The image of Russia in Central & Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans - Russia: mighty Slavic brother or hungry bear next-door?
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The image of Russia in Central & Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans Russia: mighty Slavic brother or hungry bear next-door? www.globsec.org
?
Countries surveyed
Author
Daniel
Milo
Senior Adviser
Poland
Democracy & Resilience Center
Methodology
The outcomes and findings of this
report are based on public opinion
poll surveys carried out in September Czechia
and October 2020 on a representative
sample of the population in nine Slovakia
countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary,
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland,
Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. The
surveys were conducted on a sample
of 1000 respondents using stratified
Table of
multistage random sampling in the contents Hungary
form of computer-assisted telephone Romania
interviewing (CATI) due to COVID-19 04 Introduction
pandemic restrictions. In all countries, 06 Executive summary
the profiles of the respondents were 08 No appetite for turning to
representative of the country according the East in CEE and the Western
to gender, age, education, place of Balkans
residence and size of settlement. 10 Russia – a resurgent strategic
For the purposes of graphical data partner or a shadow of the
Serbia
visualisation, the results were rounded past era?
to full numbers. To improve the 14 Fear of the Russian Bear
readers’ experience, the responses 16 Russia - the victim of NATO Bulgaria
in closed questions with a scale were and Western machinations
generalised. For example, a question 20 Russian virtual military muscle
with options definitely agree/ rather 22 Legacy of Slavic brotherhood Montenegro
agree/ rather disagree /definitely and anti-fascist struggle as
disagree was merged to agree / door-opener
disagree. 24 Country summaries North
MacedoniaIntroduction This report,
To counter these influence strategies,
it is necessary to first comprehensively
understand how Russia is seeking therefore, aims to
to depict itself in CEE and the provide answers
Western Balkans and how successful
its attempts have been. Equally
to the following
important is the need to take note of questions:
Central and Vladimir Putin himself. The manner
in which the Kremlin is nurturing and
both commonalities and differences
across the region and within different
Eastern Europe exploiting these attitudes for its political segments of societies.
(CEE) and the purposes, however, is a paramount
Western Balkans problem.
have been, due to Russia’s turn to a more confrontational
?
their geographic foreign policy approach has seen the
position and country use various methods, including What narratives concerning
history, contested
active measures, disinformation and
information operations, to increase Russia and its policies are most
territories that have its leverage in an attempt to roll back
the pro-Western transition of the
prevalent? How are they exploited
seen global and region. The end goal of this long- to drive pro-Russian sentiment?
regional powers term influence operation is not the
compete for control renewal of the Warsaw pact2 - the
communist alternative to NATO - or
and influence. the Soviet Union dominated Council
?
Following the fall of of Mutual Economic Assistance3. By
communism in 1989 cultivating and amplifying pro-Russian Which countries and population
and the successful
attitudes and narratives, the Kremlin
rather is seeking to weaken both the
sub-groups are seemingly
integration of CEE EU and NATO from within, slowing most vulnerable to pro-Russian
into the EU and
and/or paralysing their decision-
making processes and shaping their narratives and why?
NATO, it seemed policies. EU unity is indeed crucial
almost inevitable if the sanctions regime and overall
approach of the EU towards Russia
that the allure is to be sustained. The planting and
?
of Russia would cultivation of geo-political, cultural and
diminish as would historic narratives concerning Russia Is there a single disposition that
its footprint.
can critically influence how people in
the two regions perceive Russia and
fits all pro-Russian sympathizers
the EU, NATO and the US. The recent across the two regions or are
Yet 40 years of communist rule that
example of the Russian-produced
Sputnik V vaccine bypassing the there multiple distinct groups
witnessed countries come under official registration procedures of the
drawn to the country?
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
Soviet domination, combined with the European Medicines Agency, with
memory of the Red Army liberating the Moscow instead turning to negotiating
two regions from fascism and a web of deliveries with individual EU members,
economic, cultural and religious ties, is yet another example of the country
?
continue to draw certain segments of exploiting every opportunity to
the population to Russia. The mere
fact that a significant subset of Central
influence its image and gain political
leverage.
