Retail Real Estate: Clean Up in Aisle Six, or Heading to Chapter-7? - StepStone Group
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Retail Real Estate:
Clean Up in Aisle Six, or Heading to Chapter-7?
"First there was books, then With Amazon's recent acquisition of Whole Foods,
and the near daily announcements of store closings, much
music and video...Now Amazon. has been written about the death of retail. Perhaps too much.
com is placing its bets on the After all, US consumers touch retail daily. The newsstand,
fledgling grocery business." coffee shop, lunch spot, supermarket, drug store, dry cleaner,
– The New York Times, 19 May 1999 fitness center, movie theater, take-out dinner place and frozen
yogurt bar all occupy retail oriented real estate. Chances
are that unless one falls within a narrow demographic and
geographic segment, most of what is worn or eaten comes via
brick and mortar locations. And given that people are likely
to continue getting dressed and eating every day, demand for
retail will persist.
Will evolving consumer shopping patterns impact retail
oriented real estate? Of course. Just as malls took retailers from
Main Street in the 1970s and category-killer power centers
took shoppers away from malls in the 1990s, the Internet has
transformed the way the world shops. The issue that investors
will address over the coming decade is the extent to which
these changes in buyer behavior result in obsolescence
or opportunity.
February
STEPSTONE2018
| Retail Real Estate: Clean Up in Aisle Six, or Heading to Chapter-7? 1E-commerce Sales Growing Fourfold
FIGURE 1 | E-COMMERCE AS % OF US RETAIL SALES
Over Retail Sales (EXCLUDING AUTOMOBILE & GAS STATION SALES)
In 2007, 5.2% of retail sales (excluding spending on autos
and gas) occurred online. Today, that figure is 13.2% with 40%
e-commerce spending growing at an annualized 12.8% over 35% 2027
33.7%
the past decade compared to just 2.7% for overall retail sales.
30%
Projecting these trends out over the next decade suggests that
one-third of retail sales could occur online by 2027 (Figure 1). 25%
The trend toward e-commerce is leading to a record number 20%
of store closings projected for 2017; retailers such as HH Gregg,
15% 2017
Sports Authority, Gander Mountain, Radio Shack, Payless 13.2%
Shoes, The Limited and Toys 'R' Us have all announced closings 10% 2007
and/or bankruptcy protection. This is on top of the weakness 5.2%
5%
seen at general merchandise retailers where closures are Projected
planned at Sears/Kmart (150 locations), J.C. Penney (138) and 0%
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Macy’s (68). The 8,640 stores projected to close in 2017 is up
fourfold from the 2016 levels and a 40% increase over the
global financial crisis (GFC) level of 6,163 in 2008 (Figure 2). Source: US Census Bureau June 2017, StepStone.
At the same time that there are a record number of stores
closing, there are interesting new entrants into the physical
retail space; formerly online only operators such as Bonobos, FIGURE 2 | ANNUAL RETAIL STORE CLOSINGS
Warby Parker, Fabletics, Athleta and Boston Proper have all
begun to open brick and mortar outlets to create omni-channel 8640
distribution options for their consumers. Even e-commerce
pioneer Amazon has begun to test unique store concepts
for books and convenience food while finalizing designs for 6163
an ‘Apple-esque’ showroom for its line of tablets, e-readers
5077
and wireless speakers. The less encouraging aspect of the
4475 4442
entrants is that a Bonobos, Warby Parker, or Amazon store is 3917
substantially smaller than a J. Crew, LensCrafter, or Barnes & 3081 3084
2795
Noble store given that the new entrant is mostly a showroom 2645 2480
1975 2003 2140 2056
with almost no inventory. Mall owners are leasing to these 1704 1766
1343
new entrants to fill storefronts, but are in effect getting
paid for one-third of the space, leaving a large portion of
dead space behind newly erected dividing walls. Another
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change in the retail landscape is that off-price retailers such
as Burlington, Dress Barn and TJX are all opening new stores
as consumers have become thriftier since the GFC. Source: Credit Suisse.
