THE ORF FOREIGN POLICY SURVEY 2021 - INDIA'S YOUTH REFLECT ON HOW THE NATION ENGAGES WITH THE WORLD
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THE ORF
FOREIGN POLICY
SURVEY 2021
YOUNG INDIA
INDIA’S AND
YOUTH THE WORLD
REFLECT ON
HOW THE NATION ENGAGES
Harsh
WITH THEV WORLD
Pant
with
Prithvi Iyer, Nivedita Kapoor, Aarshi Tirkey, and Kartik Bommakanti© 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF. Attribution: Harsh V Pant, with Prithvi Iyer, Nivedita Kapoor, Aarshi Tirkey, and Kartik Bommakanti, The ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2021: Young India and the World, August 2021, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation 20 Rouse Avenue, Institutional Area New Delhi 110002 India contactus@orfonline.org www.orfonline.org ORF provides non-partisan, independent analyses and inputs on matters of security, strategy, economy, development, energy and global governance to diverse decision makers (governments, business communities, academia and civil society). ORF’s mandate is to conduct in-depth research, provide inclusive platforms, and invest in tomorrow’s thought leaders today. Design and layout: Rahil Miya Shaikh ISBN: 978-93-90494-59-0
Contents Preface ............................................................................ 4 Executive Summary ......................................................... 6 Introduction .................................................................... 10 Context and Rationale for the Poll ................................... 12 Survey Findings and Analysis .......................................... 15 a. Indian Foreign Policy b. India and the Neighbourhood c. India and the P5 + 3 d. Multilateralism and Globalisation Scope for Future Research .............................................. 38 Annexure ......................................................................... 40 Acknowledgements ......................................................... 56 About the Authors ........................................................... 57
Preface
T
count of over 4 million lives lost (and counting),
he word ‘unprecedented’ has often the real human cost of the pandemic remains
been used in the past year-and-a- immeasurable. The battle has not been won;
half to describe the sheer scale the war is far from over.
of disruption that COVID-19 has unleashed
upon the world. Indeed, now we know that The pandemic revealed the strengths and
the pandemic has spared no one, its wrath weaknesses of various governance systems,
reaching the most cosmopolitan of cities and social welfare policies, principles of economic
the remotest villages alike. Yet, in early 2020, organisation, and multilateralism. It has also
as the outbreak of COVID-19 was declared had an extraordinary impact on the churn that
a pandemic, leaders across the world would was already underway in the global order, even
have thought the battle could be quickly won. before the first reports of a ‘strange respiratory
They sounded off a war cry: Test, Trace, and disease’ started coming out of Wuhan. Growing
Isolate. Countries shut down all movement in geopolitical rivalries—characterised by the
their cities and towns and closed their borders need to gain technological, economic and
too, in an attempt to contain the spread of military superiority—continue to disrupt the
the virus. As lockdowns became the norm, delicate balance of power that exists in the world
the global economy was buffeted with strong today. The rise of protectionist sentiments,
headwinds, and many countries soon plunged coupled with the growing discontent towards
into deep recession. Today, while we have a multilateralism and globalisation, aredramatically changing the post-Second World by Indian foreign policy in recent years. The
War consensus on managing an increasingly poll also takes a deep dive into the nuances
integrated, albeit distrustful world. of the Indian youth’s outlook on the economy,
globalisation, and multilateralism, as well as
As India navigates the challenges of this the performance of the Prime Minister Narendra
evolving global order amidst the massive Modi-led Indian government on key issues.
fallout of the pandemic, its policy choices
need to respond to the current complexities Reflecting this survey’s goal of gaining a better
and reflect the needs, aspirations and will of understanding and a more rounded view of
its people. This first iteration of ORF’s “Foreign the youth’s perception and opinion of India’s
Policy Survey”, conducted in collaboration with foreign policy, the authors of this report are
Impetus Research, endeavours to understand young people who have a stake in the nation’s
the opinions and views of the country’s youth journey in the coming years. Our young
on some of the most important questions scholars—Prithvi Iyer, Nivedita Kapoor, Aarshi
that confront India and the choices that the Tirkey, and Kartik Bommakanti, led by ORF’s
nation must make in this fast changing global Director of Studies and Head of Strategic
environment. Studies Programme, Professor Harsh V Pant
have worked through this difficult period to
The survey—which reached out to the urban produce this very important survey available
youth and was conducted prior to the second to all who engage with India and its external
5
wave—found an optimistic assessment of relations. As times change, so do aspirations
India’s foreign policy and an agreement with and perceptions. ORF will institutionalise this
PREFACE
many of the current government’s recent policy Foreign Policy Survey as an annual endeavour
interventions and external engagements. to better track how India’s young demographic
More than seven of every 10 (72 percent) of comprehends the country’s foreign policy
the respondents rated the conduct of India’s goals and its approach to its growing role in
foreign policy as either very good or good. Not world affairs.
surprisingly, global pandemics were assessed
as India’s biggest foreign policy challenge, Congratulations to the entire team for this
followed closely by terrorism, climate change, effort. We are confident that ‘The ORF Foreign
and border conflicts. The apprehension Policy Survey 2021’ will help bring to the fore
regarding China’s rise was reflected in the low voices of young India and help us understand
trust ratings for India’s eastern neighbour. In the generation who will shape this country’s
contrast, the United States was rated highly partnerships and determine its place in the
in the survey, mirroring the direction taken global order.
Dr. Samir Saran
President, ORF
August 2021Executive Summary
1 Urban Indian youth surveyed in this poll have a positive assessment of the
conduct of the country’s foreign policy, with 72 percent of respondents
rating it as either very good or good. This is reflected in their support
for some of the government’s key foreign policies, including on China,
Pakistan, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The area
where the government has the respondents’ least support concerns
the country’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP).
