THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA - LOCUSTS, STATE AUTHORITARIANISM AND WEBS OF US IMPERIALISM
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THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN
EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA
LOCUSTS, STATE AUTHORITARIANISM AND WEBS
OF US IMPERIALISM
AUGUST 2021
DISCUSSION PAPER
Multiple Shocks in Africa Series
The research for the discussion papers of the Multiple Shocks in Africa series was conducted under
extremely challenging conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdowns and
travel restrictions. As such, we were unable to visit case study countries for on-the-ground research and we
are deeply grateful to our local partners who provided the necessary support (albeit also being limited by
restrictions) and to other key informants for invaluable information.
The discussion papers are aimed at providing a broad scoping of the shocks being experienced by the
people of the focus countries, and an initial dive into the interconnections between the processes driving
these shocks. The ACB has a long track record of producing high quality and reliable research, but any
potential errors or blind spots in this research series are those of the ACB. We welcome further input as we
advance our collective knowledge and change project.
The African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) is a research and advocacy organisation working towards
food sovereignty and agroecology in Africa, with a focus on biosafety, seed systems and agricultural
biodiversity. The organisation is committed to dismantling inequalities and resisting corporate industrial
expansion in Africa’s food and agriculture systems.
© The African Centre for Biodiversity
www.acbio.org.za
PO Box 29170, Melville 2109, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Tel: +27 (0)11 486-1156
This publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
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may be shared without modification for non-commercial use provided the
African Centre for Biodiversity is acknowledged as the source. Prior written
agreement is necessary for any commercial use of material or data derived
from this publication.
Copy editor: Liz Sparg
Cover image, design and layout: Xealos Design Consultants
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Andrew Bennie for researching and writing this report, to Mariam Mayet and Linzi Lewis
for their contributions, to Sasha Mentz-Lagrange, Brittany Kesselman and Sabrina Masinjila for initial
research, to Deidre May for editing and Million Belay for reviewing the final paper. The ACB would like
to thank friends, colleagues and key informants for their valuable information, time and input to this
research. The ACB further acknowledges the generous support of various donors. The views and opinions
expressed in this report are those of the ACB and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position
of our donors.
2 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA
Table of contents
Acronyms and abbreviations 4
Paper snapshot and quick links 5
Key findings 7
Introduction 10
Multiple shocks in a politically and ecologically precarious region 11
The ecological context the locusts flew into 11
The emerging impacts of the locust swarms in Ethiopia 12
Multiple layers of shocks: The locusts and COVID-19 13
Smallholders first: A home-grown, state-driven approach to the Green Revolution 14
Commercialising smallholders: Convergence of state-led development,
philanthro-capitalism and World Bank designs 17
The state’s Green Revolution architecture 17
Some emerging impacts of Green Revolution strategies 19
The market, a seed law and corporate value chains: Gates Foundation, World Bank and
USAID cheer for the private sector 20
From smallholders first, to agrarian extractivism 24
Large-scale land deals: Opening land and labour to the global food regime 24
The costs of a failed agribusiness drive 24
Failures and human cost of agrarian extractivist and mega development projects 28
The case of the Kuraz Sugar Development Project and Gibe III Dam 28
Devastating impact on local indigenous people 28
Environment and people sacrificed for projects that end in colossal failure 29
Political dimensions of large-scale developments 29
The failures of agrarian extractivism and Ethiopia’s political conflict 30
Protests ignite when the capital threatens to extend its boundaries 30
Conflict in Tigray continues unabated 31
How agrarian crisis relates to political crisis 32
State-driven industrialisation, introduction of GMOs and US imperialism:
Converging around agrarian extractivism 33
Conclusion and further research 35
References 37
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 3
Acronyms and abbreviations AGP Agricultural Growth Programme (World Bank) AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa AISE Agricultural Input Supply Enterprise ATA Agricultural Transformation Agency BMGF Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation DfID United Kingdom Department for International Development EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization GM Genetically modified GMOs Genetically modified organisms GTP1 or 2 Growth and Transformation Plan 1 or 2 IP Intellectual property IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification KSDP Kuraz Sugar Development Project PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty PPP Public-private partnership PSNP Productive Safety Net Programme TPLF Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UPOV International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants USAID United States Agency for International Development USDA United States Department of Agriculture WFP World Food Programme 4 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA
Paper snapshot
and quick links
The current conflict in the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia has
plunged millions of people into extreme levels of hunger and hundreds
of thousands into famine. This conflict is another in a series of
connected shocks to hit smallholders and rural dwellers in the Horn
of Africa over the last few years. Before the onset of the conflict,
extensive crop damage was inflicted by a series of locust swarms.
Ethiopia was one of the most extensively impacted countries in the
region, and Tigray in particular. This paper explores how a key factor
shaping the context that these shocks have impacted is the Ethiopian
state’s drive to industrialise agriculture, with resulting social and
ecological costs, including linkages to conflict.
PHOTO CREDIT: PRIME, KELLEY LYNCH. 2015
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 5
Below each section of the paper is described. sought to attract foreign finance capital to
Simply click on the section heading to go massively industrialise agriculture. We argue
straight to it. that these have amounted to nothing more
than failed agrarian extractivism, as many
• Introduction – Introduces the scope of the communities have had their land and resources
paper. grabbed from them with indiscernible local
• Multiple shocks in a politically and development and employment linkages.
ecologically precarious region – Shows • The failures of agrarian extractivism
the climate-related shocks that were already and Ethiopia’s political conflict – Shows
hitting smallholders and rural dwellers before some of the connections between Ethiopia’s
locust swarms arrived, the impacts of the political conflict and the failures of agricultural
locust swarms on food security and resilience, industrialisation and its low-wage, mega-
and how these were further exacerbated by development model in the context of neoliberal
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. globalisation.
