The Rift: Explaining Europe's Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on Iraq
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Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) 2, 223–244
The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent
Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the
American-Led War on Iraq
JˇRGEN SCHUSTER
Eberhard Karls Universita¨t Tübingen
HERBERT MAIER
Universität Regensburg
America’s plan to attack Iraq split Europe down the middle. Why did
European countries take such different stances toward the Bush ad-
ministration’s policy? This article examines three different approaches,
each rooted in one of international relations (IRs) prominent schools of
thought, with regard to their explanatory power in this specific puzzle.
Firstly, it shows that public opinion (utilitarian–liberal approach) cannot
account for whether a state joined the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or not.
Secondly, it demonstrates that in Eastern Europe systemic forces of
power relations (neorealist approach) are suitable for explaining state
behavior, but not in Western Europe. Thirdly, it shows that the ideo-
logical orientations of governments (liberal–constructivist approach)
were the decisive factor in determining whether a state supported the
United States in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. These
results offer some interesting insights for the theoretical debate in IRs
theory and foreign policy analysis, which are discussed in the final sec-
tion of the article. In regard to foreign policy analysis, for example, the
results of this study propose to ‘‘bring political parties in.’’
America’s Iraq policy split Europe down the middle. After months of ‘‘fighting’’
inside and outside the Security Council, the United States, supported by a ‘‘coa-
lition of the willing,’’ attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003 without having obtained the
clear legitimacy they sought. Europe was deeply divided over the question of
whether it should support its main ally or ‘‘balance’’ against his Middle East plans.
Some European allies like Germany and France vehemently opposed the Bush
administration’s policy to disarm Iraq by military means and the accompanying
reorganization of the Middle East’s political landscape. Others like Spain and Po-
land explicitly supported this policy. Why did the European states take such dif-
ferent political positions toward Iraq or, more accurately, toward the United States,
Authors’ note: We thank all the people who helped to improve this article with their critical comments. We are
especially grateful to the editors, the anonymous reviewers, the participants at the Graduate Program in Inter-
national Relations at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen and the following individuals: Verena Andrei, Stephan
Bierling, Thorsten Göbel, Andreas Hasenclever, Carmen Huckel, Reinhard Meier-Walser, Philipp Schuster, and
Christian Strobel.
r 2006 International Studies Association.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.224 The Rift
despite them all having been allies of the United States, often for decades, and
rarely ever parting with Washington in major international crises in the past?
International relations (IRs) theory offers various approaches for the explanation
of international politics as well as for the analysis of particular foreign policies.
Three paradigms have been dominating the field in recent years: (neo)realism,
liberalism, and constructivism (Walt 1998; Rittberger 2001; Snyder 2004).1 As these
approaches offer different and competing explanations of foreign policy,2 it seems
worthwhile to analyze which one offers the most convincing account of the behavior
of European states during the Iraq crisis or to see, indeed, if any of them can
provide answers to such a profound and ‘‘real-world’’ question at all.
In the following section we derive three hypotheses out of these paradigms. The
competing explanatory factors of the study are systemic forces of power relations (a
neorealist approach), public opinion (a utilitarian–liberal approach), and ideological
orientations of governments (a liberal–constructivist approach).3 The neorealist or
power–structural approach regards state behavior as a function of a specific state’s
power position in the (relevant) international system. It explains variance in IRs and
foreign policy not through differences of the individual units but via different sys-
temic power constellations. The utilitarian–liberal approach and the liberal–con-
structivist approach reject this Primat der Außenpolitik. Instead, as reductionist
approaches, they explain variance in international politics and foreign policy through
differences in domestic characteristics, that is, they postulate a Primat der Innenpolitik.4
We tested these hypotheses or the explanatory factor they claim is valid, respec-
tively, on the position of 20 European states toward an American-led Iraq war. As
already mentioned, what we hope to explain with these hypotheses is the political
position the (European) states took toward an American-led attack on Iraq, that is, if
a country (openly) supported the United States endeavor and was part of the
‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or if it rejected the demand for (political) support.5
The reasons why we selected those states listed in Table 1 are manifold. Following
Mill’s ‘‘method of difference’’ we confined our cases to a certain class of countries,
European democracies, primarily because by doing so we were able to control for a
range of possibly different explanations like form of government or, partly at least,
cultural differences. Furthermore, Hypothesis 3, the partisan hypothesis, could
reasonably only be tested in ‘‘western democracies’’ and it was the behavior of some
1
See note 7 for basic literature on structural realism, page 227 for modern liberalist work, and page 231 for
prominent examples of social-constructivist writing.
2
Though it is sometimes disputed to what extent theories of IR, especially neorealism, can be used as or
translated into theories of foreign policy, all approaches stress specific factors that can be used to analyze and forecast
foreign policy. The claim that ‘‘international politics is not foreign policy’’ and that IRs theory cannot be used to
analyze foreign policy is especially maintained by Kenneth N. Waltz (1979:71–72 and 121; 1996). Waltz’s arguments
are convincingly refuted by Colin Elman (1996) and James Fearon (1998:289–313). It is quite common for IR
scholarsFneorealists are no exceptionFto analyze foreign policy with their IR-toolbox. Waltz himself makes
statements and predictions about foreign policy based on his theory (1991:667–670; 1993:45–46 and 61–76). See
Rittberger (2001) for a practical demonstration how not just hypothesis, but also theories of foreign policy can be
constructed out of IR approaches.
3
The reason why we selected these hypotheses for a closer examination is a twofold one. Firstly, each is derived
from one of the currently leading theoretical approaches to IR (see next section). Secondly, those were factors
regularly cited as possible reasons for state behavior in media reports and comments before the last Gulf War.
4
Of course, there are constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt who locate the primary source of state
behavior on the systemic level of analysis (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999). This strand of
constructivist thought is sometimes labeled as sociological institutionalism, whereas what we call liberal construct-
ivism might also be called ideationist liberalism.