2Creative destruction has been at work for over a century
in the retail space as new entrants, new formats and new FIGURE 3 | R
EIT SECTOR RETURNS & WEIGHTS
technologies have altered the landscape from Main Street to
malls to power centers to omni-channel. To a large extent, the 30%
pain felt by the retail sector is more of a story about corporate 25%
strategy than a real estate story. 20%
The concern over retail business strength is most evident in 15%
the real estate investment trust (REIT) market where investors 10%
can express their fear or favor daily. The listed real estate
5%
market was introduced to investors in 1991 when the open-air
0%
shopping center owner Kimco Realty became the first publicly
(5%)
traded REIT. Given that provenance, and the concentration
of high value malls in the publicly traded REITs, retail is the (10%)
largest sector within the NAREIT Equity REIT Index at 16.9%. (15%)
Industrial
Office
Retail
Residential
Diversified
Lodging/Resorts
Health Care
Self Storage
Infrastructure
Data Centers
Specialty
NAREIT Index
Timber
Through September 2017, retail REITs were down 10.8%,
the only sector to post a negative return for the period
(Figure 3). This compares to a 6.0% gain for the broader index Returns YTD Sector Weight
and is considerably lower than the strong returns posted in Source: NAREIT as of September 2017.
Data Centers (28.0%) and Industrial (18.5%).
Grocery anchored REITs such as DDR (-40.3%) and Brixmor
(-23.1%) were down even more than the retail sector given
concern over e-commerce entrants.
The US grocery market is extremely fragmented and regional.
Whole Foods is one of only a few national chains, but even
with 460 stores the chain represents only a 1.7% market share. FIGURE 4 | G
ROCERY SECTOR MARKET SHARE
Add to that level the 0.8% share that Amazon garners and
you have the seventh or eighth largest purveyor of groceries 17.3%
in the country (Figure 4). The market is split on whether the
Whole Foods acquisition will mark the beginning of the end
of grocery anchored retail, or a capitulation from Amazon that
losing money on delivery was unsustainable and therefore a
move into physical stores would lower operating expenses by 8.9%
having consumers pick up goods from a centralized location.
5.6% 5.1%
It is worth noting that the grocery business is a very low margin
3.4% 3.4%
business dependent on high volume to turn a small profit. 2.5%
1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 1.5%
The business model is being challenged by demographic 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9%
0.8% 0.8%
shifts. Millennials are delaying marriage and parenting. They
BJ’s Wholesale Club
Hy-Vee Food Stores
Whole Foods
HEB Grocery
Trader Joe’s
Sam’s Club
Wegmans
Delhanize
ShopRite
Walmart
Amazon
Kroger
Costco
Target
Publix
Meijer
Ahold
Aldi
Southwestern
Grocers
Albertson’s/
Safeway
also prioritize experiences over possessions; in the age of
celebrity chefs and Instagram, dining experiences are high on
their bucket list. Both young and old are migrating to urban
apartments rather than suburban homes. All of this means
that there has been a shift to dining out. Source: Statisdata 2016.
STEPSTONE | Retail Real Estate: Clean Up in Aisle Six, or Heading to Chapter-7? 3In 1992, households spent about US$162 at grocery stores
for every US$100 spent at restaurants (Figure 5). Over time, FIGURE 5 | MONTHLY SPEND ON FOOD & BEVERAGE BY VENUE
spending at restaurants gradually increased to the point
that in 2015, retail sales at restaurants were actually higher $60,000
than retail sales at grocery stores. Operators of retail centers
have identified this trend and have increased the food and $50,000
Monthly Sales (US$ millions)
beverage component of their tenant mix in order to provide the
$40,000
experiences that cannot be replicated online.
$30,000
The Move to Omni-channel
Is Bi-directional $20,000
At its core, a retail store is a distribution center in which the $10,000
items are selected by the consumer who then bears the burden
of last mile delivery (i.e., they take their purchases home). $0
Amazon has already announced an arrangement with the
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department store Kohls whereby customers wishing to return Grocery Restaurant
goods received via delivery can return incorrect items to a local
Source: US Census Bureau, October 2017.
Kohls store. This reduces the overall delivery cost for Amazon,
increases customer satisfaction and therefore purchase
activity, and potentially leads to an up-sell opportunity in
which Kohls might be able to entice Amazon customers to
make a purchase during their visit. There are rumors currently
that Amazon will deepen this relationship by acquiring Kohls, FIGURE 6 | BENEFITS OF OMNI-CHANNEL OPERATIONS
which would signal a confirmation of the importance of
omni-channel operations in the evolution of retail.
Studies have indicated that the benefit to the retailer from 35% 75% in-store
Return Rate 35% purchase during
having an omni-channel operation can be significant given Return return visit
Rate
that as many as 35% of all online orders are returned, at
significant expense to the retailer. By directing returns to
= 65% = 90%
a store location, the retailer is able to up-sell the customer Net Sale Net Sale
three-quarters of the time, meaning that net sales rise from ONLINE ONLY OMNI-CHANNEL
65% to around 90% (Figure 6). Source: Shop Visible.
