The growth and nancial status of professional sports in North America: insights for English soccer leagues?
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Managing Leisure 7, 145–163 ( 2002)
The growth and nancial status of professional
sports in North America: insights for English
soccer leagues?
Dennis R. Howard and John L. Crompton
Lundquist School of Business, University of Oregon, USA and Department of Recreation,
Park and Tourism Sciences, Texas A & M University, USA
An overview of the nancial status of professional sports leagues in North America is provided. It
reveals that they face similar challenges to those confronting professional soccer teams in England:
most teams report annual operating losses; costs, primarily attributed to players’ salaries, are
accelerating at a level which outstrips the large growth in revenues that is also occurring; and the
wealthiest teams tend to dominate competitions on the playing eld. The North American leagues’
problems of falling attendance, declining ratings, and an economic disconnect with their fan base all
contribute to the leagues’ declining nancial health. Strategies used by leagues to control player
costs are described.
INTRODUCTION and £127 million of the additional costs were
attributable to increases in wages and sala-
The Deloitte and Touche Annual Review of
ries. The deteriorating status of football
Football Finance ( 2001) for the 1999/2000
clubs was re ected in the changing fortunes
season concluded that the aggregate pre-tax of the Singer and Friedlander Football Fund.
losses of Premier and Football League clubs The Fund invested exclusively in football
totalled £145 million. Only 15 of the 92 clubs clubs and businesses associated with them.
reported an operating pro t. Among the elite In 1997, when it was launched, it raised
Premier clubs, nine of the 20 teams showed approximately £30 million and attracted
an operating pro t. These losses occurred at nearly 20,000 members ( Miles, 2002) . There
a time when English football has never been was much excitement and optimism about
richer. In the nine-year period from 1990/91 the investment potential of football. In the
to 1999/2000, Deloitte and Touche report that previous year, the share prices of several
aggregate income for the 92 teams increased clubs had more than trebled. Manchester
by an extraordinary £823 million to its United brie y achieved a market capital-
1999/2000, total of £1.078 million. This in- ization of £1 billion.
crease in revenues is projected to continue to The game appeared to be in a nancially
reach £1.5 billion in the 2002/03 season. Part strong position since attendances have risen
of this projected increase is attributable to consistently each year since 1986. Prior to
the substantially larger television fees which that time, they had declined for much of the
will grow to £100 million over this period. post-war period. Since the turnaround in
The substantial losses that have accrued 1986, attendances have increased from 16
while revenues have escalated re ect the million to around 30 million. However, much
clubs’ inability to control costs. Thus, while of the momentum for investing in clubs arose
revenues increased by £128 million in from the anticipation of quantum increases in
1999/2000, costs escalated by £188 million, income from the sale of media rights. The
Managing Leisure ISSN 1360-6719 print/ISSN 1466-450X online © 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/13606710210163364146 Howard and Crompton
television companies competed vigorously these problems while others have failed to do
for those rights. The revenue potential from so, may offer insights that are useful in
this source was realized, but it was accom- addressing the problems of the English lea-
panied by the spiralling costs associated gues.
with the purchase of players and paying
them exponentially higher wages. As a result,
THE GROWTH IN US PROFESSIONAL
the value of football stocks has plummeted
SPORTS
so the Singer and Friedlander Fund was
valued at only £7.4 million in March 2000. Professional sports was a major bene ciary
Television rights across the ve leading of the longest sustained period of growth in
European football leagues of England, Spain, United States’ history. In the 1990s, almost
Italy, Germany and France rose 993% in value 180 new professional sports teams came into
in the 10 years from 1991, but are projected existence, so the total inventory of pro-
to increase by only 8% in the 3 years after the fessional teams at all levels now exceeds 800.
2002/03 season ( The Sunday Times, 2002) . Most of these teams were associated with the
The likelihood of future reductions in media 13 new leagues which were launched in that
rights income was exacerbated by the de- decade ( e.g. the Xtreme Football League,
mise of ITV digital whose 2002 bankruptcy National Rookie League, West Coast Hockey
will be prominent in the minds of the media League) . Two trends that were unanticipated
representatives charged with renegotiating by analysts at the beginning of the 1990s
television rights. This has reinforced the were the spectacular expansion of major and
sense of urgency to address football’s nan- minor league hockey in the Sun Belt states,
cial crisis. The Deloitte and Touche ( 2001) and the emergence of women’s sports lea-
report shows a convincing high correlation gues ( e.g. Women’s National Basketball Asso-
( r2 = 0.89) between clubs’ wage bills for ciation and the Women’s United Soccer
players and their league standings on the Association ) .
playing eld. Over the previous ve-year There are four so-called major leagues in
period, the four Premier League clubs with the United States: the National Football
the average highest salary bills were Man- League ( NFL) , Major League Baseball
chester United, Liverpool, Chelsea and Arse- ( MLB) , National Basketball Association
nal, and all of these teams are consistently ( NBA) and National Hockey League ( NHL) .
