Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia - Geopolitics of the pandemic in Thailand
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Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia Geopolitics of the pandemic in Thailand Kasira Cheeppensook, PhD
Systemic Implications of the
COVID-19 Crisis in Asia
Geopolitics of the Pandemic in Thailand
August 2021I Contents Executive Summary..............................................................................................................................................II Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................1 Contextualizing COVID-19 in Thailand: Actors, discourses and debates..........................................................1 Systemic implications of the pandemic...............................................................................................................4 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................................10
II
Executive Summary
COVID-19 has sweeping implications. The geopolitical Third, COVID-19 might accelerate deliberalization
landscape, coloured by the rivalry between the great and deglobalization. We have seen concerns that
powers, provided a complex political, economic and several measures to combat the pandemic led to rights
social environment in which the pandemic took effect. encroachments and power consolidation by the state.
How countries manage the disease and procure the Countries also turned more protectionist and inward
vaccines could add to their credibility and geopolitical as a result, coupled with the restrictions of movement.
capital. Thailand was praised for its handling of the Thailand must be aware that a sustainable development
pandemic during the first wave in 2020, managing to path needs to be informed by the rule of law, social
maintain a low transmission rate. However, vulnerabilities justice and an inclusive and participatory process.
that manifested in a number of sectors coupled with
untimely management from the government rendered Fourth, we’ve seen trust eroding because of doubt and
Thailand less resilient when a new wave of the pandemic dissatisfaction with the COVID-19 management at both
occurred in 2021. the national and international levels. The COVID-19
Vaccines Global Access, or COVAX facility, co-led by the
The COVID-19 implications can be seen in five main World Health Organization, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance
areas. First, Thailand’s navigation through the great and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations,
powers’ rivalry arguably intensified with the pandemic. brought together different stakeholders in an attempt to
Thailand tried to maintain relationships with China and ensure fair distribution and equal access. This is in part
the United States in trade and security terms despite redeeming and proof of multilateral efforts in providing
the trend of American disengagement in Asia during public goods despite growing criticism that COVAX
the Trump administration and the increasing appeal does not truly ensure equitable distribution of vaccines.
of unilateral actions by both great powers. Prioritizing Thailand’s slow vaccine roll-out and reliance on vaccines
unilateralism would have negative impacts for smaller from China might go against its intention to diversify the
states, and Thailand referred to regional and international risks and, again, to avoid overreliance on any one country.
frameworks to avoid being roped into the great powers’
game. Fifth, the digitization of geopolitics, complicated by the
evolving decoupling of technologies, has made it more
Second, we see an increasing role for middle-power difficult for states to manage cyberthreats and distorted
diplomacy. Thailand could capitalize on its willingness information. COVID-19 has accelerated digital technology
to contribute to world politics as a diversifying venue usage, with numerous tech-based solutions developed to
to avoid being overly dependent on either of the great help combat the pandemic. In reaping benefits from this,
powers. Thailand also could strive to play a middle-power Thailand has to bear in mind people’s rights to freedom
role in regional conflict transformation as a member of expression and information and the reality of digital
country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. inequalities.Contextualizing COVID-19 in Thailand: Actors, discourses and debates · 1
Introduction
The COVID-19 crisis likely will leave altering effects on After setting the stage for implications of the crisis, the
the geopolitical landscape, which will remain to be seen actors involved and the national discourse and policies,
in the years to come. The “new normal” has broad this paper analyses Thailand’s foreign and security
implications towards the geopolitical atmosphere and not trajectory amid a geopolitical balance altered by the
only to the new behaviour of people. Although Thailand pandemic and influenced by (albeit not exclusively) the
managed the COVID-19 crisis fairly well in 2020 in terms following drivers and implications: (i) the great powers’
of transmission control, the country faced disruptions rivalry; (ii) middle-power diplomacy; (iii) deliberalization
that resulted in severe economic contractions at the and deglobalization in the post-pandemic world; (iv)
expense of small businesses and people. In 2021, it faced the trust deficit and the politics of vaccines; and (v) the
a new wave of COVID-19 infections that threatened to digitization of geopolitics.
undo the work it had achieved in the past year and left an
uncertain future for the geopolitical status quo.
Contextualizing COVID-19 in Thailand: Actors,
discourses and debates
Thailand experienced the first reported SARS-CoV-2 virus partly to the quick recovery at the beginning. Thailand’s
case outside China in January 2020. By the end of the health care system benefited from its experiences in
month, Thailand had the second-highest number of communicable disease control, such as with smallpox.
1
reported cases globally, after China. The country had since invested in its health care system
to increase coverage as well as the availability of health
In six months, Thailand went from ranking as one of care professionals.
the riskiest countries regarding coronavirus infection
when the pandemic first broke out to occupying the top As soon as the situation of pneumonia of an unknown
spot in COVID-19 recovery management, according to cause was reported in Wuhan, China, at the end of 2019,
the Global COVID-19 Index (July 2020). Then Thailand Thailand activated its Emergency Operations Centre
2 4
dropped rapidly, to rank 149th as of July 2021. Untimely (4 January 2020). This was considered quite early to
management, a slow vaccine roll-out and mismatched prepare for any emergency health situation.
communications from the authorities were among the
top factors that led to the deteriorating public trust in In early February, the government started quarantine
Thailand. for Thai people who returned from Wuhan for 14 days.