What is the interplay between
European and Balkan society feel different pro-Kremlin narratives
nostalgia for “the good old days” of
the communist past1, one where Russia and how do they reinforce one
played a more predominant role in
world affairs, is not necessarily a cause
another?
for concern. Nor the fact that some
feel an affinity towards Russian culture,
Moscow’s geopolitical stances or even
4 5Key
Findings
1 4 6 8
There is no single image of Russia is seen as a strategic Even in countries that are Pro-Russian narratives serve
Russia in the region. partner by 30% of people across notably reserved towards as an important tool in shaping
Narratives that emphasize a common the region. Russia, Moscow’s projection of public opinion
heritage and victimhood, however, resonate Given that all surveyed countries, apart from its military superiority appears across the region and they are widely
most strongly, overall, among populaces. Serbia, are NATO members, this substantial to be resonating. accepted as discussed in this report.
figure is quite surprising and a testament to On average, 50% believe that Russia has
the still-significant Russian footprint present. the most powerful military in the world,
whereas only 47% think the same of the US
military.
2 9
Societies in some countries are
more inclined to accept pro-
5 Russia is still not seen as a real
alternative to the West but
Russian narratives, which, in
turn, further reinforce these
The narrative asserting that
NATO is deliberately provoking
7 rather as a victim of Western
machinations.
predispositions. Russia by encircling it with Favourable attitudes towards Post-communist nostalgia, Slavic
The concept of Slavic unity underpins military bases is shared by 45% Russia and high levels of brotherhood and/or dissatisfaction with the
the victimhood narrative that sees Russia of the region’s population. acceptance of pro-Russian state of society underline the rejection of
recognized, by some, as a mere victim of The opposing view stating that Russia is narratives that blame the West the Western liberal democratic order and
the West. Those identifying with this notion responsible for provoking NATO by initiating and/or NATO do not translate the preponderance of pro-Russian attitudes.
are also more likely to believe that Russia is conflicts in Eastern Europe, meanwhile, is into geopolitical support for
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
a superior military power. affirmed by 40% of people. Moscow.
Rather than falling into the Russian bear’s
embrace, even the most ardent supporters
of pan-Slavic unity and admirers of Russian 10
weaponry rather choose the West or a
3 middle ground position. Russian influence
operations, as of yet, only rarely result
There is no universal profile of
a pro-Kremlin backer across the
The majority of people living in the region (56%) do not feel threatened in tangible changes in public support for region.
by Russia. the EU and NATO - two primary Western Different groups in different countries
Most respondents think that their country is too small to pose a threat to Russia or that Slavic links geopolitical and cultural anchors important indicate varying level of acceptance of pro-
and heritage will discourage Moscow from engaging in hostile acts. to the region. Russian narratives.
6 7Bear Bear Bear
huggers feeders sceptics
Serbia Hungary Romania
Bulgaria Czechia Poland
Slovakia North Macedonia
Montenegro
Undergirded by complex This group of countries These two countries,
historical, cultural and is home to attitudes on separated by geography,
ethnic ties, these countries Russia that are marked share scepticism of Russia.
express favourable views by pragmatism and some This sentiment is based,
and share a high level of sympathetic ears. Unlike in to a certain extent, on
affinity towards Russia. The the previous group, Russia historic experiences and
victimhood narrative that is not seen as a brother/ the national narratives
places the blame squarely sister and religious, cultural interpreting them (e.g.
on the shoulders of West and/or historical links play a the Molotov-Ribbentrop
and NATO, moreover, considerably less prominent Pact or the occupation of
receives a sympathetic role. Several Russian Bessarabia and Northern
audience and buy-in in narratives, nevertheless, Bukovina). Neither
these countries. The notion are accepted in significant perceives Russia as an
Countries that they share a common
Slavic heritage with
Russia is also pervasive
numbers. The reasons
behind these attitudes differ
in each country and so
important strategic partner
and the prevailing view
in each sees Moscow
of this region
and popular among an too does the openness of labelled as a threat. Some
overwhelming majority of societies to any particular pro-Russian narratives
people, reinforcing other narrative. including, for example,
narratives. Despite this the claim that NATO and
can be categorized sentiment, when asked, West are aggressive and
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
even the bear hugger unfair, however, are shared
group declines to select by sizeable proportion of
into three groups
Russia, as opposed to the the populations of the two
West, as their preferred countries. While people
choice for the geopolitical in both countries firmly
and cultural orientation of believe that the US has the
according to their
their countries. upper hand when it comes
to the military, a sizeable
minority subscribe to the
belief that Russian military
views on Russia superiority is unsurpassed.