• Smallholders first: A home-grown, state- • State-driven industrialisation, introduction
driven approach to the Green Revolution of GMOs and US imperialism: Converging
– Describes the policy approach to agricultural around agrarian extractivism – We point
industrialisation and the central role played out that, despite the fall-out and failures
by the Ethiopian state in conceptualising and of agricultural industrialisation in Ethiopia’s
driving this approach. context, the process continues full steam ahead,
• Commercialising smallholders: backed by transnational interests connected
Convergence of state-led development, to US imperialism and geopolitical interests,
philanthro-capitalism and World Bank as seen regarding commercial growing of
Designs – Shows the state’s attempts to link genetically modified (GM) seed in the country.
smallholder farmers into national and global • Conclusion and further research –
value chains, and the impacts of these. Further, Summarises the paper and concludes with dire
we discuss how the Ethiopian state’s approach warnings to the rest of the continent based
converges with the neoliberal agendas of on our analysis of the Ethiopian experience. As
powerful global actors. Here, we focus on this was an initial scoping paper of Ethiopian
efforts to commercialise the seed sector agricultural industrialisation, it also mentions
and increase the involvement of private and topics of further research needed to deepen
transnational actors. our understanding of key dimensions of this
• From smallholders first to agrarian process.
extractivism – Explains how the state also
6 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA
Key findings
• This paper finds that the locust swarms that on the country’s inequitable agricultural and
infested East Africa and the Horn of Africa industrial growth path and have been key in
during 2020 were not an isolated shock but the intensified political tension since 2014. This
came on the heels of a series of droughts and speaks to the dangers of the current Green
floods, linked to the climate crisis, that had Revolution development consensus being
been hitting smallholder farmers in the region. promoted for Africa, where the majority of
The conditions linked to climate change also people are dependent on agriculture, including
contributed to the intensity and reproduction much of the youth.
of the swarms. This series of multiple shocks
vastly impacted crop production, household • However, the problem posed by many
food insecurity and resilience, but then, on top agricultural scientists and Ethiopian agricultural
of this, COVID-19 restrictions added further policy, is not enough Green Revolution. Efforts
strain on food security and farming practices. are therefore underway to deepen the role of
the market in expanding the Green Revolution,
• The overall resilience of smallholders and rural through increased roles and power to the
dwellers, however, is shaped by a deeper private sector and foreign corporations.
political economy context. Central in Ethiopia
has been the state’s role in driving agricultural • The seed sector is a key target of the private
industrialisation in line with its national sector and foreign corporations. Off-farm
development objectives and its desire to move seed breeding, production and distribution
up the ladder of the global economy, an systems have primarily been a public sector
approach that pre-dated but converges with affair – 85% of the improved seed varieties
philanthro-capitalist and corporate agendas. released are publicly owned and bred through
This policy been driven along two planks. The the four main parastatal seed cooperatives
first has been a productivist Green Revolution (Ethiopia, Oromia, Amhara and South Seed
approach in which raising the productivity of Enterprises), which produce 75% of the total
smallholder farmers is seen as the solution to volume of cereal, pulse and oil seeds, with no
poverty and hunger. royalties or exclusive use rights being granted
on publicly bred and produced seed. However,
• The results of the Green Revolution approach the emphasis on trade, to earn foreign
have been mixed, however, and mostly exchange, and pressure of multilateral donors
disappointing: while some increases in and philanthro-capitalist organisations such as
agricultural productivity have occurred, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)
Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries have led to a stronger push to commercialise
in the world, still experiencing some of the seed sector. Although the Ethiopian seed
the highest levels of hunger. The Green law contains certain safeguards towards the
Revolution approach has failed to stem rising possible realisation of farmers’ rights, the Plant
inequality, unemployment and associated Breeders’ Rights Proclamation is essentially
political tensions. In addition, it is leading based on International Union for the Protection
to technological lock-ins, such as growing of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 1991.
pesticide use by smallholders. Initial data on
pesticide uptake and employment suggests • State control of seed production and poor
pesticide usage replacing labour employment. intellectual property (IP) protection is being
The greatest impact in high uptake areas is on blamed for the relatively low diffusion of
female- and youth-headed households, who improved seed into the agricultural system,
are relatively more reliant on off-farm wage and hence the need for greater privatisation
employment. These align with larger trends of and IP protection to dynamise the spread
youth unemployment that have been blamed of commercially bred and produced seed.
However, with little historical evidence that IP
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 7
PHOTO CREDIT: UNICEF ETHIOPIA, V2016, NAHOM TESFAYE, 2016
is relevant in terms of ensuring that better but also offer a tool to ‘civilise’ those
quality seeds are accessible and available to populations and bring them under state control.
smallholder farmers, the relatively low uptake
of improved seed by these farmers and the • In production terms, however, most large-scale
small number of crops in the case of uptake industrial plantations have been a resounding
seriously challenges both their suitability to failure. Despite the devotion of a significant
the needs of most Ethiopian farmers and amount of the state’s human, institutional
their supposed superiority over farmers’ seed. and financial resources, they have fallen far
The conditions are instead being created short of their anticipated outcomes. Of a
for commercial expansion, without assured total of 2.3 million hectares that had been
benefits to smallholder farmers and no leased to domestic and foreign investors by
commitment to supporting, recognising and 2015, less than 20% have been put under
protecting farmers’ rights and farmer managed cultivation. They have also done little to increase
seed systems. agricultural output – during the 2014/15
cropping season, these large projects were
• The second important plank to agricultural responsible for only 4.3% of total national
transformation policy has been the deeper agricultural production.
integration of Ethiopian land, labour and
resources into global capitalism, through the • What these investments have done is increase
promotion of large-scale industrial plantations the exposure of Ethiopian land, rural livelihoods
to attract capital and investment to spur and resources to the grip of global finance
employment and ‘modernisation’ of the capital, sometimes referred to as rogue capital.
agricultural system. These have largely served The investments do, however, also reflects class
as a means to bring foreign capital to bear on interests in Ethiopia, as a greater number of
ecologies, people and Ethiopian agriculture, domestic than foreign investors have also tried
8 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA
to get in on the action. Ethiopian companies, displaced to make way for these projects.
however, are less able to invest in productive Thus, after billions of public money and loans
capacity as they mostly do not qualify for the spent on promoting large-scale agriculture
favourable terms offered to foreign investors, and infrastructure-heavy projects, these have
as they do not import large enough quantities contributed little to national production or
of capital goods and/or export their produce. foreign exchange earnings and have instead
Thus, foreign investors, mostly from India and left in their wake the failures of agrarian
China, have been favoured and control much extractivism – dispossession, misery, hunger,
larger areas of land. poverty and ecological degradation.
