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Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Resilience
COVID-19 Crisis Through a
Migration Lens
Migration and Development Brief 34
May 2021
iMigration and Development Brief reports an update on migration and remit- tance flows as well as salient policy developments in the area of international migration and development. The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) is a global hub of knowledge and policy expertise on migration and development. It aims to create and synthesize multidisciplinary knowl- edge and evidence; generate a menu of policy options for migration policy makers; and provide technical assistance and capacity building for pilot projects, evaluation of policies, and data collection. KNOMAD is supported by a multi-donor trust fund established by the World Bank. The European Commission, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH commissioned by and on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) are the contributors to the trust fund. The views expressed in this paper do not represent the views of the World Bank or the sponsoring organizations. All queries should be addressed to KNOMAD@worldbank.org. KNOMAD working papers, policy briefs, and a host of other resources on migration are available at www.KNOMAD.org.
RESILIENCE COVID-19 CRISIS THROUGH A MIGRATION LENS Migration and Development Brief 34 May 2021 Migration and Remittances Team Social Protection and Jobs World Bank
Migration and Development Brief 34
Migration and Remittances Team Attribution—Please cite the work as fol-
lows: Dilip Ratha, Eung Ju Kim, Sonia Plaza,
© 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction
and Ganesh Seshan. 2021. “Migration and
and Development/The World Bank.
Development Brief 34:
Some rights reserved Resilience: COVID-19 Crisis through a
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ivResilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Contents
Summary.............................................................................................. x
Acknowledgements............................................................................... xiii
1. Remittance Flows Proved to Be Resilient in 2020.................................... 2
2. Outlook for 2021-22........................................................................... 14
3. Policy Issues...................................................................................... 16
4. Regional trends in Migration and Remittance Flows................................ 20
4.1 Remittances to East Asia and the Pacific declined in 2020............................... 20
4.2 Remittances to Europe and Central Asia Fell Sharply in 2020 amid the
Consequences of the Coronavirus and Lower Oil Prices......................................... 22
4.3 Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean Were Resilient in 2020 and
Are Expected to Continue Their Positive Growth in 2021........................................ 25
4.4 Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa continued to rise in 2020.... 28
4.5 Remittances to South Asia Unexpectedly Grew in 2020.................................... 30
4.6 Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa Declined in 2020...................................... 33
vMigration and Development Brief 34 List of Figures Figure 1.1a Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development Assistance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries,1990–2022..................... 4 Figure 1.1.b Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development Assistance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries, Excluding China, 1990–2022................................................................................................................ 4 Figure 1.2 Remittances Plummeted in Q2 2020, but Recovered in Q3 and Q4 in Many Countries.................................................................................................... 5 Figure 1.3 Employment Levels of Foreign Born and Native Born in the United States............................................................................................................ 8 Figure 1.4 Outward Remittances from Russia are Highly Correlated with the Price of Oil................................................................................................................ 10 Figure 1.5 Weak Oil Prices are Affecting Outward Remittances from Saudi Arabia 10 Figure 1.6 Saudi Arabia has Reduced the Number of Foreign Workers in the Country 11 Figure 1.7 One-off Effects of Cancellation of Haj, Floods in Bangladesh, and Tax Incentives in Bangladesh and Pakistan.................................................................... 13 Figure 1.8 Remittance Flows to Mexico Increased Due to a Weaker Peso.............. 13 Figure 2.1 Public Perception toward Immigration Has Turned More Negative...... 15 Figure 3.1 How Much Does It Cost to Send $200? A Comparison of Global Regions in 2019 and 2020........................................................................................ 18 Figure 4.1 Top Remittance Recipients in the East Asia and Pacific Region, 2020... 20 Figure 4.2 Remittance Fees to the Philippines Are among the Lowest in the East Asia and Pacific Region............................................................................................ 21 Figure 4.3 Outbound Remittances from Russia to Central Asian Countries Dropped Sharply in 2020......................................................................................... 23 Figure 4.4 Top Remittance Recipients in Europe and Central Asia, 2020............... 24 Figure 4.5 Russia Remained the Least Expensive Country from Which to Send Money.............................................................................................................. 24 Figure 4.6 Remittance Flows to Latin America and Caribbean Were Resilient in 2020, Showing a “V” Recovery.............................................................................. 25 Figure 4.7 Top Remittance Recipients in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2020.......................................................................................................................... 26 vi
Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Figure 4.8 Cost of Sending Money to Latin America and the Caribbean
Remained Stable...................................................................................................... 27
Figure 4.9 US Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions/ Inadmissible,
FY2019–FY2021....................................................................................................... 28
Figure 4.10 Outward Remittance Flows Varied Across GCC Countries.................. 29
Figure 4.11 Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa,
2020.......................................................................................................................... 29
Figure 4.12 Sending Money within the Middle East and North Africa Is Less
Expensive than Sending Money from Outside......................................................... 30
Figure 4.13 Quarterly Remittance Flows to South Asia........................................... 31
Figure 4.14 Top Remittance Recipients in South Asia, 2020.................................... 31
Figure 4.15 The Costs of Sending Remittances to South Asia Varied Widely
across Corridors....................................................................................................... 32
Figure 4.16 Top Remittance Recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2020.................... 34
Figure 4.17 The Costs of Sending Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa Varied
Widely across Corridors........................................................................................... 35
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low- and
Middle-Income Regions........................................................................... 3
Table 1.2 A Shift from Informal to Formal Remittance-Sending Channels?