5
We used a range of different criteria to establish whether a country supported the United States or not. As the
most obvious form of assistance, we regarded direct military participation in the war. Unhesitating and open passive
military help also has to be regarded as support as well as troop commitment in the aftermath of the war, especially if
this was not subject to the condition of a UN mandate. Furthermore, we especially focused on top official’s speeches,
interviews, etc. We also considered a country’s behavior in international organizations like the UN. Finally, we also
thought the assessment of other countries to be of importance and therefore regarded the White House’s list(s) of
coalition partners as a helpful tool.JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 225
TABLE 1. Illustration of Power Positions
Military
Relative Rank Expenditure Relative Rank Relative Rank
Countryn GDP GDP (GDP) (ME) ME (ME) Population Population Population
Belgium 251,000 2.9 8 3,600 2.0 9 10.2 2.2 11
Bulgaria 41,600 0.5 16 1,240 0.7 15 7.9 1.7 14
Czech Republic 132,000 1.5 11 3,000 1.7 10 10.3 2.3 10
Denmark 172,000 2.0 9 2,780 1.6 11 5.3 1.2 16
Germany 2,090,000 24.1 1 32,600 18.3 3 82.6 18.2 1
Estonia 11,800 0.1 20 173 0.1 19 1.4 0.3 20
Francew 1,440,000 16.6 3 38,900 21.8 1 59.1 13.0 3
Great Britainw 1,450,000 16.7 2 36,500 20.5 2 59.4 13.1 2
Greece 128,000 1.5 12 6,060 3.4 8 10.6 2.3 9
Hungary 111,000 1.3 14 1,880 1.1 14 10.2 2.2 11
Italy 1,160,000 13.4 4 23,700 13.3 4 57.6 12.7 4
Latvia 15,100 0.2 19 144 0.1 20 2.4 0.5 18
Lithuania 24,000 0.3 18 314 0.2 18 3.6 0.8 17
Netherlands 397,000 4.6 6 7,030 3.9 6 15.8 3.5 8
Poland 324,000 3.7 7 6,690 3.8 7 38.7 8.5 6
Portugal 112,000 1.3 13 2,410 1.4 12 10.0 2.2 13
Romania 134,000 1.5 10 2,190 1.2 13 22.5 5.0 7
Slovakia 56,300 0.6 15 1,010 0.6 16 5.4 1.2 15
Slovenia 31,900 0.4 17 436 0.2 17 1.9 0.4 19
Spain 589,000 6.8 5 7,560 4.2 5 39.4 8.7 5
Sum: 8,670,700 100.0 178,217 100.0 454.3 100.0
United Statesw 9,260,000 281,000 273.0
Russiaw 625,000 35,000 147.0
n
Data rounded and for the year of 1999. GDP and military expenditure in million U.S. dollar, population in milllion
inhabitants. Relative data only refers to the proportion of the examined countries.
w
Nuclear powers.
European allies of the United States that sparked off a debate about the future of
transatlantic relations and NATO and the EU.6
Power, Office, or (Ideology-Based) Identities?
The Systemic Level: Power Positions and Power Politics
Hypothesis 1 explains different state behavior through varying material restrictions
and opportunities on the systemic level. It does not take into account internal
mechanisms and constellations of states. This neorealist or power–structural per-
spective on the Iraq dispute offers the hypothesis thatFbecause of differences in
their power positionFthe ‘‘Great’’ European powers should oppose the United
States, whereas the small ones should lean toward supporting the superpower. This
thesis can be established via two different, but closely related, lines of argument.
Balance-of-Power Politics
Although neorealists sometimes offer rather dissimilar theses about foreign policy
behavior, they do share some basic assumptions and conclusions.7 All neorealists see
6
Except for Luxembourg, we compared all those European countries that are a member of both NATO and the
EU or can hope to join both clubs until the end of this decade. This leaves all neutral European states out, which
seems justifiable as such states generally reject taking sides in military conflicts of third parties. This can be regarded
as a sufficient reason to explain why none of these countries actively supported the offensive U.S. policy.
7
For assumptions and core elements of structural neorealist thought, see, for example, Waltz (1979, 1995),
Mearsheimer (1995:9–14; 2001:1–54), Elman (1996:18–21), and Baumann et al. (2001:38–42).226 The Rift
states as unitary and the central actors in an anarchic international system, where
no superior authority exists. From a neorealist point of view all states face rather
harsh security pressures in such a setting.8 Ultimately they are dependent on self-
help. The prerequisite to survive is power.9 States therefore act rather similar. They
seek power as a means to secure survival (Waltz 1979:79–80). Power enhances a
state’s freedom of action, its autonomy, and gives it influence over other states: both
of which improve its security. Power and security can be obtained by increasing
one’s own military capabilities. An alternative way to defend oneself from the
influence of other, maybe stronger, powers is to engage in alliances (Waltz
1979:118–119; Link 2001:107).
The central element of structural realism is the concept of structure. According to
Kenneth Waltz, a political structure is determined by three characteristics: the or-
dering principle, the functional properties of the units, and the unit’s power re-
lations (Waltz 1979:ch. 5). As anarchy is seen as a quasi-constant condition in the
international world, which does not allow for the functional differentiation of units,
the only relevant difference between states is their relative power capabilities. In
international politics, the distribution of power is what counts. In order to explain
the behavior of individual states, the systemic variable ‘‘distribution of power’’ has
to be translated into a unit-level variable. This produces the relative power of a state
in a system as the relevant neorealist-independent variable for foreign policy anal-
ysis. In neorealist understanding a nation’s foreign policy should be explainable
and predictable through identifying its power position (Baumann, Rittberger, and
Wagner 2001:42).