• Even in the case of productively ‘successful’ • Even though the state exercises a high degree
agricultural projects, such as horticulture of control over the agrarian landscape,
farms in the highlands for flower exports subjecting it to global value chains and the
to European markets, adverse social and demands of transnational corporations and
ecological impacts are significant. Given finance capital has unleashed processes that
existing land shortage in the highlands, making the state could not and has not been able
space for them requires removing farmers from to fully control. Resistance to the terms of
their land. The Amhara National Regional State agricultural industrialisation and low wage
Disaster Prevention and Food Security Program factory development and failure to stem
Coordination Office says that flower growing growing unemployment and inequality under
investors displace as many as 3 000 people per the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
year, who are left with little choice but to seek Front (EPRDF) was one of the elements of
survival in low-paid jobs, without access to the the protests that flared up in 2014/15. These
land and resources they once had. Operations protests set off a chain of political events that
contaminate Lake Tana and the Blue Nile with eventually led towards the current conflict and
fertiliser and pesticides, thus contributing to the extreme suffering of millions in the northern
the pressure on the Nile that is building as a Tigray region. This is explored in more depth in
result of the drive for ‘development’ along its the paper.
basin.
• The entry of global capital is further facilitated
by the failure of large state-owned projects,
such as the Kuraz Sugar Development Project,
which as a result have been turned over to
private (mostly Chinese) capital. Left on the
margins are the agro-pastoralists who were
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 9
Introduction
Although Ethiopia has been hailed as an ‘economic miracle’ for its
continuous economic growth over the past 15 years, it is still one of the
poorest countries in the world, with millions dependent on food aid.
T his is despite agricultural development
policy having sought to increase food
production and productivity through dogged
The Ethiopian state has apparently sought to
balance the demands of the global economy
with national development priorities. However,
‘modernisation’ and Green Revolution we explore how submitting to the demands
development strategies, which are based of the neoliberal global economy has resulted
principally on the industrialisation of in deepening inequalities, unemployment and
smallholder farming through intensified usage dispossession, and growing political discontent.
of chemical fertilisers and ‘improved’ seed, These factors cannot be delinked from the
and the promotion of large-scale monocrop current political turmoil in Ethiopia.
industrial production.
These processes point to the fact that, while
We show that this development model has BMGF and its funding of the Alliance for a
PHOTO CREDIT: EU, ECHO, ANOUK DELAFORTRIE, 2016
done little to buttress smallholder resilience, Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) receive prime
but rather the building blocks have been laid coverage for their role in industrialising African
for agrarian extractivism to take root. Agrarian seed and food systems, the complicity and
extractivism refers to processes where, in the agency of African governments in promoting
name of agricultural development, human and entrenching agrarian extractivism is given
and natural resources are diverted into the scant attention. This calls for greater support
grip of globalised capital for the monoculture to African food and farmer movements in their
production of raw materials for export via struggles for justice, ecological sustainability and
global value chains. This takes the form of food sovereignty.
industrial agriculture, but with there being few
domestic development linkages or positive
labour opportunities and conditions
(McKay 2017).
10 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIAMultiple shocks in a
politically and ecologically
Regional
precarious region
The desert locust upsurge is the latest shock to an already vulnerable
region. As locust-related losses can affect up to 100 percent of both
livelihood crop and fodder production, such threats to the human food chain have
detrimental effects on food security, livelihoods and national economies.
implications
The ecological context the To illustrate potential in theimpacts:
the
southern
country.
and south-eastern
according partsevaluation
to an independent of
locusts flew into of the 2003–2005 desert locustThis pattern
outbreak of Sahel,
in the erraticdesert
weather
locust
continued into 2020 and drove down crop
infestations contributed to the food insecurity of affected populations
D
yields, reduced
estructive locust swarms have been (particularly in agropastoral pasturesareas).
and pastoral for livestock
Combined and dried
with poor
recorded since biblical times. However, up water resources (ReliefWeb 2020).
rainfall, locust damage was a factor in significant crop production losses,
those that entered the Horn of Africa in early
while limited feed also led to the this
Compounding earlyhave
migration
beenofperiodic
livestockpolitical
and high
2020 were characterised by unprecedented levels of tensiontensions
between andtranshumance
conflicts, pastoralists
underpinned andby
local farmers
accumulation of intersecting hazards andover resources. complex interactions between authoritarianism,
disasters (FAO 2021), in a region populated ecological change and historical geopolitical
by smallholder farmers who were alreadyIn desert locust-affected countries
antagonisms of the Greater
intersecting withHorn of Africa,
imperial the vast
designs,
reeling from a series of shocks emanatingmajority
from of the population
and otherdepend
tensionsonoften described
agriculture aslivelihoods
for their ‘ethnic’1 –
ecological crisis, conflict and state fragility. tensions (Al-Bulushi 2021; Parenti 2011). By the
for example, up to 80 percent of the population in Ethiopia and 75 percent
The Horn of Africa is one of the most in Kenya. These time theand
farming locust infestations
herding hit, rely
communities Ethiopia
heavilyhad one
on rainfed
of the
vulnerable regions globally to the impactsproduction systems, highest
with numbers
the timing, of internally
duration displaced
and quantities of rainfall
of climate change and associated increaseplaying a people
critical role in – close
rangeland to 3.2 million.