2 The respondents’ level of concern about key foreign policy challenges –
global pandemics, terrorism, border conflict with China, climate change,
and border conflict with Pakistan – runs parallel to their awareness of
the most pressing issues facing India. Moreover, the youth perceive the
country’s challenges from its border conflicts with China to be more acute
than those emanating from Pakistan.3 This assessment explains the views of the youth regarding goal-setting
in Indian foreign policy, with the following as the top three priorities:
strengthening the Indian economy; combatting terrorism; and improving
relations with immediate neighbours (other than Pakistan and China). The
next priorities are improving ties with the United States (US), and resolving
differences with China and Pakistan.
4 On questions pertaining to India’s neighbourhood, respondents were
most trusting of Sri Lanka (68 percent) and displayed low levels of trust
towards Pakistan with only 10 percent of respondents indicating positive
trust ratings. They also hold a positive view of the Maldives, Nepal, and
Bhutan.
5 The respondents expressed an overarching optimism on the status of
India’s bilateral relationships with its neighbours, especially Sri Lanka (68
7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
percent of respondents saw it as a burgeoning bilateral relationship).
6
Eight of every ten (80 percent) of the respondents felt India has poor or
very poor relations with Pakistan. Respondents also believed relations
with the Maldives, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan have improved in
recent years and hold greater potential.7 More than seven of every ten (77 percent) of the respondents rated the US
as the country they trust the most among the leading global powers. The
US was followed by Australia, Russia, Japan, France, the United Kingdom
(UK), and the European Union (EU). The country that the respondents
distrusted the most (77 percent) was China. These perceptions have
also been reflected in the respondents’ vision for the future, about which
powers will be India’s leading partners in the coming decade: the Quad,
Russia, and Europe are preferred, in that order.
8
The high level of concern about the rise of China as a global power is
an important factor driving the response of urban youth regarding Indian
foreign policy. The survey found 62 percent of respondents were of the
view that India should abandon non-alignment in case of rising US-
China tensions. The respondents expressed concern not only about
China interfering in India’s neighbourhood, but also about its military and
economic superiority. They also expressed fears of a breakout of war.
8
9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
More than seven of every 10 (76 percent) were of the view that India’s
preferred mode of engagement should be global cooperation through
multilateral organisations, and over 74 percent felt that India’s quest to
acquire a permanent seat at the United Nations (UN) Security Council was
a very important goal for India. The respondents also displayed a higher
level of awareness of older multilateral organisations and forums such as
the UN and the World Trade Organization, with the exception of the Non-
Aligned Movement. In fact, two-thirds of the urban youth respondents
said they had not heard of the forum.10 There is low awareness about more recent platforms and forums,
such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Group of 20 (G20), and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Regional groupings
score much lower than the bigger power groupings on the list (G20).
11 The urban youth are deeply divided over the impact of globalisation
on India and its economy, society and culture, their standard of
living, travel to and from other countries, and education opportunities
overseas. While the opportunity to study abroad is viewed positively,
the optimism regarding moving abroad to work or stay is markedly
much lower. Moreover, an overwhelming 71 percent of respondents
felt that the ‘AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’, the Indian government’s
economic self-reliance mission, would be good for India.
9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYIntroduction
T
To be sure, COVID-19 has given a new urgency to
he COVID-19 pandemic brought the questions around the future of the world order, the
world to a standstill in 2020. At the same contours of which remain unclear. While the post-
time, the crisis caused the acceleration Cold War US hegemony has come to an end, a
of certain trends in the international system that had bipolar or multipolar world has not emerged. The
predated the pandemic, among them the rivalry situation is thus, where the rules of the game are yet to
between the United States (US) and China. The be established, making this period in contemporary
same contestation is set to define the structures of history particularly volatile and subject to widespread
the post-pandemic global system. policy shifts by nation-states responding to the
systemic changes. This is already visible in the Asia-
For some years before COVID-19, China had Pacific region, which occupies centre-stage in the
begun its economic and geostrategic rise, the ongoing US-China rivalry and is being re-imagined
US’s hegemonic position was already diminishing, by prominent stakeholders as the “Indo-Pacific”.
the gains of globalisation were getting discredited,
multilateral organisations were proving ineffective, India—a key power in this endeavour—is making
populism was rising, and the focal point of global efforts to carve out a niche for itself at the decision-
geopolitics and geoeconomics was pivoting to Asia. making table. It is engaged in efforts to manage
In the past year, all of this stirring has only gathered China, the rising power on its border, while working on
pace, revealing in stark detail the faultlines within the boosting domestic growth. Even as certain contours
international system. of this future policy are already emerging, much will‘‘COVID-19 has given
a new urgency to
questions around the
future of the world
order, the contours
‘‘
of which remain
unclear.
depend on how the regional and international system taken will define Indian policy in the years to come,
shapes itself, in turn determining India’s status in it. just as much as those not taken will.