Indications from Household Surveys........................................................... 5
Table 1.3: Revisions to IMF growth forecasts................................................ 8
Table 1.4 Differences between the 2009 Global Financial Crisis and 2020
COVID-19 Crisis..................................................................................... 9
Table 3.1 Policy responses during the COVID-19 Crisis................................... 16
Table 4.1 Percentage of Remittance-Receiving Households That
Experienced a Decrease in Remittances during 2020 in Selected African
Countries.............................................................................................. 34
viiMigration and Development Brief 34 List of Boxes Box 1.1 Top Remittance Source and Recipient Countries................................ 6 Box 1.2 COVID-19 and Migrants from Kerala.............................................. 12 Box 3.1 Concessional Financing Facility for Migration.................................... 17 Box 3.2 AML/CFT, De-risking, and Remittances........................................... 19 viii
Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
ixMigration and Development Brief 34
Summary
This Migration and Development Brief pro- India has been the largest recipient of remit-
vides updates on global trends in migration tances since 2008. As a share of gross domestic
and remittances. It highlights developments product, the top five recipients in 2020 were, by
related to migration-related Sustainable contrast, smaller economies: Tonga, Lebanon,
Development Goal (SDG) indicators for which Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and El Salvador.
the World Bank is a custodian: increasing The United States was the largest source coun-
the volume of remittances as a percentage try for remittances in 2020, followed by the
of gross domestic product (SDG indicator United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the
17.3.2), and reducing remittance costs (SDG Russian Federation.
indicator 10.c.1).
In 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top
Defying predictions, remittance flows have five remittance recipient countries were
proved to be resilient during the COVID-19 India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and
crisis. In 2020, officially recorded remittance Egypt. India has been the largest recipient of
flows to low- and middle-income countries remittances since 2008. As a share of gross
reached $540 billion, only 1.6 percent below domestic product, by contrast, the top five
the $548 billion seen in 2019. Remittances recipients in 2020 were smaller economies:
exceeded foreign direct investment flows by a Tonga, Somalia, Lebanon, Kyrgyz Republic,
wider margin in 2020. Excluding China, remit- and South Sudan. The United States was the
tance flows surpassed the sum of foreign direct largest source country for remittances in 2020,
investment and official development assis- followed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi
tance. Remittances have therefore become an Arabia, and Russia.
important consumption smoothing mechanism
Foremost among the drivers of remittance
for the recipient households and, as such, they
flows and reasons behind their resilience during
form an increasingly important (private) ele-
the crisis was migrants’ desire to help their
ment of global social protection systems.
families, to send money home by cutting con-
Among regions, remittances to Latin America sumption or drawing on savings. Other drivers
and Caribbean grew by 6.5 percent in 2020 included fiscal stimulus in host countries that
and were supported by a recovering economy resulted in better-than-expected economic
and moderately improving labor market in the performance, a shift in flows from informal to
United States. In South Asia, there was a slight formal channels, and cyclical movements in oil
moderation in the growth of remittance flows in prices and currency exchange rates.
2020, to 5.2 percent, while flows to the Middle
Counter-cyclical fiscal policy, especially
East and North Africa grew by a modest 2.3
cash transfer and employment support pro-
percent. Flows to Europe and Central Asia are
grams implemented in many large economies,
estimated to have fallen by 9.7 percent, to East
cushioned a fall in personal incomes and
Asia and the Pacific by 7.9 percent, and to Sub-
consumption, and supported businesses in
Saharan Africa by 12.5 percent.
the continuing employment of workers. Such
In 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top programs also benefited foreign-born persons.
five remittance recipient countries were India, The economic performance of major migrant-
China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt. host countries, especially those in North
xResilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
America and Europe, proved to be better in billion in 2021 and by 2.2 percent to $565
2020 than the growth rates projected in March billion in 2022 (table 1.1). Remittances are
and April. expected to grow twice as fast in Latin America
and the Caribbean and in South Asia, but they
It is believed that an increase in the recorded
are expected to decline further in Europe and
flows was in part due to a broad shift in flows
Central Asia, and remain sluggish in Sub-
from informal to formal channels in 2020.
Saharan Africa.
There was a greater use of digital remittance
channels as hand carry was affected by travel These projections are subject to significant
bans and lockdowns. The true size of remit- risks, however. The recurrence of COVID-19
tances, which includes formal and informal outbreaks cannot be ruled out in the medi-
flows, is believed to be larger than officially um-term case, many countries may not be
reported data, though the extent of the impact able to provide the same level of fiscal stimulus
of COVID-19 on informal flows is unclear. they did in 2020. Finally, the shifts from cash
to digital and informal to formal channels may
However, there were important regional vari-
also slow down, unless solutions are found for
ances. In general, due to the weak oil price,
improving access to banking for migrants and
remittances from oil-dependent economies
for new money transfer operators.
declined more than they did in non-oil econ-
omies. For example, weak oil prices affected There has been progress in some areas of pol-
the employment of migrant workers in the Gulf icy responses during the crisis. For example,
Cooperation Council countries, leading more some host countries have included migrants in
recently to declining outward remittances cash transfer programs and vaccination pro-
from the region. In the case of Russia, the twin grams. Host countries should provide vaccines
effects of weak oil price and depreciation of to migrant workers to enhance the safety of
the source-country currency caused a near- their own populations – a point that seems to
ly 10 percent fall in remittance flows to the be increasingly acknowledged. However, many
Europe and Central Asia region. host countries are financially stretched. In par-
ticular, the many developing countries hosting
Remittance flows to Bangladesh and Pakistan
migrants would need concessional financ-
were also affected by idiosyncratic factors
ing support from external sources to sustain
– such as the cancellation of the pilgrimage
increased spending associated with migrants.
to Mecca (hajj), floods in Bangladesh in July
Supporting migrants who may be lower skilled,
2020, and tax incentives offered to attract
in irregular status, and in the informal sector
remittances. In the case of Mexico, a sharp
will continue to be a challenge.
depreciation of the peso against the US dollar
since March 2020 attracted remittances as Supporting remittance infrastructure to keep
goods, services, and assets in Mexico became remittances flowing should include efforts to
cheaper to purchase with the US dollar. lower remittance fees, which have continued
to average above 6.5 percent in Q4 2020,
Looking ahead, remittance flows to low- and
more than double the SDG target of 3 per-
middle-income countries are expected to
cent by 2030. The average remittance cost
increase by 2.6 percent per year, to $553
was lowest in South Asia, at 4.9 percent, while
xiMigration and Development Brief 34
Sub-Saharan Africa continued to have the The unexpected resilience of remittance flows
highest average cost, at 8.2 percent. during the COVID-19 crisis has once again
highlighted the importance of the timely
Anti-money laundering and countering of
availability of data. After overtaking foreign
financing for terror (AML/CFT) regulations
direct investment and official development
and de-risking practices by banks (denying
assistance in low- and middle-income countries
bank accounts to money transfer operators)
(excluding China), remittances can no longer
continue be onerous for new market entrants
be ignored as small change. Countries need to
using new technologies. Many migrants do
collect better data on remittances, in terms of
not have the ID documents required to open
frequency (either monthly or quarterly), timely
bank accounts, which prevents them from using
reporting, and granularity (by corridor, chan-
online remittance services. Some countries
nel, instrument).
issued regulations for allowing e-onboarding
to comply with know-your-customer laws.
