The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
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doi:10.5477/cis/reis.176.101
The Climatic Future of the IPCC:
A Sociological Approach
El futuro climático del IPCC: una aproximación sociológica
Ramón Ramos Torre
Key words Abstract
Climate Change Climate change poses a major problem for the collective future. Ways
• Climate Futures of understanding the climatic future are many and diverse. This paper
• IPCC examines one of these methods, the so-called “reformist” approach,
• Sociology of Time reconstructed from the conception of the climatic future in IPCC
Reports on climate change. After establishing the formal and practical-
cognitive dimensions, the institutional foundations used to specify these
dimensions in this way are examined.
Palabras clave Resumen
Cambio climático El cambio climático plantea el problema del futuro colectivo. Las
• Futuros climáticos maneras de entender el futuro climático son muchas y están en
• IPCC disputa. En este trabajo se estudia una de ellas, la denominada
• Sociología del tiempo reformista, que se reconstruye a partir de la concepción del futuro del
clima en los Informes del IPCC sobre el Cambio Climático. Una vez
fijadas sus dimensiones formales y práctico-cognitivas, se estudian
las bases institucionales que contribuyen a especificarlas de esa
manera.
Citation
Ramos Torre, Ramón (2021). “The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach”. Revista
Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 176: 101-118. (doi: 10.5477/cis/reis.176.101)
Ramón Ramos Torre: TRANSOC-UCM | rrt@cps.ucm.es
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118102 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
Introduction1 This work attempts to reconstruct the so-
called “reformist” climatic future, as it appears
The world is undergoing a “climatization” in the reports on Climate Change prepared
process (Aykut, Foyer y Morena, 2017) and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
climate change (CC) is one of the main is- Change (IPCC)2. First, a) summarized informa-
sues of our era, both socially and sociologi- tion will be offered on the IPCC and its work
cally speaking (Koehrsen et al., 2020). It is a on CC; then, b) the formal dimensions of the
“wicked” problem (Levin et al., 2012), una- future horizon will be recreated, along with
voidable and complex, with only “bad” so- c) the practical-cognitive dimensions; and
lutions. Some have referred to it as being a d) finally, we will discuss the institutional foun-
sort of “trauma” that threatens all living be- dations of the climatic future.
ings, institutions and cultures (Brulle and
Norgaard, 2019). Therefore, it comes as no
surprise that dissent arises when attemp- The IPCC and the climatic
ting to resolve this issue. This paper exami-
future
nes one of these areas of dissent: the con-
ception of the future —yet another wicked
issue (Tutton, 2017)—. The IPCC was created in 1988 by the Ge-
neral Assembly of the United Nations, en-
CC clearly poses a great threat to the
dorsing an agreement reached between the
future: that which is coming (or may come)
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
or that which we can only imagine, wish or
and the World Meteorological Organization
create. The means of conceiving these fu-
(WMO). It was entrusted to collect, order and
tures are many and conflicting. Therefore,
assess the growing scientific literature on
climatic futures are numerous and have
the global climate system, in order to gather
been widely disputed. Five predominant
contrasted information for a future interna-
types of futures have been proposed (Ra-
tional convention. The political and scientific
mos, 2018a): denial-based, geoengineering,
conditions making this possible have been
reformist, radical and catastrophic. Consid-
adequately studied (see Miller, 2004). For its
ering the extensive literature on this topic,
creation, it was essential to separate climate
especially that of Mische (2009, 2014), it
policy (agreeing to conferences of the par-
has been suggested (Ramos, 2017, 2018a)
ties considered in the 1992 Framework Con-
that these differences may respond to dis-
vention on Climate Change) from the climate
tinct ways of conceiving the formal and
science sector that had mandated it.
practical-cognitive dimensions of future ho-
rizons. Later, we will specify its meaning. The IPCC’s work has been extensive. It
has made climate system changes the sub-
ject of global attention; it has taken firm steps
to make it credible —already in the 2007 Re-
1 This work is part of the «Risk, uncertainty and vulnerabi- port, it emphatically affirmed— that CC ex-
lity in Spain» study (CSO2010-20235), developed collec- ists and is anthropogenic; it has examined the
tively with Javier Callejo within the framework of the Na-
tional Plan of R&D&I of the MEC’s Secretary of State of
multiple risks faced by both the planet and
Research, Development and Innovation. I wish to thank humanity; it has proposed the need for glo-
Javier Callejo and Juan Manuel Iranzo, as well as the
members of the Sociology of Time Work Group (especially
Cristina García and Matxalen Legarreta) for the observa-
tions provided on the initial version of the work presented 2 In addition to the IPCC, multiple variants of this
at the XIII Congress of the FES (Valencia 2019). I also wish means of conceiving the climatic future may be found;
to thank the two anonymous reviewers selected by the top sociology and economics proposals may be found
REIS for their valuable suggestions. in Giddens (2010) and Nordhaus (2019).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118Ramón Ramos Torre 103
bal collaboration between science and policy tus of climate change, what can be expected
in order to confront this issue; and finally, it and what can (or should) be done to face the
has revealed the catastrophic potential of CC, challenges and avoid catastrophe. Given the
urging the creation and development of global weight of this task, it is logical that the infor-
adaptation and mitigation works. Although it mation will be offered to privileged recipients:
has received harsh criticism since the begin- policymakers, of course, but also human-
ning (Oreskes and Conway, 2018), it has also ity, in general. By limiting the use of techni-
earned undeniable social recognition. cal and scientific language, the Reports are
The work of the IPCC focuses mainly on made more readable for all. Thus, the SPMs
the publication of Reports, published every are relevant, since they use this more easily-
5 to 7 years. In 1990, the First Report was understood language, increasing their read-
published, followed by some complementary ability. Furthermore, they are accompanied
ones in 1992; in 1995, the Second was cre- by a Glossary that specifies and clarifies the
ated; in 2001, the Third; in 2007, the Fourth; meaning of more technical terms.
in 2014, the Fifth; and by 2021-2022 the Sixth
Report, currently underway, is expected.
