Recalibrating CSDP-NATO Relations: The Real Pivot
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No. 47
June 2013
This Policy Brief is published
in partnership with:
Recalibrating CSDP-NATO Relations:
The Real Pivot
Jo Coelmont & Maurice de Langlois
In an age of major power shifts, which we “leadership from behind” are not that well
know from history always to be particularly understood in Europe. The message that at
dangerous, different scenarios are possible; times it will be up to Europeans to take
the only promising one is that of more and responsibility has not come across.
well-structured international cooperation. Consequently, so far Europeans have not
Yet, critical voices point at a drifting apart achieved more coherence in defence
of longstanding allies. Recalibrating CSDP- capabilities, let alone more integration – barely
NATO relations has become more some limited cooperation and minimal savings.
important than ever. Persistent shortfalls in military capabilities are
not being met, quite the contrary.
Are long-standing allies drifting apart? In the All of this signals the absence of
US, struggling with budget deficits, questions transatlantic dialogue. And as to the
such as “Is current US security strategy not institutional dialogue between NATO and the
stimulating free-riding by allies and friends?”, or EU/CSDP, it is difficult to label that
“NATO: what is in it for us? “, and even constructive or successful. Yet, there is one
“Should the US not withdraw from NATO’s common concern: austerity. Its impact on
military command structure?”1, are more than defence on both sides of the Atlantic can
ever coming to the fore. In Europe on the hardly be overestimated. Quoting Churchill –
other hand, even if some worry about the “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now
effects of the “the US pivot to Asia”, many are we must think” – may inspire us to give
still looking to the US to take ultimate serious thought to a renewed transatlantic
responsibility for crisis management operations. relationship, in particular to an appropriate
The effect of the post-Iraq/post-Afghanistan CSDP-NATO link.
context in the US and the real meaning of
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 1
Until recently, the common view was that called “pivot”. Consequently, there is a shift in
putting this issue on the political agenda would the location and numbers of US soldiers
be counterproductive – and rightly so. Many stationed abroad, but that shift remains
well-intended efforts in that sense have fallen remarkably small.
victim to lethal collateral damage due to the
asymmetric membership. The Turkey-Cyprus Furthermore, for the first time since the
issue is of the utmost importance – and must early 1990s, the US defence budget will
therefore be dealt with at the highest political decrease substantially over the next decade.
level and not be reduced to a secondary issue But then again, since World War II there have
dealt with in the slipstream of revisiting been several ups and downs in the DOD
arrangements between NATO and CSDP. budget. This time however the impact on allies
Confusing those two debates effectively is and friends may be quite different. Even if the
counterproductive. Today, after more than a US maintains its leadership in NATO, it
decade of hesitation, it is time to develop the expects from the Europeans a more balanced
CSDP-NATO relationship on a new basis. The burden-sharing. Free-riding has now, more
objective of this paper is to present some than ever, become an issue. Many experts
practical recommendations to that end, to be agree that in the past the US was seen as the
part and parcel of a strong transatlantic overall guarantor of security, allowing partners
dialogue. To arrive at these recommendations, to steadily lower their defence expenditure
we will examine the new posture of the US and without having to fear direct or even indirect
the EU, major changes in NATO and CSDP, consequences. Now, it is clear that the US no
and the way crisis management operations are longer sees Europe as a security consumer but
conducted. as a security provider. In the context of crisis
management operations, this boils down to:
THE US: REMARKABLE CONTINUITY “dear allies and friends, sometimes you will be
ENTAILING TREMENDOUS CHANGE on your own!” To conclude, even if the
After having been drawn into two World Wars current US security strategy is more a
and with the Cold War looming, the US was rebalancing of its efforts than a full pivot to
naturally propelled into the role of “leading Asia, Europeans are under gentle pressure
nation”, in particular within the transatlantic from Washington to recalibrate their defence
community. It took the lead for about half a effort. So, the ball is in the European camp,
century, by stationing troops abroad, providing with Washington being one of the strongest
for reinforcements and strategic transport supporters to develop an effective and efficient
whenever required, ensuring overall strategic CSDP.
