TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO ORGANIZED CRIME - MSI
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TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO ORGANIZED CRIME January 2021 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was written by Phyllis Dininio, Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company, under contract AID-OAA-I-13-00042 / 7200AA18F00017. DISCLAIMER: The authors’ views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Introduction
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank many individuals for their contributions to this technical guidance. The research
would not have been possible without the leadership of Brooke Stearns Lawson, with the of United States
Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Bureau for Africa, who guided all aspects of the research,
par ticipated in the interviews, and provided feedback on the analysis and drafting. She is also grateful to Alex-
andra Kane of USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Center for her par ticipation in the inter-
views and to the USAID Technical Advisory Group for their guidance on the research. She also wants to thank
the many colleagues, who par ticipated in interviews and provided comments on the draft including USAID staff
from the DRC Mission, Guatemala Mission, Regional Development Mission for Asia, and Washington as well
as implementing par tner staff from African Parks, Checchi and Company Consulting, Chemonics International,
Counterpar t International, DAI Global, Global Communities, International Foundation for Electoral Systems,
International Republican Institute, IMA World Health, Invisible Children, Mercy Corps, Management Systems
International (MSI), National Democratic Institute, Pact, El Refugio de la Niñez, RTI International, Tetra Tech, Wil-
derness Conservation Society, Winrock International, and World Vision. The author also appreciates the con-
tributions of the roundtable par ticipants and her colleagues at MSI: Sean Williams, David Mauer, Brian Calhoon,
Adam Bloom, Jacob Milley, and Laurel Bradley.
ii
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Introduction
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................................................. ii
ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................ v
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................... 1
Organized Crime as a Development Challenge................................................................................... 1
Organized Crime Characteristics......................................................................................................... 2
Methodology Used and Limitations ..................................................................................................... 3
USAID ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAMMING ....................................................................................... 5
Core and Contextual Programming. . .................................................................................................... 5
Sector Trends at USAID........................................................................................................................ 6
Regional Patterns at USAID.................................................................................................................. 7
LESSONS LEARNED ACROSS TYPES OF ORGANIZED CRIME. . ........................................................... 10
ANALYSIS. . ............................................................................................................................................ 10
Lesson 1: Political economy analysis can help navigate power dynamics to advance reforms.. . ......................... 10
Lesson 2: Government complicity in or opposition to organized crime shapes reform strategies. . . .................... 11
STRATEGIC APPROACHES................................................................................................................. 13
Lesson 3: Addressing both incentives and risks is critical. ........................................................................... 13
Lesson 4: Social and behavior change efforts can help prevent and counter illicit activity................................ 15
Lesson 5: Interventions benefit from targeting.. . ........................................................................................ 17
Lesson 6: Specialized tools and knowledge in law enforcement, prosecutors’ units, and courts strengthen the
adjudication of organized crime.. . ........................................................................................................... 18
Lesson 7: Investigative work spurs law enforcement action and broader reform............................................. 19
Lesson 8: Programming needs to occur at multiple levels. .......................................................................... 21
Lesson 9: In some contexts, interventions may call for a sequenced approach... ............................................. 22
Lesson 10: Less sensitive programming areas may create entry points for addressing organized crime... ............ 23
Lesson 11: Embedding advisors in organizations can build capacity and foster relationships. .......................... 24
Lesson 12: Technology can support counter-crime efforts in novel ways. ...................................................... 25
Lesson 13: Alternative livelihoods need to be tailored to local preferences and contexts.................................. 26
Lesson 14: Coordinating counter-crime efforts across a Mission’s portfolio may improve results....................... 27
iii
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Introduction
EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS................................................................................................................ 28
Lesson 15: Collaboration improves program effectiveness. ......................................................................... 28
Lesson 16: Communities are a key partner in the fight against organized crime............................................. 31
Lesson 17: The private sector is a key development partner. ...................................................................... 32
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................ 33
ANNEX I: TYPES AND NUMBER OF CORE PROJECTS. . ........................................................................ 34
ANNEX II: CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY............................................................................................ 37
Asia........................................................................................................................................................ 37
DRC....................................................................................................................................................... 37
Guatemala. . ............................................................................................................................................ 37
ANNEX III: ADDITIONAL RESOURCES................................................................................................... 38
Organized Crime White Papers............................................................................................................ 38
Other USAID Resources....................................................................................................................... 38
Selected Bibliography............................................................................................................................ 38
iv
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime
ACRONYMS
ACDS ASEAN Catch Documentation Scheme kWh Kilowatt hour
AOR Agreement Officer’s Representative LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations LGBTI Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex
C-TIP Counter-trafficking in persons
MSI Management Systems International
CARPE Central Africa Regional Program for
the Environment NGO Non-governmental organization
COP Chief of Party OCCRP Organized Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project
COR Contracting Officer’s Representative
PEA Political economy analysis
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
SIGAR Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction
eCDT Electronic Catch Documentation and
Traceability
SMART Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool
FPIC Free, prior, and informed consent
TIP Trafficking in persons
GIATOC Global Initiative against Transnational
Organized Crime UNTOC United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime
IJM International Justice Mission
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs
v
INTRODUCTION
The United States Agency for International Develop- governance staff and conflict and violence prevention
ment’s (USAID) Bureau for Africa initiated research staff working to address trafficking in persons (TIP), mi-
in 2018 on the development response to organized grant smuggling, and gang-related crime and violence as
crime.1 The resulting technical guidance aims to help US- well as corruption, impunity, and governance challenges
AID, other development actors, and other U.S. Govern- in crime-affected contexts. The lessons and recommen-
ment personnel design and implement more effective dations support stand-alone programming in each of
interventions to counter organized crime. these sectors and possible coordination across multiple
sectors.
