The growth implications of Trump's and Biden's fiscal plans
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9 October 2020 Macro Research
US Election Brief
The growth implications of Trump’s and Biden’s fiscal plans
This is the third part in a series covering US elections. The first was about opinion polls and possible electoral outcomes, while
the second discussed the distributional impact of the tax plans proposed by the two presidential candidates. The next one will
be on trade policy.
■ The fiscal agendas of the two presidential candidates are radically different.
■ Donald Trump proposes to extend beyond 2025 the tax provision of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in an almost budget-neutral
way through 2030. Joe Biden, instead, has a more comprehensive plan, which combines more progressive taxation with
higher spending. Biden’s proposal is more likely to boost GDP (and inflation) than Trump’s. It is also likely to increase the
budget deficit at a time when debt pressure is rising as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.
■ Under Biden, and assuming his fiscal agenda is fully implemented, US GDP might be 5-6.5pp higher by 2024 (in cumulative
terms) than projected under a current-policy baseline, with additional primary budget deficits standing at around 1.5% of
GDP each year through 2024. Instead, the Trump agenda might boost GDP by 1.0pp at most, with a more limited impact on
the deficit (with extra annual primary budget deficits of around 0.5% of GDP through 2024).
For weeks, Congress has been struggling to pass a new stimulus package as partisanship has been hindering negotiations,
with the two parties pushing for different kinds of measures. Last Tuesday, before changing course, US President Donald
Trump temporarily closed the doors on any agreement when he tweeted the following: "I have instructed my representatives to
stop negotiating until after the election when, immediately after I win, we will pass a major Stimulus Bill that focuses on
hardworking Americans and Small Business”. What’s at stake at the moment is the approval of a package that should avoid the
recovery to come to halt at the turn of the year. But, looking at a longer time horizon, also the gap between the fiscal agendas
of the two presidential candidates over the next four years could not be bigger.
From what can be inferred from his extremely vague campaign, Trump’s main aspiration is to extend beyond 2025 the tax
provision of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in an almost budget-neutral way – by partly offsetting tax cuts with spending
cuts of an equal amount. Democratic nominee and former Vice President Joe Biden, instead, has a more comprehensive plan,
which combines more-progressive taxation with higher spending. His goal is to rebuild infrastructure, tame inequality and
inaugurate a transition towards cleaner energy sources. While more realistic and fiscally responsible than the plans proposed
by Senator Bernie Sanders or Senator Elizabeth Warren during the Democratic primary election, Biden’s proposal is more likely
to boost GDP (and inflation) than Trump’s, while running higher budget deficits at a time of rising debt pressure as a result of
the COVID-19 crisis.
The fiscal plans
Biden’s fiscal proposal aims to revitalize the economic prospects of the American middle class by making the tax system more
progressive and by increasing spending on education, healthcare and social security. In addition, it aims to upgrade decaying
infrastructure, with a focus on environmentally friendly investments. Over a ten-year horizon (until 2030), Biden’s campaign
expects tax revenues and government spending to increase by a cumulative USD 3.4tn and USD 5.4tn. Just to have a sense of
the size of the plan, they are equivalent to, respectively, about 15% and 25% of 2019 GDP (Table 1). These estimates are
based on the assumption that Biden, if elected, would pass his fiscal plan within the first year of his presidency. While there is a
consensus regarding the amount of additional tax revenue that his tax reform would entail, there is more uncertainty
surrounding his spending plans. As for the latter, we rely on the (likely-conservative) estimates provided by the Penn Wharton
Budget Model.
In our last US Election Brief, we highlighted the distributional implications of Biden’s tax plan, which would put the burden of the
adjustment primarily on high-income earners and corporates. In a nutshell, Biden proposes hiking the top marginal rate on
income of above USD 400,000 to 39.6%, from 37%, while increasing the corporate tax rate to 28%, from 21%. He also wants to
eliminate tax breaks for capital gains and dividends and plans to subject incomes of above USD 400,000 to payroll taxes. If
these measures are approved by Congress in 2021, it is fair to assume that they will roughly generate the same amount of
annual tax revenues until 2030 (with slight differences due to GDP growth).
