, the court found language within the statutory
authorization for SEPTA gave express powers “to sell, lease as les-
sor, transfer, dispose of or otherwise convey any franchise, right
or property, real, personal, or mixed ... which are useful for its
purposes.” Id. at 718, 833 A.2d at 716. The authorizing statute even
went so far as to empower the transportation agency, “[t]o explore
alternative means of raising revenue or reducing expenses, includ-
ing, but not limited to, real estate leases and rentals ... .” Id. (em-
phasis in original). In reviewing the propriety of SEPTA leasing
out property to commercial entities, the Supreme Court con-
cluded it was necessary to consider whether the excess property
which was being leased was used for SEPTA’s operations.
As opposed to the factual situation in Delaware County, the
Supreme Court determined the leased portions of the office build-
ing were “being used for something ‘other than’ as part of SEPTA’s
operation.” Id. at 717, 833 A.2d at 719.
Very simply, SEPTA is acting as a commercial landlord,
which is clearly distinct from acting as a ‘metropolitan trans-
portation authority’ pursuant to 74 Pa.C.S. §1711(a). We
cannot agree with SEPTA’s argument that because the excess
property is being used to raise revenues and reduce SEPTA’s
expenses, such use is equivalent to being part of SEPTA’s
operations simply because the legislature ‘authorized’ such
action.
Id.
The Supreme Court found leasing out portions of an office
building was not within the defined purpose of the agency to oper-
ate a metropolitan transportation system and that therefore the
portions of the building owned by SEPTA which were leased out
to private entities were subject to property taxation. Id. at 717, 833
A.2d at 719-20.
25
Lehigh 7-17 op942 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
Although the School District seems to have latched on to the
fact there is a factual similarity between the SEPTA case and the
matter currently before the Court because of the leasing of prop-
erty by the public authority, the Supreme Court did not focus on
whether the public authority leased property it owns. Instead, the
court has looked to whether the leasing of the property was con-
sistent with the purpose for which the public agency was authorized
by legislation. See id.
ANIZDA countered with the argument that several arena or
stadium projects throughout Pennsylvania have been developed
under the supervision and ownership of public authorities. ANIZDA
pointed out stadium or arena facilities in Philadelphia, Scranton,
Hershey and even in Allentown were constructed and are oper-
ated by public authorities. It is true that all these facilities were
developed under the auspices of a public authority in a specific
region or metropolitan area. Each of those facilities or venues
though is different from the arena project and the related com-
mercial development in this case because of the unique statutory
language which authorized the acquisition of land and the construc-
tion of the arena and other leased portions.
The Financing Law authorized the ANIZDA to promote
industrial, commercial and other economic development. ANIZDA
is permitted to promote and encourage retail establishments, and
to promote the use of urban and commercial centers by providing
parking, convention, tourism, recreational, and sports facilities.
These various functions of ANIZDA are to be performed without
regard to whether the specific project, project applicant, or project
user is a public or private actor, or is done for a profit or non-
profit purpose. See 73 P.S. §§372.1(1), (9), (10), and (14). Under
the statute, “project” is loosely defined as any facility or activity
“which promotes any of the public purposes set forth in section 2
or 2.1 of this act ... .” 73 P.S. §373.
Under Section 376 of the Financing Law, ANIZDA is broad-
ly authorized to conduct activities related to the overall goal of
promoting economic development. These activities include acquir-
ing, owning, or leasing land necessary or convenient “for carrying
out the purposes of this authority, and to sell, option, lease as les-
26
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 943
sor, transfer and dispose of any property or interest therein at any
time acquired by it.” 73 P.S. §376(b)(4). Under Section 376(b)(9),
the Financing Law goes even further to explicitly empower ANIZDA
to enter into lease agreements as long as the leases do not extend
beyond the term of the existence of ANIZDA under the statute.
See 73 P.S. §376(b)(9).