Regulators are aware of the usefulness of
applying a risk-based approach rather than a
rule-based approach to small-value remittanc-
es, but this has not yet been adopted.
xiiResilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Acknowledgements
This Brief was prepared by Dilip Ratha, Eung were received from the World Bank’s regional
Ju Kim, Kebba Jammeh, and Maja Vezmar chief economist offices and members of the
of the Migration and Remittances Unit of the Migration Steering Group, including Samik
Jobs Group in the Social Protection and Jobs Adhikari, Oya Pinar Ardic Alper, Valerie Mercer
Global Practice; Sonia Plaza of the Finance, Blackman, Ergys Islamaj, Gerard Kambou,
Competitiveness, and Innovation Global Jean Lee, Michael Lokshin, Harish Natarajan,
Practice; and Ganesh Seshan of the Poverty Iffath Sharif, Siddharth Sharma, Maheshwor
Global Practice. Thanks to Michal Rutkowski Shrestha, and Hans Timmer. Thanks to
and Ian Walker for helpful comments and Rebecca Ong for communications support
support. Useful comments and contributions and Fayre Makeig for editing.
xiiiMigration and Development Brief 34 1
Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
1. Remittance Flows Proved to Be Resilient in 2020
Defying predictions, remittance flows have and El Salvador . The United States was the
proved to be resilient during the COVID-19 crisis. largest source country for remittances in 2020,
In 2020, remittance flows to low- and middle-in- followed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi
come countries (LMICs) reached $540 billion, Arabia, and the Russian Federation.
only 1.6 percent below the $548 billion seen in
There was a sharp temporary drop in remit-
2019 (figure 1.1 and table 1.1). The decline was
tance flows in the second quarter (Q2) of
smaller than the predictions published in April
2020, as lockdowns and travel bans imposed
and October 2020 (see World Bank 2020a and
in response to the COVID-19 crisis also shut
2020b). It was even smaller than the rate of
down remittance services (figure 1.2). It is pos-
decline registered during the global financial
sible that migrants postponed sending money
crisis in 2009. And the decline in remittances is far
during the initial chaos in late March and April
lower than the 11 percent decline in foreign direct
2020. But even if they had money to send, they
investment (FDI) flows to LMICs seen in 2020.
could not send cash, as money transfer opera-
Thus, the gap between remittances and FDI tors had temporarily closed their offices. Travel
widened further (figure 1.1a). Excluding China, restrictions affected in-kind or cash remittanc-
FDI flows to LMICs declined by over 30 percent es carried by hand by travelers. However, as
in 2020. As a result, remittance flows to LMICs some of the strict lockdowns were lifted, there
other than China surpassed the sum of FDI and was a recovery in Q3 and Q4 in Latin America
official development assistance (ODA) in 2020 and the Caribbean (and other regions).
(figure 1.1b).
The initial decline in remittance flows affect-
Among regions, remittances to Latin America ed almost all countries, especially those in
and Caribbean grew by 6.5 percent in 2020 the Europe and Central Asia region. There
and were supported by a recovering economy were a few exceptions, however; remittance
and moderately improving labor market in the flows to Bangladesh, Mexico, and Pakistan
United States. In South Asia, there was a slight continued to increase, for reasons discussed
moderation in the growth of remittance flows in below. Among regions, Latin America and the
2020, to 5.2 percent, while flows to the Middle Caribbean and South Asia were more resil-
East and North Africa grew by a modest 2.3 ient to the crisis and saw the strongest growth
percent. Flows to Europe and Central Asia are (table 1.1). Remittances to Latin America and
estimated to have fallen by 9.7 percent, to East Caribbean grew by 6.5 percent in 2020 and
Asia and the Pacific by 7.9 percent, and to Sub- were supported by a recovering economy
Saharan Africa by 12.5 percent. and moderately improving labor market in
the United States. In South Asia, there was a
In 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top
slight moderation in the growth of remittance
five remittance recipient countries were India,
flows in 2020, to 5.2 percent, while the Middle
China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt.
East and North Africa grew by a modest 2.3
India has been the largest recipient of remit-
percent. Flows to Europe and Central Asia are
tances since 2008 (box 1.1). As a share of
estimated to have fallen by 9.7 percent, to East
gross domestic product, by contrast, the top
Asia and the Pacific by 7.9 percent, and to Sub-
five recipients in 2020 were smaller economies:
Saharan Africa by 12.5 percent.
