Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments
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Continuity and Change in the
Foreign Policies of the Mbeki
and Zuma Governments
There is a commonly held view in foreign Introduction
policy analysis circles that in the transition
from the Mandela to the Mbeki government, Paradoxical though it may sound, the foreign
continuity was the order of the day, policy of South Africa, like that of all other
while from Mbeki to Zuma it purportedly states, is a story essentially of both continuity
suggested change. Was this the case? We and change. In political and foreign policy anal-
are interested in establishing whether ysis, change and continuity depend on several
Mbeki introduced important nuances, explanatory factors, including institutional,
refinements and changes in foreign policy environmental and personality dynamics.1
that might reveal some discontinuities, Here should be added aspects such as routines
and whether the foreign policy directions in decision making, beliefs, socialisation, and
and strategies of the Zuma presidency human and financial resources, which all have
resembled a fundamental break from those a bearing on whether a government’s foreign
pursued by Mbeki. In terms of the latter, policy is the product of continuity or a subject
the leadership tensions in the African of change.2 Let us remember that it is in the na-
National Congress (ANC) which brought ture of governments, especially bureaucracies,
about the Zuma presidency were said to not to favour change over continuity. South
be accompanied by changes in policy. African foreign policy theorist Costa Georghiou
Could it be that this rupture in the ruling argues that ‘persistence and change coexist
uneasily, and it is this mixture that makes
ANC and the government was ironically
the future so uncertain. The twin forces of
characterised by policy continuities?
integration and disintegration, continuity and
change, creates a mood of both confidence and
disorientation in international politics’.3
In this article we seek to understand the
paradox inherent in South Africa’s foreign
policy by examining its avowed macro-agendas
Chris Landsberg
within a world increasingly realigning itself
Chris Landsberg is Professor of International in powerful economic groupings. It is given as
Relations at the University of Johannesburg. read that statements made by policymakers
© Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 1Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
may assume different forms when delivered to more strategic. He came to advance the course Eradicating poverty, unemployment and in- it, ‘the regeneration of Africa is the main pillar
different audiences – for instance for the con- of a highly ambitious transformational and de- equality were not merely ends in their own right of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. It is
sumption of domestic voters or for the global velopmental foreign policy programme and, in – they were also means to boosting the econo- central to ensuring a better life for all in South
media – yet it is precisely this schizophrenia, many respects, he modified and refined many my in a cyclical process that Mbeki championed Africa and on the continent’.9 The fact that in
the legacy of decades of hounding by a vehe- of the foreign policy directives of the Mandela under the rubric of a ‘developmental state’. In 2008 South Africa had diplomatic relations
mently critical world, that has informed the government, of which he was a key member. his modernisation project, emphasis was con- with 47 of the continent’s states, compared to
new Republic’s political discourse over the last Where Mandela’s government had spoken stantly placed on creating a macro-economic just one at the height of apartheid, was testi-
12 years or so. of domestic and continental African interests environment that could boost growth and cre- mony to its ‘Africa first’ policy.
This policy article tests the commonly held and of ‘universality’, Mbeki would seek, some- ate opportunities for sharing it. Domestic and The Mbeki administration endeavoured
view that, in the transition from the Mandela what ambitiously perhaps, to put these words foreign policy was informed by his understand- to remain faithful to the idea of never going
to the Mbeki government, continuity was the into actual policy. He would come to herald ing that South Africa was characterised by a it alone in Africa, but preferred to build stra-
order of the day, while from Mbeki to Zuma it the Republic as an ‘active agent of progres- context of ‘Two Nations’ and ‘Two Economies’. tegic partnerships as it sought to consolidate
purportedly suggested change. We are inter- sive change’4 as he pursued a foreign policy of One was largely poor and black, living mainly its agenda. As Mbeki engaged Africans as
ested in establishing whether Mbeki introduced redress and development. He was determined in conditions of poverty and ranked around 135 partners, he shunned hegemonic ambitions.
important nuances, refinements and changes to see South Africa become a pivotal state on on the Human Development Index. The other Therefore, while many commentators over-
in foreign policy that might reveal some discon- the continent, as a reliable global player follow- was largely wealthy and white, and ranked stated Pretoria’s leverage and labelled it a ‘he-
tinuities, and whether the foreign policy direc- ing a predictable foreign policy in pursuit of a around 28th. gemon’ demanding leadership and dominance,
tions and strategies of the Zuma presidency progressive agenda. To do this he would come These two economies, belonging to both the Pretoria-Tshwane chose the part of partnership
resembled a fundamental break from those to rely heavily on negotiations, diplomacy and developed global ‘First World’ and developing and equality with African states.
