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Issue 5
December 2019
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
ISSN 2406-1824Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction
of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace
through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals
against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the
ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German
Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects,
we are part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner projects in
approximately 60 countries.
The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual
openness. We maintain a worldwide network with currently 30 international offices. Our
work in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo concentrates on the democratisation process,
political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support
and open public fora about topical and marginalised socio-political issues and we enable
networking among local and international actors whose work aligns with Green values.
Cover design Bogdan MaksimovićIntroduction Southeastern Europe 3
Kosovo: A Hostage Crisis
By Natalija Miletić
Twenty years on from the Kosovo War, the ing conducted by the very politicians who
collective memory of both parties in the were on opposing sides during the war in
conflict remains burdened by myths and 1998-99. The fact that the negotiations are in
incontestable truths about what actually a state of stalemate, and have been for a
took place. Nationalist and ethnocentric long time, should come as no surprise.
narratives about the war in the former Yu- The hostage crisis known as Kosovo, in
goslav autonomous province continue to which the populations of both Kosovo and
dominate public discourse of both Kosovo Serbia are held as ideological hostages by
and Serbia. their own political elites, has already been
The process of reconciliation and building going on for twenty years. The lack of prog-
longstanding peace is being undermined, ress in the official negotiations between
primarily, by political elites in both coun- Belgrade and Pristina is an obstacle to
tries, whose populist policies amplify the peacebuilding and the normal coexistence
prejudices between Kosovar Albanians and of the two Kosovar communities. However,
Serbs. The political establishment in both bad policies made by local and interna-
countries –composed of, inter alia, war- tional stakeholders, mainly affect the lives
mongers, former combatants, convicted of ordinary citizens, rather than the politi-
and non-convicted war criminals– face cians and policy makers that are involved.
pressure from the international community This issue of Perspectives on the 20th anni-
to finally, and without hesitation, resolve versary of the Kosovo War and the NATO
the question of the former province of the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
ex-Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and normal- slavia, is dedicated to ordinary citizens.
ize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. These are the people who, to this day, live
The current problems concerning relations with the consequences of war, even if they
between the two countries are partly the re- took no part in it; the youth raised to hate;
sult of the normalization negotiations, anti-war activists who are considered ene-
which have been going on for more than a mies of the state; minorities that are used
decade under the patronage of the interna- as pawns in political maneuvering; victims
tional community. Kosovo’s status negotia- of war crimes and victims of the NATO mil-
tions, which have taken place in the after- itary campaign. In this issue of Perspec-
math of a conflict that claimed the lives of tives we aim to highlight the fact that Koso-
thousands of civilians, destroyed tens of vo is not just a toponym, but a country
thousands of homes and displaced more burdened by its recent violent history,
than a million people, led to thousands of where common people are struggling to
women being raped, and which only ceased rebuild the broken societies that the con-
following the intervention of NATO, are be- flict has left behind.
Natalija Miletić, journalist4 Southeastern Europe Introduction
Introduction
By Marijana Toma
In the early 1980s, after the death of Social- choice of official language, control of the
ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) police, as well as veto powers over any fur-
President Josip Broz Tito, demonstrations ther changes to the Constitution of Serbia.
took place in Kosovo as Kosovo Albanians A wave of demonstrations were organized
sought for Kosovo to be recognized as a Re- across Kosovo, involving students and
public within SFRY. At the same time, in- teachers, intellectuals, and miners, which
creasing numbers of prominent individu- led the Presidency of SFRY to impose ‘spe-
als and institutions in Serbia began to cial measures’, with federal authorities
request that Kosovo’s autonomy be re- assuming responsibility for security within
duced, claiming that the Kosovo Albanian’s the province. In that period, thousands of
protests were “organised counter-revolu- Kosovo Albanians employed in the public
tionary activities”. Additionally, the emi- sector– doctors, teachers, university pro-
gration of Serbs and Montenegrins from fessors, workers, judges, police and civil
Kosovo intensified in this period, accom- servants– were dismissed from their posi-
panied by increasingly vocal demands tions and replaced by non-Albanians. At
from the Serbian public to halt this trend. the same time, police violence against
During the mid-1980s, the division be- Kosovo Albanians increased.
tween Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was
evident and deep: Albanians continued to A decade of non-violent
request that Kosovo be granted the status
of a Republic, as well as for greater liberal-
resistance and the formation
ization, and expressed concerns about of the Kosovo Liberation
Kosovo’s underdevelopment within SFRY, Army
while Serbs were concerned about discrim- In September 1991, after the war in Slovenia
ination against them by the Kosovo Alba- already ended, and war in Croatia was on its
nian-led provincial government. After the way, Kosovo Albanian political leaders gath-
Central Committee of the League of Com- ered together within the Democratic League
munists of Serbia elected Slobodan Mi- of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, a promi-
lošević as the new Chairman of the Presid- nent writer and intellectual, and embraced
ium of the Central Committee, he managed a policy of non-violent civil resistance, es-
to marginalize his political opponents in tablishing a system of unofficial, parallel
the Party and established full control over institutions in the health care and education
the Serbian branch of the League of Com- sectors. Kosovo Albanians held an unoffi-
munists, allowing him to crucially influ- cial referendum in which they voted over-
ence political events in Yugoslavia. whelmingly for independence from Serbia
At the beginning of 1989, amendments to and Yugoslavia. Between 1992 and 1995, the
the Constitution of Serbia were adopted by situation in Kosovo remained tense, but did
the National Assembly. These constitu- not erupt in violence , despite the
tional changes revoked Kosovo’s autono- strong-handed rule of the Serbian regime.
my: most of the Provinces’ autonomous After almost a decade of non-violent resis-
powers were annulled, including control tance by Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovo
Marijana Toma, historian over economic and educational policy, Liberation Army (KLA), an armed resis-Introduction Southeastern Europe 5
tance organization, was formed by late After additional attempts by international
1997 and began attacking Serbian police mediators to persuade Slobodan Milošević
and civilians in Kosovo. In late 1996 and to accept the agreement, US Ambassador
1997, the KLA claimed responsibility for Richard Holbrooke announced the failure
armed attacks on members of the military of negotiations on March 23rd 1999, after
in Kosovo, as well as against civilians. The which NATO Secretary General Solana di-
beginning of armed conflict between the rected Wesley Clark to commence air
Yugoslav Army and Serbian police with the strikes, which began on the March 24th and
KLA is commonly connected to the attack continued until June 10th 1999.
