The Rise of India and Pakistan's Perspective - UC Press Journals

NASREEN AKHTAR AND INAMULLAH JAN

The Rise of India and Pakistan’s Perspective

ABSTRACT

The rise of India presents Pakistan with a stark choice between seeking accommo-
dation and maintaining the conventional rivalry that has largely defined the rela-
tionship between the two countries. The national and international climate is less
favorable to Pakistan than it was a few decades back. The gap in performance
between India and Pakistan in vital areas of national life has greatly widened.
K E Y W O R D S : security, rivalry, deterrence, conflict, alliances, India, Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan’s response to India’s recent rise has been more or less similar to the
historical pattern of its relations with its bigger, much stronger neighbor:
a comprehensive strategy of counterbalancing what it sees as the Indian
threat. The only difference is that at 70, Pakistan finds the rising Indian
power pulling away on account of its economy, technology, military capac-
ity, and global influence versus Pakistan’s limited capacities in these areas. It
has consistently pursued a three-pronged strategy to counter India. First, it
continues to build its military capacity, including conventional forces and,
since the 1970s, the pursuit of nuclear weapons. National security remains
a dominant official narrative and has been at the top of the hierarchy of
national goals. Second, given the structural imbalance between India’s

NASREEN AKHTAR is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations
at International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Her recent publications include “India’s
Regional Strategic Outlook and Influence via Afghanistan” (UNISCI Journal, January 2019) and
“Civil and Military Relations in Pakistan: Looking through a Rear View Mirror at the Major
Impediments to Democracy” (Virginia Review of Asian Studies, 2018). INAMULLAH JAN is Lecturer
in International Relations at International Islamic University and PhD Scholar at Quaid-e-Azam
University, Islamabad. His recent publications include “American, Indian and Chinese Media on
‘Belt and Road Initiative’” (Global Social Science Review, February 2018). The authors wish to
thank the anonymous reviewers for their help, which was essential to finishing this article. Emails:
, .

Asian Survey, Vol. 59, Number 6, pp. 1094–1115. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.
© 2019 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for
permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s
Reprints and Permissions web page, https://www.ucpress.edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1525/AS.2019.59.6.1094.

1094

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1095

power and its own, Pakistan has constantly sought allies in the region and in
the greater world to augment its power and influence. Its military alliance
with the United States on three occasions, though not directly related to
India, was meant to access economic and military resources to improve its
position, which it was able to do.
   Transactional as these relations have been, Pakistan has also developed
strategic ties with China, a close neighbor and long-term friend. It has
evolved a comprehensive relationship with the rising world power over a range
of issues, from nuclear cooperation to transfer of defense technology and
defense production, to the recent launching of the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor, which gives Beijing access to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, and
a naval foothold in the Indian Ocean. Recently, Pakistan has changed its
strategic thinking and has successfully developed security and political rela-
tions with Russia, a development never seen during the Cold War era. Third,
Pakistan seeks internal stability, economic growth, national solidarity, and
consensus on democracy as essential tools to revive and strengthen itself to
meet the challenges of national security.
   There is a realization among the security and political elite of Pakistan that
the country has been through a very long rough patch of political and security
disorder—terrorism, extremism, and insurgency. Even in the face of domes-
tic difficulties, it may continue to use similar tools to balance India. However,
it may revisit its priorities and preferences and the order of domestic and
international policies in view of regional and international constraints. The
question is, will it make a paradigm shift from geopolitical realism, which has
been central to policy over the past 70 years, to a pragmatic assessment of the
sustainability of the counterbalancing strategy? Pakistan’s security elites, and
their national constituency of support, are more optimistic about maintain-
ing credible, full-spectrum deterrence against India while harnessing national
resources and the opportunities opened up by China’s investments and the
economic corridor. Its India policy is not likely to change unless there is
a better regional security climate, better understanding between the leaders of
the two countries, and better appreciation of the fact that resolving problems
through dialogue, economic cooperation, and empathy surpasses confronta-
tional stalemate. Currently, there are hardly any positive signs in this respect
on either side of the India–Pakistan border, where exchanges of fire and
killing of each other’s soldiers have become a “new normal.” The new gov-
ernment of Imran Khan in Pakistan seems serious about normalizing

1096  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

relations with India and has opened the long-awaited Kartarpur Corridor to
aid the Sikh community.1 Khan’s policy has military support, and both civil
and military establishments are on the same page, which has never happened
in the past.2 The Indian government has also responded positively, but this
development has not removed security threats, and New Delhi has refused to
engage in dialogue on the disputed issues; Modi’s reelection offered hope, but
it became a mirage. The pre-election environment in India was troubling,
which raised tensions between India and Pakistan. And the post-election
environment escalated the warlike situation between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir’s development.3
   The history of Pakistan–India relations is one of disharmony and dis-
trust. How do we explain the persistent hostility between these two arch-
rivals? Some of the literature in international relations theory and specific
works addressing the security problems of South Asia and specifically
India–Pakistan conflict provide a rich and varied theoretical understand-
ing.4 Each conceptual construct has an angle, touching some part of the
history and political reality, but many contribute to a holistic, comprehen-
sive, and convincing answer to the hostility question.5 We briefly examine
various theses, describe some of their inadequacies, and then offer our own
explanation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The story of how India and Pakistan got to where they are today is deeply
entangled with the circumstances of their birth: communal violence; trans-
migration of massive of populations; leaving dead loved ones, heritage, and

