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Visit http://www.mindef.gov.sg for more news and information about MINDEF and the SAF
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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF SAF DAY INTERVIEW WITH
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, DR NG ENG HEN ON 25 JUN 2020, 1030HRS
Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen: First, let me welcome you to this video conferencing. I
will make some opening remarks and take your questions. But let me start by saying that this
year, we are commemorating the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) Day in the midst of a global
pandemic; that is obvious. But what may not be so obvious, at least about the weight of the
impact, this COVID-19 pandemic is more than a public health problem.
Danger – Disruptions Ahead
I think historians and experts think that it may be a once in a lifetime disruptive event that
will define this generation, much like how the Great Depression, World War I, World War II
defined theirs, and I am choosing those events for historical context pointedly. Because if you
look at just over the last five months since the initial cases were discovered, and surveyed in
broad terms the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the overall landscape becomes quite
clear.
For instance, it has stress tested every facet of our society, our economies and international
relations. It has forced every country to re-evaluate their fundamental assumptions, both
internally and externally. This accelerated latent and current trends. We are talking about
digitalisation, unmanned systems, how we work, commune, travel. I mean just take this video
conference for example, none of us would have thought that we would have to do this and
yet, now it is second nature to us and in fact we are wondering, why do we not do this as the
norm right? And that is how much it has accelerated. And we hear from companies saying
that their plans to push digitalisation is accelerated by years, not months. It has pushed
countries to relook their dependencies, whether it is your supply chains, business continuity,
investments. And it has altered international relations, because the COVID-19 pandemic has
revealed the extent to which countries place their national interests above others.
I think there will be more to come. Because health experts say that a vaccine is some time
away, a year, two years, maybe, if at all. But at this stage, just five months after the initial
cases were discovered, if we were to ask how the world at large did against COVID-19, what
should have been a common enemy, I think the answer would be “just passed, could have
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done much better”. If you remember, well some of us can remember in school where the
teacher wrote on our test scripts, “just passed, could have done much better”. Because
instead of cooperation and collaboration, at a time when it was most needed, it was more
each country for itself and that is the reason for the “just pass” mark.
For Singapore, the canary in the mine of globalisation, we cannot remain unscathed and
indeed, I think the change will impact us harder, because for Singapore our livelihoods depend
on trade and productivity, our openness of our systems, because our trade is three times our
GDP (Gross Domestic Product). And for Singapore to thrive, we need a busy, free flowing,
international bazaar, and we cannot take for granted that that will be the case going forward.
I have painted these larger trends as a backdrop because that is the world that we live in, that
we have to contend with. For SAF Day, I want to focus on what this post COVID-19 world
means for national security, external relations and the SAF. So let me deal with some key
facets in that context.
A More Unpredictable and Uncertain Strategic Environment
The pandemic has resulted in a more uncertain external environment, most obvious is the
heightened contestation between US and China. Let us begin with the US. The US has defined
China as its main threat for the 21st century. This is a systemic view across the US, not just
the White House. This sentiment permeates not only the executive, but their legislature, their
media, the academia, business groups, down to the man on the street. This entrenched view
of China not playing by the rules, or at least taking advantage of rules to get ahead of the US
unfairly, has bipartisan support.
So for example, last month, the Democrat-led House of Representatives, approved the bill
recommending sanctions against Chinese officials for their treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang.
It was Democrat-led, because it is from the House of Representatives where they hold the
majority. The bill, in that House of Representatives, all but one member voted for it. But the
Republican-led Senate also passed the bill with unanimous consent; it has got bipartisan
support. If you look at the White House, both the State and Department of Defence are
aligned, not only with an overarching narrative, but with specific policy plans and action
mapped out against China. So the US recently published its strategic approach towards the
People’s Republic of China and it accused Beijing, and I quote, “exploiting the free and open
rules based order and attempting to reshape the international system in its favour”, close
quote. This very much is in line with the US Department of Defence’s National Defence
Strategy, which was published in 2018. I quote from that – “the CCP (Communist Party of
China) is expanding use of economic, political and military power to compel acquiescence from
nation states, harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of
countries and individuals around the world”, close quote.
The US will compete head on in the technology sector to maintain its dominance. In January
this year, the US Senate introduced legislation, to provide over US$1 billion to invest in
Western-based alternatives to Huawei and ZTE, these two companies were named
specifically. Senator Marco Rubio, who is a member of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign
Relations Committee said and I quote, “we are at a critical point in history and we cannot
allow Chinese State directed telecommunication companies to surpass American
competitors”, unquote. Even in areas of trade, finance, supply chains, the US has sent strong
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signals that it wants to be less dependent and it made moves to be even independent of
China. The direction to uncouple is clear and in that divided world, all countries are poorer
for it.