by Serbian police special forces on the fam-
ily compound of Adem Jashari in the vil- Operation Allied Force -
lage of Donje Prekaze in March 1998, in
which Jashari, one of the founders of the
NATO military intervention
KLA, along with an estimated 50 others against the Federal Republic
members of his family and associates, in- of Yugoslavia
cluding several women and children, were Between March 24th and June 9th 1999, large
killed. During the spring of 1998, the KLA areas of Serbia, including Kosovo, Bel-
gradually increased the intensity of attacks grade and Novi Sad, were targeted by
in Kosovo, including against police patrols. NATO bombing. While Montenegro was
The Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian police not targeted often, Podgorica was bombed
responded by shelling Albanian villages. In at the end of April 1999. According to the
July 1998, the KLA began an offensive in Army of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade region
the Municipality of Orahovac, in an at- was most intensively targeted by NATO’s
tempt to take control of the area, which firepower. Although NATO and allied gov-
resulted in the killing of many civilians, ernments and military officials stressed
both Albanian and Serb, by both the Serbi- their intent to limit civilian casualties and
an security forces and KLA. Following the other harm to the civilian population, from
KLA’s operations in the Orahovac region, the outset of operation Allied Force, civil-
the Serbian army and police coordinated ian casualties occurred.
action against KLA forces, and by early Human Rights Watch, which conducted an
September 1998 the KLA had lost much of investigation in NATO’s intervention, report-
the territory it had previously held. ed ninety separate incidents involving civil-
ian deaths during the bombing campaign.
Diplomatic efforts During the NATO air campaign, the inter-
to stop the war national community continued with diplo-
Following a massacre in mid-January in the matic efforts to persuade the Yugoslav
village Račak, in central Kosovo, the Con- leadership, primarily Milošević, to accept
tact Group called for a peace conference to an international military presence in Koso-
be held in France at the beginning of Febru- vo. Based on the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari
ary 1999. Despite efforts by the Contact plan, a Military Technical Agreement be-
Group, the negotiations failed due to sub- tween the International Security Force
stantial differences between the Federal (KFOR) and the Governments of the Fed-
Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbian authorities eral Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia was
and the international community on the is- signed on June 9th, 1999 in Kumanovo, then
sue of implementation and an international Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
military presence in Kosovo. According to The agreement encompassed the with-
the ICTY, the diversity of the Kosovo Alba- drawal of Serbian-Yugoslav forces from
nian delegation caused indecision and nu- Kosovo, deployment of KFOR in Kosovo
merous changes in their position; the ap- following the adoption of a UN Security
proach of the Troika (Austrian Ambassador Council resolution, and allowing KFOR to
Wolfgang Petritsch, acting as the European operate without interference. On June 10th
Union’s Special Envoy for Kosovo, Russian 1999 the Security Council adopted Resolu-
envoy Ambassador Boris Mayorski, and tion 1244, authorizing the creation of an
U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill) did not international civil presence, the purpose of
encourage confidence in the process; and which was to provide an interim adminis-
the involvement of the U.S. Secretary of tration for Kosovo, demilitarization of the
State, Madeleine Albright, introduced con- KLA, and safe return of refugees and inter-
fusion and uncertainty into the position of nally displaced persons. Following the
the international negotiators. withdrawal of the Serbian police and Yugo-6 Southeastern Europe Introduction
slav Army, according to the records of the Korenica, and other villages in the Reka
Government of Serbia, more than 187,000 Valley, Serbian forces killed at least 287
Serbs and other non-Albanians left Kosovo Kosovo Albanian men and forcibly ex-
and moved to Serbia. Those who stayed in pelled a number of Kosovo Albanian civil-
Kosovo were targeted by Albanians in re- ians and forced them to leave for Albania.
prisals. In this post-conflict violence, be- A significant number of bodies of these
tween June 12th 1999 and December 31st men were later discovered in a mass grave
2000, 932 non-Albanians were killed, ab- in Batajnica, during the exhumations con-
ducted or went missing, mostly Serbs. ducted in 2001-2002. In Izbica, on March
Post-conflict relations between Serbs and 28th 1999, over 100 mostly older men were
Albanians have developed slowly. Violence separated from women and children, gath-
did not end in 1999, erupting again in ered in a field, divided into two groups and
March 2004 when ethnic tensions led to un- shot. In Podujevo, on March 28th 1999, the
rest and riots in what is now known in Ser- Serbian Scorpions police unit committed
bia as the “March Pogrom”, in which 15 a massacre, killing 19 Albanian women
Albanians and 12 Serbs were killed, 170 and children from the Duriqi and Boguje-
Serbs were seriously injured, around 800 vci families.
Serb houses were destroyed or seriously
damaged, as well as 90 Ashkalia and two Victims of victimhood
Albanian houses, and 36 Serbian Orthodox Since the end of the armed conflict, Serbia
Churches and other religious places were and Kosovo have been in dispute over al-
completely or partially destroyed. In recent most every issue related to the conflict,
years, the security situation in Kosovo has from the causes of the conflict, its chronol-
improved and although the return of Serbs ogy, and nature, to the atrocities that were
is slow, relations between Serbs and Alba- committed, and the number of people who
nians in Kosovo are slowly normalizing. lost their lives during and after the conflict.
