SYRIA CRISIS REGIONAL OVERVIEW 2018 - Sida
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SYRIA CRISIS
REGIONAL OVERVIEW 2018
with annexed chapters on Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey
December 2017
Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget
is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year as to ensure
predictability for humanitarian organizations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort
to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles, Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective
indicators and parameters of which the most important are related to the number of affected people,
vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to
forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another
part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and
deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian
situation throughout the year, including additional funding to Syria crisis
For 2018, the Syria crisis is allocated an initial 355 Million Swedish Kronor (MSEK). Close monitoring
of the crisis will continue throughout the year for potentially additional funding or amendments.
The Humanitarian Crisis Analysis (HCA) for the Syria crisis applies a regional approach, including Syria and
neighboring countries hosting a vast number of Syrian refugees such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.
Humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees in Iraq will be included in the Humanitarian Crisis Analysis for Iraq.
Egypt has been excluded from this analysis due to Sida´s limited humanitarian support to the Egypt. However,
it should be noted that the UN’s Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) includes all 5 countries
mentioned above and excludes Syria which has its own separate humanitarian response plan (HRP).
The following sections below highlights briefly some common features of the crisis. A more in-depth analysis
per country is referred to in annexed respective country chapters.
1. FEATURES OF THE REGIONAL SYRIA CRISIS
1.1 Summary
In March 2017 the conflict in Syria entered its seventh year. With the geo-political dynamics significantly
evolving throughout 2017, the scope of humanitarian needs remains much at the same level compared with
the situation given a year ago. The scale, severity and complexity of needs across Syria remains
overwhelming. According to 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), 13.1 million people are estimated
in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria, with 5.6 million of them presenting acute needs. 11.2 million
people are being targeted for humanitarian assistance. Some of the most vulnerable people inside Syria are
the 2.98 million people living in hard-to-reach areas including 419,000 people living in UN-declared besieged
areas as well as the 420,000 Palestinian refugees residing inside Syria. 6.1 million people are internally
displaced, many of them multiple times. There are 5.6 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries
including 2 million Syrian registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 3.5 million Syrians
registered by the Government of Turkey, as well as more than 30,000 Syrian refugees registered in North
Africa (UNHCR data, March 2018). A small number of refugees have been able to return to Syria as safe,
dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place. In 2017 an estimated 721,000 displaced people
including 66,000 refugees returned to their area of origin, which is a slight increase compared with 2016. At
the same time, hostilities continue, resulting with an estimated average of 6,550 displacements per day.
OCHA estimates 700,000 returns in 2018 but in parallel 2.2-2.3 million displacements are anticipated to take
place.
Civilians in Syria continue to face an ongoing protection crisis. Breaches of International Humanitarian Law
(IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) are continuously being reported. Indiscriminate armed
attacks cause not only human loss but a great destruction of health facilities, schools, market places and
houses, leaving people with a very limited access to basic services and housing facilities.
1The highest burden of refugees remains within the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan
with respective 3.2 million, 1 million and 656,000 registered refugees (UNHCR, Dec 2017). Still, the numbers
of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan cannot be seen reflecting the actual figure of refugees since registration
activities ceased in 2015. The estimated number of refugees are rather 1.5 million in Lebanon and 1.3 million
in Jordan.
The harsh conditions for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan have forced people into poverty and thus made
them extremely vulnerable. Cessation of registration and aggravating factors to renewal of registration, put a
large number of refugees into an illegal status lacking legal documentation. These people have been deprived
many of their basic rights such as the right to protection, health care, education, basic services etc. Livelihood
opportunities are few and a majority of refugees are living under the poverty line with negative coping
mechanisms seen consequently. Child labor and early marriages are increasing in numbers, likewise is the
prevalence of Gender Based Violence (GBV). Women and men, boys and girls are exposed to sexual
violence and in addition boys and men are at risk of forced conscription or recruitment into armed groups in
Syria and of labor exploitation in countries where they sought asylum. The lack of legal documentation in
Lebanon and Jordan puts people at risk of deportation, and evictions of refugees from the informal tented
settlements (ITSs) in Lebanon are taking place en masse. The refugee influx to neighboring countries has
added a socio-economic burden overstretching their own national resources. Despite generosity from
receiving countries and mobilized burden-sharing international financial support, refugees are exposed to an
intolerant and hostile environment in host countries. In Lebanon where 25 % of the population compose of
refugees, the national rhetoric strongly articulates that refugees should return to Syria.
Over 3.2 million registered Syrian refugees live in Turkey. Out of these, almost 230,000 people are hosted in
21 camps run by the Turkish authorities, where refugees are accessing proper shelter, health- and
educational services, food and social activities. Most Syrian refugees live outside the camps, under very
challenging circumstances with depleted resources. Registered refugees have access to public services,
including education and healthcare. However, for many refugees, accessing these basic facilities is often
difficult for various reasons, including problems in registering with local authorities and the language barrier.
All in all, the Syria crisis remains the largest displacement crisis of the world today with the conflict being the
principal driver of humanitarian needs and the civilian population being exposed to significant protection risks
which threaten their lives, dignity and wellbeing.
1.2 Returns
Over 721,000 people, including approximately 66,000 refugees, have spontaneously returned to their areas
of origin as of October 2017 (compared to 560,000 total returnees reported in 2016). Humanitarian actors
anticipate a lower number of refugee return compared to IDP returns, based on information from an IOM
conducted intention survey. In neighboring countries, the pressure on Syrians to return permeates the rhetoric
at all political levels. In Lebanon, the President urged the international community for a repatriation campaign
to be organized, although assuring that no force would be exerted. However, a new refugee policy is being
prepared by the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign affairs which promotes a transfer from refugee
status to “commuter” status, deportation of those who are convicted and restricting border entries. UNHCR
does not promote, nor facilitate the return of refugees to Syria, assessing the prevailing prerequisites for
organizing safe, dignified and durable returns not in place UNHCR in neighboring countries has expanded
its protection response to monitor returns and to provide humanitarian assistance as necessary.