Beyond Bangkok, it tightened monitoring in provinces
The ability of Thailand’s health care system to prevent and popular with tourists, such as Chiang Mai, Chon Buri,
handle epidemics ranked sixth in the world and first in Asia Krabi and Phuket. Towards the end of February, the
3
in 2019, according to the Global Health Security Index. Ministry of Health issued an announcement, effective 1
This strength made Thailand one of the most prepared March 2020, that COVID-19 was considered a dangerous
countries to tackle a pandemic at the start, contributing communicable disease. The announcement allowed
1 The Bangkok Insight Editorial Team, “ระทึก!! ไทยขึ้นแท่นอันดับ 2 ติด ‘เชื้อไวรัสโคโรนา’ รองจากจีน,” [“Thailand is ranked 2nd in
coronavirus infections after China”], The Bangkok Insight, 28 January 2020. Available at https://www.thebangkokinsight.com/
news/politics-general/general/280748/.
2 “The GCI dashboard: Thailand,” last modified 22 July 2021. Available at https://covid19.pemandu.org/Thailand.
3 “GHS Index map”, last modified n.d. Available at https://www.ghsindex.org/.
4 Supakit Sirilak, ed., Thailand’s Experience in the Covid-19 Response (Thailand, Ministry of Public Health, 2020): 29.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in Thailand2 · Contextualizing COVID-19 in Thailand: Actors, discourses and debates
officials to require suspected infected persons to undergo In early April, a curfew barred people from leaving
treatment or to quarantine. It also allowed them to close their home from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m., except for absolute
down venues to prevent transmission of the coronavirus. necessities, such as medical professionals, banking and
The government expanded monitoring of geographical delivery services. International flights were prohibited.
areas through which people transited from China to The government ensured that people who had COVID-19
5
Japan, Singapore and South Korea. would be entitled to free health care. However, it failed
to ensure timely access when the pandemic flared up a
The first death linked to COVID-19 in Thailand was year later and many were stranded. School terms were
6
reported in early March. The government then upped rescheduled for a late start (middle of May to early July).
screening measures and temperature checking, with The Thai new year, Songkran, festivals were cancelled.
screening and monitoring in hospitals. Countries with a Alcoholic beverages were prohibited for sale in Bangkok
high risk of the dangerous communicable disease were and ten other provinces to lessen the workload for
announced. In the middle of March, a large cluster of medical professionals.
cases was linked to a boxing stadium in Bangkok. The
government set up the Centre for the Administration of During this period, the government also tightened rules
the Situation Due to the Outbreak of the Communicable prohibiting crowd assembly, using the Emergency Decree.
Disease Coronavirus, under the direct supervision of the At that time, Thailand had more than 2,000 people
prime minister. The Centre later issued the Thai Chana testing positive for COVID-19. It was able to control new
7
app (meaning “Thailand wins”) for people to use to infections to fewer than ten persons per day towards the
check themselves in when visiting public venues and end of April, highly contrasting with the situation merely
thus to facilitate tracking of any potential transmissions. fifteen months after when new infections skyrocketed
Measures to guard against COVID-19 transmission towards 20,000 per day with estimated even higher
escalated to the national level, with the campaign of unrecorded numbers.
8
“Stay home, stop the spread, for the nation”.
By early May, when the situation seemed to improve,
The government closed schools not long after as well as the lockdown was eased and then further relaxed in the
entertainment venues and massage parlours in Bangkok middle of the month. The government said it would remain
and surrounding areas, initially for two weeks. Mass vigilant because the disease could return towards the end
gatherings were discouraged. Department stores were of 2020. When the new wave hit Thailand in the first
also closed, except for necessary services, such as take- quarter of 2021, the combined political, economic and
home food and pharmacies. Borders were temporarily health care system vulnerabilities left people adrift, with
closed. Field hospitals were prepared. Before the end of weakened social capital and even more marginalization
9
March, the prime minister issued an Emergency Decree. and exclusion.
Some monetary remedy measures were also issued to
help relieve the COVID-19 repercussions. Geopolitically, Thailand’s heavy land, sea and air
transportation exposure due to its central location
5 The information in this and the following paragraph is summarized by the author from “ย้อนไทม์ไลน์ 100 วัน กับสถานการณ์ ‘โควิด-
19’ ในประเทศไทย,” [Timeline 100 days with ‘Covid-19 situation’ in Thailand], Bangkokbiz News, 12 April 2020. Available at https://
www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/875664.
6 Thairath Online, “สรุปไทม์ไลน์ “โควิด-19” ในไทย จากวันที่พบผู้ป่วยรายแรก สู่วันไร้ผู้ติดเชื้อ,” [“Summary of timeline Covid-19 in Thailand
from the day the first patient was found till the day with no infections”], Thairath, 13 May 2020. Available at https://www.thairath.
co.th/news/society/1843259.