8 91
?
1 1
East vs. West*
West East
No appetite 35%
Montenegro
25%
for turning to the Slovakia
East in CEE and the
29% 11%
Serbia
Western Balkans 21%
Bulgaria
10%
Most countries of CEE are positioned at the eastern edge of the EU and NATO. Cultural
and social feelings of belonging to the West or East, therefore, can play a crucial role in 25% 9%
framing the place of this region and its affinity to the two opposing geopolitical poles. As
underlined in GLOBSEC Trends 20204, instead of choosing one or the other, most Central North Macedonia
Europeans choose the in-between position. On average, 49% would prefer to join neither
the West nor East, not surprising considering the region’s history, geography and self- 46% 7%
identification.
Romania
Following the fall of communism, the Unlike the western lure of a better life narratives, the desire to choose
West came to embody the promise of and economic opportunities, those the East (Russia) over the West
37% 6%
better living standards, security, stability electing for a pro-Eastern leaning (represented by the EU and NATO)
and economic opportunity, these ideals are influenced by a broader range is rather small. This might, at first, be
serving as a magnet for EU and NATO of factors. Bulgaria and Slovakia seen as a problem for Russia but it
integration. The West, consequently, is exhibit the greatest propensity for actually is congruent with Moscow’s Czechia
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
the region’s second highest preference this viewpoint, 9% and 11% in Central overall strategy. Rather than attempting
for its geopolitical orientation, selected Europe, respectively. In these two to present itself as a viable alternative 29% 5%
by one third of respondents (33%). countries, this stance is driven by to the EU or NATO, as elaborated on
positive attitudes towards Russia in this report, Russia is seeking to
including their cultural and/or religious smear and damage the image of these
Hungary
East means Russia proximity and even common Slavic
heritage. In other countries, like
organizations6.
According to our research findings, in Czechia and Hungary, this affinity is 37% 3%
CEE, the East is largely associated with rather buttressed by negative attitudes
Russia5. And when given a clear-cut towards the West and its perceived ills.
choice, only 9%, on average, choose Whatever the reasons, Russia is Poland
to express an explicit preference for a not seen as a real alternative to the
pro-Eastern cultural and geopolitical West. Even in countries where large
orientation (which often translates into segments of the population are
42% 2%
pro-Russian). sympathetic to some pro-Russian
* There has recently been much discussion in our society about the geopolitical and civilisational positioning of your country. Would you like your country to
10 be a part of the West. a part of the East. or somewhere in between? 112
?
2 2
Russia is the most important strategic partner*
Agree
Russia 59%
– a resurgent
strategic partner
or a shadow 42%
41%
of the past era?
38%
33%
The political and economic transition of the post-communist bloc and its accession 30% Regional average
to the EU and NATO was hailed by many as a shining example of successful societal
transformation leading to greater prosperity and stability. While a large majority of
the region’s population supports the political and economic changes that have been
introduced since the fall of communism, the perception of these changes on a personal 23%
level is much more mixed. As evidenced in the 2018 GLOBSEC Trends report or in a 2019
21%
Pew Research report7, sizeable shares of people express dissatisfaction with the effects
of post-1989 developments on their own lives. One quarter (28%) of the populations of
the Visegrad Four countries (CZ, HU, PL, SK), for example, believe that their lives were
better before the fall of communism, with Slovakia and Hungary particularly driving
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
these figures.
The post-communist transformation countries and age groups within each of communism, are more prone to
indeed has not proceeded without country. In Bulgaria, Czechia and falling victim to contemporary anti-
setbacks and there have been winners Slovakia, identification of Russia as a Western and pro-Russian narratives
and losers in the process. The effects strategic partner increases with age. than their parents or grandparents. 6% 6%
of post-communist nostalgia and/or That said, the youngest generation
disillusionment with the current state in other countries, including Serbia,
of affairs is discernible in perceptions, Hungary, North Macedonia and
held by some, that Russia is a strategic Montenegro, is, surprisingly, more
partner. inclined to see Russia as an ally. An
explanation might lie in the possibility
There are, however, significant that young Serbs, Hungarians and
North
differences both between different Montenegrins, born long after the end Serbia Slovakia Bulgaria Montenegro Hungary Macedonia Czechia Poland Romania
* Which of the following countries or groups of countries are the most important strategic partners of [your country] today? 5 countries to choose from,
12 maximum two picks: The US, China, Russia, France, Germany and the EU (for non EU member states) 13?