Accordingly, the statute creating the NIZ and ANIZDA gives
clear and express permission to the authority to acquire, develop,
and lease out property it has purchased as long as the acquisition,
development, or leasing of the land is consistent with the overall
goal of economic development as broadly defined by the Financing
Law. Therefore, because it is conceded ANIZDA is a public au-
thority of the Commonwealth, and that any land owned by such a
public authority is immune from taxation as long as a property is
acquired or used consistent with the statutorily designated purpose
of economic development, the properties owned or leased out by
ANIZDA are immune from taxation by any local authority such as
a school district, municipality, or county.
The upshot of this determination is that the arena itself and
leased condominiums which house retail or restaurant operations
are immune from the imposition of property taxes. The arena and
the related food service businesses fall within the clear definition
of what ANIZDA was directed to pursue under its enabling legis-
lation. The Financing Law authorized ANIZDA to promote eco-
nomic activity with the development of a sports recreation and
entertainment facility, as well as enabling ANIZDA to lease land
which it had acquired for the purpose of fulfilling that legislative
directive to promote economic activity. Because the arena and the
retail condominium units are owned or leased for that legisla-
tively authorized purpose, the appeal by ANIZDA with regard to
those two properties is granted, and the determination by the
Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals in case numbers
2015-C-1488 and 2015-C1491 is reversed.
The status of the other two condominium units which house
the parking decks is subject to different considerations. Initially
the Court raised concerns over the tax immunity of the parking
decks because of the inability of ANIZDA to define the economic
27
Lehigh 7-17 op944 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
impact of the decks strictly within the NIZ. While it is clear the
parking decks themselves are physically located in the NIZ, this
Court was troubled by the fact the parking decks may be used by
persons patronizing businesses outside the NIZ. It is arguable the
authorizing legislation only provided a basis for tax immunity for
those properties enhancing economic development within the NIZ
itself, not as an economic development tool for locations both
within and outside the defined geographic boundaries of the NIZ.
ANIZDA argues the construction and leasing out of the park-
ing decks is as much within the statutorily authorized purpose of
economic development as is the construction and operation of the
arena and the retail units. ANIZDA points out the language found
at 73 P.S. §§372.1(10) and 376 specifically empowers ANIZDA to
provide parking. Those same statutory sections expressly permit
ANIZDA to operate parking decks or to lease out the parking decks
for operation by other entities. ANIZDA contends that because
the provision of parking is one of the statutorily approved pur-
poses of the economic development mission of the Financing Law,
the two parking deck condominium units also enjoy immunity from
the imposition of any local property taxes, even if leased by ANIZDA.
As is the case with the opposition by the School District to
ANIZDA’s argument for immunity from taxation for the retail unit
condominium, the School District contends the development and
leasing out of the two parking decks is beyond the statutorily des-
ignated purpose described for ANIZDA under the Financing Law.
“Any parcel—or part thereof—which is ultimately adjudged to be
outside of the scope of the Authority’s tax immunity will then be
subject to local real estate taxes.” Lehigh-Northampton Airport
Authority v. Lehigh County, Board of Assessment Appeals, 585
Pa. 657, 676, 889 A.2d 1168, 1179 (2005).
The School District also refers this Court to the unreported
decision of the Commonwealth Court in Pennsylvania State System
of Higher Education v. Indiana Area School District, 2012 WL
8667893 (Pa. Commw. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), aff ’d,
620 Pa. 558, 69 A.3d 236 (2013). In that case, a portion of a build-
ing on the campus of a university within the State System of
Higher Education was leased out to a local business incubator. The
28
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 945
business incubator was part of a program in the University’s Col-
lege of Business to provide assistance to start-up or developing
businesses in the county. It was further argued the business incu-
bator provided a community service and education to the students
about the development of actual businesses.
Even though the college building was located within a Key-
stone Opportunity Enterprise Zone (KOEZ), where properties
were “exempt” from property taxes, the Indiana County Assessment
Office determined the leasing of a part of the college-owned build-
ing to a commercial tenant subjected the entire building to the
imposition of property taxes. The local school district and county
taxing authorities argued that even though the university building
was owned by the Pennsylvania State System for Higher Education
(PSSHE), an agency of the Commonwealth, the property in ques-
tion was not automatically entitled to be immune from taxation.