at the forefront of the Premier League. In The number of teams in these four leagues
short, the evidence is strong that money increased from 103 franchizes in 1989 to 123
brings success. by 2001. During that time, the NHL added
These challenges of rapidly accelerating eight expansion teams, MLB added four, the
revenues being outstripped by even greater NFL added three and the NBA added ve new
increases in salaries; substantial operating teams. The most spectacular growth in pro-
losses at a time when revenues are at an all fessional team sports, however, occurred at
time high level; and the wealthiest teams the secondary level, where the so-called
dominating the major competitions are also minor league teams, particularly in hockey
characteristic of the challenges confronted and basketball, have expanded in numbers
by professional sports leagues in the United substantially. By 2000, over 140 minor league
States. The review of these leagues’ nancial hockey teams were playing in arenas
challenges in this paper suggests that the throughout the US and Canada. Only base-
problems of the English soccer leagues are ball, with a total of 188 franchises, has more
not unique. The discussions in the paper of minor league teams. Four new basketball
how some of the major leagues have resolved leagues were launched in 2000 alone, includ-Growth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 147 ing the International Basketball League, the out victory over China in the women’s world National Rookie League, the College Pro cup nal in 1999. With an estimated 40 million League, and the ABA 2000. And, what is US viewers, the cup nal was the most probably surprising even to the most ardent watched soccer match in the history of US football fans in the US is that, by 2001 over 60 network television, and the crowd of 90,185 professional football teams in addition to the at the Rose Bowl was the largest ever for a 32 NFL franchizes, operated in cities through- women’s sporting event. out the US and Canada. In the late 1990s, new women’s leagues The Arena Football League ( AFL) may be were established in basketball ( WNBA and the single most successful league property the now defunct American Basketball launched in the last 15 years. The AFL has League) , soccer ( WUSA) , softball ( WPSL) and expanded from eight teams at its inception in plans for a professional hockey league in the 1987 to19 teams in 2001. In fact, it has grown US and Canada are under serious considera- from one to two separate leagues with the tion. Women’s sports properties accounted creation of its own minor league, called AF2 for $600 million of the $4.5 billion that in 2000. In 2001, there were 47 indoor foot- corporations spent on sports in 1999. A ball teams playing under the Arena Football crucial factor in both the development and League banner. Arena football is a hybrid sustainability of these new properties has version of the outdoor game with similar been corporate support. Corporations began scoring, rules and the basics of blocking and to realize that women’s sports could provide tackling. The one major difference is that it is a highly effective platform for reaching played indoors, on a surface half the size of a women, who make 80% of a household’s regulation football eld, surrounded by pad- purchase decisions in the US. As the execu- ded dasher boards, similar to hockey. The tive director of the Women’s Sports Founda- result is a game called the ‘50-yard indoor tion asserted, women are now serious war’ or the ‘brawl inside the wall’ ( Fitzgerald, consumers of sport, who are ‘no longer 2000) . The league’s model has proven im- watching soap operas and talk shows from mensely successful. In 1999, the NFL ac- 10am to 2pm’ ( Reynolds, 1999, p. 5) . Indeed, quired an exclusive option to purchase 49.9% in the US more than half of women now of the league by 2002. It seems likely that engage in some form of regular exercise, and arena football will become NFL-indoor or one third of all high school girls participate in NFL-arena within the near future. one or more varsity sports. Women’s sports nally emerged as a part One sports property which has ourished of the professional sports landscape in North as a result of corporate America’s growing America over the last half of the 1990s. The interest in aligning with women’s sports, has talent pool produced by the achievements of been the Ladies’ Professional Golf Associa- title IX, which is a federal law requiring tion ( LPGA) . The women’s golf tour experi- women be given equal sporting opportun- enced a remarkable increase in corporate ities to men in high schools and colleges; the support over the last decade, with sponsor- resultant success of women’s national teams supported prize money more than doubling on the world stage at the summer and winter from $17.1 million in 1990 to $36.2 million for Olympics; and the 1999 women’s soccer the 2000 season ( Williams, 2000) . While the world cup provided the impetus for the LPGA continues to grow, the recent experi- launch of several women’s sports leagues. ence of the WNBA and the WPSL indicates The seminal event in the history of women’s that women’s sports leagues will continue to sports in the United States was probably the struggle to nd a secure niche in a cluttered national team’s dramatic penalty kick-shoot- sports marketplace. After a successful debut
148 Howard and Crompton
season in 1997, the NBA owned WNBA found established outdoor Major League Lacrosse
it dif cult to maintain its initial momentum. ( MLL) . Again, as with any new sports ven-
During the 2000 season, league-wide attend- ture, an essential ingredient for success is
ance slipped 11% and the league reportedly corporate sponsor support. With the niche
continued to lose money ( Mullen, 2001) . On sports, the property’s ability to tap the
the plus side however, television ratings, intensity of the sports fan base is the key to
while modest, grew 5% during the league’s generating sponsor involvement. As one ana-
fourth season and the WNBA was able to add lyst suggests, ‘The intensity of the fan base is
six new corporate sponsors. Since its incep- often far more important than its actual size’
tion, the league has steadily expanded from ( Cawley, 2000, p. 25) . The MLL was able to
its original eight teams to 16 teams in 2001. leverage the league’s natural appeal to la-
Analysts are less sanguine about the crosse enthusiasts in signing its rst three
WPSL’s future. The league, launched in 1997, major sponsorship deals with Sports Hel-
as Women’s Pro Fastpitch, has struggled to mets, Great Atlantic ( a lacrosse catalogue) ,
nd its niche in the competitive sports and stick maker Warrior Lacrosse, for re-
market. Instead of achieving its initial goal of portedly more than 1 million dollars ( Bern-
expanding to at least 12 markets to establish stein, 1999) .
a national presence, the WPSL declined from Complementing the extensive involvement
the six original teams to just four franchizes of corporations has been the evolution of
by the end of its fourth season. Given its cable television as the second key element in
severely contracted state, the league faced the growth of niche sports. Cable channels
major challenges in sustaining suf cient fan such as ESPN, ESPN2 and the 13 Regional
and corporate support to ensure its future. Sports Networks around the country are in
Another sports property that has become a constant need of new programming to ll
big nancial success in recent years is the US their 24-hour schedules. For example, it was
open tennis championships which is argu- anticipation of the expansion of professional
ably the single most pro table sporting event rodeo into network television that persuaded
in North America. Total revenues grew to the owner of the MLB Texas Rangers and NHL
$135 million in 2000, with corporate sponsor- Dallas Stars to buy the Mesquite rodeo in
ship support almost doubling from 1995 to 1999 ( Mesquite is a suburb of Dallas) . His
$27 million. The United States Tennis Asso- instincts were veri ed in 2001 when the
ciation reported an income of $90.29 million professional bull riders’ world challenge
after expenses, so the net operating pro t event graduated from ESPN2 to NBC in the
represented 69% of total revenues ( Kaplan, fall of 2001 ( Shropshire, 2001) . The demand
2000) . The pro t margin is remarkable when to ll cable programming has created attrac-
compared to most major league teams which tive exposure opportunities for other niche
operate at a loss. sports like track and eld, bowling and bass
Finally, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw shing on a national level, and for lacrosse
the growth of many new, ‘niche sports’, like and roller hockey on a local or regional
billiards, lacrosse and pro rodeo. These level.
sports attract a small but avid following, and
their appeal is often con ned to a particular
THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF
region. Lacrosse, a game historically con-
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
ned to the east coast and pockets of interest
in the midwest, has established two pro- In 2001, the estimated total market value of
fessional leagues; the indoor National La- the 123 franchises across the four major
crosse League ( NLL) and the more recently leagues in the US and Canada had grown toGrowth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 149
Fig 1. Economic value of the major leagues
about $30 billion, more than doubling their lost money each year, usually between
market value in 1990. The relative economic $200 to $300 million each year. During
valuation of each league is shown in Figure 1. the 2000 season, the NHL lost $150
The cumulative revenues generated by the million.