1.3 Cross border and UNSC 2165
As part of the Whole of Syria response (WoS), humanitarian assistance is delivered partly to Syria via cross-
border delivery from Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. UNSCR 2165, adopted in 2014, stipulates four crossing points
at the Syrian border; two at the border with Turkey; one at the border of Jordan; and one at the border of
Iraq, in addition to the border crossings in use before adoption of 2165.
These border crossings fall outside the control of the Syrian government. 2.76 million people in need were
reached every month on average through cross-border operations (OCHA data, Jan-Aug 2017) providing
life-saving interventions to people who would otherwise not be accessed from Damascus. The cross-line
2delivery of humanitarian assistance from Damascus cannot replace the cross-border delivery much
depending on security issues and the GoS´s track record of being extremely bureaucratic putting up
procedures that delay or to a high extent prevent aid from being delivered.
Note: The UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on UNSCR 2165 (now referred to as 2393) in December 2017
resulting in favour of a one-year extension (with minor revision) of the resolution, now expiring on Dec 31st,
2018.
1.4 Synergies with Development Assistance
Creating synergies between humanitarian and development programming is a major priority. Sida is
approaching mid-term of the implementation of its regional Syria Crisis Strategy (2016-2020), with the
objective of building resilience in Syria and neighboring countries, by focusing on basic services, livelihoods,
GBV, supporting civil society and human rights. The strategy appropriates around 340 MSEK per year in
development funding, almost doubling the total Sida contribution of the Syria crisis response and with an
explicit aim to relieve the burden off- and complement the humanitarian response. Funding within the regional
Syria Crisis Strategy supports partners implementing segments of the HRP and the 3RP.
Complementarities between the two streams of funding have actively been sought, both through joint analysis
and financing choices. Contributions under the strategy, that are particularly relevant for complementarity
include, for example;
• In Lebanon and Jordan, Sida supports the World Bank Global Concessional Financing Facility which
provides financing on concessional terms for projects that are part of these countries' development
agenda and which benefit both Syrian refugees and affected host communities.
• For the region affected by the Syria crisis, including Syria, Sida supports UNFPA’s Multi-country
strategy to respond to gender-based violence in the Syrian crisis.
• Inside Syria Sida supports the Whole of Syria Livelihoods Consortium, comprising six different
(primarily humanitarian) INGOs with ongoing humanitarian programs in the country, over a three-year
period. The purpose of the initiative is to improve the livelihoods for internally displaced persons and
the host communities in which they live.
The development strategy has also enabled humanitarian financing to stand even more firmly on its life-
saving mandate. Sida has since 2016 continuously adjusted its humanitarian assistance by increasing the
share of funding to emergency and front-line humanitarian responders and multi-sector refugee response by
increasing its support to the CBPFs, SRC, UNHCR, and NRC. At the same time, in the protracted crisis
setting, also humanitarian programming must contribute positively, when and as much as possible, to the
resilience of the population.
Going forward, within the framework of Sida’s humanitarian assistance, Sida will prioritize the following as
part of its approach to strengthening synergies with relief and development.
(a) creating further complementarities with Sida development funding, particularly when partners are
shared, including by promoting the phasing-in of development funding when relevant;
(b) advocating for the Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) and the humanitarian leadership to take a
catalytical role in linking planning and programming with parallel processes in the areas of resilience,
stabilization, and development to bring in development funding to strengthen the resilience of the
population and public institutions, including in the more stable areas of Syria;
(c) building local capacities, particularly those of civil society actors, to respond to crises, and where
possible enable international partners to hand over services (like GBV and Child Protection) to
national counterparts;
(d) promoting a further consolidation of cash programs as part of the refugee response and their
transformation into social safety net systems; and promoting a transition to cash assistance, also in
Syria, where possible.
1.5 Cash transfer programs (CTP)
According to data from OCHA´s Financial Tracking System (FTS), Syria, Lebanon and Jordan received 59%
of all cash-based programming funds in 2015. Turkey is not accounted for since the Swedish support to
3Syrian refugees is administered by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). The largest proportion of
cash-based programming was delivered in Syria (33%), driven largely by programs implemented by UNRWA
for Palestinian refugees residing in Syria. Jordan and Lebanon received a combined 26% of the reported
funding for cash-based programming in 2015, of which 97% was delivered under the Syria regional refugee
response plan (3RP).
Sida´s contribution 2017 in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan has channeled cash-based support to UNHCR,
UNRWA, ICRC, NRC, SRK, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and via the CBPF-support. This included a
combination of unconditioned/unrestricted and conditioned/restricted cash transfer programs within
unearmarked and earmarked funds.
During the first half of 2017 there was an initiative taken jointly by DfID and ECHO to transform the
programmatic modality of Multi-Purpose Cash (MPC) in Lebanon. In brief, this model (named the Single
Agency Model) took on a harmonized program approach for MPC programs with one agency delivering MPC
support, governed by an independent governance structure and monitored by an independent M&E body.
The model encountered much resistance from aid organizations to an extent that the role-out had to be halted
in June 2017. However, DfID decided to move forward with the One Single Agency model and signed an
agreement with WFP for a two-year program. This program is now also being funded by ECHO, Norway and
Germany.
Sweden, through Sida and MFA has engaged in the MPC discussion in Lebanon from when it was initiated,
without taking any official position. An in-depth understanding of what could be at stake has been gained by
numerous discussions with relevant partners. One advantage with consolidated MPC programs is the
potential link to national social safety net programs. In Turkey, ECHO has launched its biggest humanitarian
program yet through the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) which provided over one million of the most
vulnerable refugees in Turkey with cash transfers as well as social assistance. ESSN ins implemented in
collaboration with WFP and the Turkish Red Crescent. However, the outlook of creating such a durable
linkage cannot be seen realistic in Lebanon.