It is important to note that the main motive that guides the actions of states does
not necessarily have to be the whole international system and a state’s power po-
sition within the global power structure (Mearsheimer 1990:7). For most states,
excluding great and superpowers, who are supposed to have much further reach-
ing interests, the power structure within their ‘‘salient environment’’ (i.e., their
neighborhood) is relevant, because ‘‘power and incentives wane with distance from
states’ homebase’’ (Mouritzen 1998:4). Neighboring countries and those who are
rather close possess a greater potential for influence, because the possibilities of
economic and military power projection decline with increasing distance. There-
fore, balancing alliance behavior is not foremost aimed at the greatest power, but
rather focused on those states that pose the potentially greatest (negative) influ-
ence-potential or even threat (Walt 1987:esp. 23–24 and 153–165).10 In terms of
security seeking, the aim of a state’s balance politics is to prevent other states from
gaining (dominating) influence over it. This is why countries balance in a way that
minimizes their (expected) loss in autonomy, or, in other words, that maximizes
their (expected) long-term freedom of action (Baumann, Rittberger, and Wagner
2001:46).11
The small European states’ freedom of action and autonomy is most likely con-
strained by the great European countries, whose freedom of action is again
8
Liberals, Institutionalists, and Constructivists typically do not doubt that the international system is anarchic.
But they reject the classical neorealist conclusion that this property inevitably produces a high security pressure,
which makes power politics a necessity and genuine cooperation impossible (Wendt 1992; Powell 1994).
9
For short definitions of power and its components see Waltz (1979:131) and Morgenthau (1973). For further
discussions of this central but elusive concept, see for example, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001:71–75) and Baldwin
(1993:3–25). Because of their importance and their relative ease to measure and compare, we took the following
three components of power into account: military power, measured by military expenditure, economic power,
measured by GDP, and the size of the population (see Table 1). Thereby, we focus on the ‘‘input dimension’’ of
power and follow the neorealist understanding of power as control over resources (Mastanduno 1999:141; Wolf
2004).
10
The geographical proximity is a core element of Walt’s ‘‘Balance-of-Threat-theory,’’ which says that states do
note balance against power alone, but against threats.
11
Obviously, in this perspective neorealism is not an evolutionary theory, but a theory of collective rational
choice, which makes predictions about specific foreign policy actions possible.JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 227
foremost curtailed by the United States. Thus it can be argued that the great
European powers tend to balance, or at least try to balance, against the United
States to enhance their own autonomy and influence, while the small European
states tend to balance (with the help of the United States) against the powerful
European countries for the same reason (Link 2001:134).
The same hypothesis can be derived with a slightly different line of argument,
which is in principle based on considerations of balance of power, too.
Alliance Dependencies
Alliance politics is often explained with reference to conditions of dependence. The
argument is that asymmetric dependent allies face an alliance dilemma. On the one
hand, they have to fear being dragged into the others’ conflicts, especially those of
the leading power. On the other hand, they are afraid of being abandoned by the
leading ally. This concern will be greater if a state is dependent on his ‘‘great
partner’’ and minor if the alliance leader is in turn (at least indirectly) dependent on
the former (Snyder 1984; Kupchan 1988; Bennet, Lepgold, and Unger 1994).
For the small European states, a sound relationship with the United States ap-
pears much more important than for the powerful countries, because they cannot
guarantee their security autonomously. They are much more vulnerable to influ-
ences from other, larger countries, as they are too weak without a strong partner.
Whereas the powerful states can self-confidently confront the United States because
their risk in doing so is simply relatively low, in small states the fear not to anger the
superpower should prevail.12 For them it is appropriate to demonstrate their loy-
alty in order to reassure themselves of further support from the United States and
to make clear their own relevance. This, in essence, is the classical balance-of-power
argument ‘‘disguised’’ as alliance dependency.
Whether argued directly with balance politics or indirectly with alliance depend-
encies: the neorealist forecast says that the small European states tend to support
the American Iraq policy because it is American power that enhances their security
and strengthens their autonomous freedom of action by holding in check the power
of the bigger European states (Link 2002:41).
But which are the small and the Great Powers in Europe? Table 1 illustrates the
relative capabilities of the analyzed countries using the indicators of economic
strength, military expenditures, and population.
Obviously, Germany, the nuclear powers France and Great Britain, but also Italy
stand apart. According to the applied indicators, these four countries constitute the
group of the great European powers, whereas the 16 remaining countries are
considered to be small states (similarly Mearsheimer 1990). The country-specific
neorealist forecast is therefore that Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy
should oppose the Unites States’ Iraq ambitions, but the rest should support
Washington.
Subsystemic Level: Societal Forces and Ideological Preferences
Whereas the power–structural hypothesis sees the configuration of power resourc-
es of unitary states as crucial, Hypotheses 2 and 3 identify domestic configurations
as relevant factors determining foreign policy. For (modern) liberals and liberal-
constructivists, the international system does not determine states’ preferences and
actions. From a domestic politics perspective the sources of foreign policy lie in the
material and ideal interests of individuals and groups, the relations between them,
and their relative strengths. Domestic actors and structures explain states’ prefer-
ences and actions (Moravcsik 1997, 2003). The main foreign policy actor is a
12
Remember that the small European states’ experience with the United States is very positive. It was the
United States that fended off a hegemonic attempt by a European great power three times within one century.228 The Rift
country’s government. Its ‘‘core shared beliefs and interests’’ are said to be ‘‘the
primary motivational basis . . . of foreign policy’’ (Hagan 1995:133), especially in
very important issue areas like security. Thus Hypothesis 2 examines how signif-
icant the domestic interests of governments were. In essence, it postulates that the
preferences of society determine the actions of governments. Hypothesis 3 exam-
ines whether the ideological stances of governments played a role in determining a
country’s position during the Iraq crisis. It claims that the party affiliation of a
government, that is, if an administration is left or right orientated, is the decisive
factor in determining the position a country took.
Influence of Public Opinion
One central argument of utilitarian–liberal approaches is that, in democracies at
least, societal interests shape the behavior of governments and therefore of states,
because rational politicians adapt to the interests of society in order to assure re-
election and stay in power. To put it rather simplistically but vividly, representative
government acts as a ‘‘transmission belt’’ that translates individual and group in-
terests into public policy (Moravcsik 1997:518).13 In such a conception of public
policy, public opinion, elites’ attitudes, and positions of interests groups are decisive
factors for political action.