     1. Umair Jamal, “Making Sense of the India-Pakistan Kartarpur Corridor Opening,” India
Today (New Delhi), November 23, 2018.
     2. “Pakistan Government and Military on the Same Page: PM Imran Khan,” Economic Times,
December 4, 2018, ,
accessed December 18, 2018.
     3. On August 5, 2019, India annexed Jammu and Kashmir, a disputed territory. Pakistan
considers this is violation of the UN resolution which provided “the right of self-determination” to
the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Modi’s political development in Kashmir has created serious
tension between the two nuclear rivals.
    4. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Karachi: Vanguard Books, 2005): 31.
     5. T. V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014): 4–5.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1097

property behind; and the dispute over the princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir. At independence, India and Pakistan “saw each other as the enemy
and the only enemy.”6 Zeev Maoz rightly argues that the persistence of
conflict and confrontation between any two countries depends on the terms
and conditions of their creation and independence.7 There is enough evi-
dence of bloodied borders and continued confrontation. The countries have
fought three major wars (one leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan and
the creation of Bangladesh in 1971), developed nuclear weapons, run an arms
race, and engaged in proxy conflicts in Afghanistan.8
    States set their goals and objectives according to the geostrategic and
regional environment. Rival states, in particular, shape their policies in the
context of the existing regional environment. John A. Vazquez, in exploring
“general theories of war, rivalry, and deterrence,” applies a “steps to war”
explanation to examine the perpetuation of conflict between India and Paki-
stan.9 He argues that actions states take in pursuit of their objectives shape
their images and the images of the adversaries, developing a particular kind of
behavior pattern among the policymakers and in relation to the adversary.
Internally, it creates constituencies of confrontation, and externally, compe-
tition and rivalry. T. V. Paul notes that “the India–Pakistan conflict is both
enduring and asymmetric, but the power asymmetry is truncated and miti-
gated by many factors. In particular, the weaker party, Pakistan, has been
successful in reducing the asymmetry through strategy, tactics, and alliances
with outside powers”—that is, the US and China.10
    There is a broad body of emerging literature on rivalry, which a number of
scholars have applied to explain the India–Pakistan problem.11 Some of the
enduring dimensions of rivalry are wars, persistent crises, and frequent clashes
along the Line of Control in the Kashmir region. The countries have become

     6. I. A. Akram, “Security and Stability in South Asia,” in Stephen Philip Cohen (ed.), The
Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1987): 164.
    7. Zeev Maoz, “Joining the Club of Nations,” International Studies Quarterly 33:2 (June 1989):
199–231.
     8. Ibid.
     9. John A. Vazquez, “The India-Pakistan Conflict in the Light of General Theories of War,
Rivalry, and Deterrence,” in T. V. Paul (ed.), The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New
Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 54–79.
   10. T. V. Paul, “Why Has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been So Enduring? Power Asymmetry and
an Intractable Conflict,” Security Studies 15:4 (2010): 600–30.
    11. Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009): 27–53.

1098  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

interlocked into a sort of unending rivalry,12 which includes conflictive quests
for identity, power, status, and competition in Afghanistan and in the larger
Islamic world.
   Some scholars argue that civil–military relations in Pakistan are the prism
through which one should look at the question of why India–Pakistan relations
have been troubled and may remain so in future. Pakistan and India both have
continued the rivalry over the past 70 years, which eventually affected Paki-
stan’s politics and economy. But Christine Fair puts Pakistan’s military’s view
of itself as the “defender of ideological frontiers” at the center of the hostility.13
   There have been disagreements between the security establishment and the
civilian leaders on many domestic and international issues, and on the nature
of the relationship with India and the terms of its normalization. But more
than ideology, it is in the pragmatic interest in security and the best way to
advance it that there have been agreements as well as disagreements between
the civilians and the military. As far as relations with India are concerned, any
civilian government, no matter how much it desires to establish good relations
with India, will have to work closely with the military. Also, today, there is no
single view of India in Pakistan. There is wide range of views. The biggest
change, as Stephen P. Cohen notes, is that “more dovish views are being
articulated now than at any time in Pakistan’s history.”14 Further, he says,
“in a major shift of elite and public opinion, more and more Pakistanis now
talk openly of accommodating India on a range of issues as long as Pakistan’s
interests are safeguarded.”15 This contradicts his main theme—the pessimistic
conclusion that “India-Pakistan rivalry is likely to endure for several more
decades—even to 2047” (the centennial of Pakistan’s independence).16
   However, there is another explanation that draws on strategic culture.17
A country’s strategic culture can be viewed as the totality of attitudes, belief

    12. Gowher Rizvi, “The Rivalry between India and Pakistan,” in Barry Buzan, GowherRizvi, and
Rosemary Foot (eds.), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1986): 3–33.
     13. C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2014): 4–7.
    14. Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum (Noida, India:
HarperCollins, 2013): 116.
     15. Ibid.: 109.
    16. Ibid.: xi.
    17. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” in Michael R. Chambers (ed.), South Asia
in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 2002): 325.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1099

systems, values, thinking, and behavior of its security community toward
security problems, challenges, threats, and perceptions of an adversary or
adversaries. This provides a broader lens through which to examine Pakistan’s
relations with India. The key elements of Pakistan’s strategic culture are
countering Indian hegemony, primacy of national security, pride in protect-
ing Muslim sovereignty, and a proactive defense posture, including develop-
ment of nuclear weapons.18 Most of the elements, views, and arguments listed
above in the literature on India–Pakistan relations are relevant in that they
highlight a particular aspect of a broader category: the strategic culture.
A strategic culture can change, but only very slowly, and it involves organi-
zational factors. Some of the major institutions—the political executive, the
foreign policy bureaucracy, and the military—play a central role in shaping as
well as perpetuating Pakistan’s strategic culture. Security establishments have
an institutional interest in supporting the central elements of the strategic
culture, which is true of Pakistan. Change would require a change in the
balance of power within the Pakistani decision-making structure, where the
military always has the last word in security policy. When Benazir Bhutto and
Rajiv Gandhi met in 1988, they were ready to bury the bitter past, and their
meeting resulted in the two sides agreeing not to attack each other’s nuclear
facilities.19 But Bhutto’s wish to normalize relations with India was not
respected by the military establishment.20
   Pakistan’s security concerns about India have ranged widely over the
decades, from existential threat to proxy wars, destabilization, and internal
insecurity through elements funded, trained, and supported by India in
several Pakistani regions: Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), and the metropolis of Karachi.21 India has accused Pakistan
of similar acts in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and other states, and acts of
terrorism that it believes groups based in Pakistan have carried out in Bombay

