A Policy Proposal for Canadian the Government to Counter Disinformation: Countering Disinformation Through Collaboration
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A Policy Proposal for Canadian the Government to
Counter Disinformation: Countering Disinformation
Through Collaboration
Blair Maddock-Ferrie
Royal Military College of Canada
Federalism-E is founded by the Royal Military College of Canada and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at
Queen’s University.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)2 Federalism-e is an electronic student journal about federalism, multi-level governance, and intergovernmental relations put forth in collaboration between Queen's University and the Royal Military College of Canada. This annual journal will publish papers by undergraduate students, which are reviewed by an editorial board composed of their peers, in both English and French languages. It is a bilingual, undergraduate electronic journal with a mandate to provide a forum to encourage research and scholarly debate with respect to a wide variety of issues concerning federalism both within Canada and abroad. Federalism-e est un journal électronique sur le fédéralisme, la gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux et les relations intergouvernementales, élaboré en collaboration avec l'Université Queen's et le Collège militaire royal du Canada. Ce journal annuel publiera des articles d'étudiants de premier cycle, qui seront examinés par un comité de rédaction composé de leurs pairs, en anglais et en français. Il s’agit d’un journal bilingue de premier cycle dont le mandat est de fournir un forum pour encourager la recherche et les débats universitaires sur une grande variété de questions relatives au fédéralisme au Canada et à l’étranger. Editors-in-Chief/Redacteurs en Chef: Officer Cadet/élève-officier - Kiernan Alexander, Royal Military College of Canada Officer Cadet/élève-officier - Teresa Quadros, Royal Military College of Canada Associate Editors/Rédacteurs Associés: Aidan Trembath, Brandon University Easton Thomas, York University Hope Charney, University of Saskatchewan Mikal Fakhreddin, University of Windsor Nikhil Pandeya, Queen's University Noah Davis, University of King's College Paul E. Farquharson, University New Brunswick Sanjana Rahman, York University Stefanie Hebel, University of Guelph Faculty Advisor/Conseiller de la Faculté: Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College of Canada, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University Contact Information: Email/Courriel – federalismeditors@gmail.com Website/Site web – https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/fede Address/Addressee – Royal Military College of Canada 13 General Crerar Cres Kingston, ON K7K 7B4 Federalism-E is founded by the Royal Military College of Canada and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University. Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)
3
Background
Canadian disinformation policy does not exist. 1 Moreover, an open call for grants that
examine policy solutions on this issue is ongoing. The only existing policy intends to broadly and
vaguely target extremist content, the policy’s purpose, and initiative are ineffective as it falls short
in two important areas:1) the policy fails to distinguish between misinformation and
disinformation in their documentation, 2 and 2) the policy fails to address the overall risks of
censorship in response to disinformation or “extremist content”.3 “Extremist content” is ill defined
by the Canadian government but according to Canada Center for Community Engagement and
Prevention of Violence it means any content that might lead to violent extremism. 4 Unfortunately,
due to the nature of policy summaries, none of the language was agreed upon by the Canadian
government nor accepted as formal definitions. 5 The Canadian government had not defined
disinformation until 2021, and the current definition does not acknowledge it as a deliberate attack
from an opposing actor. Rather, the unintentional perversion of truth – which is misinformation –
can be called disinformation under the current definition, which has the consequence of censorship
and being unable to target the perpetrators, countering neither effectively. 6 Within the scope of
this paper, the most effective mechanism of reduction will be increasing the Russian overhead
costs for launching disinformation operations.
The current Canadian government's position fully acknowledges that disinformation is a
threat in line with the definition adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
however, it has considered only two possible responses.7 Firstly, the federal government supports
banning content that it has identified as “disinformation” and implementing additional monitoring
mechanisms to carry out increased bans. Secondly, it involves education and a counter-offensive
of sorts to disinformation campaigns that involve both operations and financial pressures. 8 The
latter action will be the subject of this proposal and are inline with recommendations from the
Global Engagement Center.
It should be noted that any solution proposed to stop the spread of disinformation will not
solve the problem unless it addresses the social phenomena that make disinformation effective.
