Tony Blair's Warfare State
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David Edgerton
Tony Blair’s Warfare State
Armaments have made a re-appearance in British politics. Under-the-
counter sales to Sierra Leone have been revealed. The Saudis, major cus-
tomers for British arms, have released two nurses held for murder.
Jonathan Aitken, a former defence procurement minister, has been
charged with perjury and other offences, following a libel case involving
allegations connected with arms sales to Saudi Arabia. British-made
armoured cars have been involved in internal repression on the streets of
Indonesia—another important arms customer. George Bernard Shaw’s
Major Barbara is being staged again. After more than a year of prepara-
tion, New Labour has published its Strategic Defence Review.1
These recent events are merely a reminder of the continued importance
of the British arms trade, and of the place of the military in the British
state. For many on the Left, the coming into office of New Labour offered
very little except the possibility of a new constitutional settlement, and a
more positive approach to the European Union. Defence policy high-
lights the continued centrality of the Atlanticist, rather than the
European dimension, as well as the continued importance of the military
at the heart of the British state. A deep commitment to the maintenance
of strong armed services, a strong defence industry, and an increase in
British abilities to intervene around the world characterize New Labour’s
defence policy. Indeed a new moral imperialist fantasy has gripped New
Labour. George Robertson says in his introduction to the Strategic
Defence Review that ‘The British are, by instinct, an internationalist
people. We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should dis-
charge our responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by
and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go
unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good.’2
New Labour’s foreign secretary, Robin Cook, cut quite a dash as an
able inquisitor of the Tory government on the sales of arms to Iraq. On
1
Its main conclusions were trailed at the end of a fly-on-the-wall TV documentary in May
(‘The Paper War: Inside Robertson’s Defence Review’, 31 May 1998, BBC2), and in a series
of articles starting about a week before final publication. This was yet another clear example
of policy being announced in dribs and drabs to selected journalists before Parliament was
informed. And yet the leaking of rhe actual text of the Review caused consternation. The
issue is not of course leaking, or the rights of Parliament, but the control of information.
2
Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World, Introduction, Para. 19. The
Review may be found on the website www.mod.uk/policy.
123coming into office he trumpeted a new ‘ethical foreign policy’, which involved putative restrictions on the British arms trade. And yet, exist- ing contracts were let through, the new European code on arms exports he promulgated was exceptionally weak, and the new parliamentary con- trols on export licensing of arms are much weaker than those proposed by Sir Richard Scott’s report on the sale of arms to Iraq. Robin Cook is now reported to have successfully argued for the maintenance of a larger frigate force than the Ministry of Defence wanted (32 out of 35) for both humanitarian purposes and for showing the flag.3 There was never any question that New Labour would take on the mili- tary-industrial complex, quite the contrary. Thus, while for Frank Dobson, Secretary of State for Health, nothing is ruled out in thinking about the future of the NHS, and at Social Security, a junior minister, Frank Field, was licensed to ‘think the unthinkable’, the Strategic Defence Review has been conducted on the basis of a clear prime ministerial com- mitment to the maintenance of strong armed forces. Furthermore, key aspects of defence policy—the maintenance of Trident, and the procure- ment of Eurofighter—were beyond consideration in the Review. The key mantra repeated by George Roberston throughout the Strategic Defence Review was that it was ‘foreign policy-led’, unlike the supposedly ‘Treasury-led’ reviews of previous years. ‘Treasury-led’ is nothing but a code for cuts in spending. Gordon Brown’s Treasury reportedly wanted cuts of around 10 per cent but only managed a tiny fraction of this, though they have successfully insisted on the sale of property. The result is that absolute defence expenditure will stay at some 80 per cent of the level of the late 1970s, and some 70 percent of the peak in the mid-1980s.4 As the Ministry of Defence itself rightly states, ‘This Government is not allowing resources to drive defence policy.’5 The US’s Little Helper Robertson has claimed that the Review will result in a radical redeploy- ment of British