The formal dimensions of the climatic
The structure of these Reports is con-
future in the IPCC Reports
sistent. They are divided into three parts,
each of which is created by one of the Ramos (2017, 2018a) considers the long
Working Groups (WG): WG-I is devoted to tradition of reflection on time and its futu-
the physical scientific foundations; WG-II res, beginning with Augustine of Hippo, who
focuses on impacts, adaptation and vulner- suggested that the future is a horizon of the
ability; WG-III examines the mitigation of cli- present. For its creation, formal and practi-
mate change. Each Report includes a Sum- cal-cognitive dimensions must be conside-
mary for Policymakers which is available for red, to establish what we can know, ima-
unspecialized readers. A synopsis of these gine, do, assess and fear or anticipate. The
three summaries appears in the General dual configuration provided by the formal
Summary of the Synthesis Report. and practical-cognitive dimensions allows
The results of three decades of work cul- for differentiation between multiple futures
minate in a collection of information regard- and reveals the causes behind their strains.
ing the status, genesis and future of climate Since the future is a horizon, the “formal
change. In this paper, we focus our attention dimensions” allow us to specify the configu-
on this latter aspect. Our objective is to rec- ration of a scenario of events involving very
reate the image of the future horizon that has distinct participants (from humans to bacte-
been foreseen or proposed by the IPCC. The ria, polar bears to tropical coral reefs). These
source of the information is quite selective. participants may act as agents or patients.
With only a few exceptions, the Fifth Report The futures differ and contrast with one an-
from 2014 has been used, mainly the Sum- other, depending on their specific dimen-
mary for Policymakers (SPM) and especially sions (Table 1): their changing depth, bringing
the Summary of the Synthesis Report. them closer together or further apart from the
The Fifth Report has been selected since present; their relaxed or strict chronometry,
it is the most recent, and therefore, the most permitting the measurement of durations and
relevant to the current struggle regarding placing events on clocks or calendars; the
the climatic future. Given their significance, variable density of the events taking place;
the SPMs have received the most attention. the vibrant or dull nature of these potential
The IPCC aims to determine the current sta- events; the structure of the horizon as a col-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118104 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
lective setting or a temporary landscape. Be- of years, especially when considering the ef-
low we will present further details on each of fect of greenhouse gas concentrations or
the dimensions of the IPCC Reports. mitigation and rebalancing issues related to
climate systems once reaching the point of
Table 1. Formal dimensions of the future no return (ibid.: SPM 2.4). In any case, the
consistent warning is that it is necessary to
— Depth: where the future reaches; its variable be freed from the immediate and the short-
scope. term, working within the framework of pro-
— Chronometry: the measure of “when” and “how
found temporary horizons and considering
often” with regard to future events.
— Density: the presence/absence of events, sce- what may occur there as an incentive for im-
narios and participants. mediate reflection and action: the future nei-
— Realism or Vitality: concreteness/vagueness of ther will end tomorrow nor it is negligible.
that which is represented.
For the purpose of self-observation and
— Structure: the intelligent relational order of that
which takes place. comparison, this profound future takes into
account a past having a correlating depth,
Source: Ramos, 2017 and 2018a.
also based on the “hundred-year” approach.
From an assessment perspective and to es-
The first dimension refers to its changing tablish its origin, events taking place since
“depth”. This is a central theme of discus- the onset of the western industrial revolu-
sion in recent debates on the current social tion or during the period immediately follow-
crisis, which have focused on diagnosing a ing the massive industrialization from 1861
decline in the memory of the past and antic- to 1880 (ibid.: SPM-2) or a broader meas-
ipation of the future, with the resulting mag- ure of study between 1850 and 1900 are of
netic power of the present to attract every- the greatest interest. These periods are con-
thing to it, leading to a collapse of the past sidered valid for measuring temperature in-
and future. According to these approaches, creases given the existence of a reliable
the social future (see Ramos, 2014) has record (IPCC, 2018b: Box-SPM1).
essentially disappeared from the present Climate change exists in its own space;
world; in any event, it has no depth. it is global, affecting all regions and en-
The IPCC’s proposal and information on claves of our planet (from the immense Si-
all of its incursions on the future is quite dis- berian tundra to the tiny Pacific coral reef
tinct. Clearly, the future of climate change is islets) and all of its living inhabitants. Its un-
profound, with a varied extension given the ion with time creates a temporarily profound
context of its analysis. Risbey (2008) has CC time-space (in its future horizon) which,
suggested that, like other institutions that fo- in spatial terms, is limitless; a time that ex-
cus on the analysis of participants, the IPCC tends as far as the global space horizon.