teams in the Big Four Leagues in 2001 edged
Professional sport executives attribute the
over $10 billion.
failure of franchises to make a pro t to their
Despite their value and the magnitude of
inability to generate suf cient revenues to
their nancial resources, a majority of teams
meet the acceleration in operating costs
in some leagues, are losing money on an
which has occurred in the past decade.
annual basis. Consider the following data:
However, some analysts claim their pur-
c Since 1993, net income has steadily ported losses are the result of creative
declined across all leagues except for accounting and are paper rather than real
the NFL; the average net earnings in losses. All agree that irrespective of how the
1999–2000 was just 4%. operational nancial status of the franchises
c 75% of the teams in the NHL and 70% of is viewed, their owners enjoy substantial
the teams in Major League Baseball, capital appreciation of their assets. These
nished in the red in 1999–2000. issues are reviewed in the following sub-
c Since 1994, Major League Baseball has sections.150 Howard and Crompton
Revenues cannot keep pace with They pre-sold over 3 million tickets every
expenses year. Yet the team claimed, in a Securities
The fundamental problem for many teams is Exchange Commission ( SEC) ling, that only
that although revenues are rising, costs are their successful appearance in post-season
increasing at a more accelerated rate. The playoffs allowed them to turn a modest
pro t and loss reports of professional sports pro t. Excerpts from a prospectus led by
at the individual team level show that a the Cleveland Indians with the SEC to offer
number of teams are facing serious nancial $73.6 million public stock sale, stated:
problems. The Anaheim Angels reported Management believes that the Indians’ local
more than $42 million in operating losses revenue potential has already been realized,
during the rst three seasons of the Walt and that future increases in net income, are
Disney Company’s ownership of the MLB likely to be substantially less than in the past
team ( Shaiken, 1999) . Over the same time- 5 years. Without the contribution of post-
season playoff revenues, the team would not
frame, from 1997 through 1999, the NHL’s
have produced a pro t in 1997.
Vancouver Canucks reported losses of C$91
million ( Kerr, 2000) . Surprisingly, many of the Creative accounting
teams at the top of their respective leagues While league of cials and team owners con-
are reporting serious losses. One year after sistently report that their franchises are
winning the NBA championship, the San losing lots of money, the actual extent and
Antonio Spurs claimed that the team lost $6 magnitude of these claims are dif cult to
million to $7 million in 1999, and projected substantiate. Very few professional sport
losses of $30 million by 2002. Even the teams are publicly held corporations. Owner-
venerable NFL team, the Green Bay Packers, ship in most cases is mainly in the hands of
reported an operating loss of nearly $500,000 private individuals, families or closely held
in 2000. During the 2000 season, the Packers’ corporations, all of which are under no legal
expenses, primarily players’ salaries, in- obligation to disclose detailed nancial in-
creased at a rate three times greater than formation about their team’s operations.
team revenues. The Arizona Diamondbacks Financial experts and players’ association
reported an operational loss of $15.8 million representatives have repeatedly challenged
in 2000. In an effort to bring a winning ball the authenticity of the owners’ claims of
club to Phoenix in just its second year of nancial distress, claiming that ‘creative ac-
operation, the MLB expansion team doubled counting’ procedures used by the owners
its payroll to $70 million in 1999. Despite the made the teams’ nancial positions look
team’s excellent performance on the eld, much worse than they really were. A former
attendance declined, as did revenues. As a president of the Toronto Blue Jays reputedly
result, the team had to make a cash call of $24 stated:
million to its owners/investors in order to Under generally accepted accounting princi-
meet the Diamondbacks large payroll ( Gil- ples, I can turn a $4 million pro t into a $2
bertson, 2000) . million loss, and I can get every national
The Cleveland Indians MLB team are a accounting rm to agree with me. ( Zimbalist,
troubling example of how hard it is even for 1992, p. 62)
the most successful teams to make money This was a reference to the roster deprecia-
in the current economic environment. After tion allowance provided to the owners of
the opening of Jacobs Field in 1996, the professional sports teams. Under a special
Cleveland Indians were one of the most provision, called the ‘Veeck tax shelter con-
successful teams in all of professional sports. vention’, ( after Bill Veeck, a legendary gureGrowth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 151
among the owners of MLB teams) , the IRS Capital appreciation
allows owners to claim half of what they paid In addition to the special tax bene ts they
to purchase a team as depreciation on player receive, owners of sports teams have been
contracts. Speci cally, the owner can assign able to count on steep increases in the
50% of the franchises purchase price to market value of their teams. Historical re-
player contracts. And then, for tax purposes cords of franchise sales indicate that team
the roster can be treated as a declining or sales prices have increased at double digit
‘wasting’ asset, depreciating the value of the rates over the past 30 years. In 1920, George
contract over a ve-year period. Halas paid $100 for the NFL Chicago Bears. In
The following illustration clari es how an a more contemporary context, in 1984 the
owner can take advantage of this tax shelter- owner of the NFL Denver Broncos paid $70
ing provision ( Quirk and Fort, 1999, p. 105) :
million to purchase the team. A decade later,
Suppose someone buys an NFL team for $200 the NFL Tampa Bay Buccaneers were sold for
million. The new owner assigns 50% of the $197 million. By 2001, according to Forbes
purchase price to player contracts, ( the magazine, all three of these NFL franchizes
maximum allowed under the law) , that is,
were estimated to be worth around $500
$100 million, and then depreciates the con-
tracts over ve years at $20 million per year.
million. As Table 1 indicates, huge capital
Suppose that revenue is $100 million per gains are not con ned to NFL teams. From
year, and that costs, exclusive of player 1995 to 2000, the average value of MLB teams
contract depreciation, are $90 million. Then, increased by $126 million, at an annual rate of
for the rst ve years of operation of the appreciation of around 17%. Both the NBA
team, the books of the team will look like and NHL also demonstrated impressive dou-
this: ble digit gains.