UniCredit Research page 1 See last pages for disclaimer.9 October 2020 Macro Research
US Election Brief
Therefore, between 2021 and 2024, these measures would generate approximately 40% of the total tax revenue expected to
be taken in during this ten-year horizon, that is, USD 1.35tn.
Regarding Biden’s spending plans, the main category is education (USD 1.9tn), which would include, among other things, the
introduction of universal pre-Kindergarten, two years of debtless college and free public college for students from low-income
families. His investment projects (USD 1.6tn) involve water infrastructure, high-speed rail, municipal transit, other green
infrastructure projects, research and development involving clean energy, fifth-generation mobile telecommunications networks
and artificial intelligence. Biden also plans to expand Social Security benefits and housing tax credits for low-income
households, to lower the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 60 years of age and to expand the Affordable Care Act’s health-
insurance marketplaces. Since Biden is likely to frontload some of the additional spending that is expected through 2030, our
working assumption is that 50% (and not just 40% in case of an even annual distribution) of this spending will be concentrated
during his first term, for a total of USD 2.6tn.
TABLE 1: BIDEN’S FISCAL PLAN (USD, BILLION)
2021-30 2021-24
Total tax revenues 3,375 1,350.2
Corporate 1,438 575
Payroll 993 397
Individual income 944 377
Total spending 5,370 2,685
Education 1,929 965
Infrastructure and R&D 1,600 800
Social Security benefits+ paid leave 838 325
Housing 650 419
Health care 397 199
Primary deficit 1,995 1,335
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model, UniCredit Research
Biden’s spending proposal is large by historical standards – it is larger than anything proposed on the campaign trail by such
past presidential candidates as former US Presidents Barack Obama, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush or Senator John
McCain. However, Biden’s fiscal ambitions are far more realistic than those of Senators Warren and Sanders. The latter
planned to boost government spending by around USD 50tn by 2030 (chart 1). The largest components of Mr. Sanders’s
spending plans were his Medicare-for-all plan and his Green New Deal, which would have cost, respectively, around USD 24tn
and USD 16tn over a ten-year horizon. Warren had similar, albeit less aggressive, spending ambitions. They would have both
tried to raise around USD 25tn in additional tax revenues, levied primarily on the very rich. Either way, the federal budget holes
associated with such plans would have likely been significant. As we highlighted in the previous note in this series, the differing
vision of societal and economic transformation that the progressive wing of the Democratic party wants to bring about might be
a source of political tension in Congress, if Biden gets the opportunity to present his plan for approval.
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US Election Brief
CHART 1: DIFFERING FISCAL AMBITIONS
Fiscal plans of different Democratic candidates (USD, trillions)
Additional tax revenues
Additional spending
Biden
Warren
Sanders
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Source: Progressive Policy Center, UniCredit Research
As mentioned, the Trump campaign has not provided many details about its fiscal platform. For this reason, we follow Moody’s
approach that relies on Trump’s 2021 budget proposal. As shown in Table 2, most of the stimulus associated with this proposal
is to come from tax cuts and is to be primarily concentrated after Trump’s potential second term – his main promise is to extend
the TCJA tax provisions beyond 2025, when they are due to expire. Therefore, as discussed below, the growth impact of his
fiscal agenda is likely to be rather limited. The main measures through 2024 involve a reduction in payroll contributions and a
tax on capital gains indexed to inflation – both of which imply lowering the overall tax burden. Moreover, over the next decade,
the tax cuts would be partly neutralized by spending, particularly through a reduction in healthcare and Social Security benefits.
The only source of additional spending is likely to be infrastructure investment.
TABLE 2: TRUMP'S FISCAL PLAN (USD, BILLION)
2021-30 2021-24
Total tax revenues -1,890 -310
Corporate -200 -34
Payroll -172 -172
Individual income -1,517 -103
Total spending -737 23
Education -170 -52
Infrastructure and R&D 1,084 394
Social Security benefits -485 -138
Healthcare -928 -217
Others -238 38.4
Primary deficit 1,153 334
Source: Moody’s, 2021 US Fiscal Budget, UniCredit Research
Chart 2 draws from all of the above information to illustrate the possible budget implications for 2021-24 of the two candidate’s
proposals– assuming that the extra budget is equally allocated each year. Under Biden’s plan, the primary budget deficit as a
percentage of 2021 GDP is projected to be around 1.5pp higher than in a baseline scenario under current policies. The deficit
associated with Trump’s plan, instead, would be higher than the current policy baseline by the equivalent of less than 0.5pp.