forces, a theme echoed by some commentators.6 And yet what is really striking is how little change there will be. As well as retain- ing Trident and the Eurofighter programme, there will be marginal cuts in the air force and navy, and a small increase in the size of the army, much of which will remain in Germany. The well-known military historian and defence editor of the Daily Telegraph, John Keegan, is clear that the Review ‘leaves our armed forces much where they were under the last gov- ernment, but defines their various roles in neat and persuasive language. It is an exercise in words rather than a re-organization or a rationaliza- tion’. Crucially, too, he suggests that the planned aircraft carriers, which are supposed to come into service around 2012, will continue to allow Britain, in the eyes of the service chiefs, to provide a complete air, sea, and 3 Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, 4 July; The Times, 2 July. This may be the result of malicious leaking, of course. 4 See, for a similar conclusion about US defence spending after the Cold War, Gilbert Achcar, ‘The Strategic Triad: The United States, Russia and China’, NLR 228, March–April 1998, pp. 91–126. 5 Ministry of Defence, Shaping The Future Together: Annual Report of Defence Activity, 1997/8, available on website www.mod.uk/publications, 9 July 1998. 6 Gerald Segal, The Evening Standard, 8 July 1998. 124
land force, though on a small scale, to assist US operations. He claims that
the composition, rather than the size of British forces, is what allows
Britain to be the USA’s principal partner.7 It is little wonder that the ser-
vice chiefs are happy, as are—to judge by the business pages—the arms
suppliers.
If the Review was not ‘Treasury-led’ it was not ‘foreign policy-led’ either.
The Review itself contains no serious foreign policy analysis or argumen-
tation at all. But defending the defence budget, and the extension of the
expeditionary capacity, has required that some extraordinary assessments
of Britain’s place in the world be made. For the Defence Review has little
if anything to do with the defence of the United Kingdom. Malcolm
Chalmers points out that only some 15–20 per cent of British defence
spending is attributable to ‘uniquely national requirements’. Some 36
per cent of the army is stationed outside the UK, and more than half the
navy is in foreign waters.8
New Labour is re-inventing Britain, following Mrs Thatcher, as a global
contender. Tony Blair has claimed that by ‘virtue of our geography, our
history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player’.
Britain, he said, should be strong in Europe, but be ‘the bridge’ between
the US and Europe. Britain should have strong defence ‘not just to defend
our country, but for British influence abroad’. Britain ‘can be pivotal’ in
the world since it enjoyed a ‘unique set of relationships’ through the UN,
NATO, G8, Europe and the Commonwealth, and through ‘our close
alliance with America’. In an extraordinary encomium to Arlanticism he
said, ‘We must never forget the historic and continuing US role in
defending the political and economic freedoms we take for granted.
Leaving all sentiment aside, they are a force for good in the world. They
can always be relied on when the chips are down. The same should
always be true of Britain.’9 George Robertson claimed in the House of
Commons on 27 October 1997 that ‘The British are by inclination an
internationalist, not an isolationist people’. We intend, he said, ‘to be
persuaders for our values and our points of view. Britain will continue to
be a force for good in the world’, an endorsement, presumably, of the for-
eign policies of Mrs Thatcher and John Major.
Robertson’s speeches, and the Defence Review itself, are full of half-
baked claims for a peculiarly global orientation of the United Kingdom
in order to justify a global defence role. One particularly risible instance
is the suggestion that there are ten million British citizens living abroad,
with the implication that they needed defending, presumably from the
Americans, French and Australians among whom they live, and whose
7
John Keegan, The Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1998.
8
Malcolm Chalmers, Defence for the 21st Century: Towards a Post-Cold War Force Structure,
Fabian Discussion Paper 40, London 1997.
9
Prime Minister’s Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 10 November 1997. For good
measure he said, ‘I value and honour our history enormously. . . There is a lot of rubbish
talked about the Empire. In my view, we should not either be apologising for it or wring-
ing our hands about it. It is a fact of our history. It was, in many ways, a most extraordi-
nary achievement and it had left us with some very valuable connections—in the
Commonwealth, in the English language. So let us use them and be thankful we have
them.’