This study focuses on public opinion and asks to what extent it can explain the
behavior of European states during the Iraq crisis. Hypothesis 2 assumes that the
general public has a distinct and measurable impact on the foreign policy behavior
of countries. The core statement of this ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach is that ‘‘[i]n sum,
leaders follow masses’’ (Risse-Kappen 1991:480). Whereas it was nearly consensus
for several decades that mass public opinion plays only a very minor role in foreign
policy, if any, this interpretation has been considerably challenged over the last 20
years. A growing number of studies reached the conclusion that ‘‘mass public opinion
matter[s]’’ (Risse-Kappen 1991:510, emphasis in the original).14 The thesis that mass
public opinion has an effect on policy should be especially true if a broad public is
activated (Powlick and Katz 1998). This was surely the case with the Iraq question,
which was hotly debated around Europe. Furthermore, the hypothesis exists that
the influence of mass public opinion grows as more, especially issue specific, survey
data become available to politicians (Holsti 1996:195). Therefore we operational-
ized the influence of society, its beliefs, interests, and actors through the concept of
mass public opinion.15 We applied two criteria to measure public opinion. Firstly,
we considered the results of surveys. Secondly, we analyzed the extent of public
protests.
However, some problems with the case-specific formulation of the hypothesis that
mass public opinion determines a government’s Iraq policy should be discussed.
First of all, second-hand survey data had to be used. There were some cross-
country surveys available, but in order to get a broader picture it was essential to
use country-specific surveys as well. Therefore, and because of changes over time, it
seems reasonable to allow for a rather wide tolerance. Furthermore, especially if
13
Clearly, this argument is based on the concept of political actors as rational utility maximizers as it is for-
mulated in classical economic theory of politics and pluralist theory of democracy. From that perspective the
aspiration of politicians to ‘‘attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office’’ (Downs
1957:28) finally acts as the mechanism that makes society’s preferences those of governments.
14
For overviews of the debate about the effect of public opinion on foreign policy see Russett (1990:87–110),
Holsti (1992), and Shapiro and Jacobs (2000:223–245).
15
This operationalization of societal attitudes also results from the nature of the examined problem. The
influence of private interest groups etc. should be rather low in the analyzed situation compared with situations with
distributional effects, because ‘‘in the case of broader political and security issues, powerful domestic actors do not
frame policy decisions as they do on domestic matters’’ (Banchoff 1993:12). Furthermore, the influence that private
interest groups can exert in politicized issues seems to be largely dependent on the support of mass public opinion
(Risse-Kappen 1991:510–511).JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 229
prediction: country does ‘neutral range’ prediction: country
H 2a
not support the U.S. supports the U.S.
share of population 0.6 0.5 0.4
against attack
mass protests
against an
Iraq-war
prediction: country does
H 2b prediction: country supports the U.S.
not support the U.S.
FIG. 1. Decision rule for the societal hypothesis.
measurement difficulties are considered, it is rather unlikely that a government will
follow public opinion if there is no clear or a changing majority. Thus, it was
deemed necessary to specify an ‘‘undetermined’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ range, which we
defined as instances where between 40% and 60% of the people were against or for
an Iraq invasion in the weeks and months before the beginning of the war. Only if
more than 60% persistently opposed an attack would it be expected that the gov-
ernment followed in its policy.
It is clearly a weakness when for a particular value range of an independent
variable no meaningful prediction can be formulated. Thus, we formulated Hy-
pothesis 2 in a second version, which argues that only if public opinion is clearly
against an invasion, that is, if more than 60% oppose such an action, a country will
take a corresponding stance. If opposition is below that threshold, Hypothesis 2b
predicts that a country supports the United States.16
As mentioned above, besides survey data, we employed a second criterion to
determine the public’s attitude. As an indicator of salience we considered to what
extent people took to the street to express their opinion. If there were mass dem-
onstrations against an Iraq war, it can be argued that there was clear public pressure
on the government, even if the general public mood was in the ‘‘neutral’’ range.
Consequently, under such circumstances a government should have taken an op-
posing stance against the United States as well, according to the societal hypoth-
esis.17 As describing all possible constellations and predictions of Hypothesis 2a and
2b would be too long winded for this paper, Figure 1 shows the possible values and
the accompanying forecasts of these hypotheses. The dotted arrows show when and
how mass protests altered the classification compared with survey data.
Do Parties Matter?
The third or partisan hypothesis suggests that the ideological background of a
government, which is expressed in its party affiliation, has a major influence on
foreign policy. Governments formed by left-of-center parties or at least dominated
by leftist parties are expected to oppose America’s Iraq policy. Governments
16
This argument needs at least one further auxiliary assumption. For example, it can be argued that, for
diplomatic reasons, a country tends to support a friendly nation, because it seeks to avoid conflict not only on the
domestic level, but also on the international level. Only if domestic opposition is obvious, a government should
withdraw from its predisposed supporting stance. See Bennet et al. (1994). In the strict sense, this argument leaves
the subsystemic level and employs a third-image argument.
17
This argument rests on the consideration that even with unclear survey data, a significant part of the pop-
ulation is highly mobilized if hundreds of thousands of people take to the street. A very strong issue-specific
activation suggests that the relevant issue has a significant impact on the overall valuation of a government or party.
Thus, this issue should be relevant for the voting decisions of an important part of society.230 The Rift
formed by or dominated by right-of-center parties are supposed to back the United
States.
Obviously, this hypothesis implies a very different conception of political actors.
They are not primarily regarded as utility maximizers, who derive utility only from
being in office. On the contrary, this hypothesis models political actors as mainly
policy oriented. It assumes that their first and foremost concern is to shape their
countries’ policy according to their political beliefs or ideology.
According to the ‘‘partisan theory’’ (Hibbs 1992), political actors are, with limits
of course, able to do this. Partisan theory suggests that the partisan composition of a
government is a major determinant of policy outputs and outcomes as well. Party
ideologies are thought to be relevant for public policy (Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1996;
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997; Boix 1998).
Regularly policy preferences are operationalized through the left–right scheme.