has opted for a “hundred-year” methodol- The events taking place in the considered
ogy. That is, it consistently uses the year future may or may not be subject to strict
2100 as its deadline to determine the ulti- measures to establish when they take place
mate changes in climate. At times, this dom- and how long they last. This requires the
inant secular horizon is decreased, consid- “chronometry” dimension. The IPCC Reports
ering a shorter period ending in 2050 or one “time” the future. This chronometry is neither
that ranges from 2030 to 2050 and a longer casual nor anecdotal. By assigning dates
one from 2080 to 2100 (IPCC, 2014c: SPM- and durations, they offer a sense of realism
2.3). On other occasions, distinct proposals to the future. This realism is characteristic
are made, considering future horizons that of techno-science, in general, which identi-
expand over hundreds or even thousands fies that the “real” can be measured, turning
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118Ramón Ramos Torre 105
it into numbers with actual and credible fig- on cold and sterile descriptions. There-
ures. These results are not negligible, since fore, the dense, extensive and fully meas-
in this way, the cognitive-emotional unique- ured future of CC tends to be colorless, dull
ness or distancing is compensated, creat- and de-dramatized. There are exceptions,
ing a profound and very long-term contem- which tend to include images and icons.
plation of the future, such as that of CC. As The use of populated infographs that high-
a strange future (Jasanoff, 2010a), it should light a potential future of adaptation, resil-
be set aside, since it extends beyond our ience or mitigation is a deep-rooted com-
current scope of interest and action. There- municative practice of the Reports (see
fore, we disregard this future of the prag- IPCC, 2018a and Harold et al., 2020). They
matic paradox as Giddens (2010) described appear as simple dissemination instruments
it. Chronometry is a means of offering prox- and are, in fact, informative and didactic;
imity; by assigning precise dates and dura- yet, they are intentionally expressive. The
tions, the future becomes more recognizable graphs and their icons offer a visualization
and more approachable; and CC is seen up of a vivid and credible future, in the form of
close, becoming increasingly real. an image. To enhance the realism that they
The “density” of events refers to an in- describe, color is used, such as red to rep-
creased or decreased presence of scenar- resent danger (see IPCC, 2014b: SPM 7.b)
ios, events and participants (agents or pa- or drawings-icons to expressively suggest
tients) considered in the future. It differs from droughts, fires or coastal erosion (see IPCC,
other dimensions since it does not depend 2014a: Figure SPM-2). This is not done in
on and is not determined by relative depth excess; at times, they appear as if a sort of
or chronometry. The profound and timed fu- game; but they serve to highlight and con-
ture of the IPCC Reports is a set of scenar- trast with the sterile presentation of the fu-
ios that are filled with events and processes ture.
(potential, plausible, probable, sure) in which “Structure” is the most relevant formal
carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse dimension. By structure, we refer to a sta-
gases are the main participants. These par- bilized and intelligible order. Determining
ticipants include both the rich and the poor, the implicit future structure in the IPCC Re-
and the most diverse of all living things. All of ports means understanding the order that
this, like a 21st century Noah’s Ark, appears is necessary so that the events taking place
in the future of the Reports. And there is a are not simply a heterogeneous mishmash
recurrent call to action regarding the inter- of scenarios, actions and participants, but
relationship or the systemic nature of every- rather, an interlinked set. The structured
thing that is happening. These scenarios are future is an established whole, and not a
like very full niches that condition everything. random collection of things to come3. This
Given their complexity, the resulting world is does not mean that contingencies and the
difficult to predict. In an attempt to manage unplanned (or unimagined) will not occur;
it, moral calls for prudence, integrated re- however, a space and framework will be
sponses and consideration of the long term assigned to the unintelligible. For the rest,
are made (Ibid.: SPM-4). structure is understood to be the process of
The density of the future events is re-
lated (although not identified) with the “re-
alism” or “vitality” with which potential fu- 3 I make Hölscher’s distinction (2014: 34 et seq.) be-
ture events appear. Scientific prose tends tween the future as a set of things that are not yet ex-
isting and that are yet to come and the “actual” future
to avoid (or should avoid) drama and ex- as an integrated and connected set that contains and
pressivity. This literary genre tends to rely encompasses them.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118106 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
establishing the order and the action of the the current situation is projected to the fu-
structure on which it takes place. ture. In the second, the emissions scenar-
The key proposal of the IPCC states that ios, social derivatives are included, which,
the future is a horizon of horizons, a set of economically, demographically or techno-
possible futures. Responding to Luhmann logically differentiated, create distinct emis-
(1976) and Esposito (2009), it considers sions situations; they are more similar to
the difference between the present futures the social sciences. The third type, the rep-
(multiple futures that we can now contem- resentative concentration trajectory sce-
plate and consider to reduce uncertainty) narios, considers four fundamental types,
and the future presents (what will be when differentiated by their respective radiative
this future actually takes place). To present force and the corresponding global warm-
this opening of the future horizon, the Re- ing. The last, the mitigation scenarios, are a
ports use the language of the scenarios4. broad set of potential futures differentiated
Each considered scenario reveals a poten- by mechanism and levels of mitigation (re-
tial climatic future or an aspect of the same. duction of emissions and carbon sinks).
Probability, plausibility or desirability are not Börjeson et al. (2006) referred to these
assigned —although this latter is more ap- types of scenarios as exploratory scenar-
parent than real—; it is simply a potential ios (external or strategic). When considering
scenario that demonstrates one of the plu- the climatic future, the question is not “what
ral and eventual futures of CC. is going” to happen (predictive scenario),
The Reports distinguish between distinct but rather, “what could” occur (exploratory
types: reference scenarios (IPCC, 2014c: scenario). If, when specifying what could
SPM-2.1), emissions scenarios (IPCC, occur if considering forces of the environ-
2000), representative concentration scenar- ment, then they are considered external ex-
ios (IPCC, 2014c: SPM-2.1) and mitigation ploratory scenarios. On the other hand, if
scenarios (IPCC, 2014c: SPM-3.4). In the the strategic action of the relevant partici-
“Glossary”, their distinctive characteristics pants is considered, these are considered
are specified5. The first type considers sce- strategic exploratory scenarios.