2 2
Russia is our most important strategic partner
- age groups
Slovakia Serbia
76%
58% 60% 58% 59%
52%
47%
43% 44%
41% 39%
29%
18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o. 18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o.
Bulgaria Hungary
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
53%
44%
41% 40% 39% 41%
38%
35% 34%
29% 31%
21%
18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o. 18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o.
14 153
?
3 3
Do you think that Russia presents a danger
to your country?
Yes No
Fear of the 68%
Russian Bear 43%
Media coverage of Russia’s actions and policies, especially in the Western press, is
mostly critical8. The direct Russian military involvement in combat in eastern Ukraine, the 30%
illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian airstrikes in support of the brutal Assad regime in 25% Regional average Yes
25%
Syria, aggressive hacking campaigns carried out by the military intelligence GRU units 22%
20%
and the targeted assassination of the Kremlin’s defectors and detractors have indeed
made headlines across the world in recent years. Yet how do these stories influence
10%
perceptions of Russia as a threat in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western 7%
Balkans? 3%
With few exceptions, the majority of threaten them. In Hungary, meanwhile,
Poland
Czechia
Romania
Hungary
Montenegro
Slovakia
North Macedonia
Serbia
Bulgaria
people living in this region (56%) do respondents judged the fair mutual
not feel threatened by Russia. This relations between Budapest and
might come as a surprise in light of Moscow to be the most important
the geographic proximity of several factor.
countries in the region to Russia and
their complicated histories that have The wide variety of motivations,
included past military occupation and
Twice as many including emotional and cultural bonds 21%
conflict. Americans and pragmatic appeals, point to the 24%
According to a Pew Research survey,
perceive Russia success of the information operations
conducted by or on behalf of Russia
twice as many Americans (50%) as a threat than and their reliance on customised
feel threatened by Russia than people living country-specific narratives that reflect
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
countries situated in its vicinity (25%). different local contexts. In many of 56% Regional average No
While differences in Russian threat in CEE and these countries, Russia is described
perceptions are vast across the region, the Western in official intelligence or security
the three-group classification laid out
earlier is not necessarily applicable
Balkans. reports as a challenge and its actions
as threatening to their stability and 55%
57%
on this question. Czechia (57%) and security . These official security
61%
Bulgaria (55%), the former a bear assessments, nonetheless, do not
feeder and the latter a bear hugger, are Serbia, Slovakia, Montenegro), a seem to have much bearing on societal 65% 65% 66%
similarly inclined, for example, to reject perceived brotherly/sisterly Slavic perceptions of Russia.
the notion that Russia poses a threat. family link, shared with Russia, plays
an important role. In other countries
The reasons why such a small share (Czechia, Poland, North Macedonia,
of populaces feels threatened by Romania), respondents cite the fact
Russia vary in each country. In the that their country poses no threat to
more Russophilic countries (Bulgaria, Russia, giving Moscow no reason to 91%
16 174
?
4 4
Russia vs. NATO
NATO deliberately provokes Russia by encircling it with military bases.
Russia deliberately provokes NATO by initiating conflicts in Eastern Europe.
Russia - the Serbia
71%
victim of NATO
31%
Montenegro
and Western
60%
44%
40% Regional average
Russia provokes NATO
Slovakia
machinations Bulgaria
41%
56%
The accession of Central European, Eastern European and some Balkan countries into
46%
NATO extended the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
22%
to this region, shielding it from direct military threats and anchoring it to the West. The
Russian Federation, for its part, has been concerned with this NATO expansion into an
Romania
area it considered to be its backyard and has perceived these developments as posing a
38%
threat to its security and national interests11.
37%
Since 2014, NATO has become one
of the most prominent targets of Czechia
Russian disinformation campaigns12.
38%
The Russian government and aligned
outlets have sought to consistently 42%
disseminate anti-NATO narratives.