rejuvenation This
and was
crop mainly
production.
in extreme weather events (Abshir 2020). induced by conflict related to land and border
In a region where most people depend on During the past disputes (ReliefWeb
several years, the Greater 2020),
Horn while
of Africa600
has000
beenhad
plagued
agriculture and pastoralism for their livelihoods, been displaced by climate-induced shocks
by numerous and consecutive climatic hazards, including severe droughts
populations are particularly hard hit by these (IPCshocks
and flooding. Such 2020). doBynotOctober
only have 2020, 1.4 million
immediate, people
short-term effects,
extreme events (Tegebu 2020). Figure 1 gives had returned home through government-led
they exacerbate prevailing food insecurity and undermine livelihoods
an idea of the series of shocks impactingand on development return operations, but tragically, had lost their
gains that have taken years to build. Natural hazards
smallholder and rural dwellers before thedisproportionately assets and social organisation in the process of
affect rural areas, mainly food-insecure, poor people –
locusts arrived – mainly a series of droughts displacement.
most of whom derive their livelihoods from agriculture, which is highly
and flooding as a result of above-averagesensitive to climate variability. Around 80 percent of the damage and
rainfall, which led to spikes in displacement
losses caused by1 drought
We placeimpacts
our initialare
use to the agriculture
of ‘ethnic’ in invertedsector,
commasaffecting
because
and food insecurity. From 2015, Ethiopiacrop and livestock such conflict is rarely simply about ethnic antagonism, but
production.
experienced an intense onset of El Niño, which usually reflects deeper economic and political grievances that are
expressed through ethnic identity, or channeled that way by the
reduced usual rainfall and led to droughts prevailing organisation of the political system, a point we will
return to below.
Figure 4. Timeline of natural hazards in the Greater Horn of Africa, 2018–2020
Figure 1: Multiple shocks hitting East African smallholders
FLOODS PROLONGED DROUGHT DESERT LOCUST
Nearly 500 people lost their lives while hundreds of Since 2016, up to 6 out of the past 7 seasons failed in parts The worst upsurge in 25 years in Eastern Africa –
thousands of others were displaced. of East Africa, affecting more than 20 million people. nine countries, as well as Yemen, are affected.
March–June 2018 October 2018–September 2019 since October 2019
June–September 2018 October 2019–May 2020 since March 2020
RIFT VALLEY FEVER FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES COVID-19
outbreaks in Kenya and Uganda Two consecutive seasons with rainfall measuring Global pandemic results in a severe economic
200 percent above the average. 2019 floods were the slowdown and widespread disruptions to
Source: FAO (2020a: 5) worst since 1997 with 2.8 million people affected. livelihoods, markets and trade.
Source: FAO, 2020
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 11This pattern of shocks reflects the predictions were undertaken, which included an extensive
of most major climate models, which project monitoring system and on-the-ground and aerial
that this region of Africa will face intensified pesticide spraying (Cressman 2021).
desertification because of climate change. As a
result, the drought cycle has intensified, even Given that locust swarms destroy crop and
as overall rainfall levels have increased (Parenti fodder production, they put millions of people
2011). In short, this means more and frequent who rely on agriculture for their livelihoods at
droughts, and more episodes of above-average risk of greater food insecurity across Ethiopia,
rainfall leading to flooding – the patterns Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea.
that created the conditions conducive to the For example, 70% of the Kenyan and 80% of
reproduction and intensification of the locust the Ethiopian population rely on agriculture
swarms (UNEP 2021). or pastoralism. Exacerbating the situation,
before the locusts arrived, six of the previous
The emerging impacts of the eight staple crop seasons were below average
or failed, due to a combination of drought
locust swarms in Ethiopia and flooding (FAO 2021) and the region was
The locust swarms that arrived from the also already home to 20% of the world’s food
Arabian Peninsula in late 2019 and into 2020 insecure people (Muhumuza 2020), 44 million of
were the largest seen in Kenya and Uganda whom were in a state of acute levels of hunger
in 70 years and in Ethiopia and Somalia in 25 (IPC Phase 3),2 with 8.6 million of these in
years. Locusts are “considered the planet’s Ethiopia (FAO 2020a).
most devastating migratory pest”, with “a It is estimated that control operations prevented
truly staggering capacity to consume” – a the potential loss of 4 million tons of cereal and
square kilometre of locusts can devour the 790 million litres of milk production feeding
same amount in a day as approximately 34.2 million people (Ferrand 2021). However,
35 000 people (FAO 2021: 115). The first much of southern Ethiopia, the worst affected
locust swarms began invading Somalia and East African country (FSNWG 2021), was
Ethiopia in October 2019 and spread to north- already experiencing “crisis” levels of food
east Kenya by December (FAO 2020b). The insecurity when the locust swarms arrived
swarms grew for the most part of 2020 and (IPC 2019). They ravaged several hundreds
were successively brought under control by of thousands of hectares, which damaged
September 2020. A new generation of locusts pasture and crops and reduced cereal stocks
then developed in November 2020 in Eastern amongst affected households (UNEP 2021).
Ethiopia and south-central Somalia but went
into decline after massive control operations 2 http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-
classification-system/ipc-acute-food-insecurity-classification/en/
12 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIAFor example, in one of the earlier regions to action was taken globally, the number of people
be hit, the northern region of Tigray, more living in acute food insecurity would double to
Crisis overview
than 25% of total production was destroyed
(Oxfam 2021). In the Doba woreda (district)
265 million (WFP 2020).