    18. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Deterrence Stability on the Sub-
continent,” in Michael Krepon et. al (eds.), Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015): 95–118.
    19. Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Karachi: Vanguard Book,
2005): 111–12.
   20. Interview, retired general Amjad Shoaib, Islamabad, May 23, 2018.
    21. Amir Mir, “Pakistan: Evidence of Indian Interference,” GatestoneInstitute, July 29, 2009,
, accessed Janu-
ary 29, 2016.

1100  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

(2008), Pathankot (2016),22 and Pulwama (in Jammu and Kashmir, February
2019). India claimed that more than 40 Indian soldiers were killed in the
suicide attack at Pulwama. In response, India conducted a surgical strike in
Balakot (in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province) and claimed to have killed 130
members of a banned terrorist group, Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan denied
Indian’s claim, and a few days later Pakistan shot down two Indian planes and
captured an Indian pilot (who was released after 72 hours). It was the first
time the two states were apparently ready to use their nuclear weapons,
but the situation de-escalated with help from the US, the United Arab
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.23 Six months later, in August 2019, severe ten-
sions returned. Pakistan had expected that Modi’s second term would resolve
the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, but his decision to annex Jammu and
Kashmir brought the nuclear states close to war. In the present nuclear
environment, Pakistanis worry that Modi’s government is willing to consider
any measures, even a nuclear strike.
   As we know, proxy conflicts and counter-interventions have a long history
in the subcontinent. The question is whether the two states have learned any
lessons. Are the current governments willing to change their course to look at
a wider picture of terrorism as a common threat, and explore the opportu-
nities that globalization and trade corridors might open up for them? This is
one of the questions we will address. The most important question is, what
does the rise of India mean for Pakistan? Will Pakistan change its outlook
toward India by recognizing it as a dominant power in the region, or continue
to resist accommodation by attempting to balance India through military
power, nuclear weapons, and political standoffs?

COMPARISON AND COMPETITION WITH INDIA

Having gained independence at the same time and sharing the same past
under the same empires, the British being the last, Pakistanis are quick
to compare their country with India in every respect. Decades of better
economic performance, well before the rise of India (which started only in

    22. “Pathankot Attack: India Says Patience Running Thin over ‘Pakistan Inaction’,” Express
Tribune (Islamabad), January 16, 2016.
    23. Ankit Panad, “Why the Indian Air Force Strike at Balakot in Pakistan Matters,” The Dip-
lomat, February 27, 2019, , accessed March 5, 2019.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1101

the last decade of the last century), seemed to validate the decision of the
founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to separate from India.24 They find
themselves in a sort of competition with India, from economic and political
performance to international connectivity, influence, and power. Never rec-
ognizing the fact that India was much larger and stronger and had more
resources, Pakistan pursued a policy of “parity”: equality and equal treatment
by its allies.25 This sentiment goes back to the independence movement, when
the Muslim League, the party that led the struggle for Pakistan’s creation,
developed the “two-nation theory,” meaning that regardless of numbers,
Hindus and Muslims were two separate and equal nations in terms of con-
stitutional rights.26 But after its independence Pakistan experienced a chaotic
political environment which would not allow the two countries to resolve their
conflicts. Farzana Shaikh says that the “troubles of the country stem from its
very inception” while confronted with its internal and external rivals.27
    When confronted with the question of how “parity” is possible, given the
glaring asymmetries of power, military potential, geographical size, and
population, Pakistan has often given the juridical argument of nations being
equal as sovereigns. Beyond this legalistic approach, Pakistan has from the
outset pursued a realist paradigm of international relations, particularly in
reading and interpreting India’s intentions and threat.28 In the first few
decades, the dominant view of India was that it was not reconciled to the
partition and would do everything possible to undo it. The Indian annex-
ation of the larger part of Jammu and Kashmir lent very strong support to
this view, along with early disputes on water issues, trade and cash, and arms
share for Pakistan. Indian intervention in what was then East Pakistan
confirmed Pakistan’s worries.29 Over time, this view has changed from
India’s seeking to destroy Pakistan to India’s seeking regional domination.
Having developed nuclear capability—the balancer or equalizer Pakistan
has come to possess, along with robust and relatively large conventional

   24. Rashid Amjad, “Pakistan’s Growth Spurts and Reversals: A Historical Perspective,”Lahore
Journal of Economics19 (September 2014): 91–104.
    25. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967): 50–55.
   26. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965).
   27. Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan.
   28. G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947–1966 (London: Pall Mall Press,
1968): 23.
   29. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Myth of Independence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967): 111–22.