balance and, indeed, by determining the
security strategy for the whole of the Alliance THE EU: NO OPTION BUT BECOMING
and its friends. Since the end of the Cold War THE ACTOR OF ITS FUTURE
the political environment has changed For the Europeans and the EU as such, the
drastically. And so has the US. general picture looks quite different. During
the a-typical period of the Cold War, from a
However, a closer look at the American European perspective, the security paradigm
position in the present geopolitical context appeared remarkably self-evident.
reveals that its grand strategy remains
reasonably intact: defending its position in the At present, that certainty has all but
world, politically, economically and militarily. evaporated. The crisis in former Yugoslavia
But there is a shift towards a new area of was a wake-up call, demonstrating for all to see
concern, the Asian and Pacific region: the so- the absence of a European security strategy
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 2
and of any structures to steer a crisis Petersberg Tasks, up to peace enforcement, but
management operation of limited magnitude in with a strong preference for “quick in, quick
Europe’s own backyard. Saint-Malo signalled to out” operations. For Europeans traditionally
European countries that any ambition to alter focussed almost exclusively on maintaining
this situation leaves them no other option than tactical military capabilities, their defence
to rebuild their respective sovereignties at the planning is now confronted with a new
level of the EU, as they already did for so many paradigm. The question now is whether they
other vital “national” policies. Four decades are still in favour of conducting the high-end
after the rejection of a European Defence Petersberg operations, up to peace
Community, the taboo that rested on “defence” enforcement, or not. In short, Europeans need
as part of the European construction was lifted. to reach agreement on the role and usefulness
Saint-Malo thus symbolises a first and most of the military instrument within the overall
remarkable paradigm shift. toolbox of external action.
However, in practice Saint-Malo was only One of the EU’s mantras is its strong
about gathering some military capabilities for ambition to act preventively. “We need to
potential “peacekeeping operations”, while develop a strategic culture that fosters early,
“agreeing to disagree” on strategy. For some it rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.
was about becoming a more significant […] Preventive engagement can avoid more
contributor during such military operations serious problems in the future”, states the 2003
with the purpose of gaining influence on European Security Strategy. However,
decision-making in Washington; for others it operations in Libya and Mali have made clear
was about the ability to launch autonomous EU that setting up preventive crisis management
operations. This ambiguity led many countries operations, let alone urgent interventions,
to believe that listing some of their existing remains among the structural weaknesses of the
capabilities in an EU catalogue would do the Union. Ad hoc solutions have shown their
job and that when push would come to shove, limits and can no longer hide the need for a
any shortfalls would in any case be filled by more structured approach, for the ability to call
NATO – read by the US. That implicit on permanent capabilities for planning and
paradigm is on its way out. conduct of crisis management operations, and
for stand-by assets to implement them. That
Experience has shown that – if there is very sensitive paradigm shift is in the making.
sufficient political will – European countries
are able to deploy and sustain quite impressive Finally, the paradigm that CFSP and CSDP
numbers of troops. On the other hand, the are to be built exclusively through a bottom-up
operation in Libya once again highlighted that approach with no need for any top-down
the already identified strategic capability steering is running out of steam. With the
shortfalls (strategic air transport, air-to-air Lisbon Treaty the European External Action
refuelling, ISR, and SEAD) constitute the Service was created to bridge “the
limiting factor for Europeans. Moreover, at supranational” and “the intergovernmental” in
present there is little appetite among Europeans security matters. It has started to develop sub-
to launch operations that could be long-lasting, strategies, each focused on a specific region,
with many boots on the ground, with such as the Sahel or the Horn of Africa.
potentially many casualties, or considerable However, recent events prove that such sub-
collateral damage. The “declared ambition” strategies, valuable though they are, must be
remains to conduct the whole spectrum of anchored in a much broader strategy, which
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
3moreover needs to be well known and state. All of these dimensions must be
supported by the Heads of State and represented in the “civil-military strategic HQ,
Government. On defence matters, the Lisbon their respective competences and specificities
Treaty produced all the instruments to provide acknowledged. The aim is to safeguard unity of
effective top down direction. The respective direction or unity of command in each and
white books or defence plans of the Member every distinct area, while at the same time
States , all established in more or less splendid ensuring overall coherence. This calls for
isolation, have produced so far an impressive list permanent structures, which is indeed
of redundant military capabilities at the EU level, common practice at the national level in
which far outnumber the list of shortfalls. All countries experienced in crisis management, as
these are good reasons for the December well as in some international organisations.