Rather than treating illicit activities discreetly, this
guidance treats them as a whole and offers lessons The guidance is organized into four sections. The
and recommendations that may support multiple introductory section lays out the development chal-
programming areas. While lessons included in the lenge posed by organized crime, the characteristics of
guidance may arise from a particular sector, they apply organized crime, and the research methodology. The
more broadly across all sectors. Therefore, the intended second section describes USAID programming trends in
audience is wide-ranging: environmental staff working organized crime. The third section offers lessons learned
to address wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, and illegal and recommendations. Finally, the concluding section
fishing; economic growth staff working to address illegal summarizes the research. The annexes contain a table of
mining, drug cultivation, and illicit finance; and health staff USAID core organized projects by country, the meth-
working to address counterfeit pharmaceuticals. The odology used for the three case studies, and a list of
audience also includes democracy, human rights, and additional resources and selected references.
ORGANIZED CRIME AS A DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE
Organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, in fragile states with weak institutions, but the damages
scope, and influence in the 21st century. Deregulation extend to fragile and developed states alike. Subsequent
and improved infrastructure have facilitated the move- World Development Reports have analyzed linkages
ment of both illicit and licit goods across the globe, and between organized crime and specific development
technological advances, such as the Internet and cell topics, including gender equality; jobs; risk management;
phones, have facilitated communications within criminal mind, society, and behavior; digital dividends; governance
networks. Organized crime generates trillions of dollars and law; and education. Recognizing the salience of the
in revenues every year, dwarfing legitimate markets in issue, the U.S. Government identified transnational or-
some regions. 2 ganized crime as a threat to national security in its 2017
National Security Strategy.
The World Development Report 2011 helped focus
international attention on organized crime as a threat to
development.3 It stressed that organized crime thrives
1 The initial research focus on strengthening rule of law approaches to address organized crime expanded to consider development responses more broadly.
2 World Economic Forum, State of the Illicit Economy Briefing Papers (Cologny: World Economic Forum, 2015), 3-6, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_State_of_the_Illicit_
Economy_2015_2.pdf.
3 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (Washington: World Bank, 2011), 2, https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8439-8.
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Introduction
Organized crime poses challenges to many aspects of development. Namely, organized crime:
■ Corrodes public institutions, democratic process- or gang warfare; and competition with counterfeit,
es, and the rule of law through the co-option or illegal, or unregulated products. Organized crime may
complicity of public officials, including political leaders, also contribute to broader market distortions (e.g.,
police, prosecutors, judges, and border guards. For the Dutch disease where inflows of illicit profits may
example, criminal proceeds can distort political pro- inflate the currency and make legitimate exports less
cesses by funding campaigns, buying votes, or financ- competitive).
ing political thuggery. Similarly, criminal manipulation
of justice and security systems can erode public faith ■ Harms communities and individuals through the rav-
in these institutions and popular legitimacy of the ages of human trafficking, problematic substance use,
government as a whole. and ineffective medicines, among other harms.
■ Chills participation in civil society organizations and ■ Exploits and further entrenches gender and other
political processes and deters investigative journal- social inequalities. For example, lesbian, gay, bisexual,
ism because of attacks that crime groups perpetrate transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons, women,
against activists. and girls may be at a heightened risk of sex traffick-
ing and forced prostitution due to their lack of eco-
■ Fuels conflict and instability through funding non- nomic opportunity and protections. Youth may also
state armed groups—such as the Unity and Jihad be at a heightened risk of forced recruitment into
Movement in West Africa and the Taliban in Afghan- criminal armed groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance
istan—and through violent competition among rival Army of central Africa and the Revolutionary Armed
crime groups, such as drug cartels in Mexico or com- Forces of Colombia.
peting drug rings in Guinea Bissau, which allegedly
led to the double assassinations of the President and ■ Threatens endangered species and damages eco-
the Chief of Defense Staff in 2009. systems through wildlife trafficking and illegal and
unregulated logging, fishing, and mining.
■ Increases business risks through extortion, piracy, or
kidnapping carried out against business operations
and staff; high levels of violence arising from cartel
ORGANIZED CRIME CHARACTERISTICS
USAID follows the definition of organized crime agreed thereby including the domestic provision of illicit goods
to in the 2000 United Nations Convention against and services, extortion, corruption, and other organized
Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC).4 The conven- crimes that may not involve a transnational dimension.
tion defines organized crime as taking place when three
or more people operate in a structured or networked Organized crime falls into two primary categories: the
way to repeatedly execute or commission serious crime provision of illicit goods and services as well as pre-
for profit.5 While the convention focuses on transna- dation (Figure 1). In the first category, criminal groups
tional organized crime, USAID and other development provide illegal goods and services to paying customers.
organizations focus on organized crime more broadly, They provide illegal goods, such as cocaine, rhino horns,
4 “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto,” adopted November 15, 2000, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Online: 5, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.