125nationalities they often share!10 But the central arguments are economic.
The Review notes that
Our economy is founded on international trade. Exports form a
higher proportion of Gross Domestic Product than for the US,
Japan, Germany or France. We invest more of our income abroad
than any other major economy. Our closest economic partners are
the European Union and the US but our investment in the develop-
ing world amounts to the combined total of France, Germany and
Italy. Foreign investment into the UK also provides nearly 20 per
cent of manufacturing jobs. We depend on foreign countries for
supplies of raw materials, above all oil.11
These arguments are weak and partial. Thus while the USA, Japan,
Germany and France all export a smaller share of GDP than Britain, all,
with the possible exception of France, have larger shares of world exports
than Britain. High investment in the developing world may be a rele-
vant consideration but, if so, the foreigners who invest in Britain should
themselves take responsibility for Britain’s defence. As far as oil is con-
cerned, thanks to the North Sea, Britain is less dependent on imports
than any large industrial country, and it is hard to believe that the MOD is
unaware of this. This is not to deny that Britain is a global nation with
global interests. But it is to make the point that Britain, at the end of the
twentieth century, is hardly unique in this: the world has many such
nations. Indeed, an independent Scotland could claim global status as
great as the UK’s by these criteria.
East of Suez
What is perhaps more surprising is that nowhere in the Defence Review is
there a correlation between British economic interests in particular parts of
the world and security interests. For as Robertson told the House of
Commons on 27 October 1997, ‘Britain’s interests do not extend equally
everywhere’. His comment carried a hint of regret and his analysis of where
Britain’s interests do indeed extend would gladden the heart of an imperi-
alist concerned to defend the route to India: ‘Our assessment is that we are
likely to be most directly involved ... in Europe, the Gulf or the Mediterra-
nean, where our economic and security interests are more most closely
engaged’. Such arguments are repeated, with more circumspection in the
Review, which includes the statement: ‘We have particularly important
national interests and close friendships in the Gulf’. Wisely, it does not
detail these national interests and close friendships, which are intimately
tied, not to oil, but to arms exports.12 But the upshot is that Britain is
returning permanently, if not to East of Suez, then to a commitment to
10
That this figure is pure propaganda is confirmed by the fact that, on enquiry,
Government departments do not quite know where it came from, and there is certainly no
breakdown by country, or by status, of these 10 million.
11
Strategic Defence Review, ch. 2, para. 19. See also Supporting Essay 2.
12
Britain has a defence agreement with the United Arab Emirates because of UAE insis-
tence on this as a condition of arms sales! See Neil Cooper, The Business of Death: Britain’s
Arms Trade at Home and Abroad, London 1997, p. 148. One of the supporting essays notes:
‘we have bilateral understandings with some Gulf states which carry the strong expecta-
tion of military support’, Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essay 2, para. 16.
126intervene East of Suez. But, as William Wallace has put it, ‘the hard ques-
tions are—with which partners, under what circumstances, and where?’,
and these have not been answered—at least, not in the Review. A cynic
might suggest some answers: with the USA; to defend arms buyers; and at
the behest of the USA.13
It is obviously significant that the defence review of a supposedly ‘interna-
tionalist’ nation, which is supposedly ‘foreign policy-led’ was not held in
conjunction with Britain’s European partners. Indeed, ‘Rejection of closer
European defence cooperation, at the outset of the review, left the special
relationship with the Americans defining the political context.’14 Indeed.
This was clear enough in the recent Gulf crisis: Britain, despite holding
the EU Presidency, did not so much as consult with its European partners
on the issue.15 Rather, it sent ships and aircraft immediately. A Gulf crisis
without British participation, however wrong, or indeed militarily irrele-
vant, would have blown the arguments of the Review. This illustrates how
right Malcolm Chalmers was to warn that ‘It is difficult to see how the
likelihood of future joint operations with the US can be used as a determi-
nant of UK force levels’.16
A Peculiarly Military Nation?
