THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW - EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE
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1 THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW
THE PROTESTS IN
BELARUS: INSIGHTS
FROM MINSK AND THE
WESTERN VIEW
EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE
Vilnius, Lithuania
August, 2020
THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 2
ANDREI YAHORAU
Senior analyst of the Centre for European transforma-
tion. Master of Political Science. A. Yahorau graduated
from Belarusan State University, department of political
science, and holds a master’s degree in political science.
He has been working in the political research area since
2001. Andrei Yahorau is one of the founders of the only
specialized political science magazine in Belarus “Politi-
cal sphere” (Palitychnaja Sfera) and he is the magazine’s
deputy editor. Since 2005 he has been an expert and the
head of analytical group of the Humanitarian Techniques
Agency.
Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime, tained and severely beaten, and the beatings
established as a result of a constitutional and torture continued at places of detention.
coup in 1996, is currently facing the most se- The authorities’ goal was to quickly suppress
rious political crisis in all the years of its ex- the protests; their tactics, however, produced
istence. After the cynically rigged election on effects opposite to those intended. People on
9 August 2020, masses of people took to the the streets began to respond to the violence
streets of their cities to protest. The official- by confronting the police. On the second day
ly announced results of the election in which of protests, that is, on 10 August, protesters
Lukashenko won 80.1 % of the vote, while his began erecting barricades in the streets of
main rival, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, received Minsk; in some cases, the confrontation be-
just 10.1 %, radically diverged from the views of tween police and protesters lasted for several
the majority of Belarusians. The gap between hours. The violence continued over the next
the apparent number of supporters of change two days; the number of detainees exceeded
and the election results triggered mass pro- 7 thousand people, and two people died.
tests. In the entire history of the country’s in-
Large industrial enterprises (BelAZ, Grodno
dependence, the authorities have not encoun-
Azot, BMZ, MTZ, and others) joining protests
tered anything similar, neither in terms of the
on 11–13 August, as well as protests ex-
number of protesters, in terms of geography,
panding in geography to almost 50–60 cities
nor in terms of the duration of the protests.
forced the authorities into temporary retreat.
On the evening of the first day of the protests, On 13 August, Natalya Kochanova, chairper-
that is, on the evening of 9 August, the author- son of the upper house of the parliament (un-
ities responded with unprecedented violence til 2019, she had been the head of the Presi-
against the protesters. For the first time, rub- dent Administration), announced the release
ber bullets, stun grenades, and water cannons of some of the detainees (and they began
were used against them. Protesters were de- to release them) and called for de-escala-
THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 3
tion. Street violence temporarily stopped, but in the event of increased instability indicates
protesters organised mass flash mobs and the instability of his position. This situation
formed solidarity chains. The symbolic ac- creates enormous risks for the independence
tions of women in white, lining up along the of Belarus. At the same time, the provision of
streets in many cities, were particularly strik- such assistance by Russia will critically un-
ing. It was noteworthy that street protests dermine the existing pro-Russian sympathies
began to spread to residential areas of large of Belarusians. The protests do not have any
cities, visually present everywhere. This re- pronounced geopolitical orientation: they
duced the effect of state propaganda, which cannot be called pro-Western or anti-Russian.
sought to represent the protests as protests The masses of people only take to the streets
of a small number of people, to nothing. to demand Lukashenko’s resignation and the
appointment of new elections.
By the sixth and the seventh day of the pro-
tests, the number of enterprises on strike had Until now, the issue of political representation
grown to two dozen enterprises, including of protesters remains a significant problem.