The move to omni-channel has been bi-directional with
e-commerce players acquiring brick and mortar retailers,
and vice versa. In the past 12 months Walmart has acquired
Jet.com and Bonobos; PetSmart has acquired Chewy’s;
Nordstrom has acquired Trunk Club; and Saks Fifth Avenue has
acquired GILT Groupe. The US$6.5 billion paid by the retailers in There has only been one
these transactions marked a significant investment in building
out an online presence to complement their physical presence, mall built in the US in the
as well as the acquisition of technology and technologists that
will be crucial in the retail landscape of the future. past decade.
4Little Warehouse on the Prairie Imagine a time when consumers would have to go to a store, select among a limited number of offerings, and then pay whatever the merchant demands because competition is relatively low. Think then if technology brought a new entrant into that consumer’s world whereby the buyer could select from a seemingly infinite number of items in all sizes and colors, and then, as if by magic, have their purchases delivered to their home. Surely this would be the end of stores. Right? At the end of the 19th century, most Americans shopped at a general store that carried 100 to 200 items. In contrast to the drab physical shopping experience, technology in the form of the 1886 Bloomingdales catalog featured 1,700 items with illustrations and enticing prose. The Sears catalog of 1895 had 583 pages of merchandise that rural people didn’t know existed or know that they needed, but once they saw it, they sure did crave it. Ponder the competitive advantage these new entrants enjoyed with their ability to reach customers in far flung locales, present them an endless assortment of goods and ship to them directly. Clearly this technology-enabled competitor would lead to the extinction of local stores with their limited inventory and legacy cost structures. Not exactly. In fact, rather than rely solely on the catalog, Sears built on the success of the mail order business by opening brick and mortar stores around the country. In 1931, 50 years into the company’s existence, Sears' in-store sales volume eclipsed the catalog business for the first time, and forever thereafter. Retailers of the late 19th century pioneered omni-channel with their recognition that physical stores can complement technology to provide a broad set of purchase opportunities for their consumers. Technology-enabled competition is once again reshaping the retail landscape. Will brick and mortar survive? Will omni-channel once again be the winner?
Half of US Malls Could Close Within
a Decade FIGURE 7 | US MALLS BY GRADE
160 25%
The typical mall anchor department store was on life support
after the pain inflicted from power centers in the 1990s. Just 140
before these companies went under, private equity and hedge 20%
Share of Total Market Value
120
fund buyers were attracted to their cash flow potential and
snatched them up in flurry from 2000–2008. The new owners 100
15%
Count
levered the operations to the point that debt service costs 80
prevented them from investing in e-commerce technologies 10%
60
and distribution capabilities that would have helped them
weather the threat from online competitors. As a result, 40
5%
these anchors are in dire financial condition and are no longer
20
drawing in the foot traffic needed to make the enclosed mall
ecosystem viable. Anchors had been given extremely low 0 0%
A++ A+ A A- B+ B B- C+ C C- D
rental rates for their large footprint stores on long term leases. Grade of Malls
The idea was that four or five of them on the outer spokes of Count Market Value
a mall would draw consumers through the mall and into the Source: Green Street Advisors.
inline merchants. These merchants would be willing to pay a
much higher rental rate provided foot traffic was sufficient to
ensure higher conversion.
The more likely scenario is that the lower grade malls begin to
As the anchors fail, however, the mall operator is left with a
be decommissioned. Doing so may have a major impact on
large format box that is hard enough to fill in the first place,
the markets that rely on these centers, but is not likely to have
let alone repurpose. These dark boxes at the end of the mall a large impact on the investable universe; even though the
also diminish the consumer flow to the inline stores, which malls rated B or lower represent 60% of the number of malls,
leads to a downward spiral in rental rates, occupancy and they are only 18% of the market value for US malls (Figure 7).
merchant credit quality.