We followed this scheme and grouped all major parties and all governments in
either the right category or the left one. Social-democratic, socialist, communist,
green and social-liberal parties were counted as left parties. The category of right
parties consists of conservative, liberal and liberal-conservative, Christian-demo-
cratic, and center-parties.18 We applied two criteria for that classification. The first
criterion was the way a party sees itself, which is expressed in which international
party organization a party is a (associate) member.19 Secondly, the political science
literature about European parties and their ideological orientation and media re-
ports were used to classify the parties.20
The hypothesis that leftist parties, and therefore governments dominated by
leftist parties, should oppose the Iraq policy of the Bush administration rests on
three considerations. Firstly, it can be argued that ideological kinship plays a role in
international coalition-building processes, which implies that right-orientated gov-
ernments tend to support a conservative U.S. administration.21 Secondly, the po-
litical left tends to value peace and nonmilitary conflict resolution higher, especially
when there is no ‘‘clear’’ humanitarian cause for an intervention.22 Thirdly, anti-
American sentiment seems to be stronger within the European left than the (mod-
erate) right.
Although the partisan hypothesis is widely examined, discussed, and usually
affirmed in Comparative Politics and Comparative Economics, it is neglected in
Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis and IRs. Studies that explicitly examine
whether the ‘‘color’’ of a state’s government makes a difference for its external
behavior in comparative perspective are very rare, even though disagreements
between parties over foreign policy issues are quite common and often as fiercely
debated as those about domestic issues.23
This neglect of party politics in the analysis of foreign policy and IRs is partic-
ularly noteworthy, because the ‘‘partisan theory’’ lies at the center of democratic
legitimation. It is also remarkable because, with the ‘‘constructivist turn’’ (Checkel
18
A complete list of the 116 examined parties and their classification can be downloaded at http://www.uni-
regensburg.de/Fakultaeten/phil_Fak_III/Politikwissenschaft/html/herbert_maier_downloads.html.
19
Member lists are provided by all major international party organizations. See www.europeangreens.org,
www.eldr.org, www.evppe.org, www.pes.org, www.liberal-international.org, and www.socialistinternational.org.
20
Besides country-specific articles about party systems that cannot all be listed here, we mainly used Ismayr
(2002, 2003) and Bugajski (2002), which provide a good overview of European party systems.
21
The assumption behind this argument is that ideological kinship involves a similar belief system or set of
normative political attitudes, which leads to a similar assessment of problems and a similar policy, respectively.
22
The dimensions ‘‘peace’’ and ‘‘military’’ are important indicators for classifying parties on the left–right
continuum (Budge and Klingemann 2001).
23
Of course, some studies on foreign policy analyze the role of political parties, but mostly those are country-
specific studies (see, for example, Banchoff 1993; Verbeek 2003). Comparative studies are rare. Exceptions are, for
example, Zürn (1993), Kittel, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig (1995), Kaarbo (1996), and Therien and Noel (2000).
Therien and Noel provide a short overview of the spare literature about the impact of political parties on foreign
policy as well.JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 231
Theoretical Level of Actor Actor’s Actor’s Independent Hypothesis
Background analysis basic Preference variable
interest
Structural Third- State Survival, Maximizing Power position Weak states
realism image security autonomy and support U.S.,
(neorealism) influence strong oppose.
Utilitarian Second- Government (Re-)election Determined by Societal States, whose
liberalism image to attain (exogenous) preference public is
office societal (public against an
preference opinion) Iraq-war,
oppose an
attack.
Liberal Second- Government, Convert Assumption: Left Party Left
constructivism image party elites partisan is stronger affiliation of governments
(idealist identity into peace-orientated government oppose the
liberalism) public policy and more U.S.’s Iraq-
skeptical against policy, right
(conservative) governments
U.S.-policy. support the
U.S.
FIG. 2. Overview of the examined hypotheses.
1998) in IRs, a new (or renewed) emphasis has been put on ideational factors like
beliefs, norms, ideas, and culture (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Klotz 1995;
Finnemore 1996a; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999; Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner
2001).24 In principle, nothing speaks against locating the ‘‘intersubjectively shared,
value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour’’ (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wag-
ner 2001:106), which constructivists claim to guide actors’ behavior at the level of
political parties or party ideologies, respectively. If parties and governments took a
distinguishable position according to their ideological background, then they did so
because they differently interpreted or constructed the situation, as they had dif-
ferent identities or normative visions about appropriate political behavior.
The next section presents the empirical answers to the question of whether it
were international power structures, public opinion, or party ideologies that had
the dominant impact on the Iraq policy of European states in the months before the
war. Before this presentation, Figure 2 gives a short overview of the three hypoth-
eses derived above.
Results
In this section the results of the hypotheses tests on the 20 European countries
listed above will be presented. The dichotomous values of the variables were de-
rived with the help of case studies, which examined the behavior of each country
from summer 2002 until summer 2003.25
Table A1, which can be found in the appendix, summarizes those values for each
country. Tables A2–A5 summarizes the performance of the hypotheses tested, with
Tables A3–A5 providing some simple statistics as well.
Hypothesis 1: Small States and Great Powers
Out of 16 small states only three did not declare themselves part of the ‘‘coalition of
the willing’’ and did not lend their political, sometimes even military, support to the
24
We use the term constructivism in the sense of ‘‘soft’’ or ‘‘thin’’ constructivism (Carlsnaes 2002; Palan 2000).
25
For those case studies and their sources, see Schuster (2004).232 The Rift
United States, namely Belgium, Greece, and Slovenia, with Slovenia being rather
unsure for quite a long time. Together with Belgium, France and Germany, the two
leading continental powers, fiercely opposed the United States. But the other two
Great Powers, Great Britain and Italy, supported the United States.
With a ‘‘hit rate’’ of 75%, the power-structural hypothesis scored rather high as
Tables A2 and A3 show (see appendix). Several further points are also noteworthy.
In several cases Hypothesis 1 is the only hypothesis that offers a correct forecast. All
those casesFEstonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Ro-
maniaFare former communist countries in Middle-Eastern Europe. And the only
ex-communist country that did not align itself with the United States was Slovenia,
although for several months it seemed as if Slovenia would declare itself part of the
‘‘coalition of the willing.’’ Obviously, in the eastern parts of Europe the power-
structural hypothesis scored well. Not so much in Western Europe, where its fore-
cast and actual behavior fit in 6 out of 10 cases and where alternative accounts attain
a better record.