pursued by Mbeki. In terms of the latter, we what became known as ‘soft power’. ‘Third World’, led the Mbeki government to Mbeki advocated a New Partnership for
consider whether the leadership tensions in the Mandela had struggled to articulate an identify six broad strategic goals that domes- Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a modernisa-
ANC which brought about the Zuma presidency effective national interest paradigm and set- tic and foreign policy should have in order to tion and pro-growth plan aimed at soliciting
were accompanied by changes in policy, or tled for a foreign policy that sought in part to narrow the gap: eradicating poverty; reducing Western investment, aid, market access and
whether this rupture was ironically character- realise the goals of the Reconstruction and unemployment and creating jobs; fighting assistance for Africa’s development and peace
ised by policy continuities. More interestingly, Development Programme (RDP), notably job crime; building the capacity of state; bringing operations, in exchange for Africans holding
we consider whether stated policy by the Zuma creation, addressing inequalities and accelerat- about a better Africa; and bringing about a bet- themselves accountable politically and eco-
government was in line with practice followed ing economic growth. Mbeki however thought ter world. The last two aims reveal explicitly a nomically. If Mbeki’s much vaunted ‘African
or whether there were deviations. he could realise his predecessor’s wish to in- line of thinking also evident in a 2005 strategic Renaissance’ served the purpose of the vision,
fuse into foreign policy the notion of national Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) document then NEPAD became the policy strategy to
interest. To do so, he set out to use domestic – that ‘the context of South Africa’s foreign realise that vision. NEPAD was a modernisa-
1999–2008: Mbeki’s Change sources for foreign policy and address the di- policy is firmly rooted in Africa and the South, tion and reconstruction programme aimed at
trumping Continuity chotomy of the country’s domestic and interna- and its national interest is, therefore, defined in stimulating Africa’s development after decades
tionalist roles by anchoring foreign relations, in terms of achieving the challenges of the second of failures that were the legacies of colonial-
On the face of it, Thabo Mbeki’s vision was the eyes of voters at least, on domestic goals. A economy’7. ism, as well as the Cold War, bad governance,
more internationalist than that of Nelson strategic 2005 foreign affairs document stated As part of a new ‘continentalism’, Mbeki unsound economic policies and management,
Mandela, perhaps reflecting his exposure to that ‘domestic priorities guide the Department’s sought to influence the inter-African system, and destructive conflicts.10 It was a strategy of
international affairs during the ANC’s decades policies and underpin its activities’.5 It further not in the direction of supra-nationalism or engagement which promoted intra- and extra-
in exile, including his years attending univer- stated that ‘South Africa’s interaction with explicit federalism, but towards functional- African partnerships.
sity in England and political training in Russia. the international community must necessar- ism and a rules-based continental order – if Major achievements in the African strat-
Certainly, when he replaced Mandela as presi- ily reflect its national imperatives, including anything, a kind of confederalism or loose egy came through multilateralism: the re-
dent in June 1999, the impetus of his diplomacy such critical issues as job creation and poverty cooperation that falls short of binding struc- structuring of the South African Development
was first to overhaul foreign policy and make it alleviation’.6 tural reform.8 As the Fifteen Year Review put Community (SADC) and transformation from
2 Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 © Africa Institute of South Africa © Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 3Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the thankless negotiations in Burundi, coordinat- which was established at the Bandung re- playing a bridging role between these divided
African Union (AU). Pretoria played a strategic ing the Comores’ peace effort, mediating in the vival, the 50th anniversary commemoration blocs with the aim of extracting political and
role as champion of new values and principles Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), facilita- in April 2005 co-hosted by South Africa and financial commitments from the North.
in Africa, emphasising the construction of tion in Lesotho and dialogue with Angola, on Indonesia14 during the Asia-Africa Sub-regional Transformation of global power and eco-
sub-regional and continental institutions and top of dispatching observers in Ethiopia/Eritrea Organisations Conference (AASROC); and the nomic relations featured as major goals of the
mechanisms in defence of democratisation and and supporting the UN-led process in Western African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) bloc within the Mbeki government, and as such they built on
a new interventionism against gross violations Sahara. In peacekeeping it actively helped in context of EU–ACP relations. As one foreign af- and added to Mandela’s notion of commitment
of human rights, genocide, unconstitutional Burundi, the DRC and Liberia. Mbeki in fact fairs official said, ‘in relating to Asian states, to multilateralism and international law. His
changes of government (read coups d’état) and continued with the Mandela government’s we sought to pursue Africa’s interests’.15 executive collective came to promote ‘global
instability in one country, threatening broader tactic of ‘quiet diplomacy’, this time towards Mbeki had introduced a new, more complex governance’ that would influence the balance of
regional instability.11 Zimbabwe from 1999 onwards. and dispersed dimension to North–South dia- power in a West-dominated world. On the politi-
Perhaps as wary as Mandela of grand While Mandela had committed himself to logue, which in essence sought to reformulate cal front, modernised policies campaigned for
continental arrangements, Mbeki saw build- non-alignment, Mbeki subscribed to a more development as a universal and strategic chal- the reform of the global political architecture,
ing a continental union in Africa – a new elaborate scheme of South–South coopera- lenge facing the international community. This while on the socio-economic front South Africa
continentalism but not as a United States of tion as he set out to reinvigorate political and reconfigured or modernised notion had as its was concerned with the transformation of the
Africa – as the most rational way to proceed economic links between Asia, South America aim a challenge to the international economic global financial systems, as well as with ex-
in transforming the African order. Mbeki and Africa, and emphasised developmental balance of power, and extraction of significant tracting finances for development commitments
challenged the then Libyan leader Muammar goals linked to the expansion of trade, poverty financial resource commitments from the North from multilateral bodies.19 While political policy
Gaddafi’s United States of Africa (USAf) as not reduction through growth, and modernisation in areas of aid, trade, debt relief and eradica- stressed the need to restore the centrality of the
palatable, and preferred instead an institution- through infrastructure development and tech- tion, and market access.16 United Nations (UN) in global affairs and the
alised, functionalist approach to continental nical cooperation. To quote the Fifteen Year Mbeki and his government approached need for a strong disarmament and nuclear non-
affairs. South Africa’s preference for a looser Review, ‘the value of South–South co-operation the industrialised powers with much self- proliferation global regime, socio-economic pol-
confederation was instrumental in the estab- [had to] be visible in increased market access, assurance and boldness. Indeed, if the chief icy pushed for restructuring of the International
lishment of the AU and institutions such as the trade and investment benefits for all countries goal of South–South strategies were to turn Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The
Peace and Security Council, the strengthening of the South and material support for NEPAD the South into a more cohesive bloc that could defence of multilateralism strongly emerged as
of the AU Commission, and the establishment projects’.13 A key goal of Mbeki’s tri-continental engage the North more effectively, then the a priority. As the Fifteen Year Review stated, ‘a
of an African Court of Human and People’s strategies was to engage leaders of the three goals of the North–South strategies were just commitment to multilateralism is at the heart
Rights. South Africa was also a key promoter continents so that they could organise them- as bold: the Mbeki government took it upon of South Africa’s foreign policy. Since 1994, the
of the idea that Africa’s Regional Economic selves better, speak with one voice and utilise itself to bargain for more favourable conces- country has sought to contribute to a transpar-
Communities (RECs) and Sub-regional multilateral forums in order to extract greater sions in the areas of political governance, the ent and rules-based international political and
Economic Communities (SECs) could be the political and development commitments from global financial architecture, financing for economic order that advances the interests of
building blocks of continental development and the North and/or West. development and a voice for the South in global developing countries’20.