One issue is that the federal government requires the national population to trust the political
1
Tej Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options (Ottawa: Evidence for Democracy, 2021),
5.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Public Safety Canada, “National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence,” Public Safety Canada,
December 11, 2018, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/index-en.aspx.
5
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) Government of Canada, “Protecting
Democracy from Disinformation: Normative Threats and Policy Responses,” CRTC, July 23, 2020,
https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/acrtc/prx/2020tenove.htm.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)4
establishment, and that it will work in the citizenries’ best interest.9 In democracies, there are often
populations or groups who are not content with the current government policies and/or attitudes.
These groups are targeted by disinformation that often builds on existing concerns of the effected
groups against the government, that are then twisted into a narrative to undermine the belief in the
democratic system. The goal of disinformation on the systemic or national level to erode trust in
government and faith in democracy. This weakens the trust in the democratic processes of the
state. Therefore, any solutions that do not target the original grievance of the effected populations
will not stop the spread of disinformation as the demand for alternative information remains.
The method to slow this production effectively would be to inflict a cost against the Russian
government for their disinformation tactics. The Russians have shown a level of sophistication to
produce such disinformation that does not correlate to the popularity of the disinformation being
produced. Russia uses largely small cells that operate often on their own initiative on an industrial
scale to produce disinformation at an incredible rate. They use existing telecommunications
networks to spread this disinformation to the target nation from Russia. Memes for examples can
be wildly effective yet are very cheap in comparison to the “set piece operations” found in the
Cold War.10 In turn, the Russians have noted that NATO has not acted in retaliation over the
Russian campaign or objective to release disinformation to damage the creditability of Russian
adversaries. NATO’s refusal to retaliate for fears of escalation have created a position where the
Russians produce disinformation on an industrial scale without fear of reprisal.11 If Canada can
create a direct cost to the Russian operations, it might reduce the frequency of the operations and
force the more judicious application of them over time.
The threat of disinformation is not unique to Canada; it has rather encompassed other
Western nations since the Cold War. 12 In Canada, the current threat of disinformation is
characterized by constant erosion of Canadian democracy from three principal opposing actors—
Russia, China and Iran— seeking to paralyze the capacity of the federal government to act
effectively.13 Since 2008, the era of disinformation commenced when the Russians declared non-
kinetic war on the West. 14 The Chinese likewise joined this large-scale operation between 2014-
2016. The Iranians are the weakest players but are a recognized opposing actor in the realm of
9
Brad Graham, “The Governance Monitor: Canadians' Trust in Government Rebounds,” iPolitics, September 20,
2021, https://ipolitics.ca/2021/09/20/the-governance-monitor-canadians-trust-in-government-rebounds/.
10
Nicholas Thompson, “How Russian Trolls Used Meme Warfare to Divide America,” Wired (Conde Nast,
December 17, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ira-propaganda-senate-report/; Thomas Rid, Active
Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (London: Profile Books, 2021), 145-189.
11
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World (Brussels:
European Parliament, 2021)
12
Rid, Active Measures, 6-11.
13
Government of Canada, “Protecting Democracy from Disinformation”.
14
Giles, Keir. Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Rome, Italy: NATO Defence College Research Division,
2016, 20.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)5
disinformation by the Canadian government. 15 Who, despite their very low impact, could act as a
test case to check the viability of this proposal. 16 Historically, the Canadian government has failed
to address cyber-related and information warfare issues.17 Correspondingly, there are few
protocols to deter opposing actor operations that target the government and general populace in
this manner. The policies that Canada claims to counter disinformation at best educate in a very
tepid manner, largely being limited to academia, with these protocols systematically failing to
address what drives the popularity of disinformation. Canada ranks very low on NATO's trusted
list of member states’ countering disinformation, however, what this means on an ordinal scale is
not defined.18 As early as 2015, NATO informed each of its member states of the threat of Russian
disinformation, following the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s publication of a piece of
Russian disinformation.19
The Canadian government publicly acknowledged the threat of disinformation between
2017 and 2019, issuing a complete report on this existential threat in 2019. Since the emergence
of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, there have been calls for national policy that
addressed disinformation.20 The sheer volume of attacks launched against Canada by Russia and
China during the pandemic has led to the growth of destabilizing movements, including the anti-
vaccine and the anti-lockdown movements. Proponents of these movements argue there are
governments are becoming authoritarian due to the disinformation in no small part confounding
understanding the need for lockdown, and other Non-pharmaceutical Public Health Measures
(NPHM).21 These narratives are only aided by censorship, which to them reinforces the belief that
their government does not have their best interest in mind 22
15
Kaveh Shahrooz, “Foreign Influence from Iran in Canada Is a Real Concern: Kaveh Shahrooz,” Macdonald-
Laurier Institute (Macdonald-Laurier Institute, January 27, 2022), https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/foreign-influence-
iran-canada-real-concern-kaveh-shahrooz-toronto-sun/.