Tonga, Lebanon, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
2Migration and Development Brief 32
34
Table 1.1 Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-
Income Regions
Region 2009 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f
($ billion)
Low- and Middle-Income
302 446 441 478 524 548 540 553 565
countries
East Asia and Pacific 80 128 128 134 143 148 136 139 142
Europe and Central Asia 33 42 43 52 59 62 56 54 50
Latin America and
55 68 73 81 89 96 103 108 112
Caribbean
Middle East and North
31 50 49 52 53 55 56 57 59
Africa
South Asia 75 118 111 117 132 140 147 152 158
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 41 37 41 49 48 42 43 44
World 433 602 597 640 694 719 702 713 726
(Growth rate, percent)
Low- and Middle-Income
-4.8 0.5 -1.3 8.4 9.8 4.6 -1.6 2.6 2.2
countries
East Asia and Pacific -4.8 3.7 -0.5 5.1 6.8 3.0 -7.9 2.1 2.1
Europe and Central Asia -11.3 -15.3 2.1 21.0 12.9 4.6 -9.7 -3.2 -6.9
Latin America and
-12.3 6.5 7.4 11.1 9.9 8.3 6.5 4.9 4.0
Caribbean
Middle East and North
-6.0 -6.4 -1.2 5.3 2.3 3.4 2.3 2.6 3.1
Africa
South Asia 4.5 1.6 -5.9 6.0 12.3 6.1 5.2 3.5 4.0
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.1 6.6 -8.3 10.8 17.4 -0.4 -12.5 2.6 1.6
World -5.0 -1.3 -0.8 7.1 8.5 3.7 -2.4 1.5 1.8
Source: World Bank-KNOMAD staff estimates. See appendix in Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World
Bank 2020c).
Note: e = estimate, f =forecast.
3Resilience
COVID-19 COVID-19
Crisis Through
Crisisa Through
Migration
a Lens
Migration Lens
Figure 1.1a Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development
Assistance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1990–2022
($ billion)
800
FDI
600
400
Remittances
200
ODA
0
19 0
19 6
19 7
20 19
20 e
20 1f
f
91
19 2
93
19 4
95
20 7
18
20 3
14
20 5
16
20 9
20 0
19 8
20 5
20 6
07
20 8
20 9
20 0
20 1
20 2
01
20 2
20 3
04
22
9
9
9
20
9
9
1
1
1
9
0
9
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
2
19
19
20
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Sources: World Bank¬–KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Pay-
ments Statistics. See appendix in the Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank 2020c).
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecast.
Figure 1.1b Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development
Assistance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries, Excluding China, 1990–2022
($ billion)
600
500 FDI
400
300 Remittances
200
100 ODA
0
19 0
19 6
19 7
20 19
20 e
20 1f
f
91
19 2
93
19 4
95
20 7
18
20 3
14
20 5
16
20 9
00
98
20 5
20 6
07
20 8
20 9
20 0
20 1
20 2
20 1
02
20 3
04
22
9
9
9
20
9
9
1
1
1
9
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
2
19
19
20
19
19
20
20
19
20
20
20
20
Sources: World Bank¬–KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Pay-
ments Statistics. See appendix in the Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank 2020c).
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecast.
4Migration and Development Brief 34
Figure 1.2 Remittances Plummeted in Q2 2020, but Recovered in Q3 and Q4
Percent (year-over-year growth)
50
30
10
-10
-30
-50 Q2 Q3 Q4
-70
-90
Brazil
Samoa
Pakistan
Mexico
Nepal
Dominican Rep.
Bangladesh
Kenya
Thailand
Mongolia
Morocco
India
Guatemala
Philippines
Ukraine
Kyrgyz Rep
Egypt
Jordan
Russian Federation
Sri Lanka
El Salvador
Ecuador
Moldova
Montenegro
South Africa
Indonesia
Colombia
Malaysia
Uzbekistan, Rep. of
Armenia
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Nigeria
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Source: Haver Analytics and World Bank–KNOMAD staff.
The remittances industry has participated in the It is believed that there was also a broad shift in
rapid acceleration of digitalization that is observ- flows from informal to formal channels in 2020.
able in multiple dimensions of firms’ and house- Since digital remittances are better recorded
holds’ reactions to the COVID 19 crisis. Starting than cash remittances, especially those carried
June 2020, remittance flows through digital by hand or sent through other informal channels,
channels increased, especially for migrants with official data are likely to record more remittanc-
access to bank accounts and credit cards. Many es even if the true size of remittances may be
leading money transfer operators reported dou- falling. This observation is consistent with the fact
ble-digit growth in their digital services, in sharp that a large number of households surveyed in
contrast to a fall in their cash remittance services. Q2 reported receiving lower remittances since
The switch from cash to digital channels seems the start of COVID-19 in Mexico (35 percent)
to have continued throughout 2020. Recent data and the Dominican Republic (54 percent) even
showed that cross-border remittances processed as central banks recorded higher inflows (table
via mobile money increased by 65 percent in 1.2).1 The true size of remittances, which includes
2020 (from $7.7 billion in 2019 to $12 billion in formal and informal flows, is believed to be
2020), reaching over $1 billion in transactions larger than officially reported data, though the
sent and received each month (Andersson and extent of the impact of COVID-19 on informal
Naghavi 2021, GSMA). flows is unclear.
Table 1.2 A Shift from Informal to Formal Remittance-Sending Channels? Indications
from Household Surveys
% of households reporting a fall in Year-on-year change in remittance
remittance receipts in Q2 inflow in Q2
Mexico 35% 10%
Dominican Republic 54% 18%
Source: World Bank, COVID-19 High Frequency Monitoring Dashboard; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
5Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Box 1.1 Top Remittance Source and
Recipient Countries
In 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top from Europe and Central Asia, as the country’s
five remittance recipient countries were India, remittance outflows are more correlated with
China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt oil prices than are those from Saudi Arabia,
(figure B1.1.1). India has been the largest which reported an 11 percent growth in out-
recipient of remittances since 2008. As a share bound remittances in 2020.
of gross domestic product, by contrast, the top
According to the United Nations Department
five recipients in 2020 were smaller economies:
for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA
Tonga, Lebanon, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan
2020), the worldwide number of international
and El Salvador.
migrants (including refugees) was estimated
Data on remittance outflows typically get less at 281 million in 2020. The top host countries
attention than data on remittance inflows. for migrants are the United States (51 million),
The largest remittance-sending countries Germany (16 million), Saudi Arabia (13 mil-
are a mix of high-income countries from the lion), Russia (12 million), the United Kingdom
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and (9 million), the United Arab Emirates (9
Development, Gulf Cooperation Council coun- million), France (9 million), Canada (8 million),
tries, and large middle-income countries. The Australia (8 million), and Spain (7 million).