7 PPTV Online, “วิธีลงทะเบียน “www.ไทยชนะ.com” ใช้เดินห้าง-ร้านค้า,” [“How to register on www.ไทยชนะ.com for department stores-
shops visits”], PPTV, 17 May 2020. Available at https://www.pptvhd36.com/news/ประเด็นร้อน/125544
8 Ministry of Public Health, Thailand, “อยู่บ้าน หยุดเชื้อ เพื่อชาติ,” [“Stay home, stop the spread, for the nation”], n.d. Available at
https://www.moph.go.th/index.php/news/read/1700.
9 The information in this and the following two paragraphs is summarized by the author from “Timeline 100 days”, and “Summary
of Timeline”.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in ThailandContextualizing COVID-19 in Thailand: Actors, discourses and debates · 3
engendered it particularly vulnerable in the case of a and working from home (for those who can afford to
pandemic. It has a long natural border with neighbouring do so). Nonetheless, a general dissatisfaction with the
countries, with migrant workers crossing it on a daily government’s measures emerged, stemming from the
basis. Thailand also is a coastal state. The Thai fishing economic losses and masks being too expensive and hard
industry employs numerous migrant workers, with to find. The government provided cloth masks for each
coverage to Malaysian and Indonesian waters. household, but they were perceived as less effective than
surgical masks. When the mask supply improved, social
The high infection rates of the countries located to division ensued from miscommunications and the slow
the west of Thailand, such as Bangladesh, India and roll-out of vaccinations.
Myanmarwould further test Thailand’s management of
the pandemic. As case numbers rose to new record levels, There was a sense of resentment with the government
it would be wise for Thailand to unify the sector responses telling people to “stay home” and “don’t let your
to provide a whole-of-government (in which public guard down” but not providing much relief. The quick
sector officials work across departments to achieve a lockdown, although considered efficient for reducing
common goal) and whole-of-society (in which the society transmissions, caused huge revenue loss. When a second
and the private sector, including epistemic communities, lockdown was suggested again once the new wave
cooperate) approach to address the unfolding crisis. occurred, very little remedy measures were offered. Some
people who were eligible for the government assistance
Government measures to provide economic remedy in the first wave could never claim it due to extensive
10
assistance included subsidies for domestic tourism ; small misinformation. Even then, the relief was perceived by
monetary compensation for freelancers outside of the some people as “too little, too late”, leaving a need for
social security system; a three-month pay-out (a meagre more inclusive and more universal relief as well as better
1,000 Thai baht each month) for vulnerable groups, such public communications.
as impoverished people, older persons and people with
disabilities; a pay-out for agricultural households; and Early on, civil society groups attempted to fill the
free vocational online training, inter alia. The Bank of communications gap to a certain extent. Thailand’s
Thailand required banks to help with debt relief measures village health volunteers visited households door to door
and provide loans with a low interest rate. Electricity to increase their awareness of the risks and precautions.
bills and water bills were reduced. For people working They also monitored all people in their area. The health
from home, the Office of the National Broadcasting volunteers typically receive 1,000 Thai baht remuneration
and Telecommunications Commission provided free a month from the Ministry of Public Health, which was
12
10 GB mobile internet as well as an increase in home increased by 500 Thai baht for the pandemic period.
11
broadband speed and free mobile calls. Beyond the These volunteers comprise a crucial element in the
state, civil society and the private sector proved to be primary health care system, responsible for local data
other important players in the holistic approach. collection, home visits and local campaigns to support
other health care professionals. Even before the pandemic
People were (and remain) highly cooperative with the was declared globally, these volunteers were monitoring
health care measures to help lower transmissions, such residents and following up with people who might have
as wearing masks, hand washing, social distancing had contact with any suspected case.
10 In July 2021, the “Phuket Sandbox” was inaugurated for fully vaccinated international visitors in an attempt to provide a boost to
the country’s decimated tourist sector, Thai News, “Phuket Sandbox inaugural flight welcomed with water salute”, 1 July 2021,
Available at https://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news/detail/TCATG210701222741427.
11 Thai Publica, “สำ�รวจมาตรการเยียวยาโควิดฯ แจกแล้ว 6 แสนล้านบาท,” [“Exploring Covid relief measures, distributing 6 hundred billion
baht”], 23 February 2021. Available at https://thaipublica.org/2021/02/include-money-giveaway-measures-fight-covid-19/.
12 Prachachat, “ครม. จ่ายเงินตอบแทนพิเศษ อสม. ต่ออีก 3 เดือน ถึง มิ.ย.,” [“The cabinet pay village health volunteers for 3 months more till
June,”] Prachachat Turakij, 30 March 2021. Available at https://www.prachachat.net/politics/news-639635.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in Thailand4 · Systemic implications of the pandemic
The health care sector experienced a mask crisis during the more proactive measures from the government to prevent
first wave of cases and needed to depend on donations. any further loss of jobs.
A “mask bank” was initiated to spread their availability.
