Pay-for-Performance Models for Teachers and Administrators
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Pay-for-Performance Models for Teachers and
Administrators
The following research brief presents an overview of three aspects of the pay-for-
performance concept in education: the structure of such programs, the criteria on
which awards are based, and the amount of awards. We include summaries of
thirteen state and district pay-for-performance models as examples.
MARKET EVALUATION SURVEYING DATA ANALYSIS BENCHMARKING ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGYHANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Pay-for-Performance Models
“The single greatest factor in student achievement lies in the effectiveness of teachers
and leaders.”1 In fact, a recent study from the Milwaukee Public Schools discovered
that 75 percent of the effect a school has on a student can be attributed to the
individual teacher, while only 25 percent of the effect can be attributed to the school. 2
The belief in the validity of these statements has led to a recent surge in the growth
and popularity of performance-based compensation systems for public school
teachers and principals in the United States, as these initiatives are believed to attract
and retain high quality teachers to low-achieving schools.
The success rates of these systems vary considerably; some programs have a
measurably positive effect on school quality and teacher engagement, and others do
not seem to affect any change at all. North Carolina, for example, has had an
incentive system called the “Teacher Bonus Program” in place since the late 1990s,
which awards cash bonuses to teachers in schools that improve their students’ test
scores by a determined amount. A recent study by Thomas Ahn and Jacob Vigdor of
the University of Kentucky and Duke University, respectively, showed that the
program has decreased absenteeism among teachers and raised standardized test
scores.3 Another similarly structured program in New York City, however, was
canceled after it was shown to have no measurable effect on student achievement.
The program also failed to improve teacher instructional technique or absenteeism
levels, especially at larger schools with more teachers where the opportunity for, and
incidence of, “freeloading” was higher.4
Despite the uncertain track record of incentive systems and the controversy
surrounding them, many local and state education agencies are taking
advantage of the government’s renewed focus on the issue of teacher
effectiveness and performance-based compensation models in order to develop new
systems of their own or build upon existing systems. Of the federal programs that are
making funds available to support these efforts, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) is
the most prominent. Since its creation in 2006, TIF has made hundreds of millions of
1 “Application for Grants: Louisiana Department of Education.” U.S. Department of Education, p. 38.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100109.pdf
2 “Application for Grants: Chicago Public Schools.” U.S. Department of Education, p. 40.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100127.pdf
3 Duffy, F. “Researchers: School-Level Incentives Unite the ‘Tortoise and Hare.’” Education Week Teacher, 29
June 2011.
http://blogs.edweek.org/teachers/teaching_now/2011/06/researchers_school-
level_incentives_unite_the_tortoise_and_the_hare.html?qs=group+incentive
4 Sawchuk, S. “Study Finds Few Gains in Schoolwide Pay Program.” Education Week Teacher Beat, 3 February
2011.
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2011/02/schoolwide_bonus_pay_and_poten.html?qs=group+i
ncentive
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 2HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
dollars in five-year grants available to education agencies that develop incentive plans
with a performance-related component.5
The following research brief discusses the structure of pay-for-performance models,
the criteria used to determine incentive rewards, and the typical amounts of
performance pay. To highlight the actual implementation of pay-for-performance
models, the final section contains a table examining the variety in pay-for-
performance models across thirteen district and state initiatives. Key findings from
this brief are as follows:
Incentive systems may reward either individuals or groups of people ranging
in size from just a few employees to all of the employees in a school. Most
incentive systems that offer group rewards also offer individual rewards,
although the opposite is not always the case. Also, many incentive systems
offer cumulative and/or tiered rewards. In some models, employees can
accumulate multiple bonuses by meeting criteria in different categories, and in
others, each category is divided into different award levels, so that the size of
the award corresponds to the standard attained by the employee.
The measures that determine eligibility for incentive pay depend on the
type of award and the recipient of the award. Awards at the school level
are usually based on student achievement or improvement on tests while class
observations and involvement in leadership activities have greater weight in
the determination of individual awards.
Currently the most popular way of measuring the effect that schools and
teachers have on student achievement is value-added modeling, which
isolates the effect of specific teachers, groups of teachers, and schools on a
student by controlling for other influences on the student, such as prior
achievement and family characteristics.6 The use of this type of performance
measure in pay-for-performance models, however, draws criticism from many
scholars. It requires a great deal of data sophistication on the part of the
district or state, and may require outside assistance from a company or
organization that specializes in data analysis.