Revenue $100 million Table 1 indicates that pro t taking is best
Less costs $ 90 million understood from a franchise appreciation
Less depreciation $ 20 million perspective. Given the considerable cost of
Pre-tax pro ts –$ 10 million buying a team, return on investment is
Depreciation is simply a bookkeeping entry dif cult to justify on the basis of annual
with no actual cash expended to cover this operating income performance. Many teams
expense, so a $10 million pro t is trans- are struggling to break even from one season
formed by legitimate accounting procedures to the next, and the average net pro t
to a $10 million pre-tax loss. Some analysts generated by major sport franchises of
believe that this tax shelter enhances the around 6% is well below market rates
after tax return to an owner to such an extent of return for investments of comparable risk.
that it increases the value of a team by as However, when ownership investment is con-
much as 40%. sidered on the basis of asset appreciation,
Table 1 Average value of league teams from 1995–2000 (in millions)
%Annual
League 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 $ Diff increase
NFL $160 $177 $202 $285 $380 $423 +$263 24.2%
NBA $113 $127 $150 $170 $183 $207 +$94 12.9%
MLB $107 $111 $115 $134 $194 $233 +$126 17.2%
NHL $71 $74 $90 $125 $135 $148 +$77 16.5%
Sources: Financial World and Forbes152 Howard and Crompton
the nancial rewards of team ownership are last ve years, the NBA’s average attendance
evident. has fallen by about 2%. During the 1999–2000
While the cost of ownership continues to season, 11 of the NBA’s 29 teams showed
rise at unprecedented levels, it appears that substantial declines, with four reporting dou-
there are still more wealthy individuals inter- ble digit gate losses from the previous sea-
ested in buying teams than there are avail- son. On the ice, only nine of the 27 teams
able franchises. As long as demand exceeds comprising the NHL reported increased at-
supply, the value of professional sport fran- tendance in 1999–2000, while half the teams
chises will continue to climb. While so called, suffered moderate to severe losses. The NHL
‘psychic income’ bene ts ( e.g. prestige, sta- declines are particularly troubling for a
tus, fame, fun) remain as compelling motives league that depends on gate receipts for 60%
for team ownership, contemporary owners of of its total revenues. Attendance eroded
professional sport franchises also recognize steadily over the last four years of the 1990s,
that well managed sport properties afford with league-wide percentage of capacity g-
them abundant tax sheltering bene ts during ures falling from 93% in 1996–97 to 88.9%
their initial years of ownership and the during the 1999–2000 campaign.
prospect of an attractive return on invest- Even the venerable NFL, with its limited
ment over the long haul. inventory of just eight home games per
season, has reason to be concerned. During
the 2000 season, 16 of the league’s 31 teams
THE LEAGUES’ DECLINING HEALTH
showed no growth. What may be more
The four major leagues are confronted with troubling is the rising report of ‘no shows’
four major problems: falling attendance, de- ( no longer reported by the league) in many
clining ratings, a saturated marketplace and NFL stadiums. An example is the Carolina
an economic disconnect with their fan base. Panthers, who, in only the third year of
Each of these issues is discussed in the operation, saw an average of more than 7,000
following sub-sections. no shows per game. That was a 317% in-
crease in empty seats compared to their
Falling attendance inaugural 1996 season ( Swift, 2000) .
A majority of teams in the four biggest
leagues, reported at or declining attend- Declining ratings
ances in 1999–2000. During the 2000 MLB Most league executives, particularly in the
campaign, more than one third of the league’s NFL and NBA, profess relatively little concern
total seating inventory went unsold. Even the about stagnant or sagging attendance, pro-
stirring home-run duel between Mark claiming that the typical fan is now a tele-
McGuire and Sammy Sosa during the summer vision fan. Certainly, more sports
of 1998, which many pundits called baseball’s programming is available on free or cable
‘comeback season’, was not able to re- television than ever before. And, with the
invigorate major league attendance. In fact, emergence of regional sports networks to
the overall increase in MLB attendance of compete with ESPN’s delivery of around the
four per cent in 2000 was attributable entirely clock broadcasting, fans have unprecedented
to just one team, the San Francisco Giants, opportunities to watch their favourite teams.
who experienced a 67% jump in attendance Although the four major networks now de-
when they moved into their new Pac Bell vote an increased portion of their program-
Park. Without the Giants’ extraordinary at- ming to sports – which in aggregate exceeds
tendance spike, overall major league gate 2000 hours each year – unfortunately, fewer
gures would have been down 2%. Over the viewers appear to be watching games involv-Growth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 153
ing teams from the NBA, NHL, MLB, or the too many choices and consumers may be
NFL. Ratings for all four leagues have been overwhelmed. As Business Week proclaimed,
sinking for the past decade ( McGraw, 1998) . ‘It’s a brutal battle, especially as audiences
Between 1987 and 2000, ratings for MLB were fragment amid the urry of competing
down 30%, for the NBA 14% and for the NFL choices’ ( Stevens and Grover, 1998, p. 89) . As
22%. Some, like the President of the entertainment providers, sports teams are
NFL, believe that the glut of sports enter- part of this highly competitive environment.
tainment options increasingly available to They are competing for the scarce time and
fans has diluted network numbers. There are disposable dollars of the same consumers
more people watching sports on television, that all other entertainment companies are
but they are watching it on a lot more seeking to attract. The challenge of compet-
channels ( McGraw, 1998) . ing in such a cluttered marketplace is ex-
acerbated because consumer spending on
Saturated marketplace entertainment in 2001 declined dramatically
Ironically, the prosperity that undergirded as the economy entered a recession.
the unprecedented growth of the sports
industry over the past decade has been a Economic disconnect
major contributor to one of the most serious A more ominous explanation for the various
challenges confronting sport teams – a sat- league rating declines is that working and
urated marketplace. Consumers now have middle class families, the traditional bedrock
more entertainment options available than fans of professional sports, are gradually
ever before. Indeed, a respected national losing interest in watching major league
business publication proclaimed that the games because they can no longer afford to
long-term robust economy which charac- attend them. There is ample evidence of a
terized the 1990s had stimulated the creation growing economic disconnect between pro-
of so many new sport and entertainment fessional sports and most Americans. Table 2
alternatives that the US now faced an ‘enter- shows the steady and substantial increase in
tainment glut’ ( Stevens and Grover, 1998) . the cost of attending games across all four
Although new sports teams and properties leagues. Using the Fan Cost Index ( FCI)
expanded substantially, so did other enter- created by Team Marketing Report, which
tainment options. Major entertainment and estimates the average cost for a hypothetical
media companies like Disney, Time-Warner family of four to attend a professional team
and Viacom invested heavily in movie stu- sports event, comparisons are provided for
dios, broadcast and cable networks, online the major leagues over a 10-year period.