A desert locust upsurge is still underway in the Greater Horn of Africa
in the eastern region of Ethiopia, over 20and 000the Arabian The Ethiopian
Peninsula, government
while the declared
situation returned a statein
to normal
households were affected by the locusts, Southwest
and Asia, of
andemergency
the potentialon 10 April
spread to West2020,
Africa imposing
was stopped
over 6 000 households lost their sorghum and in July 2020, restrictions
thanks to massive related
control to the
operationsmovement
from May toofJuly
people
2020
onion crops (Resilient Food Systems 2020). A in Ethiopia, Kenyaandand goods,
Somalia. control of food and other prices,
wider assessment (FSNWG 2021) conducted and a reduction in public services, including
Weather conditions remained
in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia found that In the Greater theofprovision
Horn Africa, afterofmonths
inputsofthat many Ethiopian
surveillance and control,
favourable for desert locust
one third of cropping households and half the situation farmers
progressively have come
improved to
during rely
the on
secondas a result
and thirdof the
quarters
throughout 2020 Despite forecasts
of livestock-rearing households experienced of 2020 (see government’s agricultural development policies.
figure 2) to the extent that desert locust did not reach the
of below average rainfall for the
pasture and crop losses, with 70% reporting summer breedingThis
areasincreased
of the Sudantheinnumber
June–July of2020Ethiopians needing
and therefore
first half of 2021, soil moisture and
high or very high crop and rangeland losses. did not migrate food
to West and non-food
Africa. assistance in 2020 by 9.8
vegetation conditions are likely
The highest prevalence of food insecurity million, totalling 16.5 million. Combined with
in 10 administrative areas, As
to remain conducive for desert
was observed and the 15 million
anticipated, however, people
above average in Ethiopia
rainfall in Eritrea,who already
Ethiopia and
locust to breed the Sudan from Julyreliedto September
on safety created
nets anda suitable
relief environmentthis
assistance, for
major deterioration in food security among
the remaining desert
meant locust
that that had30%
over not been of controlled
the to breed
population and
needed
agricultural households was found between
for a reinvasion from Yemen.
external While FAO in
assistance and governments
2020 (Teshome in the affected
2020).
the first and second rounds of the assessment
countries intensified the surge to fight desert locust in October in Eritrea,
in several districts in Somalia and Ethiopia. Aand
survey conducted across to four drought-
Ethiopia, Somalia the Sudan, winds started blow southwards
After the locusts struck, more than 60% of
and pushed swarms towards the Ogaden region of eastern that
prone rural highland regions found theand
Ethiopia
respondents indicated food insecurity levels likelihood
south central Somalia, whereof foodgeneration
a new insecurity amongst
developed those
in November.
greater than acute (FSNWG 2021). The locusts not on the Productive Safety Net Programme
therefore created new pressures on already (PSNP) increased by around 11% as a result
extremely precarious food security situations.
Figure 2. Desert locust-infested districts during the second and third quarters of 2020 in the worst-affected countries
(Ethiopia,
Figure Kenya
2: Areas and Somalia)
infested by locust swarms between April and September 2020 across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia,
with the most affected areas lying in Ethiopia.
APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER
Heavy infestation Few swarms remaining
Source: FAO (2020a: 3)
Source: FAO, 2020
of COVID-19 measures, while in zones with
Multiple layers of shocks: The
Furthermore, Cyclone Gati made landfall on 22 November near Xaafuun
high numbers of COVID-19 cases, 34% of
and the northern tip of northeast Somalia. It was the strongest storm on
locusts and COVID-19 households reported that their food security
record in Somalia. Twice the annual average of rainfall fell in two days in
situation had worsened (Abay et al. 2020).
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, certain areas. Cyclone WhileGati
it iscrossed northeast Somalia to the Gulf of Aden
believed that urban areas suffered
rooted in the ecological contradictions of the following day and subsequently weakened.
disproportionately, many rural residents reported
capitalist globalisation and extractivist models increases in food prices, difficulties in obtaining
of development (ACB 2020; Wallace et al. Cyclone Gati impacted current desert locust infestations in several ways
food from markets, and reductions in food
2020), added another layer of pressure ontothat could not be predicted in advance. Heavy rains that fell on the
availability in local markets (IPC 2020).
the precarious populations of the region.northern Somali plateau allowed immature swarms that were still present
Globally, the restrictions imposed to deal to rapidly complete
with Wetheir
nowmaturation and lay eggs.
turn to locating theseIn addition,
shocks inwinds
the
associated
the pandemic led to a food and hunger crisis. with the cyclone
context of drove
the some
state’sof these
drive swarms
to southeast
industrialise to the
and
As international food chains broke down, Ogaden, where they matured and laid eggs in existing breeding
globalise Ethiopian agriculture, and the impact areas.
food prices increased and people lost the on smallholders and the politics of
incomes needed to buy food. The World Food Ethiopian society.
Programme (WFP) predicted that unless urgent
3
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 13Smallholders first: A
home-grown, state- As the magnitude and impact of such climatic events increase, aggravated
by climate change and land degradation, more and more households
driven approach to the
and communities are less able to absorb, recover and adapt, making
them even more vulnerable to future shocks. In the Greater Horn of Africa,
consecutive years of climatic events have increased households’ exposure
to risks, with limited recovery between shocks. Especially with its
Green Revolution significant potential to become a plague, desert locust infestation could
lead to further suffering, population movements and rising tensions in
already complex environments.
Figure 5. Livelihood systems in the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen and
E thiopia is acknowledged as containing some
of the world’s richest wild and cultivated
plant genetic diversity (Mulesa and Westengen
Figure 3. Map of predominant agricultural regions in
desert locust infestation in 2020
Ethiopia
2020). The main custodians of the agricultural
biodiversity are the 80% of the population
that depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.
Agriculture is central to the Ethiopian economy.
It constitutes about 35% of gross domestic
product (GDP), 95% of which is produced by
smallholders (Ayele et al. 2019; CSA and WFP ABYEI
2019). It is the source of over 70% of the
country’s export earnings, mainly in the form
of coffee, oil seeds and pulses, the total value
of which increased from US$ 300 million in
2002/3 to US$ 2 billion in 2010/11 (Alemu and
Berhanu 2018).