European Council on Defence to tackle crisis Only thus can a strategic HQ be structurally
management and the corresponding military part of the overall holistic set-up.
capability requirements, and to provide effective
top-down steering. If not a new paradigm, this is At the military level, the US has set up six
at least a major change in policy. permanent regional unified combat
commands. Among them US Europe
CRISIS MANAGEMENT: SOMETHING Command (USEUCOM), which is in no way
QUITE DIFFERENT THESE DAYS considered to be duplicating NATO’s strategic
In crisis management there is no such thing as HQ, SHAPE, because in the US system,
soft or hard power. There are but instruments of whenever operations are conducted, the
soft and hard power. Recent experience has principle of supporting and support HQ is
made it evident, once more, that real power lies applied to all of the permanent combat or
in a holistic and tailored approach, and in the force HQs. In the EU however, the strategic
ability to mobilize all of the required means at military HQ is still in the making. For well-
the right moment. The weakest link is known political reasons, progress has had to
determining the final outcome. The military and remain under the radar screen. The paradox is
civilian capabilities deployed are simply catalysts, that the current organisation within the Union
and even then if and only if, on the ground, is rendering any preventive or urgent action
within local communities and in the region, impossible. Moreover, not only is an EU
some crucial political ingredients are present. strategic HQ essential in a command and
For durable solutions to be possible, the control structure, but it too has to be
economic dimension must be brought in as well. complemented by appropriate force or combat
Primus inter pares is the political factor: a clear HQs.
desired political end-state that fits into a longer-
term strategy. Such a holistic and well-tailored The final observation on crisis management
approach is no longer simply a desirable is that the specificities of a given crisis will
objective in crisis management, but a necessity. determine the international organisation, the
country, or the group of countries best placed
In this context the strategic headquarters for to take the lead. All of this pleads in favour of
planning and conduct of operations acquires a recalibrating CSDP-NATO relations.
totally different meaning. Such a strategic HQ is
to integrate all factors. Its scope goes beyond the NATO IS TRANSFORMED
traditional 3D approach; in the light of the NATO remains the transatlantic forum to deal
growing “economization” of security, economic with collective defence and military
policies are to be integrated as well into an interoperability, but also to conduct military
overarching roadmap leading to the desired end- crisis management operations when North
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 4American and European countries decide to join policies constituting our international relations.
forces. Part of that endeavour is bringing ever closer
NATO is an excellent forum to generate the defence policies of the Member States,
military capacity through its force generation forging a Common Security and Defence
conferences among Allies and partners. Policy leading to a common European
Moreover, it has access to some irreplaceable defence. Throughout the Atlantic all of our
capabilities, in particular several highly nations have national obligations and military
specialised force HQs, co-financed by Allies. tasks to ensure at home, but will be called
However, NATO lacks the various civilian upon ever more to operate in an international
components needed for a comprehensive context. All of us are faced with tight budgets.
approach. This constitutes a kind of mirror Defence matters, defence budgets as well, but
image to EU – and another good reason to so does the justified expectation that the
redefine arrangements between the two. defence effort achieves maximum efficiency
and effectiveness. This requires standing
To a large extent the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, allowing for prevention, rapid
arrangement still defines the relationship action, and being part of reconstruction
between CSDP and NATO. But it has in effect whenever required. This implies all partners
never been applied in the circumstances for to assume responsibility and show solidarity.
which it was designed, i.e. to provide support to In that context, it is not advisable to suggest
the EU “when NATO as such is not involved”. that the US leave the military structure of
Berlin Plus was used only for post-conflict NATO. It is advisable for the EU to be more
management, transferring from a NATO to an present in the Alliance. A sense of urgency is
EU operation, and never under time pressure. justified at this pivotal moment. Time has
Supporting urgent or even preventive EU come to create a new era in the NATO-CSDP
operations would be quite a challenge. relationship. Recommendations to do so are
offered in 3 distinct domains.
