SPECIAL EDITION - SERIES OF ESPRESSO INSIGHTS - The dialogue with Serbia Arbër Fetahu

No.24/2020   December 25, 2020

SPECIAL EDITION –
SERIES OF ESPRESSO
INSIGHTS

The dialogue
with Serbia
_

Arbër Fetahu

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Group for Legal
and Political
Studies
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based in Prishtina, Kosovo.

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SPECIAL EDITION – SERIES OF ESPRESSO INSIGHTS
2020 has been a year to remember, especially in Kosovo. In this Espresso.Insights series, GLPS
recaps and analyses the main events in the fields of politics, law and society that have affected
the country this year and identifies the challenges ahead of 2021. In part 8, Arbër Fetahu
explores the political relations between Kosovo and Serbia throughout the year, and evaluates
the progress made in their bilateral dialogue.

#KOSOVOin2020: The dialogue with Serbia
By: Arbër Fetahu – Research Fellow at Group for Legal and Political Studies

The dialogue for the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is marking its first
decade. Throughout these years, the dialogue has experienced almost everything from
blockades, changes of delegations, and renewals of European Union (EU) High Representatives
and mediators, to controversial topics such as border correction between Kosovo and Serbia.
However, the results and outcomes have not been satisfying and, in most occasions, have been
vague. Indeed, the dialogue was constructed as a sensational event rather than as a process
that should produce tangible results towards full normalization of relations. From the start, the
general tone of the meetings had been progressively acrimonious, with threats to pull out from
the talks coming from both sides. The domestic issues outweighed the incentives for EU
integration, in which light several meetings were cancelled or delayed—a proof that the dialogue
was driven by anger and fury rather than by rationality.

The resumption of the dialogue and transatlantic competition
This year, the newly-elected Albin Kurti administration was overthrown in late March through a
no-confidence vote, arguably to prevent the stagnation of the dialogue with Serbia. Therefore,
after twenty months of diplomatic blockade due to the 100-percent tariffs imposed by Kosovo in
2018 over Serbian and Bosnian goods, the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade resumed in
July, following the inauguration of Avdullah Hoti’s executive. This resumption had its price, since
the tariffs, as well as the reciprocity put in place by Kurti’s Vetëvendosje (VV) government, were
lifted.
         The international pressure to resume the negotiations were high, especially from the
United States (US) and President’s Trump Special Representative in the dialogue, Richard
Grenell. A flawed yet remarkable event that showcased Washington’s rising interest in the
dialogue was the cancellation of the high-level Washington meeting between Kosovo and Serbia,
organized by Grenell and scheduled for the 27th of June. The failure to finally convene occurred
due to the indictments of the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) against Kosovo’s President
Hashim Thaçi, who was meant to lead the Kosovar delegation at the White House. Arguably, this
was a cold shower for the US administration, who had been pushing unconventionally for the
resumption of the dialogue in Washington—in this way neglecting the EU’s traditional role as
mediator. In this light, two competing narratives arose throughout the first half of the year:
Washington’s narrative, supportive of a fast deal embroiled with economic aspects, and Brussels’
narrative, which envisaged the importance of a structural process ending with a comprehensive
legally-binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.
         Following the Washington fiasco in June, better circumstances were created for the EU to
take up its role as broker. A new government had been formed in Kosovo, and the first virtual
meeting between incoming Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić
took place the 10th of July, at the so-called Paris Summit. Among the attendees were French