major industrial giants. A partial erosion of The symbolic trio, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya,
the vertical power structure began. Belarus Veronika Tsepkalo, and Maria Kolesnikova,
state TV workers joined the strike; heads of who actually represented the united forces
some state institutions, Belarusian ambassa- of change during the election campaign, fell
dors to Switzerland and Slovakia expressed apart after the departure of Svetlana Tikha-
their support for protesters. On Sunday, novskaya and Veronika Tsepkalo. The po-
16 August, mass rallies were held in Minsk litical leadership vacuum created problems
and most cities of Belarus. After eight days of with regard to the political representation of
protests, the number of protesters grew from protesters, who had no established demands
tens of thousands to about 500,000 people in for several days. It was only on the fifth day
the capital and, probably, to 1 million people of the protests that the headquarters of Ma-
in the whole country. The geography of the ria Kolesnikova, as well as Svetlana Tikha-
protests expanded to almost all cities. novskaya herself publicly announced their
demands to the authorities, which, in short,
What is happening in Belarus can surely be
were as follows: an end to the violence, the re-
called a democratic revolution. However,
lease of all political prisoners, the resignation
a radical change in the situation in favour
of Lukashenko and the appointment of new
of protesters has not yet come. Lukashenko
elections. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya stated the
continues to control central and local author-
need to create a Coordination Council, which
ities, as well as national security, defence,
had to include representatives of citizens’ or-
and law enforcement agencies. Not a single
ganisations and associations. Such a Coor-
high-ranking official has yet sided with pro-
dination Council could become a representa-
testers, and no cases of law enforcement of-
tive body of protesters and a potential group
ficers refusing to carry out orders have been
capable of negotiating with Lukashenko on
recorded. Lukashenko’s appeal to Russia and
his resignation.
Vladimir Putin with a request to refer to the
CSTO mandate and to provide security as- On 14 August, an extraordinary meeting of
sistance to Belarus in suppressing protests EU foreign ministers, convened at the initia-THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 4
tive of Poland and Lithuania, stated that the tlement are positive initiatives, although the
presidential election in Belarus was not free acceptability of such a scenario for the Belar-
and fair; however, it did not call the sitting usian authorities remains unclear.
president illegitimate. Ministers also agreed
The forced stay of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in
on the need to sanction those responsible for
Lithuania creates opportunities for the Lithua-
the violence, repression and falsification of
nian government to establish direct contacts
election results. Taking into account the un-
with her. Taking into account the absolute
derstandable EU desire to increase pressure
necessity to support Tikhanovskaya in Lithu-
on the Lukashenko regime, it should be rec-
ania, as well as the necessity of humanitarian
ognised that there are controversial aspects
support for victims of repression and symbol-
with regard to a sanctions decision as well.
ic solidarity with protesters, official Lithuania,
Sanctions cannot have immediate effects on
nevertheless, should avoid public alliances
the development of the current political crisis,
with Tikhanovskaya. Such actions will have
and they are only of symbolic importance.
a negative effect on the development of the
More decisive EU involvement in the current
situation in Belarus, as they could provide
situation is necessary, including the follow-
Belarusian and Russian propaganda with an
ing: extensive measures of diplomatic pres-
additional reason to present the events in Be-
sure on sector ministries in cooperation with
larus as inspired by the West.
the EU; temporary suspension of assistance
programmes, including programmes of inter- Now, for the first time in a quarter of a cen-
national financial institutions (WB, EIB, EBRD) tury, the situation in Belarus is in the hands
and international organisations (UNDP, WHO); of the Belarusian people. The victory of the
creation of a working group on the current sit- democratic forces has never been so close;
uation in Belarus, including representatives however, it is too early to write off the Lu-
of EU institutions, ministries of foreign af- kashenko regime. Today, two choices remain
fairs of EU countries, international organisa- for Lukashenko: negotiations with protesters
tions (CoE, OSCE), as well as Belarusian civil or the announcement of a state of emergen-
society representatives and representatives cy. In the second case, the consequences will
of expert organisations. The proposals of be unpredictable for the country.
Lithuania and Poland to mediate in crisis set-THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 5
EDWARD LUCAS
Edward Lucas is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center
for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was formerly a
senior editor at The Economist. Lucas has covered Central
and Eastern European affairs since 1986, writing, broad-
casting, and speaking on the politics, economics, and se-
curity of the region. A graduate of the London School of
Economics and long-serving foreign correspondent in Ber-
lin, Vienna, Moscow, and the Baltic states, he is an interna-
tionally recognized expert on espionage, subversion, the
use and abuse of history, energy security and information
warfare.