The converse narrative purporting that
The claim that NATO is North Macedonia
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
Russia is provoking NATO by initiating deliberately provoking Russia by 37%
conflicts in Eastern Europe, meanwhile,
is believed to be true by only 40% of
encircling it with military bases is 32%
45% Regional average
NATO provokes Russia
respondents. The detrimental impact particularly prevalent and gains
of Kremlin rhetoric is further visible in
the gradual decrease of support for
acceptance by 45% of people in Hungary
NATO in Bulgaria, which has declined surveyed countries. 33%
by 9% since 2019 and currently stands 42%
at 47%.13
is a relevant factor influencing public Russia. Bulgaria, where people with
Poland
The categorization of countries into opinion on the matter within countries. university education are more likely
three main groups is pertinent, with the Those having secondary education to affirm this narrative, represents an 23%
exception of Romania, in understanding without school-leaving certificate are interesting exception.
67%
attitudes towards the “Russia vs. most prone, in the majority of countries,
NATO” pairing. Education, meanwhile, to believe that NATO is provoking
18 19Russia a victim
? of the West or the
4 4
Russia as a victim vs. Russia as an agressor aggressor?
The concept
Western countries often unjustly accuse Russia of unlawful or fraudulent behaviour.
Similar to narratives that portray
Those who also agree that Russia is our Slavic brother or relations with Russia should be nurtured.
NATO as the real aggressor, this
Russia is behaving aggressively against its neighbours and tries to weaken the EU and NATO. same victimhood storyline is
of Slavic unity
elevated through assertions that
75% Russia has been unjustly accused
74%
of all wrongdoings by the West. The
comparison, therefore, of two opposing
71%
58%
56%
59%
narratives – one blaming Russia and
the other the West – can provide
interesting insight into the relative
underpins the
victimhood
success of Russian image projection
60%
endeavours.
48%
44%
50% 41% 42% The survey data, in fact, indicates that
narrative
49%
a majority across the region fault the
43% 43% West for unfounded criticism rather
than Russia’s actions. This perspective
37%
that portrays
is more likely to be held in five of nine
35% 34% surveyed countries. The “West is to
blame” view garners, overall, 2% more
North Macedonia
buy-in than the “Russia is a regional
Russia as a
Montenegro
aggressor” narrative.
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Czechia
Poland
Serbia
The “Russia as a victim of the West”
mere victim of
and “Slavic brotherhood/special
relations with Russia” narratives,
meanwhile, correspond closely in the
eyes of respondents. Indeed, when
it comes to victimhood, those who
subscribe to the Slavic brotherhood/
special relations storyline are more
inclined to see Russia as a victim, with
the West.
each reinforcing one another. The
23% positioning of Russia as a brotherly/
27% sisterly nation in Slavic countries of
CEE and the Western Balkans and
the perceived need for a special
37% 39% 40% relationship in non-Slavic countries,
as elaborated further below, plays an
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
48% important role.
49%
53%
More than half of respondents in the region view relations with Russia 84%
positively. 55% consider Russia to be our Slavic brother or believe that
relations with the country should be nurtured. 47% believe that Russia
is subjected to unfounded criticism by the West.
20 215
?
5 5
Military superiority: Russia vs. the US
Russia’s military power is far greater than that of any other country in the world.
The US military is more powerful and technologically advanced then Russian.
Russian virtual Serbia
62%
military muscle
30%
North Macedonia
58%
41%
Russian global image projection is underpinned by its show of force including the
dramatic use of military equipment, military drills and accompanying rhetoric for Romania
psychological effect. Russia, in this regard, has mastered psychological tactics and 57%
information operations, making them integral components in its military affairs since
68%
World War II. Russia, notably, has employed these capacities extensively in the
presentation of new equipment and military operations in Ukraine and, most recently, Montenegro
Syria.