It may not be an overreach to conclude that these
developments together will have an indelible impact While foreign policy continues to be an elite decision-
11
on Indian foreign policymaking. making domain, India, as a democracy, should
INTRODUCTION
remain steadfast in considering public opinion,
Not yet a major power but no longer a player that can especially when it comes to issues with far-reaching
be ignored – India has a unique position today that consequences. With 65 percent of the Indian
has led to an ongoing lively debate on the choices population being young—i.e., below the age of 35—
being made as the country positions itself in the taking this demographic along its journey becomes
world. The fractious nature of the debate reveals the even more significant.
inflection point that has been reached: the roadsContext and
Rationale for
the Poll
V
War, the 2003 Iraq War,4 and the 2008 Civil Nuclear
arious surveys on India’s public Deal.5 Other polls have sought to understand public
opinion and foreign policy have been mood on broader themes that include Indo-US
conducted over the past several years, bilateral ties,6 the separatist movement in Sri Lanka,7
each with their own strengths and limitations. For and the use of nuclear weapons.8
one, the Indian Institute of Public Opinion (IIOPO) has
been conducting annual and sometimes bi-annual While useful in their declared aims, these surveys
surveys since 1959, and it is only recently that these suffer from several limitations. For instance, the IIOPO
are being analysed. There have also been issue-
1
did not analyse its survey findings until recently.
specific surveys that aimed to assess public opinion Some surveys are limited by their scope as they
on crucial events such as the Gulf War of 1991, 2
relate to a single event, while others are restricted
India’s 1998 Pokhran 2 nuclear tests, the 1999 Kargil
3
by their sampled population, usually the urban
1
Aidan Milliff, Paul Staniland, and Vipin Narang, “Uneven Accountability? Public Attitudes on Indian Foreign Policy since the
1960s,” MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2019-21, 2019, 1–66, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3448740#references-widget.
2
Shivaji Kumar, “India’s Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A View from New Delhi,” India Review 17, no. 4 (August 8, 2018):
353–71, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1510158.
3-7
Kumar, “India’s Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A View from New Delhi.”
8
Benjamin A. Valentino and Scott D. Sagan, “Atomic Attraction,” The Indian Express, June 3, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/
article/opinion/columns/barack-obama-hiroshima-speech-india-nuclear-weapon-terrorism-atomic-attraction-2831348/.demographic and those in policymaking circles. This survey builds upon the existing strand of
The latter trend was seen in different surveys polling research, but with a focus on India’s urban
conducted by media houses and scholars on the youth. This is an endeavour to understand how the
Indian government’s nuclear policy (1994) and the
9
youth—the most important stakeholders of India’s
country’s foreign and security policy (2019).10 future—perceive crucial foreign policy changes and
propositions. As foreign policy initiatives become
In more recent years, some polls have been broader in enmeshed with domestic political considerations,
their aims and have assessed Indian attitudes towards ORF is of the view that an opinion poll of this nature
the government’s policies,11 and their views on has become more relevant than ever. Since this poll
relations with other countries.12 For instance, Devesh is the first attempt to conduct this exercise, we are
Kapur, the then Director of the Center for Advanced surveying a smaller subset i.e., the Indian urban
Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania, youth.
conducted a survey from 2005-2006 that remains
the largest pan-India poll so far, with 212,563 The poll sampled 2,037 Indians from 14 cities, and
interviews. 13
The survey assessed how Indians the questionnaire was administered in eight regional
perceive various countries, and also attempted languages, in addition to English (See Annex B for
to link India’s foreign policy with the perceptions full details on the methodology.) It is the first Indian
of various Indian socio-economic groups and survey that targets the age group of 18-35 years. The
regions. 14
Other polls with similar aims of gauging survey evaluates recent views of the urban youth on
the electorate’s response towards foreign policy the government’s foreign policy, their assessment
13
have also been undertaken by the Lowy Institute in of emerging challenges in this domain, as well as
collaboration with the Australia India Institute.15 With India’s ties with regional and global powers. The
CONTEXT AND RATIONALE FOR THE POLL
a sample of 1,233 Indian adults, the poll gathered 18-35 demographic makes up 27 percent of India’s
opinion on India’s relations and reputation with urban population, and around 26 percent of the
other countries, security threats, and the structure country’s overall population. (In the country’s rural
of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. CNN- districts, this age group comprises 25 percent of the
IBN-Today in 2014 conducted its own survey population.)a
of 6,280 urban residents, to gauge if the Indian
public favoured Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s The authors believe that this survey is the first of
governance and policies, including his foreign its nature to consider India’s public opinion on
policy.16
multilateralism and globalisation, and examine
9
David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, “Elite Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy in India,” Asian Survey 36, no. 6
(May 25, 1996): 545–60, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645790.
10
Dhruva Jaishankar, “Survey of India’s Strategic Community” (New Delhi, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/Survey-of-India’s-Strategic-Community.pdf.
11
Kumar, “India’s Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A View from New Delhi.”
12
Rory Medcalf, “India Poll 2013” (Sydney, 2013), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/india-poll-2013.
13
Devesh Kapur, “Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy,” India Review 8, no. 3 (August 13, 2009): 286–305, https://doi.
org/10.1080/14736480903116818.
14
Kapur, “Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy.”
15
Medcalf, “India Poll 2013.”
16
Kumar, “India’s Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A View from New Delhi.”
a
These have been estimated through the method of linear interpolation, based on data from the Census of India.‘‘ This poll is an
endeavour to
understand how
the youth—the
most important
stakeholders in India’s
future—perceive
crucial foreign
policy changes and
‘‘
propositions.
14
CONTEXT AND RATIONALE FOR THE POLL
how these perceptions may be shaped by the the timeline of the poll—i.e., before the second wave
COVID-19 crisis, which continues to unfold as we hit the country—these dilemmas are inevitably not
publish this report. This survey was conducted reflected in the survey responses.
between 3 to 21 December 2020, and reflects the
public opinion on foreign policy developments up to However, even as these conundrums remain
that period. Since then, the rapid pace of changes unaddressed, the responses to ORF’s survey provide
within and outside India has continued unabated. useful insights on the nature of public opinion in India
in relation to the government’s key foreign policy
India, which has been grappling with a devastating decisions. Needless to say, future surveys would
second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, has had benefit from mapping any identifiable differences in
to rethink questions about its domestic capacity and public opinion as a result of the second wave of the
international ambitions. At the same time, it is aware pandemic, and whether it may have had a lasting
that the evolving international situation continues to impact on how India’s youth interprets the nation’s
demand its steady involvement and response. Given engagement with the world.Survey Findings
and Analysis
1. INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY
T
many as 72 percent of respondents had a positive
he conduct of Indian foreign policy in the assessment of the performance (32 percent very
past years has received an enthusiastic good, and 40 percent, good). A small 6 percent had
approval in this urban youth poll. As a negative view of the situation.