narios in which, given a lack of innovations The IPCC also considers other scenarios.
or adaptation and mitigation measures, They are implicit in studies on the mitigation
of the WG-III and clearly appear in the Spe-
cial Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC, pub-
4 There is an enormous amount of literature regard- lished in 2018 (IPCC, 2018b)6. This Report
ing the future, scenarios and the IPCC. As for scenar- presents the future of a climatic system that
ios and the future, the works of Börjeson et al. (2006), does not exceed 1.5ºC as a regulatory sce-
Ramírez and Selin (2014) and Wilkinson and Edinow
(2008) are of special interest. For more on the history of
nario, corresponding to the so-called “trans-
scenarios in the environmental field and CC, see Swart, forming regulatory scenarios” of Börjeson
Raskin y Robinson, (2004) and Moss et al. (2010). Re- et al. (2006). That is, it is a positively valued
garding climatic scenarios in the IPCC Reports, the ref-
erence text is IPCC 2000. As for the scenarios of the
scenario and is considered an objective to be
Fifth Report, see the Climate Change monographic from achieved (backcasting). In a regulatory per-
2014 (122), especially Ebi et al.; Nakicenovic, Lempert y spective, this scenario combines the potential
Janetos; O’Neil et al. and Vuuren et al.; in Spanish, see
Escoto, Sánchez y Gachuz, 2017.
with the feasible, plausible and desirable.
5 In IPCC 2014c, Annex II, a Glossary is provided spec- Other less commonly considered sce-
ifying this semantic field. The fundamental voices are: narios have emerged sporadically in some
base/reference, emissions scenario, mitigation sce-
nario, IE-EE scenarios (special Report on emissions),
radiative force, integrated models, representative con-
centration trajectories and their distinct variants. 6 See note 7.
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analyses. They do not have specific names “Knowledge” of the future inevitably
and may be referred to as Catastrophic highlights the problem of uncertainty. The
Scenarios. They tend to refer to unusual IPCC has been very thoughtful regarding
and less likely phenomena, but those having its relevance7. The underlying problem is
very negative and long-term consequences. the need to ensure the quality and cred-
It is noted when they cause abrupt and irre- ibility of the scientific knowledge included
versible changes (IPCC, 2014c: SPM-2.4) or in its Reports. Therefore, it explores two
changes that are unlikely but have extreme sides of uncertainty —failing to consider
consequences (IPCC, 2014b: SPM-2). other aspects of the same—. It considers,
These scenarios are quite rare but they are on the one hand, the levels of reliability of
relevant, given their potentially catastrophic the knowledge; and on the other hand, the
climatic results. probability of occurrence of the events or
Clearly, the IPCC scenarios are quite assertions (IPCC, 2013: RT-1). First, varied
varied. They consider a set of potentially levels of reliability are differentiated, accord-
(un)livable worlds represented by the cli- ing to the agreement reached by the scien-
matic future. tific community and the available evidence.
Uncertainty leads to a deficit of trust, due to
a lack of evidence and consensus; the first
The practical-cognitive dimensions of the is established by the available facts; the
climatic future in IPCC Reports second, by the social communication tak-
ing place between scientists. The other side
The formal dimensions reveal a long-term of this uncertainty has a very well-known
climatic future, with precise temporary as- pedigree: it is measured based on numeric
signments, filled with numerous events and probabilities, differentiating between seven
participants, having a moderate vivacity intervals. Using these two measures of un-
and forming a complex set of potential futu- certainty, it is possible to collect all of the
res that are represented by multiple scena- available information, resulting in the com-
rios. In addition to these formal dimensions, plex task of assigning levels of reliability
it is necessary to add other practical-cogni- and/or probability to the assertions.
tive ones. They refer to knowledge, action, Projected over the future, it presents an
values, emotions and narrative (Table 2). uncertain climatic future which, as will be
The proposal is of a climatic future that is subsequently verified, is qualified by a high
knowable, can be acted on, and is valuable, degree of techno-scientific “colonization”.
emotional and describable, at distinct levels This permits a significant decrease in sub-
and modalities. Its implicit display in the stantial uncertainty, according to criteria of
IPCC Reports makes it even more specific. trust and/or probability.
Creating a catalog of future uncertainties
Table 2. Practical-cognitive dimensions of the future would be a tedious task. Therefore, three
variants (distinguished and highlighted) are
— Knowledge: certainty and uncertainty regarding sufficient to reveal the difficulties in estab-
the future.
— Action: from know-how to adapt and mitigate.
— Value: from risk to opportunity. 7 Regarding the Third Report, the reflections of Moss
— Emotion: from fear to confidence. and Schneider (2000); on the fourth, the methodological
— Narrative: imagined stories. notes on uncertainty (IPCC, 2005); for the Fifth Report,
the methodological notes of Mastrandrea et al. (2010),
Source: Ramos, 2017 and 2018a. whose recommendations are included in the drafting
of the Reports of the three WGs and are summarized in
the Glossary (IPCC, 2014c: Annex II-Glossary).