integration.12 Membership of strategic partnerships with forums. Mbeki’s foreign policy strategists had In a subtle way, Mbeki had taken up
How far this proliferation of partnerships like-minded states continued to proliferate. long held the view that ‘engagement with Mandela’s mantle of domestic change and
would make any difference to domestic trans- Pretoria-Tshwane formed ad hoc coalitions, and developed countries is premised on the notion reform, and had skilfully introduced a trans-
formation remained a key concern, but as created regional and sub-regional platforms to of forging partnerships for peace, security and formational agenda at home and aligned it
important were the military conflicts that have attain its goals. It had played a role in redefin- development’.17 Foreign policy came to stress a with a proactive role in foreign diplomacy. The
turned the continent into a volatile region. ing forums like the Non-aligned Movement new priority: ‘fundamentally’ altering ‘the re- West needed South Africa as much as South
Under Mbeki’s leadership, South Africa made (NAM), as well as being pivotal in the creation lationship between Africa and the North, while Africa needed the West, and that had profound
a significant shift by adopting a pro-peace- of new platforms such as the G20+; the India- strengthening the relationship between Africa implications for Mbeki’s leverage on the conti-
keeping posture, not just a stance in favour Brazil-South Africa Trilateral Forum (IBSA); the and the South’.18 The goal was to bring about nent and in multilateral organisations. It gave
of peacemaking. Peacemaking involved the New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP), international political and economic redress by him a strong bargaining hand, and at times
4 Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 © Africa Institute of South Africa © Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 5Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
he was forceful in his criticism of the West, as for them, would not result in a radical change about Mbeki’s contribution to foreign policy in the advancement of the global community.29
was evidenced by his government’s response in policy, certainly not in foreign policy and particular: ‘[H]e made our country an integral Motlanthe reminded South Africans that his
to the September 11 events. However, it was definitely not in terms of stated policy on pa- part of the continent and worked tirelessly for task was to see out the mandate of the Mbeki
still not clear how this increased voice, without per. Instead of the change that many of Mbeki’s an African rebirth.’25 ‘Through his leadership’, years; the priorities he identified for his own
substantive pooling of sovereignty, could be detractors had hoped for, we would rather see a continued Zuma, ‘South Africa’s stature grew government were the same as those articulated
anything more than talk – or such at least was high degree of the embrace of policies of Mbeki in the continent and globally.’26 by President Mbeki in 2004.
the growing concern of many within the ranks as articulated in key foreign policy statements So if continuity, at least in terms of stated In his first and only State of the Nation
of the ANC. and documents associated with the new Zuma policy, was to be the order of the day, what Address on 6 February 2009, Motlanthe made
government. Many of the Mbeki critics who about the ‘change’ that opponents consistently it known that his was ‘a responsibility, within
yearned for widespread change did not even promised? The foundation for the foreign policy a matter of a few months, to lead the national
2008 and Beyond: Continuity realise that the motto of the Zuma government agenda of the next government was laid by the Executive in completing the mandate accorded
with Practical Deviations during the election campaign was ‘continuity dramatic 52nd ANC Conference in the northern to the ANC in the 2004 elections, and in laying
trumping Change and change’. Elsewhere the author has argued city of Polokwane in December 2007, which the foundation for the post-election adminis-
that ‘...since Zuma’s emergence as president not only witnessed a shift in support from tration to hit the ground running’. With this,
From 2003 an internecine broedertwis (frater- there has, on paper at least, been more conti- Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma, but also adopted Motlanthe signalled continuity, as well as mak-
nal squabble) pervaded the ANC, which became nuity than change in South African foreign a number of resolutions, including those on ing an explicit link between the previous Mbeki
increasingly bitter. This fallout resulted first in policy’.22 He went further to argue that ‘such international relations and foreign policy.27 administration and a future post-2009 election
the deputy president Jacob Zuma being relieved changes as have occurred have been changes government.
