LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY - THE MARCH 31 ANALYSIS - SETA
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THE MARCH 31
LOCAL ELECTIONS
IN TURKEY
NEBI MIŞ • HAZAL DURAN
ANALYSIS MARCH 2019 NO.50THE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY NEBI MIŞ • HAZAL DURAN
COPYRIGHT © 2019 by SETA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. SETA Yayınları ISBN: 978-605-7544-37-7 Layout: Hasan Suat Olgun Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2019 SETA | SİYASET, EKONOMİ VE TOPLUM ARAŞTIRMALARI VAKFI Nenehatun Cd. No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TÜRKİYE Tel: +90 312 551 21 00 | Faks: +90 312 551 21 90 www.setav.org | info@setav.org | @setavakfi SETA | İstanbul Defterdar Mh. Savaklar Cd. Ayvansaray Kavşağı No: 41-43 Eyüpsultan İstanbul TÜRKİYE Tel: +90 212 395 11 00 | Faks: +90 212 395 11 11 SETA | Washington D.C. 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1106 Washington D.C., 20036 USA Tel: 202-223-9885 | Faks: 202-223-6099 www.setadc.org | info@setadc.org | @setadc SETA | Kahire 21 Fahmi Street Bab al Luq Abdeen Flat No: 19 Cairo EGYPT Tel: 00202 279 56866 | 00202 279 56985 | @setakahire SETA | Berlin Französische Straße 12, 10117 Berlin GERMANY Tel: +49 30 20188466
THE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY CONTENTS ABSTRACT 7 INTRODUCTION 8 LEADING DYNAMICS OF THE MARCH 2019 LOCAL ELECTIONS 9 WHAT THE MARCH 2019 ELECTION MEANS TO POLITICAL PARTIES 12 VISIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT: FROM PAST TO PRESENT 15 CONCLUSION 25 s e ta v. o rg 5
ANALYSIS
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Nebi Miş
Nebi Miş is the Director of Political Studies at the SETA Foundation. He is also faculty
member in the department of Political Sciences and Public Administration, and the Middle
East Institute of Sakarya University. Dr. Miş received his BA in International Relations
from Sakarya University in 2003, and his MA in 2005. He received his Ph.D. from Sakarya
University upon completion of his doctoral thesis titled “Securitization Politics of Turkey:
1923-2003” in 2012. He also worked as a researcher for Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in
Belgium for a year during his Ph.D. studies. His research areas include political systems
and institutions, democratization, Kurdish issue, Turkish civil-military relations, security
politics in Turkey, Islamism and democratization in the Middle East. His articles have been
published in various national and international academic journals. Dr. Mis is also the co-
editor and co-writer of several books such as “Democracy Watch: Social Perception of 15
July Coup Attempt”, “Turkey’s Presidential System: Model and Practices”, “The AK Party’s
Fifteen Years in Politics”.
Hazal Duran
Hazal Duran graduated from TOBB University of Economics and Technology Departments
of International Relations and Turkish Language and Literature (double major) in 2012. She
completed her MA in Modern Turkish Studies (MTS) at İstanbul Şehir University. Duran con-
tinues her doctoral studiesat Bilkent University, Department of Political Science. She works
as a Researcher at SETA Ankara Directorate of Political Studies.
6 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
ABSTRACT
The analysis explains the March 2019 local election’s
significance to Turkish politics and concentrates on the
ways in which the visions of various political parties
for local government have changed over the years.
On March 31, 2019, Turkey will hold local elections in 30 metropolitan districts,
51 provinces, 922 counties, 32,105 neighborhoods, and 18,306 villages. This lo-
cal election will be the fifteenth electoral contest since the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AK Party) came to power 17 years ago. Yet there will be a range of
new dynamics at play, as Turkey’s political arena undergoes major changes. The
April 2017 constitutional referendum facilitated the country’s transition from
the parliamentary system of government to a type of presidentialism known
as the “Presidency System of Government.” The country’s political arena has
been reshaped under the new system. On June 24, 2018, Turkey held a national
election for the first time under presidentialism. Parliamentary and presidential
elections took place on the same day and various political parties contested races
by forming electoral alliances among themselves. Those alliances made a signifi-
cant impact on the election results.
A large number of political parties will participate in the March 2019 local
election as part of broader electoral alliances. As a matter of fact, those electoral
alliances have deepened since last year’s national election, with each alliance
endorsing a joint mayoral candidate in many provinces. In some cases, they even
jointly nominated a group of candidates for the city council. As such, Turkey
will discover for the first time how electoral alliances will influence voter behav-
ior in local races.
This analysis explains the March 2019 local election’s significance to Turkish
politics and concentrates on the ways in which the visions of various politi-
cal parties for local government have changed over the years. Accordingly, the
analysis primarily discusses the upcoming election’s key dynamics. It proceeds
to analyze the March 2019 election’s significance for each major political party’s
internal agenda and future projections. Moreover, this analysis offers a detailed
account of how each political party’s vision for local government has changed
over the years and how their respective visions have been tailored for the 2019
local election campaign. Finally, it identifies a number of issues that will pos-
sibly set the post-election political agenda in Turkey.
s e ta v. o rg 7ANALYSIS
(CHP), the Good Party, and the Felicity Party
(SP) together on the basis of opposition to the
AK Party and Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan. In the end, President Erdoğan and
the AK Party claimed their fourteenth con-
secutive victory, including parliamentary and
presidential elections, and constitutional refer-
endums. Having received 52.59 percent of the
popular vote, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became
Turkey’s first president under the new system
of government. The People’s Alliance, which
the AK Party and the MHP had formed joint-
ly, attained parliamentary majority with 53.66
percent. The AK Party claimed 295 parliamen-
INTRODUCTION tary seats with 42.56 percent of the vote and
The June 2018 presidential and parliamenta- the People’s Alliance, together with the MHP’s
ry elections, which took place shortly before 49 parliamentarians, managed to control a to-
the 2019 local election, represented a turn- tal of 344 seats.1
ing point in Turkey’s political history for two Turkey’s formal transition to the presiden-
reasons. First, those elections were a critical tial system after the June 2018 elections raised
threshold for the transformation of the coun- a number of questions about the potential
try’s political system since the transition to impact of the new rules and the introduction
presidentialism had already been accepted by of electoral alliances in the first local election
the April 16, 2017 constitutional referendum. under the new system. In this regard, each po-
Moreover, various political parties could form litical party assessed how joining an electoral
electoral alliances for the first time under the alliance might help or hurt them. In the end,
new rules, which set apart the June 2018 elec- they decided to join forces in what they con-
tions from previous electoral contests. sidered key districts. Whereas the AK Party
Ahead of the June 2018 elections, Tur- and the MHP jointly endorsed candidates in
key’s leading political parties formed two ma- 51 provinces and many counties, the CHP
jor alliances. The AK Party and the National- and the Good Party adopted the same strategy
ist Movement Party (MHP) formally joined in 50 provinces. The Peoples’ Democratic Par-
forces, with the implicit support of the Grand ty (HDP), in turn, supported the CHP-Good
Union Party (BBP), to contest the election as Party alliance by not contesting the election in
part of the People’s Alliance - whose stated pur- 11 provinces.