Belarus is not just a black hole in human say in Estonia or Latvia in the early 1990s).
rights terms: a country where torture, ab- Nor is it “like Ukraine” or “like Moldova”. It is
ductions, forced confessions and grotesque like Belarus.
election-rigging are commonplace. It is also a
Nothing tried by any country has really
black hole in terms of the outside world’s pol-
amounted to a policy. The objectives are un-
icy. In the years since independence, and par-
ticularly since Alyaksandr Lukashenka won clear. Are we actively backing the opposition,
the last free presidential election in 1994, or just trying to constrain the regime? Do we
Western countries have tried many approach- really want a democratic political upheaval
es, ranging from friendly engagement with in Minsk? Is the main priority to keep Belar-
the authorities in Minsk to vehement con- us from being annexed by Russia? What level
demnation and sanctions, and lavish support of risk are we prepared to take? What politi-
for the opposition and independent media. In cal and economic resources are we willing to
between come long periods of neglect. These devote to achieve success? These questions
attempts to deal with Belarus are sometimes have lacked answers for thirty years.
pursued with determination and in unison but
In the meantime, Belarus itself has changed.
more often dilatorily and raggedly.
Traumas, whether of the Second World War,
The level of knowledge about Belarus in most or the intense Sovietisation of the 1960s and
Western capitals – Vilnius is a big exception – 1970s, are part of folk memory, but no longer
is stunningly low. Lurid scenarios attract the of people’s lived experience. Public expecta-
most attention, regardless of their plausibili- tions are higher: the stability and paternalism
ty. One mistake is to overestimate the signif- that once chimed with the popular mood now
icance of the linguistic divide. The difference chafes. Belarusians want dignity, respect,
between Belarusian and Russian is for most truth and justice. They also want their well-ed-
people not a matter of political principle (as, ucated, industrialised country to aim higher.THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 6
Much of that could be said about Russia too, persecuted and do everything possible to
which is why the events of the past days in circumvent the regime’s censorship. We can
Belarus are so terrifying for the Kremlin. The place the perpetrators of repression on sanc-
opposition in Belarus cannot be dismissed as tion lists. We should take time too to reflect
Soros-financed fanatics, waving foreign flags on our past mistakes.
at the behest of foreign paymasters. The po-
That should bring us to the immediate focus
litical conflict does not pit a “western” orien-
of our policy: Russia. The real reason why the
tated slice of the country against an “eastern”
West’s Belarus policy is so ineffective is that
one, which is how many Russians viewed the
it has to accommodate the Kremlin’s imperial
revolution in Ukraine in 2014. This is the bot-
pretensions. Since the unification of Germany
tom against the top. A whole country is in re-
and first expansion of NATO and EU member-
volt against arrogance, brutality, lies, humilia-
ship in the 1990s we have chipped away at
tion and waste.
this ghostly aftermath of the Soviet empire.
Outsiders can show their support for the Belarus is now the only country in which the
strikers, demonstrators and detainees. The outside world accepts that Russia has some
proposal by Lithuanian journalist Andrius kind of special, privileged status. Only when
Tapinas to recreate the “Baltic Way” human that changes and the Kremlin understands
chain of August 23rd 1989, but from Vilnius to that any interference in Belarus will bring an
the Belarusian border, is a particularly com- immediate and costly penalty, can the Belaru-
mendable one. We can offer asylum to the sians win their freedom, at home and abroad.THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 7
CHRIS MILLER
Chris Miller is the Director of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is also Assistant Profes-
sor of International History at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research examines
Russian politics, foreign policy, and economics. His most
recent book is Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent
Russia which has been reviewed in publications such as
The Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, The National Interest
and the Times Literary Supplement.