of his duties in 2005, followed by a change in in style and refinements here and there, while According to the caretaker president, ‘both
ANC leadership at Polokwane in December as regards stated policy, continuity has pre- The Motlanthe Months: in the G20 meetings and other multilateral
2007, plus the forced recalling by the party of vailed’.23 This should not have come as a sur- Continuity all the Way institutions, our government has argued for
Thabo Mbeki as head of state in September prise to seasoned observers of South African appropriate and urgent interventions par-
2008, and ultimately Zuma’s election as presi- foreign policy, with the stress here on policy, Kgalema Motlanthe, South Africa’s caretaker ticularly in the developed countries whence the
dent. This led many an observer to believe that which should not be confused with the analysis president after the dramatic recalling of Mbeki crisis originated and where it is most severe’.30
there would be radical changes in domestic of second-hand punditry. on 20 September 2008, made plain that the Motlanthe made specific reference to Mbeki’s
and foreign policy. During Zuma’s election On the eve of Jacob Zuma’s assuming office, main goal of his seven-month stint to April role as SADC facilitator in Zimbabwe, and said
campaign hustings, for example, the Congress the president-to-be hinted at continuity when 2009 would be to see out the Mbeki period. As that his government would assist in efforts to
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), one all the talk was reconciliatory: ‘[W]e have said such, he gave notice that his intension was not help reconstruct Zimbabwe and urgently as-
of Zuma’s staunchest defenders, vowed that that … foreign policy will not change. There to introduce new policies but to ensure that the sist in dealing with the humanitarian crisis
‘everything must change’, a sentiment echoed will be continuity’. Indeed, Zuma was signal- mandate of the Mbeki government was brought in that country. Over Zimbabwe policy there
by the South African Communist Party (SACP) ling anything but radical change, and markers to a successful conclusion. On 28 September would be continuity. In spite of the continued
who vowed that ‘things are going to have to were being laid down that promised more of 2009, Motlanthe gave his first live television political and refugee crisis in the troublesome
change’.21 the same. In spite of the bitter infighting of address to the nation and described the week northern neighbour, Motlanthe did not deviate
However, Mbeki’s critics and Zuma’s sup- the previous five years, in his presidential in- in which Mbeki was recalled as president as from the Mbeki’s government’s stance in favour
porters appeared oblivious to the fact that the augural address on 9 May 2009 Zuma lauded ‘one of the most difficult weeks in the history of engagement in it, stressing the need for a
fight between Zuma and Mbeki within the ANC his predecessor’s achievements in foreign of our young democracy … it has been a week negotiated settlement and full implementation
was largely about style and personality, and policy and diplomacy: ‘[H]e took the country of uncertainty and doubt, hurt and anger’.28 of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) brokered
not over policy substance. Zuma’s allies ap- forward as a true statesman. He made a re- Motlanthe vowed to ‘draw on the example by Mbeki in 2008. On the wider continent, too,
peared to have misinterpreted the policy mood markable contribution towards strengthening set by my immediate predecessor, President Motlanthe welcomed the political dialogue be-
in ANC quarters as they confused anger with our democracy, and laid a firm foundation for Thabo Mbeki’ and expressed indebtedness to tween the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda, and
Mbeki over his style with differences over poli- economic growth and development.’24 As newly his predecessor for his ‘leadership’ and ‘his stated that his government would continue to
cy. The change in leadership in the ANC, sadly elected president, Zuma proceeded to opine vision’ in promoting progress in Africa and support the AU in pursuit of the same strategy
6 Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 © Africa Institute of South Africa © Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 7Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
of political dialogue in Burundi, Sudan, Western Enter Zuma: Continuity see the Republic ‘becoming an active agent of to ‘streamline the work that is currently done
Sahara, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, and elsewhere. amidst Diffusion progressive change’.36 by different departments on development
Whereas Mbeki had emphasised a function- One of the first moves announced by co-operation into a coherent and systematic
alist approach to Regional Economic Comm- Turning to the new Jacob Zuma-led govern- Minister Nkoana-Mashabane was that the framework’.39 In August 2009, she confirmed
unities (RECs) on the continent, Motlanthe ment which was elected into office in April name of the department responsible for the that ‘work towards the establishment of SADPA
stressed that his government would ‘use the 2009 and inaugurated in May of that year, it management and coordination of the Republic’s is currently underway … This agency… will be
privilege of chairing SADC to strengthen this articulated policies which read like carbon diplomacy and foreign policy would change tasked with the management of South Africa’s
regional institution, with a particular empha- copies of Mbeki’s. In August 2009, the new from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) developmental assistance to contribute to
sis on implementing Summit resolutions and Zuma administration finalised their Medium- to that of DIRCO. According to the new min- capacity and institutional building, as well as
cementing regional strategic cohesion’.31 Just term Strategic Framework (MTSF) to Guide ister, the idea was to emphasise that foreign support socio-economic and human resource
how this strengthening would take place was Government’s Programme for the Electoral policy would be ‘based upon and is indeed an development’.40
not spelled out. Instead, the Motlanthe govern- Mandate Period 2009–2014, revealing that advancement of our domestic priorities at an In terms of the Zuma administration’s
ment turned its attention to improving SADC’s the Zuma administration would cham- international level’. This did not come as much ‘Africa prioritisation’ strategies, there emerged
interaction with the Common Market for East pion its foreign policy under the broad goal of of a surprise, and signalled government’s in- two broad thematic areas: Africa continental;
and Southern Africa (COMESA), another worthy ‘Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced tention to introduce a new style and approach and improving political and economic integra-
cause for trade but hardly underpinned by firm Co-operation’.33 to the conduct of foreign affairs, namely to em- tion of the SADC. Even though the government
commitments to direct integration and peace- The developmental agenda was in turn phasise issues of collaboration and non-hegem- set out to pursue its Africa strategies under
making or peacekeeping. to be based on the existing ‘key pillars of our onic soft-balancing as opposed to dominance, the label of ‘African advancement’, its policy
In terms of South–South cooperation, the foreign policy’, under a series of sub-goals or hegemonic intentions and power-seeking real- borrowed heavily from the Mbeki government’s
message in Motlanthe’s State of the Nation ad- sub-categories, namely34 (1) closing the gap ist approaches to its relations with other states notion of the ‘African agenda’, even retaining