The school district and assessment agency claimed that leasing a
portion of the college building was outside the educational purpose
of the university. PSSHE contended the local taxing authorities
were legislatively prohibited from assessing a tax against the prop-
erty, and that as a property owned by an agency of the Common-
wealth, the university building was immune from taxation.
The Commonwealth Court found that while it is well estab-
lished that real estate owned by the Commonwealth is not subject
to taxation by political subdivisions absent express statutory author-
ity, tax immunity for properties owned by agencies or instrumen-
talities of the Commonwealth is not unqualified. Tax immunity
only applies to property which is acquired or used for an authorized
governmental purpose. PSSHE, supra at *3. The burden is on the
taxing authority to establish the lack of immunity by showing that
the Commonwealth agency or instrumentality acted outside the
scope of its authority in acquiring and holding the property. Id.
The Commonwealth Court noted the analysis from the
SEPTA decision which clarified that when applying the government
use test in a tax immunity analysis, a court must look not only at
whether the agency or instrumentality was given authority to hold
or lease property, but also to whether the holding or leasing of
property is within the agency’s or instrumentality’s governmental
purpose. Id. at *4.
29
Lehigh 7-17 op946 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
When applying the SEPTA decision to the Indiana Univer-
sity case, the Commonwealth Court found PSSHE’s activities in
leasing a portion of the university building to a business incubator
were more like that of a commercial landlord. Therefore, PSSHE
was not absolved from paying property taxes on the portions of the
university building utilized for such commercial ventures. Id. at
*5. The Commonwealth Court concluded the leasing out of the
portion of the college building to a business incubator fell outside
the educational purpose for which PSSHE was statutorily created,
in much the same way the Supreme Court concluded that leasing
out of portions of any office building owned by SEPTA fell outside
the statutory purpose of a metropolitan transportation agency.
The case before the Court is different from both the PSSHE
and SEPTA cases because the legislation which created and empow-
ered ANIZDA specifically and explicitly authorized ANIZDA to
acquire and develop or lease property consistent with the goal of
economic development in specified areas in the 128 non-contiguous
acres of land within the City of Allentown designated as the Neigh-
borhood Improvement Zone. As a result, from its very inception,
ANIZDA was statutorily distinct from SEPTA or PSSHE in the
purpose for which the authority was conceived and enacted.
However, this does not end the Court’s analysis to determine
if the construction, operation or leasing out of the parking decks
is so squarely within the defined governmental purpose for which
the ANIZDA was created to entitle the two parking deck condo-
minium units to tax immunity. Whether the land acquisition and
development undertaken by ANIZDA was for the purpose of
construction of an arena or retail and commercial business opera-
tion, the one constant requirement was that the land being pur-
chased and developed or the facility being constructed was within
the physical and geographical confines of the 128 non-contiguous
acres defined as the NIZ. The Financing Law detailed the funds
supporting the purchase of land by ANIZDA and bonds financed
by ANIZDA would encompass all state taxes generated from the
development and operation of businesses within the delineated
boundaries of the NIZ, and only those businesses within the spe-
cific contours of the NIZ. The statute did not permit state taxes
30
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 947
generated from businesses located outside the precisely desig-
nated boundaries of the NIZ to subsidize the financial operations
of ANIZDA. See 72 P.S. §8902-B (defining “Earned income tax”
as “[a] tax or portion of a tax imposed on earned income within a
neighborhood improvement zone ... .”).
