Ships, guns, but no laws? Whitepaper on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea - Risk Intelligence
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RiskIntelligence
Ships, guns, but no laws?
Whitepaper on piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea
January 2019
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against risk. Recommendations made are based on information
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Definition and background
The terms ‘West Africa’ and ‘Gulf of Guinea’ are often used as synonyms, yet there are
significant differences. Meaningful research and analysis require an exact definition.
Unfortunately, there are no distinct geographic features that could be used to define either
region.
For any discussion related to maritime security, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct offers the most
relevant definition of the region because it is specifically concerned with this issue. The code
was adopted in 2013 and covers all 17 coastal states from Senegal in the north to Angola in the
south as well as two island nations (Cape Verde and Sao Tomé & Principe). While those
countries are located in West and Central Africa, the term ‘West Africa’ is generally used as an
easy abbreviation to describe the region.
Map of West Africa
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Page 2 of 8The Gulf of Guinea is only a relatively small part of West Africa. Different countries may be
included and Risk Intelligence has adopted a relatively large definition, which covers the
maritime areas from Côte d’Ivoire in the west to Gabon in the south-east. That includes most of
the large ports as well as most of the important offshore oil and gas facilities throughout the
region.
Security incidents in 2018
The maritime security incidents recorded by Risk Intelligence in 2018 – as shown on the map
below – underline that the Gulf of Guinea, particularly the area off Nigeria’s southern Niger
Delta, is the main area of concern of the shipping industry.
Maritime security incidents in 2018 as recorded by Risk Intelligence. The blue area represents the Gulf of Guinea
as defined by Risk Intelligence. (Source: Risk Intelligence System)
While the types and distribution of attacks are shifting, highlighting the dynamic nature of
maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, the general area of concern has remained very
similar over the past years. It is highly unlikely that the focus on Nigeria will change in the
coming months, requiring careful analysis of the current situation and ongoing developments.
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Page 3 of 8Good or bad reporting?
Looking at the pure number of maritime security incidents in West Africa, the situation has
remained remarkably stable. Between 2009 and 2018, Risk Intelligence recorded between 80
and 140 incidents per year in West Africa. The majority of these incidents took place off Nigeria.
Number of maritime security incidents per year as recorded by Risk Intelligence between 2009 and 2018. (Source:
Risk Intelligence System)
For operators of merchant vessels in the region, these figures are certainly a cause of concern
and require adequate measures to protect ships, crews and cargoes. However, the graphic
above highlights that alarming headlines about the annual number of attacks are not a good
representation of the long-term trend. That includes media reports, but also official sources
such as the MSCI Advisory 2019-003, issued by the US Maritime Administration.
There is no doubt that it is important to highlight the lack of maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea and the resulting threat for seafarers. Nevertheless, the current situation should neither
be presented as too alarming nor as almost resolved, which may easily be the case when the
number of reported attacks against merchant ships decreases again.
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Page 4 of 8Complicated statistics
Different types of statistics about maritime security incidents in West Africa are another problem
for maritime operators. Various organisations collect reports about such incidents, yet reporting
standards and the classification of incidents are very different.
Reports about maritime security incidents in 2018 as recorded by the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, MDAT-GoG
and Risk Intelligence. (Sources: IMB Annual Report, MDAT-GoG Quarterly Reports, Risk Intelligence System)
All statistics shown in the comparison above are valid, but a cross-cutting comparison is
impossible. Different organisations have different requirements which have to be met so that
specific incidents can be included in their statistics. Some incidents are not even included in all
datasets, notably incidents that have been reported as ‘suspicious’ by some sources which are
classified as not related to piracy by Risk Intelligence.
Moreover, the same incident may be classified in different categories. For example: When a
ship at anchor is boarded by several men who are noticed by the crew and escape empty-
handed, it can be classified as a successful boarding (summarised in the blue column) or as an
attempted theft (summarised in the red column).
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Page 5 of 8Different types of crimes
Genuine concerns of shipping companies operating in West Africa are further complicated by
other types of semi-legal or criminal activities at sea. That includes widespread illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, smuggling of illicit goods such as drugs or weapons,
illegal migration, oil theft and fuel smuggling as well as some other – often related – issues.