The actual amount of incentive pay for high-performing teachers,
teams, and schools varies between districts and states. The maximum
amount that an individual can earn through bonuses in the districts examined
for this brief range from $2,000 to $16,000. The average awards as found by a
5 “Teacher Incentive Fund: Funding.” U.S. Department of Education.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/funding.html
6 Ibid. p. 9.
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 3HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
survey by the National Center on Performance Incentives are similarly
disparate by individual earning the award.
Incentive System Structure
Performance-based pay systems rely on three structural elements: (1) the individual or
group whose performance will be measured; (2) the input and output measures used
to evaluate performance; and (3) the scope of staff who are eligible to participate in
the performance-based system.
Structural Elements of a Performance-Based Pay System
Unit of Measures of
Incentive Eligibility
Accountability Performance
• Determine whose • Determine what input • Determine both the
performance is to be and output measures scope of eligible staff
measured: individual, are used to evaluate as well as percentage of
group, or a hybrid of performance those eligible staff who
the two models may receive
performance increases
in a given year
There are several different types of awards that may be included within this
performance-based pay system structure, including performance-related pay,
knowledge- and skills-based pay, career ladders, and market-based pay.7 Performance-
based pay rewards instructional staff for student achievement, as measured by, for
example, standardized test scores or value-added assessments. Knowledge- and skills-
based pay rewards instructional staff for certain activities or qualifications, such as
participation in professional development programs. Many incentive systems
incorporate an instructor hierarchy in some form; teachers are rewarded for taking on
additional responsibilities that correspond to specific positions in this hierarchy. This
career ladder pay provides teachers with defined professional goals and usually
encourages collaborative and mentoring activities. Finally, market-based pay is offered
to teachers and leaders who fill positions in high-need academic areas and schools.
Many incentive systems integrate two or more of these incentive types.
Incentives may be awarded both at the individual level and the group level. Both
models have benefits and drawbacks. Individual-level awards tend to lead to
increased performance on the part of the individual, who has sole responsibility over
7 Heyburn, S., Lewis, J. and Rigger, G. “Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive
Fund Grantees.” The National Center of Performance Incentives, March 2010: p. 4.
http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/2010_Heyburn_etAl_TeacherIncen
tiveGrantees1.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 4HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
his or her situation, and also encourage the best employees to stay on at their
institution while putting (implicit) pressure on lower-performing employees to leave.8
However it is difficult to accurately measure one individual’s impact on student
success, and, even if that were not the case “rewarding teachers for their individual
performance is also contrary to the highly collaborative nature of teaching and may
even reduce the incentive to cooperate with others.”9
It is primarily for this reason that some education agencies choose to adopt team-
based incentive systems. Team-based incentive systems are those that reward
members of a specified group for achieving a collective goal. The group may vary in
size from two employees to all employees, and may be composed of any combination
of individuals—for example, rewarded teams could be an entire school, grade-level
groups of teachers, departmental groups of teachers, “or some combination
“Rewarding teachers for their thereof.”10 The teams may be assembled by
individual performance is contrary to alottery,
variety of methods such as a random
selection by a school administrator,
the highly collaborative nature of or even self-assembly by the teachers
teaching and may even reduce the themselves.
incentive to cooperate with others.”
Team-based incentives, unlike individual-
level rewards, tend to “promote social cohesion, feelings of fairness, and
productivity norms.”11 They also tend to result in a knowledge transfer from higher-
performing individuals to lower-performing individuals, thus encouraging mutual
learning. Moreover, team rewards “create a dynamic in which peers hold each other
accountable.”12 However, team-based incentives do lead to some potential
problems. There is evidence that under this incentive structure, while the
performance of lower-ability teachers improves, performance among the higher-
ability teachers may decrease. Also, the knowledge that the reward depends on the
performance of an entire group causes some members of the group to contribute less
or nothing at all to the effort, since they can depend on the others to do the work for
them. Finally, team-based incentive systems do not take into account variation in
teacher effectiveness. The most effective teachers are not recognized, and may decide
to leave the school system or profession.
The summary of state and district pay-for-performance systems at the end of this
brief demonstrates the range of accountability units acting within incentive structures.