Similarly, any property purchased by ANIZDA outside the
designated boundaries of the NIZ would not be entitled to the tax
relief to which ANIZDA asserts it is entitled. Id. (defining “Neigh-
borhood improvement zone” as “A neighborhood improvement
zone designated by the contracting authority for the purposes of
neighborhood improvement and development within a city,” and
“City” as “A city of the third class with, on the date of the designa-
tion of a neighborhood improvement zone by the contracting au-
thority, a population of at least 106,000, based on the most recent
Federal decennial census.”). However, while the authorizing leg-
islation and the articles of incorporation for ANIZDA specifically
delineated the purchase, ownership or leasing of properties was
limited to only those parcels located within the boundaries of the
NIZ, neither the statutes nor the articles of incorporation limited
the field of economic development to be circumscribed by the
same physical dimensions of the NIZ. ANIZDA is legally empow-
ered to purchase and even lease properties situated within the NIZ
to private commercial entities, but the authorizing language did
not so narrowly define the ANIZDA’s purpose of enhancing eco-
nomic development to the same boundaries. See 73 P.S. §372.1(14)
(identifying promotion of the health, welfare, and safety of the
residents of the Commonwealth through the promotion of eco-
nomic activity as a legislative policy objective in enacting the Fi-
nancing Law).
If one were to accept the premise that the scope of eco-
nomic development, for which any property owned by ANIZDA
would be entitled to tax immunity, must be limited to those areas
within the physical boundaries of the NIZ, it begs the question of
why the revitalization or development of any property other than
those specifically owned by ANIZDA but located within the NIZ
would not also violate the authorized purpose of the NIZ Law and
the Financing Law. Such an interpretation of the statutes would
31
Lehigh 7-17 op948 ANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al.
constrain the Court to find ANIZDA was only fulfilling its legisla-
tively authorized purpose if the economic development activities
it undertook were limited to benefit only the specific parcels owned
by ANIZDA. The Court finds such an interpretation would be
unreasonable based on a fair reading of the relevant statutes.
While the clear mandate of the Financing Law was to enable
ANIZDA to purchase, own and lease properties within the NIZ,
the fact that the development, renovation, and ownership of prop-
erties by ANIZDA, even those properties leased to outside private
entities, may engender the development, revitalization and owner-
ship of properties outside the boundaries of the NIZ does not
subject the properties owned by ANIZDA to local taxation. This
interpretation is a logical extension from both language of the NIZ
law and the Financing Law’s policy objective. 72 P.S. §8902-B; 73
P.S. §372(14).
Consistent then with this Court’s interpretation of the statu-
tory authorization behind which ANIZDA may purchase, develop,
or lease land within the NIZ for the purpose of engendering eco-
nomic activity, the Court also concludes that the acquisition, de-
velopment, ownership or leasing of acreage within the boundaries
of the NIZ renders those properties immune from taxation by local
authorities, including the imposition of school district property
taxes. The Financing Law and the Articles of Incorporation do not
circumscribe the authorized purpose of ANIZDA to the promotion
of economic development solely within the confines of the legis-
latively designated areas.
The Court is cognizant of the potential consequence of this
interpretation on the question of future acquisition of properties
within the NIZ by ANIZDA. It is not inconceivable that specific
parcels located within the boundaries of the NIZ may become
available on the market or become financially distressed. It is also
foreseeable that a body such as ANIZDA would then step in to
purchase those same properties, either to retain the properties for
possible sale to third parties or to lease them out to other private
commercial entities. The potential ownership of those properties
by ANIZDA will render those same properties immune from
taxation. This immunity from taxation would continue until such
time as the properties are sold by ANIZDA to an entity which does
32
Lehigh 7-17 opANIZDA vs. City of Allentown et al. 949
not have the same status as a public instrumentality qualifying for
tax immunity. Although neither party could cite any specific intent
announced by ANIZDA to undertake such an effort, the potential
exists for ANIZDA to hold properties for the duration of its author-
ized existence, or until the year 2062.
The prospect that the Allentown School District, one of the
most financially distressed school districts in Pennsylvania, would
be faced with large portions of the district immune from taxation
fosters a concern the School District could become even more
fiscally hard-pressed. The advisability of such a consequence,
though, is an issue for the General Assembly to determine, not this
Court. The question before the Court today is narrowly tailored
to the consideration of whether duly enacted legislation and au-
thorizing documents allowed for the properties which are owned
and possibly leased by ANIZDA as a public instrumentality of the
Commonwealth to be immune from taxation by local governing
bodies. Having so determined the properties are in fact immune
from local taxation because they are owned and leased within the
authorized purpose of ANIZDA to promote and enhance eco-
nomic development, it is for the other branches of government to
decide if the enabling legislation needs to be amended in the future.