pose was to protect Turkey’s interests at home
1. For analyses of the June 2018 election results, see Ali Çarkoğlu
and abroad with an emphasis on native and and Kerem Yıldırım, “Change and Continuity in Turkey’s June 2018
Elections”, Insight Turkey, Vol: 20, No: 4 (2018); Nebi Miş, “Yeni
national values. Its opponent, the Nation Al- Siyasal Sistemin İlk Seçimleri ve Sonuçlarının Karşılaştırmalı Analizi”
liance, brought the Republican People’s Party [A Comparative Analysis of the First Election under the New Political
System and Its Outcome], Muhafazakar Düşünce, No: 54, (2018).
8 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
TABLE 1. ELECTORAL ALLIANCES AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES BY PROVINCE
The People’s Alliance The Nation Alliance HDP
Provinces Where the HDP
Provinces Where the MHP Will Support the Provinces Where the Good Party Will
Will not Contest in Favor of
AK Party Support the CHP
the Nation Alliance
Ağrı, Ankara, Antalya, Ardahan, Artvin, Aydın, Adana, Ankara, Antalya Artvin,
Balıkesir, Bilecik, Bitlis, Bolu, Burdur, Bursa, Aydın, Bartın Bilecik, Bolu, Burdur
Çanakkale, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne, Erzincan, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir,
Erzurum, Gaziantep, Giresun, Hakkari, Hatay, Eskişehir, Giresun, Hatay, Istanbul, Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Aydın,
Istanbul, Izmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kocaeli, Izmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kastamonu, Antalya, Bursa, Gaziantep,
Konya, Malatya, Mardin, Muğla, Muş, Ordu, Kırklareli, Kırşehir, Malatya, Muğla, Adıyaman
Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Siirt, Sinop, Şanlıurfa, Sinop, Tekirdağ, Tunceli, Yalova,
Şırnak, Tekirdağ, Trabzon, Van, Yalova Zonguldak
Provinces Where the AK Party Will Support Provinces Where the CHP Will
the MHP Support the Good Party
Afyonkarahisar, Aksaray, Balıkesir,
Denizli, Düzce Elazığ, Gaziantep,
Adana, Iğdır, Kars, Kırklareli, Manisa, Mersin, Isparta, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, Kilis,
Osmaniye Kocaeli, Konya, Manisa, Nevşehir,
Osmaniye, Sakarya, Samsun, Tokat,
Trabzon, Yozgat
The 2019 local election campaign was political parties.2 Consequently, all political
distinguished from earlier campaigns due to parties attempted to reach out to the elector-
localized alliances and comprehensive chang- ate through social media campaigns and by
es to their campaign strategies. Under the launching their own digital platforms. More-
AK Party’s leadership, the People’s Alliance over, they developed digital platforms to facili-
pledged to run an “eco-friendly campaign” by tate rapid and effective communication among
refraining from noise and visual pollution. In their members and the campaign staff.
this context, the alliance largely stopped hang-
ing banners on the streets, using plastic and
paper campaign material, and driving vehicles LEADING DYNAMICS OF
around districts. Other political parties largely THE MARCH 2019
followed suit. LOCAL ELECTIONS
The March 2019 election was also distin-
From late 2018 onwards, the main item on
guished from previous races by the emphasis
the agenda of Turkey’s political parties was
on digital campaigns at the expense of tra-
how electoral alliances would be shaped. The
ditional campaign methods. Technological
AK Party and the MHP were first to announce
advancements and developments in the area
publicly that they were interested in joining
of digital communication had an impact on
forces for the local election. Spokespeople
the relationship between society and politics,
and changed voters’ expectations from major 2. Nebi Miş, “Dijital Seçim Kampanyası, Ama Nasıl?” [A Digital Election
Campaign, But How?], Türkiye, 18 December 2018.
s e ta v. o rg 9ANALYSIS
for both movements reiterated their commit- time, the CHP and the Good Party had al-
ment to “native and domestic values,” which legedly agreed to jointly endorse candidates
formed the basis of the partnership after the in some provinces and the HDP was going
July 15, 2016 coup attempt. Several develop- to support their alliance.3 That allegation,
ments, however, drove a wedge between the combined with the earlier decision by the AK
two parties around the same time. First, the Party and the MHP to contest the election
MHP introduced an amnesty bill - one of the alone, indicated that the post-coup attempt
party’s campaign promises - in the Turkish war on terrorism at home and abroad, and
Parliament. The AK Party’s reluctance to sup- the presidential system’s progress could be in
port the bill had a negative impact on its re- jeopardy.4 Therefore, the AK Party and the
lationship with the MHP. This disagreement MHP decided to join forces once again in the
was followed by a dispute over the Council March 2019 local election.