Figure 1: How would you rate India for its foreign policy on an overall basis?
32 40 15 4 2 7
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Very good Good Neutral Bad Very bad Don’t know / Can’t sayThis support extended across metros and non- or somewhat concerned about climate change. The
metros in the country, with 68 percent overall good respondents also ranked cybersecurity as an area of
rating in the former, and 73 percent in the latter. concern, with 82 percent being very concerned or
When asked about major foreign policy challenges somewhat concerned about it.
for India, respondents identified global pandemics
and terrorism as the areas of highest concern. Other At 83 percent, there was higher concern about
issues, including cybersecurity, border conflicts with border conflicts with China as compared to the
China, climate change, and border conflicts with border conflicts with Pakistan. This is in line with
Pakistan (See Figure 2), also garnered a high level the finding that 70 percent of respondents are
of concern. concerned about the rise of China as a global power
(See Figure 12). Following the border conflict in
As India continues to deal with the economic and eastern Ladakh in 2020, the concern regarding
health ramifications of COVID-19, an overwhelming border conflicts with China has overtaken worry
nine in every ten respondents said they were about the disputes with Pakistan. Three-quarters
concerned about such pandemics (74 percent were of respondents (75 percent) said they were very
very concerned while 17 percent were somewhat concerned or somewhat concerned about border
concerned). At 85 percent, terrorism was judged conflicts with Pakistan. This has translated into low
to be another key concern for the country. Eight of trust levels for both the neighbours, as shown in
every ten (83 percent) said they were very concerned Figures 6 and 9.
16
Figure 2: How concerned are you about the following major foreign policy challenges
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
facing India?
1
1
Global
pandemics 74 17 5
(like COVID-19) 2
2
Terrorism 64 21 3 6 5
1
Cyber Security 58 24 3 5 9
Border Conflicts 2
with China 52 31 8 4
3
Climate Change 50 33 5 3 6 3
Border Conflicts 3
with Pakistan 49 26 14 5
3
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Very concerned Somewhat concerned Neither concerned nor unconcerned
Somewhat unconcerned Not concerned at all Don’t know/Can’t sayThe concern about specific foreign policy challenges Other focus issues include improving ties with
mentioned above is also reflected in the high priority the US (82 percent) and improving relations with
young Indians accord to strengthening the Indian immediate neighbours other than Pakistan or China
economy and combatting terrorism. Nearly nine of (79 percent). This is echoed in the heightened trust
every ten (89 percent) say strengthening the Indian ratings of the survey respondents towards countries
economy should be a very high priority or somewhat like Sri Lanka (68 percent) and Bhutan (55 percent)
high priority, and 85 percent say the same about (See Figure 6). There is lower priority placed on
combatting terrorism. resolving differences with Pakistan and China, as
compared to other issues.
Figure 3: How much priority should be given by India to the following matters?
Strengthening
the Indian 80 9 3 2 6
economy
Combatting
terrorism 73 12 3 4 7
Improving relations
with immediate
neighbours (other
than Pakistan and
57 22 6 6 9 17
China)
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Improving ties
with the US
56 26 5 3 9
Resolving
bilateral
differences with 37 25 8 20 9
China
Resolving
bilateral
differences with 33 21 8 28 10
Pakistan
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Very high priority Somewhat high priority Somewhat low priority
Very low priority Don’t know/can’t sayThe numbers are sizeable, however: 62 percent with India’s western neighbour should be a very high
of respondents said that very high priority or priority or somewhat high priority.
somewhat high priority should be given to resolving
bilateral differences with China. Thus, there is a Meanwhile, the Modi government’s approach to
strong acknowledgment of the China threat, its China in the aftermath of the 2020 border clashes
implications on India’s foreign policy interests, and garnered support among 78 percent of the
by extension, on the interests of the Indian people. respondents. This approach was characterised by
While respondents displayed an affinity to partner a strong military response, stricter rules regarding
with the US (as will be discussed later in this report), entry of Chinese investments, banning of certain
there is also a belief in the value of seeking resolution apps, and a heightened engagement with other
with China. In the case of Pakistan, only 54 percent regional powers.
of respondents believe that resolving differences
Figure 4: To what extent do you agree with the Modi government’s approach to China?
60%
53
18 50%
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
40%
30%
25
20%
10% 7
6 6 5
0%
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor Disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know/can’t
disagree sayOne of the key decisions of the government—to 5). This policy move received the highest approval
block Chinese mobile apps—saw 86 percent of rating among all the foreign policy decisions of the
respondents agreeing with that decision (See Figure government surveyed by this poll.
Figure 5: Do you agree with the following major foreign policy decisions of the Modi
government?