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President Emanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Notwithstanding the
summit’s poor outcome and the sides’ rigid stances, the holding of a virtual meeting after twenty
months of standstill was a success in itself.
         Once the first virtual meeting had broken the ice, Hoti and Vučić finally met face to face
the16th of July. Held under EU auspices, the meeting aimed to continue the process of the
normalization of relations and restate Brussels’ upper hand in the mediation tasks. Despite the
resumption, the dialogue was facing old problems, seeing both delegations remain entrenched in
their positions. While Prime Minister Hoti posited that the only worthwhile solution was the
mutual recognition, Vučić opposed this approach by stating that “Kosovo wanted everything
solved overnight and make Serbia unconditionally accept”. Under the mediation of EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, and EU Special Representative for the Dialogue,
Miroslav Lajčak, both parties focused their negotiations on the issue of missing persons,
displaced persons and economic cooperation. Kosovo and Serbia agreed to form national
diplomatic teams of experts and set another meeting in September.
         Towards the end of the summer, in August, the diplomatic teams of experts of Kosovo
and Serbia met in Brussels. The outcomes of these negotiations were not promising, as both
sides threw accusations at each other over previous political blockades. There were almost no
tangible results, despite the modest agreement reached on the topics of missing persons,
displaced persons, and other economic aspects.
         While Brussels was preparing for the next high-level meeting on the 7th of September, the
US administration also made its move. Following the failed June meeting, Trump managed to
strike back with a new summit between Prime Minister Hoti and President Vučić, scheduled for
the 4th of September and held at the White House. The result of this meeting was nothing more
than a vaguely-defined economic deal between Kosovo and Serbia, which ultimately failed to
tackle the issue of mutual recognition. It also did not contribute to normalize the relations
between the two. The Washington agreement, described by the US as ‘historic’, was nothing
groundbreaking—if anything, it was used as an electoral tool for Trump’s campaign ahead of the
presidential polls in November.
         Only three days after the Washington meeting, leaders of both countries met again in
Brussels with the facilitation of EU High Representative Borrell. The encounter felt like a
repetitive scene, either side holding a different stance. However, they were more optimistic to
cooperate and negotiate. Borrell depicted the process as hard but he appreciated the willingness
of both leaders to commit to the dialogue.
         From September to December, despite more (mostly technical) meetings and twisted
rhetoric, the negotiations did not produce fruitful results—not least after the re-emergence of the
establishment of the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM) in Kosovo as a highly-contested
topic of discussion. The Serbian delegation insisted that no agreement could be reached without
the formation of the ASM while, on the other hand, Kosovo considered the ASM as a closed
chapter, arguing that the verdict of its Constitutional Court around the topic was undisputed. The
formation of the ASM was the highlight of the talks towards the end of the year, stalling the
negotiations to very considerable extent.
         Special Representative Lajčak, in an attempt to reconcile the views around the
establishment of the ASM, visited Prishtina and Belgrade in mid-October. In Prishtina, Lajčak
posited that, without the formation of the ASM, no final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia
would be reached. This statement was met with resistance and criticism from Kosovo’s political
establishment and the public alike. In Belgrade, Lajčak stated that the ASM agreement should be
implemented—indicating that Kosovo’s constitution was not a Bible and could thus be changed to
accommodate the ASM’s establishment. In the same regard, Vučić declared that Serbia was

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determined to the implementation of the ASM, and that no other agreement should be reached
   without its formation. On the 10thof December, a new expert-level meeting was held in Brussels.
   The expected topics were pensions and cadasters, while no information was given regarding the
   ASM.

   A challenging year ahead
   Despite its resumption, in all, the dialogue did not achieve too many tangible results in 2020. On
   the one hand, Kosovo and Serbia were entrenched in their rigid positions, while the EU failed to
   push forward any viable solution which would be acceptable for both. The vast interference of
   external actors, such as the US, further undermined the EU’s role in the process, whom often did
   not do enough to stand its ground as mediator.
           2021 seems to be a challenging year. We can expect an increasing momentum in the
   rounds of negotiation, though a comprehensive legally-binding agreement that would normalize
   the relations between the two countries still seems out of reach. With this new pulse, the ASM
   will occupy the headlines of the process and will most likely contribute to future situations of
   impasse. Furthermore, Kosovo’s unstable political context could affect the dialogue if new
   elections would take place in 2021—a hypothesis that should not be discarded.

Espresso.Insights

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Espresso.Insights are aimed at decoding the policy research of our Fellows to a broader audience.
Espresso.Insights present short summary of analysis and information that help readers and policy-makers
in particular, to understand the relevant research, as they suggest possible policy options and argue for
certain path of action. Aiming to intensify the debate about policy issues and general public concerns,
Espresso.Insights will, in addition, serve as gears to aid an informed decision-making process.

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