dress was similar to that articulated by Mbeki. between domestic and foreign policy; (2) con- and international entities. Nkoana-Mashabane the very labelling41 Indeed, Deputy Minister of
He insisted that South Africa would continue to tinued prioritisation of the African continent; announced that the name had been changed ‘to International Co-operation, Ebrahim Ebrahim’s
foster strong ties with China in the belief that (3) strengthening of South–South relations; help clarify the mandate of the Department… declaration that the ‘consolidation of the
there was ‘much mutual benefit to be gained (4) relations with strategic formations of the The name should reflect the new focus that our African agenda’ would be the main priority in
from our partnership’, and affirmed his gov- North; (5) strengthening political and economic government wishes to place on partnerships South Africa’s foreign policy,42 corroborates
ernment’s ‘commitment to close relations that relations; and (6) participating in the global and co-operation for development.’37, 38 this view of continuity in Africa strategy. In
we have forged with Brazil and India through system of governance. All these were familiar However, while talks of fundamental change line with the Mbeki posture in Africa, the new
IBSA’, the trilateral cooperation initiated by themes and suggested continuity, not change. were being dished up for popular consumption, Zuma government vowed to contribute to the
Mbeki in 2003. He also preferred a ‘strengthen- While the wording had been adapted here and in reality many actors hinted at stability and promotion of peace, security and stability by
ing of bonds that our country has been forging there, in reality it meant more of the same. predictability. More significantly, they did not sustaining involvement in peacekeeping opera-
with Russia, and countries in Asia, the Middle When Deputy Minister of the Department wish to end those of Mbeki’s policies that were tions in Africa.43 Policy further stated that the
East, as well as Latin and North America’.32 of International Relations and Cooperation proving successful. One such example commu- Republic would continue with reconstruction
Even as pertains global governance strate- (DIRCO), Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, told parlia- nicated by the new Zuma-led government was and development efforts on the continent, es-
gies, Motlanthe made known that South Africa ment in June 2009 that South Africa’s approach that it would build on the work of the Mbeki pecially in post-conflict situations in countries
would join other countries from the South and to foreign relations over the next five years government in the area of development coop- such as the DRC, Sudan, Burundi, Western
‘continue to pursue the cause of the restruc- would ‘be driven by the need to deliver to the eration and proceed to establish a development Sahara and Zimbabwe.44
turing of the UN, the IMF and other multilat- masses of our people, which is at the core of agency for South Africa. The new government Whereas the Mbeki government had ex-
eral institutions so they reflect the changed and our national interest’, he was not stating publicly committed itself to establishing the panded on the Mandela administration’s idea
changing global reality and operate in a demo- something novel or original, nor was Deputy South African Development Partnership Agency of pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy pos-
cratic, equitable and transparent manner’.. In Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim’s commitment to (SADPA), with the aim of promoting develop- ture and expansion of a South–South coopera-
short, the change from Mbeki to Motlanthe the pursuit of a ‘progressive international- mental partnerships. According to Nkoana- tion strategy, the Zuma government’s policy of
heralded continuity, not change. ism’,35, echoing as it did Mbeki’s commitment to Mashabane, the new government intended ‘strengthening South–South relations’ marked
8 Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 © Africa Institute of South Africa © Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 9Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
a direct continuation of Mbeki’s South–South agenda both on the continent and the develop- government from 1999 to 2008 essentially fol- policy, very little has changed on paper and
cooperation and ‘agenda of the South’ strate- ing world’, as Nkoane-Mashabane explained, lowed a transformational and developmental in terms of articulated foreign policy. In the
gies. As with the Mbeki government, the main and to persue a ‘dynamic partnership for devel- foreign policy. This was especially true in Inroads article of 2011, titled Transformation,
rationale which underscores the South–South opment and co-operation’.49 Here it should be relation to the global governance strategies of continuity and diffusion: South African foreign
cooperation strategies of the Zuma government remembered that the Mbeki government’s rela- the Mbeki government. President Zuma has policy under Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, the
would be to ’ensure the creation of political, tions with developed countries were concerned attempted to borrow from this dimension of author argued that, instead of any farfetched
economic and social spheres necessary for with peace, security and development.50 Mbeki’s diplomacy too as he and his govern- change, ‘the Zuma government opted for a
the fight against poverty, underdevelopment The rationale behind Zuma’s stated policy ment endorsed the notions of transformation tactic of merely sticking different labels on
and marginalization of the South’. Nkoana- in favour of engaging the industrialised pow- and developmentalism in their future foreign policy without changing the policy itself ... At
Mashabane stressed that ers was advanced by Nkoane-Mashabane, policy. the same time however’, its journey without a
when she stated that ‘countries of the North It should also be remembered here that map has rendered South Africa’s foreign policy
‘South Africa will continue to build relations are undeniably an economic power base of the the voice and participation of Africa and the ‘unpredictable and erratic’.56 The question
based on solidarity and co-operation with world and remain essential to the economic broader South were key rationales behind about the Zuma government’s foreign policy in
regional and sub-regional groups in the South well-being of the developing world’.51 Given Mbeki’s transformational global govern- relation to continuity and change was not so
such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), these economic considerations, South Africa ance positions. If more evidence is required, much whether there was change from Mbeki
Forum for China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), set out to ’forge partnerships with these coun- Nkoane-Mashabane’s declaration soon after to Zuma, because we have established that on
Africa-India Forum, G77 plus China, the India- tries within the context of trade, development the April 2009 polls, that ‘we believe that the paper it was sturdiness. In terms of stipulated
Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, and the and co-operation.’52 Engaging the North, policy transformation of the international system will policy there was continuity. Instead the issue
New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) stated, would furthermore be ‘done to advance not only give Africa a bigger voice, but will was an apparent disjuncture between Zuma’s
in pursuit of the consolidation of the African South Africa, the continent and the rest of the put us in a better position to address the de- stated policy and the actions of the government
Agenda.’45 South’s developmental agenda’. In the medium velopmental plight of our continent’,54 marked in practice.