16
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 12; Carme Colomina, The Impact of
Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World (Brussels: European Parliament, 2021).
17
Ibid.
18
NATO, “NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
19
Ibid.
20
Abde Amr, “Weaponizing Fact-Checking: What Canada Needs to Know,” The Monitor, July 1, 2021,
https://monitormag.ca/articles/weaponizing-fact-checking-what-canada-needs-to-know.
21
David Robert Grimes, “Medical Disinformation and the Unviable Nature of Covid-19 Conspiracy Theories,”
PLOS ONE 16, no. 3 (March 12, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245900.
22
Ryan Tumilty, “Covid Pandemic Corroded Canadians' Trust in Politicians - Even Their Neighbours, Poll Finds,”
national post (National Post, May 24, 2021), https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/covid-pandemic-eroded-
canadians-trust-in-politicians-science-and-even-their-neighbours-poll-finds; Amr, “Weaponizing Fact-Checking.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)6
Issue
In 2019, Canada finally acknowledged the threat that disinformation presents to Canadians.
The policy summary, entitled Protecting Democracy from Disinformation: Normative Threats and
Policy Responses, outlined a series of competing schools of thought which for the purpose of this
paper are grouped together in two groups: firstly, domestic modes of control address the use of
censorship and algorithmic targeting to shut down sources of disinformation internally, and
secondly international initiatives that focus on education and mechanism of reducing the spread of
disinformation internationally.23 These broad groupings do have overlapping applicability and by
no mean exclusive. The case of education for example is most effective when coordinated
internationally but domestic efforts can also facilitate success. What becomes an issue is when
these two groupings become viewed as control/censorship and education. Education certainly has
merit; however, censorship is dangerous and has been shown to further erode trust in government,
which is in part the objective of the opposing actor’s disinformation. A common narrative put forth
by the Russians is that NATO is coalition of near plutocratic states that are not democratic and but
a cabal of elites. The censorship, in this manner can feed into such a narrative and undermine the
faith in democracy.
An argument being made in many circles is that combatting disinformation requires
legislation that would curb internet freedom and user privacy as part of a wider government
initiative to crack down on extremist speech. 24 Bill C-10, including its successors Bill C-11, Bill
C-76, and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, empowers the Canadian government to
identify anti-establishmentarian content on the internet and monitor those accounts.25. While
disinformation can be spread by extremists and dissidents; the creators are opposing actors.26 Thus,
the goals and behaviours of these anti-democratic actors are not the same as those that are
addressed in the current legislation. The rise of disinformation in the ongoing non-kinetic war
against democratic nations by Russia, China and Iran cannot go unaddressed.27 Doing so leaves
Canada in a vulnerable position because of the disinformation created by adversarial actors.
23
Government of Canada, “Protecting Democracy from Disinformation”.
24
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5.
25
Aiello, “Feds Unveil Plan to Tackle Fake News.
26
NATO, “NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm; Government of Canada, “Protecting Democracy from
Disinformation”.
27
Giles, Keir. Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Rome, Italy: NATO Defence College Research Division,
2016, 20.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)7
Analytic Framework
To address the factors and policy options available for Canada an options analysis has been
completed in the following sections of Factor, Options, and Comparison. This analysis had
identified three factors and will assess three options.