United States was the largest sender in 2020, These countries account for about half of the
recording around $68 billion in outflows, fol- total international migration stock.
lowed by the United Arab Emirates ($43 billion)
Source: World Bank-KNOMAD staff.
and Saudi Arabia ($35 billion). Among mid-
dle-income countries, Russia is a large sender
($17 billion) due to its sizable immigrant stock
Figure B1.1.1 Top Recipients among Low- and Middle-Income Countries
($ billion, 2020) (Percentage of GDP, 2020)
38
83
33
29
27
60 24 24 24
22 21 21
43
35
30 26
22
17 17 15
Ja iti
al
ca
a
ic
s
Re n
sh
Vi ia
m
e
ico
on r
es
a
a
ng n
Sa n
o
do
ra
Pa p.
ng
o
a
in
in
ep
bl
di
Ba sta
er
El ista
th
na
ai
de
H
in
n
du
Re
ex
ra
Ch
pu
In
lva
To
m
ig
a
so
N
p
et
ki
la
eb
Uk
jik
M
ip
N
ab
Le
Ta
Eg Phil
L
H
Ar
yz
rg
t,
yp
Ky
6Migration and Development Brief 34
This is not the first time that remittance flows foreign-born persons3. On the other hand, they
have proved resilient during a crisis; the supported businesses in continuing the employ-
same thing was observed, for example, in the ment of workers (Murthi and Rutkowski 2021).4
aftermath of the global financial crisis. In fact,
The economic performance of major migrant-
remittances often rise in times of financial crisis
host countries, especially those in North
or natural disasters in the recipient country
America and Europe, proved to be significantly
(Ratha 2009; World Bank 2010). Even during
better in 2020 than the growth rates pro-
a crisis in the host country, migrants may try
jected in March and April. The International
to reduce consumption (or rent payments)
Monetary Fund ’s projection for the 2020 GDP
and draw on their savings to continue to send
growth rate was revised upwards in October
money home.2 During the COVID-19 crisis,
last year, and again, the preliminary estimate
the need for financial support for families
of the GDP growth rate for 2020 released in
back home has risen, for essential goods and
April 2021 was even higher (table 1.3). A very
services including health care. Remittances
large drop in GDP and consumption in South
have provided a lifeline for families back home
Asia—relative to declines in remittance-source
struggling with loss of income and pandem-
countries’ GDP due to the pandemic—is likely
ic-induced economic slowdown. Unable and
to be another factor behind an increase in
perhaps unwilling to take the risk of traveling
remittances by migrants trying to support fam-
to home countries, migrants have tried to send
ilies needing help.5
as much money home as they can. Remittances
have therefore become an important consump- Consistent with this picture of sharper-than-ex-
tion smoothing mechanism for the recipient pected recovery, in the United States, the
households and, as such, they form an increas- largest migrant-host country, the employment
ingly important (private) element of global level of foreign-born workers fell by 21 percent
social protection systems. in April 2020 compared to February 2020, but
steadily recovered afterwards (figure 1.3). The
Counter-cyclical fiscal policy, especially cash
recovery in employment levels together with
transfer and employment support programs
cash transfers received directly from the gov-
implemented in many large economies, also
ernment enabled migrants to send remittances
propped up activity and employment levels.
to family and friends back in origin countries.
In addition, even when people were laid off,
This is an interesting distinguishing feature of
such programs cushioned a fall in personal
the COVID-19 crisis, compared to the global
incomes and consumption, including those of
financial crisis of 2009 (see table 1.4).
7Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Table 1.3 Revisions to IMF growth forecasts
Immigrant Apr.2020 Oct.2020 Apr. 2021
stock, forecasts forecasts forecasts Change in 2020 forecast
2020
Country (million) 2020 2021 2020 2021 2020 2021 Oct20-Apr20 Apr21-Oct20 Apr21-Apr20
U.S.A. 50.6 -5.9 4.7 -4.3 3.1 -3.5 6.4 1.6 0.8 2.4
Germany 15.8 -7 5.2 -6 4.2 -4.9 3.6 1 1.1 2
Saudi Arabia 13.5 -2.3 2.9 -5.4 3.1 -4.1 2.9 -3.2 1.3 -1.9
Russian Fed. 11.6 -5.5 3.5 -4.1 2.8 -3.1 3.8 1.4 1.1 2.4
U.K. 9.4 -6.5 4 -9.8 5.9 -9.9 5.3 -3.3 -0.2 -3.4
U.A.E. 8.7 -3.5 3.3 -6.6 1.3 -5.9 3.1 -3.1 0.6 -2.4
France 8.5 -7.2 4.5 -9.8 6 -8.2 5.8 -2.6 1.5 -1.1
Canada 8 -6.2 4.2 -7.1 5.2 -5.4 5 -0.9 1.7 0.8
Australia 7.7 -6.7 6.1 -4.2 3 -2.4 4.5 2.5 1.7 4.2
Spain 6.8 -8 4.3 -12.8 7.2 -11 6.4 -4.8 1.9 -3
Italy 6.4 -9.1 4.8 -10.6 5.2 -8.9 4.2 -1.5 1.8 0.3
Largest host countries* 209.7 -5.3 4.5 -6.1 3.9 -4.8 4.8 -0.9 1.4 0.5
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2020, 2021; Immigrant stock data from UN DESA.
Note: f = forecast, e = estimate.