Berlin Plus has outlived itself. At the time it
was about “no Discrimination, no Duplication, Co-operation
no Decoupling”, creating, in political terms, the • Establish a new deal on security, a
notion of hierarchy between NATO and CSDP. transatlantic Strategic Security Compact,
But this did not stop unproductive competition codifying a broad concept of security,
between NATO and CSDP. Today, it is well- analyzing the challenges posed by a
known that for political reasons Berlin Plus multipolar world, and aspiring to joint
cannot be used. It is time to turn a dysfunctional strategy and coordinated action to offer the
CSDP-NATO relationship into a constructive right solutions. This compact should be
and future-oriented one. part and parcel of the EU-US Strategic
Partnership.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
THREE CS UNDERPINNING A NEW • Convene regular and structured bilateral
CSDP- NATO RELATIONSHIP EU and US meetings in the context of the
The new geopolitical environment creates transatlantic Strategic Security Compact to
valuable opportunities. The US is ending two enhance effectiveness and better support
wars in Central Asia. European countries are today’s “multi-bilateral” scheme. Analyse
repatriating their military forces as well. The US the possibility of deepening permanent
is rebalancing it posture. In the EU we are liaison arrangements, not only through
embarked on a process of Europeanising all embassies but also between relevant
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
5policy-making and executive bodies, e.g. dependent on direct support from US
between the EEAS and the National Security military capabilities.
Council.
• Implement an effective decision-making
• This bilateral EU-US partnership should process allowing emergency action by both
inspire the debate at the level of CSDP and NATO and the EU, underpinned by
NATO. arrangements for immediate mutual
support. Establish liaisons teams
“It is important to avoid doing ‘too between the Strategic HQs of
both NATO and the EU, the
little too late’” latter to be further strengthened
and thus to become permanent.
Co-ownership • Coordinate the defence planning of
• Implement new structures for dialogue countries, ensuring on the one hand that
between NATO and CSDP based on full EU member states are able to set up
participation, on both sides, of all Nations operations for the whole spectrum of the
and Members States. Joint meeting at all Petersberg Tasks and on the other hand
levels of both organisations should be that missions commonly agreed upon in
allowed to deal at all times with issues related NATO are adequately supported as well.
to all on-going or potential crisis In this context the defence planning of
management operations, in whatever European member states will focus on
international context. identifying and reducing existing
redundancies at the EU level, solving the
• Whenever a military operation is launched already identified shortfalls, maximising
by the EU or NATO, apply a supporting- “pooling and sharing”, prioritising future
supported approach in both directions requirements, and favouring multilateral
allowing for the transfer or dual use of both solutions while ensuring corresponding
NATO’s and the EU’s collective assets and national budgetary margins to do so.
capabilities: the HQs, centres of excellence,
training facilities etc. In this context, • For EU member states, in the spirit of
establish command and control Permanent Structured Cooperation,
arrangements for such transfer, in particular develop a co-leadership of countries that
of a specific HQ from one organisation into have the will to become the engine of
the chain of command of the other when it Europe in defence and security (capacities,
has the lead in a given operation. operations, budget).
• Synergies on military capabilities, and in • Preserve current procedures and practices
particular on civil-military and even dual use to ensure interoperability between the
capabilities, should be jointly explored. forces of members and partners of NATO
and the EU. The Connected Forces
Capabilities Initiative offers a promising way forward in
• Develop for the EU member states an this regard. Intensified multinational
appropriate level of strategic autonomy, education and training is key to
allowing in specific cases to prepare, plan maintaining capable, knowledge-based
and conduct operations without being militaries.
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
6EPILOGUE defence outside the structures of the EU by
Must the dialogue between CSDP and NATO remain turning to the Western European Union. An
impossible, for “well-known reasons”? More and experiment not to be repeated. Setting up a
more, the relevance of NATO is becoming an kind of European pillar (or caucus for that
issue of pressing importance for Americans and matter) in NATO surely is a useful technical
Europeans alike. Should they connect their instrument for the purpose of internal
respective forces, how, and at what cost? The coordination within the Alliance. But by no
relationship between the EU and Turkey is means can such a pillar substitute for a
important as well, but of a different nature and comprehensive security and defence policy of
magnitude, and will therefore not to be solved in the Union and its Member States. Consistency
the slipstream of any renewed CSDP-NATO and synchronisation of efforts will be of the
relationship. Continuing to link these issues will essence.