5 UNTOC defines serious crimes as crimes that carry a maximum sentence of at least four years' incarceration. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime
(GIATOC) instead defines serious crimes as crimes that have a significant impact. See GIATOC, Organized Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable Development (Geneva:
GIATOC, 2015), 5, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/global-initiative-organized-crime-as-a-cross-cutting-threat-to-development-january-2015.pdf.
2
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Introduction
and firearms, or illegal services, such as commercial sex, use violence to ransom ships or individuals and stealth
bonded labor, facilitation of migration routes, and money to appropriate identities and information through the
laundering. They also provide otherwise legal goods Internet. With public officials, they offer bribes, often
illegally, offering lower prices because their goods are backed by the threat of violence, to secure contracts,
unregulated, counterfeit, stolen, or smuggled to avoid concessions, and land or to manipulate government
taxes and tariffs. processes to their advantage (e.g., evade regulations or
prosecution). The corruption of public officials may con-
In the second category, criminal groups prey upon or- stitute a crime group’s main activity or support a crime
ganizations or individuals to extract payments. They use group’s other activities.
intimidation and threats to extort protection payments
from business owners, workers, or individuals. They
Figure 1.Types of Organized Crime
METHODOLOGY USED AND LIMITATIONS
This technical guidance results from a two-year effort to Mission for Asia. The research benefited from 43 inter-
learn from USAID programming to address organized views with more than 100 staff members from USAID/
crime as well as the research and initiatives directed by Washington,6 Missions, and implementing partners.
academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
businesses, governments, and other donors. It draws Using the construct of organized crime described
from a literature review; five roundtables and corre- above, the guidance cuts across sectors that are often
sponding white papers; a catalogue of USAID organized siloed. It examines innovations and lessons from mul-
crime-related programming; a review of relevant USAID tiple program areas to distill insights about how and
program reports and evaluations; interviews with key why interventions work or fail to work, as well as how
stakeholders engaged in countering organized crime; to better tailor them to a specific context to achieve
and virtual case studies of USAID programming man- the intended outcomes. It highlights innovations and
aged by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lessons that are transferable across sectors as well as
Mission, Guatemala Mission, and Regional Development how and when coordination across related programs
can strengthen their impact. It also considers how these
interventions need to respond to the vulnerabilities
6 Bureaus for Africa; Asia; Conflict Prevention and Stabilization; Democracy, Development and Innovation; and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
3Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Introduction
of marginalized groups, including Indigenous Peoples, research. It also does not provide an in-depth source
women, youth, people with disabilities, LGBTI persons, of programming guidance for specific sectors. Rather, it
and ethnic and religious minorities. provides guidance for USAID based on program expe-
riences and research to date across different types of
Given the nascent state of research on development re- organized crime and development sectors in the hopes
sponses to organized crime, the guidance has limitations. of improving the impact of programming in this critical
It does not benefit from knowledge produced through area.
randomized controlled trials or similarly rigorous
42 USAID ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAMMING CORE AND CONTEXTUAL PROGRAMMING USAID funds a range of interventions that counter in crime-affected contexts but may also address other organized crime. Core programming focuses specifical- issues. Figure 2 shows the main core and contextual ly on organized criminal activities whereas contextual programming that address organized crime at USAID.7 programming addresses organized criminal activities Figure 2. Core and Contextual Programming at USAID 7 As civil society initiatives are often part of the programming in all core and contextual sectors listed here, they are not captured in a separate category.
Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime USAID Organized Crime Programming
SECTOR TRENDS AT USAID
The research team developed a catalogue of USAID may address the encroachment of pastoralists on nature
programming from 2014 to spring 2020. The team reserves and destructive hunting policies as well as wild-
included projects identified by previous cataloguing life trafficking. For this reason, it is difficult to determine
efforts,8 a search of all USAID Mission websites, search- funding directed to organized crime by sector.
es on the Development Experience Clearinghouse, and
interviews or emails with USAID staff. The cataloguing effort shows areas of emphasis in US-
AID programming. In terms of the number of projects,
The effort yielded a total of 298 projects. Most of the Figure 3 shows that wildlife crime and TIP9 interventions
core projects are principally focused on organized are the dominant core programming sectors. However,
crime, but some, notably those in the wildlife crime, drug trafficking has been another focus area in terms of
other conservation crimes, and counterfeit pharma- funding, as USAID has funded a few very large projects
ceutical sectors, are more broadly focused with only a to address drug cultivation in Afghanistan, Colombia, and
portion of a project’s funds directed to organized crime. Peru, with an average size of $67 million.
For example, an environmental conservation project
Figure 3. Core Organized Crime Projects, Count by Sector 10
In terms of contextual programming, crime and violence Security Initiative, and Mérida Initiative, which started to
prevention has by far the largest number of projects decline in 2017. The number of projects in other sectors
(Figure 4). This reflects funding through the Central has been lower and fairly stable.
America Regional Security Initiative, Caribbean Basin
8 The most relevant effort was reporting to the U.S. Council on Transnational Organized Crime in spring 2018 as mandated by Executive Order 13773, but USAID databases and
program reviews on specific sectors provided further information.
9 TIP involves the recruitment, transportation, or receipt of persons through the use of force, fraud, or abuse of power for the purpose of exploitation. This includes child labor
and child soldiers.