1102  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

forces—Islamabad is more confident of thwarting an Indian attempt to repeat
what it did in the creation of Bangladesh. But the image of India as the enemy
runs very deep in Pakistani society, and there is a strong perception that given
the opportunity, India would harm the territorial integrity and solidarity of
Pakistan. For instance, Pakistan argues that it has good evidence of India
supporting the Baloch separatists, and its involvement in the destabilization
of the country.30
   In recent decades, with the rise of India in the global economic and
diplomatic scene, Pakistan’s self-comparison with India has taken a sober
turn. While India’s economic growth has become (and remained) almost
double Pakistan’s, and that country has seen consistent growth and stability,
Pakistan has remained embroiled in internal conflicts, terrorism, religious
extremism, and insurgency.31 Decades of military rule and the reign of cor-
rupt dynastic political groups that lacked any vision or direction for the
country have greatly changed the terms of comparison. There is now recog-
nition in the elite ruling groups and among the common men and women of
Pakistan that India has done far better and that its power, affluence, and
global influence are increasing.
   In a positive sense, democrats and democratic movements have always
used India as a reference point, asking why, if India can sustain democracy
in similar economic and social conditions, Pakistan can’t do the same.
There is recognition and even admiration in Pakistan of India as a better
and more evolved democracy, because of Pakistan’s many disruptions.32
Using India as a comparable “twin”—the other self—Pakistanis often push
their leaders and themselves to follow the Indian example. In a way, we find
Pakistanis as secret admirers of India’s achievements in every field, to the
extent that Pakistanis often downplay the achievements of their own coun-
try. The power transition in India, the rise of the middle class, and the rise
to power of ordinary men and women in various states and at the level of

   30. Sartaj Aziz, “India’s Role in Promoting Terrorism in Pakistan No Secret,” Dawn (Islamabad),
September 12, 2015.
    31. Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, “National Internal Security Policy 2014–18,”
2015; Raza Rumi, “Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy,” United States Institute of Peace,
Washington, DC, May 13, 2015, , accessed November 23, 2018.
    32. Meghnad Desai and Aitzaz Ahsan, Divided by Democracy (New Delhi: Lotus Collection, Roli
Books, 2005): 44–50.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1103

the union, have greatly impressed the middle classes of Pakistan, who still
find themselves on the margins of power. They argue that while the tradi-
tional elites and their surrogates continue to dominate the economic and
political structure of Pakistan, the same structures in India have come to be
shared more widely, though domination by the upper castes remains a big
challenge.
   India’s economic performance, its adoption of modern technologies, its
receipt of foreign direct investment, and its expanding global trade—including
with China, a close ally of Pakistan—have made Pakistanis rethink the terms
of comparing Pakistan with India. India enjoys far greater prestige, influence,
and diplomatic clout than Pakistan, which has a serious image problem in the
Western world because of the rise of radical Islam, militancy, and terrorism.
Terrorism, more than the image, has affected Pakistan’s economic growth
badly by raising the opportunity cost too high during the period when Indian
economic growth was high.33 Another problem related to the economy in
Pakistan, along with serious structural issues of governance, is the energy crisis:
a big gap between demand and supply of power due to planning decisions and
the choice of energy resources, which have made Pakistan’s industry uncom-
petitive.34 One of the negative effects of this is a powerful business lobby; some
sections of the political class aligned with business have been resisting the
freeing of trade. It is as much a political decision as it is an economic one, to
protect industrial interests.
   A dominant security narrative in Pakistan is that no government of Paki-
stan should move quickly, or even at all, on opening up trade with India. In
2012 President Asif Ali Zardari’s government moved to strengthen economic
ties with India and to grant it most-favored nation status, but his government
could not execute the policy because Zardari, like his late wife, Prime Min-
ister Benazir Bhutto, was not trusted by the security establishment. At pres-
ent, Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government has the full support of the
military establishment. Scholars in Pakistan believe that the military estab-
lishment itself now desires normal relations with India, but only if there is no
compromise on the disputed territory of Kashmir. This was the commitment

   33. Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, “Impact of War in Afghanistan and Ensuing
Terrorism on Pakistan’s Economy,” , accessed December 2, 2018.
   34. Ahmad Fraz Khan, “Power Shortfall Touches 6,000 MW,” Dawn (Islamabad), May 21, 2016.

1104  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

of the chief of army staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who revealed to
Navjot Singh Sidhu during the khan’s oath-taking ceremony that Pakistan
would open the Kartarpur Corridor on the commemoration in late 2019 of
Sikhism founder Guru Nanak’s 550th birthday.35
   Prime Minister Khan has said that he has not made a decision on the
Kartarpur Corridor’s status and that he “has the full support of the army and
the Chief of the Army Staff stands right behind his decisions.”36 Also, the
military establishment seeks peace between India and Pakistan. In March
2018, General Bajwa invited Sanjay Vishwasrao, the Indian military attaché,
and his team to the Pakistan Day military parade in Islamabad. This sug-
gested that “ties between the two foes were warming up.”37 The Bajwa
Doctrine categorically states his narrative on peace and development in the
region, which certainly includes India.38 This is the first time in Pakistan’s
history that the security establishment has shifted its policy toward develop-
ing normal relations with India.
   Looking at India’s economic growth, Pakistani experts often cite it as an
example to follow by replicating India’s trade, investment, financial, and
taxation policies.39 As Pakistan has done better than India in the past, Pak-
istani economists believe that Pakistan could sustain much more robust
economic growth than the 4.7% it had in fiscal year 2015–16.40 (The current
rate is 4.5%.41) Pakistan has many complex problems: energy shortages,
insurgency, terrorism, and elites rooted in a feudal power structure. Never-
theless, India remains an example to be followed, particularly in the areas of
democratic development, economic growth, and political stability.