8 “Evaluating and Rewarding the Quality of Teachers: International Practices.” Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development: 2009. p. 71.
http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/Springer_Balch_OECD_Chapter.p
df
9 Ibid. p. 72.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 73.
12 Marshall, K. “Merit Pay or Team Accountability?” Education Week Commentary, 30 August 2010.
http://www.marshallmemo.com/articles/Kim%20Marshall%20Ed%20Week%20Sept.%201,%202010.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 5HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
For example, New York City Public Schools provides an example of the school-
based incentive system. Within this district, 205 schools participated in an incentive
program which rewarded individual teachers based on overall school performance.
Schools were assigned a letter grade based on their overall progress in four categories.
Schools that received “A”s and “B”s were eligible for rewards. However, the program
was canceled in its third year, in January 2011, after only 13 percent of schools met
basic proficiency thresholds for bonuses.13
On the other hand, Fort Worth Independent School District’s PEAK Rewards
Program takes the idea of rewarding individuals for group performance and
specializes it. Instead of teachers receiving incentive pay for overall school
performance, they receive awards based on participation in a four-tiered team
structure. The four levels of teams on a school campus are:
1. Campus team: all teachers, instructional staff, and leadership at a school
2. Grade-Content team: all teachers across a content-grade
3. Vertical team: teachers in different grade levels working in the same areas
4. Horizontal teams: teachers working across content areas
The aMAzing educators program developed within Boston Public Schools and
Springfield Public Schools combines team incentives and individual incentives.
School-wide financial rewards are given to all school staff if the school meets student
growth targets. Individual rewards are given to teachers who take on additional
leadership roles, demonstrate their effectiveness in performance evaluations, and/or
commit to remaining in the school for an additional two years to operate “model
classrooms.”
As can be seen, there is great variety in the units of accountability contained within
pay-for-performance systems. Yet at the same time, a survey conducted by the
National Center on Performance Initiatives in fall 2009 of TIF-funded pay-for-
performance models demonstrates that models structured around the individual and
the school levels and the individual, team, and school levels are by far the most
prevalent. The survey findings are detailed in the table below.14
13 “What New York City’s Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us About Pay for
Performance.” Rand Corporation. 2011. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9596/index1.html
14 “Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive Fund Grants.” National Center on
Performance Initiatives. p. 10.
http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/2010_Heyburn_etAl_TeacherIncen
tiveGrantees1.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 6HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Units of Accountability for Performance-Based Awards
Number of Percent of TIF
Unit of Accountability
TIF Sites Sites
Individual and school 14 50%
Individual, team, and school 9 32.1%
Individual only 2 7.1%
School only 2 7.1%
Team and school 1 3.6%
Individual and team 0 0%
Team only 0 0%
Lastly, there are two main types of incentive system structures: rank-order
tournaments and fixed performance contracts.15 Rank-order tournaments offer a
set number of awards to the employees or groups of employees that perform the best
relative to their peers, while fixed performance contracts define certain standards of
performance and reward all employees who meet them. The former model is
generally less popular than the latter because it can lead to competition among
teachers.
Evaluations and Incentive Criteria
U.S. states and the Department of Education have placed heavy emphasis on the use
of value-added student learning measurements in teacher evaluations and
performance-based pay systems. Value-added analysis uses multiple years of
student performance data to determine the projected growth trajectory of
individual students and to isolate the
Value-added performance measures effects of specific teachers. Many states
receiving either Race to the Top or Teacher
appear to be among the most Incentive Fund grants report the
common type of measure to be used in implementation of both formative and
pay for performance models summative assessment measures in
evaluating student growth. Summative tests
include statewide standardized exams of certain grade levels and academic areas,
while formative assessments may include continuous and/or less formal strategies to
evaluate student progress in all grades and developmental areas.
It is no surprise that districts distribute awards based on student academic
performance. In addition to this, awards may be granted to teachers who acquire
knowledge and skills or assume extra responsibilities and duties. Our analysis of a
sampling of state and district performance-based pay systems highlights the use of
15 Heyburn, S., Lewis, J. and Rigger, G. “Compensation Reform and Design Preferences of Teacher Incentive
Fund Grantees.” The National Center of Performance Incentives, March 2010: p. 9.