Factors
Respecting Free Speech: Canada needs to address disinformation that does not inhibit
freedom of speech but provides a means of at least monitoring future operations accurately, such
as through expanding existing security apparatus and greater education. 28 Canada must create a
policy that directly acknowledges the threats of Russia and China disinformation campaigns, and
counter the latter’s actions without harming Canadian society. 29 The history of disinformation
shows that the federal government must be able to identify these operations before they can be
countered, and countering disinformation effectively includes fostering organic trust in the
government.30 Suppressing deceit will not improve trust; it will undermine what little remains.
Canadians want to trust the government, and the government needs to show that they can. 31
Cost-Effectiveness: The Canadian policy should also be cost-effective, as the government
has been unwilling to spend money on these initiatives.32 The question of defence spending has
been historically contentious in Canada; however, current measures have the capabilities to counter
disinformation efforts.
Making Disinformation Costly to Opposing Actors: Further, any measure that increases
the of cost launching disinformation campaigns would be ideal. 33 This could disincentivize attacks
requiring less frequent, but more sophisticated operations. The final factor that must be considered
is the viability of any policy given existing infrastructure, as well as Canada's overall lack of policy
experience.
Options
The Canadian government has already acknowledged two competing schools of thought
that favour domestic and international responses, the issues comes when these are mechanized on
the domestic level. Broadly, under domestic modes of control or international initiatives. However,
there exists a third path that employs the mechanisms of domestic modes of control in a manner
28
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5;
29
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 21-22.
30
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5.
31
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 16-17.
32
Timothy Caines, “RUSSIAN MENACE : IS THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF COUNTERING
RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION?,” Exercise Solo Flight JCSP, no. 45 (May 2019),
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/308/305/caines.pdf.
33
Ibid.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)8
that does not harm free speech. This option affords government the ability to monitor a particular
population through existing frameworks, and using algorithms coupled with data contributed by
allied nations that identified disinformation. Bill C-11, which forces social media companies to
provide data analyses for all users, further expands the possible usages of algorithms and other
data analyses.34 This serves three purposes: first, to understand the size of the threat; second, to
analyze threat viability, including funding and possible weaknesses within tactics and third, to
identify which groups consume the most disinformation as a possible indicator of the groups that
are dissatisfied.
Education could also be achieved by maintaining a database of disinformation, as well as
forcing government employees to complete courses that address disinformation.35 The goal of the
database would first and foremost be to prevent the government from spreading disinformation
accidentally; and secondly, to offer educational tools to the public.36 The creation of a database is
recommended by NATO and also supported by the Global Engagement Center, with the goal of
keeping this database open to the public and allied governments.37 The creation of this data base
is at this time theoretically but likely on going through American and Estonian efforts.38 The risk
is that these tools will not stand up to opposing actor adaptation because several reports indicate
that the Russian and Chinese governments already understand how nations react to disinformation
much better than the experts who write the policies in western nations.39 Thus, a publicly available
database would maximize the value of education, while at the same time prevents government
entities from spreading opposing actor disinformation unintentionally.40 There are many instances
of Russian and Chinese disinformation being spread by government agencies located in Canada
and the United States showing the importance of educating all levels of Canadian and American
government.41
NATO has been experimenting with how to inflict a cost to opposing actor operations, and
from such activities what emerged were two competing theories. First, fight disinformation with
disinformation, and the second theory suggests using asset forfeiture of these sites where possible,
targeting websites and generators of large-scale conspiracies. In the 1950-60s, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted the first option; it had little success with this operation,
having backfired on the US, as the operation was perceived by American allies as having
34
Parliament of Canada, “Government Bill (House of Commons) C-11”.
35
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5.
36
Global Engagement Center, Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of State, 2020), 61.
37
Ibid, 62-64.
38
Tyler McBrien, “Defending the Vote: Estonia Creates a Nettwork to Combat Disinformation, 2016–2020,”
Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, 2020,
https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/TM_Estonia_Election_FINAL%20edited_JG.
pdf.
39
Ibid, 63-64.
40
NATO, “NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
41
Ibid.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)9
undermined the faith in the US. This may have inadvertently contributed to false intelligence
assessments both within the US and in allied nations.42 However, humours forms of countering
disinformation through memes, that directly addresses Russian disinformation has been successful.