Hypothesis 2: The Sceptical People
In all but a few European countries, the public’s attitude toward an Iraq interven-
tion was clearly hostile against an invasion (see Tables A2 and A4 in the appendix).
European societies generally were very skeptical against the United States Iraq
policy. In no country was there a clear and permanent majority for a military
solution of the Iraq crisis. On the contrary, in most countries a clear majority
rejected an attack, even if supported by a further United Nations Security Council
Resolution. Nearly everywhere, sending own troops to Iraq was regarded as
anathema by large majorities. In some states, however, public opinion was rather
undetermined. Public opinion about the right Iraq policy was unclear in Bulgaria,
Denmark, Poland, and Romania before the war, where nearly half of the population
expressed consent to America’s Iraq policy and wanted their governments to sup-
port the United States. Opinion polls showed similar figures for Great Britain, but
contrary to the four countries listed above, Britain saw substantial public unrest as
hundred of thousands took to the streets to protest against an imminent attack and
their own government’s support of such a move. Germany, Italy, and Spain, to
name just the most striking examples, saw massive public protests as well. In those
countries, but also in France, Greece, and so forth, opinion polls showed a crystal
clear picture with up to 90% rejecting an invasion and support of an intervention.
Despite this sometimes massive public resistance, governments generally did not
follow public opinion. In fact, the forecast of the societal hypothesis was correct in
only 31% (Hypothesis 2a) and 45% (Hypothesis 2b) of the cases, respectively. Ad-
ditionally, there were no cases in which public opinion served as the only expla-
nation for the relevant country’s political position. Although there are clear signs
that some governments that supported the United States, like those of Spain, Italy,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic, became more cautious with mounting public
opposition and, for example, backed away from once offered active military sup-
port, no country that stood in the camp of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ altered its
pro-American position and shirked from its political support.
As just indicated, public pressure seems to have influenced governments in their
decisions about the use of their own military forces.26 Although the dependent
variable of this study is the political stance a country took, it seemed worthwhile to
analyze how well the societal hypothesis would have fared, if the dependent var-
iable had been altered into ‘‘active military participation in an Iraq intervention.’’
Clearly, a forecast about military participation of European countries in an Iraq war
based on the public’s stance would have scored very well with a ‘‘hitrate’’ of nearly
26
Chan and Safran (2006) and Schuster (2004) provide a more detailed discussion of this issue.JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 233
90%. As there is further evidence from the case studies that some governments
really backed away from military support and constrained their support for the
United States at the political level in the face of public opposition, it can be argued
that the public’s will is generally mighty enough to hinder the use of military force,
but it seems not to be influential enough to determine key political foreign policy
positions.
Hypothesis 3: Party PoliticsFThe Left Versus the Right?
The result of the partisan hypothesis is somewhat ambivalent, but very interesting
(see again Tables A2 and A5 in the appendix). In 12 out of 20 cases a state took the
position expected by the partisan hypothesis. Overall, this result is not very im-
pressive, but a closer look reveals some interesting details. Whereas in Middle
Eastern Europe the partisan hypothesis correctly predicted only 4 out of 10 cases, it
was wrong in only two West European Countries: in Britain and France. However,
in both countries there was clear case evidence that the parties of the right were
more supportive toward the United States than those on the left. France, by the
way, was the only country with a right-of-center leadership that opposed the United
States’ Iraq policy. And Britain’s labor government was the only leftist West Eu-
ropean government which supported the United States. In contrast, six out of
seven left-of-center governments in Eastern Europe positioned their country in the
‘‘coalition of the willing.’’ In this part of Europe, the ideological orientation of a
government, measured in the categories of left-of-center and right-of-center, ob-
viously has no explanatory power for a country’s position during the Iraq crisis. In
Western Europe though, the party affiliation of a government seems to be a good
indicator of how a country behaved during the Iraq crisis, as Table A2 and espe-
cially the low value of the Fisher–Yates test on statistical independence show (see
Table A5).
The hypothesis that leftist parties tended to object to the U.S.-led invasion,
whereas the political right supported this action, gets further support from a more
detailed analysis of the positions of individual parties. Table 2 summarizes the
results of this analysis, which examined the stance of 116 European parties or their
leadership, respectively. It shows a significant relationship between the ideological
orientation of parties and their stances during the months before the Iraq war. This
relationship is weaker in Eastern European countries than in Western European
ones, but is nevertheless significant. Still, the main point is that there exists a clear
difference between Eastern and Western Europe.
TABLE 2. Summary of European Political Parties’ Positions
Fisher–Yates Percentage
Test on Statistical K Coefficient Rate
Independence (Normed) f (Via w2) Difference l
w
All parties 0.0000 0.7265 0.5988 60.28 0.5769
Western European partiesw 0.0000 0.9100 0.8406 81.58 0.7647
Eastern European partiesn 0.0245 0.4164 0.3081 29.31 0.0000
All opposition parties 0.0000 0.7715 0.6509 59.87 0.4000
Western European opposition partiesw 0.0018 0.8473 0.7483 60.00 0.3333
Eastern European opposition partiesn 0.0171 0.6125 0.4805 48.48 0.4167
All governmental partiesw 0.0004 0.6346 0.5021 45.03 0.0714
Western European governmental partiesw 0.0001 0.9023 0.8286 82.86 0.8000
Eastern European governmental parties 0.2689 0.3093 0.2241 15.93 0.0000
n
Passed exact Fisher–Yeates test at a ¼ 0.05.
w
Passed exact Fisher–Yeates test at a ¼ 0.01.
N ¼ 116.234 The Rift
The partisan hypothesis clearly holds for oppositional parties, both in Eastern
and Western Europe. For governmental parties, however, only in Western Europe
does a strong and significant relationship between the ideological orientations of
parties and their positions regarding an Iraq intervention exist. Eastern European
parties in government mostly did not act as expected according to their ideological
background. Obviously, it did not really matter in former communist states if a
country had a left-of-center or right-of-center government. It did make a significant
difference in Western Europe though.