Let us now turn to China, how does China see this current situation? China on its part will
continue its relentless march to achieve its two centenary goals, which was set up by
President Xi Jinping, to rise and to be strong. The first goal is to build a moderately prosperous
society in all aspects by 2021, and I think that goal has been achieved. The second goal, quote,
“to build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally
advanced and harmonious”, unquote, by 2049. I think China will want to accelerate the
achievement of that goal if opportunities present themselves. China neither accepts nor sees
its own actions as inconsistencies or weaknesses of its systems or values, as characterised by
the US. It views external criticisms or protests against China's behaviour through the lens of
strategic rivalry with the US. And it views the Communist Party of China as central to the
sovereignty and national security of China, and will seek to strengthen its grip on national and
external affairs. If one were to ask what lies at the heart of this discord and strategic mistrust
between the US and China, because what I have mentioned are just manifestations of
something much deeper, which is not easily resolved. Discord and strategic distrust between
US and China arise from the fundamental notions of how each sees itself and through that
lens, the other. Both have their own rich historical contexts.
So if I start with the US again. For the last century, the US, which is today's most economically
successful country with the most powerful military has played critical and leading roles to
shape the world based on its values and ideals. The terms such as “American Exceptionalism”
and “liberal democratic ideals” are central to US foreign policy, apparent reservations of the
Trump administration non-withstanding. The US cannot embrace the Chinese model of
governance, or its modus operandi, whether it is conducted locally or internationally, it
cannot accept it, or embrace it as compatible with its own values and liberal democratic
systems.
What about China? China sees itself as a continuum of the longest unbroken ancient
civilisation. Even though the forms of governance over its 5000 years of history has changed
from imperial rule, feudalism, to now socialist rule under the Chinese Communist Party of
China The notion that China should aspire to adopt democratic ideals does not come into
mind, either within the establishment or even among its population. For both its people and
its establishment, their perception of their present society, or China's present society pose
contradictions to socialist ideals, but the solutions would have to come from within.
So this consciousness of China's being is what is uppermost in both its people and
establishment. But what is also in the collective consciousness of both leaders and people is
the witnessing of historical events when China was weak, whether it was within the last 200
years with foreign concessions who extracted the unequal treaties in the mid-1800s, the
Opium Wars, or even further back against marauding hordes at its borders. The Chinese
Communist Party of China has decided that the strength is better and far more secure. And
this in part explains their words and deeds, not only to the party, but its governing
establishments.
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If you view this gap between the US and China from this perspective, the realisation is the gap
is far apart and will widen further. The basis for both countries are very far apart. This gap
between US and China, how does it impact ASEAN?
Well, first of all, we cannot avoid the effects of this contestation. And for Singapore, our small
country, at the geographical intersection of East and West, will be acutely impacted for both
trade and security, and that is a clear given. The US-China relationship is all important, but
the overall geopolitical context will add to the tensions. If we start from Asia, what happens
to Japan, Korea and India bears close watching. If you move on to Russia and Europe, these
are other key pieces. Because the US seeks to reduce European dependence on its military
and capability, as well as increase European purchases of US goods, I think the stress by the
US on the Trans-Atlantic security alliances may weaken.
Some of it, we are witnessing the beginning of the weakening, if not unravelling, of the post-
WWII constructs of the last 70 years. What will replace it, is anybody's guess. If we are
fortunate, the pace of change will be gradual. But the odds of a disruptive change can never
be discounted. These changes that are described would have occurred even without COVID-
19, but the pandemic has further stressed the region. Particularly ASEAN, because its many
emerging market economies, will be saddled with greater public debt and rising
unemployment. All countries because of COVID-19 pandemic had to increase fiscal spending,
but few if any, especially within ASEAN, had the strength of past reserves to draw on without
having to incur massive debt.
Singapore was fortunate we had reserves to draw on, but for many countries, other countries,
in fact if not all other countries, they had to meet their fiscal deficits from debt. Furthermore,
demands for goods and services, for example tourism, which ASEAN countries are very much
dependent, on will be weak for a few years and commodity prices will remain low because
demand is low. And all this means that ASEAN as a whole will grow much slower. I have taken
some time to put into detail the post-COVID-19 aftermath which Singapore will have to deal
with in terms of national security. We cannot be divorced from this context. At the same time,
known threats remain, whether it is the South China Sea disputes, terrorism, cyber-threats.