These estimates are done in terms of a static budget – which does not take into account the impact of a specific policy on
economic growth and the resulting impact on the cost of that policy.
UniCredit Research page 3 See last pages for disclaimer.9 October 2020 Macro Research
US Election Brief
CHART 2: SIGNIFICANT RISE IN ANNUAL PRIMARY DEFICIT UNDER BIDEN
Additional primary budget deficit for each year of the next
presidential term (% 2021 GDP)
2.0
1.0
0.0
Biden Trump
Source: UniCredit Research
Growth implications
In a recent report, Moody’s has estimated that by the end of 2024 the US GDP would be around 4.5pp higher than a current-
policy baseline under Biden, whereas the differential would be around 1pp under Trump. Estimates from other organizations
point to similar figures.
In order to estimate the growth impact of the proposed fiscal plans, we resort to the fiscal multipliers – a standard framework to
measure the impact of discretionary fiscal policy on output. In simple terms, fiscal multipliers captures the effect of a one-dollar
change in spending or tax revenue on GDP. Although the theoretical rationale behind the idea of fiscal multipliers is intuitive,
estimating them is rather challenging from an econometric point of view because it is difficult to isolate the direct effect of a
fiscal shock on GDP. In general, the size of the multipliers varies from one country to another depending on a number of
structural factors, such as trade openness, labor-market rigidity or the size of automatic stabilizers. At the same time, within the
same economy, the value of a multiplier varies over the cycle. Fiscal multipliers are generally found to be larger in downturns
than in expansions – this is because during an economic contraction, idle resources abound and governments are not
competing against private firms for the same inputs. And they tend to be bigger when monetary policy is close to the zero
interest lower bound and so increasingly constrained.
One way to estimate the growth impact of Biden’s and Trump’s plans would be to look at an overall multiplier – that is the
impact of a percentage change in the primary budget balance (regardless of how the fiscal impulse is generated) on real GDP.
Table 3 shows three such multipliers, that are both dependent and independent of the business cycle. They indicate the
estimated GDP impact for the first three years after a new fiscal measure has been adopted. The estimates are averages from
a survey of the literature conducted by the Peterson Institute in 2017 at the time of the approval of the TCJA. According to the
first row, for example, which reports estimates that are not conditional on the business cycle, a 1pp decrease in the primary
balance (i.e. the fiscal stance becomes looser) might lead to a 1.5% increase in GDP levels after three years, and vice versa.
TABLE 3: ESTIMATES OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS
First year Second year Third year Cumulative
Non-state contingent -1.0 -0.6 0.1 -1.5
Bad state -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.4
Good state -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.4
Source: Peterson Institute, UniCredit Research
UniCredit Research page 4 See last pages for disclaimer.9 October 2020 Macro Research
US Election Brief
Chart 4 shows the results of a simulation that looks at the cumulative impact of the fiscal plans over the whole next presidential
term. Given the current economic situation caused by the COVID-19 crisis, the multipliers reported in the “Bad state” row are
certainly more representative of today’s position of the US economy in the business cycle. However, since over the next four
years the American economy might return to more normal conditions, we prefer to adopt a more conservative approach and
take an average of the good and bad state multipliers. Under Biden, by 2024, US GDP might be 5% higher than in a scenario
with unchanged policies, as opposed to around 1.2%higher under Trump.
Using a simple rule of thumb from the Cleveland Fed, according to which 1pp of additional economic growth leads to around
0.4pp of higher inflation, then inflation might be, respectively, 2pp and 0.5pp higher than the baseline level at the end of 2024 in
cumulative terms.1
CHART 3: DIVERGING GDP PATHS
Cumulative GDP impact of fiscal plans (pp compared to baseline)
6.0
5.0
Biden Trump
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2021 2022 2023 2024
Source: UniCredit Research
Looking at overall multipliers has the advantage of simplicity (as it is necessary to consider only changes in budget balances)
but the disadvantage of omitting key features of each fiscal plan (as multipliers vary significantly between individual categories
of spending and taxes). As shown in Table 4, on the spending side, purchases of goods/services by the federal government
and investment in infrastructure tend to be associated with the highest multipliers. On the revenue side, cutting income taxes on
low-income households has usually more-positive effects on GDP than reducing taxation on corporations and the wealthy (and
vice versa). Regardless of the sizes of the two plans, Biden’s one, which is more focused on higher spending backed by higher
taxes on firms and rich individuals, is likely to be more pro-growth than Trump’s one, which is biased towards tax cuts on the
well-off and reduction in public spending.