Conclusion
Because the properties Defendants are seeking to tax fall
within the geographic confines of the NIZ and the legislature has
established immunity from taxation for those properties located
within that geographic area and owned by ANIZDA, the decision
of the Lehigh County Tax Assessment Appeals Board entered on
May 1, 2015 is REVERSED.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2016, upon consideration
of Petitioner’s Appeal from the decision of the Lehigh County
Board of Assessment Appeals, filed May 8, 2016,
IT IS ORDERED the decision of the Lehigh County Board
of Assessment Appeals entered May 1, 2015 is REVERSED for
the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion.
33
Lehigh 7-17 opLEHIGH LAW JOURNAL
ESTATE AND TRUST NOTICES Buckley, Dolores B., dec’d.
Notice is hereby given that, in the Late of Allentown.
estates of the decedents set forth Executor: Andrew J. Magyar
below, the Register of Wills has c/o James J. McConnell, Es-
granted letters testamentary or of quire, 526 North St. Cloud
administration to the persons named.
Street, Allentown, PA 18104.
Notice is also hereby given of the
Attorney: James J. McConnell,
Esquire, 526 North St. Cloud
existence of the trusts of the deceased
Street, Allentown, PA 18104.
settlors set forth below for whom no
personal representatives have been
appointed within 90 days of death.
Charles, Doris A., dec’d.
Late of 1235 N. Marshall Street,
All persons having claims or de-
South Whitehall Township.
mands against said estates or trusts
Executors: Bruce D. Charles
are requested to make known the
and Ted W. Charles c/o The
same, and all persons indebted to
Roth Law Firm, 123 North Fifth
said estates or trusts are requested
Street, Allentown, PA 18102.
to make payment, without delay, to
Attorneys: Larry R. Roth, Es-
the executors or administrators or quire, The Roth Law Firm, 123
trustees or to their attorneys named North Fifth Street, Allentown,
below. PA 18102.
FIRST PUBLICATION Charles, Theodore W., dec’d.
Auman, Mary L., dec’d. Late of 1235 N. Marshall Street,
Late of Allentown. South Whitehall Township.
Executrix: Sheryl Ann Stephens Executors: Bruce D. Charles
c/o Noonan & Prokup, 526 and Ted W. Charles c/o The
Walnut Street, Allentown, PA Roth Law Firm, 123 North Fifth
Street, Allentown, PA 18102.
18101-2394.
Attorneys: Larry R. Roth, Es-
Attorneys: Noonan & Prokup,
quire, The Roth Law Firm, 123
526 Walnut Street, Allentown,
North Fifth Street, Allentown,
PA 18101-2394.
PA 18102.
Boandl, Glenn, dec’d. Christofaro, Richard D., dec’d.
Late of Allentown. Late of the City of Allentown.
Executor: Richard Boandl c/o Executrix: Mary R. Baglini c/o
Martin J. Karess, Esquire, 215 John O. Stover, Jr., Esquire,
North 9th Street, Allentown, PA 537 Chestnut Street, Emmaus,
18102. PA 18049.
Attorney: Martin J. Karess, Attorney: John O. Stover, Jr.,
Esquire, 215 North 9th Street, Esquire, 537 Chestnut Street,
Allentown, PA 18102. Emmaus, PA 18049.
Brobst, Edgar A., Jr., dec’d. Dengler, Frank R., dec’d.
Late of 534 Third St., #502, Late of 2550 Route 100, Ore-
Catasauqua. field.
Executor: Edgar A. Brobst, III, Executrix: Clarabelle I. Dengler,
4391 South 5th St., Emmaus, 2550 Route 100, Orefield, PA
PA 18049. 18069.
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