*Weighted average for top 30 host countries computed using immigrant stock as weights
Figure 1.3 Employment Levels of Foreign Born and Native Born in the United States
105
Employment in the United States, Index (Feb. 2020 = 100)
100
96
95
94
90
Native born
85
Foreign born
80
79
75
0
0
0
1
21
1
0
20
0
0
0
21
20
20
20
-2
-2
r-2
r-2
-2
l-2
-2
-2
-2
b-
n-
n-
g-
p-
b-
ay
ar
ar
ct
ov
ec
Ju
Ap
Ap
Ju
Ja
Fe
Au
Se
Fe
M
M
O
M
D
N
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 8Migration and Development Brief 34
Table 1.4 Differences between the 2009 Global Financial Crisis and 2020 COVID-19 Crisis
COVID-19 crisis, 2020 Global financial crisis, 2009
Affected all host and origin countries Affected mostly host countries in the Global North
Widespread use of remote work and online delivery Flows shifted from formal to informal channels as
services shifted flows to digital, formal channels migrants switched to informal jobs and AML/CFT
regulations were tightened
Of fiscal stimulus mechanisms, both cash transfers and Fiscal stimulus mainly to the banking sector – effects on
support to businesses (to maintain employment) included migrants less direct
foreign-born persons
Significant return migration and no new migration; as a Return migration decreased, so even with no new
result, stock of international migrants likely decreased migration, stock of international migrants increased
Migrants played a key role as front-line workers (at both As the unemployment rate rose, migrants were seen
ends of the skill spectrum, as retail, IT, and health care as competitors to native-born workers, and anti-
workers); tourism and hospitality sectors affected immigration sentiment increased
Remittances dipped sharply in the second quarter of Remittances declined by 5 percent
2020 but recovered quickly; the overall impact was only
-1.6 percent
Currencies of most recipient countries did not depreciate Currencies of recipient countries depreciated (e.g., Indian
(except in Europe and Central Asia) rupee, Mexican peso, Philippines peso, Nigerian naira)
Transit migration increased as many host countries There were anecdotal reports of “reverse remittances”
implemented strict travel bans and border enforcement; sent by family members in origin countries to migrant
this possibly increased remittance flows to (transit relatives in host countries
migrants in) transit countries
No evidence of “safe haven” factor or “home bias” (which Evidence of “safe haven” or “home bias” for investment-
prompts migrants to send funds to their origin country related remittances
during an economic downturn in the host country)
In the case of Russia, a weak oil price contin- fall in remittance flows to Europe and Central
ued to affect economic activity and employ- Asia. By contrast, countries receiving remit-
ment levels, and thereby, outward remittances tances from Europe experienced an increase
flowed to Central Asia (figure 1.4). Russia is the in US dollar valuation due to an appreciation
largest host country for migrants from Central of the euro against the US dollar (around 9
Asian countries such as the Kyrgyz Republic, percent in the second half of 2020).
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – and it is also the
A weak oil price also affected the employment
largest source country of remittances to these
of migrant workers in the Gulf Cooperation
nations. A second impact of weak oil prices
Council (GCC) countries, and more recently,
was felt through a weakening of the ruble
outward remittances from the region. Take the
against the US dollar, which lowered the value
case of Saudi Arabia, the third-largest source
of remittances from Russia in US dollar terms.
country of remittances after the United States
The ruble depreciated by 20 percent during Q2
and the United Arab Emirates.5 For decades,
2020 and remained weak through the second
until after a peak in oil prices in 2014, outward
half of 2020 and Q1 2021. The twin effects of
remittances from Saudi Arabia continued to rise
a weak oil price and the depreciation of the
even as oil prices fluctuated. The government
source-country currency caused a 10 percent
used its large fiscal reserves to smooth public
9Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Figure 1.4 Outward Remittances from Russia are Highly Correlated with the Price
of Oil
($ million) ($/bbl)
12,000 140
10,000 120
100
8,000
80
6,000
60
4,000
40
Outward remittances, Russia
2,000 20
Brent crude ($/bbl) (Right Axis)
0 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019 2020
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Source: Haver Analytics and World Bank-KNOMAD staff.
Note: $/bbl = dollar per barrel.
spending and the employment of workers (over of $2.8 billion in 2015 to $1.8 billion in 2020,
three-quarters of them were foreign workers in and the decline was the steepest (14 percent) in
2020). After reaching a peak in 2015, however, 2020. This gradual decline is consistent with the
outward remittances gradually declined (figure longer-term trends in oil prices as well as policy
1.5). Bilateral flow data are hard to obtain, measures that encourage the hiring of nationals
but judging from the data reported by the in Saudi Arabia as well as other GCC countries
Philippines, remittances from Saudi Arabia to (figure 1.6).
this country declined by 36 percent from a peak
Figure 1.5 Weak Oil Prices are Affecting Outward Remittances from Saudi Arabia
($ million) ($/bbl)
11,000 140
10,000 120
9,000
100
8,000
80
7,000
60
6,000
40
5,000
Outward remittances, Saudi Arabia
4,000 20
Brent crude ($/bbl) (Right Axis)
3,000 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019 2020
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Source: Haver Analytics and World Bank-KNOMAD staff.
Note: $/bbl = dollar per barrel.
10Migration and Development Brief 34
Figure 1.6 Saudi Arabia has Reduced the Number of Foreign Workers
Number of registered foreign workers (thousands).
8,500
8,000
7,500
7,000
6,500
6,000
5,500
5,000
2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018 2018 2018 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Source: General Authority of Statistics, Saudi Arabia.