For every mask purchased, another one was donated to Even though Thailand was celebrated as exemplar in
13
hospitals or vulnerable groups. its COVID-19 transmission control in the first wave,
subsequent policy debates revealed a degree of disparity,
Some businesses regarded the government measures to dissatisfaction and lack of trust that needed to be
control transmissions, such as the lockdown and curfew, addressed so that the pandemic could be controlled in
as directly hurting them, and they tended to cooperate a way that does not decrease social capital. This became
less. The economic repercussions were felt most heavily even more the case when the new wave occurred. This
by the small and medium-sized enterprises, where help is to set the stage before we consider the systemic
remains needed the most. These businesses would like implications of the pandemic in the next part
Systemic implications of the pandemic
The great powers’ rivalry collaborating with Thailand on some military exercises
and concluding arms deals. China even provided some
The China–United States tensions exacerbated further as arms at a price lower than what the United States had
a result of COVID-19, with both countries blaming each previously given. In fostering a comprehensive strategic
other for mismanagement of the disease. This could result partnership with Thailand, China looked to deepen the
in each power ending up prioritizing unilateral actions relationship in all aspects, including security.
and fostering bilateral relationships with allies instead of
using a multilateral framework in an already unbalanced With military spending rising globally, including in Asia,
world order. The rivalry between the two great powers China and the United States, as usual, are at the forefront
14
amid the uncertain atmosphere caused by the pandemic of military spending and foreign arms sales. The United
could be accentuated. States came back to Thailand after the country had
controversial elections in 2019 and renewed the arms sales
15
Thailand must tread carefully in its relations with these under foreign military sales. Both sides have continued
two powers. Thailand has maintained a balance with both the traditional large-scale military exercises with Thailand.
countries, trying not to offend one by having good ties But Thailand must be careful not to get roped into any
with the other, which is an increasingly difficult task. With strategic great-power push-and-pull game.
its major non-NATO ally status, Thailand has historically
been one of the closest friends in the region with the In recent years, Thailand seemed to be forging close ties
United States. When Thailand’s defence cooperation with with China, deepening bilateral relations in several areas.
the United States wound down due to an undemocratic It has cooperated on high-speed railways and announced
political transition, China stepped up to fill the niche by intentions in October 2020 to welcome Chinese tourists
13 “Mask Bank Project,” last modified n.d. Available at maskbank.org.
14 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “World military spending rises to almost $2 trillion in 2020,” 26 April 2021.
Available at https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/world-military-spending-rises-almost-2-trillion-2020
15 Bloomberg News, “China competes with US for weapons sales to Thailand,” 3 December 2019. Available at https://www.
bangkokpost.com/business/1807664/china-competes-with-us-for-weapons-sales-to-thailand.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in ThailandSystemic implications of the pandemic · 5
with a special visa once the pandemic-related border both great powers that it remains open to both countries,
16
restrictions open up. a fine balance indeed.
In celebrating 45 years of a relationship, Thailand hopes
to collaborate further with China on trade, technology Middle-power diplomacy
and innovations. China is indispensable to Thailand’s
economy, occupying the top spot as its biggest trading Middle powers are countries that do not possess the
partner. status of a great power in terms of economic or military
prowess but consistently have a role in international
The strategic competition was highlighted further through politics. They usually contribute to “niche” diplomacy,
the China–United States trade war, and the United States’ an area neglected by the great powers. What is more
Indo-Pacific Strategy, seen as directed against China. The debatable is whether they exhibit normative qualities or
recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic norm-conforming behaviours. Middle powers could be
Partnership (RCEP) also is perceived by some observers guided by norms, be it democratic values, human rights
as China’s further expansion of its zone of influence and or rule of law. Key players, such as Australia, Germany
mitigation of the United States’ influence in the region. and Japan, all contribute to international politics, abiding
Thailand, and ASEAN at large, might benefit from a by their middle-power status, such as emphasis on
production base expansion, bolstered regional supply international legal principles and multilateral order. The
chains and an increase in some exported goods, but middle powers’ increasing engagement in international
it still risks losing out in trade from Chinese dumping. politics and conflict transformation provide opportunities
Thailand thus needs to diversify its trade relationships for smaller countries to avoid getting locked into the
further into other markets while referring to the ASEAN great powers’ rivalry.
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific vision, which is more neutral
17
and inclusive. While the pandemic has exacerbated the rivalry of the
two great powers, it has opened up a number of areas
Amid this rivalry, Thailand has attempted to rebalance for the middle powers to increase their role. This does not
without downplaying either relationship yet avoiding mean that they will not find an ally in one of the great
overdependence on either country. This is going to be powers. But at least the normative value will be intact and
increasingly difficult due to the assistance Thailand has can gradually transform some aspects of foreign policy to
received from China in terms of vaccine donations and be more informed by desirable norms. For instance, the
its vaccine purchases from China. The pandemic has trend of the United States’ disengagement in Asia during
not halted the geopolitical rivalry between the two the Trump administration made it more possible for the
superpowers. Actually, the tensions with the United middle powers to collaborate with China in the “freed-
States increased when China, first blamed as the cause up space”, such as on green issues and environmental
of the pandemic, seemed to come out better looking in protection.
terms of transmission control and its pledge to distribute
its vaccines to Asia first. Thailand aims to demonstrate When the United States started the process to withdraw
18
its capability in pandemic management while reassuring from the Paris Agreement in 2017, closer collaboration
between the European Union countries and China
16 Bangkokbiz news, ““พิพัฒน์” อัพเดตไทม์ไลน์ใหม่ นักท่องเที่ยวจีนบินเข้าสุวรรณภูมิ-ภูเก็ต วันที่ 20 กับ 26 ต.ค.นี,้ ” [“Pipat” updated new
Timeline for Chinese tourists flying into Suvarnabhumi-Phuket October 20 and 26”], 10 October 2020. Available at https://www.
bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/901902.