     35. Navjot Singh Sidhu is a Sikh former Indian cricketer, now a politician, and a friend of Prime
Minister Imran Khan. Guru Nanak was a founding father of Sikhism, the second-largest religion in
India. His shrine is in Nankana, Punjab, Pakistan. The Kartarpur Corridor would allow the Sikh
community to visit their spiritual leader.
    36. Imran Khan, “Govt Enjoys Unwavering Support of the Armed Forces: PM,” Express Tribune
(Islamabad), December 3, 2018.
    37. “Pakistan’s Military Seeks Better Relations with India,” Dawn (Islamabad), May 6, 2018.
     38. “The ‘Bajwa Doctrine’,” Dawn (Islamabad), March 25, 2018.
    39. Aleem Bawany, “Where Does Pakistan Stand as India Chases Digital Dreams?” Dawn
(Islamabad), October 2, 2015.
    40. Khaleeq Kiani, “Pakistan Misses Economic Growth Target,” Dawn (Islamabad), May 21,
2016.
    41. Amjad Jamal, “Pakistan’s Economy Is Expected to Stablise. Is Growth Next?” Dawn,
September 28, 2019.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1105

THE CHOICE OF RIVALRY VERSUS ACCOMMODATION

The rise of India at both regional and global levels is an emerging fact that
presents Pakistan with difficult choices. The two extremes that Pakistan has
entertained in the past are strategic rivalry and political accommodation, to
the degree that the political elites and the powerful security establishment
could find consensus. Rivalry with India is likely to continue, as it has in the
past 70 years. It has essentially two elements: to counterbalance the Indian
threat by, first, making Pakistan’s conventional defense forces more effective,
and, second (in recent decades), by developing what has come to be known as
full-spectrum nuclear deterrence.42 Recently there has been greater recogni-
tion that terrorist groups, like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, pose a grave threat
to national security. But such considerations have not displaced India from
the top of Pakistan’s ranking of threats.43
    Pakistan views the rise of India through a lens of fear more than of hope for
reconciliation. Within the security community, the belief is that India will
use its economic strength, diplomatic standing, and growing strategic part-
nership with the United States (a three-time strategic partner of Pakistan and
still an ally) to dominate the region, and pursue a policy of deterrence or
coercion toward Pakistan. The way it is perceived in Pakistan, such a policy
might force Islamabad to change its attitude and certain policies toward
India. The fear is that India has become too powerful to resist, and even
defending its old positions in disputes with India, like Jammu and Kashmir,
is becoming increasingly difficult.
    For India, the most important issue is the alleged activities of the terrorist
groups it believes operate from within Pakistan with the tacit support
of certain elements within the security establishment of Pakistan.44 New Delhi
wants to take firm action against the leaders of banned groups like Jammatt-
ul-Dawa and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which it believes carried out the terrorist
attacks in Mumbai, Pathankot,45 and Pulwama, as noted above. Most

    42. Maimuna Ashraf, “India and Pakistan: Enforcing Strategic Deterrence,” Foreign Policy News,
March 11, 2015, , accessed February 23, 2019.
    43. Rumi, “Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy.”
    44. “Indian PM Modi Accuses Pakistan of Promoting Terrorism,” Express Tribune, June 8,
2015, , accessed December 2018.
    45. “Nawaz-Modi Call: India Urges Pakistan to Act after Pathankot Airbase Attack,” Dawn
(Islamabad), January 5, 2016.

1106  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

importantly, Indian leaders want Pakistan to abandon its Kashmir dream.
After the Pulwama attack, warmongering between India and Pakistan spiked,
and then eventually de-escalated. Unlike in earlier incidents, China did not
pick sides in the India–Pakistan conflict, but urged both to resolve their
grievances; owing to India’s rise, both the US and China want peace in region.
   In reality, with its rise, India has acquired far greater strengths than Pakistan
can match or hope to balance. Let us mention three, all of which could have
enormous bearing on bilateral relations: economic strength, international pres-
tige, and the growth and modernization of security forces. India’s economic
strength directly influences its pattern of defense spending. India spends
roughly US$ 40 billion per year on defense; Pakistan, US$ 7.7 billion.46
A typical annual increase in India’s defense spending would equal the entire
defense budget of Pakistan. But given its larger economy, India spends far less
on defense as a percentage of GDP. India has the potential to suck Pakistan
into an arms race and bleed it dry economically. Pakistan may avoid that trap,
but still may find it increasingly difficult to maintain an optimal conventional
defense. On the other hand, Pakistan’s military spending as a percentage of
GDP has been constantly falling.47 There is a perception that the security
establishment has used its budgetary allocations prudently to maintain effective
military power.48 The military believes that it has the ability to defend Pakistan.
   Another way to balance India has been via innovation and indigenous
production to cut costs. The evidence is already strikingly clear. Pakistan was
forced to change its “minimum nuclear deterrence” doctrine to “full-spectrum
deterrence” to counterbalance the Indian doctrine of the “cold start,” which
India has argued would be a response to Pakistan, if terrorist groups with
support in Pakistan carried out another attack like the one in Mumbai.49 The
“cold start” may use India’s mechanized forces, which have the capacity to
overwhelm Pakistan’s, or punitive conventional strikes—enough to damage
but below the threshold of igniting a full-scale war. Pakistan reads into this
doctrine the specter of India’s new power, and finds itself unable to match

