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BRIEFING PAPER
Number CBP 9137, 16 February 2021
The imprisonment of By Ben Smith
Alexei Navalny
Contents:
1. Alexei Navalny
2. Background of discontent
3. Reaction
4. Sanctions
www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | papers@parliament.uk | @commonslibrary2 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny
Contents
Summary 3
1. Alexei Navalny 4
Crackdown halts protests 4
2. Background of discontent 5
Dangerous moment 5
3. Reaction 6
UK 6
EU 6
Council of Europe 7
G7 7
4. Sanctions 8
UK sanctions 8
Widespread international pressure 8
The “Magnitsky” legal frameworks 8
4.1 Co-ordination? 9
Cover page image copyright Alexei Navalny by Ilyalsaev. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0
/ image cropped.3 Commons Library Briefing, 16 February 2021
Summary
Russian Opposition Leader, Alexei Navalny returned to Russia in January 2021, after
recovering from Novichok poisoning. He was immediately arrested and imprisoned over a
conviction that the European Court of Human Rights had previously declared violated his
human rights. That brought thousands of Russians onto the streets, in some of the biggest
demonstrations against the Government. At least a thousand were arrested.
The demonstrations were widely ascribed to growing discontent with the Government
over corruption and declining living standards,. The events have propelled Navalny to a
new level of prominence and shown the Government increasingly resorting to repression.
EU criticisms of Navalny’s treatment caused relations between the EU and Russia to
nosedive, with the Kremlin announcing the expulsion of European diplomats, a move seen
as a calculated humiliation. The EU remains divided, however, over how to respond. Some
countries would like to see the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany
cancelled, but Germany argues against mixing business and politics.
The Council of Europe, the body that oversees human rights in Europe and of which
Russia is a member, has also condemned Navalny’s treatment. The UK has used the fact
that it is chairing the G7 and the UN Security Council to encourage a strong international
reaction.
Short of cancelling the Nord Stream 2 or imposing other large-scale economic sanctions,
sanctions targeted against individuals for corruption and human rights abuses are the
most likely international reaction. The US, the UK and the EU all have legal frameworks
specially designed for this kind of sanction – often known as Magnitsky sanctions, after
the Russian auditor who died in a Russian jail after uncovering massive fraud.
Sanctions over Navalny will be an early test of transatlantic and cross-Channel
collaboration after the US presidential transition and Brexit.1. Alexei Navalny
Anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny has long been a leading figure opposing the
present Russian Government. In August 2020 he was poisoned with a nerve agent from
the Novichok group and was urgently transferred to a hospital in Berlin, where he
recovered.
On 17 January 2021 he returned to Russia and was immediately arrested.
A few days later he released a video describing what he said was President Putin’s
“palace” on the Black Sea coast, and it soon clocked up 100 million views. President Putin
denied that either he or his family owned any such property, while critics said that the
residence had been built for Putin by billionaire businessmen who support him. More than
a quarter of Russians watched the video.
A Moscow court sentenced him on 2 February to two years and eight months’
imprisonment. That brought thousands onto the streets in more than 100 cities to call for
his release. In Moscow some 40,000 came out. More than 2.500 people were arrested on
the day of his sentencing.
Crackdown halts protests
An independent monitor estimated that some 10,000 people had been arrested over the
two main weekends of protest in January, and more than 1,000 were sentenced to jail
terms in Moscow and St Petersburg alone.
The response from the security agencies seemed to be having the desired effect. On 14
February Navalny’s chief of staff called off the street protests, asking people to make light
displays instead.
www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | papers@parliament.uk | @commonslibrary5 Commons Library Briefing, 16 February 2021
2. Background of discontent
The Russian economy has managed only slow growth in the last few years, recovering
slowly after shrinking in 2016. Forecasts suggest a contraction of 4 per cent in 2020,
leaving average real incomes falling by 11 per cent since 2013; increasing numbers of
Russians live in poverty. In spite of the economic damage inflicted by the Covid pandemic,
the Government scrapped a big investment plan in 2020, in order to protect its national
wealth fund.
From being largely happy with the country’s direction in early 2018, Russians became far
more dissatisfied following the announcement in June of that year of a sharp increase in
the pension age. That did not stop about 78 per cent of the electorate voting Yes in the
referendum held at the end of June 2020 on reforms allowing Vladimir Putin to serve
another two terms as President after the 2024 election (if he stands).