Different patterns of agriculture predominate
in different regions (see Figure 3): pastoralism is Source:FEWS
Source: FAONET,
(2020:
20206)
practised mostly in the lowland areas and pure
and a half. However, poverty and food security
cropping mostly takes place in the highlands,
remain widespread, and Ethiopia is still one
where the majority of the population live.
of the poorest countries in the world. Official
Of the estimated 113 million people, 70%
poverty rates have been reduced from 44.2% in
are under 30 years of age (Peebles 2019),
2000 to 23.5% in 2016 (Ayele et al. 2019) but
and because of the fast-growing population
remain much higher in rural than in urban areas
and restrictions on expanding land sizes, the
(Kulkarni and Gaiha 2020). In 2016, 25.5% of
average cropping landholding size operated by
the population was classified as food insecure,
a smallholder is 0.95 hectares, while a third of
which would have been much higher if 18
smallholders work on farmland of less than 0.5
million people had not received food assistance
hectares (CSA and WFP 2019). The majority
through emergency and productive safety net
(54%) therefore survive off less than a hectare
programmes (CSA and WFP 2019). By 2019,
of cropping land (Paul and wa Gĩthĩnji 2017).
8.5 million people suffered from “acute food
In a country plagued by food insecurity and insecurity”, while malnutrition rates remained
chronic dependence on food aid – having highest in rural areas. The child stunting rate
experienced some of the worst famines is still around 37%, while in some regions, like
globally in the twentieth century – Ethiopia has Amhara, it is above 40%, with only 7% of
made socio-economic progress, with record children receiving a minimum acceptable diet
economic growth rates over the last decade (FSIN 2020).
6 | Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen – Revised desert locust crisis appeal (January 2020–June 2021)
14 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIAPHOTO CREDIT: PRIME, KELLEY LYNCH, 2015
To address these patterns, dominant discourse Revolution approach of increasing efficiency
and state policy express the notion that the and productivity of smallholder farming. This
country’s continued poverty and hunger approach is embedded in Ethiopia’s guiding
rates are a function of the “backward”, national development plan, the Agricultural
“rudimentary” nature (CSA and WFP 2019: Development-Led Industrialisation Programme.
4) and low productivity of the agricultural The basic idea was, because Ethiopia is a
sector, a barrier to overcome through provision labour-rich and capital-poor country, the
of technology, inputs and improved seed. strategy should be based on a model that relies
Thus, while being proactive in recognising on labour-intensive agriculture. Agricultural
and protecting its agricultural biodiversity and productivity would be raised, without displacing
farmers’ rights, the state has doggedly pursued labour, by supplying smallholder farmers with
the industrialisation of agriculture through Green Revolution technologies consisting of
Green Revolution technologies as the solution improved seeds and synthetic fertilisers, together
to raise the productivity of the smallholder with expanded extension services. This would in
sector (Hailemichael and Haug 2020). turn achieve food security for rural populations
and increase the raw materials available to
In 1991 the military regime was overthrown by develop industrial and manufacturing sectors.
the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Further to this logic, through state support,
which assumed control of the government smallholder farmers could then gradually
through leading a coalition of mainly ethnic transition to off-farm employment in those
parties, in the form of the Ethiopian People’s industries (Lavers 2020; Makki 2012). This
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The has been described as “an Ethiopian vision of
TPLF came to power largely on the back of the Green Revolution initiated through state
a mobilised peasantry. While the political planning and support” (Alemu 2011: 73).
importance of the peasantry was reflected
in its prioritisation of agriculture and rural The relationship between smallholders and
development (Rahmato 1993), this was to the state is an important feature to take into
be done through a single-minded Green account. Before the Derg military regime took
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 15Centralisation of land described as a market-oriented but state-led
approach to capitalist development, which aims
ownership in the hands of at using a mixture of public investments, market
an authoritarian incentives, and monetary and tax inducements
to channel resources and investments into
state, with developmental planned ends (Makki 2012). On the one hand,
priorities similarly the model largely bucks the neoliberal trend and
involves large-scale, public-driven investment
being determined from in megaprojects in communications, transport
above in a top-down and infrastructure (Jacobs 2020; Jay 2019).
On the other hand, this state-led approach
manner, continues to is aimed at more thoroughly inserting the
severely restrict the Ethiopian economy and society into the global
economy and in so doing, offering what it has
political expression and in abundance – land and associated natural
confidence of resources and cheap labour (Rahmato 2014).
smallholders in their In this context, given the EPRDF’s desire to
ensure political control over the peasantry in line
relationship with the state. with its national development objectives (Lavers
2020; Rahmato 1993), smallholder political
self-organisation is undermined by extensive
power in 1974 from the imperial regime of
state (and EPRDF) structures that coordinate
Haile Selassie, land was mostly in the hands of
and mobilise people around development at
landlords, on whom the peasantry/smallholder
local level and align party, state and smallholder
farmers had to depend, for access to land
activities, resulting in a pervasive system of state
and associated natural resources. After taking
control over rural life (Berhanu and Poulton
power, the Derg quickly dismantled the base
2014). It is these structures through which the
of the landlords’ power by expropriating
drive for agricultural industrialisation is also
their land and redistributing much of it to
coordinated at local level.
smallholders but vesting ownership of land in
the Ethiopian state. It was one of the fastest In addition to attracting low-wage factories
and most extensive land reform programmes to produce goods for global markets, the Plan
in the world (wa Gĩthĩnji and Mersha 2007), for Accelerated and Sustained Development
transforming Ethiopia into a country of to End Poverty (PASDEP) sought to deepen
“self-labouring peasants” (Rahmato 1993: the commercialisation and ‘modernisation’ of
40). Consequently, such centralisation of land agriculture through a two-pronged approach.
ownership in the hands of an authoritarian First, it aimed increasingly to integrate
state, with developmental priorities similarly smallholder production into commodity
being determined from above in a top-down production for agro-processing and international
manner, continues to severely restrict the trade, to generate more foreign exchange and
political expression and confidence of thereby ensure food and nutrition security
smallholders in their relationship with the state. (Ayele et al. 2019; Lavers 2012). Second, given
This democratic disjuncture is a key ingredient the perceived shortcomings of the smallholder
in the rollout and imposition of Ethiopia’s sector in industrialising Ethiopian agriculture
Green Revolution strategy. and the shortage of capital in the country, the
PASDEP sought to attract foreign capital to
The mid-2000s saw a continued commitment
expand the commercial agricultural sector by
by the state to the Green Revolution strategy
encouraging greater foreign investment through
but it was also underpinned by an intense
large-scale land investments (Lavers 2020).
drive to commercialise the agriculture sector.