1.6 Partners and funding
In 2017 the initial allocation for the Syria crisis amounted 315 MSEK and by December 15th a total of 441
MSEK had been disbursed. The initial budget for the Syria crisis in 2018 is 350 MSEK. Three new partners
submitted initial submissions requesting funds for either Syria, Jordan and/or Lebanon, where two of them
were accepted for funding for projects inside Syria. In addition, Sida is proposing to fund WHO in Syria based
on the acute needs within the health sector combined with the lack of health partners that can cover a vast
geographic area within Sida´s Syria crisis portfolio. One partner was funded in Syria in 2017 and submitted
a 3-year proposal for a different kind of program for 2018-2020. This proposal was rejected since it was
assessed of being too development oriented in a geographical area that is still very unstable. Save the
Children have a 3-year funding already agreed upon in 2017.
It is essential for Sida to continue supporting OCHA at the regional and country levels through different
instruments to continue to play an important and active role in influencing decisions related to structure,
management and coordination.
Given the figures of 11.2 million people targeted in Syria (HRP) and 5.3 in refugee hosting countries (3RP),
the aim has been to remain with at least 60% or more of the total funding allocated to Syria.
The division between the total funding is UN 38.5%, non-governmental partners including the ICRC at 38.5%
and CBPF 23%.
41.7 Funding table
SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA CRISIS IN 2018
Recommended partner for Sida Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or Proposed amount
support multi sectorial programming) by Sida (in MSEK)
REGIONAL
UNHCR (Regional 3RP) Multi sector support covering Jordan, 30
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt
UNRWA (Emergency appeal) Multi sector support covering Syria, Jordan 25
and Lebanon
OCHA (Regional office (WoS), Humanitarian Coordination 10
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon)
TOTAL REGIONAL 65 (19%)
SYRIA
UNICEF Non-earmarked funding to UNICEF's 25
humanitarian program, Whole of Syria,
multi-sector support
UNHCR Non-earmarked to UNHCR's humanitarian 25
program, Whole of Syria multi-sector
support
WHO Non-earmarked funding to humanitarian 20
health program, Whole of Syria
Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF) OCHA Country Based Pooled Fund, 20
Damascus based for Syria
Turkey Humanitarian fund (THF) OCHA Country Based Pooled Fund, 25
Turkey based cross-border into Syria
International Red Cross Non-earmarked to ICRC's appeal, multi- 20
Committee (ICRC) sector
Swedish Red Cross (SRC) Support to IFRC Emergency Appeal 20
Islamic Relief (IR) Emergency Health 15
Norwegian Refugee Council Non-earmarked multi sector support 10
(NRC)
International Rescue Health program support 10
Committee(IRC)
Save the Children (SCI) Child protection support 7
Action Contre La Faim (ACF) Non-earmarked to Food-, Wash- and 5
Nutrition programs
Church of Sweden (CoS) Child protection, Psychosocial support 4
TOTAL SYRIA 206 (59%)
LEBANON
Lebanon Humanitarian Fund OCHA Country-based Pooled Funds for 15
(LHF) Lebanon
International Red Cross Non-earmarked to ICRC's appeal, multi- 10
Committee (ICRC) sector
Swedish Red Cross (SRC) WASH, Psychosocial support 5
International Rescue Protection (GBV) 5
Committee(IRC)
Norwegian Refugee Council Non-earmarked multi sector support 10
(NRC)
Lebanon INGO forum (included in Coordination, Advocacy 1
NRC agreement)
TOTAL LEBANON 46 (13%)
5JORDAN
Jordan Humanitarian Fund (JHF) OCHA Country Based Pooled Fund for 20
Jordan and cross border for Syria
Norwegian Refugee Council Non-earmarked multi sector support 12
(NRC)
Jordan INGO forum (include in Coordination, Advocacy 1
NRC agreement)
TOTAL JORDAN 33 (9%)
GRAND TOTAL 350 (100 %)
ADDITIONAL MULTI YEAR RESILIENCE FOCUSED FUNDING
Recommended Sector/focus of work (incl. Multi-year support
1 Proposed amount
partner for Sida integrated or multi category B
(in MSEK)
support sectorial programming)
Save the Children Child protection Lebanon Year 2/3
5
(SCI)
1 Sida supports multi-year humanitarian interventions with one of the following purposes:
a. Humanitarian assistance in protracted crises, in line with multi-year Humanitarian Response Plan (only in contexts with
multi-year humanitarian planning)
b. Transition/phase out of humanitarian assistance (handing over to development and national/local actors according to a
proposed plan within a specific time-frame).
c. Humanitarian assistance in specifically hard-to-reach areas. Based on the observation that in many of today’s humanitarian
contexts, few actors tend to have access to those with the greatest needs, Sida would like to encourage partners to build
strong and durable relations with concerned stakeholders in a view to facilitate swift and efficient access also to areas
considered more challenging to reach.
6SYRIA CRISIS / SYRIA
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ANALYSIS 2018
December 2017
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW
1.1. Type of crisis
In March 2018, the conflict in Syria will end seven years of duration, entering its eighth year. 13.1 million
people are assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance including 6.1 million internally displaced people
(IDPs), many of them displaced multiple times. The conflict has killed over 350,000 people, including 100,000
civilians and caused a large-scale displacement with a large spill over to several of the neighboring countries.
Close to 5.6 million Syrian are residing in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt
and the rest of North Africa. Turkey stands with the highest case-load of 3.5 million Syrian refugees, followed
by Lebanon and Jordan with respectively 1 million and 659 000 registered refugees from Syria, the two latter
being a far too underestimated figure. The Syria crisis remains the world´s largest displacement crisis.