term, policy toward the North would see the a direct continuation of Mbeki’s position. When This divergence between stated policy and
Nkoane-Mashabane’s refrain that South Africa Zuma government continue to pursue a devel- she also vowed that ‘we will continue to work action came about because of a number of rea-
as a developing country would maintain ‘natu- opmental and investment-oriented approach with other nations and progressive non-state sons and explanatory factors, but because of
ral partnerships with other countries of the to engagements with the North, such as the actors’, as well as ‘for the reform of the UN, the weaknesses in the institutional apparatus
South with whom we share similar challenges Organisation for Economic Cooperation and including the Bretton Woods Institutions’, she in the Zuma government, many deviations
and constraints’, was a familiar theme which Development (OECD) and the Group of Eight borrowed directly from the Mbeki script. Just as from the government’s own stated policies crept
came to the fore during the Mbeki years.46 (G8). the Minister insisted that ‘we cannot achieve in, and we had what has been called elsewhere
Ebrahim’s pledge that South Africa’s South– The final pillar of the Zuma government’s our objective of a better world when the current a ‘diffused’ foreign policy in practice. Stated
South cooperation would focus on its ‘strategic evolving foreign policy is that of ‘participating configuration of the Security Council of the UN policy on paper did not correspond neatly with
alliance’ with India, China and Brazil47 was a in the global system of governance’, and the is informed by the geo-politics and security actual policy in practice.
direct continuation of Mbeki’s strategies to- preference for ‘robust engagement’ in multi- concerns of the 1950s when most of Africa was Zuma’s first state visit since becoming
wards IBSA and the G-77 Plus China. Zuma was lateral fora, including championing the reform under colonial rule’,55 she was again identify- president was to Angola in 2009, a mission
present at what might turn out to have been of the UN Security Council. These are themes, ing directly with the Mbeki position in favour undertaken to patch up the relationship with
the founding meeting of another South–South it will be recalled, that were championed by of ‘rules-based multilateral approaches to President Dos Santos and his government,
partnership, that between Africa and South Mbeki’s bifurcated strategy of politico-security problems of international peace and security’,, which had deteriorated between the two coun-
America.48 global governance and socio-economic global as well as ‘proposals for addressing the short- tries during the Mbeki era. Again, this was not
Engaging the Northern industrialised pow- governance. The very phrase was lifted directly comings in the UN system’. so much a change in policy as an attempt to
ers and their associations is another pillar of from the 2008 DFA Strategic Plan.53 In the early Thus, in spite of COSATU’s call on the eve ease the frosty relations between Luanda and
the new Zuma administration’s foreign policy part of this treatise, dealing with the foreign of the Zuma government taking office that Pretoria-Tshwane, which came about more as
that echoes Mbeki’s international plans. At policy strategies of the Mbeki government, ‘everything must change’, in terms of foreign a result of a personality clash between Dos
its core is the pursuit of a ‘developmental the point was made that the South African
10 Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 © Africa Institute of South Africa © Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 11Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
Santos and Mbeki. Again, practical considera- approximately December of that year revealed rights.58 Part of its motivation was fear that the pertains Syria, the Zuma government’s position
tions and differences should not be confused not just inconsistency but confusion. What is UN resolution would be used by NATO and the was much in line with the position of its prede-
with policy differences. even more interesting about the Zuma govern- Western powers as a pretext for military inter- cessor’s views. What is less obvious to explain
Certainly, Luanda took umbrage at South ment’s voting behaviour in terms of the Libyan vention against a regime change in Damascus, is the inconsistencies between South Africa’s
Africa’s growing influence in Africa under debacle is that it appeared to have taken many as they did against Libya. Libya and Syria positions, and the apparent
Mbeki’s leadership, and there was an element of its original positions in apparent isolation of In November, when the Syrian issue was wavering in its decision-making approaches.