Lurking behind the Strategic Defence Review is the notion that Britain
can maintain a seat at the ‘top table’ by virtue of its military prowess—the
familiar idea that Britain ‘punches above its weight’ in matters military.
The evidence for the proposition is in fact extremely weak. The nation that
really punches above its weight is the United States, both in terms of its
commitment to defence expenditure, and the technological sophistication
of its weaponry. By comparison with Europe, Britain spends about the
same proportion of GDP on defence as France, but more than the European
average. It is not clear however, that Britain does have, and more impor-
tantly, will have, the general technological edge over Europe it once clearly
held. Since the 1960s, at least, Britain’s major weapons have been highly
dependent on foreign links. While the supposedly independent nuclear
deterrent has been largely American—in the cases of Polaris and Trident—
most of the major aircraft deployed have been American or the products of
European collaboration (Jaguar, Tornado, and now Eurofighter). Indeed,
the moves afoot to further integrate the European arms industry will nec-
essarily further reduce technological differences between the armouries of
European nations. European integration also has important implications
for the level of defence production in Britain. Presumably Britain would
benefit from a free European market in arms, but this would surely only be
acceptable to other European nations in the context of strong defence
agreements with them. But this would in itself raise major questions about
transatlantic defence industry links.
Sometimes it is suggested that Britain’s tradition of professional armed
13
William Wallace, The Guardian, 9 July 1998.
14
Ibid.
15
One journalist makes the extraordinary argument that Blair believes that strong
defence will make the British public mote amenable to European integration. (Donald
MacIntyre, The Independent, 3 July 1998).
16
Chalmers, Defence for the 21st Century.
127forces marks it out, but this distinction too is disappearing, as European powers abandon conscription. In fact, the argument comes down to one about the army, and its historical expertise in low-intensity conflict and peace-keeping duties. But that role hardly justifies the maintenance of the bulk of the armed forces, or indeed a major armaments industry, nor is it compatible with the notion of a powerful expeditionary force. Given these powerful trends, punching above the weight of European powers will mean little more than higher spending. But punching above one’s weight is an inappropriate metaphor for warfare. Being the best bantam weight in the world is pointless if one is fighting heavyweights or more than one bantam weight at a time. Could Britain have taken on Iraq alone? The Arms Industry Despite the concern about the arms trade, Labour is deeply committed to the maintenance of a strong British military-industrial complex, and also the extensive arms exports this entails. New Labour, Robin Cook aside, has taken easily to boasting about the British arms industry. George Roberston says the British arms industry is ‘one of the best in the world, worth £5 billion in exports, with 440,000 people employed in it. We have to show a commitment to it.’17 And, indeed, New Labour has endorsed the procurement plans of the previous gov- ernment, including not only Eurofighter, but Challenger II tanks and much else besides. There is to be no cut at all in projected procurement expenditures. Britain does indeed have a strong arms industry. Its share of the arms trade is much larger than its share of manufactured exports: as Britain became a net importer of manufactures in the 1980s, it remained a net exporter of armaments. It is a revealing measure of the militarization of British industry that on the IPPR’s pre-election Commission on Public Policy and British Business, the only two representatives of manufactur- ing industry worked for Britain’s two leading armourers, British Aerospace and GEC.18 The industry, to judge from some partial figures, is remarkably concentrated in the South East of England: some 38 per cent of private arms employment on MoD contracts—excluding subcontrac- tors—is in the heart of England. Only two regions are more dependent on arms employment: the North, just, and the West. 19 The size and export strength of the industry suggest a rare British suc- cess story, especially in contrast to manufacturing as a whole. But the size of the industry is determined by government purchasing, not by the dic- tates of the market. The success of the industry in export markets is like- wise determined very largely by state policy. The availability of modern armaments for export depends on state research-and-development funds and state procurement. It might indeed be more economical to import 17 The Independent, 6 July 1998. 18 See Paul Anderson and Nyta Mann, Safety First: The Making of New Labour, London 1997, p. 394, fn. 55. 19 Ministry of Defence, UK Defence Statistics 1997, London 1997. 128
armaments, even with the loss of export markets. The history of defence
procurement is littered with cases of huge cost overruns and cancell-
ations, with costs being borne by the taxpayer and not the industry.