56%
This emphasis has included, for According to responses to the two 50%
example, the development and opposing narratives – one asserting
presentation of new military equipment that Russia has the strongest military Bulgaria
(e.g. tanks, fighter jets, cruise missiles, in the world and the other that the US
ATBMs and submarines). A standard military is more powerful than Russia’s 53%
feature encompasses slick video - the majority in six of nine countries
25%
footage of new equipment, sometimes are inclined to accept Russia’s line.
comprising its combat use in action Nevertheless, overall perceptions, it
(e.g. test sites in Syria), that enables should be noted, are nearly equal. The majority Slovakia
Moscow to boast its abilities. These
images have been disseminated There is, significantly, no single age
in six of nine 52%
through the sprawling network of profile that characterizes people countries are 47%
pro-Russian information sources in
the region, instilling an image of vast
who subscribe to the Russian military
superiority framing. In some countries,
inclined to
Czechia
military power14. it is youth - the supposed digital natives accept Russia’s
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
– that are enormously influenced by line on military 47%
The aim of projecting conceptions of the Kremlin narrative (Serbia, Hungary,
Russia as a military superpower on par Czechia, Romania and Poland). In superiority. 45%
with the US, achieved by parading its Bulgaria and Montenegro, conversely,
new equipment and proving its combat the oldest generation proves most Hungary
readiness, is two-fold. Firstly, Moscow susceptible to the claim. Slovakia and
35%
is seeking to foster admiration and Romania, meanwhile, present the
support from those sympathetic to case where both the younger and the 52%
Russia and spark apprehension among oldest generations were found to be
those wary of the country. Moscow, prone to perceiving Russia as a military
Poland
secondly, is attempting to camouflage superpower. North Macedonia is also
the fact it is lagging on other issue a distinct case, with the middle-aged 30%
areas, among others, economic demographic most likely to believe
development, quality of life and the that Russia holds a military might 68%
state of medical facilities.15 advantage.
22 236
?
6 6
Russia as the main actor responsible for the
defeat of Fascism in WWII. continues to play
the leading role in fight against fascism today
Legacy of
Agree Disagree
70%
Slavic brotherhood
60% 58%
51%
48%
41%
and anti-fascist
39% 37%
North Macedonia
25%
struggle as
Montenegro
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Czechia
Poland
Serbia
a door-opener 17% 17%
In addition to contemporary issues, perceptions of
30%
Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans are influenced
by historical and cultural narratives. In Slavic countries, 39% 38% 40% 40%
which represent all surveyed countries apart from 46%
Those who agree that
Hungary and Romania, the notion of joint historical, Russia is our Slavic
cultural and even “spiritual” bonds is often exploited to brother 60%
elevate Russia’s image in the region. 67% Average
The (ab)use of fascism as a central element of its Against this backdrop, the “Russia as
Serbia 89% anti-fascist legacy raison d’être. leader against fascism” storyline was
found to be prevalent in five of nine
Notwithstanding the many historical other attribute concerning Russia and by Russia While the remembrance of fallen countries surveyed. In another two
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
and even current conflicts between adopt more anti-Western attitudes. Bulgaria 84% soldiers and victims is, undoubtedly, countries, equal shares embraced and
Slavic nations that have witnessed Memories of the region’s anti-fascist laudable, its contemporary exploitation rejected the narrative, whereas it was
a Russian role (e.g. the breakup of That said, no universal characteristics Slovakia 78% struggle and the toll absorbed by the for nefarious political motivations is not. vehemently spurned in only one. Most
Poland, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, are discernible among people Soviet Red Army in its campaign to This flagrant abuse was exemplified, people in the region, furthermore, are
the Russian invasion of Ukraine and professing a special bond between liberate Europe during the Second for example, in Russia’s preposterous inclined to believe that Russia is playing
annexation of Crimea), this communal their country and Russia, ethnic (Slavic Montenegro 72% World War remain intact throughout situating of the Ukrainian conflict as a leading role in combating fascism
sentiment garners a tremendous countries) or otherwise (Hungary and the region. The remembrance of Red a contest between “fascist” forces on today. The fact that Russia, in fact, has
following throughout the region, Romania). The segmentation by age, North Macedonia 65% Army soldiers who sacrificed their the Ukrainian side and brave anti- been cultivating (complex) ties with
creating further openings for additional similarly, points to no distinct pattern. lives during this struggle indeed were fascist volunteers on the other17. This many far-right political groups20 and
pro-Russian narratives to seep in. Though Slavic unity holds greater an integral component of communist attempt to frame the conflict in Ukraine parties throughout Europe appears lost
Czechia 47%
sway among older people in Slovakia, ideology, contributing to the formation through the prism of the anti-fascist on these segments of society.