ventures, new record labels and theme parks. The results show the price of attendance
It is projected that the total number of rising four to six times greater than the rate
channels available to television viewers will of in ation. The NBA and NHL lead the way,
increase from about 75 in 2000 ( mostly cable with more than 100% price increases over the
channels) to 1000 by 2010, ‘when digital decade. In 2001, at an average of $53.14, the
compression of television signals makes cost of a ticket to attend an NFL game had
room for hundreds of channels, and the eclipsed all of the other leagues. But, the NBA
linkage of televisions and computers be- and NHL were not too far behind, with ticket
comes a reality’ ( Stevens and Grover, 1998, prices averaging, $51.34 and $47.70, respec-
p. 90) . At the same time, the exponential tively. For a family of four to attend an NHL
growth of web sites is creating further ( $264.11) or NFL ( $303.33) game during the
choices for consumers. Some industry ana- 2000 season, amounted to about 30% of an
lysts are worried that there may already be average household’s weekly earnings. Even154 Howard and Crompton
Table 2 The rising cost of attending major league sports
%
League 1990-91 2000–01 Change Proj. 2006
MLB $77.41 $145.83 +88% $221
NBA $138.82 $282.72 +104% $462
NFL $152.55 $303.33 +99% $493
NHL $132.62 $264.11 +131% $461
From 1991-2000 CPI rose 21.4% in US
*Based on Fan Cost Index (FCI) calculated by TMR to represent average cost
for family of four attending a major league game (two adult and two child’s
tickets, four sodas, four hot dogs, two beers, two programs, two caps).
Sources: Team Marketing Report (April 2000, October 2000, November 2000,
and September 2001) and USA Today, January 22, 1998, p. 3.
MLB, which takes pride in being pro sports’ professional sporting events on a regular
biggest bargain, raised its cost of attendance basis, it is not surprising to nd consumer
by 88%. It is clear that attending a live major interest dissipating for both live and tele-
league sport event is now beyond the reach vised offerings of major league sports. It has
of most of the population. Indeed, nine out of been suggested that the greatest danger
ten Americans say ticket prices are so high facing professional sports is fan ‘apathy.’ For
that it is dif cult for them to attend a example, a 1998 Los Angeles Times poll
professional sporting event ( Howard, 1999) . reported that almost two thirds of respon-
Data con rm the increasingly narrow dem- dents did not consider an NFL team in the
ographics of those attending big league Los Angeles area to be of any importance to
games. They indicate that more af uent them ( McGraw, 1998) . A similar situation
spectators have replaced middle class and appears to have emerged among top teams in
blue-collar fans. A columnist proclaimed, the English premier league. Roy Keane, the
‘going to ball games is becoming a perk of the Manchester United captain, famously be-
new rich’ ( Angell, 1998, p. 9) . His proclama- moaned the replacement of the hard-core,
tion is given credence by a report indicating enthusiastic, loud, genuinely loyal suppor-
that the household income of Washington DC ters by relatively wealthy season ticket hold-
area residents attending Baltimore Orioles ers who watched the game quietly while
games averaged $87,500, whereas the aver- eating their prawn sandwiches!
age household income of those residing in With ticket prices displacing all but the
the Baltimore DC area is around $53,000 most af uent consumers, teams – partic-
( Fehr, 1997) . Other compelling evidence in- ularly in the NBA and NHL – have devoted an
dicating the gentri cation of big league ap- increasing proportion of their seating in-
peared in American Demographics ( Dortch, ventory to corporate ticket buyers. A survey
1996) . The analysis found that adults with conducted by the NBA’s Minnesota Timber-
household incomes of $75,000 and above wolves found that 62% of season tickets sold
were 72% more likely to attend major league in the lower bowl of their arena were owned
baseball games than households with ag- by corporations ( Swift, 2000) . While teams
gregate incomes of less than $35,000. When may be able to sell an increasing share of
only such a narrow segment of the market their most expensive tickets to businesses,
( 13.6% of US households have incomes in the trend leads to other problems. It has been
excess of $75,000) can afford to attend pointed out that:Growth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 155
Fig 2. Reasons why fans stay home
the corporate fan, who has replaced the core CONTROLLING PLAYER COSTS: A
fan, is a ckle beast, choosy about which PRESCRIPTION FOR RECOVERY
game he’ll use his precious free time to
attend. Mid-week against the Milwaukee The single greatest operational expense for
Bucks, or the Nashville Predators? That’s a major league teams is player costs. It is a
pass. If the suit bothers to give the tickets conundrum familiar to English soccer clubs,
away, he’s likely to hand them over at the last recently highlighted by David Beckham’s new
minute to some secretary in personnel, who contract with Manchester United raising his
might prefer to be home watching Regis [a guaranteed salary for the next four years
popular television game show] make people from £40,000 to £90,000 per week. Even
sweat. ( Swift, 2000, p. 75) before the Beckham contract, Manchester
United’s salary bill was £1.3 million per week
It is no wonder, then, that no shows are a
( Cave and Millard, 2002) . According to esti-
growing concern to the major leagues. Some
mates provided by various industry sources,
teams, like the NBA’s Charlotte Hornets, were
player payroll costs in the American leagues
lling less than half the number of seats that
represent about two-thirds of the total opera-
were actually sold late in the 2000 season. tional expenses incurred by teams. Salary
Sold but un lled or unused tickets can have increases during the 1990s in every major
serious nancial repercussions because, sports league were extraordinary. As Table 3
‘When no one is in that seat, not only do we illustrates, the NBA led the way. In 1991, the
lose the value of the ticket, we lose conces- average NBA player was a millionaire. Ten
sion money, merchandise money and pro- years later, the average had more than
gram money’ ( Swift, 2000, p. 76) . trebled to $3.93 million. From 1990 through
While pricing is a serious issue facing the 2001, player salaries increased more than
managers of professional sports teams, a poll two and half times in all four major pro-
commissioned by Sports Illustrated, indicates fessional leagues.