at best lead to a standstill in the relationship,
which is a luxury that we can no longer afford. Military Capabilities. Military capabilities are
Within our transatlantic community we have a of the essence. It is an illusion to hope that
longstanding tradition of confronting highly optimizing the institutional relations between
sensitive issues and subsequently solving them. CSDP and NATO will generate additional
The same is true within the process of European capabilities. The added value lies in making
integration. Mutual respect for autonomy is better use of existing capabilities and expertise,
another tradition to keep. Rearticulating and creating a win-win situation through a
deepening CSDP-NATO relations is “supporting and supported” approach during
undoubtedly a good step to transcend the crisis management operations. Hence the
present blockage. proposed 3 Cs and in particular the suggestion
to replace the concept of “assured access to
Events dear boy, events. The specificities of a NATO’s planning capacities” by “assured
given crisis always determine the international transfer of NATO’s assets and capabilities to
organization, the country or group of countries the EU”, notably C2 structures to be inserted
best placed to take the lead in crisis management in a modular way into overarching C2
operations. The more options available, the structures of the EU. Vice versa the UE is to
better. Some argue that NATO is no longer set support NATO operations by providing
to launch any military operation of some specific capabilities and instruments it has
magnitude. Others argue that CSDP is finished. developed within the framework of CSDP and
We believe that both these convictions about the in other areas relevant to crisis management,
future are reckless and wrong. Circumstances including support and expertise that can be
will dictate. Credibility and cohesion will be of provided by the EU Commission.
the essence, for CSDP as for NATO, which calls
for mutual support, not for competition. Too daring proposals or too short-term? The
recommendations put forward in this paper
Europe’s defence will be European or not. By nature may at first glance look rather daring, but they
a European defence policy has to be part of a are but a continuation and enhancement of
comprehensive foreign policy and of a global both CSDP and NATO as autonomous but
European security strategy even, covering both cooperative projects. The profound
the internal and external aspects of security. In modifications which both CSDP and NATO
this context CSDP and NATO are but subsets, will undergo in the years and decades to come
although of the first importance. Not that long may reveal these recommendations to be
ago, European countries tried to forge European unsustainable in the long term, to be replaced
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
7by more profound adjustments. In the meantime Brigadier General (Ret.) Jo Coelmont,
though it is important to avoid doing “too little Senior Associate Fellow at Egmont and at
too late”. the Royal Higher Institute for Defence,
former Permanent Military Representative
This calls for a strategic reflection, on all of Belgium to the EU Military Committee.
sides. A message to be taken on board at the
upcoming European Council on defence in Major General (Ret.) Maurice de Langlois,
December 2013 and at the NATO summit in Director for European and Transatlantic
2014. Security at IRSEM, former Deputy
Permanent Military Representative of
France to the EU Military Committee.
REFERENCES
1 Barry Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2013.
This policy brief results from a series of brainstorming meetings held by an informal working group. All members of the group took
part in their personal capacity. While all subscribe to the general thrust of this paper, they do not necessarily agree with every single
point. The authors express their warm gratitude to every single member, for their insightful and creative contributions.
Members:
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, Egmont;
Mr. Robert Golanski, European Parliament;
Dr. Giovani Grevi, Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE);
Prof. Dr. Jolyon Howorth, University of Yale;
Mr. Paul Huynen, Foreign Affairs Belgium;
Dr. Maya Kandel, IRSEM;
Daniel Keohane, Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE);
Dr. Alexander Mattelaer, Institute for European Studies ( IES), Vrije Universiteit Brussel;
Dr. Christian Moelling, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik( SWP), Berlin;
Lt.Gen. (Ret.) Jean-Paul Perruche, President of EuroDefense-France, Former Director General of the EU Military Staff;
Jamie Shea, NATO HQ;
Dr. Luis Simón, Institute for European Studies (IES), Vrije Universiteit Brussel;
Prof. Dr. Richard Whitman, Kent University
The Security Policy Brief is a publication of Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations. Founded in 1947, the Egmont
Institute is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to interdisciplinary research.
> www.egmontinstitute.be
The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the authors and are not those of EGMONT, Royal Institute for International Relations
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