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118108 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
lishing future variations in temperature. The structures, laws, procedural regularities and
WG-I Report (IPCC, 2013: PF-1.1) distin- coincidences of the climatic system, and this
guishes between three types: uncertain- is not attributable to humans. Thus, it is cre-
ties resulting from the natural variability of ated only in part by actions (not even the en-
the climatic system and its chaotic evolu- tire set of manmade factors can fully explain
tion; the results of the varied trajectories or climatic variation). Furthermore, its creation
social-demo-economic-technological dy- does not adjust to the intentionality of the
namics and their unpredictable emissions stakeholders, since the future is open to par-
levels; finally, the response and model un- adoxical events, perverse effects and uncon-
certainties, the effect of the models used to trollable counter-performativities.
observe and project them. The uncertainty The future (or possible futures) requires
is intrinsic: it lies in the observed object, in action. And this need justifies the effort
the social system acting on and affected by being made to study and assess data in
it and in the observers that attempt to per- the Report creation. As the old positivist
ceive one and other, and which, interfering, motto says: knowledge is power. But at
create uncertainty with their own models. the same time, this relationship between
The IPCC opts to recognize the multiple what one knows and what one does (or
sides of uncertainty. It is true that it tends can/should do) poses greater challenges.
to identify this with a lack of provisional One of these is the connection between
knowledge, the collective result of a com- experts and policymakers, two commu-
plexity that cannot yet be modelled and that nities that have difficulties in reaching
will ultimately disappear if it continues. It is agreement. When the IPCC was created, it
not a structural or ontological uncertainty, seemed quite clear that the experts would
but rather, an observational and epistemo- propose what was scientifically possible
logical one, caused by complexity (IPCC, and the decision makers would offer ac-
2014a: A.3). This ignorance is recognized as tion plans and objectives to be achieved.
marginal and provisional. Suppositions are But this relationship has changed some-
not made with regard to a future that cannot what; in fact, some have assured that
be predicted or imagined, dominated mainly since the 2015 Paris Agreement, the roles
by an ignorance that cannot be eliminated. have been reversed (Beck and Mahony,
Therefore, the uncertain climatic future of 2017; Aykut, 2017; Geden, 2016). In the
the Reports is, in large part, a techno-scien- Fifth Report (see IPCC, 2013: SPM-3.4
tifically colonized future, that is, a de-futur- and Table SPM-1) it was declared that
ized future (Luhmann, 1976; Esposito, 2009) stabilizing the temperature at 1.5°C above
in which, in a forced manner, its uncertainty the preindustrial levels was a possibility
tends to be reduced to numeric or modelled contemplated in very few scenarios, with
probability (Wynne, 2010). limited probabilities and thus, one that
The climatic future filled with epistemic should be discarded. After 2015, the deci-
uncertainty is exposed to the “action”. Like sions adopted in Paris (art. 2.1.a) and the
the futures of modernity (Luhmann, 1976; invitation made to the IPCC8, this became
Hölscher, 2014), it is an open future. By a political objective that scientists have
open, this means that it is possible and nec- been forced to support, even though it is
essary to act to ensure its creation. This
openness does not embody humankind’s 8 Literally: “Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
dream of taking full ownership of the future. mate Change to provide a special Report in 2018 on
the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-in-
The climatic future has its own “factuality” dustrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emis-
(Adam and Groves, 2007), based on process sion pathways”.
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118Ramón Ramos Torre 109
an unprecedented change, assuming radi- risks” (ibid.: SPM-3.2), leading one to be-
cal reductions in emissions and the use of lieve that immediate and prioritized action
resources that are not widely accepted on should be taken to reduce or address these
a social level (see IPCC, 2018b: C). Now, risks, but without explicitly stating this. At
the IPCC experts must demonstrate not times, lost in this labyrinth of action, it falls
only why this scenario is preferable, but into the paradox of proposing what it ulti-
also what can and should be done to en- mately discards, such as when it appears
sure it. This is the logic behind the Special to promote the BECCS (bioenergy and cap-
Report on Global Warming of 2018. ture and storage of carbon dioxide) tech-
In any case, this action plan is un- nologies to mitigate CO2 volume, but then
clear and contradictory. Inevitably, calls assures that they are uncertain, associ-
to action are being made. This occurred ated with challenges and highly costly (ibid.:
upon realizing the huge risks being faced SPM-3.4).
(IPCC, 2014c: SPM-2.3) and when con- There is a dominant tone to the prose,
sidering the problems proposed by adap- graphs and figures in the Reports. It is al-
tation (ibid.: SPM-3.3) and the challenges ways a firm believer in soft reformism,
of the mitigation policies (ibid.: SPM-3.4). based on cooperation between subjects
Clearly, CC has “the characteristics of a that are naturally disposed to joining forces:
global collective action problem” (ibid.: local, regional, national, state and inter-
SPM-3.1) and it concludes with a catalog national powers; public policies as well as
of heterogeneous measures that reduce business decisions; governments and com-
vulnerability and exposure to CC, adapta- panies; avant-garde cities and indigenous
tion and even transformation (ibid.: Table
communities, etc.; all concerned about CC,
SPM-3) without prioritizing or calibrating
wishing to act and do so in the same sense,
the forms of support and/or resistance.
collectively.
But in the end, the proposals are poorly
defined, topical and lacking commitment. The “value” dimension is intrinsic to the
For example: future. Related to uncertainty and action,
it has its own specific characteristics. The
Effective decision-making to limit climate change value of the future has generated great con-
and its effects may be informed by a wide range
sideration and despair for humankind. In
of analytical approaches for evaluating expected
risks and benefits, recognizing the importance
the specific case of the Reports, this value
of governance, ethical dimensions, equity, value is situated in an intermediate point between
judgments, economic assessments and diverse the possibility of catastrophe and the best
perceptions and responses to risk and uncertainty of all possible worlds. For this, on the one
(IPCC, 2014c: SPM-3.1). hand, it shows the extent to which that
which is most highly valued is at risk and,
Is not all of this obvious? A catalog of
on the other hand, it assures that the adap-
topics? The IPCC takes refuge in the topic
tation and mitigation of CC can be success-
given its limited room for maneuver. In its
proposals, we find samples of avoidance fully achieved, building a world of sustaina-
and inhibition, as if promoting an apathetic ble and just development.