10 This figure counts all projects that were active--and not just projects that were initiated--in a given year.
6Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime USAID Organized Crime Programming
Figure 4. Contextual Organized Crime Projects, Count by Sector
REGIONAL PATTERNS AT USAID
The cataloguing effort highlights regional patterns in US- Europe and Eurasia, and Middle East and North Africa
AID programming (Figure 5). In terms of core program- have far fewer projects. Regarding contextual projects,
ming, Africa and Asia have similar numbers of projects the LAC region has significantly more projects than the
whereas Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), other regions.
Figure 5. Core and Contextual Programming by Region, Count of Projects CORE
Trafficking in Persons
Wildlife Crime
Other Environmental Crimes
Drug Trafficking
Illicit Finance
Counterfeit Phamaceuticals
CONTEXTUAL
Crime & Violence
Rule of Law
Anti-corruption
Investigative Journalism
Local Governance
Electoral Governance
7Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime USAID Organized Crime Programming
The dominant core sectors differ for each region. In Regional patterns also emerge within each sector. Com-
sub-Saharan Africa, wildlife crime, TIP, and other conser- bating wildlife trafficking programming is concentrated
vation crimes are the dominant core sectors, whereas in in Africa and Asia but still present in LAC. Counter-traf-
Asia, TIP, wildlife crime, and drug trafficking are dominant. ficking in persons (C-TIP) projects are concentrated in
In LAC, drug trafficking and other conservation crimes Asia, Africa, and LAC. Projects that address other con-
are dominant, and in Europe and Eurasia, TIP is domi- servation crimes are concentrated in LAC and Africa.
nant. Efforts to counter drug trafficking are concentrated in
Asia and LAC.
The dominant contextual sectors also differ for each
region. In LAC, crime and violence prevention has the USAID’s organized crime programming has tended
most projects. In the other regions, crime and violence to cluster in countries (Figure 6). During this five-year
prevention as a sector does not exists, and the rule of period, ten countries had four or more core organized
law sector is larger than other sectors in contextual crime projects.11 This likely reflects available program
programming. funding and priorities within bureaus and Missions as
well as the geographic concentration of organized
crime.
11 This list includes Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, DRC, Guatemala, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, and the Philippines.
8Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime USAID Organized Crime Programming
Figure 6. Location of Core Projects
93
LESSONS LEARNED ACROSS TYPES
OF ORGANIZED CRIME
The following section lays out lessons learned in three categories: analysis, strategic approaches, and effective partnerships.
ANALYSIS
The research identified two overarching lessons on the importance of analysis to guide interventions.
Lesson 1: Political economy analysis can help By looking at these dynamics among key actors, PEA
navigate power dynamics to advance reforms. can suggest possible pathways and entry points for
countering crime. The analysis asks who has an interest
in change, who has an interest in preserving the status
Political economy analysis (PEA) recognizes that power quo, and what drives these interests. This understanding
dynamics shape reform trajectories. Politically informed can help identify strategies that strengthen supporters,
approaches to reform aim for a “best fit” based on what weaken opponents, and bring opponents on board. PEA
is politically feasible and technically sound. Given the should also consider gender and other social dynamics
government complicity that often accompanies orga- that may create different barriers and opportunities
nized crime, this approach is critical for addressing it. among actors and provide different perspectives on the
Ongoing PEA can help to operationalize the process of operation and impact of organized crime. Thus, stand-
thinking and working politically. PEA examines the inter- alone PEAs or the integration of PEA into sectoral
ests and resources of key actors and how they influence assessments can help guide projects both initially and on
reform efforts. PEA looks at informal and formal institu- an ongoing basis.
tions as well as power dynamics. Applying PEA to orga- PEAs can also help catalyze broader reform. In the
nized crime entails understanding the linkages between Central African Republic, a study of diamond smuggling
criminal, private sector, and political actors (which are conducted by USAID’s Artisanal Mining and Property
not mutually exclusive) and the social structures within Rights project has had a significant impact on reform
which they operate, including social and gender norms, prospects. Using a PEA lens, the study clarified the
discrimination, and stigma. This also entails understanding excessive burdens of the formal systems for exporting
how crime groups are linked to or competing against diamonds (e.g., the Kimberley Process), the alternative
other criminal structures. Rather than treating crime trust networks that developed in the wake of the 2013
groups as outside social structures, PEA looks at the crisis, and patron-client relationships in government that
social, political, and economic embeddedness of criminal sustain diamond smuggling. Whereas some government
networks. This includes examining the incentives and officials opposed the study’s release, others recognized
risks that shape actors’ engagement in organized crime. how much the country was losing to neighboring Cam-
Economic opportunities, the functioning of the state, eroon from the illicit trade and supported the opening
social relations, and social norms are some factors that for reform. After more than a year of discussions and
influence that engagement. advocacy, the government approved the public release
of the PEA report and turned the PEA recommenda-
tions into an action plan for reforming the diamond
sector.12
12 Chief of Party (COP) and Advisor of the Artisanal Mining and Property Rights project, in discussion with the author, June 22, 2020.Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
Recommendation 1: Use a PEA lens to think and work politically and help guide
counter-crime interventions.
Guiding questions: Who has an interest in countering crime? Who has an interest in preserving
the status quo? What drives these interests? What resources do they have to influence
counter-crime efforts? How can interventions help strengthen supporters and weaken
opponents?