of State’s ruling to repeal the 2013 abolition Another issue that came up during this
of the pledge of allegiance. On October 23, period related to the method of electoral al-
2018, the AK Party and the MHP announced liances in local elections. The February 2018
that they would not join forces in the local regulation on electoral alliances allowed po-
election - although they added that they litical parties to formally work together in
would continue to work together in all other parliamentary elections alone. Under those
areas. Several weeks later, however, they re- rules, political parties could contest parlia-
sumed negotiations for an electoral alliance. mentary elections together, whereas candi-
dates and parties had to work individually in
local elections.5 In other words, there were
Alliance negotiations between
limited options available to political parties
the AK Party and the MHP took
that wanted to form alliances in local elec-
place in a positive atmosphere tions. Candidates endorsed by multiple par-
and ended in a short time. ties could enter the race as independents or
on the ticket of any party to the electoral al-
Against the backdrop of the AK Party’s liance. That requirement caused occasional
difficulties with the MHP, talks between the problems in negotiations among the politi-
representatives of the CHP, the Good Par- cal parties.
ty, the HDP, and the Felicity Party ensued. Alliance negotiations between the CHP
First, CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Good Party, for example, repeatedly
held talks with the leaders of the Good Party, came to a standstill due to conflicts of inter-
the HDP, and the Felicity Party individu-
ally. The media reported that those political 3. “CHP ile İyi Parti Uzlaştı” [CHP and the Good Party Reach an
Agreement], Yenişafak, December 12, 2018.
parties saw the disagreement between the
4. Burhanettin Duran, “İttifaklarda Son Durum” [The Latest on Electoral
AK Party and MHP as an opportunity and, Alliances], Sabah, November 23, 2018.
therefore, resolved to form an alliance on the 5. “Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında Kanun
ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun” [The Law on
basis of shared principles. Around the same Amendments to the Law on the Fundamental Rules of Elections and
Voter Registries and Some Other Laws], Resmi Gazete, March 16, 2018.
10 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
ests between the two movements. Both sides local election would have an impact on the dy-
claimed to be more likely to win local races namics of national politics: “The most recent
in key provinces including Ankara, Adana, developments in our region mean that March
Anlalya, and Mersin. As a matter of fact, Bül- 31 will be much more than just a municipal
ent Tezcan, who represented the CHP in the election. The election has become a question
negotiations, was allegedly sacked after failing of survival for our country and an election
to manage the fallout from the inconclusive about national survival.”7 MHP Chairman
talks. Although the two parties announced Devlet Bahçeli echoed the same sentiment in
that their negotiations continued without his response to critics of the national survival
interruption and on the basis of shared prin- discourse: “Those who question the relation-
ciples, lengthy talks were needed before they ship between the March 31 local election and
shook hands on a deal. the question of national survival suffer not
By contrast, alliance negotiations between only from ill intentions but also problematic
the AK Party and the MHP took place in a national identity. The People’s Alliance must
positive atmosphere and ended in a short time. succeed on March 31 to ensure that the debate
The two parties initially announced that they on [presidentialism] does not resurface.”8
had reached an agreement on a strategy for the For the AK Party and the MHP, the elec-
metropolitan municipalities. They proceeded tion evolved into a question of national sur-
to broaden the scope of their partnership and vival for three reasons. Primarily, the CHP-
decided to work together in additional prov- Good Party-HDP bloc openly challenged the
inces and counties. The scope of the CHP’s al- legitimacy of the presidential system - as they
liance with the Good Party, on the contrary, had done the year before. In the lead-up to the
did not become clear until they submitted June 2018 elections, all three movements had
their candidate lists to the Supreme Electoral called for the parliamentary system’s restora-
Board on the final day. tion and pledged to take the necessary steps
Local elections in Turkey have tradition- in that direction without delay if they won the
ally been not just a means to shape local gov- election. As a matter of fact, they attempted
ernments but also an opportunity to restore to issue a joint statement on that question.
the public’s confidence in national politics.6 Those parties’ approach and rationale regard-
In this sense, it became clear that the March ing the presidential system motivated the AK
2019 local election would reflect on Turkish Party and the MHP that the March 2019 local
politics in general when the question of na- election represented a critical threshold for the
tional survival became a key issue in the cam- survival of the new political system. After all,
paign. Spokespeople for the AK Party and the consolidating the presidential system was vi-
MHP repeatedly highlighted that the election tal to the lasting institutionalization necessary
was vital to Turkey’s survival. Turkish Presi-
dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned that the 7. “Erdoğan: 31 Mart Seçimleri Bir Beka Meselesi” [Erdoğan: The March
31 Election Is a Matter of National Survival], Türkiye, January 28, 2019.
8. “Devlet Bahçeli’den Flaş Sözler: 31 Mart Tarihi Bir Eşiktir” [A Surprise
6. F. Michael Wuthrich, National Elections in Turkey: People, Politics, and the Statement by Devlet Bahçeli: March 31 is a Historic Threshold], Hürriyet,
Party System, (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY: 2015). February 26, 2019.
s e ta v. o rg 11ANALYSIS
for Turkey to reach its future goals.9 That the The final dimension of the “national sur-
CHP-Good Party-HDP bloc would openly vival” question related to efforts to undermine
question the validity of the presidential system the Turkish economy through manipulations,
if they were to win local races in key metro- which was what happened after the June 2018
politan districts, such as Istanbul and Ankara, elections. After last year’s election, the Turkish
turned the March 2019 campaign into much Lira’s rapid depreciation against the U.S. Dol-
more than just mere local elections. lar and the steady increase in the inflation rate
Another reason behind the national sur- were considered as consequences of foreign
vival debate was Turkey’s fight against terrorist manipulations against the Turkish economy.10
organizations, including FETÖ and the PKK, Consequently, the CHP, the Good Party, and
and the country’s active foreign policy at the the HDP frequently claimed on the campaign
regional and international levels. In the wake trail that Turkey was going to suffer an eco-
of the July 2016 coup attempt, which FETÖ nomic meltdown after the March 2019 local
orchestrated, the AK Party’s cooperation with election. As a matter of fact, spokespeople for
the MHP played a crucial role in the domes- those movements described the launch of di-
tic and international fight against that group. rect sale points, known as tanzim stores, which
Again, during the same period, the MHP of- enabled citizens to purchase fruits and vegeta-
fered its unconditional support to the AK Party ble for more reasonable prices, as a reflection
government’s counterterrorism operations of the alleged economic crisis.