Since mid-2000s, the Humanitarian Law
War crimes in Kosovo Center in Serbia (HLC) and Humanitarian
During the entire period of the NATO Law Center Kosovo (HLC Kosovo), two hu-
bombing, the Army of Yugoslavia and po- man rights organizations and documenta-
lice forces of the Republic of Serbia contin- tion centers, have conducted extensive
ued to specifically target Kosovo Albanian research on human losses in connection
civilians, committing killings, including with the Kosovo conflict. According to the
executions, and forcing civilians to leave Kosovo Memory Book Database, a total of
Kosovo for Albania and Macedonia. Atroc- 13,535 persons were killed or disappeared
ities began almost immediately after the during and in the context of the armed
beginning of NATO bombing. One of the conflict in Kosovo, 10,812 of which were
first major crimes was committed by mem- Kosovo Albanians, 2,197 were Serbs, and
bers of Serbian police in Suva Reka, on 526 were Roma, Bosniaks, Montenegrins,
March 26th 1999, when 45 members of Ber- and other non-Albanians. HLC and HLC
isha family were killed. Among them were Kosovo have analyzed more than 31,600
many women and children, whose bodies documents from numerous sources, in-
were discovered and exhumed from a cluding a large number of statements giv-
mass grave at the police compound in en by victims or witnesses of war crimes.
Batajnica, a Belgrade suburb. One area According to the HLC and HLC Kosovo
targeted by the Army and Police was the database, during the conflict in Kosovo in
municipality of Đakovica, where Serbian 1998, 2,046 persons were killed or went
police began killing Kosovo Albanians and missing, of which 1,705 Albanians, 280
burning houses in March and April 1999 in Serbs, and 61 were other non-Albanians;
order to create an atmosphere of fear 1,018 were Kosovo Albanian civilians, 129
among those civilians who refused to leave were Serb civilians, and 44 other non-Al-
their homes and flee to Albania. During banian civilians; 682 were Kosovo Alba-
the Reka Valley operation, launched in nian members of the KLA, one Kosovo
part as a response to the killing of five po- Albanian who was a member of the Army
licemen on April 22nd 1999, the Army and of Yugoslavia/Serbian police, 151 Serb
Police acted in conjunction, expelling members of Army/Police, and 16 persons
Kosovo Albanian civilians from their vil- of other ethnicities who were members of
lages and sending many of them to Alba- the Army of Yugoslavia/Serbian police. It
nia. On April 27th 1999, in villages Meja and was impossible to determine the status ofIntroduction Southeastern Europe 7 four Albanians and one non-Albanian as ones on Surdulica, where 29 people were combatant or civilian. killed, Niš, where 19 civilians were killed, Between March 20th and June 14th 1999, Ser- and on the Radio-Television of Serbia stu- bian forces killed or destroyed the bodies of dio in Belgrade, where 17 civilians were 6,901 Albanian civilians. In the same peri- killed. od, the KLA was responsible for the killing or disappearance of 328 Serbian civilians Reconciliation and 136 Roma persons and other non-Alba- While some progress has been made in the nian civilians. Combat between the Army of area of dealing with the past and transi- Yugoslavia/Serbian police and KLA result- tional justice, the process of reconciliation ed in the killing or disappearance of 1,204 still lies in the distant future in the region members of the KLA and 559 members of of the post-Yugoslav states, and in Ser- the Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian Police. bia-Kosovo particularly. It is therefore nec- During the NATO bombing, HLC and HLC essary that Serbia and Kosovo, as well as Kosovo documented 758 persons who lost other countries in the region, accept the their lives as a result of NATO attacks, of already established facts about war crimes which 205 Serbian civilians, 220 Kosovo-Al- committed in the Yugoslav wars during the banian civilians, 28 Roma civilians and ci- 1990s, demonstrate additional willingness vilians of other ethnicities, 30 members of to address these issues through the estab- the KLA, and 275 members of the Army of lishment of regional truth experiments, Yugoslavia and Serbian police. NATO repair the damage inflicted upon victims, bombs killed 260 people in the territory of and establish accountability for past atroc- Serbia, 10 in Montenegro, and 488 in Koso- ities, through war crimes prosecutions and vo. The two most deadly NATO attacks were halting the promotion of war criminals. in Korisa, where 77 Albanian civilians were These steps present the only solid ground killed, and Bistražin, where 64 Albanian ci- for the long awaited reconciliation be- vilians were killed, whereas on the territory tween Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, as well of Serbia, the most deadly attacks were the with other neighbors in the region.
8 Southeastern Europe Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils
Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing –
the lesser of two evils
By Simon Ilse and Milan Bogdanović
In early 1999, German Tornado jets took part in airstrikes against targets in Serbia, thus
opening a new chapter in the history of Germany. The decision to participate in the NATO
intervention in the Kosovo war, taken by the newly formed red-green government in
Germany, headed by Gerhard Schroeder, caused major internal strains, primarily in the
ranks of the Greens. The focal point of criticism was the “Green” Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Joschka Fischer, whose support for military intervention clashed with the Green
Movement’s anti-war policies. Winfried Nachtwei, former member of the German Bun-
destag and the Alliance 90/Greens, interviewed for this edition of Perspectives, speaks
about the controversial dilemma of protecting human rights through the use of military
force and the policy of non-violence, as well as about the lessons learned from the war
and the process of peacebuilding in Kosovo.
In regard to the NATO intervention in legitimized under international law. In this
1999 – did the Greens do the wrong thing respect, it was clear to us that we support-
for the right reasons? ed one evil to prevent another intolerable
That thought came to me a few weeks after evil.
the beginning of the NATO intervention,
because the intention to avert an immi- Could you describe this dilemma?
nent humanitarian threat within a short The Green Party, including the peace move-
period of time was not achieved. The in- ment, have argued for years about how ad-
tention was right, I still believe that, but the equately Western European states could
result is questionable. The thought came have reacted to the wars in the Balkans. It
up: “Was one being naive about the effec- was agreed that humanitarian aid should be
tiveness of this kind of military action?” supported, aid should be given to refugees,
refugees should be admitted and sanctions
Was the decision to participate in opera- should be imposed on the main aggressors.