   46. “Defence Budget: Indian Allocation Soars to $40.07 Billion Compared to Pakistan’s $7.8
Billion,” Business Recorder (Karachi), March 5, 2016.
   47. Farrukh Saleem, “Pakistan-India Defence Spending: A Relentless Widening of Disparity,”
Hilal: The Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine, June 2015, 12.
    48. Interview with Raza Rabbani, senator, Islamabad.
   49. Muhammad Azam Khan, “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot,” United States Naval Institute,
March 2011, ,
accessed February 2, 2016.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1107

the striking capability and probable advance of Indian forces deep into
Pakistani territory.
    Thus, Pakistan has opted for a nuclear response, developing “tactical” or
“theater” nuclear capabilities. Using such weapons, presumably on its own
territory when the Indian forces are deep inside it, may present very difficult
choices. Both using and not using nuclear forces, whether as a first option or as
a last resort, may be self-defeating, and they have been avoided in the recent
tensions. Introduction of these weapons with short-range missiles for delivery
by either side may be considered destabilizing.50 The nuclear arms race in
South Asia is one of the outcomes of the changing balance and structural
asymmetry of power, which may continue to widen with India’s rise and
Pakistan’s slow development. However, nuclear weapons have deterred both
India and Pakistan, and both may continue to rely on conventional weapons.
    India’s diplomatic influence, particularly with the United States since the
emergence of a strategic partnership, including a civilian nuclear deal in 2005,
had already resulted in the relative isolation of Pakistan, but Pakistan always
denied its isolation. Pakistan has now opted for proactive diplomacy, and it
has developed strategic partnerships with regional powers: China, Russia, and
Iran. India’s consistent blaming of Pakistan for ignoring or “sponsoring” acts
of terrorism (which Pakistan routinely denies) presents a great challenge for
its image and credibility in the world. Since 9/11, India has found the inter-
national climate favorable to pushing Pakistan into a corner, even though
Pakistan acted as a partner in the US’s war in Afghanistan. Pakistan has often
argued that it is a victim of terrorism itself, and that in fact it is facing
this menace because of the US war in Afghanistan, and also because of the
US-assisted anti-Soviet mujahedeen resistance in the 1980s. But it seems that
Pakistan has not been able to sell this idea. Instead, it has faced repeated
demands that it do more to defeat terrorism and help Afghanistan and its
allies defeat the Taliban insurgency there, which is a major global concern.
Concerns about Pakistan staying on the brink of terror-related conflict and
instability remain pervasive inside and outside the country.51 President

   50. Michael Krepon, “The Myth of Deterrence Stability between Two Nuclear Armed Rivals,”
in Michael Krepon et al. (eds.), Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Wash-
ington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015): 15–42.
    51. “Transcript of Obama’s 2016 State of the Union Address,” New York Times, January 12,
2016, , accessed
December 25, 2018.

1108  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

Donald Trump has changed the US policy and decided to leave Afghanistan.
India has played an immense role in Afghanistan and spent huge amounts of
money on its development, but Pakistan has a strong connection with the
Taliban. The Trump administration, which has annoyed Pakistan’s political
and security establishment, now needs it in negotiations with the Taliban so
that America can withdraw from Afghanistan with honor. If the US with-
draws and the Taliban returns, both India and Pakistan will strive to protect
their own interests, and this may engage India and Pakistan in another never-
ending conflict, because each blames the other for using Afghanistan’s soil to
pursue its own strategic interests.
   Over time, primarily because of Pakistan’s domestic failures, wrong pri-
orities, bad politics, poor leadership, and hyper-security-strategic agenda, the
international climate has been far less favorable to Pakistan than it was
during the two waves of the Cold War. But there is very little appreciation
in Pakistan’s corridors of power—either political or in the security estab-
lishment—that the world has changed so much that Pakistan cannot main-
tain the old policies that have lost their relevance, especially toward
Afghanistan and India. Adjustment and adaptation (or flexibility) are time-
tested diplomatic tools which Pakistan has yet to find for itself. The reason is
that civilian leaders and the military establishment have yet to develop a new
consensus on India beyond rivalry and counter-balancing. A major shift
toward accommodation has yet to take place; none of the country appears
to be prepared for that.
   In Pakistan, the military and its allies, in both mainstream political parties
and right-wing religious groups, continue to prefer a guarded, nuanced,
go-slow policy toward India. Perhaps they no longer want a confrontational
policy over Kashmir, but neither are they willing to accept the status quo.52
Nor will it be possible for a mainstream national party like the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz, even with stronger domestic support, to change its
policy toward India unilaterally, without taking the military into confidence.
   Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has tried. In May 2013 he attended
the inauguration of India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, which was
unprecedented in the history of the two countries. He has often gone
“beyond the script” to repair relations between the two countries, with

   52. Anwar Iqbal, “Musharraf Agreed in 2000 to Low-Key UN Resolutions on Kashmir: U.S.
Cable,” Dawn (Islamabad), September 4, 2015.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1109

a strong desire and willingness to seek “out of the box” solutions. But his
wish for a policy of openness with India has met strong resistance. His
administration announced that it would extend most-favored-nation status
to India, but then under pressure, dragged its feet. And Modi’s Christmas
Eve visit to Nawaz Sharif ’s residence in Lahore, while it demonstrated
eagerness on both sides to improve relations and the optics of doing so,
was not without controversy. Right-wing groups and conservative media
were very critical of Sharif for inviting Modi to his home without the
formalities generally associated with such visits.
   Relations with India is one of the most debated issues in Pakistan, and has
been for much of their history, because of the various impacts it has on the
country. The views of Pakistanis on the nature of ties with their bigger, more
powerful neighbor have changed somewhat. A strong attitude of confronta-
tion, rejection, and resistance to India in the region and in the Islamic world
has given way, at least in some traditional and non-traditional political circles,
to a more realistic assessment of what Pakistan can do in the present regional
and global circumstances. Pakistan is going through a long period of self-
assessment regarding its policy toward India and Afghanistan.53 And the most
remarkable thing about this rethinking of Pakistan’s threat environment and
policy options is that it is taking place within the security establishment.
   The first important strand of the new thinking is that Pakistan must put its
own house in order. It must defeat terrorism, extremism, poverty, and cor-
ruption and improve governance—poor governance has immensely exacer-
bated the situation. For the past decade, Pakistan has gradually reoriented its
strategy toward counter-insurgency training, and acquiring equipment for
this purpose. Its perception of India as a threat remains, but with Pakistan’s
credible nuclear deterrence, India no longer poses an existential threat—
unlike the Islamist militants who are using terrorism and undermining the
stability and order of civil society.54
   Pakistan has reduced its support for the militant groups once massively
engaged in Jammu and Kashmir. Officially, it claims it is no longer support-
ing proxies: direct support of the Kashmiri Mujahiddin has been stopped,

    53. Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistan’s Shocking Strategic Shift,” National Interest, August 4, 2015,
, accessed May 23, 2018.
   54. Yelena Biberman, “In Pakistan, Domestic Threats Begin to Overshadow India,” Washington
Post Blogs, January 6, 2015, , accessed May 23, 2018.