In 2020, the deployment of workers to the GCC to Bangladesh and Pakistan surged ahead. As
countries, Malaysia, and Hong Kong SAR, reported in the Migration and Development
China, declined by over 70 percent from the Brief 33 (World Bank 2020b), the cancellation of
Philippines, by 68 percent from Bangladesh, travel to Saudi Arabia in July 2020 diverted funds
64 percent from Pakistan, and 60 percent from set aside for the Haj pilgrimage to remittance
Indonesia. In Saudi Arabia, the number of flows to Bangladesh and Pakistan. In addition,
foreign workers fell dramatically in 2020, with Bangladesh suffered huge flooding in July 2020,
more than 257,000 leaving in Q3 alone (when which attracted larger remittances from migrant
a yearly total of 1.2 million return migrants workers overseas. Finally, both Bangladesh and
were expected). In Nepal, the renewal of work Pakistan offered tax incentives (through finan-
permits for migrant workers declined by 65 cial intermediaries) to attract remittances6 The
percent during the first seven months of 2020. effect of cancelling the Haj travel may be felt this
There are also widespread reports, although no year as well. The effect of floods, however, were
systematic official data, of the significant return one-off. Tax incentives may continue to keep the
migration of workers from the GCC countries. In level of remittances high in 2021, but it is not clear
India, the state of Kerala alone reported return how long these measures would accelerate their
migrants in excess of 1.2 million (box 1.2). growth rate.7
This overall declining trend in remittance flows Another high-profile country case is that of
from the GCC region, however, is masked by Mexico, where the COVID-19 crisis seemingly
two idiosyncratic factors – the cancellation of had no effects on remittance inflows (fig-
the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj)and floods in ure 1.8). Indeed, remittance flows to Mexico
Bangladesh, both of which took place in July increased by 9.9 percent in 2020, with a 35 per-
2020. Also, there is one policy factor at play cent year-on-year increase in March 2020. This
– tax incentives offered by Bangladesh and increase seems to be due to a sharp deprecia-
Pakistan. The effects of these factors can be tion of the peso against the US dollar – between
seen in figure 1.7, where indices of remittance January 2020 and April 2020, the peso was 29
flows to Bangladesh and Pakistan are com- percent weaker, and it is yet to recover. A weaker
pared with an index of remittance flows to the peso attracted remittances as goods, services,
Philippines. During 2019 and until February and assets in Mexico became cheaper to pur-
2020, the indices for all three countries moved chase with the US dollar.
close to one another. However, in July 2020, flows
11Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Box 1.2. COVID-19 and Migrants
from Kerala
Kerala, India, has a long history of migra- Incoming remittances were also affected: 49
tion to the Gulf countries for work. Like many percent of households stated that the amount
other sending regions in India, the state was received had declined after January 2020. On
adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandem- average, overseas remittances fell by $267 in
ic, which limited jobs abroad and compelled monthly terms among households who report-
an estimated 700,000 migrants to return home ed receiving remittances. Among households
from abroad in 2020 (Financial Express 2021). who reported having a member who returned
A household survey conducted over July and home from abroad after 2018, job losses were
August 2020 in Kerala for the World Bank by the main reason for returns after January
the Center for Development Studies revealed 2020 (42 percent) compared to pre-January
that nearly half of surveyed families with mem- 2020 returns (25 percent). Greater job losses
bers either still abroad or recently returned are likely the result of cost-cutting measures
were worried about getting COVID-19 from taken by foreign employers first laying off
returning migrants. By contrast, at most a third their migrant workforce as they found their
of nonmigrant households were worried about businesses negatively affected by lockdowns.
contracting COVID from returnees. Those who returned after January 2020 were
nearly twice as likely to state that they intended
Among households with members still abroad,
to move abroad again for work compared to
nearly 51 percent stated that these workers
their counterparts who had returned prior to
had been adversely affected by COVID-19
January 2020.
measures in the host countries, primarily
through wage reductions (42 percent) fol- Source: KNOMAD 2021.
lowed by temporary job losses (26 percent).
12Migration and Development Brief 34
Figure 1.7 One-off Effects of Cancellation of Haj, Floods in Bangladesh, and Tax
Incentives in Bangladesh and Pakistan
180 Remittance inflows, Index 2019=100 Philippines Bangladesh
Pakistan
160
140
120
100
80
60
2016 - Jan
2016 - Mar
22016 - May
2016 - Jul
2016 - Sep
2016 - Nov
2017 - Jan
2017 - Mar
2017 - May
2017 - Jul
2017 - Sep
2017 - Nov
2018 - Jan
2018 - Mar
2018 - May
2018 - Jul
2018 - Sep
2018 - Nov
2019 - Jan
2019 - Mar
2019 - May
2019 - Jul
2019 - Sep
2019 - Nov
2020 - Jan
2020 - Mar
2020 - May
2020 - Jul
2020 - Sep
2020 - Nov
2021 - Jan
2021 - Mar
Source: Haver Analytics and World Bank–KNOMAD staff.
Figure 1.8 Remittance Flows to Mexico Increased Due to a Weaker Peso
4,500 ($ million) FX (peso/US$) 25
24
Remittances
4,000 23
Peso/$ (right scale)
22
3,500 21
20
3,000 19
18
2,500 17
16
2,000 15
19
18
8
0
21
0
20
9
9
9
20
0
0
9
20
8
-1
-2
l-2
-1
-1
-1
-2
-2
l-1
l-1
n-
p-
p-
n-
p-
n
ov
ov
ay
ar
ov
ar
ay
Ju
Ju
Ju
Ja
Ja
Se
Ja
Se
Se
M
M
M
N
M
N
N
Source: Haver Analytics and World Bank–KNOMAD staff.
13Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
2. Outlook for 2021–22
As of April 28, 2021, daily new COVID-19 and the Caribbean (LAC) and South Asia, but
cases hovered around 800,000. Even as many they are expected to grow in all regions except
high-income nations made significant progress Europe and Central Asia in 2021.This outlook
in vaccinating their populations, new cases is subject to significant uncertainties, however.
and deaths were surging in India, Brazil, and The recurrence of COVID-19 outbreaks, some
Mexico. Our medium-term economic outlook, of them due to variants of the virus, cannot be
therefore, must factor in a great degree of risk ruled out in the medium term. These risks would
and uncertainty. continue to affect certain sectors (for example,
hospitality and tourism) more than others (IT
In 2021 and 2022, economies worldwide are
and health care, for example). Some countries
expected to rebound further., with advanced
may not be able to provide fiscal stimulus to the
countries performing significantly stronger
same extent they did in 2020. Finally, the shifts
than the low- and middle-income countries
from cash to digital and informal to formal
(IMF 2021, Wolf 2021) (table 1.3). With that,
channels may also slow down, unless solutions
incomes and employment of foreign-born
are found for improving access to banking
workers are also expected to recover, which
for migrants and for new money transfer
would lead to an increase in remittance flows to
operators.