So the question to ask for us from a national security perspective, is how does Singapore
navigate our small vessel, amid turbulent waters and large ocean liners that are crisscrossing
and changing lanes? I think we have to do it with great care and focus. As a small country, we
know it takes very little to tip us over. So for the SAF we need to be alert, to be strong to
defend our sovereignty and national interest. We do not want to be caught in-between big
power rivalry or be forced to choose sides. We want to be useful and friendly to all. We want
to work with like-minded partners in ASEAN, and around the world to uphold a global system
that is based on and thrives on openness, inclusiveness, connectivity, trade cooperation,
respect for international law and non-aggression.
The Continued Need for a Strong SAF
Let me now zoom in to the SAF specifically and then I will take questions. So let me begin with
resources for the SAF. Even with increased regional and global unpredictability and potential
instability, which I have sketched in detail, Singapore will face budgetary pressures internally.
This is a given. In the first quarter of this year, our GDP contracted around 5%, so this year's
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growth is bound to be affected. Even for 2021, next year, full recovery remains uncertain.
MINDEF/SAF are taking measures to cut cost where we can without compromising critical
operations or reduction in SAF’s medium and long-term capabilities. We will continue to be
prudent in our spending. But I think all of us know that we will have to tighten our belts for
this year, even the next, even 2022, until the economy fully recovers.
Let me now drill in on specifics. Despite the pandemic, we have not compromised on security
operations. So since January when cases were detected, since April when circuit breaker was
imposed, our units continued to perform critical operations. And we did it through cohorting,
which means that if you are functioning as a unit, you stay together, you do not cross, you do
not meet other people. And that is to ensure continuity. Our servicemen and servicewomen
perform critical functions, whether it is in island defence, protection of key installations,
maritime security, air defence or counter-terrorism. And to ensure that they were intact
before they started operations, they stayed in-camp sometimes as long as two, three weeks,
and then started the operation. So they were away from their families for an extended period
of time. And I want to congratulate them because through all these months, thousands of
people on duty, we only had one infection. And we basically maintained clean units, and they
kept Singapore safe because of how they conducted the operations.
Now, we will continue to generate new units to meet our security needs. I have talked about
our Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) at our Committee of Supply earlier this year, to help
us better deal with maritime terrorism and sea robbery and piracy. I said that we have added
four patrol vessels, we started refurbishment and they will go into operations soon.
The C4I community, what we call the Command, Control, Communications, Computer and
Intelligence community, and our Defence Cyber Organisation have stepped up efforts for
cyber-security. So over the past year, with added 150 persons to their ranks. The C4I
community has also set up a dedicated intelligence facility for counter-terrorism and this will
provide early warning and incident response. And we are working with other national
agencies and foreign military intelligence partners. It is an ongoing set up, and this will be very
important for us, to help us better deal with terrorists. The Army, in tandem with these
efforts, has enhanced its Island Defence Task Force, together with our local agencies to allow
us a more concerted response to incidents.
Now let me move on to training, particularly overseas training. We will resume our training
in a graduated and safe manner. Next month, July, our Navy's RSS Supreme, our frigate will
set sail for Hawaii to participate in Exercise RIMPAC, which will involve 24 ships from 11
nations. This will be purely at sea, for safety reasons. And our frigate will be leading a group
of ships during the exercise for warfare training. For the Air Force, we are working with our
Australian counterparts for short term overseas flying training detachments to resume. For
the Army, you will remember Basic Military Training (BMT) – we delayed it for a few weeks,
it is now resumed. For our Specialist Cadet School (SCS) and Officer Cadet School (OCS), they
continued, as well as essential In-Camp Training (ICT) for NS units. On top of that, we continue
to mobilise NS units. For example, we mobilised a combat surgical hospital – an NS unit – to
support taking care of patients in the Community Care Facility at the Singapore EXPO. We
mobilised NS units for home security operations to protect Jurong Island and other key
installations. Now, more ICTs will resume in the coming months, as will IPPT (Individual
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Physical Proficiency Test), IPPT Preparatory Training, Remedial Training in what we call our
Fitness Conditioning Centres, and those will be phased in.