The invasion of Ukraine has seen widespread use of memes intended to challenge Russian
disinformation. These memes have seen great success in undermining the effectiveness and reach
of Russian disinformation operations. The cost effectiveness of this meme tactic makes it ideal for
nations with small military budgets to adopt as a form of retaliation. 43 The second option involved
the use of attacking the major sources of disinformation by identifying its country of origin and
sites that host it. Many disinformation websites propagate old articles and/or participate in
disinformation networks, such as botnets which automatically promote false articles. These article
are often copied or slightly modified from original creator that is at the center of the bot net and is
the human actor44 By identifying the first website to post articles containing disinformation, one
can trace the origin of the disinformation and, in turn, target the websites, their financial links, and
where they are based.45 Over time and through the use of shared intelligence networks, the process
can be automated effectively. This would not censor the disinformation directly, as it targets the
source of the disinformation. 46 This would not prevent or limit the spread of user-generated content
either.
Comparing the three policies below, can be summarized under the categories of censorship
of the population that a) prevents the spread of disinformation, that b) educates the population on
disinformation, and that c) retaliates either with disinformation from Canada against the
perpetrators of disinformation or launch operations against mechanism that disseminate
disinformation.
Comparison
Censorship: The tactic which is the costliest both in terms of the impact on the democratic
process and monetary value is censorship. To successfully censor disinformation requires
implementing physical infrastructure through either governmental regulation addressing the
information entering and exiting Canada or costly programs embedded on existing
telecommunications networks. 47 Alternatively, it would require internet service providers to
implement blocks on sites and posting at the consumer level, increasing already record-high costs
for the internet.48 These are also the tactics used by China and Russia for their own domestic
42
Rid, Active Measures, 61-74.
43
Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Ukraine's Showdown with Russia Plays Out One Meme At A Time,” The Washington
Post (WP Company, January 26, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/26/ukraine-russia-memes-
social/.
44
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 17-18.
45
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5, 10-14.
46
Ibid.
47
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5.
48
Cansumer Staff, “Why Is Internet so Expensive in Canada?,” Cansumer (Cansumer, September 23, 2021),
https://cansumer.ca/canada-internet-pricing/.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)10
internet control.49 The ability for people with no technical experience to bypass censorship systems
will inevitably escalate government actions to the point of anti-democratic silencing of genuine
dissent.50 At best, censorship will fail to counter disinformation, and at worst, it will deteriorate
Canada's democracy to the opposing actor’s benefit.51
Education Initiatives: The option of education is the cheapest, as implementation costs
could be mitigated by expanding on existing government archives, such efforts to report
disinformation to intelligence agency and other internet education initiatives, such as those in
schools about internet literacy.52 Education possesses possibly the most significant long-term gain,
because it will make populations more critical of media. Nevertheless, education alone cannot be
expected to halt the spread nor the creation of disinformation. 53 The only lasting fix to the spread
of disinformation is a policy that improves society and addresses the needs of the people most
vulnerable to actions by the opposing actor.54 The worst outcome to a public education initiative
is that disinformation will become more sophisticated and occur less often, with the Canadian
government no longer spreading it unintentionally. 55 However, this tactic could be fully effective
within decades, not years due to the time to educate the population. The effects of disinformation
attacks are not designed to facilitate an immediate tactical goal and are intended to undermine the
faith in the long term. The effects of these tactics therefore function over many years or decades
and measuring success within a time frame where these attacks are not measured by the actor
committed them is unwise.56
Retaliation: The option of attacking the sources of disinformation is the best compromise
of the three. The cost of these operations is low, except that they may encourage further escalation
from the opposing actor.57 It is possible the opposing actor may dedicate resources to produce mass
disinformation to overwhelm the effort temporarily. Opposing actor retaliation requires
appropriate resolve to counter, and adaptation must be foreseen in the policy. Memes are a low-
cost measure to counter opposing actor disinformation in conjunction with other effort serve as a
short term form of retaliation. 58 The option of attacking disinformation at its source is in the least
49
NATO, “NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
50
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 21.
51
Ibid.