In our research, people who subscribe Bulgaria, Czechia and Montenegro, of close bonds between the liberators struggle was further emboldened by
to the Slavic brotherhood/sisterhood youth are more drawn to the possibility Poland 30% and the liberated. The communist era the activities of groups like the Night
concept are both more inclined to take of special relations with Russia in that ensued (and claimed many lives16) Wolves18 operating also in CEE and
a positive view towards nearly every Hungary, Romania and Poland. put an emphasis on the victory over Western Balkan countries.19
24 25Country Bear feeders
74% of
Bear sceptics
summaries
Czechia Romania
Hungarians
Population wary of Russia,
evidenced by second highest
agree that More people see Russia as a
threat than not
threat perception of Russia in Hungary should
the region nurture its Russia and NATO are equally
relations with blamed for provocations
Bear huggers One in five respondents view
Russia.
Russia as a strategic partner Slightly more people
believe that Russia is acting
More people believe Russia aggressively towards its
Serbia Bulgaria
is responsible for provoking neighbours than the “West is
NATO and acting in a hostile unjustly making accusations
Most pro-Russian country in Russia perceived as an North Macedonia
manner than the reverse about Russia” narrative
the survey important strategic partner by
four in ten Bulgarians Population holds low threat
More people identify the perception of Russia While more people recognize
Russia seen as a strategic
partner by more than 50% of Explicit pro-Eastern geopolitical Majority of Russian military, rather than the
US, as superior.
the US military as superior, six
in ten Romanians believe that
respondents orientation not present Slovaks (50%) People express second
highest belief, following only Russia has the most advanced
Majority of population believes Russian victimhood narrative
are inclined to Slavic brotherhood affinity Serbia, in the idea that Russia military
in all surveyed pro-Russian prevalent, accepted by nearly see Russia as second lowest in the region has the military upper hand
Majority of Romanians believe
narratives half the population a victim of the Slavic brotherhood in nurturing their relationship
Slavic brotherhood narrative Oldest and university
West. Among attachments to Russia are with Russia
nearly universally accepted in educated most sympathetic those who Hungary shared by two-thirds of the
the country to pro-Russian narratives subscribe to population
the concept Russia perceived as a strategic
One-third are inclined
of Slavic partner and a victim of NATO Poland
to believe that NATO is
provocations by one-third of
Montenegro Slovakia
brotherhood, the population
responsible for provoking
Russia is seen as a threat by
Russia
this figure seven in ten Poles
Most pro-Russian country Considerable presence of increases to Three-fourths of people agree
that the country should further
More people conclude that
Strategic partnership with
among NATO members pro-Russian attitudes - among 58%. develop its relationship with
the West is unjustly accusing
Russia and any pro-eastern
surveyed most ardent of NATO and EU Russia of wrongdoing than the
Russia orientation sentiments are
members other way around.
negligible
Russian narratives targeting
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
Russian victimhood narrative is
NATO have proven effective Russia seen as a strategic
accepted by four in ten, rising Two-thirds consider Russia’s
and are widely accepted partner, NATO as an aggressor
to five in ten among those who actions as provocations
support closer ties with Russia against NATO and eight in ten
Most inclined to believe Majority believes in Russian
think Russia generally treats
Russian victimhood narrative victimhood narrative
Explicit support for Eastern its neighbours aggressively –
among Slavic brotherhood
orientation is negligible the highest percentage in the
adherents Slavic brotherhood plays a
region
predominant role
Younger generation holds
Middle-aged people most
more favourable disposition 66% of Poles One-third of Poles believe
reserved in their attitudes Young and educated more
towards Russia resilient to pro-Russian
towards Russia and oldest consider Russia has the strongest
narratives
generation most distant
Russia’s actions army and identify with Slavic
brotherhood links with Russia
as provocations
against NATO.