Who controls what in Syria is rather complex and requires a map to facilitate a better understanding. The
map below presents the areas of control in Syria as of November 2017 and therefore does not consider the
most recent changes.
The high level of violence and number of attacks throughout 2017 has subjected civilians to direct and
indiscriminate attacks, including the use of barrel bombs and other explosives in populated areas. This has
resulted in a numerous level of displacements. Movement of 1.8 million people have been reported between
January and September, amounting to approximately 6,550 people displaced each day and remaining at the
same level as in 2016.
In May 2017, the Governments of Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed a joint agreement at the so-called Astana
talks calling for the constitution of four ‘de-escalation’ zones inside Syria. The de-escalation zones
encompass most of the remaining areas of Syria still held by armed opposition groups (not including IS). The
plan calls for the cessation of hostilities between rebel groups and forces fighting on behalf of the government
and with Russia, Turkey and Iran to act as guarantors. The present zones include a) Idleb governorate and
certain parts of neighboring Lattakia, Hama and Aleppo Governates b) parts of northern rural Homs and
Hama governorate c) East Goutha in Rural Damascus and d) certain parts of southern Syria. These de-
escalation zones should not be confused with safe-havens. Reduction of violence has been most notably in
the southern zone but in other zones violence continued to delay and hamper the scale up of humanitarian
assistance.
71.2. Geographical areas and affected population
While the crisis has affected all people living in Syria, some populations and locations have been more acutely
affected than others. The most severe needs are seen in areas of conflict with large numbers of IDPs.
According to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2018 (GNO),13.1 million people are in need of humanitarian
assistance, 11.2 people are being targeted and 5.6 million of the estimated 13.1 million in need are facing
acute needs at catastrophic, critical or severe levels. The HRP 2018 (draft version as it is yet to be launched)
identifies six population groups considered particularly vulnerable and who are likely to face multiple
lifesaving needs and heightened protection risk. These groups are as follow: people living in UN-declared
besieged and hard-to-reach areas (2.98 million people); people exposed to high intensity of hostilities and
areas contaminated with explosive hazards; IDPs in last resort camps/sites/collective centers; newly-
displaced people; spontaneous returnees; and overburdened host communities including long-term IDPs.
These groups are broad categories of people with needs cutting across all sectors. Within these groups there
are subgroups that require special attention when prioritizing the response: children; youth; women and girls;
people with chronic illness, disabilities and injuries; and the elderly.
The needs of people living in UN-declared besieged areas continue to be extremely severe due to arbitrary
restrictions on freedom of movement, imposed constraints on the delivery of basic commodities and
humanitarian assistance and lack of livelihood opportunities compounded by ongoing hostilities.
Displacement patterns across Syria remains extremely fluid. Many people have been displaced multiple
times. IDPs in last resort sites (sites with restricted freedom of movement) are deemed to be among the most
in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. Out of 6.1 million displaced people in Syria, 750 000 are
estimated to live in informal settlements.
Another vulnerable group of people are Palestinian refugees in Syria (PRS). 420,000 PRS (95 % of the total
in Syria) are in need of humanitarian assistance. Prior to the crisis, Palestine refugees experienced significant
levels of poverty and with seven years into the conflict their low resilience and limited coping capacities have
been exhausted.
The geographic focus of new displacements has shifted as the situation on the ground has evolved. New
displacements have been most frequent in northeast Syria (Idleb, Ar-Raqqa and Deir-Ezzor Governorates).
Large numbers of people were also displaced from Hama and Aleppo governates of which many now reside
in Idleb governorate which hosts over 1.1 million IDPs. During the period between 15 December 2017 and
16 January 2018, 214,000 people were displaced, mainly in the northwest. Population on the move continue
to be exposed to a number of protection risks and, e.g. confiscation of ID documents of IDPS at checkpoints
or transit canters are widely reported.
It has been estimated that 721,000 (including 66,000 refugees) have spontaneously returned to their areas
of origin (UNHCR, Sep 2017). An increasing number of returns is seen to areas being relatively stable.
However, the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts
of Syria. One million displaced people are estimated according to HNO to return during 2018, mostly in
Aleppo, Damascus, rural Damascus, Homs and Ar-Raqqa. Around 200,000 spontaneous/self-organized
refugee returns are as well estimated.
Protection concerns are widespread with 97% of assessed communities reporting the occurrence of at least
one protection concern. The Protection Needs Overview (PNO) finds people in Syria still being highly
exposed to multiple protection risks in areas where conflict is still active. In areas with reduced hostilities,
civilians are suffering the effects of over six years of conflict.
WASH and access to food are high priorities, as well as access to health services. 7.6 million people lack
WASH facilities. 11.3 million people require health assistance and 95% of these people lack access to
adequate healthcare. According to WHO substantial health needs in Syria continue to be unmet and
resources to support the health workforce and health system are stretched to the limit. As of June 2017,
WHO maps over half of Syria´s 111 public hospitals and half of its 1,802 public health care centers were
8either closed or functioning only partly. In cross-line assistance, medical items are systematically being
removed from the convoys.
Overall, access to basic public services has significantly declined with reduced access to water, electricity,
health care, education etc. For example, two third of the total populations is estimated to have disrupted
water- and electricity supply. Scarce livelihood opportunities and limited agricultural recovery have continued
to impact food security. 6.5 million people are facing large food consumption gaps and an additional 4 million
people are at risk of becoming food insecure with the current drought being an aggravating factor. This
situation forces people to develop negative coping mechanism such as child labor and early marriage, which
exposes children to greater protections risks.
1.3. Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan
The requirement of 2018 years HRP amount USD3.5 billion covering the humanitarian needs of the Syrian
people. This presents an increase in volume of 3% compared to 2017. 10.5 million people are targeted for
direct assistance and 11.2 million for service delivery.