17 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 22 June 2019, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/
ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf.
18 Matt McGrath, “Climate change: US formally withdraws from Paris agreement”, BBC News, 4 November 2020. Available at
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54797743.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in Thailand6 · Systemic implications of the pandemic
in the area of climate change was bound to happen. role of a broker in conflict transformation, adhering to
The United States re-joined the Paris Agreement international legal principles. Thailand performed this
19
recently (April 2021) , but the European Union still role well when it was country coordinator for China-
practises diversification in terms of green diplomacy. ASEAN relations to stabilize the situation in the South
From environmental standards, the European Union China Sea, to the satisfaction of the actors involved.
is cooperating with other international organizations, ASEAN was looked upon further to help coordinate the
such as the International Labour Organization and Code of Conduct.
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, to run a programme to enhance respect Amid the great powers’ rivalry, the middle powers might
for labour rights and responsible business conduct, in be influenced to take a stronger stance and to “side”
partnership with China, Japan, Myanmar, the Philippines, with the great powers. If so, Thailand, together with the
20
Thailand and Vietnam. These are important trading other ASEAN member countries, may have the difficult,
partners with potential for responsible supply chains. but not unmanageable, task to engage with China in
multilateral dialogue to steer it away from unilateral
This has direct implications for any country that wants to actions as best as possible. They can do this by keeping a
conduct a diplomacy of balance to avoid overdependence, channel of communication open as well as engaging on
such as Thailand. In diversifying its relationships, Thailand any conflict at hand, such as maritime security.
should look to the other middle powers for further
collaboration in the areas of environment, technology
and non-traditional security issues, disease control Deliberalization and deglobalization in the post-
included. The ASEAN Regional Forum, with which ASEAN pandemic world
is more or less attempting to remain in the driver’s seat,
provides a multilateral forum for stakeholders outside There are concerns that COVID-19 may have destabilizing
the region with interests in security issues in Asia and effects on democracy and/or the democratization process.
the Pacific. Although China and the United States are A number of measures aimed to contain the spread of
involved in the ASEAN Regional Forum, the other eight COVID-19 have posed negative repercussions for people’s
dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, European Union, rights and freedoms. China, for example, imposed
India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the Russian drastic measures to curb transmission of the coronavirus,
21
Federation), along with other countries, joined to discuss including surveillance, and claimed successful results
issues of common interest that avoid specific reciprocity. because of the restrictive measures. There is a real danger
This is valued by Thailand and other ASEAN member from general interpretation that the most effective way
countries as opportunity to branch out, with ASEAN to control a viral transmission includes the sacrificing of
centrality at the core. Non-traditional security issues, by rights not as an exception but as a rule.
nature, are cross-cutting and do not always follow the
given geopolitical alignments. Thailand is particularly vulnerable, given its past political
incidents and current turmoil. The Emergency Decree
Thailand geopolitically serves as a “hub”, leading it to issued to tackle the COVID-19 situation was criticized as a
be well positioned strategically. This is even more evident tool to control people’s freedom of expression and access
when viewing Thailand in the ASEAN context under of information. In its attempts to combat “fake” news,
the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. In a number the government also extended containment imperatives
of cases, Thailand has been expected to perform the
19 H. J. Mai, “U.S. officially rejoins Paris Agreement on climate change,” NPR, 19 February 2021. Available at https://www.npr.
org/2021/02/19/969387323/u-s-officially-rejoins-paris-agreement-on-climate-change.
20 European Union, “Responsible Supply Chains in Asia,” last modified n.d. Available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
march/tradoc_156624.pdf.
21 Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong, and Aaron Krolik, “In coronavirus fight, china gives citizens a color code, with red Flags,” The New
York Times, 28 January 2021. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia Focus Topic #1: Geopolitics of the PandemicSystemic implications of the pandemic · 7
to anti-government criticism, as Amnesty International volatility and divisions created by the pandemic that
22
pointed out. barred the movement of trade, know-how and people.
Lacking pandemic leadership from a technocratic This has placed Thailand at an uneasy junction. As noted,
organization, such as the World Health Organization Thailand is working to avoid overdependence on any
(WHO), there have been temptations for governments to one country, but it might still suffer from smaller export
centralize and consolidate their powers. Data privacy has markets due to encroachment by Vietnam. Income
been sacrificed in the name of pandemic containment. inequality has worsened, and it might be more difficult
Extending emergency powers may have created long- for Thailand to catch up, considering it is still climbing
term instability. Rather than feeling secure, people may the innovation ladder. These efforts to attract FDIs for
feel threatened. ‘new S-Curve’ industries such as robotics, aviation and
logistics, and biofuels must go hand in hand with income
The illiberal effect can manifest in the increasing redistribution.