1110  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

and now Pakistan supports Kashmir diplomatically. Some observers think
there is a shift in its policy toward being less “aggressive.”55 Since January
2002, its declared policy has been that it will not allow any militant group to
operate from its soil against India or any other country.56 Two years later, in
January 2004, Pervez Musharraf, then military chief and president of Paki-
stan, said in a joint statement with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vaj-
payee that he “would not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be
used to support terrorism in any manner,” emphasizing that consistent and
meaningful dialogue would produce “positive results.”57 In subsequent years,
Pakistan has repeated this position. There has been considerable change on
the ground in terms of banning all the terrorist parties and groups that have
been found to be fighting or assisting militancy in Indian-administered
Kashmir. But dismantling Kashmir-focused militant groups has been very
hard, as some factions have turned to domestic terrorism as a reaction to
Pakistan’s shift. While India admits that cross-border interference has
decreased considerably, it says it has not completed ended. Recently India
attacked three “terror launch pads” in the Neelam Valley in Pakistan-held
Kashmir and claimed to destroy terrorists’ camps, which Pakistan has
denied.58 The problem is both distrust at the state level and rogue terrorist
elements. India has found Pakistan’s commitment to ending cross-border
intervention through proxy unconvincing, weak, and contrary to the facts.59
   While Pakistan may turn its focus to domestic issues to revive the econ-
omy and rebuild its institutions, it is not likely to capitulate to Indian
“domination” and accede to its demand to accept the status quo in Kashmir
and recognize the Line of Control as the “international” boundary. The issue
has become deeply mixed into Indian and Pakistani politics, and also deeply
intermeshed with their competing issues of national identity. It is not yet

    55. Lalwani, “Pakistan’s Shocking Strategic Shift.”
   56. “In Musharraf ’s Words: ‘A Day of Reckoning’,” New York Times, January 13, 2002,
, accessed August 14, 2019.
   57. “Joint Statement of India and Pakistan,” Dawn, January 7, 2004, , accessed February 13, 2019.
    58. Vishnu Som, “3 Terror Camps In PoK Destroyed, 6–10 Pak Soldiers Killed: Army Chief,”
NDTV, October 20, 2019, , accessed October 24, 2019.
   59. Aryaman Bhatnagar and C. Raja Mohan, “India-Pakistan Relations and Regional Stability,”
Special Report no. 55, National Bureau of Asian Research (February 2016): 88–89, , accessed January 25, 2019.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1111

politically feasible for any government of Pakistan to sidetrack the Kashmir
issue and develop extensive relations with India. Officials may seek a middle
ground of comprehensive dialogue with India, inclusive of the Kashmir issue.
India may continue to link progress on other issues to progress on curbing the
terrorism that it believes emanates from Pakistan. But India also wants to
separate economic issues from Kashmir and other disputes.
   Since August 2019, the political and security situation between India and
Pakistan has drastically changed. India’s annexation of Jammu and Kashmir
by force violated the UN resolutions on Kashmir and the Simla Accord, in
which the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through dialogue.60 India’s
interior minister, Amit Shah, praised Modi for making Kashmir an insepa-
rable part of India in “one go.”61 But this has complicated the security
environment. Pakistan has taken this issue to the Security Council and
sought help from its friends (China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) to put
pressure Modi to undo his unilateral policy vis-à-vis Kashmir. As we know,
the whole international community and the major powers are deeply con-
cerned regarding the tension in the region, which could lead to a nuclear war.
Sober and wise voices in India and Pakistan strongly oppose war. But Prime
Minister Imran Khan has cautioned the world that both states have nuclear
weapons. President Trump and some Muslim states are reportedly striving to
tamp down the bellicosity on both sides.

ALLIES AND PARTNERS

One of the conventional responses of Pakistan to Indian regional domi-
nance has been Islamabad’s nurturing of its close partnership with China.
Pakistan started getting closer to China in the wake of the India–China war
of 1962, when it saw its Cold War ally, the United States, rushing to assist
India.62 Pakistani officials thought, and still think, that US support of
India and its military capability will hurt Pakistan’s interests more than it
hurts China’s interests because India says that it is increasing its ability to

  60. The Simla Accord was signed in 1972 by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
   61. Quoted in India Today, August 29, 2019, .
   62. Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: A Diplomacy of Entente Cordiale (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1974): 43–44.