The three strategic objectives (as outlined in the HRP 2018) are:
1) Provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable people. This objective will
focus on people living in areas with a high severity of needs and where access to basic goods and
services are limited. These areas are likely to include significant numbers of displaced people,
including newly displaced IDPs; a high concentration of overburdened communities; and in some
instances, spontaneous returnees. Health, NFIs, food security and nutrition sector are prioritized
sectors under this objective.
2) Enhance the prevention and mitigation of protections risks, and respond to protections risks
through supporting the protective environment in Syria by promoting international law, IHL,
HRL and through quality principled assistance.
This objective recognizes exhaustion of most options leading to increased development of harmful
coping strategies that particularly impact women and children, elderly and persons with disabilities.
This objective includes efforts to strengthen inter-sectoral cooperation to improve protection
monitoring, in coordination - to the extent feasible - with the Syrian State. The objective will aim to
mitigate many key concerns such as child labor and recruitment, early marriage and lack of civil status
documentation as well as providing technical support to issues relating to Housing, Land and Property
rights.
3) Increase resilience and livelihood opportunities and affected peoples´ access to basic
services.
This objective aims to increase resilience through enhanced livelihood opportunities for the most
vulnerable people and improved sustained access to basic social services in communities affected
by the crisis, particularly in areas with a high severity of needs. There is a need to scale-up actions
aimed at preventing a further deterioration of the situation and reduce aid dependency under this
objective. This objective also looks to strengthen early prevention mechanisms and promote social
cohesion.
Protection and early recovery are being mainstreamed across the operations.
2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES
2.1 National and local capacities and constraints
The main burden of the humanitarian crisis in Syria is carried by Syrian host communities, and as a result
their own resources and resilience levels are decreasing and being exhausted. The Syrian government
continues to be involved in all aspects of the response within areas of its control, not least by continuing to
provide certain basic services. It controls the international response through granting or limiting access and
permits to humanitarian actors. In areas no longer controlled by the government, local councils have been
set up, to sustain the provision of some basic services; however, in many areas their influence has decreased
9since the arrival of radical groups. International assistance is given to many local councils as part of so called
stabilization efforts in opposition areas.
The response in Syria is increasingly dependent on national and local civil society actors. Over 220
Syrian NGOs are authorized to aid in areas under the Government of Syria’s control. National staff and
national organizations are implementing most of the response, taking enormous risks in their work.
Throughout the conflict, at least 160 aid workers and 770 health workers have been killed (ACAPS, NGO
Safety, 22/10/2017). Many more operate cross-border from neighboring countries to aid areas that are not
accessed from Damascus.
The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementer of humanitarian assistance,
particularly of deliveries of food and Non- Food Items (NFIs). It works mainly in government controlled areas,
but also retains many functioning branches in opposition areas and is a major actor in cross-line assistance.
SARC is managing a complicated balancing act between protecting its neutrality while managing its auxiliary
role with the government.
2.2 International operational capacities and constraints
The humanitarian coordination for the Whole of Syria (WoS) response is composed of a set of hubs based
outside Syria (Jordan and Turkey) which coordinate the cross-border response together with a coordination
structure based in Damascus. The leadership is shared between the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator
(RHC) based in Amman and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for Syria based in Damascus. The WoS
coordination is guided by its highest body; the Strategic Steering Group (SSG). SSG is chaired by RHC and
HC for Syria and with members from all hubs, OCHA, UN-organizations, International Non-Governmental
Organizations (INGOs), National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGOs), Deputy RHC, HC Jordan and
observers from ICRC and the IFRC movement. Donors do not hold any seats in the SSG even though the
push has been hard from some donors (not by Sweden). The SSG has declined the ask from donors on
inclusion and instead a model of pre- and post SSG briefings has been set up. The WoS donor community
has structured itself in a coordination body based in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon of which Sweden is an
active member. The understanding is that the respective country coordination fora function well but the
coordination between the respective countries is rather weak though now is being in the process of
strengthening links.
Three OCHA administered Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) serve the WoS response. The Turkey
cross-border Humanitarian Fund (HF) serves with response in opposition-controlled areas mainly in north
Syria; Syria HF with Damascus-based response in government controlled areas; and Jordan HF with partly
cross-border response in opposition controlled areas mainly in south of Syria.
sSeden has
2.3 Access Situation
Access constraints remain one of the foremost challenges to humanitarian response in Syria. The major
obstacle to accessing people are security and permission related issues. Most challenging is to reach out
with assistance the 2.98 million people living in hard-to-reach areas including 419,000 people living in UN-
declared besieged areas. To address access challenges principled advocacy on humanitarian principles,
together with strategic use of humanitarian funding, will be central and should be one of Sida/Sweden’s focus.
Geographical severity will be guided by an inter-sector severity categorization and sector-specific severity
analysis. The inter-sector categorization identifies levels of severity which often indicate that different forms
of assistance may be needed and should be used as a guidance for Sida´s strategic support.
3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN
3.1. Response Priorities 2018
Humanitarian Focus: Sida´s response support should be aligned with the three strategic objectives of the
HRP and will only be granted to partners with projects inside the HRP. It should aim to find a healthy balance
10between the three strategic objectives with some emphasis on SO1&2. As far as feasible, Sida should give
priority to fund partners responding to prioritized needs and people categorized as most vulnerable in areas
assessed with the most severe needs in line with the HRP and OCHA´s severity map. SO3 enables Sida to
support partners’ projects with a livelihood and resilience component as well as delivery of basic services.
Support to projects within SO3 should however remain with a life-saving focus.
All Sida´s humanitarian funding should have a visible strong component of protection, gender and conflict
sensitivity throughout the entire project cycle. This will require a strong and on-going dialogue with partners
in all stages of the support, from appraisal to the final reporting.
3.2. Partners
All Sida´s partners are required to be active members of the whole of Syria (WoS) coordination structure
(except for ICRC/IFRC/SRC).