http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/2010_Heyburn_etAl_TeacherIncen
tiveGrantees1.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 7HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
value-added/growth measures in pay-for-performance models, as well as other
measures, including:
Graduation rates
Attendance rates
Perception data (student and staff surveys)
Teacher and principal/administrator observations
State standardized test scores and/or district end-of-course assessments (not
related to growth)
However, value-added performance measures appear to be among the most common
type of measure used in pay-for-performance models. A review of performance
models used in TIF grantees reiterates this trend, noting that 17 of 33 TIF grantee
sites use value-added performance measures. “Simpler approaches, including gains,
proficiency gains (movement across proficiency categories), average achievement, and
proficiency rate” were used less often in pay-for-performance models.16 The table
below summarizes results from the study.17
Performance Measures for Performance-Related Awards, by Enrollment Size
of Site
# of
Type of Performance # of Small # of Large Total # of
Medium
Measurement Sites Sites Sites
Sites
Value-added 2 9 6 17
Gain 1 0 1 2
Movement across
1 1 1 3
proficiency thresholds
Proficiency or attainment
2 1 1 4
rates
Gain/movement/attainment
1 3 2 6
combined
Individual learning plans 1 0 0 1
Total 9 14 11 33
Despite the popularity of the value-added performance measures in pay-for-
performance models, many scholars and educators have identified inefficiencies and
weaknesses with these measures. First, critics argue the ineffectiveness of value-added
systems due to their reliance on standardized testing results. Scholars further
criticize the evaluation methods of the value-added system for its assumption that
curricula are vertically aligned to allow for accurate assessments of student growth
16 Ibid. p. 12.
17 Ibid.
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 8HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
over a multi-year period.18 Various research studies have determined that year-to-
year curriculum variation is significant, and that the process of creating
appropriate longitudinal scales to compare test scores can introduce more error into
the analyses of student growth and educator effectiveness.19
A further criticism of value-added student assessment measures is that missing testing
data may jeopardize the validity of the analysis. As research has demonstrated that
lower achieving students are more likely to have missing test scores, the failure to
properly address this lack of information may lead to selection bias if these missing
scores are omitted from the analysis. An analysis of this nature would result in
disproportionately low performance scores for lower achieving students, while high
achieving students would continue to increase an education gap. However, value-
added programs do not require complete testing data from each student, but use that
information that is available to “invisibly predict” missing scores. Proponents of
value-added analysis argue that this strategy helps to eliminate selection bias and
“might lead to particular efficiency gains relative to other approaches when missing
data are substantial.”20
Additional concerns relating to the accuracy of student data is the challenge of
accurately linking students with teachers and the general lack of transparency of the
value added system. In response to these arguments, less complicated methods have
been developed that are vulnerable to various potential problems and have yielded
ineffective results. In general, these simplistic models could not analyze multiple years
of student data and over-identified only highly effective and highly ineffective
teachers. An article from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development notes that “it is critical that school systems understand the problems
and limitations of their management information systems insofar as they relate to the
creation of [a value-added system].”21 Problems frequently found in value-added
systems include the mismatch of student and teacher data, multiple teachers with
responsibility for the same student, unclear team or group composition, a lack of data
or the capacity to measure the actual value added by a teacher, and bonuses awarded
to the wrong educator or denied to the right one.
18 Doran, Harold C. and Steve Fleischman. “Challenges of Value-Added Assessment.” Educational Leadership,
Nov 2005. Vol. 63, No. 3. Pp. 85-87.
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational_leadership/nov05/vol63/num03/Challenges_of_Value-
Added_Assessment.aspx
19 Ibid.
20 Sanders, William L., et al. “A Response to Criticisms of SAS EVAAS.” SAS. Nov 2009. P.p.5.
http://www.sas.com/resources/asset/Response_to_Criticisms_of_SAS_EVAAS_11-13-09.pdf
21 “Evaluating and Rewarding the Quality of Teachers: International Practices.” Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2009, p. 19.
http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/news/PapersNews/Springer_Balch_OECD_Chapter.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 9HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Award Amounts
Incentive pay for high-performing teachers, teams, and schools varies among districts
and states. There does not appear to be a methodology by which program developers
determine the appropriate amount of incentive. Some incentives are stated as
percentages of a teacher’s salary, while others are in fixed dollar amounts. Many
systems allow teachers to be eligible for partial incentives based on their degree of
success in meeting established criteria. For instance, in the now-defunct New York
City Public Schools scheme, teachers would receive a full bonus of $3,000 if the
school received an “A” on its district scorecard. For those in schools reaching a grade
of “B,” teachers received $1,500. In Fort Worth Independent School District,
teachers are eligible for a nearly 24 percent bonus over their average salary.
Additional financial incentives of $1,000 to $4,000 are offered to staff members at
targeted schools. In Boston and Springfield School Districts, teachers are able to earn
over 18 percent (Boston) and 28 percent (Springfield) of their salary in additional
compensation.