tion Allied Force, from a German point Whether military action should be taken
of view, and in conditions that were not was the subject of huge debate, and it was
easy, the right one? postponed by the Greens, in the autumn of
From the very start it was mainly about the 1996, when a delegation from our parlia-
dilemma of preventing another Bosnia in mentary group and our party visited Bosnia
the European political sphere of interest and Herzegovina. There, in Sarajevo, we
and, in that sense, it was very much the really understood what had happened to
right and necessary thing to do. A major the defenseless population in besieged Sa-
problem was that the United Nations Se- rajevo, and how Europe had done nothing
curity Council was unable to legitimize effective against it. This was precisely where
military action, i.e. the use of force, be- we, most of whom were pacifists, came to
Winfried Nachtwei, former
Bundestag MP (Alliance ‘90/Greens)
cause of the veto announced by Russia and realize there are situations in which the use
Simon Ilse, hbs Belgrade office probably also China. The threat of military of military force can be necessary, legiti-
director strikes, air strikes, was justified, given the mate and justifiable, in order to prevent
Milan Bogdanović, hbs Belgrade
program coordinator
real situation in Kosovo, but it was not mass violence.Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils Southeastern Europe 9
In 1998 the violence had escalated consid- their support. Had the majority of them
erably. In September 1998 the UN Security withdrawn their support of their own For-
Council stated how the development in eign Minister, Joschka Fischer, it would
Kosovo posed a threat to security and have led to the Green Party leaving the co-
peace in the region. The issue was ad- alition and the German Government, and
dressed to both parties in the conflict, in- Fischer would not have been Foreign Min-
cluding the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army, ister any more. Fischer had already made
Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - good progress agitating for a political solu-
Ed.], but the armed Serbian forces were tion to the conflict, with the five points of
marked as the main driver and as the side the so-called Fischer Plan. It tried to in-
responsible for the violence. That was the clude Russia and the Western states were
main reason for the final approval. behind it.
Fischer was the main proponent of a dip-
And the dilemma in the German public lomatic solution to the Kosovo war, and
discourse – what was it like from your thus the party conference of Bielefeld was
perspective? essential for the further development –for
The support of Germany for the NATO in- the political development, in Europe– re-
tervention meant that democratic Germa- garding the war in Kosovo.
ny participated in a war for the first time.
In the case of the Greens, it was aggravated Was the Fischer Plan, with its famous 5
by the fact that in our party programme – points, the crucial step towards the reso-
even in 1998– we rejected United Nations lution of the conflict?
combat missions. We only voted for the It would be an overestimation to say it was
weakest form of blue helmets. When we the crucial point. There are different fac-
agreed to the NATO intervention, we sim- tors that came together, but it did set the
ply broke with the essential pillars of our diplomatic stone rolling. If, however, the
peace policy. That brought a storm of in- US and Moscow had dismissed it, the ini-
dignation from substantial parts of our tiative would have gone up in smoke.
own membership and voters, because There was a will to find a resolution. That
those who were involved in the govern- was especially obvious on June 2nd when
ment were considered traitors to our pre- two envoys of the Troika –Chernomyrdin
vious principles. However, the problem and the Finnish President Ahtisaari– were
was that those who condemned the inter- in Belgrade. There was another urge from
vention could not provide any suggestions Russian President Yeltsin: “You have to
as to what else was possible and necessary reach an agreement!” Milošević sensed
to do in Kosovo. then that he didn’t have Russian support
In summary, we had a dilemma between anymore, which is why he gave in.
the protection of human rights, on the one To summarize, there were several people
hand, against mass violence, and on the seeking solutions and the stubborn Mi-
other hand the obligation to non-violence lošević had to give in.
- non-violence as a fundamental value for
the Greens. How do you see the role of Joschka Fis-
cher, the then main politician of the
Shortly before the intervention the fa- Greens, today? How much is his public
mous Green Party conference of image influenced by 1999?
Bielefeld took place. Joschka Fischer’s Joschka Fischer did indeed play a very es-
speech and the paint bag attack1 left a sential role in this. As a political realist he
strong historical impression. What was was aware even before October 1998, be-
the most important thing about that par- fore the red-green coalition was formed,
ty conference? what the participation of the Greens in the
I was at the party conference in May 1999. Government of Germany would mean. The
The NATO intervention had already been rest of us, me included, were not com-
going on for a few weeks and it hadn’t pletely aware of that in advance.
shown the effect we had hoped for. The If you are part of the Government, it isn’t
conference was essential, because there enough to just criticize what has been
was a discussion about whether the Greens done and say what should be done better.
would continue to support the course of You have to practice politics in the given
the Federal Government and support its circumstances – with strong principles and
Foreign Minister or would they withdraw with the ability to form an alliance. He was10 Southeastern Europe Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils
very dedicated to the principle that Ger- KFOR did not show determination in many
many must not act alone, but always to- areas. There were organized demonstra-
gether with partners. He had a strong tions, with around 50,000 people attending
opinion about that and pursued it with the in Kosovo, which is very small. Some of the
best powers of persuasion, leadership and protesters were armed and behaved like a
rhetoric. In this stormy political sea he mob. KFOR soldiers mostly did not inter-
was, I believe this strongly, the best and vene and during the days of the March ri-
strongest navigator. I am very sceptical ots many Kosovo Serbs were forced from
whether there was anyone else in the their homes. Ten Serbian Orthodox sacred
Green Party that could provide such strong buildings were destroyed in the Prizren
leadership, who would be able to do what area alone at that time.
he did. That was an extremely disturbing setback.
If the Bielefeld party conference had devel- However, we had the impression that les-
oped in another direction, it would have led sons were learned relatively quickly at an
to the break-up of the government. It would, operational level. It got a little tricky again
most probably, not have changed the fact in North Mitrovica, in the areas predomi-
that Germany was participating in it [NATO nantly inhabited by Serbs, in connection
intervention - Ed.] – it would have just par- with the unilateral independence, then
ticipated under another government. again in 2011, in relation to the customs
For the Greens this would possibly, or even issues, when a KFOR soldier was shot.
probably, have led to a split and thus to a These crises flared up over and over again.
considerable decline. The Greens are to- What was not achieved was to reduce the
day the second strongest and sometimes considerable influence of organized crime
even the strongest party in Germany - this within the top political circles. It was also
success might not have happened in that not possible to effectively reduce unem-
case. ployment and the lack of prospects, espe-
cially for younger people.
As a member of the Bundestag’s Defense However, it must be said that KFOR cannot
Committee, you have been to Kosovo do this. These things have to be supported
several times since 1999. What was your by UNMIK. I do not dare to say from a de-
experience of the 2004 riots, the 2008 fense policy perspective why this was so
declaration of independence and other unsuccessful.
inter-ethnic tensions?