1112  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

compete with China.63 A scenario making the rounds these days, that the US
would use India as a regional counterweight to the rising power of China, does
not appear likely in the age of globalization, and in view of the growing
economic and commercial ties between India and China.64 Nor does Pakistan
believe that China needs Pakistan as a counterweight to India. These ideas of
the past, which are rooted in military and strategic rivalry, have lost much of
their explanatory power.
    Pakistan’s partnership with China started three decades back, when Paki-
stan was motivated by its defense needs and alliances to offset the Indo–Soviet
alliance.65 However, over the years, relations between China and Pakistan have
improved on account of independent economic rationales. A defense and
strategic partnership has provided the umbrella under which the two countries
have explored new horizons, including nuclear power plants, cooperation in
defense production (including fighter aircraft and missile technology), and
mega-infrastructure projects. The most important of these is the 2015 agree-
ment on Chinese investment of around US$ 46 billion in energy, roads, and
railway projects, and the establishment of special economic zones.
    This is one of the greatest economic opportunities Pakistan has encoun-
tered in the context of its fraught regional and international circumstances.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will link western China with the
port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea and bring Pakistan much-needed foreign
direct investment for development.66 It is one of the major policy initiatives
that Pakistan believes will contribute to modernization of infrastructure,
economic growth, and global connectivity. Its strategic value in terms of the
naval presence that China is developing at Gwadar cannot be discounted: it is
one of the responses of Pakistan to the growing strategic partnership of India
with the United States.67 For Pakistan, China might be able to undermine

    63. Vivek Doval, “Why India Should Cooperate and Compete with China,” Economic Times,
April 12, 2019.
   64. “China’s Xi Greets India’s Modi in Home Town with Eye to Trade Ties,” Dawn, May 14,
2015, , accessed May 24, 2018.
    65. Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2015): 50–55.
   66. Afshan Subohi, “China-Pakistan Corridor: Visibility of the Game Changer,” Dawn, April 27,
2015, , accessed January 25, 2019.
   67. KohSwee Lean Collin, “China and Pakistan Join Forces under the Sea,” National Interest,
January 7, 2016, , accessed May 24, 2018.

AKHTAR AND JAN / PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON INDIA’S RISE  1113

India’s role in the region, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will
change the game in South Asia. Interestingly, India has developed strong
relations with both Afghanistan and Iran; Iran will provide infrastructure
connectivity via the port of Chabahar.
   Pakistan has attempted to counter the growing Indian influence in
Afghanistan by a combination of strategies. First is a consistent dialogue
with Afghanistan to improve trust and assure the Afghans that Pakistan can
in no way benefit from Afghanistan’s troubles. Second, Pakistani author-
ities have moved to demonstrate their country will no longer use the
Taliban or any other proxies for leverage against the Afghan government.
Instead, they will pursue direct diplomatic means to resolve Pakistan’s
concerns, which include the presence in Afghanistan of sanctuaries for the
banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and of an Indian spy network intended
to destabilize Pakistan.
   Finding the Afghans distrustful, Pakistan has convinced China and the
United States, along with Afghanistan, to broker talks between the Taliban
and the Afghan government. A political settlement, if and when it happens,
would remove one of the major irritants between Kabul and Islamabad:
Pakistan’s alleged backing of the Taliban and intervention in Afghanistan.
With peace and stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan may regain the trust and
cooperation of the Afghans and become one of the major regional partners for
the reconstruction of the country. At the moment, there is too much uncer-
tainty about Afghanistan, the Taliban as a coherent and stable force, and
Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. But what is clear is that Pakistan does not
want military conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban. It would like to
persuade them to enter into a dialogue with the Kabul government under
the four-power arrangements.

CONCLUSION

Comparing itself with India, from music, films, fashion, and cricket—the
most popular sport in both countries—to international diplomacy, military
power, and nuclear weapons, comes naturally to Pakistan for historical rea-
sons. The two nations achieved independence at the same time, reflecting two
rival notions of nationalism. The psychological and sociological roots of rivalry
with India lie in the historical development of the idea of Muslim nationalism
as a parallel to Indian nationalism. While the idea of being “equal” to India

1114  ASIAN SURVEY 59:6

remains vibrant, and in some ways injects energy into Pakistani dreams, it
pushes the ruling groups away from geopolitical realism.
   Strategic competition with India, however, has generated a debate in
Pakistan on whether such a quest would benefit Pakistan, or is even desirable.
The critics of Pakistan’s attempts to balance the Indian threat by seeking
alliances and developing over-extended defense infrastructure, including
nuclear weapons, point to the heavy costs. The dismantling of democracy
(four times), the imbalance in civil–military relations, and the stunted growth
of democratic institutions are some of them. Calls to improve ties with India,
and move Pakistan back toward the South Asian center, have become strident
but remain weak, fragmented, and unable to influence policy. The conven-
tional narrative of India as a threat remains strong and claims much of the
space in the media and in political discussions—thought at the moment, in
terms of threat ranking, it appears to be lower than home-grown terrorism.
But in the present environment, India’s annexation of Jammu and Kashmir
has increased the risk of terrorism across the border and may escalate tensions
between India and Pakistan.
   India’s rise and increasing pre-eminence have added to old fears of India’s
seeking domination, or using its new economic and growing military power
to keep Pakistan off-balance and destabilized, or even provoke confronta-
tion. These are perceptions that run deep, and those who hold them cite the
early 1970s Indian intervention in East Pakistan to create Bangladesh, as well
as India’s recent assistance to Baloch insurgents. Fears, threat perceptions,
and counter-interventions are mutual—they emanate from both sides and
have their roots in policies of using proxies as means of sub-conventional
conflict. This remains the subtext of the two countries’ policies, with their
occasional ice-breaking and fresh “resolve” to resume dialogue, which often
ends in stalemate.
   The question is, will Pakistan change its past pattern of policies toward
India because of India’s rise and in view of its own domestic security and
economic problems? It probably will, if it finds its interests secured and India
reciprocating. It may soften its policies, and seek sustained dialogue, yet the
two countries may remain in a gray area of no war, and no peace. Pakistan
would like to find a historic reconciliation that links up with resolution of the
Kashmir dispute and then allows everything else to follow—expansion of
trade and culture, and opening up of the visa regime. Is such a deal possible?
It is not easy to predict, but there is evidence that both countries have