of jealousy and envy. South Africa tried on nu- the AU, which nominated South Africa to serve moved to the General Assembly for a vote In its response to the crisis surrounding
merous occasions to patch up the relationship, for a second term as a non-permanent mem- condemning Syria’s excesses, 122 countries the 2010 presidential election in Cote d’Ivoire,
but Luanda chose to keep the Mbeki govern- ber on the Council. The AU’s position rejected voted in favour, 13 against and 41 abstained, we witnessed a great deal of prevarication and
ment at arm’s length. Zuma, who enjoyed closer ‘...any foreign military intervention, whatever including South Africa.59 China and Russia what Kiru Naidoo had called ‘vacillation’ by the
personal ties with Dos Santos, set out to restore its form’.57 Much confusion emerged because vetoed the resolution, while fellow BRICs Zuma government. Zuma first toyed with the
the relationship. South Africa voted in favour of resolutions member, Brazil, abstained along with South idea of backing the Angolan position, which
Another example to consider here is the 1970 and 1973, together with two other African Africa. After the failure to secure a unanimous was in support of former president Laurent
furore caused by South Africa’s vote on the UN members, Gabon and Nigeria, and soon after, vote in the Security Council, the Syria issue Gbagbo, after which the South Africans made
Security Council pertaining to Libya. During when it became apparent that North Atlantic became a victim of both South Africa’s burning a U-turn by supporting the AU position, which
the debates in the UN Security Council over Treaty Organisation (NATO) was using the of its fingers regarding Libya and the Western called for a negotiated position between the
what to do with the recalcitrant and tyranni- resolutions for ‘regime change’ purposes and powers’ blatant abuse of the issue for ulterior belligerents, and later on the AU switched to
cal President Gaddafi of Libya, in March 2011 to bring about a resource war in that country, regime change and resource war motives. On supporting Alassane Ouattara.64 In the end, it
South Africa voted in favour of Resolutions South Africa criticised the very resolutions 23 November 2011, South Africa decided not took a trip to Paris and an official meeting with
1970 and 1973 (which imposed sanctions and a it had voted for. Again, South Africa’s vote to support a resolution condemning the hu- French president Nicholas Sarkozy for Zuma to
no-fly zone over Libya) but abstained on a vote showed confusion and diffusion. South Africa man rights violations and threatening punitive make a decisive call for Gbagbo to leave and for
in November of that year (which condemned took these votes in apparent isolation of the measures against the Bashar al-Assad regime; Ouattara to be installed as president, but only
the Syrian government’s excesses against its AU, the continental body which nominated it to the South African mission in New York opted after it backed a negotiated solution between
own people). However, the Mbeki government serve on the Council for another two years from to abstain on the vote.60 Scarcely three months Gbagbo and Ouattara.65 The Cote d’Ivoire deci-
followed a more consistent line of voting in the January 2011 to December 2012, after its origi- later we witnessed the continuation of a new sion and how it came about, showed indeci-
Security Council on issues such as Myanmar, nal stint of January 2007 until December 2008. disturbing trend in foreign policy as govern- siveness on the part of the Zuma government,
Zimbabwe, Iran and Iraq. The Mbeki govern- While many commentators have tried to ment again prevaricated. In February 2012 which made it difficult to pin down whether it
ment’s rationale was that, unless a government rationalise South Africa’s Libya vote in favour it voted in favour of a resolution calling on was continuity or change that was at play when
or state ‘poses a threat to international peace of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 as having been President Al-Assad to step down from power.61 compared to the Mbeki approach.66 One thing
and security’, it would refer such an issue to motivated by ethical and moralistic consid- After Russia and China had vetoed the UN is certain – Mbeki was more decisive when it
another UN body, notably the Human Rights erations a la the Nelson Mandela attempts at planned resolution, South Africa emerged with came to conflict resolution than Zuma appears
Council. Thus the hallmark of the Mbeki gov- a moralistic and values-driven foreign policy yet another position as it came out against to be.
ernment’s behaviour on the Council during orientation between 1994 and 1999, no sooner military intervention in Syria and called on the A further example could be highlighted
the period January 2007 to December 2008 had South Africa adopted this apparent moral- Syrian people to be allowed the opportunity here to show that the rhetoric of change often
was consistency, and the principled position istic position – and stung by widespread criti- and space to determine their own future.62 invoked by officials in the Zuma government is
adopted was that those issues which were not cism against its handling of the Libya issue, In a statement explaining its decision, the not always backed up by the actions in reality.
dubbed ‘threats to international peace and including its prevarication and backtracking representatives to South Africa’s mission in Just as Mbeki offered the Zimbabwe govern-
security’, and which could be resolved through after NATO’s abuse of the UN mandate given New York said that the Syria issue needed to ment a credit extension of some US$1 billion in
peaceful and negotiated means did not belong to it to execute resolutions 1970 and 1973 –in be discussed in the UN Human Rights Council 2005, so in 2011 the Zuma government offered
in the Security Council. October 2011 South Africa decided to abstain in Geneva, not in the UN Security Council.63 It the beleaguered Swazi monarchy and govern-
The Zuma government’s behaviour on the on a crucial vote in the UN Security Council should be remembered that this was a rationale ment a R1,2 billion loan to address the woes of
Council during the period January 2011 until condemning Syria’s violations of human often invoked by the Mbeki government, and as their ailing economy.67 What all of this shows
12 Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 © Africa Institute of South Africa © Africa Institute of South Africa Africa Insight Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 13Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg
is that the public speak and idiom often em- Mbeki also articulated a clear North–South from the foreign policy rubrics of his predeces- and even inside the ruling ANC, has been of
ployed of ‘change’ and ‘difference’ is not always agenda in which he sought to extract commit- sor under the mantra of ‘pursuing African radical change under Zuma. The reality, howev-
backed by action in reality. ments from the industrialised powers in the advancement in enhanced international er, has been that the articulated foreign policy
Finally, when President Zuma delivered his forms of aid, debt relief, market access, trade cooperation’. Zuma made it just as clear that, of the government, at least as stated on paper,
2012 State of the Nation Address on 9 February, and resources for peace support operations that in line with the Mbeki approach, his govern- has in the main suggested continuity. The
there was not a single reference to matters of would help to bolster Africa and the South’s ment would continue to pursue a ‘broad-based stated foreign policy borrowed heavily from the
foreign policy or diplomacy, except for one line development goals. He pursued equally grand developmental’ foreign policy trajectory. Just Mbeki script. However, because of largely insti-
referring to NEPAD in the context of infrastruc- aims pertaining to global governance, ar- as the Mbeki administration had emphasised tutional weaknesses which characterised the
tural development. This again conveys a mes- ticulating political governance goals alongside an African agenda, South–South cooperation, state and foreign policy apparatus of the Zuma
sage about foreign policy as an afterthought, socio-economic global governance aims. The North–South dialogue and global governance, government, fuelled in the main by the spill-
and may help to explain the haphazard nature former were aimed at transforming political so the Zuma-led administration is articulating over of broedertwiste (fraternal squabbles) and
of foreign policy. institutions such as the UN Security Council, a similar set of foreign policy pillars. These factionalisation in the ANC, fragmentation has
whereas the latter focused on the need to trans- are African advancement, strengthening been the order of the day, and a great deal of
form global socio-economic institutions such as South–South relations, engaging the North diffusion and confusion came to mark foreign
Conclusion: The Change the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade and actively participating in the global system policy, and deviations from even government’s
of Continuity Organisation (WTO), and to ensure that Africa of governance. Even the Zuma government’s own stated foreign policy.