Banning
Chinese Mobile 86 12 2
Apps
Controlling
Illegal 74 18 8
Immigration
Balakot Air
Strike
68 17 15
Strengthening
the Quad
64 18 18
19
Withdrawing 42 29 29
from RCEP
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Yes No Don’t know/can’t say
The polling also points to a higher level of percent, 68 percent, and 64 percent, respectively.
awareness about the ban on Chinese mobile apps, While 42 percent of respondents supported the
seen in the low level of don’t know/can’t say response government’s position to withdraw from the Regional
(2 percent). This is markedly lower than the don’t Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
know/can’t say response for other parts of the 29 percent did not approve of it, making this the
question. policy measure with the least support from the
On other key foreign policy decisions (See Figure youth. The significant level of don’t know responses
5)—i.e., controlling illegal immigration, the Balakot (29 percent) is in line with lower levels of knowledge
air strike, and strengthening the Quadrilateral among respondents about newer multilateral
Security Dialogue (Quad)—the percentage of formats. Especially on questions gauging
respondents agreeing with the decisions were 74 perceptions about globalisation and multilateralism(which will be explicated later in this report, see lack of information about the subject. Once again,
Figure 16), respondents were less aware this reflects the view among young Indians that India
about smaller, regional, and newer multilateral needs to deal with the rise of China by building its
organisations. relations with other like-minded powers, including
the US, Australia and Japan.
This tendency is lower in the case of the Quad:
where 64 percent of respondents agreed with the The following sections will delve into how India’s
government strengthening this multilateral format. urban youth construe the country’s relations with
An equal percentage of 18 percent disagreed with neighbouring countries, and with global powers
the idea of making the Quad stronger, and expressed dominating the international order.
2. INDIA AND THE NEIGHBOURHOOD
Thriving bilateral relationships between India and its In relation to Afghanistan, 23 percent of respondents
neighbourhood are crucial for bolstering prospects reported a complete lack of trust while 42 percent
for trade and connectivity along with ensuring that trusted the country either ‘completely or somewhat.’
national security concerns are addressed effectively. In the case of Bangladesh and Nepal, the majority
Given the strategic importance of well-adjusted of respondents were somewhat trusting of their
relationships with neighbouring countries, this poll neighbours to act responsibly in the world. Similar
20 sought to understand how India’s urban youth to findings related to Tamil Nadu’s diminished trust
perceives India’s engagement with them. towards their immediate neighbour (Sri Lanka),
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
trust levels for Bangladesh was lowest among
A majority of Indian youth are largely trusting of respondents from Assam, with only 15 percent of
India’s neighbourhood except in relation to Pakistan, respondents from the state showing favourable trust
for which there was overarching distrust from the ratings. Further investigation is needed to determine
surveyed population. Trust towards Sri Lanka playing the reasons why certain states deviate from the
a responsible role was the highest at 68 percent. seeming consensus on perceptions towards
Bhutan and the Maldives also enjoy heightened India’s neighbours. Nonetheless, the overarching
trust at 55 percent and 54 percent, respectively. perception towards countries like Bangladesh and
However, state-wise comparisons revealed that trust Nepal seem to be characterised by favourable trust
towards Sri Lanka was lowest among respondents ratings (See Figure 6).
sampled from Tamil Nadu,17 with only 9 percent of
respondents saying they completely trust Sri Lanka,
and 34 percent somewhat trust the country.
17
This could be attributed to the strained relationship between Tamil Nadu and the Sri Lankan state over the treatment of the latter’s
Tamil population following the civil war involving the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).Figure 6: For each of the following neighbouring countries, please indicate how much
you trust each of these nations to act responsibly in the world.
Sri Lanka 21 47 9 4 9 10
Maldives 18 36 7 4 9 26
Nepal 14 41 9 7 15 14
Bhutan 13 42 10 5 13 18
Afghanistan 10 32 9 8 23 19
Bangladesh 9 41 11 7 17 14
21
Pakistan 2 8 5 7 71 6
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Trust completely Trust somewhat Neither trust nor distrust
Distrust somewhat Distrust completely Don’t know/can’t say
The poll findings point to an inverse relationship The overarching concern about border skirmishes
between education and proportion of don’t know with Pakistan—seen in the finding that 83 percent of
responses. More research is required to understand respondents are either very concerned or somewhat
the reasons for this inverse relationship. concerned about the cross-border threat, may have
contributed to the feeling of reduced trust and faith in
The findings on the assessment of India’s bilateral the bilateral relationship.
relationships with its neighbours showed that similar
to their perceptions on trust levels, most respondents Apart from Pakistan, the respondents were broadly
believed India to have very good relations (14%) or positive about the state of India’s bilateral relationship
good relations (48%) with Sri Lanka (See Figure 7). with its neighbours. Slightly less than half (46 percent)of respondents perceived overall good relations percent, and 21 percent, respectively. Figure 7 shows
between the Maldives and India, while 44 percent a broad consensus among the youth that India has
were of the same view about India’s relationship with good relations with its neighbours except for Pakistan.
Bhutan. On the question of Bangladesh, Afghanistan However, the neutral and don’t know responses
and Nepal, the proportion of responses indicating in Figure 7 show that for countries occupying less
good relations or very good relations was 41 percent, primacy in public discourse, possibly due to reduced
34 percent, and 45 percent, respectively. media coverage, the proportion of don’t know
responses is higher. Incidentally, the least number of
A sizeable proportion of respondents also displayed don’t know responses on this question was found in
neutrality or admitted to not knowing about India’s relation to Pakistan (7 percent), reiterating that the
bilateral relationship with countries like the Maldives, respondents’ perceptions have also been shaped
Bhutan and Afghanistan. The don’t know responses by the amount of public traction received by
for these three countries stood at 29 percent, 19 countries within domestic debates.
Figure 7: How do you assess the status of India’s bilateral relationship with each of
the following neighbouring countries?