After Belarusian President Alexander Lu- responded by slashing U.S. diplomatic rep-
kashenko stole his country’s presidential elec- resentation in Belarus and restricting many
tion on August 9 and violently cracked down other ties. With Minsk suffering Western
on citizens who protested, the U.S. govern- sanctions and condemnation, Russia saw
ment declared that it was “deeply concerned.” an opportunity for greater ‘integration’ via
But what is the U.S. prepared to do? Wash- institutions like the customs union and the
ington is in a bind. Since Lukashenko earned Eurasian Economic Union. In Moscow these
his reputation as Europe’s last dictator, the institutions were openly discussed as tools
U.S. has been torn between two often contra- to bolster Russian influence. Lukashenko re-
dictory goals. On the one hand, Washington alized Russia’s intentions, but isolated from
condemns Lukashenko’s government for sup- the West he had little choice but to sign up.
pressing its opponents and abusing its popu-
Belarus nevertheless sought to limit its re-
lace. On the other, the U.S. wants to support
liance on Moscow by welcoming Chinese
Minsk as it tries to maximize its room for ma-
investment in industries from railroads to
neuver vis-à-vis Moscow, which continues to
technology. He signed an agreement allow-
see Belarus as within Russia’s rightful sphere
ing visa-free travel between the countries
of influence. The uncomfortable reality for
and welcomed Chinese People’s Liberation
Washington is that past efforts to support Be-
Army troops to march in Belarus’ 2018 Inde-
larusian democracy have often risked pushing
pendence Day Parade. China has lent Belar-
Lukashenko further into Moscow’s arms.
us hundreds of millions of dollars and coop-
During the years after 1991, U.S. policy to- erated with Minsk on missile development.
ward Belarus has prioritized democracy and Huawei has built up its presence in Belarus,
human rights. The U.S. has condemned Lu- too. Minsk no doubt hoped that its burgeon-
kashenko’s sham elections, supported civil ing friendship with Beijing would let it push
society groups seeking to build democratic back against some of Russia’s more intrusive
institutions, and imposed sanctions on Be- demands. China, meanwhile, was keen to ex-
larusian leaders complicit in abuses. Minsk pand its influence in Eastern Europe.THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 8
For many years the U.S. mostly ignored other free elections oust a dictator that they con-
great powers’ growing influence in Belarus. sider a friend. If Lukashenko manages to
Lukashenko’s abuses made it almost impos- hold on to power, he will be more dependent
sible for American diplomats to do business on Russian (and China) than ever before. The
with him. Even Russia’s annexation of Crimea fact that the EU is preparing new sanctions
and war in the Donbas prompted only a partial on Minsk only intensifies Lukashenko’s de-
rethink in Washington. The State Department pendence.
quietly explored improving ties and began to
For a Secretary of State focused on great
rethink sanctions after the war broke out. Yet
power competition, Belarus poses a dilem-
little actually changed after 2014.
ma. Pompeo has “strongly condemned” the
When the Trump Administration came to pow- violence police used against protestors and
er, it declared that competition with Russia declared the election “not free and fair.” Some
and China would be America’s primary foreign in Congress are demanding that the U.S. can-
policy goal, implicitly relegating questions of cel plans to send an ambassador to Minsk.
democratization to a secondary position. In Yet having been all but absent from Minsk for
February 2020—a time when Russian discus- over a decade the U.S. lacks the deep under-
sion of forcibly integrating Belarus had grown standing of Belarusian politics that is present
louder—Secretary of State Pompeo visited in neighboring countries such as Lithuania
Minsk, offering to supply oil to Belarus. “Your and Poland. Unlike in Ukraine 2014, when it
nation should not be forced to be dependent comes to Belarus the EU looks likely to play
on any one partner for your prosperity or your the leading role in forging the transatlantic
security,” Pompeo told Lukashenko. response.
Fast forward half a year, and the door that The U.S. finds it impossible to ignore the types
Pompeo had cautiously opened for Lukashen- of abuses that Lukashenko has made stan-
ko has slammed shut. The Belarusian dicta- dard features of Belarusian politics. But the
tor has visibly lost whatever popular support impulse to focus on great power politics at
he once enjoyed. Yet it is not yet clear that a time of heightened concern about Russian
Lukashenko is leaving. His “victory” in the and Chinese power is deeply rooted in Wash-
August 9 presidential vote has already been ington. The risk is that by trying simultaneous-
recognized by Russia and China. And neither ly to support democracy while opposing Rus-
of the world’s two authoritarian great powers sian and Chinese influence, the U.S. could end
has any interest in watching a movement for up accomplishing neither.THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 9
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