and contemplative science that is limited It is critical that risk be treated. Since
to listing what can or should be done and the 2007 Report, the IPCC has promoted
urges that actions to be taken, without ac- the presentation of CC in terms of risk. The
tually specifying the same. At times, hypoc- concept of risk has a complex semantic
risies are evident, such as when it estab- in social discourse, and in the social sci-
lishes a catalog of “especially concerning ences (Ramos and Callejo, 2018); this is
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118110 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
also the case in the Reports. In most cases, The future considered based on these
it is identified with a “potential for conse- values is one that is loaded with “emo-
quences where something of value is at tions”. It is impossible to read the Reports
stake and where the outcome is uncertain” with indifference, as a set of sterile texts
(IPCC, 2014a: SPM2 Glossary); when used, on the climate and its variations. Although
it is presented as the result of the interac- filled with somewhat dull prose, in line with
tion between vulnerability, exposure and the scientific-bureaucratic style, the texts
the danger (ibid.: Figure SPM8). are also filled with emotion. They transmit
The presentation of the climatic risks ap- concern. This concern refers to the scope
pearing in the Reports, especially in that of of what is taking place. And more so, it is
the WG-II, is extensive. On the one hand, a concern for what may occur in the future.
“key risks” are mentioned, classified as The screen of the future becomes a screen
such based on very heterogeneous expert of dread: increasing heat, melting arctic ice,
opinions (ibid.: B-1) that require special at- permafrost that releases methane, violent
tention. Five “causes of concern” are high- atmospheric phenomena, etc. The dread
lighted: threat on unique systems; extreme goes hand in hand with guilt, since what is
meteorological episodes; victimization of taking place is a product of human actions.
the most exposed and vulnerable collec- The emotional syndrome is harsh: concern,
tives; global impacts; unique episodes that fear, guilt. But it is not an apathetic and fa-
undergo abrupt and irreversible changes talistic catastrophism. This is perhaps due
(ibid.: box SPM.1). The risks share serious to the discursive strategy used, which ac-
threats, especially for the most exposed, knowledges that rampant fear and the an-
less resilient and more defenseless sectors. nouncement of a catastrophe will paralyze
The response to risks also permits the action; this perverse effect must be avoided
presentation of the values for the future glo- at all costs. But beyond this pragmatism is
bal society. The declaration overcomes the the independent nature of scientific prose
blurry and topical affirmations of climate which ensures distancing, balanced objec-
policies. Here, it is proclaimed that the fight tivity and the cautious reaffirmation of the
against climate change must be informed saying: knowledge is power, power to do,
by the value of “sustainable development to progress. Thus, the future of concern is
and equity, including poverty erradication” also one of confidence. How can you be
(IPCC, 2013: SPM-3.1). dragged along by the whirlwind of CC if you
Thus, the future is filled with values in are capable of understanding its causes
tension. It is identified, on the one hand, and what needs to be done to halt it? It is
with especially concerning risks, suggesting necessary to trust in others, in science and
a dystopia, faded, but still significant. On the in technology, in the planet’s capacity to re-
other hand, it is anticipated as a special op- sist. These are stacked strata of the confi-
portunity to create positive values: a lesser dence that exists in concern and its desta-
utopia of sustainable development and the bilizing emotions.
equity between populations. The synthesis The final dimension proposes the issue
between both of these suggests that the ap- of the “narrative”. The IPCC Reports are
propriate administration of future risks will not narratives that tell stories, but rather,
allow us to build a sustainable world that is they are techno-scientific reports that com-
kind and just; thus, threat becomes opportu- ply with their own discourse conventions
nity. It does not specify how to achieve this and establish events, relationships, regu-
objective, but merely states that it should be larities, projections and potential causes.
achieved, or would be desirable. They are limited to establishing a body of
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data and conjectures for the short, mid- and rising temperatures will drag us to-
dle and long term. But since they deal with wards dramatic events which will unleash
the future and the future is uncertain and it what has been covered up, hoisting hu-
is only possible to consider potential world mankind into a heap of misfortune. This is
scenarios, they ultimately present an imag- foreseen by the tragedy. The actor in these
ined and narrated future. Hulme (2009) and tales is disproportionate and blind: Pro-
Levy and Spicer (2013) already noted this, metheus and Oedipus, all in one. The future
as did the anthropologists that examined of CC is open to this type of narrative; in it,
climate-related mythology (Thompson and what may take place can be told. Does it do
Rayner, 1998). Beckert (2016) explored this so to achieve the cathartic effects that Aris-
shaping of the future in the field of econ- toteles attributed to the tragedy: the purg-
omy —beyond the deliriums of the rational ing of pain from the soul? This is one pos-
action models—. Jasanoff (2015) has also sible interpretation, but it is not the most
examined a similar phenomenon, consider- likely. Tragedy acts more as a warning; it
ing the relationships between science, tech- asks to be avoided. How can it be avoided?
nology and society, and proposing the rel- By allowing other versions to be available in
evance of the sociotechnical imaginaries order to describe what is anticipated. The
upon which future worlds are conceived. In tragicomedy is another possibility; it pro-
any event, the proposal suggests that we poses a tense history of harsh tests that are
cannot do without a future which may, in overcome until ultimately revealing a happy
some way, be waiting or in which we can ending.