Lesson 2: Government complicity in or high profits make big bribes more affordable. For senior
opposition to organized crime shapes reform officials, high profits in illicit markets represent a notable
source of wealth and power in the country, which they
strategies.13 may seek to tap. This is especially true where there are
fewer opportunities for making money in the formal
In many countries where USAID works, governments economy.
are complicit in organized crime. The extent of com-
plicity is largely determined by the quality of governing The case studies conducted to inform this technical
institutions, especially the rule of law. When the rule of guidance underscore this phenomenon. In eastern
law is weak, criminal organizations are more likely to DRC, many mines are controlled by armed groups with
offer bribes and officials are more likely to accept them the involvement of the army, police, local or provincial
or engage in criminal activities themselves, since they authorities, village chiefs, local members of parliament,
perceive the risk of doing so to be low. When the rule and the family of former President Kabila.14 The Gua-
of law is strong, criminal organizations are less likely to temala case study similarly highlighted government
engage directly with officials. complicity in organized crime. One interviewee noted,
“We see criminal groups becoming more embedded in
The degree of criminal infiltration also reflects the scale the political system. In the past, political candidates were
and scope of the criminal activity. As criminal activities businesspeople, and narcos gave the money under the
become more visible and complex, it becomes nec- table. Now, the mayor is directly involved in the narco
essary to co-opt higher levels of the state, essentially business.”15 Strategies for tackling government complicity
moving from low-level bribery of customs or law en- depend on the extent of the complicity and the opposi-
forcement officials to higher-level officials. tion to crime16 at different levels of government. Figure
7 shows four scenarios for reform.17
Higher-level complicity is also more likely where illicit
money is concentrated in fewer hands and represents
a greater share of national income. For crime groups,
13 For more on government complicity, see Phyllis Dininio, Government Complicity in Organized Crime – White Paper 2 (Washington: USAID, Bureau for Africa, 2019), https://
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TSH2.pdf.
14 Michael Kavanagh,Thomas Wilson, and Franz Wild,“With His Family’s Fortune at Stake, President Kabila Digs In,” Bloomberg News, December 15, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/features/2016-12-15/with-his-family-fortune-at-stake-congo-president-kabila-digs-in; and International Peace Information Service, “Analysis of the interactive map of
artisanal mining areas in eastern DR Congo: 2015 update,” Antwerp, October 2016, https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Analysis-and-map-artisanal-mining-DR-
Congo_v005-1.pdf.
15 Agreement Officer’s Representative (AOR) of the Electoral Governance and Reforms project, in discussion with the author, April 27, 2020.
16 The scenarios provide a heuristic device to distill the primary factors influencing reform strategies. For government opposition to organized crime, they consider only the
opposition of high-level officials. Opposition of low-level officials may have some influence on reform strategies, but decidedly less than that of high-level officials.
17 These scenarios were originally presented in Brooke Stearns Lawson and Phyllis Dininio, The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide.
Washington, DC: USAID, 2013.
11Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
Figure 7. Four Scenarios for Tackling Government Complicity
GOVE RNME NT COMPLICITY
Low-level Officials High-level Officials
Strong:
GOVE RNM E NT
Best scenario for direct Direct interventions possible but
OPPO SIT IO N
High-level officials oppose interventions potentially destabilizing
organized crime
Weak: Direct interventions most
Relatively few high-level officials effective when combined with Direct intervention not advisable
oppose organized crime increased political pressure
The best scenario is found in the top left box, where The second-worst scenario is found in the top right
complicity is confined to low-level officials, and high-lev- box, where some high-level officials are complicit and
el officials oppose organized crime. The box is shaded some oppose organized crime. Reforms are possible but
green to suggest that an array of initiatives can support may face strong backlash, and careful analysis of stake-
anti-crime efforts. holder interests and resources is necessary to identify
possible entry points.
The next best scenario is found in the bottom left box,
where complicity is confined to low-level officials, but The worst scenario is found in the bottom right box,
opposition to crime is weak. Mobilizing political pressure where high-level officials are complicit and relatively few
for reform may provide the best lever for advancing an high-level officials oppose organized crime. Direct inter-
anti-crime agenda in this scenario. ventions with government are not advisable, although
support for civil society and international advocacy may
be warranted.
Recommendation 2: In high-crime contexts, recognize that government complicity is
likely and assess scenarios for reform.
Guiding questions: Does organized crime represent a significant share of national income? Are
specific criminal markets particularly lucrative and concentrated in fewer hands? Are high-
level officials complicit in organized crime? Is there any high-level opposition to organized
crime in government?
12Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
STRATEGIC APPROACHES
The research identified a number of lessons on strategic approaches to counter organized crime.
Lesson 3: Addressing both incentives and risks labor. For some of these efforts, development practi-
is critical. tioners have joined a growing number of consumers,
investors, activists, policymakers, and corporations to
call for supply chains that are “clean”—that is, free from
Across criminal markets, incentives and risks shape who unethical or illicit activity, such as child or forced labor,
is likely to engage in organized crime for those both human smuggling or trafficking, armed conflict financing,
inside and outside of government. Incentives include or illicit production or smuggling of goods. Development
limited opportunities in licit markets and a lack of public support for clean supply chains ranges from traceability
services that create a push toward illicit activity as well and certification schemes to customs regulations and
as the lure of increased wealth and status that create operations.