against PKK targets in Northern Syria. As such,
the leaders of both parties stressed repeatedly
that the partnership between the AK Party and WHAT THE MARCH 2019
the MHP was vital to the continuation of the ELECTION MEANS TO
fight against terrorist organizations. The HDP’s POLITICAL PARTIES
references to a united force against the People’s
The March 31 municipal election is critically
Alliance added another dimension to the na-
important to the AK Party and the MHP. In
tional survival debate between the two blocs,
the July 2016 coup attempt’s wake, the coop-
even though the party refrained from formally
eration between the two political parties op-
joining the Nation Alliance. In 2015, when the
erated on several levels. First of all, the MHP
PKK unilaterally ended the ceasefire and re-
offered its unconditional support to the AK
sumed violence, HDP-controlled municipali-
Party government when it came to the dismiss-
ties had followed suit by declaring autonomy
al of FETÖ and PKK operatives from public
and financing PKK operations. Moreover, the
institutions under the State of Emergency, and
HDP supported the YPG presence in Northern
domestic and cross-border military operations
Syria, which made the local election race be-
against terrorist groups. Among other things,
tween the People’s Alliance and the Nation Alli-
ance crucial to Turkey’s fight against terrorism.
10. “AK Parti Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Cevdet Yılmaz: “Ekonomik
Saldırı 15 Temmuz’un Devamı” [AK Party Deputy Chairman Cevdet
9. Burhanettin Duran, “31 Mart Sadece Yerel Seçim mi?” [Is March 31 Yılmaz: The Economic Assault Is a Continuation of July 15], Kriter, No:
Just a Municipal Election?], Kriter, No: 33, (March 2019). 28, (October 2018).
12 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
the MHP’s support resulted in the Euphrates The March 2019 election will be the
Shield and Olive Branch Operations against third campaign for the People’s Alliance
PKK/YPG militants in northern Syria. In (including the 2017 constitutional referen-
other words, the MHP’s political support to dum). This motivates the CHP-Good Party-
the AK Party government played an important HDP bloc to do everything in its power to
role in the latter’s efforts to improve domestic reduce the number of municipalities con-
and border security. trolled by the AK Party or the MHP, and to
Therefore, both political parties main- win as many new districts as possible. There-
tained that the March 2019 municipal elec- fore, those three parties built their platform
tion would have an impact on the course of around sheer opposition to the People’s Alli-
Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts. Continued ance rather than a certain ideology or set of
cooperation between the AK Party and the values. Their eagerness to end the control over
MHP, both sides believed, was key to domes- metropolitan districts, notably Ankara and
tic political stability and, by extension, cross- Istanbul, of the AK Party and MHP made it
border military operations against terrorist possible for the CHP, the Good Party, and
groups. They posited that the Nation Alliance the HDP to ignore their vast ideological dif-
could jeopardize Turkey’s ongoing fight against ferences. In other words, the opposition bloc,
the PKK and FETÖ because that alliance’s which failed to defeat the People’s Alliance in
participants lacked a coherent strategy to com- the presidential and parliamentary elections
bat those organizations effectively. last year, seek to reverse the trend by winning
The AK Party and the MHP saw their the local election.12
cooperation in the March 2019 municipal The March 2019 election turned into
election as a crucial step towards ensuring a fight for survival in the eyes of the CHP-
domestic stability until the 2023 presidential Good Party-HDP bloc because intraparty
election and addressing structural problems. crises affecting the CHP and the Good Party
Their partnership, which was born out of the would deepen if they suffer yet another de-
July 2016 coup attempt, played a crucial role feat in this election. As a matter of fact, the
in ending a long-standing crisis of Turkey’s CHP and the Good Party leaders faced im-
political system (with the April 2017 consti- mense pressure from their respective bases
tutional referendum) and in implementing the and certain intraparty opposition groups as
new system after the June 2018 presidential they engaged in alliance negotiations. For
and parliamentary elections.11 By the same example, many CHP heavyweights, includ-
token, both movements maintain that their ing Deniz Baykal, Hurşit Güneş, and Ilhan
continued partnership is key to ensuring the Cihaner warned that working with the Good
compatibility of Turkey’s state apparatus with Party would weaken the CHP in municipal
the new political system after the March 2019 races.13 The CHP leadership ignored those
municipal election.
12. Abdulkadir Selvi, “CHP-İYİ Parti ittifakı nereye gidiyor?” [The Future
of the CHP-Good Party Alliance], Hürriyet, December 12, 2018.
11. Fahrettin Altun, “Laying the Cornerstone for a New Turkey: The June 13. Hazal Duran, “CHP Nereye Koşuyor?” [CHP: Quo Vadis?], Sabah
24 Elections”, Insight Turkey, Vol: 20, No: 3, (2018). Perspektif, February 2, 2019.
s e ta v. o rg 13ANALYSIS
critics and moved on with partnership talks. municipal election. After last year’s presi-
Yet, the eventual agreement crippled both dential and parliamentary elections, a large
movements in some provinces. Even after the number of CHP delegates signed a petition
scope of the partnership became clear, the to demand leadership change and an emer-
debate within both movements became more gency congress. Those opponents eventually
and more heated. Consequently, sitting may- suspended their campaign to avoid further
ors and party officials serving at various levels damage to the party before the municipal
of the CHP and the Good Party ended up election. For those reasons, a poor perfor-
submitting their resignations. As such, there mance by the CHP and the Good Party
is plenty of unhappiness and dissatisfaction in March 2019 could revive the intraparty
among loyal supporters and intraparty op- opposition challenging the CHP’s current
position groups, even though the the CHP leadership.
and the Good Party concluded a partnership For the Good Party, in turn, the munic-
agreement. An additional dimension of that ipal election represents a key factor for the
crisis related to power struggles among vari- future. The nationalist contingent within the
ous intraparty groups over the selection of movement was unhappy with the leadership’s
endorsed candidates on the local level.14 decision to join forces with the CHP and the
Felicity Party in the June 2018 parliamentary
The AK Party and the MHP elections. Their disapproval fueled a heated
maintained that the March 2019 post-election debate among the Good Party
municipal election would have an ranks, as deepening polarization resulted in
Chairwoman Meral Akşener announcing her
impact on the course of Turkey’s
resignation. Her decision to step down led to
counterterrorism efforts.