To what extent do you think the decision
As members of the Defense Committee, to intervene in Kosovo influenced later
we were mainly involved in KFOR. I had discussions about military interventions
contact with UNMIK police and we also worldwide?
met representatives from Kosovo, includ- Kosovo taught us decisive and fundamental
ing civil society actors, on a regular basis. lessons related to stabilization operations in
As far as KFOR is concerned, I always had post-conflict environments, with consider-
the impression that on the whole they act- able potential for violence. The experience
ed appropriately and predominantly was used in Afghanistan by Bundeswehr
wisely. soldiers and our NATO partners.
In the first few years, stabilization and pre- Each crisis operation is different, because
venting major outbursts of violence was all countries in crisis are different, and the
the priority. All of a sudden the March riots significantly different framework condi-
happened, I was there and I saw how it ex- tions in Afghanistan were not considered
ploded, so to say. I noticed a few things: sufficiently. It was a totally different war,
First of all, the so-called community of with a different balance of powers, where
states had, in the meantime, lost interest a wave of wars over decades meant the
in Kosovo, partly due to other crises, espe- Mujahedin, the Taliban, were very experi-
cially in Afghanistan after September 11th. enced in the affairs of war. In other words,
There was a certain Kosovo-fatigue in the the experience from Kosovo was trans-
Parliament as well as the urge to reduce ferred too simply to the next mission.
the number of KFOR soldiers more
quickly. That sounded a little like the grand topic
The so-called frozen conflict, which had of “Lessons Learned”. Did the Green Par-
previously been neglected at the interna- ty or Germany learn from Kosovo? Are
tional level, exploded again in March 2004. there certain strategies or new ways ofWinfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils Southeastern Europe 11
approaching conflicts as a consequence At the time, that was hugely underestimat-
of the experience in Kosovo? ed by the German Government. We now
The experiences of the OSCE and KFOR need to draw a line and evaluate what went
mission in Kosovo from autumn 1998 until wrong, what should be done better in the
March 1999 were the starting point. There future in order to promote an empirical
was a huge observer mission with a con- narrative that is as realistic and factual as
flict dampening function, but there were possible. At the time, Foreign Minister Fis-
not enough sufficiently educated and ca- cher also said: “We must look to the
pable people. It is something that has been future”.
corrected. It was not understood by the ruling parties
The creation of the Civil Peace Service, that they must not only stay politically ac-
with advisors working against social hos- tive in relation to such conflicts, but that
tility and the Center for International there is also a continuing struggle for legit-
Peace Operations in Berlin, which is inter- imation and acceptance.
nationally highly recognized – they were
one lesson. After the intervention in 1999 you men-
Another lesson was the Stability Pact – tioned there was fatigue regarding Koso-
transnational, comprehensive support for vo in Germany. What is the situation
the Western Balkans, which was supposed now, 20 years later? Is Kosovo still of in-
to bring together different ethnicities and terest in Germany in 2019?
regions through practical work. Many les- The “Kosovo fatigue“ –lower interest among
sons were learned from the crisis in the the public about Kosovo– is still present. It
Presevo Valley in 2000 and in Macedonia is a fatigue towards countries in conflict
in 2001. There was a danger of a new inter- with which European countries, or now the
nal war, which was prevented for the first European Union, and the Federal Republic
time through coordinated crisis manage- of Germany, had special dealings in the
ment by the international community. past; for some years now, since 2014 at
Still, in my opinion, the German Govern- least, it applies very clearly to Afghanistan.
ment did not do any systematic and public There are only reports in the media when
evaluation of the Kosovo war, of its own something huge happens. The problem is
participation in it and of the whole mission that there is an enormous crisis competi-
– and this also applies to many other coun- tion today. The most actual crises, in
tries. There hasn’t been an overall “lessons which our own soldiers are involved, get
learned” process at the political and strate- the most attention.
gic level and for the current political gen- International efforts of stabilization and of
eration the experiences from Kosovo are peace building are much more complicat-
not relevant. ed and have a more long-term character
than it was imagined at the end of the
How do you explain the fact that the West 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s.
has suffered a severe defeat regarding the There is now the possibility, twenty years
justification and interpretation of this war after the war in Kosovo, twenty years since
and that to this day it continues to be a the beginning of KFOR and UNMIK, to
great hurdle with regard to normalizing draw attention again. Many women and
relations between Kosovo and Serbia? men, who were familiar with the initial
I have also observed this loss of interpretive phase of intervention are now saying that
sovereignty or legitimacy of one’s own ac- KFOR and its troops, who had the task to
tions, which was already apparent in the im- ensure peace and to prevent new violence,
mediate years following this intervention. were successful.
These are narratives that are still wide-
spread among the population today, that Translated by Sanja Katarić
the population was lied to, that there were
other interests at play. The point of view The conference was marked by heated anti-war protests,
1
has been adopted that the war in Kosovo both in and outside the venue. At one point, Mr. Fischer
was hit by a bag of red paint, causing damage to his ear
and the violence started with NATO bomb-
drum - Ed.
ings and there was no history behind it.12 Southeastern Europe The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia
The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia:
Its functions, problems, and critiques
By Ivan Čolović
The myth of the Battle of Kosovo Field on June 28th 1389, in which the armies of the Otto-
man Sultan Murat I and Serbian Prince Lazar clashed, has, since the early 19th century to
this day, served the purpose of legitimizing various political and military projects: From
the breakup of communist Yugoslavia and the policies of Slobodan Milošević, through the
“Kosovo is Serbia” motto, as part of the Serbian “European agenda”, to the dialogue –both
internal and with Brussels– led by Aleksandar Vučić. The “Kosovo Covenant” in modern
Serbian history is used to accommodate various political ideas and actions.