adversity towards migrant workers and marginalization
of vulnerable groups of people. Transparency, good
governance and accountability, already elusive, have Trust deficit and the politics of vaccines
deteriorated due to the pandemic. But this might compel
the authorities to hastily decide on policies without Although the Thai government was praised in terms of
complete information. Thailand needs to be careful, now its COVID-19 transmission control in the first wave, the
more than ever, in controlling the spread of the disease economic losses and unequal access to the monetary
but not at the expense of people’s goodwill and rights. assistance have deteriorated the public trust. The current
political turmoil signifies that some citizens have lost trust
Internationally, the liberal order might experience a in the government. Without quick, transparent, inclusive
regressive effect from the COVID-19 containment and participatory management to restore that trust, it
measures imposing restrictions contrary to the notion of could pose long-term volatility for the country.
“free” and “open”. Countries might emphasize regional
blocs rather than placing trust in global institutional order. Ironically, past pandemics have made the world realize the
necessity of international cooperation and international
Even before COVID-19, we were warned of a deglobalizing organizations for global health governance. It might
trend in world politics. Deglobalization includes mitigated be different in the case of COVID-19. The pandemic
interdependence, manifested in increasing protectionist has exposed several limitations in the one international
measures. Not only in economic terms do we see the organization, the WHO, tasked with running global
deglobalizing trends but also in political aspects. The health governance. It has cost the WHO credibility and
pandemic might be accelerating the deglobalizing trends cooperation from some members.
even further by creating doubt of mutual reciprocity. At
the onset of the pandemic, some export restrictions were The United States’ announced withdrawal from the
23
imposed out of fear of domestic scarcity of necessities, WHO, which would have taken effect in July 2021, and
such as medical supplies. Countries had to look for China’s delay in submitting key information regarding
alternative supply chains and made sustained attempts the origins of the coronavirus both affected trust in the
to reduce strategic vulnerabilities in the procurement of global multilateral mechanism and pointed towards a
essential goods, moving from a “just-in-time” to a “just- trend of unilateralism. Even when the United States
in-case” rationale. This was also a result of geopolitical under President Biden pledged its renewed support for
22 Amnesty International, They Are Always Watching: Restricting Freedom of Expression Online in Thailand (London, Amnesty
International, 2020).
23 BBC News, “Coronavirus: Trump moves to pull US out of World Health Organization,” 7 July 2020. Available at https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-us-canada-53327906.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in Thailand8 · Systemic implications of the pandemic
24
the WHO, the organization was already viewed as Asia and beyond. Vaccinations approved for full use
politicized. The coronavirus posed tremendous strain on could potentially alter the geopolitical landscape, creating
global health care service, especially in poorer countries. new dependencies and new hegemonies. It is true that
The WHO’s loss of leading roles in global health the pandemic has propelled advancements in science,
governance might be the basis for renewed effort for a biotechnology and medicine, with larger investments in
regional mechanism. The ASEAN ministers, for instance, these areas. But technology and innovations have vast
25
endorsed a COVID-19 Response Fund in 2020. effects on the geopolitical balance, which could create
inequalities in less-equipped countries. The wealthier
The WHO launched the Access to COVID-19 Tools nations are in possession of most of the vaccines available.
Accelerator to bring together different sectors to
collaborate globally to ensure timely development and As of now, Thailand is considered slow in its vaccine roll-
production of the vaccines as well as equitable access. out, and the majority of vaccines used so far were bought
One of the Accelerator’s components is the COVID-19 from or donated by China. Some Thais even visited the US
Vaccines Global Access, or COVAX facility, with almost to receive more effective vaccines while the US donated
26
200 countries participating. This initiative aims to ensure some to Thailand to help protect medical professionals.
that countries have fair access to the vaccines. COVAX Thailand’s neighbouring countries (Cambodia, the Lao
provides an international platform to support vaccine People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Vietnam)
production as well as manage the pricing to ensure will be receiving vaccine allocations from COVAX. To
that the participating countries can access the vaccines. join COVAX, Thailand had to pre-pay, leading it to
It was nevertheless accused of avoiding the root cause prioritize direct agreements with manufacturers. This
since it cannot bypass the intellectual property rights to led to Thailand being heavily criticized for not joining
encourage local production and dissemination. earlier. Local production of AstraZeneca, through Siam
Bioscience, only recently began and could not adequately
27 29
China joined the COVAX facility in October 2020. serve local demands. Again, trust (or the lack thereof)
President Biden reversed the previous administration’s continues to have a crucial role. Initial accusations argued
28
decision not to join. The United States’ prior actions left that the Thai government had not adequately supported
countries with concerns that, should the United States a domestically researched and produced COVID-19
have viable vaccines, it would prioritize its domestic vaccine. This was later countered by the National Vaccine
30
population. China also tried to garner trust by leading the Institute as distorted information. Reports in April 2021
world in vaccine candidates. Both Beijing and Washington that the Institute refused to buy BioNTech-Pfizer vaccines
have recently ramped up vaccine exports to Southeast offered by the company, and overall doubts whether US
24 Karen Weintraub, “Biden administration renewed support for World Health Organization is ‘good news for America and the
world,’ scientists say,” USA Today, 22 January 2021. Available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2021/01/22/
scientists-applaud-biden-decision-rejoin-world-health-organization/4243377001/.