the resignation of additional heavyweights
including Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Özcan Yeniçeri,
In light of the abovementioned issues, and Nevzat Bor. Although Akşener proceeded
both the CHP and the Good Party leader- to reverse her decision and returned to the
ship will possibly encounter intraparty op- party’s leadership, the wave of resignation
position groups after the March 2019 mu- continued in the lead-up to the March 2019
nicipal election. Both movements suffered municipal election as well. Those resignations
from a serious crisis of leadership after a decreased the number of parliamentary seats
poor performance in the June 2018 elec- that the Good Party controlled from 44 to
tions, as certain groups within those parties 39. Bearing in mind those developments, the
held their leaders responsible for the failure. Good Party leadership’s election strategy will
Therefore, a much stronger intraparty op- likely come under criticism – depending on
position movement could emerge especially the election results.15
among the CHP ranks after the March 2019
14. Burhanettin Duran, “Kılıçdaroğlu’nun Manevraları ve CHP’nin
Serencamı” [Kılıçdaroğlu’s Maneuvers and CHP’s Situation], Sabah, 15. Nebi Miş, “2019’da Siyaseti Ne Bekliyor?” [What Lies Ahead for
February 12, 2019. Politics in 2019?], Türkiye, January 3, 2019.
14 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
VISIONS FOR LOCAL ister. Knowing that political parties that won
mayoral elections in Istanbul had historically
GOVERNMENT: played a prominent role in national politics,
FROM PAST TO PRESENT the mainstream media and other allies of the
The Justice and Development establishment cared deeply about the 1994
Party (AK Party) mayoral race.
Although the AK Party was established in At the time, Erdoğan managed to over-
2001 and therefore did not formally become come the resistance against himself and his par-
part of local government for another three ty by adopting a new communication strategy.
years, the 1994 municipal election was key to His unique brand of political communication,
understanding the movement’s vision for local which helped him to win the 1994 election,
government. March 27, 1994 was a historic remained intact after the AK Party’s establish-
day in Turkey’s political history. On that day, ment. As a mayoral candidate, Erdoğan’s first
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who would proceed to step was to reach out to the recently urbanized
shape the country’s future, won the mayoral middle and working classes - a demographic
race in Istanbul. The future president’s victory that no other party had penetrated ever be-
in Istanbul resulted in much more than the fore.17 He communicated in person with
municipality of Turkey’s largest city changing various social groups, including low-income
hands.16 At the same time, the 1994 election residents who had recently moved to the city,
and implemented an unprecedented campaign
ushered in a new era, during which Turkish
strategy. Erdoğan distinguished himself from
politics and the idea of local government un-
the rest of the mayoral candidates by walking
derwent major changes. During his tenure as
into people’s homes, telling them about his
the mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan developed a
plans, and promising to deliver public servic-
political style and legacy that became driving
es.18 At the same time, he communicated with
forces behind the AK Party’s establishment.
largely ignored parts of Turkish society by fo-
Two of those factors were particularly impor-
cusing on not just districts promising politi-
tant: Erdoğan’s unique style of political com-
cal support but also social groups that did not
munication on the campaign trail, and his ap-
share his own worldview.
proach to local government in office and the
Ahead of the 1994 municipal election,
notion of project-centered local government.
Erdoğan built a strong organization with ex-
As Erdoğan ran for office, mainstream
tensive knowledge of local governments. He
media outlets, which opposed him at the
launched training programs to make his team
time, urged residents to oppose him by say-
better equipped to deliver key public services
ing that the mayoral race was about selecting
including physical infrastructure, environ-
not just the next mayor of a megapolis with
10 million residents but also the most influ- 17. Metin Heper, “Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey:
ential Turkish politician after the prime min- Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan”, Insight Turkey, Vol:
15, No: 2 (2013), pp. 141-156.
16. Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in 18. “Tayyip Erdoğan’ın 75 Bin Kişilik Seçim Ordusu” [Erdoğan’s Election
Turkey, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey: 2002), p. 22. Team Consisting of 75 Thousand People], Milliyet, February 15, 1994.
s e ta v. o rg 15ANALYSIS
mental protection, water management, and quired a certain level of proficiency. Erdoğan
transportation as well as to familiarize them placed special emphasis on all employees of
with the relevant body of law. That Erdoğan’s the metropolitan municipality and county-
party formed special boards and teams to level local governments learned about urban
keep track of each individual polling station planning, regional planning, infrastructure
amounted to a new kind of effort. Steps by the engineering, the history of local government,
Women’s Branch, which played an active role aesthetics, history of art, and environmental
in Erdoğan’s mayoral campaign and proceeded protection. The group of people that worked
to be an important part of the AK Party’s orga- for Istanbul’s various municipalities at the time
nization, gave him a special advantage. Female proceeded to take responsibility for the nation’s
volunteers were key to conveying Erdoğan’s government after the 2002 general election.
messages to every single household. To be Erdoğan’s goal was to replace the top-
clear, Erdoğan’s decision to involve women down approach to local government - which
more deeply in his mayoral campaign was meant that the municipality would act unilat-
crucial to women playing a more prominent erally and residents were expected to be grate-
role in Turkish politics. On the campaign trail, ful for whatever public services they received
women became part of discussions on urban - with a new system, under which the local
and national problems and successfully carved administration would be required to meet
out a political space for themselves to defend public demands. To implement that plan, he
their rights and voice their demands. launched White Desk (Beyaz Masa in Turk-
Once in office, Erdoğan implemented ish), a hotline that residents could use to voice
his vision for local government and project- their demands or provide feedback on existing
centered administration, which the AK Party services. By taking that step, Erdoğan promot-
adopted with improvements in the following ed communication between the municipality
years. After taking over as mayor, the future and local residents through new channels. He
president shared Istanbul’s problems, along also commissioned opinion polls in various
with his plan and projects to address those is- districts every week to identify pressing prob-
sues, with the public. Erdoğan encountered lems, popular demands, and expectations, and
similar problems - this time, at the national the level of happiness among voters - which
level - when his AK Party came to power in made it possible for the solution-oriented ap-
2002. He proceeded to build on his experience proach to local government to work.
as mayor to implement the AK Party’s action- Since the 1980s, developed nations
and public service-centered political strategy. around the world have been trying to reform
To accomplish his goals as mayor of Is- public administration. Their reform programs
tanbul, Erdoğan desperately needed a group promoted small government, the reduction
of senior executives who would be responsible of red tape, activity, and efficiency. Govern-
for solving problems. At the time, he turned to ments and public institutions adopted a new
experts and academics for help on key issues, approach, whereby they focused on output
like infrastructure and transportation, that re- (rather than input and the administrative pro-
16 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
cess), flexible organization, offering services geared towards addressing problems of scale,
based on popular demands and expectations, financial resources, and authority, from which
and small-scale, horizontally organized public municipalities suffered.