a pull toward illicit activity. Identities, social and gender
norms, hierarchies, and insecurity may also play a role, In addition to these preventive efforts, development
and criminal networks may exploit these dynamics, programs aim to increase the risks of engaging in
such as toxic masculinity or gender inequities, to re- criminal behavior by supporting justice systems. They
cruit members, but need and greed are often primary strengthen laws on criminal activities and the capacity
motivations for participating in crime groups. Balanced of police, prosecutors, and judges to enforce the law,
against these incentives are the risks of engaging in crim- drawing on such tools as surveillance, undercover police,
inal behavior, which include imprisonment, fines, asset informants, witness protection, and asset seizures to
seizures, debarment, visa sanctions, violence, and a loss conduct investigations and prosecute crimes. Judicial
of standing in one’s community. strengthening efforts may also include support for com-
munity policing, crime observatories, and the oversight
A range of development interventions aim to reduce of justice systems.
the incentives for engaging in criminal activity and there-
by prevent it from happening. They seek to reduce the In many cases, efforts to increase the risks of engaging
push factors for engaging in crime by supporting alter- in criminal behavior also need to address corruption.
native livelihoods, education, health services, recreational While weak justice institutions may reflect capacity
activities, psychosocial services, civil rights protections, deficits, they may also reflect complicit governments
social and gender norm changes, and professionaliza- that deliberately starve offices of funds, interfere with
tion within the public sector. In addition, development meritocratic staffing, or limit the power of laws and
assistance supports the community co-management of prosecutorial tools. Addressing state complicity in orga-
natural resources, such as forests, hunting preserves, and nized crime requires efforts to strengthen accountability
mineral resources, as well as the formalization of land in government through enhanced anti-corruption laws,
titles, resource rights, and labor rights to enable commu- increased transparency, and strengthened checks and
nity members to benefit from licit activities. balances as well as social oversight, awareness raising,
advocacy, investigative journalism, and other civil society
Other programs aim to reduce the pull factors for en- initiatives.
gaging in organized crime by shrinking criminal markets.
They strive to decrease demand for illicit goods and Practitioners use these varied prevention and prosecu-
services through social and behavior change commu- tion approaches across criminal markets. In general, a
nication campaigns and advocacy for more stringent diverse array of prosecution approaches applies to all
laws. Efforts typically focus on specific illicit goods or criminal markets, whereas specific prevention approach-
services, such as rhino horns, conflict minerals, or forced es apply to many but not all criminal markets (Figure 8).
13Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
Figure 8. Programming Approaches to Counter Organized Crime
✓ indicates where programming could be applied.
Other
Wildlife Trafficking Counterfeit Drug Group-based
Conservation
Crime in Persons Pharmaceuticals Trafficking Crime
Crimes
Prevention Approach to Reduce Incentives
Alternative Livelihoods: jobs, start-
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ups, agriculture
Public Services: education, health ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Recreational Activities ✓
Psychosocial Support ✓ ✓
Civil Rights Protection ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Social and Gender Norm Change ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Professionalism of Public Service ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Community Co-Management of
✓ ✓
Resources: permitting, monitoring
Formalization of Rights ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Demand Reduction: laws, social and
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
behavior change efforts
Clean Supply Chains: laws, corporate
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
policies, certification, customs
Prosecution Approach to Increase Risks
Laws on Criminal Activities ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Law Enforcement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Investigation and Prosecution ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Community Policing ✓ ✓ ✓
Crime Observatories ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Transparency and Accountability in
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Government Institutions
Civil Society Oversight, Awareness
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Raising and Advocacy
Investigative Journalism ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
At times, USAID has combined prevention and prose- alone and those targeting counterfeit pharmaceutical
cution approaches in the same project but most often, and illicit finance have supported prosecution alone.
USAID has pursued them in separate projects. The ad- C-TIP projects have pursued both approaches but with
vantage of combining them in one project is the coor- a greater emphasis on prevention. Projects targeting
dination and information exchange across interventions wildlife crime, and to some extent other conservation
that more readily happens. The advantage of separating crimes, have also pursued both approaches but placed
them is the ease of identifying partners with the needed more emphasis on prosecution. For example, the
expertise in one area. In either case, activities should en- Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment
tail partnerships that engage various stakeholders with (CARPE) combines prevention and prosecution. On
explicit coordination mechanisms to maximize results. the prevention side, it has worked to counter wild-
life and natural resource trafficking by supporting the
The balance between the two approaches diverges governance of community forest concessions, alternative
across the six core organized crime sectors. Projects livelihoods, and public awareness raising on conserva-
targeting drug trafficking have supported prevention tion. On the prosecution side, the program has trained,
14Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
equipped, and funded park rangers; hired legal experts tion. As one Chief of Party (COP) for a regional proj-
to support the prosecution of poachers; and supported ect in Asia noted, “There is only so much ‘carrot’ that
mobile courts. can be put forward to counter trafficking in high-value
wildlife products. Striking a strong balance with the ‘stick’
As the case studies for this effort affirmed, interventions through partnerships with law enforcement agencies is
that prevent crime are a necessary complement to also needed.”20
prosecution. An advisor in the Guatemala Mission noted,
“In the case of extortion, we can arrest every gang In high-crime contexts, prosecution is needed to disrupt
member, but if youth aren’t given opportunities, new criminal networks already in operation, but prevention is
gang members will emerge.”18 Similarly, an advisor in needed to reduce the ongoing supply of new members.
the DRC Mission observed, “People go the illegal route As one interviewee suggested, prosecution is the “short
because there is no viable legal avenue.”19 At the same game,” but prevention is the “long game.”21
time, prosecution is a necessary complement to preven-
Recommendation 3: Approach prevention and prosecution holistically.