LMICs. The number of COVID-19-induced new
poor in 2020 is likely to have risen to between Despite the critical roles played by migrant
119 to 124 million.8 Thus, families in low- and workers at both ends of the skill spectrum, as
middle-income countries need even more sup- frontline workers in grocery stores and restau-
port from migrant relatives overseas. rants, and in IT and healthcare, survey evidence
suggests that attitudes towards migrants may
Based on recent trends in remittance flows,
have turned negative during the COVID-19 cri-
and assumption that the international migrant
sis.10 For example, a Eurobarometer survey (one
stock will not change much in the near-term,
of the few such surveys conducted last year)
and that economic growth will be stronger this
reported that Europeans’ sentiment towards
year and the next, remittance flows to LMICs
people from outside the EU turned negative
are expected to increase by 2.6 percent to
after the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, reversing
$553 billion in 2021 and by 2.2 percent to $565
a brief period of the positive sentiment overtak-
billion in 2022 (table 1.1).9 Remittances are
ing a negative sentiment (figure 2.1).
expected to grow twice as fast in Latin America
14Migration and Development Brief 34
Figure 2.1 Public Perception toward Immigration Has Turned More Negative
60% Please tell me whether immigration of people from outside the EU evokes a positive or negative feeling for you
55%
Negative
50%
45%
Positive
40%
35%
30%
Mar-18
Apr-18
May-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Aug-18
Sep-18
Oct-18
Nov-18
Dec-18
Jan-19
Feb-19
Mar-19
Apr-19
May-19
Jun-19
Jul-19
Aug-19
Sep-19
Oct-19
Nov-19
Dec-19
Jan-20
Feb-20
Mar-20
Apr-20
May-20
Jun-20
Jul-20
Source: Eurobarometer.
In the medium to long term, remote work and may decrease (and payments for service
a greater use of technology for the provision “exports” increase). Even more impactful would
of services may actually reduce migration (by be the possible displacement of workers by
increasing offshoring). In that event, remittances automation and the use of artificial intelligence.
15Resilience COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
3. Policy Issues
Public policy responses to support migrants Supporting remittance infrastructure to keep
and their families and keep remittances flowing remittances flowing includes efforts to lower
during the crisis have been discussed in World remittance fees, as outlined in Sustainable
Bank studies (2020a and 2020b) (table 3.1). Development Goal (SDG) indicator 10.c.1. Such
There has been progress in some areas: for fees averaged 6.5 percent in Q4 2020. Costs
example, a few host countries have included are still more than double the SDG target of
migrants in cash transfer programs and vacci- 3 percent by 2030. Average remittance costs
nation programs.11 There also seems to be an were the lowest in South Asia, at 4.9 percent,
increasing awareness of the need to include while Sub-Saharan Africa continued to have the
migrants and refugees in programs provid- highest average cost, at 8.2 percent (figure 3.1).
ing vaccines against COVID-19. Indeed, host Remittance costs across many African corridors
countries should provide vaccines to migrant and small islands in the Pacific remain above
workers to enhance the safety of their own 10 percent, especially in the case of remit-
populations (World Bank 2021). However, tance services provided by commercial banks.
many host countries are financially stretched, Intraregional migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa
and need concessional financing support from comprise over two-thirds of all international
external sources for spending associated with migration from the region. Yet intraregional
migrants (box 3.1). Supporting migrants who remittance costs are very high in the region due
may be lower skilled, in irregular status, and in to the low volumes of formal flows, inadequate
the informal sector will continue to be a chal- penetration of innovative technologies, and lack
lenge. Also, policy priorities would have to be of a competitive market environment.
tailored to the needs of different regions based
on country- and sector-specific analysis.
Table 3.1 Policy responses during the COVID-19 Crisis
Supporting remittance
Supporting migrants Supporting migrants’ families
infrastructure
Support stranded migrants. Support social services and Improve collection of high-
Extend cash transfer programs provide cash transfers to families frequency, timely data across
to support internal and left behind. remittance corridors and
international migrants. channels.
Provide access to vaccines, health
Provide access to vaccines, health services, education, and housing. Certain AML/CFT requirements
services, education, and housing. could be temporarily simplified
to incentivize online and mobile
money transfers.
Support migrants when they
return home (access to training,
jobs, credit for business Mitigate factors that prevent
investment). customers or remittance service
providers of digital remittances
from accessing bank accounts.
Source: World Bank 2020b.
16Migration and Development Brief 34
Box 3.1. Concessional Financing Facility Presently, there are no large-scale financing
facilities to address migration. To be effective,
for Migration
global migration governance must embrace
A concessional financing facility for migration the power of partnerships and leverage
was proposed at the 2020 Global Forum on available financial resources. Funds are not
Migration and Development Summit (GFMD necessarily scarce but are presently spent
2020). In the unprecedented environment in a piecemeal and uncoordinated manner.
brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, inter- For example, The EU Multiannual Financial
national cooperation may be more import- Framework's Neighborhood, Development,
ant than ever as countries seek to meet their and International Cooperation Instrument
human rights obligations toward migrants and, would have funding of over €96 billion during
simultaneously, recover from the economic 2021–27. The annual budget for immigration
damage caused by the pandemic, potentially enforcement in the United States reached
looking to migration as one way in which to do approximately $25 billion. On the one hand,
so. A community’s safety during the pandemic there is a need to channel resources in a more
depends on the safety of the migrants in the efficient and coherent manner. On the other
community as well. Indeed, supporting host hand, making partnerships between host and
countries in providing vaccines to migrants origin countries effective, innovative, and
could be among the first activities of a conces- adaptable to changing circumstances requires
sional financing facility. In addition, the facility adequate funding. In other words, effec-
could support host communities experiencing tive partnerships need to be supported by a
rapid inflows of migrants (for schools, health Concessional Financing Facility for Migration
care, housing) and to origin countries experi- with a carefully designed governance structure
encing the large-scale return of their migrant to ensure equal and voluntary participation.
workers (for access to training and jobs, and
Source: GFMD 2021; Ratha 2021.
credit for business investment).
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