there are a number of other serious issues The deputy commissioner of the NBA
that managers must address ( Figure 2) . declared, ‘we have an economic system that156 Howard and Crompton
Table 3 League salary increases from 1990-91 to 2000-01
Year MLB NFL NBA NHL
2001-01 $2,217,887 $1,320,000 $3,930,000 $1,385,000
1999-00 $1,938,849 $996,000 $3,170,000 $1,350,000
1997-98 $1,341,000 $751,000 $2,600,000 $1,200,000
1993-94 $1,012,424 $645,000 $1,350,000 $430,000
1990-91 $597,537 $351,800 $990,000 $320,000
Increase 271% 275% 297% 333%
Sources: National Football League Players Association, National Basketball Players
Association.
we think is out of whack’ ( Howard, 1999, Players Association ending a ve-year labour
p. 81) . But, this declaration was not a revela- dispute. Under the agreement, for the rst
tion to most of those who owned or operated time, players whose contracts had expired
those franchises. The owners are ultimately were allowed the right as ‘free agents’ to
responsible for paying the players’ salaries, move to a team willing to make the best offer.
but the chairman of the MLB Chicago White In exchange for free agency, the players and
Sox and NFL Bulls, expressed frustration at owners agreed to a salary cap under which
the lack of constraint demonstrated by fellow teams were restricted to spending not more
owners by commenting ‘in paying ball- than 64% of the league’s ‘designated gross
players, we are at the mercy of our dumbest revenues’ on player salaries ( in effect, this
competitor’ ( Howard, 1999, p. 81) . Each pool of money included the combined gate
league has attempted, with varying degrees receipts of NFL teams and the monies from
of success, to bring spiralling salaries under the league’s national television contract) .
some form of control. The varying systems The CBA also established a minimum, guar-
involving ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ salary caps, free anteeing players no less than 58% of the
agency constraints, and luxury taxes have all designated revenues. The salary cap or pay-
been intended to act as a ‘drag’ on the rapid roll maximum in 1994 was $34.6 million. As
in ation of player salaries. In every instance, league revenues have grown, so has the
however, owners’ efforts to impose a con- amount teams can pay their players. By the
straint on roster costs have met with erce 2001 season, the salary cap had reached
resistance from the collective bargaining unit $67.4 million, up from $64.5 million in 2000.
or players association representing the inter- Players, however, or more accurately the
ests of players in each of the leagues. Every agents representing players in contract nego-
league endured at least one labour con ict tiations, were able to circumvent the im-
over the past decade. Major League Baseball posed salary ceiling shortly after the CBA
has led the way with six lockouts or strikes agreement went into effect. They negotiated
since 1972. The following sub-sections pro- a loophole, sometimes referred to as the
vide an overview of the current state of each ‘Sanders Provision’ after Deion Sanders,
of the major leagues with respect to their the rst player to secure the arrangement. It
ability to control or constrain player sala- allows teams to pay players substantial up
ries. front signing bonuses, but count only a small
portion of the bonus payment toward their
National Football League cap. Teams are allowed to pro-rate the
In 1993, the NFL owners signed a collective amount of the bonus over the length of
bargaining agreement ( CBA) with the NFL the player’s contract. So hypothetically, let’sGrowth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 157
say Deion Sanders signed a $50 million deal amount of revenue sharing among its owners,
with the Washington Redskins for ve years, since as much as 77% of the total revenues
including a $10 million signing bonus. For cap generated by the league is shared among its
purposes, even though the Redskins could 32 teams. Revenues from the national tele-
have paid Sanders as much as $18 million in vision broadcast contract, which escalate
year one of the agreement: $10 million up from $2 billion in 2000 to $2.8 billion in 2005,
front bonus and $8 million in salary ( assum- are shared equally among teams, amounting
ing a salary payment schedule of $8 million to team shares of $60 million to $70 million
per year for ve years for a total of $40 annually. The result is that the NFL is clearly
million) , the team would only have to count the healthiest of any of the major sports
$10 million against their cap ( $8 million in leagues in North America. Not only does it
rst-year salary and $2 million as a pro rata enjoy the greatest nancial parity, it also
share of the signing bonus ) . Although the bene ts from the greatest competitive parity.
team actually paid out $18 million, due to During the 1999 season, 13 of the league’s
the signing bonus loophole it only had then 31 teams nished with records be-
to charge $10 million toward the team’s tween seven wins and nine losses and nine
salary cap. This is why the Washington wins and seven losses. The NFL has the
Redskins team payroll in 2000 was $88 mil- highest and most consistent team valuations,
lion, as much as $25 million above the NFL’s the strongest television ratings, and the most
cap. According to the NFL Players Associa- ardent fan following.
tion ( NFLPA) , the team had a total base salary In contrast to the NFL’s focus on revenue
expenditure of $31 million, and signing bonus sharing, English football clubs have moved in
payments of around $56 million ( Lombardo,
the opposite direction. Before 1984, clubs
2000) . While the Redskins had the highest
equally shared the admission revenues from
ever payroll, the NFLPA estimated the aver-
every match. Today the home clubs keep all
age NFL team spent $65 million on player
the revenues. Thus, the large well-supported
salaries for the 2000 season. What allows
clubs accrue much more income, and any
some teams the ability to maintain salary
expectation of parity of competition has
expenditures well above the cap is that some
disappeared. If no revenue sharing is in-
NFL owners have been able to generate
troduced, then the emergence of an elite half
signi cant additional income that does not
dozen clubs, analogous to the ‘old rm’
have to be shared as a part of league wide
situation of Rangers and Celtic in Scotland,
revenues, such as income from luxury suites,
concessions, naming rights deals, and in appears inevitable.
stadium signage. So, for example, because
Major League Baseball
the Redskins play in a stadium owned by the
team that generates close to $100 million in Unfortunately MLB, which often is charac-
annual revenues, most of which is exempt terized as ‘America’s pastime’, from a nan-
from the league’s shared designated gross cial perspective pales in comparison to the
revenue system, the team is capable of NFL. Major League Baseball has no salary
paying huge bonuses that don’t count en- cap. Indeed, the league has no real mecha-
tirely against the cap ( Lombardo, 2000) . nism in place to constrain salary in ation.
Although teams that play in lucrative sta- Under the collective bargaining agreement
diums have an economic advantage, the which expired at the end of the 2001 season,
league’s underlying economic structure has players with six years of ‘big league’ experi-
created substantial nancial parity among ence were eligible to become free agents.