Furthermore, there are huge hidden subsidies for defence exports. Some
defence sales have involved nothing more than additional payments to
defence contractors through the aid budget—as in the Pergau dam case;
others have had to be covered by Export Credit Guarantees—the British
tax payer ended up paying for £600 million worth of arms for Saddam
Hussein. While individual arms deals may be profitable, the overall ben-
efits to Britain may be small or negative.20 The economic case for sus-
taining arms exports is thus exceedingly weak.
The Politics of Defence
In his recent stimulating assessment of the first year of the New Labour
government, David Marquand argued that New Labour was going forward
to ‘reconstruct the state on lines appropriate to a modest, post-imperialist,
late twentieth-century European country of second rank’.21 Certainly in
the case of defence, the end of the Cold War and moves to further European
integration opened up a unique opportunity to reconsider British strategy
in the widest sense, and to assess the burden of years of high spending on
defence, and a deep Atlanticist orientation to Europe. Giving up the mind-
set this encouraged was always going to be difficult. But New Labour has
not even tried: on the contrary, it was and remains deeply committed to the
old policy. Indeed, the team of ministers put into the Ministry of Defence
were all long-term committed nuclear Atlanticists. The Strategic Defence
Review—neither strategic, nor about defence, nor yet a review—has pro-
vided a cover and a means of incorporating potentially dissident factions
into a new moral imperialism. The idea of Britain being like Holland,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, or even France, at least in relation to the wider
world, is viewed with deep hostility.
It is not surprising that, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown
should have wanted a significant cut in defence expenditure. But what is
surprising is that the Chancellor has spoken on Britishness and foreign
policy in terms quite different from his Prime Minister. For Brown, ‘we
have always been a European power’, indeed, ‘Europe, by virtue of
history as well as geography, is where we are’. But, ‘Up till 1989 we had
seen ourselves as partners with the US fighting the Cold War—an assess-
ment that postponed any real creation of a post-imperial role’. For Brown
a key British role in Europe, and, through Europe, in the world, was
critical.22 Brown probably had some success in inserting a few more ref-
erences to Europe into the Defence Review, but it nevertheless represents
a major defeat for the more Europe-oriented project. In the meantime,
Britain is committed to acting primarily with the USA in a wide-ranging
programme of global policing, and the maintenance of massive offensive
capacity.
20
See, in particular, Neil Cooper, The Business of Death, ch. 6. He additionally points out
that in the early 1990s 75 per cent of British arms exports went to Saudi Arabia alone.
Discounting this rather special contract, Britain’s share of the world’s arms trade slumps
dramatically(p. 135).
21
‘The Blair Paradox’, Prospect, May 1998.
22
Gordon Brown, Annual Spectator/Allied Dunbar Lecture, 4 November 1997.
129Finally, it seems hardly worth mentioning that any hope for the elimina- tion of the British nuclear arsenal has been dashed, except that New Labour has already decided that there is no chance of further reducations in the British nuclear arsenal until the USA and the Russian Federation made ‘considerable further reductions’;23 that it would be ‘premature to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident [warheads]’;24 and, that the ‘credibility of our minimum nuclear deterrent requires that we have the option, in extreme self-defence, of deterring further aggression through a nuclear (“sub-strategic”) strike which is limited in scale and nature of target so that it could not be expected automatically to lead to a full nuclear exchange’.25 In other words, first use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear nations. Like to much about New Labour: incredible, but true. 23 Strategic Defence Review, ch. 4, para 70. 24 Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essay 5, para 14. 25 George Robertson, Parliamentary Answer to Jeremy Corbyn, MP, 24 July 1998. Thanks to William Peden of CND. 130
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