In many cases, these are not a concern for crews on merchant vessels. However, when fishing
vessels are observed to operate in a specific manner in a region where attacks against
merchant ships are relatively frequent, such incidents are frequently reported as ‘suspicious’
despite the lack of an actual threat.
Furthermore, even reported attacks should be analysed in this broader context. For example,
several kidnap-for-ransom attacks against fishing vessels in the Gulf of Guinea in 2018 were
very likely linked to disputes over fishing rights or payments for illegal fuel transfers at sea.
While such incidents are of concern to domestic law
enforcement agencies, they do not have a direct Criminal activities at sea are of
impact on the threat level for crews on merchant concern to law enforcement
ships in specific parts of the Gulf of Guinea. agencies, but there is no direct
The broader context also has to be considered for impact on the threat level for
longer-term trends. Hijackings of product tankers for merchant vessel operations.
the purpose of cargo theft were prevalent between
2011 and 2014, but were rarely reported in recent years before several such attacks took place
in 2018. The decrease in attacks has often been linked to the oil price which fell from more than
$100 per barrel in August 2014 to less than $35 per barrel in January 2016 before it started to
climb again.
Such an analysis, however, does not account for the fact that attackers are generally trying to
steal refined products rather than crude oil. Due to subsidies in Nigeria and most other
countries across West Africa, the price of fuel and other refined products is not directly linked to
the price of crude oil. Other factors therefore have to be considered to explain the situation,
including domestic measures in Nigeria and the increasing responsiveness of the Nigerian
Navy.
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Page 6 of 8Regional efforts and trends
Based on the Yaoundé Code of Conduct that was mentioned above, governments throughout
West Africa have started to address maritime security issues in the region. Various coordination
and operational centres have already been created or upgraded. Frequent exercises are
supposed to strengthen the existing capabilities of navies and coastguards, which are also
supported by external partners.
Unfortunately, many externally-funded initiatives are unlikely to have sustainable results.
Programmes are often based on political priorities of donors rather than on actual requirements
of receiving countries. Furthermore, as with other types of foreign aid, donor-funded actions
support activities that a domestic government cannot, making projects unsustainable unless
they result in a reduction of expenditures or an increase in government revenues. The latter
would be possible, particularly in light of an increasing focus on the ‘Blue Economy’ in West
Africa, but requires a long-term involvement.
Looking at the issues related to maritime security that are mentioned in the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct, it is obvious that the fight against piracy and robbery at sea is not the main concern of
governments in West Africa. Moreover, maritime
Issues related to maritime security issues in general are generally low on the list
security are low on the list of of political priorities in a region where security is
political priorities. Land-based dominated by land-based threats which are much more
significant for domestic populations.
threats are more significant for
domestic populations. For shipping industry representatives, who are mostly
concerned about attacks against merchant vessels,
this means that there is limited overlap. Improvements to the current situation will only be
possible – and sustainable – by long-term measures. Support for these measures should not be
limited to one specific type of threat.
At the same time, the shipping industry can play a vital role in supporting regional measures.
Building trust with maritime and law enforcement agencies throughout West Africa will be vital.
For example, shipping companies should be more comfortable than today when it comes to
reporting security-related incidents to local authorities. Overall, the shipping industry can help to
improve maritime situational awareness of coastal nations in West Africa, which is becoming
increasingly important due to efforts to strengthen the ‘Blue Economy’.
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Page 7 of 8Summary
Due to various reasons, some of which have been outlined above, the situation in the Gulf of
Guinea is very unlikely to change significantly in the short or even the medium term. For all
types of maritime operations in the region, thorough risk assessments are therefore advisable,
based on a sound analysis of current threats and their potential implications on ships, cargoes
and seafarers.
Nigeria – and particularly the Niger Delta – has been the main concern for ship operators in the
past. In recent years, even high-profile incidents in other countries in West Africa have almost
always been linked to criminal groups based in the Niger Delta. This situation is very unlikely to
change. However, the analysis of individual attacks or incidents that have been reported as
suspicious has to take into account criminal patterns that are prevalent throughout the region,
for example illegal fishing and fuel smuggling.
Governments throughout West Africa are unlikely to prioritise maritime security issues, yet the
topic has at least received an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Improving
maritime security in the region will nevertheless be a long-term challenge, involving both the
public and the private sector.
Whitepaper – Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
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