institutions. In doing so, they relied on mar- In addition to implementing local govern-
ket-like structures to manage and provide pub- ment reforms, the AK Party took major steps
lic services. They also took private sector prac- to improve the physical infrastructure of cities
tices, such as human resources management, across Turkey. On the movement’s watch, the
strategic planning, performance management, country made significant progress on “social
and total quality management, and incorpo- local government,” social services, and im-
rated them into the public administration. proving the quality of public services. At the
New principles, including reliance on demo- same time, the national government made ad-
cratic governance, horizontal cooperation, en- ditional resources available to municipalities
gagement, interaction, negotiation, and joint to promote local investments. Likewise, sig-
development, became more popular in the nificant progress was made on infrastructure,
public sector.19 Finally, governments adopted housing construction, transportation projects,
a series of principles to hold public officials and social assistance.20
responsible for their performance and output. The AK Party’s approach to local admin-
Provided that Turkey was going through istration was built on Erdoğan’s original recipe
a period of political crisis in the 1990s, how- for the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in
ever, the country missed out on that global re- 1994. In this regard, the movement’s transfor-
form wave. Not only the central government mation of local government in Turkey dates
but also local governments failed to transform back to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s successful
themselves and implement key reforms. After mayoral campaign. In other words, Erdoğan’s
coming to power in 2002, the AK Party at- approach to local government as the mayor
tempted to implement some of those overdue of Istanbul remained intact under successive
reforms at the national and municipal levels. AK Party governments. The AK Party’s vision
Under the AK Party, Turkey adopted four for local government, which borrowed heav-
major changes related to local government ily from Erdoğan’s brand of local administra-
reform. The country adopted the Metropoli- tion, became institutionalized when the party
tan Municipality Law in 2004 and the Law was established in 2001 and contested its first
on Provincial Special Administrations and the municipal election three years later. Having
Municipal Law in 2005. Seven years later, the formed a single-party government after run-
AK Party oversaw the adoption of a new law ning a campaign stressing justice and progress
that increased the number of metropolitan in 2002, the party entered the 2004 local elec-
municipalities and expanded the geographical tion with an emphasis on local development.
jurisdiction of service providers under metro- At the same time, the AK Party’s election cam-
politan administrations. Those reforms were paign highlighted the importance of human-
19. Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: 20. Nebi Miş, “AK Parti Belediyeciliği: Gelenek, Uygulama ve Beklentiler”
Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes, (Basic Books, New [The AK Party’s Approach to Local Government: Tradition, Practice and
York: 1987). Expectations], Kriter, No: 29, (November 2018).
s e ta v. o rg 17ANALYSIS
centered social local government.21 A dynamic For the first time ever, the movement issued
campaign was designed to communicate di- an election manifesto, which was reserved for
rectly with voters and to ensure that the party national elections until then, and pledged
could engage in healthy and sustainable com- to promote horizontal architecture and eco-
munication with its target audience.22 In 2004, friendly cities. The AK Party’s vision for local
the AK Party won 1,750 municipal races.23 In government was also influenced by calls to
addition to offering solutions to structural reduce red tape and promote more partici-
problems related to infrastructure, transpor- pation and transparency since the 1990s. In
tation, and the environment, the movement this regard, urban councils were established
built its vision for local government with new in 2006 to facilitate residents’ direct partici-
themes in future election cycles. pation in municipal affairs. Moreover, the
movement created new mechanisms to pro-
Although the AK Party was mote transparency in line with global practic-
established in 2001, the 1994 es in local government. Finally, the AK Party
municipal election was key to pledged to attach importance to creating al-
understanding the movement’s ternative participation mechanisms.
In 2019, the AK Party’s vision for lo-
vision for local government.
cal government was broadly advertised in its
election manifesto; this included elements
In the 2009 municipal election, the AK such as Urban Planning, Infrastructure and
Party stressed the importance of “branding” Transportation, Urban Transformation,
for urban government. The election campaign Smart Cities, Eco-Friendly Cities, Social Lo-
was heavily influenced by national politics cal Government, Horizontal Urbanization,
- which meant that all political parties had Government with the People, Savings and
to put their respective visions for local gov- Transparency, and Value-Generating Cit-
ernment and campaign promises on the back ies. The manifesto showed that the AK Party
burner. Five years later, when the next munic- took into account the most recent trends in
ipal election took place, the AK Party built on urban management and integrated those de-
the discourse of civilization to stress human- velopments into its core values in local gov-
ity, democracy, and the city in its campaign.24 ernment.25 At the same time, the movement
unveiled eco-friendly projects accompanied
21. “Siyasiler ve Başkan Adaylarının Seçim Çalışmaları” [Campaign Efforts
by a campaign slogan - “The Spirit of ’94.”
by Politicians and Mayoral Candidates], Hürriyet, March 22, 2004. Other plans, such as livable cities, protecting
22. “AK Parti 28 Mart 2004 Yerel Seçim Klavuzu” [The AK Party’s
March 28, 2004 Municipal Election Guide], http://www.akparti.org.tr/
the environment, promoting architecture,
media/272261/2004-yerel-secim-klavuzu.pdf, (Accessed: March 5, 2019), and aesthetics, were implemented before the
23. Ali Çarkoğlu, “One Down, Two More to Go: Electoral Trends in the
Aftermath of the March 2014 Municipality Elections”, Insight Turkey,
municipal election with the National Gar-
Cilt: 16, Sayı: 2, (2014). dens projects.
24. “Büyük Medeniyet Yolunda İnsan, Demokrasi ve Şehir” [People,
Democracy and the City on the Road to Great Civilization], March 30,
2014 Election Manifesto, http://www.akparti.org.tr/media/272121/30- 25. Hazal Duran, “AK Parti’nin Yerel Seçim Stratejisi” [The AK Party’s
mart-2014-yerel-secim-beyannamesi.pdf, (Accessed: March 5, 2019). Local Election Strategy], Sabah Perspektif, November 17, 2018.