25 Jim Gomez, “ASEAN ministers endorse new COVID-19 response fund,” The Diplomat, 10 April 2020. Available at https://
thediplomat.com/2020/04/asean-ministers-endorse-new-covid-19-response-fund/.
26 World Health Organization, ACT Now, ACT Together: 2020-2021 Impact Report (Geneva, 2021): 9.
27 Colin Qian, and Stephanie Nebehay, “China joins WHO-backed vaccine programme COVAX rejected by Trump,” Reuters, 9 October
2020. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-covax-idUSKBN26U027.
28 Emily Rauhala, “Biden to reengage with World Health Organization, will join global vaccine effort,” Washington Post, 21 January
2021. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/biden-administration-who-covax/2021/01/20/3ddc25ce-5a8c-11eb-
aaad-93988621dd28_story.html.
29 Online Reporters, “Siam Bioscience-produced AstraZeneca vaccine passes quality testing,” Bangkok Post, 9 May 2021. Available at
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2112755/siam-bioscience-produced-astrazeneca-vaccine-passes-quality-testing.
30 Manager Online, “สถาบันวัคซีนฯ โต้ข่าวรัฐไม่หนุนผลิตวัคซีนโควิด-19 ชี้ข้อมูลคลาดเคลื่อน,” [“National Vaccine Institute countered the
news that the state did not support covid-19 vaccine production, pointing out that the information is distorted”], 5 September
2020. Available at https://mgronline.com/uptodate/detail/9630000091173.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in ThailandSystemic implications of the pandemic · 9
donated vaccines will be allocated appropriately have Digitization of geopolitics
31
only perpetuated the mistrust. By July 2021, with
COVID numbers growing rapidly, sustained efforts were The digitization of geopolitics and potential decoupling
underway by public authorities and private entities to of United States and Chinese technology is complicating
procure US-produced vaccines such as Pfizer, Moderna the situation further. If the vaccine diplomacy is about
as well as Johnson & Johnson. Thailand decided to join exercising vaccines aid relating to geopolitical leverage,
COVAX with considerable delay and is expected to receive geopolitical rivalry as such also happens along the digital
32
first shipments through this channel in early 2022. line. We have seen the recent “tech war” between China
and the United States, with the latter, together with
There are increasing breakthrough cases especially among European countries, phasing out Chinese technology
medical professionals, leading to public demands for and companies due to security concerns. A number of
better-quality vaccines that should have been provided countries have banned some Chinese apps. China now
timely by the government. Moreover, currently available focuses more on domestically developed innovations as a
vaccines seem less effective for a number of variants. development path.
Other vaccines will be available later through private
medical establishments, for a fee, which is provoking This is closely linked to geopolitics. India banned more
concerns for unequal access and increasing burden for Chinese apps as the situation at their shared border
33
the healthcare system. This will eventually delay the worsened. National security was used as justification
vaccination roll-out if the government does not manage for the United States to ban some of the Chinese apps
the situation efficiently, equipped with clear public under the Trump administration. Though later halted
communications. by US courts, the Biden administration shares many of
35
those concerns. The China–United States tech war in
China made it clear to ASEAN countries that Southeast itself is seen as a response to disparities in geopolitical
34
Asia would be a priority to receive its vaccines. It also pursuits. The United States tried to prevent technology
pledged to help with the ASEAN COVID-19 Respond and know-how from being transferred to its competitors.
Fund. This, in a way, raised concerns that China was What we know from past experiences, the countries that
expanding its sphere of influence yet again. If its vaccines hold cutting-edge technology will win advantage in any
prove to be less effective, geopolitical leverage will go geopolitical rivalry.
the other way. In a world where effective vaccines are the
new status symbol, the future of “vaccine diplomacy” This is an evolving trend that is complicated further by the
seems not to depend on the fastest delivery, but on which pandemic. The COVID-19-induced “new normal” has
vaccines are being shipped out. Thailand must overcome accelerated the digital economy and digital technology
administrative encumbrance to conduct a multipronged adoption. It has also expanded the digital divide and
vaccine track policy to diversify the risks of overreliance inequalities. The digital “have-nots” will eventually lose
and regain public trust. out, which makes the development path more dependent
on countries that possess technology and know-how.
31 Matichon Online, “ผอ.สถาบันวัคซีนฯ โต้ข่าวปลอม ยันไม่เคยปฏิเสธไฟเซอร์ ลั่นจองซื้อ 10 ล้านโดส ส่งไตรมาส3,” [“The Director of National
Vaccine Institute countered fake news, confirming no rejection to Pfizer occurred, saying 10 million doses are reserved to be
delivered in the third quarter”], 27 April 2021. Available at https://www.matichon.co.th/local/quality-life/news_2694177.
32 CAN, “Thailand reports record new COVID-19 cases for second day, apologises for slow vaccine roll-out”, 22 July 2021. Available
at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/thailand-record-daily-covid-19-cases-vaccine-slow-roll-out-covax-15266524.