Guiding questions: What is the constellation of incentives and risks for engaging in a specific
criminal market? What incentives are particularly salient? What risks are relatively weak or
nonexistent? How do incentives and risks differ among different individuals and groups? Are
they different for women and girls than for men and boys? Do they differ depending on an
individual’s position within the criminal network? Are there entry points for addressing these
incentives and risks?
Lesson 4: Social and behavior change efforts their position may sustain it. Similarly, gender norms
can help prevent and counter illicit activity. that support inequitable access to rights and other
protections can be more powerful than laws or policies,
creating opportunities for exploitation, coercion, human
Social and behavior change efforts aim to change trafficking, and other forms of violence.
the behavior of a target group by changing individual
attitudes and beliefs as well as social norms. Whereas Social and behavior change strategies may include any
awareness raising on laws and the impact of crime may of the following approaches: facilitating group delibera-
change attitudes and beliefs, efforts to change social tion and reflection, publicizing trendsetters and “positive
norms may need to focus on people’s beliefs about deviants,” creating a new reference group, encouraging
what others in their social group do, think, and expect public commitments or declarations, providing feedback
of them and what is considered “normal.” Social norms on performance vis-à-vis the norm, supporting social
can exert a powerful influence on behavior and act as a norms marketing, disseminating messages through “or-
brake on interventions. For example, laws may ban the ganized diffusion,” supporting role models, and changing
ivory trade, but social norms conferring status on ivory laws or regulations.22 Social and behavior change efforts
products or expecting customs agents to profit from may target those directly engaged in illicit activities (e.g.,
18 USAID Guatemala Democracy and Governance Advisor, in discussion with the author, April 23, 2020.
19 AOR of the Virunga Electricity Distribution Grid, in discussion with the author, September 3, 2020.
20 COP of the USAID Oceans and Fisheries Partnership, in discussion with the author, September 4, 2020.
21 Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) of the USAID Wildlife Asia program, in discussion with the author, October 6, 2020.
22 For more information on social and behavior change, see Diana Chigas and Phyllis Dininio, Social Norms – White Paper 3 (Washington: USAID, Bureau for Africa, 2019), https://
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TXDQ.pdf.
15Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
decreasing government officials’ acceptance of bribes dia to broadcast the “beautiful without ivory” message
or reducing violence perpetuated by criminal groups) to female consumers (Figure 9) and engaged religious
or those who may be complicit, or they may address and media influencers to broadcast messages challeng-
broader societal norms that create the environment ing spiritual beliefs about ivory and tiger amulets in mass
conducive to the behavior. media. In China, the social and behavior change effort
has used public service announcements, text message
Wildlife Asia has made social and behavior change a key reminders, and videos on China’s top video website
element of its work. Responding to the political con- to promote general awareness of penalties for wildlife
texts and consumer dynamics in its focus countries, the consumption under the 2017 Wildlife Protection Law
project has developed different social norm marketing since laws are an important determinant of behavior in
strategies to reduce the demand for wildlife. In Thailand, the country.
the effort has engaged fashion influencers on social me-
Figure 9. Beautiful without Ivory Campaign Visuals
In DRC, the Tushinde Ujeuri project has facilitated group ty and magnitude of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, she
discussions and supported role models in their social resolved to take action and in a social media announce-
and behavior change efforts. The project found that ment stated, “I call on every organization to help make
community discussion forums involving authorities were this plan.” Eight months later, 23 government institutions
key to changing behavior related to TIP. Given the sen- signed the United for Environmental Justice Declaration
sitive topic, the project used sketches to elicit reactions to re-establish governance and control in protected
and discuss implications. Involving local authorities in areas.24
these discussions encouraged them to take ownership
of the issue. In this way, the project aimed to engage Recognizing that many factors may impede behavior
local authorities as role models and agents of change. As change, projects often use social and behavior change
the Agreement Officer’s Representative (AOR) noted, efforts as a complement to other interventions. CARPE
“When leaders change their behavior, it is easy for the has raised public awareness to curb poaching through
community to change.”23 film screenings, posters, soccer tournaments, and infor-
mational stands, but also supported alternative liveli-
The Guatemala Biodiversity Project has supported a hoods as some households poached wildlife to supple-
public declaration and role models in its social and be- ment their food resources. The Senior Technical Advisor
havior change efforts. Targeting complacency across the for CARPE emphasized, “Awareness raising is a strategy
government, the project aimed to spur action to protect that needs to support other benefits, not a strategy on
the environment. After the project arranged a two-day its own.”25
trip for the Attorney General to experience the beau-
23 AOR of the Tushinde project, in discussion with the author, June 11, 2020.
24 Advisors of the Guatemala Biodiversity Project, in discussion with the author, June 10, 2020.
25 Senior Technical Advisor for CARPE, in discussion with the author, May 27, 2020.
16Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
Recommendation 4: Tailor social and behavior change efforts to target groups as a
complement to other interventions.
Guiding questions: What behavior is the intervention trying to change? Who engages in that
behavior and what motivates them to do so? What might incentivize behavior change? What
messages may resonate with them? Are social or gender norms sustaining the behavior, and if
so, how might the social and behavior change effort address them?