The maximum amount that an individual can earn through bonuses in the districts
examined for this brief range from $2,000 to $16,000. The average awards as found
by a survey by the National Center on Performance Incentives are similarly disparate
by individual earning the award. The table below highlights the fact that there is no
real standard amount of incentive award amongst those districts offering them.22
Incentive Award Amounts for School Personnel at TIF Sites
Other Non-
Administrators Teachers Instructional Instructional
Personnel Personnel
Minimum Award
Mean $1,639 $877 $420 $303
Minimum $50 $50 $50 $50
Maximum $5,000 $4,000 $1,500 $500
Maximum Award
Mean $8,632 $8,016 $1,547 $2,456
Minimum $800 $1,030 $400 $400
Maximum $34,875 $30,350 $6,500 $6,500
22 “Evaluating and Rewarding the Quality of Teachers: International Practices.”. Op.cit. p. 13.
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 10HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Summary of Sample Pay for Performance Initiatives
Name of Size of Unit of Maximum
District Performance Measures
Program Program Accountability Size of Bonus
-Growth models using
standardized test scores
-Graduation rates
-District pre- and post-tests
Boston and -Student work samples
$14,000
Springfield -Annual surveys and interviews
aMAzing -School (Boston);
School 22 schools -Teacher observations and
educators -Individual $15,000
Districts evaluations
(Springfield)
(MA)23 -Evidence of participation in
leadership roles
-Commitment to stay at school
for two years and have classroom
serve as “model classroom”
-No Child Left Behind Adequate
Yearly Progress benchmarks
-Value-added growth models
using statewide or national
standardized test scores
Butler County -Student satisfaction surveys
-School
School -Evidence of striving towards
PayPLUS 6 schools -Team —
District positive school culture
-Individual
(AL)24 -Evidence of participation in
leadership roles
-Attendance (perfect)
-Teacher/principal observations
and evaluations
-National Board certification
-Standardized test scores
Duval County MAP
-School -District pre- and post-test $6,300 (per
Public Program,
6 schools -Team achievement data individual on
Schools G.R.E.A.T.
-Individual -Teacher observations and team)
(FL)25 Expectations
evaluations
23 Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. “Application for New Grants Under
the Teacher Incentive Fund Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100151.” 6 July 2010. P. e1.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100151.pdf
24 Butler County Board of Education. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund
Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100075.” 6 July 2010. p. e1.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100075.pdf
25 Duval County Public Schools. “Application for Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund Program. CFDA
#84.285A. PR/Award #385A100121.” 6 July 2010, p. e1.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100121.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 11HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Name of Size of Unit of Maximum
District Performance Measures
Program Program Accountability Size of Bonus
-Value-added growth modeling $14,000
Fort Worth
using standardized test scores (teacher);
Independent PEAK -Team (four
-Campus Scorecard $10,000
School Rewards 15 schools different kinds)
-Individual Development and (principal at
District Program -Individual
Evaluation Scorecard high school
(TX)26
-Observations and evaluations level)
-Value-added growth modeling
using standardized test scores
-Teacher Effectiveness Measure,
Memphis City
-School an evaluation system in progress
Schools In the Zone 28 schools —
-Individual that incorporates measures of
(TN)27
student learning growth, teacher
observations, surveys, and teacher
content knowledge
-Standardized test scores
-Completion of a portfolio and
Round Rock Round Rock
oral presentation
Independent Incentives for $10,000
-School -Evidence of participation in
School Superior 7 schools (teacher and
-Individual leadership roles
District Education principal)
-Participation in collaborative
(TX)28 (RRISE)
meetings
-Observations and evaluations
-School-wide reward structure
-Rewards based on a “report
New York School-Wide card” grade given to each school
City Public Performance -Rewards based on scholastic $3,000 per
205 schools -School
Schools29 Bonus achievement, attendance, school union member
(NY) Program environment as measured by
surveys, and growth compared to
prior years and peer schools
26 Fort Worth Independent School District. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund
Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100138.” 6 July 2010, p. e5.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100138.pdf
27 Memphis City Schools. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund Program. CFDA
#84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100144.” 6 July 2010, p. e7.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100144.pdf
28 Round Rock Independent School District. “Application for New Grants Under the Teacher Incentive Fund
Program. CFDA #84.385A. PR/Award #S385A100065.” 6 July 2010, p. e3.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100065.pdf
29 “New York City’s School-Wide Performance Bonus Program.” Center for Educator Compensation Reform.