Let me talk about acquisitions. F-35 JSF acquisition remains on track, and we expect to take
delivery of four F-35Bs around 2026, so we are on schedule. For the Navy, the replacement
for the Missile Corvettes with our Multi-Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) is also on schedule – six
MRCV expected to be delivered by 2030. Air Defence, our Aster-30 system will be stood up
for 24/7 operations, on schedule to replace to replace our I-HAWK systems. Now there are
some delays, in particular two – the deliveries of our CH-47Fs and our H225M helicopters,
and we previously said that we expected them end-2020. There will be delays and we are
expecting them now in 2021. Similarly, for our Invincible-class submarine, our previous
timeline was 2021. There will be some slippage, this will now be in 2022, remember these
were built in Kiel.
I want to talk about our training projects, to give an update. First, what we are doing in
Australia, in Shoalwater Bay Training Area under our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
We talked about our Combined Arms Air-Land Ranges and Urban Operations Live-Firing
Facilities, our admin and logistic facilities, these are still on track to start later this year, so no
slippage there. SAFTI City, because of the situation in our dorms, work was suspended during
the Circuit Breaker period. So there is an estimated, six to nine months delay to completion
by 2024. Our Air Force fighter training detachment in Guam, is on track, no delays.
I talked about the NS Review Committee during Committee of Supply, chaired by Deputy
Secretary (Administration) as well as the Chief of Army. It is making good progress, and it will
start making recommendations fourth quarter of this year.
What about defence diplomacy efforts? Amid all these uncertainty and unpredictability, it is
important for top-level defence officials to meet. Well, let me just say a few words. We will
need extra effort, and I am looking forward to meet with both US Secretary of Defense Mark
Esper, and Chinese State Councillor and Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe in
China later this year, when conditions permit. I put that as a significant, if not must-do
deliverable – to meet personally with them later this year, both of them, to discuss the
strategic context of the way forward. So I hope that will materialise. I am on schedule to meet
with ASEAN and other Plus partners, Defence Ministers, in Hanoi in October later this year,
conditions permitting, but that is still on the cards. One last mention on defence diplomacy,
the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) meetings have continued virtually, and we have
got good discussions teed up, because next year is our 50th golden anniversary, which
Malaysia is hosting.
Supporting the Nation’s Fight against COVID-19
In the meantime, the SAF is extensively involved in our national fight against COVID-19. And
let me end off with just some broad facets of what the SAF has been doing. First off, we
mobilised more than 6,000 servicemen and women from the SAF, MINDEF, DSO National
Laboratories and DSTA (Defence Science and Technology Agency), including NSmen and ex-
Regulars also stepped up to volunteer their services. MINDEF and the SAF were asked to
provide the C2 (Command and Control) systems, personnel, and logistics to assist other
agencies, Whole-of-Government effort, whether it is distributing masks, to run the dorms,
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contact tracing, isolation and containing the spread of the infection. We helped build almost
10,000 beds, more beds than existing beds in all our public hospitals, and we cared for more
than 29,000 patients so far. And that is the reason why our public health care system was not
overwhelmed. Specifically, six military camps were converted into community recovery
facilities, which provided more than 5,000 beds. This took care of 16,000 patients as of mid-
June. The MINDEF-Related Organisations repurposed the Changi Exhibition Centre into a
Community Care Facility. There are about 4,400 beds, more than 8,000 patients taken care of
so far. And MINDEF-Related Organisations are also building a temporary dormitory for 1,700
migrant workers at Kranji, which will begin by around July. The SAF Medical Corps has been
taking care of recovering patients at the Singapore EXPO halls, and to date, they have looked
after some 4,500 patients.
Let me mention what the DSTA, DSO and ST Engineering companies have been doing. They
have developed temperature self-check systems, deployed at 70public transport stations and
interchanges from June this year. They have built the Mobile Swab Stations to enable swab
operations to be done safely and swiftly. And DSO has provided key testing of COVID-19
samples and UV disinfection cabinets and so on.
Conclusion
Let me just conclude. We will have to respond nimbly to the post COVID-19 world. As we
adapt our practices, we will remain steadfast in our commitment to protect Singapore and
our interests. MINDEF/SAF’s commitment to national security will continue, with the strong
support of the Government and our people. Thank you.
###
For further queries, please contact:
Ms Tan Rou Jin
Assistant Manager (Media Relations)
Tel: +65 9616 6739
Email: Tan_Rou_Jin@mindef.gov.sg
Ms Claudia Liao
Assistant Manager (Media Relations)
Tel: +65 9616 7246
Email: Liao_Huiting@mindef.gov.sg
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