The colloquial use of the word myth is wide- auspices of “sacred Kosovo” or the “Kosovo
spread today, to denote a story without ba- covenant” - as the mythical narrative about
sis in reality, one which is not true. Con- the Battle of Kosovo is most widely referred
trary to this, I understand myth in an to today. This function –that of political
anthropological sense, as a story with the myth– was already present in the memory
status of paramount truth in a particular of this battle in the cult writings about
society, a truth which is not debated, one Prince Lazar written a few years after the
which an individual is not obliged to be- battle. However, the mature Kosovo myth,
lieve in, but must not disturb, must not with all of the episodes we know today, was
publicly question. This is why myths are only formed in the first half of the 19th cen-
sometimes referred to as “divine stories”. tury, and has served to legitimize various
The political function of myth is based on political and military projects ever since.
this divinity and unquestionable nature, During that time, the solemn, sacred story
because it can serve those in power, or of the Battle of Kosovo has not only served
those seeking power, as a tool to legitimize to legitimize the policies of Serbian politi-
their policies. They do this by placing them- cians and the Serbian authorities. It wasn’t
selves and their political and military proj- always solely a Serbian myth. It also served
ects and actions under the protection of the to legitimize political and military projects
sanctity of myth, constructing a tailor-made undertaken in the name of other peoples,
version of mythical narration, so that they so that there are Croatian, Bosniak, Monte-
themselves may become mythical heroes, negrin, Albanian, and Yugoslav versions of
or at least their devotees and followers, thus the Kosovo myth, in addition to the Serbian
“inscribing” themselves into the myth. one. However, after the Kingdom of Yugo-
The same is true of the Kosovo myth, the slavia was dissolved in 1941 –a country
myth of the Battle of Kosovo Field on June where Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day, the day of
28th 1389, in which the armies of the Otto- the Battle of Kosovo, June 28th) was a na-
man Sultan Murat I and Serbian Prince La- tional holiday, a holiday shared by all Yu-
zar clashed. It is important to note that not goslav peoples, when the famous Battle of
all of the diverse evocations of this battle in Kosovo Field was emphasized as being a
folklore, historiography, literature, and shared political and cultural heritage– the
church literature are myth. Mythical are Kosovo myth has been exploited most of-
only those offered up as paramount, “sa- ten, if not exclusively, as a Serbian national
Ivan Čolović, political anthropologist cred”, in order to place some political idea myth. It was revived in that capacity by the
and writer or action, as well as its actors, under the Quisling government led by Milan NedićThe Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia Southeastern Europe 13
during the German occupation of Serbia versions of the Kosovo myth have also de-
(1941-1944). Nazi sympathizers close to veloped, emphasizing the participation of
Nedić proposed that the authentic Serbian Albanian warriors in the Battle of Kosovo
myth of Kosovo should be revived, as it was Field. It goes without saying that they did
alienated from the “Serbian soul” in the battle on the side of the Christians, which is
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, highlighting its to prove that Albanians are also an old Eu-
similarity to the German racial myth that ropean and Christian people, who have
had been revived in Nazi Germany. After always stood at the vanguard of Europe. In
the Second World War, communist Yugo- corroboration, a national poem is offered
slavia did not restore the Kosovo myth as about the Albanian hero Miloš Kobilić2 and
part of a common Yugoslav heritage, be- his feat – the killing of Sultan Murat I, writ-
cause that role was reserved for the solemn ten in the first decades of the 20th century3.
narrative about the People’s Liberation Writer Ismail Kadare greatly contributed to
War, the Partisans, and their leader Tito. the popularization of the Albanian version
Instead, the Kosovo myth was assigned the of the Kosovo myth. Since 2011, two plays
role of keeping the memory of the import- about the Battle of Kosovo have been part
ant contribution of the Serbian people’s of the repertoires of two Pairisian theaters,
heroic ancestors in the fight for freedom, a one of which was written based on the po-
freedom which would be fully realized, ems of the “Kosovo Cycle” from the collec-
with similar contributions from other Yu- tion by Vuk Karadžić, and the other is a
goslav peoples, only with the victory of theater adaptation of Kadare’s book, Three
Communism. This was also the role of the Elegies for Kosovo4.
Monument to the Heroes of Kosovo, erect-
ed in 1953 by Serbian communists in
Gazimestan.
“Kosovo is Serbia” –
In the time of crisis, wars, and the dissolu- A New Kosovo Covenant
tion of communist Yugoslavia (1985-1995), After the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Her-
the Kosovo myth served to legitimize the zegovina, and Kosovo in the 1990s, the Ser-
main policy goals of the Serbian regime, bian politicians who took over governing
headed by Slobodan Milošević. The main the country found themselves tasked with
portion of the 600th anniversary celebration adapting the Kosovo myth - which was still
of the Battle of Kosovo (July 28th 1989) –a an important political resource for them –
grand rally organized in front of the Gaz- to fit the new situation. It was to be separat-
imestan Monument– was used by Milošević ed and saved from being compromised as
to portray himself as the new Serbian lead- a result of what some would say was its
er, a worthy successor to those who led the abuse by Milošević and other Serbian lead-
Serbs into battle against the Turks 600 years ers during the wars, and adapted to the new
before, and to promise that he would lead goals of Serbian policy, among which was
the Serbian people into new battles. During the “European agenda” of moving toward
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herze- the EU. This is why, when the Battle of
govina, Serbian soldiers were also called to Kosovo was evoked in public events, it was
follow the example of famous Kosovo he- emphasized that the bravery of the Kosovo
roes. This sort of motivation for battle was heroes could still serve as inspiration to 21st
used most by Bosnian Serb leaders, por- century Serbs, but that it can also manifest
traying Bosniaks as descendants of the itself as political and diplomatic struggle to
Turks, and the war against them as a con- keep Kosovo as part of Serbia, instead of
tinuation of the Battle of Kosovo and an waging a new war – as Milošević did, to the
opportunity for the Serbs to take revenge detriment of the Serbian people.