NFL franchises. The NFL has the greatest When their contracts expired, these players158 Howard and Crompton
could offer their services to the highest disparity ( Rofe, 2000) . And, the disparity may
bidder. widen as the Yankees are currently consider-
Compounding the problem further from a ing a new local television deal which would
cost control perspective is that owners do give them $838 million over the next 10 years.
not have the ability to control payroll ex- In contrast, in 2000 the Twins received $5
penses when negotiating with players who million from the sale of their local television
have three to six years of experience. Players broadcast rights.
in this category, while not eligible for free The signi cant revenue disparity in major
agency, are allowed by a clause in the league baseball has translated into a serious
bargaining agreement to go to binding arbi- competitive disadvantage for have not
tration in the event of a salary dispute with teams. The Blue Ribbon Panel commissioned
the team. Final resolution of the dispute is by MLB to evaluate the economic conditions
made by an independent arbitrator who is and prospects for major league baseball
required to choose between the salary de- revealed that teams with the highest payrolls
mand made by the player and the salary offer had won virtually all of the post season
made by the team. In this process, the player playoff games since the settlement of the
and management each submit a gure, and 1994 strike. The study found that no team
the arbitrator selects one or the other; no which was not in the top tier or upper 25% of
compromise is allowed. Over the years, the payroll spending, won a single World Series
owners have won more than half the deci-
game over the previous ve seasons. During
sions. However, owners would suggest that
the 2000 season, the defending world cham-
most of their victories have been pyrrhic in
pion New York Yankees became the rst
that even when they win, players are still
major professional league team in North
rewarded with considerably higher salaries
America with a payroll in excess of $100
than they received the previous season. For
million. The last place Minnesota Twins
example, in a typical year, the three players
salary bill that season was $17 million. Thus,
who lost their cases received average salary
‘the single biggest indicator of a team’s
increases of 20% ( USA Today, 1996) . Thus,
there is ‘little downside risk’ for players opportunity for success from one year to the
because the salary gures owners present in next is whether the team’s payroll is among
arbitration are invariably higher than their the top few teams in the league. Period’
current levels of compensation. In the rst 18 ( Costas, 2000, p. 58) .
years of arbitration only 20 players emerged The competitive imbalance prevailing in
with pay cuts ( Zimbalist, 1992) . The result MLB is the league’s most pressing challenge.
has been an extraordinary increase in overall A leading national publication declared that
MLB salaries of 705% in the 20–year period ‘as many as two thirds of the teams in major
from 1982 to 2001. league baseball have no chance of contend-
Many teams have not been able to keep up ing for the World Series – now, or anytime
with the relentless escalation in player sala- soon’ ( Bodley and Brady, 1999, p. C10) . The
ries. Nowhere is the gap between the ‘haves’ league has attempted to address the serious
and ‘have nots’ more evident than in base- disparity but has not been successful. The
ball. Over the last decade, the revenue owners’ thwarted attempt to institute a sal-
disparity between large and small market ary cap precipitated a damaging players
teams has grown dramatically. In 1999, the strike, which led to the cancellation of the
New York Yankees generated a total of $179 World Series in 1994 and a shortened 1995
million in gross revenues, compared to the season. While the owners were unsuccessful
Minnesota Twins $52 million – a $127 million in imposing a cap, the 1996 agreement withGrowth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 159
the MLB Players Association did establish a National Basketball Association
‘luxury tax’ on the ve teams with the highest After remarkable growth through most of the
payrolls. In 1999, the luxury tax provision 1990s, the NBA faded over the last few years.
required the teams with the ve highest With the retirement of mega star Michael
salaries to pay a 34% tax on every payroll Jordan and his magical championship run
dollar spent above $70.5 million. The tax bill with the Chicago Bulls in 1998 and the labour
that year for the Yankees came to $4.8 dispute that led to the cancellation of 464
million. Given the limited scope ( just ve league games in 1999, league attendance
teams) and impact ( the team with the fth steadily declined, television ratings sunk to
highest payroll in 1999, the Boston Red Sox, the lowest in years, and merchandise sales
paid a tax of just $21,000) the luxury tax has plummeted ( Tagliabue, 2000) . After negotia-
proven to be an ineffective deterrent to tions over a new collective bargaining agree-
salary in ation in baseball. ment ( CBA) collapsed in June 1998, the NBA
Perhaps, the single best hope for establish- owners locked out the players for the third
ing an economic system that allows all 30 time since 1995. The struggle occurred over
MLB’s teams to compete, depends on how much of the league’s $2 billion in gross
whether the recommendations of the Com- revenues would be shared with the players.
missioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel ever come to The NBA claimed that the league operated at
fruition. The 87-page report issued in 2000, a de cit during the 1997–98 season for the
urged MLB to: rst time in almost 20 years. League of cials
attributed the steady decline in the league’s
c institute a ‘competitive-balance tax’ of operating pro ts to rapidly escalating player
50% on all club payrolls in excess of $84 salaries, which in 1997–98 amounted to 57.2%
million; of the league’s total revenues. Under the
c create a revenue sharing mechanism in existing labour contract, the players’ share
which teams would contribute at least was projected to reach 61% during the
40%, and as much as 50% of all their local 1998–99 season. Negotiations stalemated
net revenues from gate receipts and when the owners wanted to impose a xed
television contracts. limit on salaries at 48% of the total NBA
revenues. The NBA Players Association held
These recommendations and others would out for a 60% share.