These are the two overarching processes driving
This must be understood in the context of
agrarian change and extractivism in Ethiopia.
the EPRDF’s adoption of the developmental
state model. Dubbed “democratic
developmentalism”, the model can be
16 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIACommercialising
smallholders:
Convergence of
state-led development,
philanthro-capitalism
and World Bank designs
The state’s Green Revolution as “agricultural retailers” for industrial inputs
(Berhanu and Poulton 2014: 90).
architecture
The input packages were thus one channel
E mphasis has been placed on the
development of commodity value chains
with forward and backward linkages. An
through which the state sought to increase the
provision of certified seed from 187 000 tons
in 2015 to 356 000 tons by 2020, an annual
associated Green Revolution architecture has growth rate in seed supply of 8%. It has also
been built by the state, which includes the sought to increase the supply of chemical
development of one of the largest extension fertilisers to farmers by 15% a year, to a total
services in sub-Saharan Africa, with 60 000 of 2.06 million tons (Alemu and Berhani 2018).
diploma-holding agents working through 10 However, this improved seed is still only used on
000 farmer training centres. The extension about 30% of agricultural land and most of it
agents provide input packages to farmers and is hybrid maize and wheat (Alemu and Berhanu
promote associated farming techniques, with a 2018; MoA 2019). Up to 90% of seed used in
rural credit system developed to enable farmers Ethiopia is still farmer seed, emanating from
to purchase them (Cafer and Rikoon 2017). farmer managed seed systems (Mulesa and
The formal seed sector was also built as a Westengen 2020).
public sector affair. Virtually all improved seed While the above system of improved seed
is developed in the public sector and produced distribution covers a larger geographical area,
by four state-owned cooperatives (Ethiopia, 60% of improved seed is distributed via direct
Oromia, Amhara and South Seed Enterprises). seed marketing channels, where small seed
Of this seed, 40% reaches farmers through the producers sell directly to farmers through their
state-controlled centralised distribution system own shops or through agents in designated
via input packages. While the packages are districts (woredas) (MoA 2019). However, there
not subsidised, the price of seed is set by these is little by way of a private sector seed industry
state-owned seed-producing cooperatives. in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has been
Regional agricultural bureaus estimate demand averse to considering seed as a marketable
and acquire seed from the relevant cooperative, commodity, and thus seed variety development
which is distributed to the farmer cooperative has been driven almost exclusively by the
unions for purchase by farmers, often via the public sector. All public and domestic private
extension agents who thus also tend to act producers use varieties developed by public
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 17PHOTO CREDIT: ILRI, GEORGINA SMITH, 2019
research institutes, with there being no royalties The fertiliser market used to be state controlled
or exclusive use rights granted in respect through the Agricultural Input Supply Enterprise
of commercially certified seeds. Apart from (AISE) and provided via the input packages. This
Pioneer-HiBred, the only international seed firm changed in 1993, when five new companies –
in the country, there are only a limited number including two private companies and three
of private, small-scale domestic seed producers, holding companies owned by regional EPRDF
producing mostly hybrid maize. They depend structures – were allowed entry. Then the two
on the public sector for their source seed and private companies were pushed out of the
must comply with set prices and align to the market through measures such as state control
public distribution system (MoA 2019). Thus, of the distribution systems and preferential
85% of the improved varieties released are access to foreign exchange to pay for fertiliser
publicly owned and bred through the four main imports that was given to the party-owned
parastatal seed cooperatives, which produce companies. The fertiliser market is thus
75% of the total volume of cereal, pulse and controlled by the farmer cooperative unions,
oil seeds. As we will see in the next section, the AISE and the party-owned companies
this lack of intellectual property (IP) protection (Ambassel in Amhara, Guna in Tigray, and
afforded to improved seed and state control Disnho in Oromia) (Abegaz 2013; Berhanu and
of seed production are being blamed for the Poulton 2014). The fact that 100% of Ethiopia’s
relatively low diffusion and indeed low uptake chemical fertiliser is imported puts enormous
of improved seed into the agricultural system, pressure on the country’s foreign exchange
and hence the need for greater privatisation reserves.3 Fertiliser is stored at warehouses and
and IP protection to dynamise the spread of
commercially bred and produced seed.
3 Dawit Alemu, Agricultural Economics and Extension, Ethiopian
Institute of Agricultural Research, email communication,
May 2021.
18 THE VIOLENCE OF AGRARIAN EXTRACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIAdelivered to farmer cooperative unions for smallholders into purchasing input packages
distribution to farmers, at prices regulated and adopting ‘modern’ planting techniques,
by the government, which are calculated in a country where the application of fertiliser
on the basis of cost recovery and a pre-set otherwise remains low, as many farmers find it
profit margin for cooperatives.4 Farmers then inappropriate to their farming needs and desires
purchase through government-provided credit (Cafer and Rikoon 2017).