on the Turks for their defeat in Kosovo in After 2008, when Kosovo Albanians de-
1389. This is exactly how General Mladić clared Kosovo’s independence, the Vido-
hailed the capture of Srebrenica and the vdan celebrations at Gazimestan became a
slaughter of its Bosniak residents, which frustration, because Serbian politicians and
was ruled to have been genocide by the In- religious leaders could only go there with
ternational Court of Justice in 2007: Re- KFOR’s permission, as well as the police
venge against the Turks1. force of independent Kosovo. This is why
In more recent times, in the context of re- the most important Vidovdan celebrations
viving Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, the were moved to Kruševac in Serbia and
war of 1998-1999, and the creation of an Višegrad in Republika Srpska. On the other
independent state of Kosovo, Albanian h a n d , K o s o v o’ s d e c l a r a t i o n o f14 Southeastern Europe The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia
independence served to revive warmonger- after announcing the internal dialogue, “is
ing versions of the Kosovo myth, even lead- to worry about earthly life, and let someone
ing to attempts to rehabilitate Milošević and else worry about the afterlife.”6
his Kosovo policy, elevating him to be a new The version of the Kosovo myth in Serbia
Kosovo martyr. The culmination and failure dominant today originated in the first half
of this new mobilization for battle with the of the 19th century, when concern for the
Kosovo Albanians in the name of the “Koso- afterlife was abandoned and the story of
vo covenant” was the grand rally in Belgrade Prince Lazar choosing the Kingdom of
organized on February 21st 2008 by the Ser- Heaven over the Kingdom of Earth –which
bian government, headed by Vojislav Koštu- was included in Serbian church writings as
nica, to protest Kosovo’s declaration of inde- early as the 14th century, as well as in folk
pendence. Following a series of incendiary songs recorded by Vuk Karadžić– was re-
speeches, and chants of “Kosovo is Serbia”, vised. At the time when Serbs and other
some protestors caused mayhem in the city, South Slavs were fighting for liberation
including an attack on the U.S. embassy. A from Turkish, and then Austro-Hungarian
few months after this rally, on May 11th 2008, rule, evoking the famous Battle of Kosovo
Koštunica’s party, the Democratic Party of served to raise the morale of these warriors
Serbia (DSS), lost the parliamentary for the Kingdom of Earth, and so Lazar was
elections. asked to give up on the Kingdom of Heaven
or step back and allow Miloš Obilić, who
Holy Serbia and Profane had slayed Murat, to take the lead role.
Kosovo Having renounced the Kosovo myth as a
Aleksandar Vučić, leader of the Serbian concern with the afterlife, Vučić has actu-
Progressive Party (SNS), which has occu- ally reasserted his belief in the Kosovo myth
pied the most important positions of power as heroic death for earthly life, the main
since 2012, is considered to be the politi- version of this myth from the 19th century
cian whose word on all matters of Serbian until today.
policy is final, notwithstanding the consti- It is important to note that the people using
tutional powers he actually possessed as the Kosovo myth to strengthen their politi-
Deputy Prime Minister (2012-2014), Prime cal positions today never mention it under
Minister (2014-2017), or now as President. that name, rather using the terms “Kosovo
This is why his influence on Serbia’s Kosovo covenant” or “Vidovdan covenant”, sug-
policy has been decisive, as well as the use gesting that they are talking about some-
of the Kosovo myth to further that policy, thing supposedly more true and valuable
which is ambivalent, to say the least – si- than what the colloquial use of the term
multaneously renouncing and fully affirm- “myth”, defined as a story without basis,
ing the myth. would imply. That is why there is actually
Vučić himself publicly professes doubts no difference between calls by Vučić for
about what he calls the “mythical ap- Kosovo to be discussed without using the
proach” to the Kosovo problem. At his in- “mythical approach” and the frequent
auguration as President of Serbia, Vučić statements and warnings to Serbs by his
announced a new approach to this prob- closest advisors that the “Kosovo covenant”
lem, finding a solution through dialogue, must be kept. The head of the Govern-
without prejudice, and without myths: ment’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija,
“That is why I want to open up an internal Marko Đurić, is also aware that he is not
dialogue on the matter of Kosovo and Me- contradicting Vučić by saying that “Vido-
tohija, with all our differences, without vdan is the Serbian covenant, the covenant
prejudice, upholding our country’s Consti- of all Serbs, wherever they may live and
tution. We have to be open, to renounce the work”7. The decision by the authors of the
mythical approach, but without simply giv- Strategy for the Cultural Development of
ing away that which we have every right to. Serbia from 2017 to 2027 to give the “Koso-
Our internal dialogue is perhaps even more vo covenant” a prominent role in the docu-
important than the one we should be hav- ment is also based on the premise that the
ing with the Albanians.”5 However, this re- mythical approach to Kosovo is not the
nunciation of the Kosovo myth by Vučić same as the covenant. The covenant is
applies only to one essentially benign as- mentioned as the “heroic dimension of Ser-
pect of it – the versions referring to a so- bian culture”, with a very important func-
called “celestial Serbia”. “Our job”, ex- tion – to ensure the “self-preservation of
plained Vučić in a statement a few days society in the face of existential challengesThe Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia Southeastern Europe 15
and challenges to identity”. Other aspects founded in 2012, chose the name “Zavetni-
of Serbian culture are also set out – the “En- ci”8 for itself, explaining that it was done “in
lightenment-European” and “democratic” accordance with the Kosovo Covenant, the
dimensions– but there is no doubt that spiritual and historical path of the Serbian
these are only secondary, because they do people through the centuries, followed by
not provide what is most important, the ex- our greatest rulers and minds1.”
istence and identity of the nation, a task Furthermore, any critique of the Kosovo
entrusted to the “heroic” dimension of Ser- myth –if undertaken to protect values such
bian culture, that is to say the “Kosovo cov- as enlightenment, democracy or human
enant”, or the Kosovo myth under another rights– will be ineffective if it limits itself to
name. questioning the contents of the messages
conveyed under the auspices of this myth,
because these messages are not necessarily
Critical Analysis of the unacceptable from the point of view of the
Kosovo Myth critic. It is important to identify and differ-
There are a few things to keep in mind re- entiate them, but it is even more important
garding the critical analysis of the Kosovo to point out that all of them, no matter the
myth in modern Serbia. Firstly, it is import- differences in content, have one common
ant to note that this analysis cannot be re- characteristic which separates them from
duced to differentiating between the few the values of enlightenment and democra-
historically accurate pieces of information cy. Namely, all messages relying on the
about the Battle of Kosovo and the histori- myth, messages which inscribe themselves
cally unsubstantiated stories about that into it, including those “conveyed” by the
event, which serve as the basis for the Kosovo myth today, are to be accepted
Kosovo myth, including its modern ver- without thought or discussion. The myth
sions. As noted by historian Sima Ćirković, empowers them to impose themselves on
all the materials about Kosovo, the entirety certain political collectives, while making
of the “Kosovo tradition”, as he would say, them unacceptable to collectives fostering
deserves the attention of historians and humanist and democratic values.