• The Humanitarian Funds (Syria, Lebanon and cross-border Turkey) will continue being funded,
serving the purpose of a rapid, flexible and life-saving funding. Sida will continue through its
membership of the fund´s advisory boards, to advocate for the funds to remain with a life-saving and
protection focus.
• With the complex coordination structure including in-country-, cross-border- and hub coordination, it
is key that the coordination structure remain well functioning, serving a flexible and effective response.
Sida will remain with flexible support to OCHA in 2018.
• Children are considered vulnerable with specific needs and therefore prioritized. Sida will keep the
same level of support as in 2017 to UNICEF and SCI.
• The enormous needs of protection- and basic services interventions amongst displaced people
motivates Sida to continue giving priority to fund UNHCR and ICRC with a significant volume of its
humanitarian funding for Syria.
• Health needs are largely unmet and underfunded in Syria, especially in the north part of the country.
Sida will continue to support IR and IRC for their good work within the health sector. Still, given the
enormous unmet health needs, Sida suggests bringing in a new health partner. WHO is assessed to
be a partner with a strong capacity, a widespread geographic coverage and with access in hard to
reach areas. However, WHO does not have an ongoing agreement with Sida Humanitarian and would
therefore require a new partnership agreement.
• NRC is receiving unearmarked program support in line with Sida´s new funding approach that was
initiated in 2017. NRC works within the sectors of Education, Food Security & Livelihoods (FSL), ICLA
(legal support), Shelter and Wash. NRC has informed Sida that it will take on a more focused
approach on FSL in Syria. This can be seen as a contribution to the HRP´s SO 3.
• ACF (Food Security, WASH and NFI´s) and CoS (Psycho social support to children) are both new
partners suggested to receive Sida´s funding in Syria. Both projects are in line with HRP prioritized
sectors and target groups.
• The support to SRC will remain as previous years, with SRC supporting IFRC who supports the
Emergency appeal of SARC. The funding is non-earmarked but SRC itself will partly earmark it to
health, NFI´s and capacity building of SARC.
Not visible in the funding table but worth mentioning is that Sida allocated 35 MSEK to WFP in Syria in early
December 2017. The funding will be addressing urgent food needs and contribute to averting pipeline breaks.
The funding will cover the period of 2018. WFP is a new partner to Sida in Syria.
11SYRIA CRISIS / LEBANON
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ANALYSIS 2018
December 2017
Sida’s Humanitarian Unit proposes to contribute to implement the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2018 with
an initial amount of 46 MSEK through five partners. Close monitoring of the situation in the affected area will
continue throughout the year for potential additional funding or amendments.
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW
1.1 Protracted refugee situation
Lebanon is hosting an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees where 1 million are registered by the UNHCR.
Around 30,000 of those are Palestinian refugees from Syria in addition to the estimated 174,000 Palestinian
refugees already residing in Lebanon (UNRWA Dec, 2017). UNHCR could not resume refugee registration
in 2017, suspended in 2015, but has recently confirmed the registration of 997,905 Syrians (UNHCR, Nov
2017). New arrivals, through illegal pass ways, have however continued since then. This influx resulted in
the estimated population in Lebanon increasing from 4.5 to 6 million persons between 2013 and 2015.
Overall, 25% of the people living in Lebanon are refugees. The protracted refugee presence is obviously
putting pressure on resources, infrastructures and services, with decreasing acceptance from host-authorities
and communities as time passes without bringing return prospects. In the seventh year of the crisis, the
resilience capacity of Lebanon is eroding increasingly and faster. Lebanon is a middle-income country with a
dynamic business and banking community and with a large diaspora sending back considerable investments
and remittances. But the war in Syria disrupted the Lebanese economy. Its growth rate dropped severely,
generating frustrations and pushing more people into poverty. Lebanon is built on sectarian divides and fragile
balance, and is still recovering from past wars. It is also caught between antagonizing powers in the sub-
region.
Main stakeholders: Most state institutions are involved both at national and local level. Multi-purpose
Community Development Centers are established throughout the country, and are used by UNHCR and
UNICEF to reach out to beneficiaries. The refugee affairs are much debated in the country, involving all; the
government, the civil society, the media and the public.
Trends: Donor fatigue is feared, while it is not sustainable to tap the global humanitarian financial system
with so considerable amounts of money, while other emergency settings in the world are under-addressed
and under-resourced. Negative rhetoric about refugees in public speech of major leaders has been
increasing, round up to general elections in Lebanon in 2018. They are accused of taking jobs and of
potentially transforming the population’s profile and its fragile balance. Biased interpretation of the political
and security situation in Syria which is abusively considered as safe enough for repatriation process to start,
at least in some areas, has been an attempt to trigger the expected massive return process, although
informed sources have brought the evidence that the present conditions in Syria are not yet conducive for
safe and durable returns. Since conditions are not in place for safe returns it becomes evident that Syrian
refugees will stay in Lebanon for an uncertain period.
Resilience and coping mechanisms: Access to labor and income is restricted but still enables some
refugees’ self-reliance, at least to survive. Remittances are a significant complement to relief and informal
employment. Cash assistance may be invested in income generating activities, but is mainly spent on food
items, shelter and rents. The majority of refugees have high debts.
1.2 Geographical areas and affected population
The updated map of vulnerabilities confirms the areas with the highest concentration of refugees are in weak
socio-economic areas such as Bekaa Valley (361,000) and Mount Lebanon (288,000). Other areas with
high concentration are North Lebanon (251,000) and South Lebanon (118,000). There are no formal
refugee camps and, as a result, close to a million registered Syrians are scattered in more than 2,100 urban
and rural communities and locations, often sharing small basic lodgings with other refugee families in
12overcrowded conditions. According to WFP, there are around 300,000 Lebanese people living under the
poverty threshold in Lebanon. They often live in the proximity of refugees. Palestinian refugee camps are
possible dwelling locations for the poorest. North Bekaa Valley and Akkar in the North are particularly poor
and under-equipped. The dispersion of locations where refugees are living increases the complexity and the
cost of relief and basic services delivery, while obstacles put in identifying the most vulnerable people hinder
their assistance and increase protection risks.