The observation that an overall relationship between parties’ ideologies and po-
sitions toward America’s Iraq policy exists, as it is clearly visible in the opposition
parties’ stances, has an apparent implication. In the western part of Europe ide-
ological preferences generally transformed into foreign policy. In the eastern part,
those ideological attitudes were superimposed by other forces and consequently
had no effect.
The results described so far can be further validated by a short significance test.
With a simple binomial test, we examined whether the results of the hypotheses
were just accidental, that is, could just as well have been achieved through simple
guessing or by tossing a coin; or if the knowledge of a state’s power position, the
party affiliation of its government, or the public’s attitude significantly enhanced
the chances to predict correctly if a country was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’
or not. The results of this test, which formally reads H1: pi40.5 (H0: pi 0.5), with
pi being the proportion of correctly predicted cases, are presented in Table 3.
Cleary, this test confirms the results described above. Knowledge of public opin-
ion could not really help to forecast a European country’s political position on an
American-led Iraq intervention. A forecast about military support for the United
States, though, would have been rather reliable and clearly not accidental if based
on the public sentiment about such a policy. The same is true for the power-
structural hypothesis, especially in Eastern Europe, and the partisan hypothesis in
Western Europe. In these cases it is highly unlikely that the observed proportion of
congruence between prediction and actual behavior could have been achieved
through random guessing.
Power in the East–Ideology in the West?
One major result of this study so far has been that the explanatory power of the
partisan and the power structural hypotheses differ sharply in the western and the
eastern part of Europe. The partisan hypothesis offers a convincing account for the
TABLE 3. Test of Results’ Superiority Against Guessing
Proportional Proportional
Right Wrong Right Wrong N P(x r)w
Hypothesis 1n 15 5 0.75 0.25 20 0.0207
Hypothesis 1 (West) 6 4 0.60 0.40 10 0.3770
Hypothesis 1 (East)n 9 1 0.90 0.10 10 0.0107
Hypothesis 2 (a) 5 11 0.31 0.69 16 0.9616
Hypothesis 2 (b) 9 11 0.45 0.55 20 0.7483
Hypothesis 2 (Military)n 17 2 0.89 0.11 19 0.0004
Hypothesis 3 12 8 0.60 0.40 20 0.2517
Hypothesis 3 (West)n 8 2 0.80 0.20 10 0.0547
Hypothesis 3 (East) 4 6 0.40 0.60 10 0.8281
n
Significant at a ¼ 0.1.
w
Probability that a ‘‘success rate’’ at least as good as the actual rate would have been achieved by pure guessing, with r
being the number of correctly predicted cases by each hypothesis.JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 235 behavior of West European governments, but cannot explain the positions of their eastern counterparts. The power-structural hypothesis is well placed to account for the supportive behavior of nearly all Eastern European countries, but the power position of a country seems to be a rather inadequate indicator of behavior in Western Europe. But what can account for the different explanatory power of the power structural and the partisan hypothesis in different regions of Europe? Why had there been obviously dissimilar motivational sources of foreign policy? Apparently, an inter- vening variable had to be at work. Two rivalry explanations seem plausible: one that stresses cultural factors and one that is located at the systemic level and stresses differences in the security environment or its perception, respectively. The second explanation seems more convincing. We argue that the dissimilar security situation is the prevailing reason, that is, the intervening variable, why systemic forces operated in Eastern Europe but not in Western Europe and made Eastern European countries support the United States regardless of domestic con- figurations. After all, it is plausible that a country which faces tougher security pressures and more negative influence scenarios from its neighbors is more likely to look for a strong partner to provide shelter and security. As long as the small European states are, or perceive themselves as, dependent on the United States for security, they are likely to strive for a close and untroubled relationship with the United States. Of course, this is true for all small states in Europe. But the argument is that Eastern European states live in a worse, or perceive a worse, security en- vironment, which makes power political considerations prevalent and pushes do- mestic motives aside. A possible decline in the relationship with the United States seems much graver for those states under the assumption of a declining marginal utility of security. Without dwelling on details, it can be argued that a worse ob- jective security situation can be established through the higher political instability in neighboring regions and through the potentially dominating influence of Russia, from which those states just ‘‘escaped.’’ In the end, it has no consequences at all for the observation that domestic con- stellations did not influence the security policy of the former communist states, but had generally a decisive weight in Western Europe if the security situation is just perceived or objectively determinable. Nonetheless, there is an argument that speaks against the predominance of alternative, that is, cultural explanations like the argument that the Eastern European countries are all former communist countries which had just been freed by the United States and because of this are more willing to engage in the liberation of subjugated countries. If these interpretations were the most convincing, then there should have been no significant difference in the behavior of governmental and oppositional parties as cultural and perceptional factors should have the same effect on a party, re- gardless of whether it is in opposition or if it governs. The oppositional parties in Eastern Europe therefore generally should not have acted according to the partisan hypothesis. However, they did (see Table 2). The fact that the Eastern European parties in government, but not the oppos- itional parties, generally took a pro-American stance regardless of their political background supports the interpretation that there exists an objectively more pre- carious security situation in Eastern Europe, according to which those governments were forced to act. But there is also evidence that cultural and/or perceptional factors played at least a minor role because, as Table 2 also shows, the relationship between ideological background and political stance in the Iraq issue is clearly weaker in Eastern Eu- ropean countries than in Western European ones. The essence of the empirical results of this study can be summarized as follows. Domestic constellations, or more precisely, the ideological background of govern- ments, generally decided if a country was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ in
236 The Rift
Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, though, domestic constellations did not play a
role. There, states predominantly acted according to structural forces at the sys-
temic level.
Implications for IRs Theory
This last section focuses on two implications of our empirical study for the the-
oretical debate in IRs and foreign policy analysis. We argue that (1) neorealist
theory would benefit from acknowledging the possibility of varying security pres-
sure independent of a state’s power position, and (2) political parties should receive
greater attention in the analysis of foreign policy.