Land parcels with decommissioned malls are being razed
According to Green Street Advisors, there are approximately and repurposed as multifamily communities, single family
1,100 malls in the US, of which about 250 are Grade A or better. neighborhoods—or warehouse distribution centers for
Within this stratum there are around 100 “trophy” or “fortress” e-commerce operators.
malls that are the dominant center in their respective markets
and are not likely to lose significant foot traffic to e-commerce
in the near term given their strong market demographics and Seeking the Hole in the Donut
unique merchant mix. The trophy malls tend to be closely held Converting former retail sites into distribution centers—or
by a small number of REITs, core open-ended funds, pension in the case of the Amazon / Whole Foods deal, repositioning
funds or sovereign wealth funds. They rarely trade hands. existing retail into distribution centers—solves the challenge
Given that there has only been one mall built in the US in the of getting goods closer to their ultimate destination. For most
past decade, the number of fortress malls is not likely to grow. of the 20th century, that ultimate destination for goods coming
6from an industrial warehouse was a retail store located around
the central business district (CBD) somewhere between FIGURE 8 | 20TH CENTURY URBAN PLANNING
clusters of single family neighborhoods or multifamily
communities (Figure 8). Delivering goods to these stores
was aided by a highway system that developed ring roads to
keep commercial vehicles from traversing residential surface
streets. Now that the ultimate destination for goods ordered
online is a home address, e-commerce operators are likely to
continue to seek physical locations from which to manage
logistics. These logistics include everything from traditional
home delivery and returns processing, to hybrid click-and-
pick scenarios where the consumer orders the items online for CBD Office
in-store retrieval or where a consumer fills a virtual basket of Multi-family
goods online and the store employees pick the physical basket Retail
of goods to shopper’s specifications. In the latter scenario, the Single Family
shopper can set a time to pick the order up, or the merchant Suburban Office
might facilitate home delivery from a variety of gig-job Industrial
services such as InstaCart or TaskRabbit.
Source: StepStone Group.
Buy Now, Or Wait for the Sale?
With all the creative destruction that has occurred over the
past few decades, one might assume that retail oriented real
estate has been a volatile investment. However, the retail
FIGURE 9 | 20 YEAR RISK/RETURN FOR PRIMARY
sector has been the best performing and least volatile sector
PROPERTY TYPES
among the primary property types over the past 20 years
(Figure 9). As the second largest sector in the NCREIF Property
11.5%
Index, with a 22.3% weighting, retail has generated annual
returns that are 100 basis points above the broader index
with 11.0% and 10.0%, respectively (Figure 9). The standard 11.0% Retail
deviation of retail returns is more than 200 basis points below
Total Return
that of office. 10.5% Industrial
Granted there have been rapid developments in the retail
All Properties
landscape over the last 20 months that may cause some 10.0%
to dismiss the return profile of the preceding 20 years, with Multifamily Office
the common refrain that "past returns are not guarantees 9.5%
of future results." However, those developments have
yet to lead to significant changes in retail valuations
9.0%
or fundamentals. 7.5% 8.0% 8.5% 9.0% 9.5% 10.0% 10.5%
Standard Deviation of Annual Returns
Source: NCREIF.
Note: Size of circles corresponds to to sector weight within NCREIF.
STEPSTONE | Retail Real Estate: Clean Up in Aisle Six, or Heading to Chapter-7? 7The Real Capital Analytics cap rate for retail real estate ended
FIGURE 10 | VALUATION METRICS FOR RETAIL REAL ESTATE the third quarter of 2017 within six basis points of the all-time
10% $300 low of 6.46% seen in 2007. On a price per square foot basis,
retail is 16% over its long-term average and right on top of the
9%
$250 2007 levels (Figure 10).
Price Per Square Foot
8%
6.46% 6.52% Cap rates and prices are holding steady because the real
Cap Rate
7%
$200 estate fundamentals remain supportive of investment with
6% supply low, vacancy in check and rents growing for 23 straight
$190
5% $188 $150 quarters (Figures 11 & 12). These strong fundamentals
4% controvert the weakness in the retail REITs, suggesting that
$100 individual investors may be more spooked than institutional
3%
asset owners.
3Q17
3Q01
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3Q06
3Q07
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3Q09
3Q10
3Q11
3Q12
3Q13
3Q14
3Q15
3Q16
Cap Rate $/sf
Source: Real Capital Analytics.
The Future of Omni-channel Retail
As stated above, not all sites will continue to be functional as
FIGURE 11 | RETAIL SUPPLY & DEMAND
retail given physical or market challenges with the asset. Some
15 12% of these sites will be scrapped; others will undergo significant
repositioning to include new multifamily developments,
10%
medical care facilities, and offices.