President Putin’s approval ratings fell to 60 per cent in summer 2020. That might seem
like solid support, but it was the lowest approval since 2014, before the annexation of
Crimea. Worse, his approval among voters aged 18-24 fell to 20 per cent; about 36 per
cent of this age group had voted for Putin in 2019.
Meanwhile, Alexei Navalny’s approval increased from 9 per cent to 20 per cent after he’d
been poisoned.
The poisoning, the daring return to Russia, the Putin’s palace video and the prison
sentence have raised Navalny’s profile as leader of the Russian opposition. One observer
put it like this: “Navalny is the most revolutionary figure Russia has seen since
independence in 1991”.
Dangerous moment
The Russian Government’s policy towards Navalny used to be to ignore him. The
assassination attempt having failed, his presence in a Moscow jail presents a risk to the
Kremlin as he may be considered a martyr.
The fall? in living standards is coming at a time when the popularity boost from foreign
policy exploits like Crimea may be fading. A parliamentary election is due for September
2021. Analysts say Navalny may remain in prison until the next presidential election,
scheduled for 2024, as there is another case against him pending.
One Moscow-based observer argues that the present moment is a watershed for the Putin
Kremlin, whose enforcers can keep on arresting protesters and imprisoning critics and no
longer care about presenting a positive vision for the country. She goes on: “The drama
surrounding Navalny’s poisoning was the fuse, but the fire it lit is being fed by the public’s
fatigue and frustration with the Putin regime and its inability to change”. 1
1
Tatiana Stanovaya, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Russia is destabilising itself from within’, Financial Times, 7 February
20206 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny
3. Reaction
UK
On 27 January 2020 Foreign Office minister Wendy Morton called for Navalny’s
immediate and unconditional release. Upon the news that Navalny had been sentenced,
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said on 2 February:
Today’s perverse ruling, targeting the victim of a poisoning rather than those
responsible, shows Russia is failing to meet the most basic commitments expected of
any responsible member of the international community.
The UK is chairing the UN Security Council at present and on 2 February tried to call an
informal meeting of the Security Council. It did not go ahead, reportedly over fears of
“causing tension with Russia”.
EU
On 5 February, while the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was meeting Kremlin
representatives in Moscow, Russia expelled diplomats from Germany, Sweden and Poland
for the alleged offence of attending anti-Putin demonstrations. Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov said: “The European Union is an unreliable partner. Further degradation of
ties is fraught with negative and very, very unpredictable consequences.”
There were calls for Borrell’s resignation over what some saw as an unwise trip leading to
a “brutal, calculated public humiliation” on the part of the Kremlin. The Navalny row will
“freeze already icy relations even harder” according to many observers.
Germany, Poland and Sweden each expelled a Russian diplomat in retaliation. Baltic
states, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland have called for Magnitsky-
style sanctions against Russian officials involved in the imprisonment of Navalny.
EU divisions
But the EU is divided over Russia. In February Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech
Republic and Romania called for travel bans and asset freezes on more Russian individuals.
Critics have also said that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is being built between
Russia and Germany, should be halted over the Navalny case. The new US Administration
may increasingly support a tougher line against the project. A bill passed during the
Trump Administration had already imposed sanctions in connection with the pipeline and
the Biden Administration has described the Nord Stream 2 as “a bad deal for Europe”.
The German economy minister, however, said in February that Nord Stream 2 should be
kept separate from politics, and joined France and Austria in defending doing business
with Russia in spite of human rights violations. President Macron, particularly, has tried to
engage the Russian leadership in dialogue, although the results have been “thin – non-
existent really” according to a French Russia expert.
A German commentator at the Brookings Institution argues that the EU should take a
stronger line, including using the EU’s new Magnitsky sanctions legal framework:
European governments should target the assets and estates that Putin’s henchmen
and oligarch enablers have amassed in Europe. The “European Magnitsky Act” is
named after the Russian whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a Moscow jail
in 2009. Adopted in December, it allows the EU to freeze the assets of, ban entry to,
or prohibit dealings with human rights abusers wherever they are. It’s time to use it. 2
2
Constanze Stelzenmüller, EU support for Russian democracy is inadequate, Brookings Institution, 9
February 20217 Commons Library Briefing, 16 February 2021
Council of Europe
Russia is a member of the Council of Europe (CoE) and is therefore bound by the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights. The court had already judged in October 2017 that the earlier
conviction, the basis for February’s sentence, was “arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable
and, as a consequence, in violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on
Human Rights”. On 4 February the CoE leadership issued a statement regretting
Navalny’s imprisonment and calling upon the Russian authorities to abide by their
international human rights commitments.