increase the percentage of revenues shared After a 190-day lockout, resulting in an
among the league’s 30 teams from the pres- abbreviated 50-game season ( regularly 82
ent 35% to roughly 60% ( Ozanian and Bade- games) , the NBA and its players reached a
hausen, 2000) . The proposal would reduce settlement in January 1999. The new six-year
the revenue gap between the league’s richest CBA ensured players would receive no less
and poorest teams, promising at least the than 48% and no more than 55% of the
potential of greater competitive parity. league’s pooled revenues, referred to as
The challenge facing MLB is to convince the ‘Basketball Related Income’ ( BRI) . Most im-
owners of those teams with the highest portantly to the owners, the new agreement
payrolls and greatest revenues that it is in afforded teams much greater nancial stabil-
their best interest to share ‘their wealth’ ity by setting caps for maximums on the
with their less fortunate league brethren. In salaries players can earn based on the num-
addition, the league must win the approval of ber of years of service a player has had in the
the players union in order to adopt addi- league. Under the new agreement, players
tional revenue sharing. with zero to ve years of NBA service are160 Howard and Crompton
capped at $9 million per season; players with dened by a weak Canadian dollar and high
six to nine years of league experience are Canadian taxes. The purchasing power of
capped at $11 million; and veterans with 10 the Canadian dollar has slipped 30% in value
or more years of service can earn a maximum compared to the US dollar over the last
of $14 million per season. The new CBA also decade. The declining value of Canadian
built in some long-term cost control by currency has created an increasingly stress-
setting a xed or maximum limit on salary ful dilemma for Canadian teams. Although
increases at 10%. In an effort, however, to the franchises collect revenue in their native
promote roster stability, the agreement stipu- currency, in order to stay competitive with
lated that a player re-signing with his existing American-based teams they have to pay
team could receive a pay raise of 12.5% per salaries in US dollars. In early 1999, the
year over the length of his contract. The new currency exchange difference on a $50 mil-
agreement, while costly, provides the NBA lion payroll would have been about $20
with one clear advantage over all the other million. The Montreal Canadians pay prop-
leagues, the ability to control and anticipate erty taxes on their arena of around $10
its greatest expense, player salaries. million per year which is triple the combined
taxes paid by all the US based NHL teams.
National Hockey League There appears to be no relief in sight for the
The National Hockey League is in the most Canadian franchises. In 2000, the Canadian
precarious nancial position of any of the Federal Government withdrew a tax credit
major leagues. Like MLB, it has minimal plan which would have provided teams C$2
revenue sharing and no real mechanism in million a year, claiming there was no public
place to control salary growth. Unfortu- support for the plan.
nately, the league is locked into its collective One bright note for the NHL is the tele-
bargaining agreement until 2004. This agree- vision deal the league signed with ABC/ESPN
ment established a cap only on rookie sala- in 2000. The ve-year broadcast contract
ries, set at a maximum of $975,000 per through the 2005–06 season, pays the league
season. The agreement provides few restric- $600 million, a signi cant increase over its
tions on free agency. The result is that player previous contract with Fox that paid the
salaries are growing at a much faster rate league $200 million. However, with no mean-
than team revenues. The league’s economic ingful revenue sharing proposal in sight, and
troubles have been exacerbated by several the likelihood of uncontrolled salary growth
other problems. With a relatively small na- through at least 2004, the short-term nan-
tional television contract ( teams received cial prospects for many NHL teams looks
$4.3 million per year at the end of the 1990s, grim. In 1999, it was estimated that 20 of the
compared to NFL teams’ $60–70 million) NHL NHL’s then 28 teams were losing money. It
teams depended on gate receipts on average will be interesting to see whether the NHL
for 60% of their overall revenues. This situa-
commissioner’s prescription for a ‘prosper-
tion made it particularly dif cult for the 14 or
ous NHL future’ will ever be realized. In his
15 teams that experienced attendance de-
state of the NHL address in 2000, the commis-
clines in recent years. With no provision for
sioner offered the following plan:
sharing gate revenues – home teams keep
100% of the ticket sale income – the revenue c Continue to increase revenues by mov-
imbalance has widened among NHL teams. ing into even more new money generat-
The nancial stress has been particularly ing arenas and stimulating interest in
acute for the NHL’s Canadian franchises. The hockey internationally.
six Canadian hockey teams have been bur- c Slow skyrocketing salaries with judi-Growth and nancial status of professional sports in North America 161
cious personnel decisions and, ulti- dwarf the $1.6 billion generated by the
mately, through a new collective English leagues. In the English leagues, costs
bargaining agreeing. associated with players’ salaries have esca-
c Promote, promote, promote, to build a lated at a rate substantially greater than that
younger and broader fan base ( Robin- of revenues, and there is nothing to suggest
son, 2000) . that this trend will change in the foreseeable
future. In addition, English soccer leagues are
CONCLUDING COMMENTS confronted with many of the challenges faced
by the North American leagues especially a
The urgency to control costs in the English growing economic disconnect with their tra-
and European soccer leagues is exempli ed ditional fan base, and competition from other
by the actions of the ‘G14’ group of leading sources of entertainment. However, there is
European clubs, which includes Manchester an important difference between nancial
United and Liverpool. They have proposed a prospects of the English and North American
salary cap in a bid to ease the sport’s leagues in that the long-term prospects for
economic problems. At a meeting at the 2002 nancial gain in the North American context
European cup nal, they also agreed to are excellent, while the nancial long-term
reduce their playing staffs and to introduce a outlook for the owners of English soccer
code of conduct to contain spiralling costs teams is less sanguine. The Deloitte and
( The Times, 2002) . The details remain elusive
Touche ( 2001) review asks the question ‘is
but the thinking has changed from ‘should
football an investment?’ And succinctly an-
there be a cost control mechanism?’ to ‘what
swers it by concluding, ‘Emotionally – yes.
form should it take, and how quickly can it be
Financially – in rare cases’ ( p. 43) .
implemented?’
There are three main reasons why the long-
There are fundamental differences
term nancial prospects of North American
between English football and the American
teams are stronger. First, the value of pro-
leagues in that European laws differ from
fessional sports franchises has been appre-
American laws; the English leagues have to
contend with promotion and relegation; and ciating at double digit rates annually for the
the American leagues have a draft system for past 30 years, providing owners with sub-
recruiting new players into the leagues which stantial capital gains which more than com-
contributes to parity. Nevertheless, it is likely pensate them for relatively small operational
that the analyses of approaches to resolving losses. This occurs because each of the four
the problem adopted by the American lea- major leagues acts as an independent cartel
gues offer useful insights to the conundrum restricting the number of teams allowed to
in English soccer. Professional sports leagues enter the league, so the demand from cities
in North America and professional soccer seeking to host a team always exceeds
leagues in England enjoyed unprecedented the supply of teams. This favourable de-
levels of revenues in the 1990s, but in both mand-supply position ensures the value of
cases it is likely that pro table operation will existing teams remains high. It enables team
be more dif cult to achieve in the rst owners to exact substantial subsidies – typi-
decade of the new millennium. There are cally in the $10 million to $20 million per year
similarities in the dif culties they face even range – from the public funds of host cities. If
though each of the four North American host cities refuse to pay such subsidies, the
major leagues generate more annual revenue team owners then transfer the teams to other
than the English soccer leagues, and their cities that will provide them because they are
aggregate annual revenues of over $10 billion anxious to achieve the ‘big city’ status whichYou can also read