18 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
TABLE 2. THE RESULTS OF LOCAL ELECTIONS (PROVINCIAL COUNCILOR RESULTS, 2004-2014)
Local DEHAP/DTP Voter
AK Party CHP MHP
Elections /BDP/HDP Turnout
Voting Rate 41.7% 18.2% 10.5% -
2004 Local
76.25%
Elections
Total Voters 13,447,287 5,882,810 3,372,249 -
2009 Local Voting Rate 38.4% 23.1% 16% 5.7%
Elections 85.19%
Total Voters 15,353,553 9,229,936 6,386,279 2,277,777
2014 Local Voting Rate 43.39% 25.6% 17.6% 6.81%
Elections 89.19%
Total Voters 19,469,840 11,493,758 7,907,067 2,845,276
Unlike in previous years, the AK Party relied The Republican People’s Party
heavily on social media in its 2019 municipal (CHP)
election campaign. President Erdoğan described The Republican People’s Party (CHP) has
the impact of social media as follows: “Each time been active longer than most political parties
we post a message on Twitter is like organizing in Turkey’s political history. It is possible to
several rallies at Yenikapı.” Indeed, social media analyze the movement’s vision for local gov-
was at the heart of the AK Party’s 2019 campaign ernment by looking at its track record. After
and a digital network was established to facilitate Turkey’s transition to multiparty democracy,
quicker communication among campaign offi- the CHP won 40 municipal races around the
cials. Finally, the intraparty voting on potential country in the 1950 local election - compared
candidates took place online. to 560 victories by its rival, the Democratic
The AK Party’s previous electoral suc- Party.26 In later years, the movement con-
cesses may shed light upon the results of the trolled municipalities in many cities includ-
March 31 local elections. In the 2004 local ing Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir.27
elections, the party came in first and got 41.7 The CHP’s performance in metropoli-
percent of the votes. When it came to 2009, tan areas provides valuable insights into its
the party relatively decreased voting rates to vision for local government. The movement
38.4 percent. According to the official results
of the 2014 local elections, the AK Party won 26. “Seçimi DP Ezici Bir Çoğunlukla Kazandı” [DP Wins the Election by
by a landslide and increased its votes to 43.39 a Landslide], Milliyet, October 16, 1950.
27. CHP did not contest the 1955 municipal election. It contested
percent. As the winner of the all three previous all later elections before being shut down after the September 12,
local elections, the party won the highest num- 1980 coup d’état. In 1981-1992, the party’s elite continued their
political activities as part of the Social Democracy Party (SODEP)
ber of municipalities throughout the country. and the SHP.
s e ta v. o rg 19ANALYSIS
was in charge of Istanbul in 1969-1980 and Party government. Especially from 2007 on-
1989-1994 (as the Social Democratic Peo- wards, the laicity debate redefined the CHP’s
ple’s Party), yet could not address the city’s vision for local government. By extension, the
long-standing structural problems because movement’s local election campaigns were
it lacked an active management approach.28 overshadowed by the national debate on la-
At the same time, the CHP’s image was tar- icism and Kemalism. Even though the CHP
nished by widespread corruption and brib- mentioned a range of issues, including urban
ery. A bribery scandal at Istanbul’s Water and aesthetics, the right to housing, infrastruc-
Sewage Administration (ISKI), among other ture, the environment, democracy, and par-
things, formed the basis of poor public opin- ticipation, in its election manifestos, its main
ion about the party’s local government perfor- arguments were always related to laicism
mance.29 Again, the CHP’s failure to address and Kemalism. Therefore, CHP politicians
basic issues with the city’s water supply and weighed in heavily on national issues.
garbage collection strengthened the view that Yet the 2009 municipal election was a
it was generally unsuccessful when it came to turning point for the CHP. Realizing that
local government. building its entire platform around laicism
Another important factor that influ- was costing it votes, the movement took an
enced the CHP’s vision for local government unexpected step in 2009. Then-CHP Chair-
was that the movement acted in line with the man Deniz Baykal personally admitted a
principle of “social democratic local govern- group of women wearing the burqa into
ment” since the 1970s. This approach, which party membership in an attempt to reach out
was born during Bülent Ecevit’s tenure as to conservatives.31 Yet that move was not re-
prime minister, promised to strike a healthy ceived well.
balance between urban areas and the country- The CHP’s 2014 local election campaign,
side.30 Yet, the movement’s failure to account in turn, introduced a new framework with an
for globalization and other international dy- emphasis on wealth, unity, and liberty. The
namics caused it to manage major projects party’s election campaign and rhetoric were
like Köykent with a narrow perspective. heavily influenced by the Gezi Park revolts.32
In the 2000s, the CHP’s approach to In addition to nominating many public fig-
local government came under more visible ures who rose to prominence during the up-
ideological influences. In this regard, the rising, the CHP attempted to position itself
movement built its local election campaigns as the political representative of that move-
around national issues and viewed mayoral ment.33 The movement’s election manifesto
races as an instrument to undermine the AK
31. Nebi Miş, “CHP’nin HDP’lileşme Serüveni” [The Tale of CHP’s
28. Nebi Miş, “CHP’nin Yerel Yönetim Geleneği” [The CHP’s Tradition HDP-ization], Kriter, No: 16, (September 2017)
of Local Government], Türkiye, 8 November 2018. 32. Cengiz Erişen, Political Behavior and the Emotional Citizen:
29. Nebi Miş and Abdullah Eren, “Siyasal Partilerin Yerel Vizyonu: Participation and Reaction in Turkey, (Palgrave Macmillan, London:
İstanbul Seçimleri” [The Local Vision of Political Parties: The Istanbul 2018).
Election], SETA Analiz, No: 91, (March 2014). 33. Mustafa Altunoğlu and Doğan Eşkinat, “30 Mart’a Doğru
30. “Ali Nejat Ölçen ile Söyleşi: Halk Sektörü I” [An Interview with Ali Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi” [CHP towards March 30], SETA Analiz,
Nejat Ölçen: Public Sector I], Aydınlanma 1923, No: 37. No:90, (March 2014).