October 2010. http://cecr.ed.gov/pdfs/summaries/CECR_CS_NYC_PerfBonusProgram.pdf
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 12HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Name of Size of Unit of Maximum
District Performance Measures
Program Program Accountability Size of Bonus
-Student progress measured by
Terra Nova and ACT
standardized tests
-Teacher evaluation via classroom
Ohio
Ohio Teacher -Individual observation, standards-based
Department
Incentive 105 schools -Team evaluation, and other measures $4,000
of
Fund -School -Other measures of progress
Education30
include graduation rate,
performance index scores, ACT
college readiness scores, AP
participation rates
-60% of teacher evaluation based
on classroom observation, 40%
School
Empowering on student learning gains as
District of
Effective measured by standardized tests
Hillsborough 254 -Individual —
Teachers -500 district-developed end of
County31
Initiative course examinations, testing
(FL)
student performance in all
subjects including music and art
-Seven criteria for evaluation
based on national leadership
standards
-Four-level evaluation rubric to
PULSE identify phases of
Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh accomplishment
Public Urban -Individual -Evaluated standards include the
65 $2,000
Schools Leadership (principals only) principal’s management of and
(PA) System for vision for learning, his
Excellence)32 relationship with the community,
the application of ethics and
integrity, and his ability to engage
school staff in leadership
initiatives
30 “Application for New Grants Under TIF Program, Ohio DOE.” Department of Education. 2010.
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/a100100.pdf
31 Steele, J. et al. 2010. Incorporating Student Performance Measures into Teacher Evaluation Systems.” Rand
Corporation. P. 14. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/student_teacher_eval.pdf
32 “PULSE.” Pittsburgh Public Schools.
http://www.pps.k12.pa.us/14311043013230450/lib/14311043013230450/PULSE_Executive_Summary.p
df
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 13HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Name of Size of Unit of Maximum
District Performance Measures
Program Program Accountability Size of Bonus
-Two classroom observation
periods are required each year
-Value-added growth modeling
Oregon City Performance $8,200
using standardized test scores
School Based -Individual (teachers)
6 -Evaluation based on leadership
District33 Compensation -School $16,000
activities such as mentoring,
(OR) System (principals)
leading a model classroom,
participating in peer review, and
facilitating leadership group.
-Evaluation based 50% on
student achievement, 50% on
performance
-Performance measured by
preparation for instruction and
delivery of instruction, need-
based intervention, leadership, Salary of
Harrison
The E&R and professionalism. Based on $90,000 per
School
Plan -Individual two annual observations. year; max
District 25
(Effectiveness -School -Multiple measures of student increase of
Two34
and Results) achievement used by grade and $10,000 in
(CO)
subject level. School performance salary per year
accounts for a small portion.
-Teachers move up through nine
effectiveness levels which
determine their salary, rather than
receiving salary based on years of
service.
33 “Performance Based Compensation System and Teacher Leadership.” Oregon City Public Schools.
https://wiki.orecity.k12.or.us/groups/chalkboardclassprojectwiki/wiki/ec6de/
34 “E&R Teacher Pay for Performance Plan.” Harrison School District Two.
http://www.harrison.k12.co.us/departments/human-resources/eandr
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 14HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
Name of Size of Unit of Maximum
District Performance Measures
Program Program Accountability Size of Bonus
-Individual responsibilities
-Instructional performance based
on classroom observation.
Master teachers are eligible for a
20% salary bonus, mentor and
career teachers eligible for a 30%
salary bonus.
-Student achievement measured
through a value-added growth
model. Administrative teams
bonus structures are based on
school value added student
South $10,000
growth (75%) and the school
Carolina (overall)
South program review rating (25%).
Department 71 -Individual
Carolina TAP Master and mentor teachers who
of $14,000
teach areas tested on state test
Education35 (administrators)
eligible for 20% salary bonus
based on student growth, career
teachers are eligible for 30%
salary bonus.
Master, mentor, and career
teachers who teach areas not
tested on state test eligible for
range of 20%-35% of salary
based on school performance on
state tests.
-Average scores on multiple
evaluations of classroom teaching
35 “South Carolina TAP (SC TAP).” South Carolina State Department of Education.
http://ed.sc.gov/agency/se/School-Transformation/TAP/?CFID=5136069&CFTOKEN=57042306
© 2012 Hanover Research – District Administration Practice 15HANOVER RESEARCH FEBRUARY 2012
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