22 Sri Lanka 14 48 21 4 3 11
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Maldives
9 37 18 4 4 29
Bhutan 8 36 25 6 6 19
Afghanistan 6 28 22 11 12 21
Nepal 6 39 22 11 7 15
Bangladesh 5 37 26 9 8 16
1
Pakistan 5 8 21 59 7
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Very good Good Neutral
Poor Very poor Don’t know/can’t sayRespondents in the survey were also asked to increased while an additional 32 percent felt relations
assess the levels of engagement between India partially increased. In relation to Bhutan, Bangladesh
and its neighbours to gauge the extent to which and Nepal, the proportion of respondents indicating
India’s urban youth is attuned to the evolution of the increase in levels of engagement with India were at
relations in the last five years. The proportion of don’t 30 percent, 31 percent, and 33 percent, respectively
know responses is especially high on this question (See Figure 8). However, respondents were measured
as compared to the others. in their answers and resisted claiming relations to
have drastically increased or drastically decreased.
The least don’t know responses were reported in The responses to this question indicate that the
the case of engagement with Pakistan (16 percent), majority of India’s youth has very limited knowledge
and Sri Lanka (21 percent). However, in relation to of the ebbs and flows of India’s engagement with its
countries like Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan, the neighbours. However, apart from Pakistan, the lack
don’t know responses are much higher at 29 percent, of awareness is either complemented by neutrality
37 percent, and 31 percent, respectively. Barring or an optimism about increased engagement.
this, it is evident that Indian youth believe that overall
levels of engagement with India’s neighbours has The responses of Indian youth surveyed in this
improved in recent years except Pakistan, for which poll on India’s relationship with the neighbourhood
58 percent of respondents believe engagement has has important implications. For countries in India’s
decreased. neighbourhood like Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal,
despite little awareness about the nature of India’s
23
Like with the questions on trust levels and assessment relationship with these nations, overarching
of bilateral relationship, Sri Lanka was rated highly on favourability persists. However, in relation to
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
the engagement dimension as well, with 12 percent Pakistan, the youth seem sceptical and less
of respondents believing relations to have drastically trusting across all dimensions.Figure 8: What do you think about the levels of interaction between India and each of
the following neighbouring countries in the last 5 years?
Sri Lanka 12 32 25 6 3 21
Maldives
9 23 21 6 5 37
Afghanistan 7 19 25 9 9 31
Nepal 7 26 19 18 7 23
Bhutan 6 24 28 8 5 29
Pakistan 5 8 15 14 42 16
24
Bangladesh 5 26 28 10 6 26
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Drastically increased Partially increased Remained unchanged
Decreased somewhat Drastically decreased Don’t know/can’t say
3. INDIA AND THE P5+3
The poll also covered India’s relations with key the survey asked respondents regarding the trust
powers in the world, especially given the ongoing they place in these external powers, as well as their
changes in the international order. It recognises expectations and fears for the future. This topic has
that India’s interactions with, and the actions of been at the forefront in the past year, as the impact
other powers in the global system can often lead to of the COVID-19 pandemic greatly accelerated the
significant impacts on foreign policy choices. shifts in the world order. When combined with India’s
positioning within this structure, the questions acquire
In order to gauge the views of urban Indian youth a renewed relevance.
regarding these leading actors in global affairs,Among the sampled powers, as seen in Figure 9, power (69 percent distrust completely, and 8 percent
the US at 77 percent leads the pack when it comes distrust somewhat). It is the only country on the list
to trust among urban Indian youth (32 percent trust that scores such a high level of distrust. This result
completely, and 45 percent trust somewhat). At the is not surprising, given that 83 percent of respondents
other end of the spectrum is China, with 77 percent of also expressed concern about India’s border
respondents expressing distrust of the neighbouring conflicts with China.
Figure 9: How would you rate these powers on the basis of how much you trust them?
US 32 45 8 2 5 7
Australia
21 46 8 3 5 16
Russia 21 43 9 5 11 12
Japan 18 42 10 5 12 13
25
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
France 17 41 10 5 9 18
UK 17 44 9 3 7 20
EU 11 40 11 4 9 25
China 1 10 7 8 69 5
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Trust completely Trust somewhat Neither trust nor distrust
Distrust somewhat Distrust completely Don’t know/can’t sayThis distrust is reflected across the cross-section 51 percent. The 25 percent don’t know/can’t say result
of urban youth, regardless of their level of income, reveals that the level of penetration of information
religion, occupation, gender, and place of residence. regarding the supranational body remains low.
Across these divides, a favourable opinion towards
the US is also seen in a cross-section of urban Indian The trust reposed by the respondents in these
youth. powers aligns with their hopes for the future
partnership. The highest number of 78 percent
At 63 percent, Russia continues to enjoy a high of respondents believe that the US is likely to
level of trust among young Indians, but it comes be India’s leading partner in the coming decade
at third position, with Australia taking the spot of (See Figure 10). The positive sentiment for the US
second most trusted country at 68 percent. Japan, is reflected in the fact that it is the only country in
the only other Asian country on the list, also scores a whom trust for the present is matched by the
high 60 percent. While individual European countries projections for the future. In fact, the Quad, Russia
– the United Kingdom (UK) and France – received a and Europe (in that order) were identified by the
trust rating of 61 percent and 58 percent, respectively, respondents as India’s leading partners in the
the European Union just crossed the halfway mark at coming decade.
26
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSISFigure 10: In the next 10 years, how likely are each of the following powers, to become
India’s leading partners?