(administered by extension officers) or NGO-run
micro-credit schemes (Cafer and Rikoon 2017). Furthermore, the provision of credit, coordinated
by extension officers, has often also become an
Has this intense Green Revolution push instrument of political control and patronage:
improved farmers’ lives, and how is it laying the farmers who are suspected of being allied with
grounds for corporate expansion? the political opposition can be singled out to
sell their assets to cover loan defaults to their
Some emerging impacts of cooperative (Berhanu and Poulton 2014). These
Green Revolution strategies factors have led smallholder farmers, especially
in the highlands, to become increasingly
Although the agricultural sector grew on distrustful of state-sponsored programmes.
average by 6.5% per year between 2010 and They have been excluded from democratic
2020 (Ayele 2021), the objectives of creating participation and find themselves caught
stronger linkages with industry, raising incomes between national and international agendas
and eliminating hunger and food insecurity related to agriculture-led industrialisation
remain far from being realised (Alemu and climate shocks (Cafer and Rikoon 2017;
and Berhanu 2018). Perhaps part of this is Hailemichael and Haug 2020).
simply that the uptake of Green Revolution
technologies by smallholders has been uneven: In addition, these dynamics have also played into
while some claim that agricultural reforms sharpening inequalities inherent in Ethiopia’s
have benefitted many smallholders, through development trajectory. In the bid since 2006
the provision of usufruct land titles and to increase commercialisation and linkages
price-controlled seeds and fertilisers (Alemu to domestic and export markets, the PASDEP
and Berhanu 2018), many of them are less has sought to target better-off farmers for the
enthusiastic about these attempts to embed uptake of productivity enhancing technologies,
the market into their production relations, due thus biasing them for inclusion in related
to the uncertainty and insecurity it could bring government programmes (Lavers 2020).
to their capacity for self-reproduction (Lavers
2012; Makki 2012). “Coercive agrarian
Given the EPRDF’s desire to ensure political development” means that
control over the peasantry in line with
its national development objectives, the
while the provision of
drawbacks of Ethiopia’s drive to commercialise Green Revolution
and industrialise its agricultural system have
also been amplified by the political system
extension and input
through which it takes place, taking the packages to smallholders
form of what Regassa et al. (2018: 935) term
“coercive agrarian development”. This means
are ostensibly aimed at
that, while the provision of Green Revolution commercialisation of the
extension and input packages to smallholders
are ostensibly aimed at commercialisation
sector and improving
of the sector and improving productivity productivity on limited
on limited plots of land, they also serve
as tools of political control. This has often
plots of land, they also
translated into authoritarian means through serve as tools of political
which extension agents attempt to coerce
control.
4 Ibid.
AU G U S T 2 0 2 1 19The hope is that, as more efficient, better-off 50%, which meant that the ratio of wages
farmers succeed, so less efficient ones will to herbicide prices increased by over 100%,
transition into off-farm employment. However, making it far cheaper for those who employed
realising this path is easier said than done, labour for weeding to switch to herbicide
as inequality and unemployment rise, with application (Tamru et al. 2017). The greatest
significant political and socio-economic increase in herbicide usage has been in the rural
implications. Inequality is further enhanced areas close to the capital, Addis Ababa, which
by the dynamics of the political relationships also have all-weather roads and thus better
between farmers and extension agents, where market access. This is also the region with the
the latter’s role of providing inputs and credit highest trends of agricultural wage employment
tends to favour better-off farmers, while and where wages are highest, which furthers
disadvantaging poorer ones (Cafer and Rikoon the tendency to switch to herbicide application.
2017). Similarly, in many cases the local party This has had the greatest impact on female- and
authorities’ role in debt collection ‘augmented youth-headed households, who are relatively
government/party coffers as poor farmers more reliant on off-farm wage employment
transferred virtually all productivity gains to (Bachewe et al. 2016). This paper does not
their politically connected creditors’ (Abegaz attempt a definitive assertion based on this
2013: 1481). data about the relationship between Green
Revolution technological lock-ins and general
Together with this this burgeoning inequality, unemployment and political stability, but the
the push for industrialisation is also locking data does illustrate the relationship of the
in an expanding market for imported inputs, technologies to labour substitution, inequality
another means through which smallholder and unemployment (especially among the
agriculture is being pegged to the global youth). Youth, we will see, have been part of the
corporate food regime. This is evident in the picture of the heightened political contestation
case of pesticide use. The rate of adoption since 2014. The data therefore gives some
of agro-chemicals – mostly herbicides – by indications of the economic and political
Ethiopian smallholders is among the highest trends that these technological lock-ins could
in Africa. However, while the government intensify as Ethiopia continues down the path of
has controlled fertiliser and seed distribution, agricultural industrialisation.
pesticides have largely been a commercial
market affair – the private sector is responsible The market, a seed law and
for about two-thirds of the distribution of
agro-chemicals, up to 70% in the case of corporate value chains: Gates
herbicides (Tamru et al. 2017). Pesticide imports Foundation, World Bank and
quadrupled between 2005 and 2015, while the
import of herbicides – most prominently 2,4-D
USAID cheer for the private
– tripled in the same period, from US$ 5 million sector
to US$ 17 million. The major component of
The above sections describe some of the
this increase is cheaper imports from China
dynamics of agricultural industrialisation that
(compared to those of Western corporations),
smallholders are caught up in; and additionally
followed by India. Herbicides are now used on
there is growing momentum to subject them
23% of cultivated area, with 37% of farmers in
to the power of the market and private actors.
high potential zones using herbicides. This use
From around 2009 the Ethiopian state began to
is most prevalent for teff and wheat, the most
adopt greater liberalisation, thus allowing more
commercialised crops in the country
private players in the agriculture sector. This
(Tamru et al. 2017).
shift has elevated the role of the pro-corporate
The nascent increase in herbicide use is already work that the World Bank supports through the
pointing to the impacts of the technological Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP), United
lock-in on employment and inequality (and States Agency for International Development
on political dynamics). It is usually better-off (USAID), and the Bill and Melinda Gates
farmers who can afford to employ wage labour, Foundation (BMGF). For over a decade, these
mostly for weeding and harvesting. Between actors have all consistently nudged Ethiopia
2005 and 2015, rural wages increased by towards a more strongly market-based and
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