Square Feet (millions)
10
Vacancy (%)
8%
5
6%
0
4%
(5)
In 2017, Walmart started
1Q11
2Q11
3Q11
4Q11
1Q12
2Q12
3Q12
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1Q13
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3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
2Q14
3Q14
4Q14
1Q15
2Q15
3Q15
4Q15
1Q16
2Q16
3Q16
4Q16
1Q17
2Q17
Demand Supply 10 Yr Avg New Supply Vacancy
Source: REIS. a program in which
shoppers can make
FIGURE 12 | RETAIL SUPPLY & DEMAND
$18.5 3% purchases online, have
those orders filled from
2%
$18.0
Year-Over-Year Change in Rent (%)
1%
$17.5
a local store, and have
0%
Rent (US$/SQFT)
$17.0 (1%)
the goods delivered by a
(2%)
$16.5
(3%)
$16.0
Walmart associate on their
(4%)
$15.5 (5%)
1Q11
2Q11
3Q11
4Q11
1Q12
2Q12
3Q12
4Q12
1Q13
2Q13
3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
2Q14
3Q14
4Q14
1Q15
2Q15
3Q15
4Q15
1Q16
2Q16
3Q16
4Q16
1Q17
2Q17
Rent Y-O-Y Growth way home.
Source: REIS.
8The geographic positioning of many retail locations can make
FIGURE 13 | 20TH CENTURY DISTRIBUTION MODEL them attractive hubs for the distribution of goods; most are
likely to continue to serve that function as the consumer
shopping model evolves from brick and mortar (Figure 13)
or e-commerce (Figure 14) to omni-channel with brick and
mortar and e-commerce (Figure 15).
CBD Office Conclusions
Multi-family
Retail
Observations based on national valuations for a broad
Single Family category of real estate is of marginal utility given the wide
Suburban Office variations from market to market and among property types
Industrial (i.e., malls, power centers and grocery anchored sprint centers).
It is also of marginal value to view headlines regarding tenant
Source: StepStone Group.
weakness as an indication of the value of the real estate
they occupy.
As with all real estate, location matters and this is particularly
FIGURE 14 | E-COMMERCE MODEL
true for retail oriented real estate given that the trade area
demographics will determine whether the center will draw
sufficient consumer spending to support the tenant mix.
If the trade area and location are supportive of omni-channel
retailers, or experiential retail, then there will likely continue to
be value in the real estate.
CBD Office StepStone Real Estate believes that investors should
Multi-family
be simultaneously cautious about the potential value
Retail
Single Family
erosion that is likely to occur at certain retail properties
Suburban Office and opportunistically positioned to take advantage of the
Industrial re-pricing to gain exposure to assets that are well positioned
to participate in the next generation of retail real estate.
Source: StepStone Group.
Specific risk factors that will drive the re-pricing are the
smaller store sizes required by inventory-lite retail concepts,
the functional obsolescence of certain configurations, and
FIGURE 15 | OMNI-CHANNEL MODEL the reduced foot traffic caused by home delivery. One risk
that investors should not fear is the risk of being too late.
This re-pricing will take time so investors will be rewarded
for sagacity and prudence.
CBD Office
Multi-family
Retail
Single Family
Suburban Office
Industrial
Source: StepStone Group.
STEPSTONE | Retail Real Estate: Clean Up in Aisle Six, or Heading to Chapter-7? 9This document is for information purposes only and has been compiled with publicly available information. StepStone makes no guarantees of the accuracy of the information provided. This information is for the use of StepStone’s clients and contacts only. This report is only provided for informational purposes. This report may include information that is based, in part or in full, on assumptions, models and/or other analysis (not all of which may be described herein). StepStone makes no representation or warranty as to the reasonableness of such assumptions, models or analysis or the conclusions drawn. Any opinions expressed herein are current opinions as of the date hereof and are subject to change at any time. StepStone is not intending to provide investment, tax or other advice to you or any other party, and no information in this document is to be relied upon for the purpose of making or communicating investments or other decisions. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed in this report constitutes a solicitation, an offer or a recommendation to buy, sell or dispose of any investment, to engage in any other transaction or to provide any investment advice or service. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Actual results may vary. Each of StepStone Group LP, StepStone Group Real Assets LP and StepStone Group Real Estate LP is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). StepStone Group Europe LLP is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, firm reference number 551580. Swiss Capital Invest Holding (Dublin) Ltd (“SCHIDL”) is an SEC Registered Investment Advisor and Swiss Capital Alternative Investments AG (“SCAI”) (together with SCHIDL, “Swiss Cap”) is registered as a Relying Advisor with the SEC. Such registrations do not imply a certain level of skill or training and no inference to the contrary should be made. Manager references herein are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute investment recommendations. 10
StepStone is a global private markets firm overseeing more than US$135 billion of private capital allocations, including over US$35 billion of assets under management. The Firm creates customized portfolios for many of the world’s most sophisticated investors using a highly disciplined, research-focused approach that prudently integrates fund investments, secondaries and co-investments.
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