US 44 34 5 3 3 11
Australia
21 41 7 5 6 20
Japan 21 36 9 8 9 18
Russia 20 37 9 8 10 16
UK 18 39 9 5 7 23
France 18 36 9 7 9 21
27
EU 13 36 9 6 9 27
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
China 2 13 8 13 54 10
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Very likely Somewhat likely Neither likely nor unlikely
Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely Don’t know/can’t say
Six of every ten (62 percent) of the respondents remain strained, and 67 percent think the rising
believe that Australia will be one of India’s leading power is unlikely to become a key partner for
partners in the next ten years. Russia and Japan New Delhi. In fact, their wariness about bilateral
score evenly at 57 percent. Despite the long-standing engagement with China also extends to issues of
ties with Russia, it scores much lower than the US in great-power competition. When asked what India’s
respondents’ perception while looking ahead, with a position should be if US-China tensions continue to
21-percent gap between the two when asked about rise, 62 percent said India must cooperate with the
their prediction for the coming decade. US, and 32 percent favoured a neutral stance. A
mere 1 percent thought India must cooperate with
The respondents expect India-China relations to China in such a scenario, as shown in Figure 11.The percentage of respondents calling for non-metros supported such a policy. Regarding this
cooperation with the US is much higher in the non- specific issue, government sector employees have a
metros (65 percent) than the metros (52 percent). higher percentage of wanting to stay neutral. Others
About 43 percent of those in metro cities advocated expressed higher proclivity towards supporting the
remaining neutral in case of heightened US-China US (private sector, students, unemployed).
tensions, while a lower 27 percent of those living in
Figure 11: What should be India’s position if US-China tensions continue to rise?
5%
32%
28 62%
1%
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Cooperate with the US Cooperate with China
Remain neutral Don’t know/ Can’t say
The reason for a large majority supporting the idea only 23 percent said they were not concerned (See
of cooperating with the US in this scenario can be Figure 12). In line with the earlier findings on distrust
linked to their concern about the rise of China as a of China, the concern about its rise is also spread
major power in the neighbourhood. As the survey fairly uniformly among various income groups,
reveals, an overwhelming 70 percent of respondents religions and occupations, as well as across gender
said they are concerned about China’s rise, and and metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.Figure 12: Do you feel concerned about the rise of China as a major power?
7%
23%
70%
Yes No Don’t know/Can’t say
29
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Eight of every ten (80 percent) of the respondents Overall, respondents are worried regarding long-
said they were concerned about China interfering in term issues related to economic and military
India’s immediate neighbourhood (See Figure 13). development, as well as the ability of a rising power
A slightly lower 76 percent were concerned about to impact India’s interests in its neighbourhood.
China being economically more powerful than India, The urban young population perceives the China
and 75 percent said they were worried that the border challenge as an all-encompassing one – spanning
clashes with China could lead to a war. Thus, they economic, military and foreign policy domains – with
appear to be troubled by issues beyond the border potential impact on domestic stability.
clashes in eastern Ladakh that were ongoing when
the survey was conducted. Seven of every ten (70
percent) expressed concern regarding China being
militarily more powerful than India.Figure 13: How concerned are you about China on the following issues?
China is interfering 2
in India’s immediate 50 30 6 8
neighborhood 3
China is
economically more 48 28 5 3 11 4
powerful than India
The border clashes
with China will lead 47 28 4 3 10 7
to a war
China is militarily
more powerful than
India 40 31 6 4 15 5
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Very concerned Somewhat concerned Neither concerned nor unconcerned
Somewhat unconcerned Not concerned at all Don’t know/can’t say
30
It can be argued that this also accounts for the strongest opinions. This is revealed in the least
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
an increased support to the US, which is seen percentage of don’t know/can’t say responses that
as a partner that can help manage the rise of China. were registered on the answers related to these two
Due to their concerns, young India also seems countries. This reflects a greater awareness among
willing to shift away from the policy of non-alignment the respondents regarding Washington and Beijing,
towards a more active tilt to other powers like the US. which is also indicative of the focus on these issues
in the larger national debate on mainstream and
It is evident that the question of relations with the new media. The role of other leading powers, who
US and China dominates the discourse among the are also India’s close partners, captures less public
respondents and are issues on which they have attention.4. MULTILATERALISM AND GLOBALISATION
Apart from bilateral relationships, multilateralism The survey asked respondents to choose
has become a primary channel for enhancing between multilateral and bilateral cooperation as
cooperation among countries on global issues in an India’s preferred mode of engagement with other
increasingly interconnected world. However, since countries (See Figure 14). Over three of every four
the 2008 financial crisis, the efficacy of international respondents (76 percent) said that India should
organisations has been questioned and certain prioritise global cooperation through multilateral
countries have gradually reduced their engagement organisations. A much lower 24 percent preferred
with multilateral frameworks. bilateral cooperation as India’s mode of engagement
with other countries.
Figure 14: In your opinion, what should be India’s preferred mode of engagement
with other countries?
24% 31
76% SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Global cooperation Bilateral
through multilateral cooperation (%)
organisations (%)A litmus test for the significance of multilateralism multilateral cooperation or focus on national
was the COVID-19 pandemic, as states’ immediate solutions instead— the respondents appear to be
response was to close down borders and prioritise deeply divided. Forty-six percent of the respondents
local and national solutions. At the same time, the want India to develop solutions at the global level,
very nature of the pandemic highlighted that some while 34 percent indicated that India should prioritise
solutions, notably vaccine manufacturing and solutions at the national level. Only 15 percent said
distribution, would be better achieved through global that they would prefer a balance between global and
cooperation via multilateral frameworks. national efforts (See Figure 15).
In response to the question as to whether India
should devise global solutions to COVID-19 through
Figure 15: In fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, should India prioritise developing
solutions at the global level or the national level?
50%
46
45%
40%
32 35%
34
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
30%
25%
20%
15
15%
10%
4
5%
1
0%
At a Global At a National Balance between Neither at Global level Don’t know /
Level Level National and Global nor at National can’t say
Level Level
In recent years, international and regional awareness and gauge the relevance that multilateral
organisations have had to face allegations of organisations hold in the public mind, the survey
politicisation and inefficiency. This has led to a rise in asked respondents about their knowledge of some
bilateral engagements as well as new frameworks for of the most relevant multilateral organisations and
international cooperation. In order to understand the forums that India is a part of.Figure 16: Have you personally heard of the following international and regional
organisations and forums that India is a part of, before today?