20 s e ta v. o rgTHE MARCH 31 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY
TABLE 3. THE NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES WON BY POLITICAL PARTIES (2004-2014)
Local Elections AK Party CHP MHP DEHAP/DTP/BDP/HDP
2004 Local Elections 1,762 469 247 -
2009 Local Elections 1,452 506 484 97
2014 Local Elections** 818 232 169 99
** The reason for the significant decrease of the numbers of municipalities won by the parties in the 2014 local election is the legal change to the form
of local administrative organization in 2012.
concentrated on making urban life easier and The Nationalist Movement Party
better, preserving the architectural, historical, (MHP)
and cultural textures of urban areas, improv- The MHP has been a key player in Turkish
ing physical infrastructure, and promoting politics since its establishment in 1969. The
popular participation and transparency in lo- movement played crucial roles in national and
cal government. local politics. It is possible to claim that the
Ahead of the 2019 municipal election, MHP’s approach to national politics shaped its
the CHP issued a 12-point statement to out- vision for local government. The party’s first
line its vision for local government: tolerant major success was to win 50 municipal races in
cities and respect for the people, just distribu- the 1977 election. It was particularly success-
tion of wealth, accountability, transparency, ful in Adıyaman, Muş, and Konya.
combatting poverty, production and job cre- The September 1980 coup d’état and
ation, innovation and smart cities, social jus- military interventions in civilian politics,
tice, support for culture and the arts, and en- however, took a heavy toll on the MHP. A
vironmental protection. The movement also 1981 law banned all political activities by the
used campaign slogans that promised peace movement’s founder, Alparslan Türkeş, and
and solutions to pressing problems. the MHP had to contest the 1989 munici-
The CHP has never achieved its goals pal election as the Nationalist Labor Party. In
in local elections. In 2004, it got only 18.2 1992, the Turkish Parliament passed a new
percent of the votes and won 469 municipali- law permitting the reestablishment of politi-
ties. Its voting rates slightly increased in the cal parties that were banned after the 1980
2009 local elections and the CHP reached coup. Consequently, the MHP was born
23.1 percent of the votes. When it came to again in 1993 and enjoyed vast popular sup-
the 2014 local elections, the party got 25.2 port in local elections especially against the
percent of the votes but still came in second backdrop of threats against Turkey’s national
after the AK Party. Even if the main target of security. For example, the movement per-
the CHP was winning against the AK Party, it formed better than average in the Mediter-
could not succeed. ranean and Aegean regions in the 1994 local
s e ta v. o rg 21ANALYSIS
election, which took place amid an uptick in The MHP’s vision document for the 2019
the PKK’s terrorist attacks.34 municipal election, in turn, highlighted the im-
In 1999, the MHP achieved an unprec- portance of delivering public services quickly,
edented success by winning 499 municipali- affordably and justly, respecting the environ-
ties. The movement’s success was largely due ment and promoting architectural aesthetics,
to a heightened sense of nationalism nation- and building eco-friendly social spaces. The
ally and locally. At the time and in later elec- document called for the protection of social
tion cycles, the MHP’s approach to local gov- and historical texture as well as the effective use
ernment focused on productivity and direct of technology and innovation at the municipal
contact with the constituents. The movement level on the basis of nationalism, hard work, jus-
argued that an approach to local government, tice, honesty, modernity, development, partici-
which was unique to the Nationalist Move- pation, competition, and transparency.
ment, was crucial for the country, and called The previous local election results of the
on its supporters to develop a holistic ap- MHP show that the party has gradually in-
proach to urban administration and to focus creased its voting rates. While the party got
on all social, physical, and cultural areas.35 10.5 percent of the votes in 2004, its voting
Chairman Devlet Bahçeli himself stressed rate increased to 16 percent in the 2009 local
that the MHP was trying to reconcile the elections. When it came to the 2014 local elec-
global and the local with an emphasis on na- tions, the MHP got 17.6 percent of total votes
tionalism.36 and won the elections in 169 municipalities
The MHP’s popularity at the local level throughout the country. As well as increasing
decreased in the 2000s, yet did not end com- voting rates and the number of municipalities,
pletely. In 2009, which marked the movement’s the MHP also gradually broadened its elec-
40th anniversary, the MHP won ten provinces toral base.
including Manisa, Balıkesir, Uşak, Osmaniye,
Gümüşhane, Kastamonu, Karabük, Bartın, The Peoples’ Democratic Party
and Isparta.37 Five years later, it succeded in (HDP)
mayoral races for Adana, Osmaniyet, Manisa, Kurdish nationalist political parties have been
Mersin, Isparta, Bartın, Karabük, and Kars. active in Turkish politics since the 1990s. Al-
most all of those parties pledged to strengthen
34. Hatem Ete, Hamza Taşdelen, Sami Orçun Ersay, Ülkücülükten
Tepkisel Milliyetçiliğe: MHP’nin İdeolojisi ve Seçmen Eğilimleri [From local governments and called for the transfer of
Idealism to Reactionary Nationalism: MHP’s Ideology and Voter
Inclinations], (SETA Rapor, Istanbul: 2014). the central government’s powers to municipal-
35. “Üretken Belediyecilik: Bütüncül Yaklaşım-Birlikte Yönetim” ities. The HDP, which made those points in its
[Productive Local Government: Holistic Approach-Governing Together],
Nationalist Movement Party Department of Local Government, founding declaration and election manifestos,
Publication No: 9, https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/kitaplar/ was no exception.
uretken_belediyecilik_web.pdf, (Accessed: March 5, 2019).
36. Devlet Bahçeli, “21. Yüzyıl ve 2023 Türkiye Vizyonu” [The 21st The HDP’s approach to local government
Century and Turkey’s Vision for 2023], https://www.mhp.org.tr/ was in line with the Peace and Democracy Par-
usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/21yy2023turkiyevizyonu.pdf, (Accessed:
March 5, 2019), ty (BDP), its predecessor, and reflected the idea
37. Hamit Emrah Beriş, “31 Mart’a Doğru Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi” of democratic autonomy. Both political parties
[MHP Towards March 30], SETA Analiz, No: 84, (February 2014).
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