26 27Credits
4 13
Globsec Trends 2020, GLOBSEC, available at: GLOBSEC Trends 2020
https://www.globsec.org/publications/globsec-
14
trends-2020/ See for example coverage on a Slovak
pro-Russian web Armadny Magazin (Military
Collection of opinion polls in each 5
GLOBSEC Trends 2019, GLOBSEC, available News) affiliated to a flagship of pro-Russian
country was coordinated by FOCUS, at: https://www.globsec.org/publications/ sources in Slovakia Hlavné Správy https://
globsec-trends-2019/ www.armadnymagazin.sk/2019/05/30/analyza-
s.r.o.
nasadenia-ruskych-zbrani-v-syrii-nabada-
6
See for example NATO’s approach to rusov-k-optimizmu/ or the notorious Czech
countering disinformation. NATO, July 17, 2020 disinformation outlet Aeronet.cz https://aeronet.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm cz/news/rusko-odpalilo-z-kaspickeho-more-
Terminology or A Russian Federation Information Warfare
Primer, University of Washington, November
26-strel-s-plochou-drahou-letu-v-syrii-zasahly-
cile-islamskeho-statu-usa-chteji-assada-i-
used to identify 12, 2020, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/a-
russian-federation-information-warfare-primer/
putina-zalovat-pred-mezinarodnim-tribunalem-
brzezinsky-navrhuje-odzbrojit-r/
regions in the 7
European Public Opinion Three Decades 15
See for example the UN Human
report: After the Fall of Communism, Pew Research,
October 15, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.
Development Index, where Russian Federation
is at position no. 52 http://hdr.undp.org/en/
org/global/2019/10/15/european-public-opinion- content/latest-human-development-index-
three-decades-after-the-fall-of-communism/ ranking
• CEE / Central and Eastern Europe –
8 16
Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, See for example: International media image Valentino, Benjamin A. (2005), Final Solutions:
of Russia: trends and patterns of perception, Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth
Romania, Slovakia
Ekaterina A. Repina et al, DOI: 10.18355/ Century, Cornell University Press,
XL.2018.11.02.45,
17
• Western Balkans – North Macedonia, Russian Disinformation Distorted Reality in
9
Share of Americans who say that Russia and Ukraine. Americans Should Take Note, Foreign
Montenegro, Serbia
its power pose a threat to the well-being of Policy, August 2019, https://foreignpolicy.
the United States. Climate Change and Russia com/2019/08/02/russian-disinformation-
Are Partisan Flashpoints in Public’s Views distorted-reality-in-ukraine-americans-should-
of Global Threats, Pew Research center, 30 take-note-putin-mueller-elections-antisemitism/
July, 20219, https://www.pewresearch.org/
References politics/2019/07/30/climate-change-and-russia-
are-partisan-flashpoints-in-publics-views-of-
18
The Night Wolves: Russian Motorcycle
Club or Kremlin Militia?, Military.com,
global-threats/ September 2018, https://www.military.com/
1
GLOBSEC Trends 2018, GLOBSEC, available daily-news/2018/09/04/night-wolves-russian-
10
at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ See for example: Annual report of Czech motorcycle-club-or-kremlin-militia.html
uploads/2018/05/GLOBSEC-Trends-2018.pdf Intelligence Service, available at https://
19
www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/ Russia’s influence in Slovakia. The Night
2
The Warsaw Pact was a collective defense vyrocni-zpravy/2019-vz-cz.pdf or Annual Wolves, Putin’s biker gang, The Economist,
treaty similar to NATO, uniting the Soviet Union report of Slovak Intelligence Service https:// August 28, 2018, https://www.economist.com/
and seven other Eastern Bloc socialist republics www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti. europe/2018/08/23/the-night-wolves-putins-
of Central and Eastern Europe. Signed in May html#bezpecnostna-oblast biker-gang
1955 in Warsaw, it was established as a military
11 20
counterweight to NATO. NATO expansion a ‘direct threat to Russia’ These many links include financial, media
– Putin, RT, 4 April 2008, https://www.rt.com/ and political support, cooperation agreements
3
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance news/nato-expansion-a-direct-threat-to-russia- signed between Our Russia Party and a host
was a socialist economic organization set up by putin/ of Western European far-right parties, illicit
the Soviet Union in 1949 following the rejection financing etc... See Anton Shekhovtsovs` Tango
12
of the Marshall economic plan by socialist bloc EEAS East Stratcom team has documented Noir, https://www.tango-noir.com/
countries. Led by the Soviet Union, its original 1087 cases of NATO related disinformation
members included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, in its online database: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; disinformation-cases/?text=NATO&date=&per_
Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam joined later. page=&orderby=date& offset=1080&order=ASC
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans
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GLOBSEC, the US Department of State and the National Endowment for Democracy
assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their
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