Lesson 5: Interventions benefit from targeting. The same logic applies to organized crime more broad-
ly. To the extent possible, investigations of organized
crime should look for networks of people, common
Crime and violence prevention programs stress the
routes and locales, and patterns of behavior rather than
importance of concentrating resources on the small
focusing on a specific person, place, and behavior asso-
clusters of people, places, and behaviors that are
ciated with a specific case. The analysis should consider
responsible for the majority of crimes and violence.26
where, how, and with whom criminal activities tend to
They recommend collecting and analyzing data to
occur most often and help focus interventions on those
identify these clusters and then concentrating preven-
clusters.
tive services and law enforcement in those locales and
sectors. In Guatemala, for example, USAID and the U.S. In some cases, clusters of illicit activity may arise when
Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics an organized crime group takes advantage of the same
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) have implemented transportation routes and corrupt relationships along
a place-based strategy in Villa Nueva’s Zone 12. The those routes to move multiple products in the same or
strategy includes community mobilization to prioritize different directions. In Mozambique, for example, crime
needs; social services for at-risk youth; capacity building groups have concealed rubies and ivory in containers
with the National Civilian Police; and an aggressive effort of illicit timber.28 In Mexico, cartels have used the same
bringing together police, prosecutors, and judges as- drivers and trucks to move drugs from Mexico into the
signed to the area to coordinate operations and ensure United States and then arms into Mexico on the return
detainees are duly prosecuted and cases are adjudi- trip.29 Clusters may also arise in areas of contested
cated. This joint assistance contributed to a 35 percent sovereignty, such as the Republic of Moldova’s Transn-
reduction in homicides in the area from 2017 to 2019.27 istria; in border areas, such as the Somali-Ethiopian-Ken-
yan border area or the Argentine-Brazilian-Paraguayan
border area (Keefe 2013); or in alternatively governed
areas, such as parts of the Sahel or eastern DRC.30
26 Thomas Abt, “What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle,” USAID, Washington, DC, 2016.
27 COR of the Convivimos and Community Roots projects, email correspondence with the author, April 30, 2020.
28 Simone Haysom, Where Crime Compounds Conflict: Understanding Northern Mozambique’s Vulnerabilities (Geneva: GIATOC, 2018), 11, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/10/TGIATOC-North-Mozambique-Report-WEB.pdf.
29 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain
(Washington: Congressional Requestors, 2016), 3-4, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674570.pdf.
30 For more on criminal market convergence, see Phyllis Dininio, Criminal Market Convergence – White Paper 4 (Washington: USAID, Bureau for Africa, 2020), https://pdf.usaid.
gov/pdf_docs/PA00WGXR.pdf.
17Technical Guidance on the Development Response to Organized Crime Lessons Learned Across Types of Organized Crime
Recommendation 5: Use data to focus interventions on the people, places, and
behaviors that are responsible for the majority of criminal activity.
Guiding questions: Who is part of the networks involved in the criminal activity? Along what
routes or in what locales is crime concentrated? What kinds of violence, corruption, money
laundering, or other behaviors accompany the criminal activity?
Lesson 6: Specialized tools and knowledge ing senior-level officers, for their involvement in extraju-
in law enforcement, prosecutors’ units, dicial executions. In Mexico, USAID has also supported
context analysis units in several state-level prosecutors’
and courts strengthen the adjudication of offices, which has led to the dismantling of several low-
organized crime. er-level organized criminal groups.31
The prosecution of organized crime differs from that Specific types of organized crime also require special-
used for singular or limited criminal acts. Building a case ized techniques and knowledge. In Guatemala, USAID’s
against criminal networks and organizations requires a Security and Justice Sector Reform Project helped
proactive investigation that collects information over the prosecutor’s office design specific prosecution
time. This proactive approach may draw on informants, methodologies for specific crimes—such as corrup-
plea bargaining, undercover police, and surveillance tion, extortion, homicide, human trafficking, migrant
tools as well as financial investigations and international smuggling, customs fraud, and environmental crime.
cooperation. Reactive investigations, by contrast, com- Whereas investigations against extortion may include
mence after a crime is committed and rely on eyewit- analyzing bank accounts, phone records, and social
ness testimony, defendants’ confessions, and sometimes media, investigations against wildlife trafficking include
forensic evidence. video cameras in preserves as well as remote and aerial
monitoring, and investigations against migrant smuggling
Within prosecutors’ offices, context analysis units can include interviewing victims, recovering evidence, and
help shift the focus from solving a specific case to iden- reviewing prosecutors’ files from border zones (Figure
tifying patterns in criminal incidents and discerning those 10). For each type of organized crime, investigators
people within the command structure of a crime group need to learn what type of information is useful, how
that are the most responsible for crimes, even if they to extract it, and how to present it. It is also important
did not carry them out. In Colombia, USAID supported to understand how gender inequities may help instigate
a context analysis unit in the Attorney General’s Office, crimes or affect the victims’ or witnesses’ willingness to
which yielded good results. In one case, the prosecution participate in investigations. These considerations are
led to prison sentences for 153 military officers, includ- also essential for assuring that do no harm principles are
followed and that vulnerable individuals are protected.
31 Advisor, Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Center, Bureau for Democracy, Development and Innovation, USAID email correspondence with the author, January 4,
2021.
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