PACE
On 3 February the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) condemned
police brutality and judicial abuses against journalists reporting on peaceful
demonstrations. 3
Russia’s relationship with the Council of Europe has been particularly strained since the
annexation of Crimea. It was only in June 2019 that Russian delegates to the Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assemble (PACE) regained their voting rights, after they had been
removed over Crimea. Russian delegates are unlikely to be expelled again in the near
future.
G7
On 26 January the foreign ministers of G7 members Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the UK, US and the EU issued a statement, saying they were “united in
condemning the politically motivated arrest and detention of Alexey Navalny” and “deeply
concerned by the detention of thousands of peaceful protesters and journalists”.
3
18 MPs make up the UK delegation to PACE8 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny
4. Sanctions
UK sanctions
The existing UK sanctions regime on Russia is aimed at encouraging Russia to stop
destabilising Ukraine or threatening its territorial integrity, and has been in place since
2013.
In October 2020 the UK enforced asset freezes and travel bans on six individuals
responsible for the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, using regulations that provide for
measures against those involved in proliferation and use of chemical weapons.
Asked whether the Government intends to impose further sanctions in relation to
Navalny, Ms Morton said on 27 January that the Government is considering it:
We keep further sanctions designations under constant review. However, it would not
be appropriate to comment at this stage on possible future designations, as that could
undermine their impact. We carefully consider all options under the relevant sanctions
regimes.
MPs have supported new targeted sanctions. Margaret Hodge, who takes a keen interest
in sanctions and human rights, said during the same debate that Navalny had
recommended sanctioning rich individuals with connections to the UK (including football
clubs) who had not been sanctioned.
Widespread international pressure
There is pressure for new sanctions against Russian officials in the US and the EU as well
as the UK. That is what Navalny himself called for as he was recovering from the poison
attack: “Sanctions against the whole country don’t work. The most important thing is to
impose entry bans on profiteers of the regime and freeze their assets”.
The incoming US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair, Bob Menendez, wrote to the
new Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 29 January, urging sanctions on Russian officials
who have violated human rights. Menendez went on to say: “the strength of all these
measures will depend on our
ability to coordinate and amplify Sergei Magnitsky
their effect with our European Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian lawyer who uncovered
allies”. large-scale tax fraud. While working at the Moscow
office of Hermitage Capital, a firm based in London and
The European Parliament has run by the US-born financier Bill Browder, he discovered
demanded significantly tighter that millions of dollars of Hermitage tax payments had
EU sanctions against Russia in been syphoned off into the pockets of Russian officials.
He was arrested but refused to withdraw his testimony
response to the Navalny and died in 2009, after mistreatment in jail.
imprisonment. Bill Browder, now a UK citizen, started a campaign to
have sanctions imposed on the officials involved – to get
The “Magnitsky” legal the officials banned from visiting the US and using the US
frameworks financial system.
The US was the first to pass a A Magnitsky Act naming the Russians involved was
legal framework for Magnitsky passed by the US Congress in 2012. It was later
sanctions – sanctions against broadened to become the Global Magnitsky Act of 2016,
applying to gross human rights abusers anywhere. Other
officials guilty of corruption and countries, including Canada, Lithuania and Estonia have
human rights abuses. What is introduced their own versions of the legislation.
now called The Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act was first passed to sanction officials9 Commons Library Briefing, 16 February 2021
responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky (see box ), then broadened out to a global
scope.
MEPs argued that the EU should not hesitate to use its new EU Global Human Rights
Sanctions Regime, which came into force in December 2020.
The UK also has a legal framework for Magnitsky sanctions, set out in the Global Human
Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020.
Canada passed the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act in October 2017. A
committee of the Australian Parliament recommended in December 2020 that the
Australian Government should pass similar legislation without delay.
4.1 Co-ordination?
New US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on 8 February:
…what we’re doing is, first of all, consulting and working closely with other countries
who are very concerned about what’s happened – not just to Mr. Navalny, but others
who have stood up to exercise their rights.
The level of co-ordination between the UK and the EU, and between Europe and the US
will be an interesting test of any new White House approach to consulting and
collaborating with allies.
It will also be interesting to see the extent to which the UK and the EU can put their
differences over trade aside in order to increase the impact of their foreign policies.About the Library
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