and the South enjoyed greater levels of voice emphasis on a domestically driven foreign In short, during the transition from Mbeki
The last 12 years of South Africa’s foreign and participation. The changes introduced in policy was akin to a notion pursued by both the to Zuma, there was continuity in policy on
policy have been a story of promised change South African foreign policy and diplomacy Mandela and Mbeki governments, if not as well paper but detours in practice. The moral of
but general continuity, with the latter at during the Mbeki period should therefore not be articulated or skilfully constructed. the story is that the fractured nature of the
times trumping the former when it was least underestimated, but they did not achieve what To conclude, while following the immediate transition and government that Zuma came
expected, and change prevailing when the they were intended to, namely a narrowing of aftermath of the dramatic recalling of Thabo to preside over has negative implications, not
assumption was that continuity would be the the gap between the two domestic economies. Mbeki as head of state in September 2008, just for foreign policy, but for all dimensions of
order of the day. In the run-up to the April 2009 elections, much of the talk inside and outside government national policy as well.
There was a widespread view that the tran- many in the ANC threatened a decisive shift
sition from the Mandela to the Mbeki era was away from the policy agenda of the Mbeki era
marked by continuity rather than change. The and towards sweeping change. However, as far Notes and References
reality is that Mbeki introduced many refine- as foreign policy is concerned, these threats
ments and changes to foreign policy, and in a did not materialise. Even before he became 1 Pagano, U. and Trento, S., Continuity 5 Ibid., p.2. and the responsibility to protect. Global
sense it was radically overhauled. Africa was head of state, Zuma signalled that policy would and change in Italian corporate 6 Ibid., p.2. Responsibility to Protect Journal, 2,
governance: The institutional stability of pp.436–457.
elevated to high priority in Mbeki’s foreign not change and that there would be continu- one variety of capitalism. In Di Matteo, 7 Ibid., p.2.
12 Landsberg, C., 2007. South Africa and
policy trajectory, and he was determined to ity. Indeed, stated policy as it was articulated M. and Piacentini, P. (eds.), The Italian 8 Landsberg, C., 2011. Afro-continentalism: the making of the African Union and
economy at the dawn of the XXI Century. Pan-Africanism in post-settlement South NEPAD: Mbeki’s ‘progressive African
leave an imprint of the country as a reliable on paper revealed this continuity; practice, Ashgate, Aldershot: Hants, pp.177–211. Africa’s foreign policy. Journal of Asian Agenda’, in Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A.
partner, working with fellow African states, however, revealed deviations from it. President 2 Olsen, J.P., 2009. Change and continuity: and African Studies, 46(3). and Landsberg, C. (eds.), South Africa
not as a hegemon bent on dictating the terms Kgalema Motlanthe had already vowed to An institutional approach to institutions 9 The Presidency, 2008. Towards a fifteen in Africa: The post-apartheid era. UKZN
of democratic government. European year review: Synthesis report. Discussion Press: Scottsville, pp. 197–198.
to the rest of the continent. He also pursued continue with the Mbeki foreign policy agenda Political Science Review, [AQ: does this document, Pretoria, p.58. 13 The Presidency, op. cit., p.65.
a highly ambitious South–South agenda, far and his brief seven-month stint did not see the have a volume and/or issue number?] 10 Bekoe, D.A. and Landsberg, C., 2002.
p.16. 14 Department of Foreign Affairs, 2005.
more so than the one championed by Mandela, introduction of any major changes in contradic- NEPAD: African initiative, new partner- Annual Report 2005–06, Pretoria-
3 Costa Georghiou: definition used in the ship? International Peace Academy (IPA)
and links with Latin America, Asia and the tion to Mbeki’s agenda. workshop report. New York, July.
Tshwane, pp.70–71.
2011 Foreign Policy Analysis course,
Caribbean became important new avenues in Zuma inherited from Mbeki a well-institu- University of Johannesburg, July 2011. 15 Ibid., p.71.
11 For a perspective on South Africa’s
the Republic’s international relations. tionalised foreign policy that borrowed heavily 4 Department of Foreign Affairs, 2005. ‘responsibility to respect strategies’, see 16 The Presidency, op. cit., p.66.
Strategic Plan 2005–2008. Pretoria, p. 2. Landsberg, C., 2010. Pax South Africana 17 DFA, 2005a. A Strategic appraisal of
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