52
Aiello, “Feds Unveil Plan to Tackle Fake News”; Parliament of Canada, “Government Bill (House of Commons)
C-76 (42-1) - Royal Assent - Elections Modernization Act - Parliament of Canada,” Government Bill (House of
Commons) C-76 (42-1) - Royal Assent - Elections Modernization Act - Parliament of Canada, 2018,
https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-76/royal-assent; Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada
Research and Policy Options, 5.
53
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5.
54
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 21.
55
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5.
56
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 21.
57
NATO, “NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
58
Khurshudyan, “Ukraine's Showdown with Russia Plays Out One Meme At A Time,”.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)11
an option that will provide the government with proof of action against the threat.59 Notably,
without education to undermine disinformation in the long term, the need for these retaliatory
attacks will never end. 60
The Table below outlines the advantages and disadvantages detailed in the paragraphs
above in direct comparison, based on the three variables discussed in the factors section. These
are rated on a scale of: poor, good, very good, with any factor that does not address the variable
rated as non-applicable.
Respecting Free Cost-Effectiveness Making Disinformation Score
Speech Costly to the Opposing
Actor
Censorship ● Poor ● Poor. ● Poor. ● Poor
● Does not ● Requires ● Censorship does
respect physical not reduce the
populations' infrastructur spread of
right to exist in e. disinformation.
a democratic
system. ● Increase in ● Disinformation
consumer often spreads
costs for faster if
Internet suppressed.
service.
● Creates the
● Easy to image of a
circumvent democratic
by nation Russia
consumers and China want.
making
costs of the ● Furthers
system opposing actor
redundant. objectives in the
long term.
59
Khurshudyan, “Ukraine's Showdown with Russia Plays Out One Meme At A Time,”.
60
Colomina, The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World, 17-20.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)12
Education ● Very Good. ● Very Good. ● Not Applicable ● Good
Initiatives
● Does not harm ● Implemente ● It is passive and
free d using does not affect
expression. existing opposing actor
government operations
● Is designed to archives and directly.
provide the existing
population Internet ● Long term an
with tools to education educated
evaluate on initiatives. population
their own would be less
without direct ● Possibility susceptible to
government of cost the risks of
intervention. sharing with disinformation,
fellow but overall costs
alliance are unclear.
members.
Retaliation ● Very Good. ● Good. ● Very Good. ● Very
Good
● Does not ● Indefinite ● Provides
interfere with use of excellent means
Canadian’s resources if of incurring cost
rights to view not paired on the opposing
or share with actor.
content. education.
● Risks opposing
● Reduces the ● Opposing actor retaliation.
production of adaptation
disinformation can increase ● Risks overall
. system escalation of
complexity. geopolitical
conflict.
Federalism-E Vol. 23 (2022)13
Recommendations
This paper recommends that a hybrid model of education and retaliation be adopted to slow
the spread of disinformation. Canada needs to adopt a policy in line with NATO that could provide
the time for the creation a long-term approach in the form of education. While retaliation will buy
time, the existing monitoring apparatus coupled with working with allies to implement a
widespread education initiative could achieve lasting positive results.61
Other nations are under threat from disinformation; NATO has offered to work with
Canada to develop a database that could be shared across the alliance. 62 Not only would sharing
the database dramatically decrease the individual cost burden, but it would also provide
exceptionally more data points to identify what disinformation is. 63 Any algorithm is only as
accurate as the data input within; therefore, the data input rate is directly correlated to the accuracy
of a properly trained AI.64 Further, the use of allied powers would help regain public trust as it
would legitimize Canadian actions in the larger context. 65 Ultimately, Canada needs a cohesive
strategy that uses existing infrastructure where possible and allied help when offered to win against
this increasingly widespread foe. Further, given NATO has sanctioned Russia for offensive
military actions in the Ukraine. It is reasonable that using various sanctions as a form non-kinetic
retaliation is a strategy that is in line with NATO’s existing precedent against Russia.
61
Heer et al., Misinformation in Canada Research and Policy Options, 5; NATO, “NATO's Approach to
Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm
62
NATO, “NATO's Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
63
Ibid.
64
Tom Cassauwers, and Francesco Nucci, “Can Artificial Intelligence Help End Fake News?,” Research and
Innovation, April 15, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine/can-artificial-
intelligence-help-end-fake-news.
65
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