position the events that may occur. To pop- The tragicomedy is dominant in the sto-
ulate this future, we cannot only rely on un- ries told about the imagined future. They
narrative science, with its proven data and prevent the tragic, thanks to the conver-
predictions, as if the world was forced to al- gence of a mild reformism and a humanity
ways be the same, God wouldn´t play dice, which, at the time of the decision, opts for
and what we now Know would allow us to consensus and avoids danger. The hope
predict what will take place. To act and live, that this will occur dominates how the cli-
it is necessary to use our imagination, fill- matic future is treated in the Reports. As
ing it with what we can only vaguely con- a comedy, it relies on full reconciliation,
jecture, with no assurances. This imagina- the renouncing of intransigence and egos,
tion is not an unleashed fantasy, as Beckert the acceptance of the right to live a full
correctly suggested, but rather, it is trained life for future generations, as compared to
by the day-by-day, saturated by the stories the short-term egoism of the current and
told individually and collectively, and by ex- already-aged generations, relying on the
periences. The narrative imagination resorts comic message (Frye, 1977).
implicitly to plots that are the framework of The other plot is more closely related
and give sense to the experience. Before to what Anglo Saxons refer to as the ro-
becoming sapiens, the homo species was mance (White, 1987). In this case, it tells a
narrans; so are the homines of the IPCC. story of overcoming successive tests un-
And by telling us what might occur, they til reaching an eventual victory and enter-
use plots that may be considered archetyp- ing a world of light. More than humanity, the
ical, recurrent and inclusive. protagonist of this achievement is technol-
The dispassionate tone of the Reports ogy, as Jasanoff suggested in his studies
is framed within an implicit history that may on the technological imaginarium. Technol-
be told as a tragedy (see Ramos, 2018b). ogy is that which will ultimately allow us to
There is every reason to believe that GHGs overcome these immense challenges, es-
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118112 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
pecially in terms of the current volume of What is the rationale behind this con-
accumulated greenhouse gas emissions, ception? The key lies in the institutional
with temperatures that are 1.0°C above structure of the IPCC and the network of
those of the reference period (1850-1900) relationships making it up; the first points
and with a desired stabilization at approxi- to consensus; the second, to impotence.
mately 1.5°C, with manageable and circum- The climatic future is a construct created
stantial excesses. This will be impossible, within this framework, and one that offers
on social and economic terms, unless new feedback to the same. Here, we refer to the
and daring BECCS technologies are cre- ideas of Vervoort and Gupta (2018).
ated, to ultimately remove the excess car- The IPCC is an institution created for con-
bon from the atmosphere. The difficulty of sensus. This consensus, without a doubt,
this challenge is the least of our problems. is a result of its origins (World Meteorologi-
Ultimately, only with these technological so- cal Organization, United Nations), but even
lutions can we imagine a future in which CC more so, its tasks. As a meta-scientific in-
is overcome. But there is another issue at stitution, it is not used in the creation of new
hand: this technology may actually increase knowledge, but rather, in the collection, or-
the harm that it aims to remedy. The man- dering and assessment of already available
agement of solar radiation, for example, “if scientific knowledge; it executes the detailed
it were deplayed, SRM would entail numer- cleaning process, from the many and dis-
ous uncertainties, sid effects, risks and has perse, to the unitary and agreed. The same
particular governance and ethical implica- occurs when considering its other outstand-
tions” (IPCC, 2014c: SPM-3.4). That which ing characteristics (Hulme, 2010): interdiscipli-
is intended to provide a positive final out- nary, internationality or intergovernability. As
come may, in fact, trigger tragedy. an interdisciplinary institution, it collects and
Ultimately, the imagined future does not assesses knowledge from distinct and vari-
respond in full to the orthodoxy of a typical ous fields, reducing this knowledge, by con-
plot. It is a combination of the sense of the sensus, to a common space in which it may
tragedy, the hope of the comedy and the be assembled. As an international institution,
dreaminess of the civilized romance. Many it gathers and brings together experts from
stories may be told all of which have virtu- diverse countries and research institutions,
ally identical plots. reconciling and integrating their disparate lo-
cal trajectories; only on very rare occasions is
agreement reached that is not based on con-
Consensus, impotence and climatic future sensus. Similarly, as an intergovernmental in-
stitution, representatives of distinct countries
The IPCC Reports present a highly infor- argue, contrast and agree by consensus to
mative vision of the future (profound, timed, the expert reports, which are read, discussed
dense, colored), that is structured around and approved on a line-by-line basis (Kouw
a variety of potential scenarios, open to and Petersen, 2018). And, in addition, this in-
knowledge, although having provisio- stitution is devoted to consensus as a hybrid
nal shadows of doubt, adapted to bypass and boundary institution (Beck and Mahony,
the worst contingencies. It is a risky vision 2018a), coordinating and uniting the knowl-
which, although filled with concern, has a edge of scientific experts on climate and of
happy ending and it lacks a definitive na- the representatives of countries that should
rrative plot, although it appears to be of the approve their proposals; two very distinct
tragicomedy genre. It is the climatic future worlds, brought together, that should agree
in the reformist variant. on and build a consensual world.