Refugees in Lebanon are 53% female. Among refugees, 55 % are under 17 years, with higher number of
boys than girls. Men may postpone their return after their own families have returned to Syria as those under
45 years old fear forced conscription. UNHCR estimates that around 8,000 spontaneous returns have
occurred in 2017.
UNHCR holds a register of the asylum seeker/refugees who were identified with biometry, and has recorded
the others, but does not share it with other partners despite the request of the Ministry of Interior. It manages
a database as well on vulnerable people (Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR)), based on
samplings of population and projection of trends, which cannot replace the needed direct register of
beneficiaries. VASyR/2017 shows that 76% of refugee households are now living below the poverty line of
3.84 USD per person per day, and 58% of households living below the extreme poverty line of 2.87 USD per
person per day, worse than in 2016. This highlights that relief does not and cannot extract people out of
poverty, despite considerable assistance spending, especially not refugees who are deprived with rights to
livelihood and job opportunities. It barely supports their daily survival. The USD27 monthly cash assistance
per individual brings to an average 5-member vulnerable family a food basket of USD135, less than half of
the minimum required to get out of poverty (i.e. USD380).
1.3 Critical Assumptions, risks and threats
A major risk for Syrian refugees is that patience and resources of the Lebanese authorities and communities
hosting them are further eroding over time, making a case for their coerced returns.
Access to humanitarian assistance and basic services is still restricted through different administrative
obstacles, like the effective access to the legal residence permits, despite laudable efforts and promises to
improve it and to enroll all school children in Lebanese schools.
Continued financial efforts from humanitarian donors may not be sustained over time, while the response
system is still operating in the costly mode of emergency response due to inadequate policies, coordination,
information management systems and programming. It may become more and more challenging to resource
an operation in the “Care and Maintenance” mode with humanitarian funding, as the refugee situation is now
protracted. Resilience-building investments and programs aiming at reducing needs may continue being
insufficiently resourced by stabilization and development donors.
1.4 Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan
The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), is the country plan within the frame of the Regional Refugee
and Resilience Plan (3RP) and targets 1.5 million refugees, either registered, with legal documents, or not. It
intends to assist as well around 700,000 persons in host-communities where the refugee presence is dense,
and among them the most vulnerable Lebanese people. It is Lebanon’s master plan for humanitarian and
stabilization interventions to contain the socio-economic and political impact of the refugee crisis, far beyond
what humanitarian assistance can and should achieve. It is planning to continue assisting refugees and host
communities, for the sixth year. The objectives combine care and maintenance, protection and access to
livelihoods/resilience for the refugees (60%) and support to the resilience of Lebanon, especially its services
and infrastructures, to absorb the impact of the refugee presence (40%). It promotes the strategic options of
the Grand Bargain to reduce needs and to interconnect humanitarian assistance and development
cooperation. The total requirements or the LCRP are USD2.68 billion.
132 IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES
2.1 National and local capacities and constraints
Government (national, sub-national, local): The Government of Lebanon disallowed the establishment of
refugee camps, based on its experience of Palestinian refugee camps. In addition, it has restricted labour
opportunities for Syrian refugees to the sectors of construction, agriculture and sanitation/cleaning services.
Moreover, it has prohibited UNHCR to continue registration of refugees indicating that the numbers
overwhelmed the capacity of Lebanon to absorb such a large influx. The access to residence permits for
refugees above the age of 15 was first granted for those who could afford the cost of getting a Lebanese
sponsor, while the other should prove being registered by UNHCR as refugees to get and then renew their
residence waivers and pay USD200 to the General Security Offices (GSOs) for processing the application.
This is excluding those who could not register. The USD200 fee was lifted in 2017, but as a result the GSOs
became considerably slow in delivering permits, generating long waiting queues. Today, only 20% of the
registered refugee population has received a legal residence status or could renew it as necessary. All the
others are residing illegally in Lebanon. Refugees are not also protected by the Refugee convention due to
Lebanon not being signatory to the convention.
Civil Society (national, sub-national, local): Lebanon does have a vibrant civil society, though INGOs were
first monopolizing the response in the early stage of the emergency intervention. Lebanese NGOs, more
specialized in advocacy and human rights, transformed themselves quickly and are now playing a greater
role. Advocacy and protection, social service delivery and awareness raising are areas where Lebanese
organizations are particularly adding value. They can directly identify the most vulnerable, while the UN
database is estimating beneficiary numbers through samplings and projections.
Community and household level: Without residence permits, movements within Lebanon are risky,
especially for men who may be arrested at checkpoints and then deported. As a result, income is often
brought to the household by women and teenagers, who can cross police controls more easily, while men
are staying at home with younger children. The daily pay is USD4 or less, often in agricultural fields of the
Bekaa Valley or construction sites in urban settings. The restrictions to access the mainstream legal labor
market are a factor for exploitation and negative coping strategies, like debt-incurrence, early and forced
marriages, survival sex, criminal activities, etc. Lebanese jails’ population consist of 30% Syrians, reflecting,
the demographic proportion of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
2.2 International operational capacities and constraints
Leadership and Coordination: The nature of the crisis places UNHCR at the center of the coordination
system, in conjunction with UNDP. OCHA was deployed in 2013 to support the Resident/Humanitarian
Coordinator (RC/HC) to ensure a coherent and effective humanitarian response to the context of the Syrian
crisis. Through encouraging the Government of Lebanon and liaising with international and national NGOs,
context-specific coordination mechanisms are ensured for a more cost-effective and coherent delivery of
humanitarian assistance. The cluster system was until now not rolled out. A complex set up of ten sectoral
groups is being simplified into seven fora and working groups. Information management on vulnerabilities,
needs, gaps, inputs and cash flow is the weakest point of the system, hampering efficient strategic and
operational coordination. In 2018, aid architecture will be further discussed and adjusted.