The obvious dependency of the explanatory power of the structural approach on
the security environment a state faces implies that, in security issues, too, the scope
of the neorealist theory is more limited than claimed by its advocates. Power con-
siderations only seem to govern foreign policy if a country’s security position is
fragile or is perceived as fragile. Where threats are small, neorealist accounts score
poorly. This leads to the thesis that neorealist theory is not a very suitable model to
account for foreign policy in regions like Western Europe, where national policy is,
at least to a certain degree, transformed by institutional arrangements, etc., and
where no significant external threat to autonomy can be perceived. The worst-case
assumption of structural realism seems not to describe correctly the actual calcu-
lation of political actors in those ‘‘safe regions.’’ There, considerations of power
typically seem to be superimposed by domestic factors.
Neorealist approaches could enhance their plausibility and applicability, espe-
cially in the field of alliance and balance politics if they employed a state’s security
position as the explanatory variable (or at least explicitly recognized the security
environment as an intervening variable) instead of the power position. The security
position can be understood as consisting of the power position and further com-
ponents which, independently of power relations have an effect on the security of a
country. Instead of being a function of its power position, the foreign policy of a
country should be understood as a function of its security position.
In such a model, the security position increases both with an increasing power
position and with a better power-independent security position. If the power po-
sition of a country is very weak because of its own minor capabilities and/or the
system’s power structure, then its security position is solely determined by power-
independent factors. If the security environment is very fragile and threatening,
then the security and autonomy of a country is largely, or even totally, dependent
on its power position (and those of its allies).
Under the common neorealist premise that states derive utility from security and
under the assumption of a declining marginal rate of utility from security, states will
strive less for power, and balance of power politics will determine policy less, the
better its security position is, because a marginal change in security has comparably
little impact on a state’s utility under the condition of high security. Following from
this, and from the variability of security independent of power, power and balance
politics will not play a major role if the security position is good, even if the dis-
tribution of power would suggest such policies. Especially if a good security position
is mainly a result of power-independent factors, states are supposed to be relatively
relaxed about a marginal change in their power position. However, if a state’s
security position is bad, we expect it to be much more sensitive to changes in
relative power and to act much more according to power and alliance motives.27
27
This view is very similar to Stephen Walt’s ‘‘Balance of Threat’’ theory and partly derived from it as the
informed reader surely is aware of (Walt 1987; for a similar argument see Brooks 1997). Stronger than Walt’s theory,
though, it emphasizes the importance of the ‘‘absolute’’ level of security, instead of relative differences in threats
from different states. However, the similarity is clearly strong, as the power-independent security position can beJRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 237
Our results imply the thesis of a smaller scope of the power-structural neorealist
approach. In our model the concept of the power-independent security position
leaves room for changes in a state’s security position regardless of changes in its
power position. In contrast to that, neorealists generally see security that is not
based on power as constant (and small), because they operate with worst-case sce-
narios.28 According to the results of this study, we expect the power position to be a
useful indicator for foreign policy analysis only if the nonpower components of
security are in a ‘‘bad condition.’’
Determining in more detail and across a wider range of issues and cases what
generally constitutes the power-independent security situation should be a prom-
ising field of future research, offering the opportunity of theoretical advancements
by connecting insights from different paradigms.29 Various arguments about what
constitutes a state’s security situation besides its power position can be found in
institutionalist, liberal, and constructivist thinking. These approaches have in com-
mon that they do not work with worst-case assumptions and allow for a variation of
the power-independent security situation. With varying emphasis these approaches
argue, for example, that information, international institutions (Keohane 1993,
2002), the form of government (Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and
Oneal 2001; Lipson 2003), or national cultures (Kier 1995; Katzenstein 1996;
Hudson 1997), norms (Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Finnemore 1996b) and ideas
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993) have a changing effect on policy, because such
factors are supposed to offset the constancy of anarchy (Wendt 1992).
The second major implication, or rather claim, of our study is: ‘‘Bring parties in!’’
Surprisingly enough, political parties and their differing ideological orientations
have been neglected in the theoretical study of IRs and foreign policy. However,
they offer a promising field of research, especially for the study of foreign policy
formulation in parliamentary systems. This study suggests that it is sensible to
analyze the effects that governments’ party affiliations have on foreign policy in
more detail, and from a comparative perspective. In countries that do not face
significant external threats, this domestic factor seems to have an underestimated
influence on foreign policy.
As indicated above,23 there are just a handful of scholarly publications discussing
this topic seriously and in a comparative perspective. Textbooks on IRs and foreign
policy are mostly ignorant on the role of political parties and their ideological
preferences. Whenever political parties are mentioned, two things are remarkable:
they are either touched on in a footnote or a small paragraph or they are discussed
generally in the context of government structure. Indeed, there is a strand in the
literature discussing the effects of different government and cabinet structures, and
also of different party systems, on foreign policy at some length.30 Although these
are important contributions that provide remarkable insights, it seems to us
thatFmuch like at the international levelFsuch analyses of governmental struc-
tures, which ignore the political aims, orientations, and ideologies of their subjects,
risk overestimating structural conditions while disregarding the agency of the
understood as the sum of all threats from other states. Further neorealist works that offer some similar aspects, that
challenge the constant effects of anarchy from a neorealist perspective, and that influenced our model are, for
example, Grieco (1995) and Schweller and Priess (1997).
28
(Neo)realists, especially neoclassical realists, frequently argue that the power position of a country does not
necessarily entail the expected policy. They maintain that domestic factors hinder states to react ‘‘correctly’’ ac-
cording to the structure of the international system (Waltz 1979:71). See further and on neoclassical realism gen-
erally Schweller (1997, 2003) and Rose (1998). However, for the model just described domestic factors are not just
intervening variables, which lead to suboptimal policy. It provides a (systemic) boundary condition, under which
circumstances foreign policy is led by power structures.
29
Especially in foreign policy analysis, there are trends that endorse the combination of different approaches
and accept eclecticism in theory building (Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995:2; Hill 2003:30; Neack 2003).
30
See, for example, Kaarbo (1996, 2001), Ireland and Gartner (2001), Sprecher and DeRouen (2005), or Chan
and Safran (2006).You can also read