United Nations 72 28
WTO (World Trade Organization) 69 31
SAARC (South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation) 54 46
G20 (Group of 20) 52 48
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa) 52 48
SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 42 58
33
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) 36 64
NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) 34 66
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Yes No
Nearly seven of every ten respondents have heard percent, respectively). Moreover, three of every four
of the largest and oldest multilateral organisations, respondents (74 percent) felt that India’s quest for
namely the United Nations (UN) and the World a permanent seat at the UN Security Council was a
Trade Organization (WTO) (72 percent and 69 very important goal for India.Figure 17: India seeks to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security
Council. Do you personally think that this is an important goal for India?
80%
74
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
17
10%
6
1 1 1
0%
Very Somewhat Neither important nor Somewhat Very Don’t know/
important important unimportant unimportant unimportant can’t say
34
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Beyond the UN and the WTO, awareness of other Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Non-
organisations and groupings reduces sharply. Aligned Movement (NAM) are at the lowest at 42
Roughly one in every two respondents have heard of percent, 36 percent, and 34 percent, respectively. It is
the G20 (Group of Twenty), the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, interesting to highlight that the urban youth reflected
India, China, and South Africa) and the South Asian very low levels of awareness of platforms such as
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) [52 NAM and SAARC. This is surprising, given that the
percent, 52 percent, and 54 percent, respectively]. former is intrinsically connected to India’s historical
Public awareness and knowledge about the approach towards foreign policy, while the latter is
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Bay an important pillar of neighbourhood engagement.
of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical andFigure 18: ‘Yes’ responses, by Education: Before today, have you personally heard of
the following international and regional organisations that India is a part of?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
UN G-20 BRICS BIMSTEC SAARC WTO SCO NAM
Illiterate 45 38 34 28 26 28 21 26 35
Primary
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
(up to 49 24 28 24 21 27 28 22
class 5th)
Up to 42 28 35 25 32 36 28 23
class 8th
Up to class 65 44 44 27 42 59 31 25
10th
Up to 73 53 52 35 53 71 41 33
class 12th
Completed
diploma/ 80 54 58 38 63 83 46 35
technical
course
University 84 63 63 44 70 85 52 43
graduate
Post-graduate
degree/ 87 68 70 49 80 93 55 55
professional
or higherA closer look at the data reveals that the respondents’ with globalisation. When asked about the impact
awareness of organisations varies widely across of globalisation across different parameters, the
demographic groups. For instance, among the urban Indian youth response was almost evenly split
urban youth, those who have completed higher between mostly good and mostly bad— this indicates
education and beyond have a greater awareness of a deep division of opinion on how globalisation has
organisations and forums (See Figure 18). Similarly, impacted India.
there is a much higher awareness of organisations
among self-employed professionals, students, This was reflected across questions related to how
government employees, skilled workers, and private globalisation has affected India, their own standard
sector employees, as opposed to unskilled workers of living, India’s economy, Indian society and culture,
and housewives. travel to and from other countries, and education
opportunities overseas (See Figure 19).
Alongside the world’s withdrawal from
multilateralism, there has been a growing discontent
Figure 19: In your opinion, how has globalisation affected your life, as well as India, in
general? For each of the following, do you think globalisation has had a mostly good
or mostly bad effect?
Education
36 opportunities 42 17 5 7 20 8
overseas
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
For India
overall 36 26 4 10 19 6
India’s society
and culture 29 23 10 13 20 5
India’s
economy 28 23 7 14 24 4
Your standard
of living 26 26 12 13 20 3
Foreigners
coming to
India for work
26 20 7 12 27 8
or stay
Indians going
abroad for
work or stay.
25 22 7 14 26 6
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Good Somewhat good No effect
Somewhat bad Bad Don’t know/can’t sayOn the impacts of globalisation, 62 percent said This has been seen in the question related to the
globalisation has had a mostly good effect on ‘India impact of globalisation on India’s economy, people’s
overall’, and 59 percent said it has had a mostly standard of living, and education opportunities
good effect for ‘education opportunities overseas.’ overseas. Similarly, the segment with a monthly
However, they are markedly more pessimistic about salary below INR 10,000 responded more negatively
how globalisation has affected India’s economy; regarding the effect on their standard of living, India’s
people’s standard of living; India’s society and culture; economy, and emigration. Interestingly, more women
and emigration and immigration. For instance, 51 as compared to men have a negative perception of
percent of respondents said that globalisation has globalisation.
had a mostly good effect on India’s economy, while
38 percent feel that it has had a mostly bad effect. Globally, this discontent has manifested itself in a
Similarly, while 47 percent of respondents feel growing demand for a focus on domestic industries,
that globalisation has had a mostly good effect on local job creation, and national growth. In India,
mobility of Indians to foreign countries; an almost the move towards self-reliance has prompted the
equal number of respondents (40 percent) feel that it Indian government to announce a INR 20 lakh crore
has had a mostly bad effect. economic package under the ‘AatmaNirbhar Bharat
Abhiyaan’. This also seeks to address the economic
Responses of the urban youth to these questions challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. An
also vary widely across demographic groups. Those overwhelming 71 percent of respondents felt this
with lower levels of education have reported a higher programme would be good for India, while only 2
37
percentage of ‘somewhat bad’ and ‘bad’ responses. percent felt that it would be ‘bad’ (See Figure 20).
SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Figure 20: Do you think the ‘AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’ scheme is mostly good or
mostly bad for India?
80%
71
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20% 16
10% 3 5
2 2
0%
Good Somewhat No effect Somewhat Bad Don’t know/
good bad can’t sayYou can also read