Humanitarian Agencies: UNHCR is challenged in fulfilling its protection mandate in Lebanon and is facing
criticism for the low-key tone of its public advocacy. WFP and UNICEF are the two other major operational
agencies. WFP injected over a billion USD in the Lebanese economy in the form of cash assistance since
2013. Despite humanitarian needs being far from covered, there are more actors present in the country than
required is possibly necessary, cumulating administrative overheads and complicating operations run by too
many stakeholders. As an example, the Lebanese Red Cross society deals with 23 participating national
societies, including the Swedish Red Cross.
Implementing partners: Sida’s humanitarian funding to UN agencies is both regional and country and is
non-earmarked. The Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF), targeting protection, assistance to people living with
disabilities, through Lebanese organizations with 50% of its contributions, and in the most vulnerable
14locations, is and will remain supported with 25% of Sida’s funding for Lebanon in 2018. It showed significant
improvements in 2017 for its strategic choices, added value, management and resource mobilization. It has
reached out 812,000 beneficiaries since 2015 with USD41 through 108 implemented projects that have been
audited. The LHF will be evaluated in 2018. On the verge of being closed due to under-funding (USD4.5 in
first half of 2017), it is rebooted by new cash flow, donors and leadership.
Sida supports the ICRC which is developing a Beirut based regional capacity for reconstructive medicine and
tracing of missing people. Swedish Red Cross supports the Lebanese Red Cross through the Danish Red
Cross and the French Red Cross for psychosocial support and WASH activities respectively. The Lebanon
Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF) hosted by NRC will be a new partner in 2018 for streamlining the advocacy
of 42 INGOs about refugee issues and protection.
NRC, Save the Children and IRC are the three largest humanitarian INGO partners of Sida in Lebanon with
multi-sector assistance to refugees; child protection; and prevention and response to gender-based violence
respectively.
2.3 International and Regional assistance
Donors: USA, Germany, ECHO, DfID, Japan and Norway are the major donors to the refugee response.
Since 2012, aid funding increased significantly, over USD1 billion since 2013 and peaking to USD1.7 billion
in 2017, although under-reported to OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS). While the funding requirement
for the LCRP in 2017 is USD2.8 billion, only one third of the funding provided (USD620) was reported under
the 3RP/LCRP. The LCRP is reportedly mainly resourced by humanitarian donors who provided 75% of the
total funding in 2016. Transitional/stabilization funding is either insufficient or outside the LCRP.
Donors agreed to voice the following common messages to the GoL: 1) Ensure commitment to principle of
non-refoulment and to any returns of Syrian refugees taking place in safety and dignity, in line with
international standards; 2) Improve the regulatory framework pertaining to refugees, including ensuring that
procedures for renewal of residence permits for refugees are efficient, predictable and evenly applied; 3) Re-
open refugee registration by UNHCR (suspended since 2015); 4) Promote preservation of a dignified
protection space, including humanitarian considerations in security operations.
2.4 Access Situation
Refugees are restricted in their movements if they cannot produce a legal residence permit. The road access
situation is relatively good as the country has good road infrastructure. The authorities restrict work permits
for expatriate staff to 10% of the total personnel of INGOs and may refuse to grant it in some cases; otherwise
humanitarian actors can move freely in the country. The Arsal area is no more a military zone, since it was
vacated by radical militants. The South is contaminated with UXOs from 2006, beyond the so called Blue
Line.
3 SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN
3.1 The role of Sida
Earlier assistance and results: Sida provided 59 MSEK to 8 partners in 2017, including 15 MSEK through
the Lebanese Humanitarian Fund (LHF) which is supporting mainly Lebanese organizations in the Protection
sector. UNHCR (5), ICRC (5), IRC (7), SCI (7), SRC (9) and NRC (11) are all focusing on Protection or
mainstreaming it through multisector assistance.
Sweden’s regional Strategy for the Syria Crisis 2016-2020, should become the main source for funding the
resilience objective of the LCRP. The World Bank’s Regional Concessional Financing Facility is one of its
main recipient so far (building of the Lebanese public transport system project using refugee labor).
153.2 Response Priorities 2018
The strategic focus on protection should remain. For UN agencies, regional and non-earmarked funding
should be offered (UNHCR, OCHA, UNRWA) giving them the option to prioritize funds to Lebanon. The
supports to the LHF and the ICRC remain but with increases already in the initial budget of 2018.
The support to IRC on gender-based violence in Northern Lebanon is recommended to be phased out in
2018, as a new development contribution within the Regional Syrian Crisis strategy is about to start for 24
months, again for a GBV program and in the same location as the humanitarian support. The Save the
Children child protection project is in the second phase of a three-year thematic support, and should be
phased out likewise in 2019, as a new support for Save the Children was decided recently within the Regional
Syria Crisis strategy.
Internal coordination between Sida´s units and departments, including support to Lebanon, should increase
the coherence of funding flows to partners not to be missing out on any opportunities to finance their projects
with different windows of Sida (IRC, SCI, UNFPA), to decrease administrative costs and rationalize our
support.
3.3 Synergies with Long-term Development Aid
Lebanon is not a regular recipient of aid, but given the exceptional refugee situation the country is presently
receiving considerable resources to be able to cope with the refugee crisis. The EU has created different
strategies and financing instruments (Madad, RDPP) for affected countries, and to stabilize Lebanon while it
is facing such an acute and prolonged refugee crisis. The RACE 2 programme is improving the availability of
education services. THRIVE is the equivalent programme for making the Lebanese health system fit for
addressing refugees’ health needs.
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