33 Infoquest, “สมาคม รพ.เอกชน เตรียมจับมือให้บริการวัคซีนโควิด MODERNA ราคากว่า 3 พันบาท/2 เข็ม,” [“Private Hospitals Association
collaborate to offer MODERNA vaccine service, costing more than three thousand baht per 2 doses”], 6 May 2021. Available at
https://www.infoquest.co.th/2021/84146.
34 “China promises to prioritize corona vaccines for ASEAN,” VOI, 17 October 2020. Available at https://voi.id/en/news/17059/china-
promises-to-prioritize-corona-vaccines-for-asean.
35 Straits Times, “Chinese apps could face subpoenas or bans under Biden order: Sources”, 18 June 2021, Available at https://www.
straitstimes.com/world/united-states/chinese-apps-could-face-subpoenas-or-bans-under-biden-order-sources
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in Thailand10 · Systemic implications of the pandemic
It is similar in the political arena. In the lockdown era, we the system was not always reliable. Technology is being
have seen political movements and activities intensified integrated into the fight against COVID-19, and it seems
in social media and online platforms, with causes in that it is here to stay.
different countries linked together. Quality content and
digital literacy along with cybersecurity are all intertwined Thailand is well aware of the importance of digitization of
and more necessary than ever before. Since the onset of geopolitics and the tech war. There have been concerns
the COVID-19 pandemic, more cyberattacks were bound that the tech war would put Thailand into a tight spot
to occur, leaving people and sensitive data vulnerable. because Thai companies that use the Chinese apps in
business would face obstructions. While the United
In Thailand, the Computer-Related Crime Act can be States banned Huawei, Thailand welcomed Huawei
used to ban any websites considered wrongful as well as initiatives to help combat COVID-19 as well as support
hold people accountable for them. Even though we see its 5G efforts. Huawei gave artificial intelligence solutions
online political movements that blur the line of states, and 5G technology to help with COVID-19 diagnosing
36
there might be an increase in cyberspace fragmentation at Siriraj and Ramathibodi hospitals and the Huawei
and online platforms specific to groups of countries that Telemedicine Solution with video conferencing capacity
a VPN might not always be able to overcome. to hospitals and the Ministry of Public Health.
This becomes more of an issue when we see how much In increasing its competitiveness as well as capacity
technology or tech-based solutions are used to respond in combating COVID-19, Thailand cannot avoid close
to and/or combat the spread of the coronavirus. Online collaboration with China in terms of technology.
tracking, contact tracing, remote meetings with health Thailand, of course, has focused more on being a
care professionals, contactless communications when tech manufacturing base, with some relocations of
quarantined—all are viable examples of technology being industries assisted by government initiatives to facilitate
used to support the public health response. In Thailand, business. However, it needs even more accommodating
people are required to register online for vaccines where infrastructure to adopt advanced technology and increase
investment, supported by political stability.
Conclusion
At the junction with the change of administration in the along with the “race for vaccines” and balancing
United States government, it remains to be seen whether regional and international multilateral frameworks, such
the rivalry between the great powers in geopolitical terms, as ASEAN and the United Nations organs. In the post-
with implications towards trade and technology, will ease pandemic world, there is temptation for governments
up. Some critics are of the opinion that the new United to concentrate and consolidate power at the expense of
States administration will not revert from containing the liberal democratization. Nonetheless, Thailand must not
rise of China, be it in a subtler way. Thailand is poised forget that social justice and participatory democracy
to conduct a policy of balance between the two great must also inform its pursuit to achieve sustainable results.
powers, which will become increasingly difficult. The
pandemic has further complicated the geopolitical rivalry
36 Bangkok Post, “Huawei and Siriraj Hospital sign MoU to develop 5G smart services powered by cloud and artificial intelligence,”
2 December 2020. Available at https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/pr/2028971/huawei-and-siriraj-hospital-sign-mou-to-
develop-5g-smart-services-powered-by-cloud-and-artificial-intelligence.
Systemic Implications of the COVID-19 Crisis in Asia: Geopolitics of the Pandemic in ThailandAbout the author: Imprint
Kasira Cheeppensook is a lecturer of International © 2021 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Relations at Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia
University, Assistant Dean in Academic Affairs and Deputy 7500A Beach Road #12-320/321/322
Director of the Centre for Social and Development The Plaza, Singapore 199591
Studies. After receiving a BA in Political Science majoring
in International Relations from Chulalongkorn University, Responsible:
she completed an MPhil in International Relations at Vesna Rodic | Director of the FES Thailand Office
the University of Cambridge and a PhD in International T: +65 6297 6760 | F: +65 6297 6762
Relations at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. Her interests include ASEAN, normative asia.fes.de
transition and human security. FESinAsia
FESinAsia
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily
those of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Commercial use of all media published by the
Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted
without the written consent of the FES.
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is the oldest political foundation in Germany.
Founded in 1925, it is named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president
of Germany. FES is committed to the advancement of both socio-political and economic
development in the spirit of social democracy, through civic education, research, and
international cooperation.
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has actively supported social democracy in Thailand since 1970.
The work of the country office based in Bangkok aims at facilitating inclusive dialogue,
participation, pluralism, rule of law, social justice and nonviolent conflict resolution.
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