However, the challenge of this approach is that the estimated range for each multiplier can be rather large as a result of where
an economy is in the business cycle and of the different statistical methodologies employed to estimate them. Depending on
the exact choices and assumptions, this might lead to meaningfully different outcomes when estimating the growth impact of a
given fiscal package. For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the multiplier applied to infrastructure
investment varies between 0.4 and 2.2. Moreover, in the case of Biden’s proposal, some extra spending on education could be
categorized as investment, while other spending could be considered as transfers. In order to run our simulation, we picked a
1
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2020-economic-commentaries/ec-202016-growth-
augmented-phillips-curve.aspx
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US Election Brief
middle value for each multiplier from Table 4. We only made an exception for the infrastructure investment multiplier. According
to a number of CBO studies, each additional dollar in federal investment typically increases total (federal, state and local)
investment spending by less than one dollar, as local governments tend to substitute federal spending for new spending that
they would have otherwise undertaken without the federal intervention. For this reason, we set the multiplier for infrastructure
investment at 0.6 – i.e. in line with the point estimate provided by the CBO.
TABLE 4. MULTIPLIERS BY TAX AND SPENDING CATEGORY
Multiplier*
Category Low High
Purchases of goods and services by the federal government 0.5 2.5
Transfer payments to state and local governments for infrastructure 0.4 2.2
Transfers to persons (unemployment benefits, education transfers and food stamps) 0.4 2.1
Transfer payments to state and local governments for other purposes 0.4 1.8
One-year tax cuts for higher-income people 0.1 0.6
Two-year tax cuts for lower and middle-income people 0.3 1.5
Business tax provisions primarily affecting cash flow 0.0 0.4
*The multipliers indicate the overall growth impact of specific fiscal measures after eight quarters
Source: CBO, UniCredit Research
Following this approach, we calculate that, in 2024, under Biden, US GDP would be about 6.5% higher than the baseline under
current policies, whereas, under Trump, it would be just 0.3% higher. Inflation under Biden would be around 2.5pp higher than
the baseline and around 0.1pp higher under Trump. The GDP differences with the simulation in Chart 3 are precisely due to the
features of each individual plan, with Biden’s skewed towards more stimulative spending. Trump’s tax cuts, instead, being
focused on the very rich, are barely enough to offset the contractionary impact of his spending cuts. Chart 4 uses the results
from the two simulations (with overall and more granular multipliers), for both GDP and inflation, to show a range of possible
post-election macroeconomic outcomes.
CHART 4: GDP AND INFLATION SCENARIOS
Cumulative impact of fiscal plans through 2024 with
different fiscal multipliers (pp compared to baseline)
8.0
High Low
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
Biden Trump Biden Trump
GDP Inflation
Source: UniCredit Research
UniCredit Research page 6 See last pages for disclaimer.9 October 2020 Macro Research
US Election Brief
Dragging factors
Of course, these simulations should be taken with caution for a number of reasons. First, they are based on the assumption
that whoever is elected will enjoy enough support in Congress to fully implement his agenda. However, polls point to a high
probability of a split Congress, meaning that the congressional hurdles faced by either candidate might be huge. Moreover,
even in the case of a Blue Wave (a scenario in which the Democrats take over both the White House and Congress), the left
wing of the Democratic party might challenge Biden’s spending and tax proposals, deeming them as too timid. In addition, the
use of static budget estimates in these simulations means that, for example, they do not take into account the crowding effect
of public investment on private investment. Finally, even if the Fed (given its new policy framework) is expected to keep interest
rates low for a long time, the inflationary pressures caused by Biden’s proposal might force the central bank’s hand and trigger
some monetary tightening, which would negatively weigh on growth, ultimately offsetting some of the benefits of the fiscal
stimulus.
Edoardo Campanella, Economist (UniCredit Bank, Milan)
+39 02 8862-0522
edoardo.campanella@unicredit.eu
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