other researchers. Therefore, to interpret
the Kosovo myth critically, it is not enough Translated by Nemanja Georgijević
to determine whether there is historical
1
An overview of the creation and evolution of the Kosovo
truth to it, but we must also determine the myth, and the main literature on the topic is available in
purpose served by stories about the Battle Miodrag Popović’s study Vidovdan i časni krst (St. Vitus
of Kosovo, who told them and with what day and the Holy Cross), Ogled o književnoj arheologiji
purpose, what their political and ideologi- (4th Edition, Bibiloteka XX vek), as well as in my book
Smrt na Kosovu Polju. Istorija kosovskog mita (Death on
cal messages were, and how they changed Kosovo Field, a History of the Kosovo Myth) (2nd Edition,
over time. The same can be said for re- Biblioteka XX vek).
searching and interpreting the role of the 2
Miloš Obilić is said to have been the Serbian knight who
Kosovo myth in Serbian society and politics assassinated the Ottoman Sultan Murad I in the Battle of
Kosovo during the Ottoman invasion of Serbia -- Ed. note
today. 3
An analysis of the written versions of this poem and the
It is also important to determine where we explanation of its role in modern Kosovo’s identity politics
encounter this myth today, and how to can be found in Anna di Lellio’s book The Battle of Kosovo
identify it, as it appears in various types of 1389. An Albanian Epic, I.B. Tauris&Co.Ltd., London, 2009.
4
La Bataille de Kosovo 1389, translated from the Serbian
text – from newspaper articles to scientific and directed by: Nathalie Hamel, Theatre du Nord Ouest,
studies, and from political speeches to reli- Paris. – “La viellle guerre. La Bataille du Kosovo”, directed
gious sermons. Rarely is it a well-developed by Simon Pitaqaj, based on “Trois chants funebres de
narrative, as in Zdravko Šotra’s film The Kosovo” I. Kadare, Théatre de l’Oprimé, Paris.
5
Serbian President’s address to Parliament, TANJUG, May
Battle of Kosovo (Boj na Kosovu, 1989). 31st 2017
Statements are most often put under the 6
Vučić: It’s time to talk about the Constitution and Kosovo”,
protection of the Kosovo myth by using TANJUG, June 2nd 2017
quotes from certain passages of canonical 7
h ttp://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/
2781371/djuric-nikada-necemo-odustati-od-kosova-i-
texts about the Battle of Kosovo (from Vuk metohije.html
Karadžić’s “Kosovo Cycle” or Njegoš’s 8
Translator’s note: this can roughly be translated as
Mountain Wreath), or even more simply, “Defenders of the Covenant”
by claiming that the statement or action is 9
Zavetnici
website https://web archive.org/ web/ 20180207002002/
in line with the “Kosovo covenant”. For ex- http://zavetnici.rs/?page_id=7542
ample, one political organization in Serbia,16 Southeastern Europe A Lesson in History
A Lesson in History
By Jelena Krstić
The prewar political history of the former Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo was
shaped by its educational system. Both Albanians and Serbs have omitted the other com-
munity’s language and history from their curricula. Today, twenty years after the armed
conflict, Albanian and Serbian students are using textbooks with different versions of
history. Some of the controversial phrases from Kosovar textbooks describing actions by
Serbs include: “violence and chauvinist terror”, “terror and genocide”, and “horrific bar-
baric scenes of bloody squadrons”. Serbian textbooks use phrases such as “attacks by
Albanian gangs” and “Albanian terror over the Serbs”. Such language in school textbooks
amplifies prejudice, inter-ethnic intolerance, and nationalist ideas.
“I am deeply sorry for all the victims in Kosovo, and for their families’ suffering. Yes, I knew crimes
were committed...Yes, I was involved in moving bodies to Batajnica… I didn’t oppose the conceal-
ment of crimes. I took no action to find and process the perpetrators, as I should have done.”1
Vlastimir Đorđević
Sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity
Early one morning, the S. family had to claiming that the new constitution gives the
leave their village in Kosovo. The mother province too much power. At the beginning
had dressed the children well, so that they of the 1980s, Albanians ask for Kosovo to be
wouldn’t be cold, and prepared some food recognized as a constituent Republic of the
for the journey. A group of armed men Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
stopped them in a nearby settlement and (SFRY), while Serbs intensify their calls for the
separated them, detaining the father and province’s autonomy to be reduced. In March
two sons and ordering the rest to keep go- 1989, amendments to the Constitution of Ser-
ing. They did keep going and spent some bia strip the province of its autonomy. The
time far away from their home, school, situation in Kosovo deteriorates.
friends, and relatives. Only after the war In June 1990, the Serbian Assembly de-
had ended did they return to their home. It clares that special circumstances have
was a few years later that they found out arisen in Kosovo aimed at upending the
that all three of the men had been killed constitutional order. A few days later,
and their bodies hidden in a mass grave. Kosovo Albanian MPs declare Kosovo to
The mother and two sons from the S. fam- be an independent Republic. The Serbian
ily are currently living in their home village Assembly then dissolves the Kosovo As-
again, in difficult conditions, lacking em- sembly. This officially dissolved Assembly
ployment or regular income. compiles a Draft Constitution, which is
What happened to the S. family? then accepted by a majority of Albanians
in a local referendum. In September 1990,
The Crisis between 1980 and the new Constitution of Serbia diminishes
1998 Kosovo’s autonomy even further.
The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Feder- A period of discrimination and repression
ative Republic of Yugoslavia grants the Au- against the Albanian population in Kosovo
Jelena Krstić, Helsinki Committee for tonomous Province of Kosovo greater auton- ensues. Albanian language radio and tele-
Human Rights in Serbia omy. A section of the Serbian public object, vision are limited, and newspapers areYou can also read