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Clearly, the true functioning of the insti- transaction dominates. It is the intermediary
tution is quite distinct, in many points of this point, generic, topical and unspecific, mel-
portrait. It is well known that the IPCC does low, ambivalent, at times, ambiguous and
not consider, order or assess all of the sci- nonspecific; without these characteristics,
ence related to the climate, but rather, the consensus would be problematic, since
most official of this knowledge (IAC, 2010; agreement can only be reached in a rough
Sluijs, Est y Riphagen, 2010), and, despite and unfinished space that does not belong
its programmatic intentions, experts from to anyone and is open to all. Therefore, the
the northern hemisphere have a greater dramatic, categorical, intermittent, daring,
presence (Miller, 2004). Furthermore, its strange, conflictive and discordant disap-
multidisciplinary nature is limited, since cer- pear.
tain hard sciences clearly prevail. And in The means of consensus creates this
the social sciences, the more mathemati- conception of the climate system and its
cal and formalized ones, such as econom- changes. This objective was not present,
ics, take precedence (Corbera et al., 2016). before the eyes of the participants, wait-
On the other hand, not all of the parties in- ing to be named. It was created back in the
volved have the same weight and autonomy eighties, when the climate, far from being
in the final discussion and approval of the conceived as the sum of local and regional
texts. And, it is clear that in the headquar- weather, was initially conceived and mod-
ters of this hybrid institution, science offers elled (with new, more powerful computers)
the language and persuasive rhetoric, but as a global system and, furthermore, one
politics determines the limits of what can that was at risk. This idea was outlined be-
and should be done, as well as what can fore the creation of the IPCC, but clearly,
be said. It could not be otherwise, given the once created, this institution was estab-
clear limits of the proposals: “policy-rele- lished for the purpose of attention, study
vant and yet policy-neutral, never policy- and debate (Miller, 2004). CC and the IPCC
prescriptive”9. So how can there be compli- come together in a dynamic of mutual feed-
ance with a program like this, when a yes is back. And within this framework, the cli-
almost a no? By feigning a consensus that matic future is also shaped.
is comfortable, reserved and subordinate.
The climatic future of the IPCC is fruit
With all of its imperfections, the institu- of the consensus that dominates its institu-
tion is solid and strict in its duty to create tional communication. This creates a series
consensus. As it is in its recognition (VV. AA., of consequences that are clearly ambiva-
2010), despite the harsh resistance offered lent: this has advantages and disadvan-
by denialism (Oreskes and Conway, 2018; tages. These are in line with the form of
Freudenburg and Muselli, 2013; De Pryck consensus for the recurrent future projec-
and Gemenne, 2017) and certain dramatic tions which tend to be generic, unspecific,
crises, such as that of the so-called Clim- lacking commitment, and adjusting to the
agate in 2009 (Curry, 2010; Hulme, 2010; expectations and desires of many (Victor,
Jasanoff, 2010b; Sluijs, 2012; Beck, 2012). 2015). The information provided on the cli-
It is an institution of consensus that receives matic future tends to be “digestible and
consensus. manageable” (Wynne, 2010: 297). This facil-
This type of consensus forms the basis itates its agreement with the common top-
of the institution’s communication. Here, ics of an ongoing, mild-mannered, gradual
and reliable process. Furthermore, in de-
9 In: https://archive.ipcc.ch/organization/organization. fining its scenarios, and despite its multi-
shtml plicity, unpleasant surprises, turning points
Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. N.º 176, October - December 2021, pp. 101-118114 The Climatic Future of the IPCC: A Sociological Approach
or wild cards are not even considered (Ebi concerned with considering and achiev-
et al. 2014). On the other hand, the reports ing consensus amongst nonprofessionals.
favor the well-known and promote consen- There is little interest in the idea of post-
sus or broad majorities, marginalizing mi- normal, democratized science in the IPCC
nority positions that are more innovative Reports (Sluijs, 2012).
and daring (Sluijs, 2012; IAC, 2010; Zajko, In this point, we consider the IPCC’s ex-
2015). Uncertainty is considered solely in ternal relationships with its two potential us-
its exclusively epistemic variant and limited ers: laypersons and policymakers. Layper-
space is offered to the recognition of igno- sons must be convinced to set aside their
rance and indetermination for the observed indifference. To do so, it is necessary to fo-
and specified processes. Thus, the resulting cus on concern and the recognition of CC
lack of certainty in the face of such uncon- as an actual problem. This is not an easy
trolled space-times (global, centuries later), task. Everything seems to suggest that the
such as those of CC (Curry, 2011), are es- IPCC, despite its communicative efforts, is
sentially hidden. impotent in this area. For distinct reasons,
All of this permits a presentation of CC laypersons cannot be convinced and they
within a scenario that is more certain than it continue to be trapped in their own lack
should be, without discontinuities or “black of concern (IPCC, 2016; Lucas and Davi-
swans”; it is a concerning scenario but a son, 2018; Corner, Ezra y Pigdeon, 2014;
de-dramatized one, open to adaptation and Brulle and Norgaard, 2019). And policymak-
mitigation, based on a mild reformism that ers must also be convinced in order for the
relies on the good intentions of humankind. IPCC’s work to be meaningful. But once
Consensual knowledge is paired with con- again, this is a seemingly impossible task,
sensual action. since the conferences held between parties
Ultimately, this unfolds in an institu- tend to turn deaf ears on the IPCC, trivializ-
tional discourse that is filled with too many ing CC and remaining in what Dahan (2016)
creases to be reduced to a simple im- referred to as a “schism of reality”, a world
age. The IPCC de-territorializes and gen- in which there is no relationship or interfer-
eralizes CC, separating it from the specific ence between what the wise say and the
or local spaces that exist in the every- decision makers do. In both cases, impo-
day human experience (Jasanoff, 2010a). tence dominates.
Knowledge of these characteristics is re- To conclude, when institutional consen-
served for de-territorialized specialists; sus combines with relational impotence, the
therefore, it sounds odd, even when trans- conditions give way to a reformist approach
lated into common language, as if it were to CC with regard to the climatic future. Ul-
from a world that is not intended for non- timately, institutional practices will create
professionals. This is in line with the im- and sustain worlds.
plicit theory of the knowledge deficit (non-
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